The evolving vision of the Olympic legacy:
the development of the mixed-use Olympic Parks of Sydney and London

Volume 1: Text

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Declaration

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Abstract

In the long history of Olympic urbanisation, the creation of an “Olympic Park” where various Olympic facilities are concentrated has been favoured by both host cities and the International Olympic Committee (IOC), due to the regenerative opportunity it presents and its management advantages during the Games. Yet the usages and financial viability of such an approach after the Games were questioned by past Olympic cities, such that turning the post-Olympic Park into a multifunctional “mixed-use” urban precinct rather than a mono-functional sporting quarter was the approach taken in Sydney and London. This thesis explores the evolution of the mixed-use vision, its governance and integration into the wider urban tissues in the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic phases, through the cases of the Sydney and London Olympic Parks, and highlights the evolution from Sydney to London.

This long-term analysis shows that the vision of the mixed-use Olympic Park originated as a mixture of the existing urban socio-economic aspiration and the specific spatial demands of the Olympic Games. This evolved in different planning climates, along with changes in the governance of the Olympics and legacy planning. I argue that while in the case of Sydney the governance of the legacy in each phase was confined within the designated planning timeframe and focused on the vision within the Olympic Park, London’s approach was more overlapping and extended beyond the boundary of the Olympic site, which created a considerable difference in terms of the realisation of the initial mixed-use vision and integration with adjacent neighbourhoods. Although the thesis traces the evolution from Sydney to London, it also suggests how these cities shared the limits of their entrepreneurial urban governance through the application of the public–private partnership model to legacy planning and challenges in satisfying both local and regional political aspirations for the post-Olympic Park.
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Since my research topic was the exploration of the Olympic legacy in Sydney and London, I have conducted fieldwork in Sydney, London and Lausanne, where the IOC headquarters and great archives of the Olympic Games are located. During the course of collecting the data, I have met with various experts who were involved in planning and managing the Olympic Parks in Sydney and London, as well as many staff members at the IOC; I would like to express my appreciation to all those who provided valuable knowledge and information in support of my research project. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to all of the interviewees who shared their fascinating experiences of planning the Olympics and the legacy development.

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Glossary of Abbreviations

**General**
- CBD: Central Business District
- IOC: International Olympic Committee
- PPPs: public–private partnerships

**Sydney**
- AOC: Australian Olympic Committee
- HBDC: Homebush Bay Development Corporation
- HBDSC: Homebush Bay Development Strategy Committee
- NSW: New South Wales
- OCA: Olympic Coordination Authority
- PSG: Property Service Group
- SMH: Sydney Morning Herald
- SOCOG: Sydney Organising Committee of the Olympic Games
- SOP: Sydney Olympic Park
- SOPA: Sydney Olympic Park Authority

**London**
- BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation
- BOA: British Olympic Association
- CABE: Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment
- CMSC: Culture, Media and Sports Committee
- DCMS: Department for Culture, Media and Sport
- GLA: Greater London Authority
- GLC: Greater London Council
- LCS: Legacy Communities Scheme
- LDA: London Development Agency
- LLDC: London Legacy Development Corporation
- LLV: Lower Lea Valley
- LMF: Legacy Masterplan Framework
- LOCOG: London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games
- LOP: London Olympic Park
- ODA: Olympic Delivery Authority
- OPLC: Olympic Park Legacy Company
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research topic

“...in a world which is arguably becoming culturally homogenised and in which places are becoming interchangeable, [mega-events] create transitory uniqueness, difference and localisation in space and time” (Roche, 2000, p. 7).

Although they are fundamentally one-off events for the host city, “mega-events”, also called “hallmark events” (Hall, 1989b; Ritchie, 1984), have played a significant role in modern society. Roche defines the term “mega-events” as “large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic culture, mass popular appeal and international significance” (Roche, 2000, p. 1). Ritchie calls them “major one-time or recurring events of limited duration developed primarily to enhance the awareness, appeal and profitability of a tourism destination in the short and/or long term” (Ritchie, 1984, p. 2).

The Olympics are the biggest sporting event of this kind (Hill, 1992). In hosting this mega-sporting event, the host cities have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity not only to display their cities to the world but also to gain a means of developing their existing urban structures with large budget infusions. On the one hand, in the age of inter-urban competition, the Olympic Games have been employed by host cities as a powerful tool for global promotion to attract investment and spur further growth. On the other hand, it has been utilised as a strong trigger to accelerate a massive urban regeneration. According to Roche, the mega-event could be considered “one of the most visible elements of the current local strategies of survival” (Roche, 2000, p. 147), and it is evident that many Olympic host cities have achieved rapid urban development throughout the history of the Olympic movement.

However, the long-term viability of such Olympic-led urban development has been questioned. Roberts and Mcleod suggest that “a common legacy of many past events
has been a huge debt and a great deal of under-utilised infrastructure” (Roberts and Mcleod, 1989, p. 242). Indeed, many stadia built to Olympic standards in past Olympic cities have struggled to find an appropriate use after the Games. Preventing Olympic facilities from becoming “white elephants” has been as crucial as building them as “icons” for the Games. The concern about post-Olympic utilisation extends further when applied to Olympic parks, as these go beyond single buildings and cover entire urban precincts. An Olympic Park in which various competition venues are concentrated has been created in most Olympic cities as a focal point for the Olympic Games, and it has been strategically associated with the urban regenerative aspiration of post-industrial cities (Preuss, 2004, p. 82). However, while various academics have reported the problem of utilising the post-Olympic stadium (for example, Preuss, 2004; Searle, 2002), there is relatively little research on the utilisation of the Olympic Park after the Olympic event. Furthermore, as Roche suggests, the concerns of the post-Olympic spatial vision begin much earlier when the city decides to host the Games, but analysis of how the legacy concerns are embedded in the long-term planning is missing from the existing Olympic studies.

Against this backdrop, this research aims to explore the planning process of defining the usability of the post-Olympic Park as a critical issue for the Olympic legacy. I will examine it through the cases of the Sydney Olympic Park (SOP) built for the 2000 Olympic Games and the London Olympic Park (LOP) constructed in East London for the 2012 Games. In particular, as both cities planned the post-Olympic Park as a “mixed-use” urban precinct, in which not only sports but also other urban functions such as residential and commercial uses would be included, the land-use planning, by which the city defines the functionalities within the site, is the key planning concept. While the land-use plan, or the mixed-use plan in my case, is fundamentally a matter of the spatial configuration within the designated area, many authors criticise the segregation of the specialised urban precinct (for example, Hannigan, 1998; Judd, 1999). It is also crucial to consider how it can be related to the urban context. I will therefore examine the way in which land-use within the Olympic site has been formulated and its relation with the urban context has been (or has not been) considered, from emergence of the Olympic vision to the post-Olympic phase.
1.2 Research background: the Olympics and the urban legacy

1.2.1 Olympics urbanisation: the dominance of the “Olympic Park” model

Since the first modern Olympic Games were staged in Athens in 1896, twenty-six summer Olympic Games have been held in cities throughout the world. Roche points out that the Olympic movement can be observed as “a collection of unique features due to the diverse conditions of each host city” (Roche, 2000, p. 135), and from the urban point of view, it is understood that throughout the long history of the Olympic movement, the ways in which host cities have employed the “Olympic impact” to change their urban structures has varied (Fig. 1-1).

With more spatial concerns, Kelly argues that that the role of architecture and planning in the staging of a hallmark event can be either “proactive” or “reactive”, which suggests the difference between employing the Olympics to conduct urban redevelopment and shaping the Games based on the existing urban conditions (Kelly, 1989, p. 245). These different characters of Olympic urbanisation in past Olympic cities has been extensively examined by various authors (for example, Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Liao and Pitts, 2006; Gold and Gold, 2011 [2007]-b). These authors provide historical analysis of Olympic cities in light of different types of urban development, and their studies demonstrate that the “proactive” approach has been dominant, especially since the 1960s. As a result, most host cities have created some kind of “Olympic Park”, by concentrating different sporting competition venues in certain places (Fig. 1-2).

There are multiple reasons for the dominance of the “proactive” approach and the creation of the Olympic Park associated with urban regeneration. Firstly, from the host city’s point of view, it is closely related to urban decline in post-industrial cities. Ward suggests that the decline of manufacturing began in the late 1960s, and the post-industrial city had to find “new ways of coping with the disappearance of manufacturing and the redundant spaces and lives it has left behind” (Ward, 1998, pp. 187–192). Further, Harvey puts great emphasis on the creation of spectacular urban space as a means of attracting capital and people in the age of inter-urban competition (Harvey, 1988, p. 92). Given urban decline and necessity of urban imagining associated
with urban regeneration in post-industrial cities, the “site of hallmark events is justified in the name of urban renewal” (Kelly, 1989, p. 266; Hall, 1989a, p. 28). In particular, the creation of Olympic parks, which Sheard suggests require a minimum of one kilometre square of land, is justified as a way to regenerate large post-industrial sites which may otherwise remain derelict (Sheard, 2001, p. 203). Meanwhile, Liao and Pitts note that, throughout the Olympic movement, the venue concentration approach has been favoured by the IOC for practical and ideological reasons, and many host cities have adopted it in their own urban agenda. With this marriage between the IOC’s preference and the host city’s regenerative objective, the Olympic Park has been dominant in the history of Olympic urbanisation.

1.2.2 Concerns regarding the Olympic legacy
While the research on Olympic-led urban development has developed since the late 1990s, there has also been great concern about the legacy of the Olympic-led development. Cashman suggests that “almost every Olympic city since the Games were revived in 1896” has some form of legacy (Cashman, 1998, p. 107), but he claims that utilising the word “legacy” in scholarly studies is a recent phenomenon that has increasingly been used by academics since the 1990s (Cashman, 2003, p. 35). In the realm of Olympic studies, the focus of the Olympic legacy shifted from the Olympic-led urban changes which presumably could not have taken place without the Olympics (Essex and Chalkley, 1998), to the long-term urban phenomenon, rather than simple physical commodities with the ideology of “urban sustainability” (Liao and Pitts, 2006).

The discourse surrounding the urban Olympic legacy involves various viewpoints, but much of the existing research focuses on the problem of post-Olympic usage of Olympic facilities, exemplified by Mangan’s claims that many “limping white elephants” have shaped the perceptions of “Olympic legacy” (Mangan, 2010). Bridging the discrepancy between explicit Olympic usage and undefined post-Olympic usage has been the key issue for Olympic host cities, and it has long been discussed. This

1 It is worth noting that in the realm of mega-event studies, there was a significant shift from using the word “impact” to “legacy” in the late 1990s, which I will argue reflects how academic interest in mega-events began to focus on the “post-event phase, rather than an ambiguous mega-event timeframe.

2 For example, the International Union of Architects (UIA) and the International Association for Sports and Leisure Facilities (IAKS) organised “the programme of the summer Olympic Sports facilities and their Post-Olympic Utilisation” on the occasion of the Munich Olympics in 1972, and issued the “UIA manifesto of Munich”. The manifesto emphasised that post-Olympic predictions should determine the physical size of the Olympic facilities, rather than constructing the venues simply by following the requirements of the international event. Further, the
negative legacy is also described as being a consequence of the political intention to establish the “iconic” architecture built for the Games as a way to attract global audiences (for example, Latouche, 2011; Roult and Lefebvre, 2012 (for the 1976 Montreal Games), Gold, 2011 [2007] (for the 2004 Athens Games) and Ren, 2008b (for the 2008 Beijing Games)).

Thus, there is various research on the post-Games utilisation of individual Olympic stadia (for example, Berg et al., 2002; Searle, 2002), but analysis of the post-Olympic Park as an urban precinct with concentrated stadia has been relatively absent. As already mentioned, the Olympic Park has been the dominant urban development model in Olympic cities, but there is little literature exploring the life of the Olympic Park after the Games.

Along with increasing interest in the Olympic legacy in the academic discourse, the IOC’s commitment to the Olympic legacy has altered significantly. For example, in the 1970s, an age of massive urban development associated with the Olympic Games, the IOC President Lord Killanin commented on the astonishing financial deficit of the Montreal Games in 1976. He contended: “sport was not guilty for this”. As represented by Killanin’s comment, the IOC’s main concern was “sport”, and it kept a certain distance from the host city’s urban transformations and their consequences until quite recently (Hiller, 2003, p. 102). Yet the term “legacy” is now clearly part of the Olympic Charter, which stipulates that one of the IOC’s roles is “to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries” (IOC, 2003d, p. 14). From a different viewpoint, Mangan suggests that there are essentially three reasons behind the IOC’s commitment to the Olympic legacy: to provide evidence that the event has been good for the host city / nation, to justify the use of scarce public resources, and to motivate other cities / nations to bid for future events (Mangan, 2010, p. 17).
Against this backdrop, the IOC’s spatial strategy has gradually changed. As indicated already, the Olympic Park has been constructed as an urban precinct with various types of sports facilities and ancillary urban structures primarily used for the Olympic Games, and in most cases, it has remained as a significant regional or national sports complex in the host city after the Games. This venue concentration has been preferred by the IOC, but its financial viability has been questioned (Preuss, 2004, pp. 84–94). Thus, when I talked to a member of the IOC staff, it was suggested that:

“The IOC has always asked a host city to concentrate the Olympic venues as much as possible and suggested to create the Olympic Park. But our question is whether it is sustainable.”

1.2.3 Mixed-use as a new alternative?

Against this backdrop, a new approach for utilising the post-Olympic Park has emerged. Although the Athens Olympic Complex, extensively refurbished for the 2004 Olympic Games, remained a national sporting complex after the Olympics, Sydney (2000) and Beijing (2008) took a different strategy to their predecessors in the twentieth century, and London (2012) followed their lead. These cities have constructed Olympic parks with the highest degree of sporting venue concentration in the history of Olympic cities. Yet, unlike the previous Olympic parks, the legacy of these Olympic parks was not to remain as significant sports complexes but to become “mixed-use” urban precincts instead, in which not only sports spaces but offices, residences and educational facilities would be included. The recent shift to transforming the post-Olympic Park from a sports complex to a mixed-use urban precinct can be understood as a means of securing economic viability with diverse financial resources for the area, and enhancing the park’s liveliness with a variety of activities, as suggested by various authors (for example, Coupland, 1997; Grant, 2002).

Sydney left all the competition venues constructed in the Olympic precinct, but its post-Olympic utilisation was highly criticised as “a state-of-the art ghost town” in 2001 and 2002. In order to change this, the post-SOP was re-conceptualised as “a dynamic and diverse township for living, working and leisure” (SOPA, 2004b, p.1), and Cashman

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6 Author’s conversation with Ms. Nuria Puig, IOC staff member, in July 2008
7 Commentary on CNN on 11 July 2001
points out that this unveils the fact that the post-SOP could not survive on sport and recreation alone (Cashman, 2005, pp. 161–165). Subsequently, in the case of the 2008 Olympics, Beijing also planned to transform its iconic Olympic Park, called the Beijing Olympic Green, into a mixed-use precinct. According to Ren, the Beijing Olympic Park after the Games would be a multi-functional complex with sports, entertainment, exhibitions, tourism and business services. Beijing’s long-term strategy was to utilise its internationally well-known Olympic venues, such as the National Olympic Stadium (the Bird’s Nest) and the Olympic Swimming Pool (the Water Cube), to attract national and international investment, rather than retaining them as a sporting precinct in the future, thus changing the post-Olympic Park into a crucial economic focal point for the city (Ren, 2008a, pp. 50–55). Further, in the case of London, the term “legacy” has been utilised extensively by the Olympic authorities since the city’s bidding campaign, and even before the Games, the vision of the post-Olympic Park was emphasised as a “mixed-use development comprising housing, employment, business, leisure and cultural and social facilities” (ODA, 2007d, p. 7).

While mixed-use planning has been widely recognised as a useful spatial strategy for realising viable urban precincts, there is uncertainty about whether it is applicable to the post-Olympic Park, where various sporting venues would be left as a legacy of the Olympic Games. Griffin et al. basically agree that the mixed-use strategy - in this case, the idea of bringing shops and office functions to a tourist precinct - will contribute to long-term financial viability due to the multiple financial resources. They also state that the mixed-use approach will enrich life within the site, by creating “layering experiences” by which different people can experience the precinct in different ways (Hayllar and Griffin, 2005, p.526). Yet it is crucial here to carefully read the comments of Griffin et al., and to notice that they indicate that “a diversity of functions may be appropriate” (Griffin et al., 2008, p. 255) (emphasis added). In a similar vein, Cashman comments on the post-Olympic SOP: “a new focus on the Park as a multi-purpose landscape may sustain the possibility of a useful post-Games life” (Cashman, 2005, pp. 161–166) (emphasis added). Both authors are tentative in their suggestions, and I will suggest that this implies some uncertainties in adopting the mixed-use urban strategy for a post-Olympic site.

1.2.4 Timescale and spatial scale of the Olympic legacy
While the mixed-use strategy emerged as the “possible” solution for sustaining the physical Olympic legacy after the Games, some authors suggest the need for considering the Olympic legacy from a longer timescale in the host city, and warn that there is very little literature on such an issue. Hiller suggests that “mediating the Olympic and existing regional and local urban agenda in the host city” is the mechanism for creating the Olympic legacy (Hiller, 2003). In this respect, creation of the mixed-use post-Olympic Park can be understood as the long-term process of combining the physical inheritance from the Olympic Games and other non-Olympic functions, which could be defined in other planning policies, in one urban quarter. The lack of contextual views in the mega-event research is also criticised by Roche. Roche argues that it is crucial to examine the legacy of the mega-event in the long-term history of the planning process, but many existing studies fail to explore it with a longer timescale (Roche, 1992). The timescale of the Olympic planning defined by the IOC is also relatively short. The IOC has conducted the Olympic Games Global Impact Study since 2001 to identify the various Olympic impacts on the host city, but it defines the target timeframe as 11 years (2 years in the pre-bid phase, 7 years for preparation and 2 years for the legacy) (IOC, 2006). Indeed, it is long-term examination that the current discourse on the Olympic legacy fundamentally lacks, and I will stress that this is one of the standpoints which I would like to address in this thesis.

In addition to the absence of the long timescale in the analysis of the “mixed-use” Olympic Park, its spatial reach has also been less addressed in the existing Olympic discourse. Mono-functional Olympic parks are relevant here. For example, the Munich Olympic Park built for the 1972 Olympics has left a significant legacy for the city as a sports complex, and Bale (1993) describes it as “a milieu of achievement in sports which come close to being a sporting Disneyworld” (Bale, 1993, p. 144). Yet such specialised urban precinct has been often criticised in terms of its integration with the urban tissue. Judd for example called this urban segregation a “bubble”, in which highly prosperous places are greatly segregated from their surroundings (Judd, 1999). It should then be asked if a mixed-use Olympic Park has better integration with the urban tissue than a mono-functional sporting complex. In this respect, functional connectivity between the post-Olympic Park and its neighbours is crucial. Thus, extension of the spatial reach of the post-Olympic Park beyond the site boundaries and consideration of

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8 Meanwhile Preuss suggests 4 years prior to the bid and 7 years for preparation.
the Olympic legacy in wider urban tissues is another crucial point I would like to explore in this thesis.

1.3 Research cases: the Sydney and London Olympic Parks
(Figs. 1-3 and 4)

1.3.1 The Sydney Olympic Park (SOP)
The SOP sits within Homebush Bay located at the demographic centre of the Sydney region (the New South Wales (NSW) region), which is located 14km west of the Sydney’s Central Business District (CBD), the largest business and commercial centre in the Sydney region, and 8km east of Parramatta, the second largest urban centre in the region. The SOP occupied 760 hectares of land between the Parramatta River to the north and the Parramatta Road to the south, and these two “arteries” are the spine of Sydney connecting the east and west sides of the region (Fig. 1-5).

From a regional viewpoint, the Sydney region has had uneven economic development. While the east side, in which the CBD is located, has enjoyed economic prosperity, the west part of the region has been considered economically low profile. Thus, the “rise of western Sydney” in relation to the economically developed east side of the region has been an important regional development policy. Geographically, the SOP and Homebush Bay are located on the strategic regional western corridor, where economic development has been deliberately directed in recent decades (Fig. 1-6).9

The current spatial character of the SOP and Homebush Bay has two folds. On the one hand, it is surrounded by a rich natural environment, with the Parramatta River, Homebush Bay, and two creeks (Powells Creek to the east and Haslams Creek to the west) with rich mangroves, all of which were remediated at the time of Olympic Games. On the other hand, it sits within a significant industrial neighbourhood and artificial landscape along the Parramatta Road. Indeed, the industrial use has been of significance in the local municipality of the SOP; the Auburn Council has been characterised as an “industrial commercial and warehousing municipality” (Kennedy and Kennedy, 1982, p.

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9 Metropolitan strategies published in 1968, 1988 and 2005 suggested the urban development direction and designated the Parramatta Road as one of the important development areas in the Sydney region.
12). In particular, the south and west sides of the SOP site have developed as a concentrated industrial area, and warehouse-type buildings in a relatively large lot of land have dominated the area. While the Auburn municipality has a significant physical character represented by industrial and warehousing buildings, socially the area is characterised as one of the most multi-cultural places in the whole of Australia, as well as one of the most deprived economically (Davidson and McNeill, 2008).

A historical study of the SOP site reveals the industrial development of Homebush Bay. The industrial character of this area began with the opening of the State Abattoir and the Brickworks in the beginning of the twenty century, and these State-owned industrial facilities developed along with the economic growth of the Sydney region. However, the subsequent trend of relocating industrial facilities to the outskirts of the region and the re-structuring of the manufacturing industry led to the decline of both. Further, along with long-term industrial use of the site, various areas in Homebush Bay have been utilised as dumping sites, and this has caused the significant contamination of Homebush Bay. Given the financial difficulty of operating both facilities in Homebush Bay and the significant environmental problems of the site, various visions for regenerating the area have been produced since the 1970s. The visions have been shaped by Sydney’s Olympic bidding campaigns in region. Although Sydney was unsuccessful several times, Homebush Bay was identified, in each bid, as the preferable location for a regional sports complex used for the Games, and its spatial importance in the region increased over Sydney’s long bidding history. In 1993 Sydney finally won the right to stage the Games and this spurred the regeneration of Homebush Bay and “the largest land remediation exercise ever undertaken in Australia”.10

1.3.2 The London Olympic Park (LOP)

The LOP (now renamed the London Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park) was built in the Lower Lea Valley (LLV), East London, which is located approximately 5 kilometres east of London’s historic financial centre, the City of London. It is also situated close to London’s new financial centre in the Canary Wharf area, approximately 4 kilometres away.11 Lea Valley is the area along the River Lea, the tributary of the River Thames stretching to the north, and the LLV is the southern part of the Lea Valley area (Fig. 10 Sydney Olympic Park Authority, “Restoring urban ecosystems at Sydney Olympic Park”;
11 The indicated distance is measured from Bank station to the main Olympic Stadium site in the LOP.
Like the Sydney region, prosperity in the greater London area has also developed unevenly, but its economic distribution is the opposite of Sydney’s. While the west part of the region has enjoyed economic prosperity, East London has suffered multiple deprivations. Thus, from the beginning of the formation of the great London authority in 2000, the “go east strategy”, which aimed to equalise the socio-economic conditions between East and West London, has been prioritised by the Mayor of London. This was further embraced in the UK Government’s priority urban regeneration strategy, the Thames Gateway project, which was commenced before London won the bid for the 2012 Games. Thus, the LLV has become a strategic location for both regional and national development strategy.

On the local scale, the socio-spatial context of the LOP in the LLV also has certain similarities with the SOP in Homebush Bay. Various waterways, such as the River Lea, the City Mill River and Waterworks River, run through the LOP site, and they are designated as the central features to enhance the dramatic topography and powerful landscaped structure of the LLV (ODA, 2007g, p. 27). Although these waterways are part of the natural setting of the site, they have previously blocked the east-west physical connection of the LLV. Furthermore, like the SOP, the site for the LOP is physically segregated from other areas by infrastructure, such as the A12 motorway and the London under/overground railways (Fig. 1-8).

The Olympic site and the broader LLV area form part of four London boroughs (Tower Hamlets, Newham, Hackney and Waltham Forest) which Vigor et al. call the “Olympic Boroughs”. These boroughs have relatively young and mixed communities, and are described as “some of the most deprived areas in the UK” (Vigor et al., 2004, pp. 22–25). They have suffered from high unemployment, a low proportion of managerial and professional skills among the residents and a high crime rate (ODA, 2007c, p. 27). Thus, the SOP and LOP had similar social contexts, and further the LOP has been recognised as a derelict industrial area, as Homebush Bay was. Decline of industrial use in the LLV was firmly connected with the decline of the London docklands since the 1970s, and since then various regenerative visions have been created by various authorities. Yet none of them comprehensively covered the current LOP area. The
boundaries of the Olympic boroughs in particular crossed the middle of the current LOP site, and the local Unitary Development Plan of each borough was spatially confined within its administrative boundaries. Against this backdrop, the Olympics provided the opportunity to create a site-wide masterplan beyond the local boroughs’ administrative boundaries, and extend its ambitions to the wider LLV area.

1.3.3 The SOP and LOP in the context of the Olympic movement
Selection of my cases stemmed from my research interests in examining the evolution of the host city’s handling of the Olympic legacy, in particular by creating the mixed-use post-Olympic Park. Pitts and Liao recognise that the current concern for the “sustainable” Olympic urban form began at the start of the twenty-first century (Pitts and Liao, 2009), and in this respect, Sydney is considered the forerunner and London the latest example. Furthermore, the SOP and LOP have various similarities in the urban setting for the Games and intended legacy transformation. Both Olympic parks were constructed as sites of highly concentrated Olympic venues, which in both cases included nine competition venues during the Games, and this proposal for a great urban setting was appealing to the IOC in the severe bidding campaign for the 2000 and 2012 Games (five candidate cities for the 2000 and nine applicant cities for the 2012 Games). As indicated earlier, after the Games, both cities transferred the Olympic Park to a mixed-use urban quarter in which not only sports but also other urban functions such as residences, retail spaces and offices are included. We can find a few examples of this in the history of Olympic-led urban development. Thus, while my interest in this thesis is to explore the mixed-use Olympic Park strategy from the viewpoint of its wider temporal and spatial context in the host city, I will extend my examination to the broader context of the Olympic movement.

1.4 Research questions
The lack of academic research on the usability of post-Olympic precincts rather than Olympic buildings, and the emergence of the new practical approach of transferring the legacy of the Olympic Park into a mixed-use urban precinct, is my research interest. Furthermore, given the lack of a longer timescale for the Olympic legacy in current
discourse, my thesis aims to explore the way in which the visions of the post-Olympic Park as a mixed-use urban precinct have been shaped in the long-term Olympic planning process, and to examine its relation to governance, by using the SOP and the LOP as case studies. I will emphasise in my thesis how the planning process defining the use of the post-Olympic precinct should be not only a matter of spatial strategy within the site but also an inquiry into functional integration in the wider urban planning context. Given the recent flourishing discourse on the Olympic legacy, I hypothesise that there are certain differences in planning approaches to the Olympic legacy between Sydney and London. In other words, beyond the examination of the evolution of the planning process within each city, I intend to analyse the evolution of such processes from one city to another. Thus, I will endeavour to answer the following three research questions in my thesis.

**Question 1**

*How has the vision of the Olympic legacy, in particular creating a mixed-use Olympic Park, emerged and evolved over time, and how has it been related to the governance of Olympic planning?*

My primary aim in this thesis is to assess the causes of the origin, evolution and implementation of the vision of Olympic legacy, in particular creating a mixed-use Olympic Park, in the different phases of the Olympic planning process: pre-bid, post-bid, and post-event, as suggested by Roche. I intend to examine the changes and continuities in the vision for utilising the post-Olympic Park, and its relation to planning governance throughout the different phases. As Hiller claims that dominance of the Olympics agenda often conflicts with inherited regional and local urban policies (Hiller, 2003), I am interested in how these different visions, especially Olympic and non-Olympic ones, can (or cannot) be mediated in defining the vision of a mixed-use Olympic Park.

**Question 2**

*How has the mixed-use Olympic Park vision been integrated into the local and regional spatial strategies in different phases?*

While a mixed-used urban development is considered a spatial strategy through which to diversify usability within the Olympic site, which potentially contributes to the
long-term economic viability of the site, its relation to the local and regional urban context needs to be examined, in order to avoid the area being segregated in the city. In the regional context, the construction of a specialised urban area such as an Olympic Park has been often associated with the socio-economic revitalisation of a derelict area in the region (for example, the case of the Munich Olympic Park constructed for the 1972 Olympics; see Pitts and Liao, 2009). However, it is often isolated from the regional spatial strategy and detached from the rest of the city (see the case of the Millennium Dome project in London (Thornley, 2000). In the local context, one of the negative effects in creating a new urban quarter in the city is to create a social and spatial contrast with an adjacent neighbourhood, despite the initial planning objective of bringing social benefit to the area. Thus, it is imperative to coordinate the new development with a local spatial strategy, but such synchronisation of a new Olympic site with a local and regional spatial strategy has been less examined in the existing literature. For example, Owen presents the local impact of the venue construction in Sydney but the regional dimension is less considered (Owen, 2001). In turn, Searle’s exploration focuses on the regional viewpoint and there is little reference to the local impact (Searle, 2002; Searle, 2003). Exploration of both local and regional spatial strategies will methodologically provide useful resources to examine the functional synchronisation between the mixed-use vision in the Olympic Park and the rest of the area, as spatial strategies normally designate “land-specification” in the target area with certain political intentions (Kaiser et al., 1995, pp. 278–279). Thus, I will examine if the Olympic site has been equally integrated into the local and regional urban contexts in the pre-bid, post-bid, and post-Olympic phases.

Question 3

*What was the evolution from Sydney to London, in terms of the approach to the Olympic legacy, and what was still lacking in the legacy planning?*

Tackling the usability of the post-Olympic Park and its integration into the urban context is the common planning agenda of the Olympic cities. Yet, as various authors suggest, after the Sydney Games, host cities as well as the IOC became increasingly concerned with the integration of the post-Olympic vision into the earlier stages of the planning process. Roche argues that the Olympics are evolving because of the transfer of knowledge between host cities and changing of from the IOC. Indeed, London
clearly suggests that “the London Games of 2012 have the ability to build upon the experiences of previous Olympic Games and Paralympic Games in designing and planning the facilities and their legacy” (ODA, 2007c, p.46). It is therefore hypothesised that there was a great evolution from Sydney to London in the planning approach to the post-Olympic Park. Yet I also theorise that there are still some areas that need to be re-considered in London’s legacy planning concept. Thus, my third question examines the limits of current Olympic legacy planning.

1.5 Thesis structure

The aim of this thesis is to reveal the planning process of defining the use of post-Olympic parks through the cases of the SOP and LOP. Examination of the timeframe suggested by Roche - pre-bid, post-bid, and post-event - and comparison of this process between Sydney and London are my methodological frameworks, which I will discuss in depth in the subsequent chapter. Based on these frameworks, the main body of my thesis will constitute three parts, each of which includes the cases of Sydney and London. Then, my first research question, which considers the reasons behind the evolution of the vision of mixed-use post-Olympic parks, will be examined throughout the different planning phases in Sydney and London, although its origin will be discussed only in the pre-bid phase. My intention is to examine the evolution of the vision in the different planning climates of the pre-bid, post-bid, and post-event phases. My second question, on the integration of the post-Olympic Park into adjacent and broader urban contexts, will similarly analyse each phase, in order to identify the changes and continuities over time. The third question, which looks at the evolution of Sydney and London, will also be addressed by comparing the two cases in each phase. Based on this consideration, this thesis will have the structure described in the next paragraph.

Following this introduction, Chapter 2 will set up will set up the analytical and methodological framework of this thesis. My first intention is to extract the analytical points for the subsequent empirical chapters by reviewing the existing literature. I will then demonstrate the methodological concerns for exploring the long-term planning
process of defining the spatial vision of the post-Olympic Park in Sydney and London.

Following the discussion of the analytical and methodological framework of this thesis, Part I (Chapters 3 and 4) will examine the planning process of the SOP and LOP in the pre-bid phase, which Roche identifies as a conceptualisation stage for Olympic-led urban development. Chapter 3 will consider the case of the SOP in the period before Sydney won the bid in 1993, and Chapter 4 will aim to examine the LOP before London’s successful bid in 2005. As both cities engaged in long-term bidding for the Games, my intention in both chapters is to demonstrate the way in which the vision of the usability of the post-Olympic Park in both cities was shaped over the long history of the bidding process, and to examine how it has been related to the non-Olympic vision set out in the different planning frameworks. My exploration in this phase will be concluded to point out the similarities and differences between Sydney and London in terms of embedding the Olympic vision within the city’s own urban development strategy.

Part II (Chapters 5 and 6) will comprise an examination of the post-bid phase, which is the seven-year period between the host city selection and the Olympic Games. As Roche identifies, the planning priority in this phase is to re-evaluate the bid concept and implement the construction project, which Hall (1989a) suggests as a “fast-tracking” planning process. My focus in this part is to examine the degree to which the vision of usability of the post-Olympic Park was integrated into this “fast-track” Olympic planning process, and critically examine the stability of the bid concept during the post-bid phase along with the evolving governance of the Olympic / legacy planning. My interest in this chapter is also the implementation process. In particular I look at the involvement of the private sector and its impact on maintaining the initial vision. I will also explore the degree to which the vision of the post-Olympic Park was (or was not) integrated into the wider planning context in the city. As there were fundamentally different climates in legacy planning between Sydney and London, I aim to identify the evolution from Sydney to London in conducting the legacy planning during the fast-track Olympic preparation.

Following the previous pre- and post-bid exploration, Part III (Chapters 7 and 8) look at the post-Olympic phases in Sydney and London. According to Roche, the planning role
of the post-event phase is the evaluation and re-conceptualisation of the development. Applying these ideas of Roche, my intention in Part III is to consider the experiences of the mixed-use post-Olympic Park and to look at the associated planning responses in the post-Olympic phase. Yet, while the timeframe to examine Sydney’s post-Olympic phase is sufficient, London’s legacy period is limited to just one year at the time of writing. Thus, unlike the previous parts, the target timeframe is greatly different between Sydney and London. Yet, given the anticipation of London’s more advanced legacy planning approach, this still provides various empirical materials to discuss London’s legacy strategy, and this will make it possible to observe the similarities and differences between the two cities in terms of creating the mixed-use urban precincts in the wider urban tissues.

Finally, Chapter 9 will accumulate the findings in the previous three parts and discuss the changes over time (pre-bid to post-Olympic phases) and in different places (Sydney to London), in relation to the analytical concepts raised in Chapter 2. After demonstrating these primary concerns, I will conclude this chapter with propositions to the future Olympic cities which were learnt from this thesis.
Chapter 2: Approach to the Olympic legacy: theoretical and methodological frameworks

2.1 Theoretical framework

The first part of this chapter will develop the theoretical framework through the review of relevant existing literature on the Olympics and urban studies. Aspers suggests that the researcher uses theories as “schemes of reference”, which give focus to the study (Aspers, 2004, p. 7). This not only introduces the existing studies relevant to my thesis but also provides the framework under which the obtained data will be interpreted and coded (Terraco, 1997). Thus, corresponding to the research questions raised in Chapter 1, the following points will constitute the theoretical framework to examine them.

2.1.1 The Olympic legacy, its ambiguity and multiple dimensions

As was briefly suggested in Chapter 1, it is relatively recent phenomenon that the Olympic legacy became a crucial agenda in the academic and practical realms (Cashman, 2003; Toohey, 2008; Leopkey, 2009). The concept of the Olympic legacy emerged in the Olympic circle slightly after the development of the “sustainability” agenda in the 1990s, which had a strong relationship with the environmental concerns surrounding the area used for the winter Olympic Games. Gold and Gold suggest that, in the context of the Olympic Movement, while the term “sustainability” was developed along with the increasing notion of “global” environmental concern, the concept of “legacy” emerged as “the guiding framework for considering “urban” outcomes”. They further stress that the term “legacy” became an all-inclusive framework, as it has been loosely defined and therefore provided flexibility (Gold and Gold, 2013, p.3530). While Gold and Gold see “flexibility” in the concept of the Olympic legacy, Hiller finds “ambiguity” in it. Due to the ambiguous nature of defining the Olympic legacy, Hiller states that evaluations of the Olympic legacy greatly vary depending on who is doing the evaluating. He particularly underlines the different perceptions between the IOC and a host city in regard to the Olympic legacy (Hiller, 2012, p.151).
One of the crucial triggers encouraging the study of Olympic legacy was the international symposium held by the IOC in 2003, called “the Legacy of the Olympic Games, 1984–2000” (IOC, 2003c). Similar to Gold and Gold’s suggestion, the symposium admitted difficulty in defining the meaning of the Olympic legacy, in particular when it was translated in different languages and cultures. The symposium recognised that Olympic legacy had multi-disciplines and wider spatial reach (i.e. local and global). The symposium also predicted that legacy would change over time, and this would make it more difficult to identify the characters (IOC, 2003b).

Despite initial difficulty in defining its meanings, numerous studies regarding the Olympic legacy have been conducted from diverse points of view, particularly since the Olympic legacy conference in 2003 (see IOC, 2013a), and there are various ways of categorising the different types of Olympic legacy. The IOC identifies five types of Olympic legacy in its latest document on the Olympic legacy issued in 2013: 1) sporting; 2) social; 3) environmental; 4) urban; and 5) economic (IOC, 2013b). Yet, as Leopkey addresses, Olympic legacies have multiple dimensions and there is inter-connectivity between different types (Leopkey, 2009, see also Agha et al., 2012).

My research interest in this thesis can be categorised as relating to the urban legacy in terms of the above IOC categorisation, but it inevitably has multiple dimensions. It not only relates to “hard” aspects such as urban beautification and transportation upgrading through Games-related urban regeneration (see Kassens-Noor, 2012, for an in-depth exploration of the transportation legacy in the host cities) but also includes “soft” aspects such as place marketing, which is difficult to evaluate and justify (Hiller, 2012). In brief, the urban legacy has both tangible and intangible aspects, which the IOC put great emphasis on in dealing with equally (IOC, 2003b, see also Jinx and Mangan, 2008; Mangan and Dyreson, 2010).

Furthermore, an urban legacy can be understood as a junction of the social, sporting,

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12 It is worth mentioning that there were two symposiums related to the physical aspects of the Olympic legacy: IOC (1997b) Olympic Villages: A Hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences, Lausanne. IOC (2001) Olympic Games and Architecture –The Future for Host Cities, Lausanne.

environmental and economic dimensions of Olympic legacies, a view that is materialised in Vigor et al.’s book, “After the Gold Rush: A sustainable Olympics for London”. The book explores the social, economic and environmental dimension of London’s potential legacy by regenerating the vast site in the Lower Lea Valley (see social: Raco, 2004, economic: Crookston, 2004, sporting: Coalter, 2004, and environmental: Levett, 2004). Yet the book was published before London’s successful bid in 2005 and essentially discusses various impacts happening in the Lower Lea Valley; spatial aspects, such as land use and physical transformation of the Olympic site, are less touched upon. Meanwhile, there are also various records relating to the construction of the LOP, which explore the architectural and urban design progress from the pre- to post-bid periods (see Hartman, 2012; Hopkins and Neal, 2012; Dyckhoff, 2012). These books trace the transformation of the design of the Olympic Park and venues in the Park, but lack social, economic and political contextual views on the new urban quarter in the Lower Lea Valley. Thus, I wish to stress that my research on the Olympic Park as urban legacy not only includes spatial but also social, economic and political dimensions.

2.1.2 Legacy as a process

In addition to the multi-dimension of the Olympic legacy, I would like to mention that the Olympic legacy is a process rather than a consequence. The term “legacy” is defined as “anything handed down by an ancestor or predecessor”.14 Yet, many authors suggest that the concern of the legacy should not be a matter of the post-Olympic period, but should be extended into the bidding phases in the host city (McIntosh, 2003; Leopkey, 2009). Indeed, there should be some forms of the legacy even in the unsuccessful bid cities (Hiller, 2000; Alberts, 2009; Diaey et al., 2011; Torres, 2012). The IOC also recognises the Olympic legacy is a concern throughout different phases of hosting the Olympic Games, as its legacy bibliography categorises existing literature on the Olympic legacy in three different planning phases (1.candidature, 2.Pre-Games and 3.post-Games) (IOC, 2013a).15

The most common idea of examining the Olympic legacy in different phases is to

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15 The 2003 legacy symposium concluded with some recommendations suggesting the legacy concept from the bidding process.
identify the gap between the bid promise (candidature phase) and reality (post-Games phase) through implementation (pre-Games phase) (see Mean et al., 2004; Kornblatt, 2006). The need for a long-term view of the Olympic legacy also recalls Hiller’s observation that there will be unanticipated and unplanned outcomes in the process. Due to the possible unintended outcomes involved in the “Olympic legacy”, Hiller disagrees with utilising the word “legacy”. Instead he adopts the term “Olympic outcomes”, which he thinks has both intended and unintended meanings (Hiller, 2003). In a similar vein, Mangan and Dyreson recognise the Olympic legacies as “intended and unintended” outcomes. Their concept of the Olympic legacy as “intended and unintended” outcomes includes more than “planned and unplanned” elements, as it incorporates manipulation of the initial vision on a longer timescale (Mangan and Dyreson, 2010).

Furthermore, referring to the mega-event driven urban development in the age of urban competition, Hall argues that the Olympic legacy should not be treated just as an urban phenomenon after the Games, but rather should be considered as part of the long-term urban development process. Hall particularly emphasises that the Olympic legacy cannot be separated from the host city’s urban redevelopment and place-promotion strategy, and suggests that it is formulated through the process of implementing these regenerative and imaginative aspirations, in the age of inter-urban competition (Hall, 1997). In similar vein, Roche criticises a lot of research on the impacts of mega-events on host cities which fails to understand the context of the planning process. He argues that without understanding the history of urban development, it is impossible to fully understand the nature of the legacy (Roche, 1992; Roche, 1994).

Indeed, despite of flourishing number of the literature on the Olympic legacy, it seems to me that there is relatively little empirical research connecting different phase of Olympic planning, which explore how the vision of the Olympic legacy was created, developed and implemented. In particular, there are less qualitative researches of this kind, compared to the quantitative researches on investigating the changes between different phases (for example in the case of Beijing, United Nations, 2007; United Nations, 2009 and in the case of Sydney, Giesecke and Madden, 2007). This is also true for the governmental and institutional publication on the 2012 London Games. The
Commission for a Sustainable London,\textsuperscript{16} for example, launched various publications during the post-bid and post-event phases.\textsuperscript{17} Although the Commission published the reports throughout time, the analytical points of the Olympic legacy in each document varied. There are some documents which explores the evolution from the bid promise to the implementation, its consequences in the post-event phase is less touched (for example, Commission for a Sustainable London, 2012a; Commission for a Sustainable London, 2012c). In similar vein, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport of the UK government (DCMS) had published numerous documents on the London’s Olympic legacy as quarterly reports,\textsuperscript{18} and issued planning strategy (DCMS, 2010d) and the evaluation documents on the impacts and legacy of the London Games (DCMS, 2011-13; DCMS, 2012). Yet, the urban legacy, for example, did not appear in every book, and evaluation book mainly focuses on post-bid and limited duration of the post-bid phase (one year after the Games). Thus, although the case of the 2012 London Games certainly contribute to flourishing the literature on the Olympic legacy, there is little literature which comprehensively tracks the changes of the legacy vision from the pre-bid to the post-Game time.

The timescale of the Olympic legacy, furthermore, can go beyond the planning process of an Olympic host city. Given the global reach of the impact of certain Olympic Games, the legacy of the Olympics is also inherited by subsequent host cities. Roche suggests that the host city has the opportunity to learn from the successes and failures of predecessors and this makes each Olympic city both standardised and unique (Roche, 2000, p. 137). Roche’s argument encourages us to look at the Olympic legacy in the context of the Olympic movement beyond a specific Olympic city. There are various studies which examine the historical evolution of Olympic-led urban development (for example, Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Liao and Pitts, 2006; Baim, 2009) and one with more emphasis on the Olympic legacy (Gold and Gold, 2011 [2007]-a). There are also studies specifically focusing on evolution of Olympic villages (Spà et al., 1997; Muñoz, 2006). Yet their studies are narratives of the evolution of the Olympic host cities, and the connection between different Olympic cities is rarely touched upon. Thus, in this thesis, the concept of “legacy as process” is relevant not only within Sydney or London,

\textsuperscript{16} The Commission for a Sustainable London is an independent body established in 2007 in order to monitor the sustainability aspects of the London 2012 planning and construction which the bid organisation promised.

\textsuperscript{17} Regularly publications by the Commission for a Sustainable London can be found in the bibliography.

\textsuperscript{18} Regularly publications by the DCMS can be found in the bibliography.
but also to the evolution from Sydney to London in terms of the planning strategy for the Olympic legacy.

2.1.3 The Olympics as “external” forces

While consideration of the Olympic legacy in the long-term process is an underlying theme in this thesis, Hiller’s suggestion of the Olympics as an “external” force is another crucial concept applied throughout this thesis. Hiller argues that:

“The dilemma for a host city is that the ground rules for the event are established by a body external to the city [...] Olympic is in many ways an intrusion (though often welcome one) in normal urban process and urban decision-making” (Hiller, 2003, p. 102) (emphasis added).19

“Externality” has also been acknowledged as an agent of accelerating urban regeneration in the city. Robert and Sykes point out that forces of urban regeneration are “multi-causal in origin”, and suggests that “they reflect a range of influences which emanate from both within and without a city” (Roberts and Sykes, 2000, p. 24). Their view is that urban changes are a reaction to the effort of positioning the city within the global network, and on the other hand, are greatly influenced by inner city urban politics. In a similar vein, Mumford, in his classic book, *The Culture of Cities*, critically argued that “remote forces and influences intermingle with the local and their conflicts are no less significant than their harmonies” (Mumford, 1940, p.4). Mumford suggests that certain pressures from outside significantly shape cities, and often they are against local interests.

While externality has been widely identified as an agent behind urban changes, “externality” of mega-events is more explicit and applicable for a limited duration, as Kelly claims that mega-events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup have their own specific functional, spatial and logistical requirements (Kelly, 1989, p. 265). The dilemma for the Olympic host city is to mediate the Olympic spatial requirements designated by the “external” bodies with the local and regional demands beyond the

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event. Hiller points out that the “externality” of the Olympic Games causes exceptional circumstances in the realm of mega-event-led urban planning processes, and this initiates both intended and unintended consequences in the host city (Hiller, 2003, pp. 103–104).

The conflict between Olympic demands and host city interests can be identified in the initial bid phase. Preuss critically observes that the IOC’s “practical and ideological” spatial rules are crucial for bidding cities looking to win the right to stage the Games under severe inter-urban competition, and this causes homogenisation of the Olympic cities despite their diverse urban characters. Preuss suggests that:

“The high competition of bid cities forces them to follow all requirements the IOC sets....it forces the bid cities into the so called ‘prisoner's dilemma’. That means the cities offer ever more to the Olympic Movement and increase their costs without gaining an advanced position due to the fact that all bid cities offer the same” (Preuss, 2004, p. 290) (emphasis added).

Preuss claims that the severe inter-urban competition has forced the Olympic cities to adopt the IOC’s preferred spatial setting, for example the venue concentration approach, in their urban concepts, and doubts its suitability for all the host cities. The IOC as the powerful “externality” to the city plays a dominant role in re-structuring the urban tissues in the host city.

Furthermore, “externality” also creates significant impacts on the planning process in the host city. One of the most discussed planning constraints of the mega-event, which is set out by “external body” is the unmovable deadline (see also Hall, 1989b; Hall, 1989a). While this is often employed as the rationale for accelerating urban development, which cannot be done without certain deadlines (Preuss, 2004), this time pressure also creates a special planning climate for the preparation of the mega-event. The “fast-track” planning system is frequently employed to meet the fixed deadline, and this often ignores democratic planning processes such as public consultation and transparent decision-making (Hall, 1992, pp. 125–127).

Against this backdrop, there have been great concerns about how the Olympic legacy
can be integrated into the fast-track planning process. Current discourse on Olympic studies particularly puts great emphasis on the importance of an initial commitment to the legacy. Although the Olympic legacy is essentially considered to comprise the assets or phenomena beyond the Games, various scholars now argue that the Olympic legacy is a matter of consideration even before the bidding. Cashman, however, points out that such “legacy planning” is hard to integrate into the Olympic planning before the Games, due to the time constraints of the mega-event preparation. Cashman observes that all the core efforts of the Games’ authorities are directed towards the short-term goal of hosting successful Games, and therefore he argues that there is a great danger that key decisions on the Olympic legacy will be made “on the run” or “on an ad-hoc basis” (Cashman, 1998). In addition to the time constraints, Cashman raises organisational discontinuity as a potential issue which prevents legacy planning. He points out that the Olympic legacy is often looked upon as a secondary vision before the Games, and at the time when legacy comes under serious consideration after the Games, many of the important local Olympic institutions, including the local organising committee, are winding up. Thus, Cashman questions the “consistency of vision” of the fragmented organisational structures throughout the planning process (Cashman, 1998; Cashman, 2003).

2.1.4 Entrepreneurial urban governance as a powerful driver

While “externality” is the key concept for understanding the potential conflict between the Olympic host city’s own interests and the special planning climate in the host city, entrepreneurial urban governance is a powerful driver to push the urban development associated with hosting the mega-event. It deeply involved in the initial aspiration of hosting the mega-event, the implementation process after winning the bid and the post-Olympic development phases.

Initially, the host city’s aspiration of staging the Olympics is greatly connected with its economic growth strategy in the age of inter-urban competition. Harvey observes that the transition from industrial to post-industrial society caused ever-increasing inter-urban competition seeking the people and money in the global market (Harvey, 1988, p.92), and “the shift of urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism” is firmly connected with survival strategies in inter-urban competition. Against this backdrop, he argues that the organisation of urban spectacles such as Olympics have become “prominent facets of strategies of urban regeneration”

36
which have become the means of attracting inward investment to the city (Harvey, 1989, p. 9). In a similar vein, employing the case of Cape Town’s bid for the 2000 Games, Hiller suggests that the city’s great motivation for bidding for the Olympic Games was based on “urban boosterism”, in which political and business coalitions were formed to advocate a pro-growth strategy. Hiller however argues that such urban growth strategies eventually prioritise economic prosperity rather than social benefit (Hiller, 2000).

In the implementation of the mega-event, the entrepreneurial urban governance becomes more visible through the formation of a public–private partnership (PPP), which Harvey stresses is the crucial mechanism for entrepreneurial governance (Harvey, 1989). Employing PPPs in urban mega-projects in general has been recognised as a useful method, in particular when the public funds are limited (Flyvbjerg, 2003). The financial burden of preparing the spatial setting for the Games has been widely discussed, and in previous Olympic cities, the severe deficit left after the Games has been recognised by various authors (Preuss, 2004; Gold and Gold, 2011 [2007]-b; Mangan and Dyreson, 2010). Montreal for example had to shoulder 30 years’ debt for the construction of the Olympic facilities for the 1976 Games, and it is widely believed that Athens’ significant public expenditure for the 2004 Games became one of the great triggers of the subsequent financial crisis in Greece. While the Olympic host cities have found difficulty in securing the financial resources with public money, in particular at the time of the expansion of the Olympic Games in terms of its size, the recent American Olympic cities, Los Angeles (1984) and Atlanta (1996), demonstrated different ways of delivering the Olympics and the legacy. Both cities employed PPPs in order to reduce public subsidies, and strategically tried to minimise the physical Olympic legacy, along with their commercially oriented Olympic planning structures and financial strategies (Andranovich et al., 2001; Burbank et al., 2001; Rutheiser, 1996).

While avoiding the financial burden of staging the Games, Los Angeles and Atlanta’s entrepreneurial governance also had certain limits. One of the critiques of the entrepreneurial Olympic planning is securing the social value in economically oriented strategies. Indeed, most of the critiques of Atlanta’s entrepreneurial approach have been on the significant discrepancy between what the local residents needed and what the Olympic authorities, which largely reflected the voices of regional business leaders,
aimed to achieve for Atlanta’s future economic development (Andranovich et al., 2001; Burbank et al., 2001; Rutheiser, 1996). In this respect, the identification of the beneficiary is a crucial issue in examining the legacy of the event. Hall suggests that in the context in which the organisers often address the benefits of the event for “community” in the host city, the question should then be on “which community” benefits. Echoing Hiller’s critique of urban boosterism, which fails to maintain the social promise, Hall also identifies difficulty in securing the social interests against the growth coalitions (Hall, 1997). The question of the social benefit of Olympics-related regeneration has also been touched on in the existing literature. Hughes reports on the gentrification process in the case of the legacy of creating the Olympic village in Barcelona (Hughes, 1999), and Raco also questions if deprived local residents could gain any benefits as property developers pursue their economic interests by regenerating the Lower Lea Valley (Raco, 2004). These authors thus address the importance of securing the social legacy in the economic regeneration associated with Olympics-led urban development.

Furthermore, various authors have pointed out uncertainties of entrepreneurial governance through PPPs when applied to mega-projects. Flyvbjerg suggests that the public and private sectors’ ambiguous responsibility for the project often leads to the collapse of the PPP. The ambiguity here does not only mean the role each sector plays in the project but also management of the various risks involved in conducting the mega-project. Flyvbjerg argues that without clarification of the balance between the public and private sectors, highly biased outcomes in which either the public or private sector’s interests are prioritised may result (Flyvbjerg, 2003). Furthermore, Flyvbjerg indicates that involvement of the private sector is highly dependent on the market conditions, and this is one of the great uncertainties in a PPP. From a slightly different viewpoint, Harvey argues that entrepreneurial governance is highly fluid as it seeks speculative investments in an unstable market economy (Harvey, 1989).

2.1.5 Land-use plans as a representation of a process of mediating different visions
My primary concern in this thesis is the planning process of defining the use of the post-Olympic Park, and this will be spatially represented in the land-use plan as a representation of a process mediating different visions. The problem of long-term usability of Olympic-led urban development beyond the Games has been long identified.
As indicated earlier, Hiller observes that one of the causes of the negative aspects of the Olympic legacy is the difficulty in embedding the “external” factor described above into the city context, and indicates that “the tension between the Olympic agenda and the host city agenda” may lead to a divorce between the Olympic-led urban project and the host city’s wider development plan (Hiller, 2003, p. 107). Kelly differently points out that the architects and planners involved in the mega-event are faced with a range of expectations which may or may not be consistent and coherent (Kelly, 1989, p. 266). Thus, the usage of the post-Olympic Park is understood as a matter of political conflict between different Olympic and non-Olympic authorities, which I highlight in this thesis.

In the realm of urban planning, this conflict between different authorities will be well represented in the land-use plan of the Olympic site. Kaiser et al. argue that “land use planning and decision-making resemble a high-stakes competition over an area’s future land-use pattern,” and suggest that the conflict is not only over the contents of the land-use plan, but also over the procedures of land-use regulations, plans, and development decisions (Kaiser et al., 1995, pp. 6–8). In a similar vein, Pacione suggests that “the net effect of socio-spatial process is revealed most clearly in the land-use structure of the city”, and claims that the land-use is the element most susceptible to changes in urban landscape (Pacione, 2005, p. 139). Thus, I will draw on their concept of the land-use plan as a spatial representation of the various political conflicts, and utilise it as a means of the examining the process of mediating different political aspirations.

Echoing the discussion of the current entrepreneurial governance, Kaiser et al. further indicate the socio-economic dimensions of the land-use planning. They argue that land-use stakeholders such as market-oriented players, governmental players, interest groups, and land planners are continuously in conflict over not only the contents of land-use planning, but also the way in which it proceeds. One of the significant areas of conflict over the land-use is the fight between the social and market values. Keiser et al. define “social land value” as largely represented by the history accumulated in the area over time, with certain groups of stakeholders supporting the status quo, and “market values” represent the highest and best use of land for the financial return to other groups of stakeholders. The authors suggest that the two values become sources of conflict over land-use (Kaiser et al., 1995, pp. 42–51). This further recalls Harvey’s suggestion of the
struggle between “use and exchange” values in urban land-use. Harvey criticises these biased priorities that depend on stakeholders, and argues that there is a lack of comprehensive thinking to satisfy both values in land-use planning (Harvey, 2009, pp. 153–194).

On an architectural scale, the struggle of balancing social and economic interests has also been a crucial issue for the utilisation of the post-Olympic facilities. Preuss points out that selection of the type of usage is a socio-economic and indeed political matter, as it greatly concerns how the public inherits assets from the Olympic Games (Preuss, 2004, pp. 87–91). Yet various authors criticise the dialectic between social and economic concerns in the post-Olympic facilities. Brown for example observes that the post-Olympic Oval built for the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics became “consumable space”. He explores how everyday practice can be integrated into such economically oriented space, and suggest that mediating the social and commercial use of the post-Olympic facilities represents the ordering of the society (Brown, 2004). Hall further argues that urban space left after the mega-event is “space of conspicuous consumption, celebrating commodities rather than civic values” (Hall, 1997). Hall criticises the transformation of community-based local space into a visitor attraction, which Castells calls the “disconnection of people from spatial forms” (Castells, 1983). Thus, utilisation of the Olympic legacy is blurred between the social and economic values, and therefore, as Hall argues, the urban legacy causes considerable tension in the urban policy-making environment.

2.1.6 Mixed-use strategy, its opportunity and constraint

Discussion of land-use planning has further elaborated on gaining popularity by applying the mixed-use strategy as a means of urban sustainability. As the ideology of sustainable urban forms has flourished, with “compact city” (Jenks et al., 1996) or “urban village” concepts (Aldous, 1992; Neal, 2003), the mixed-use urban strategy has attracted the attention of academics, practitioners, and planning policy makers, as a potential agent of urban sustainability (Walker, 1997). Coupland’s book Reclaiming the City, Mixed Use Development (1997) provides a useful account of mixed-use development in this respect. Coupland argues that the most significant advantage of

20 Coupland in the beginning points out the ambiguity of the term “mixed-use development”, which causes confusion among relevant parties. The ambiguity of the term lies in the degree to which different functions would be
employing a mixed-use strategy is to bring a variety of activities, potentially during the
day and in the evening, and to enhance the “liveliness” of the place (Coupland, 1997).
Grant further recognises that this essential argument for the mixed-use strategy is
inherited from Jacobs’s claim in her influential book, *The Death and Life of Great
American Cities* (1961), that “fine grain mixing of diverse uses creates vibrant and
successful neighbourhoods” (Grant, 2002, p. 72). Jacobs’ argument for replacing
“zoning for conformity” with “zoning for diversity” has been widely adopted in many
urban planning policies around the world (Jacobs, 1961, p. 149), and Grant suggests that
this is evidence of the positive potential of the mixed-use strategy. Jones and Evans
further point out that, in the UK planning context, the concept of mixed development
has been heavily promoted by the Urban Task Force Report (Jones and Evans, 2008).

While the mixed-use approach is considered an agent of a self-sufficient “compact city”
with economic vitality, social equity and environmental quality (Grant, 2002, p. 73),
various authors also point out its limits. Coupland claims that there are dangers in
encouraging separation rather than integration within mixed-use urban areas, and
additionally there may be conflict between activities (Coupland, 1997, pp. 1–25). Frug
suggests that the fundamental ideology in employing the mixed-use strategy is to
“encompass a wide variety of difference”, rather than segregating otherness in the
traditional zoning system (Frug, 1999, pp. 145–149), but as Coupland points out,
diversification often turns to “contestation” or “congestion” within the place. Such
conflict between different uses or different spaces is indeed an essential part of the
land-use planning process. Grant recognised that “compatibility” of different uses is
critical to the realisation of mixing uses (Grant, 2002). As my selected cases, the Sydney
and London Olympic Parks, would no longer remain as sports complexes, but as urban
precincts with various functions, I am interested in the “compatibility in mixed-use
urban strategy” as a practical inquiry of land-use planning. In particular, I am interested
in the compatibility between the Olympic-led function (sports) and non-Olympic
functions (others) within the same urban precincts.

2.1.7 The Olympic “bubble” as a result of enclave development
Mixed-use development is essentially a planning strategy within the designated district.
Its fundamental objective is to obtain self-sufficiency, which is the crucial idea behind the “compact city” model. Consideration of how such an urban quarter could be integrated into the urban tissues is another side to be explored, as it is often criticised for its isolation from the urban context (for example, Coaffee and Johnson, 2007). Interestingly, most empirical studies on the post-Olympic parks in Sydney and Beijing focus on the usability within the site, and its relationship with the urban context tends to be regional rather than local (for example, Ren, 2008a; Searle, 2008a). Meanwhile, various literature on the LOP is keen on its relationship with adjacent neighbourhoods (for example, Vigor et al., 2004; Macrury and Poynter, 2010).

Conceptually, Judd’s idea of the “tourist bubble” is useful. Judd indicates that various themed and specialised tourist places, such as convention centres, professional sports arenas, festival malls and casinos, have emerged as part of a new economic development strategy in the context of inter-urban competition in the USA. Yet Judd critically observes that such places became a “tourist bubble”, which “create islands of affluence that are sharply differentiated and segregated from the surrounding urban landscape” (Judd, 1999, p. 53). He argues that a “tourist bubble” is a strictly circumscribed world, which is primary utilised for consumption and play; it often contrasts with the decay of its immediate area and creates tension between areas inside and outside the “bubble”. In a similar vein, Thornley discussed this “bubble” effect from the urban planning point of view in the case of sports stadium developments which are associated with an urban regeneration scheme. Thornley argues that stadium developments are often criticised for being “divorced from their surroundings”, and suggests that the catalytic effect of the new development seldom contributes to the surroundings, and vice versa, facilities for the local community are rarely integrated into the new scheme within the development (Thornley, 2002, p. 816). Under such circumstances, Thornley emphasises that it is crucial to synchronise the urban development policy within the project area and its wider context, but he demonstrates that this does not always happen. In his empirical study of the planning process of the legacy of the Millennium Dome project in London, Dome Alone: London’s Millennium Project and the Strategic Planning Deficit, Thornley demonstrates that failure to determine the Dome’s life after the one-year event occurred because the development was “divorced from any strategic planning context before the event” (Thornley, 2000, p. 689). Thornley particularly criticises the project’s detachment from the local
community’s interest and local economy, and puts great emphasis on the need for avoiding “enclave development” (Thornley, 2000, p. 697). Given the inevitable complex planning structure in conducting the mega-project, Thornley observes that the increasing fragmentation of decision-making responsibility and the involvement of the private sector prevented the project from being integrated with strategic planning for the long-term viability of the Dome.

Thus, it is understood that while self-sufficiency is a crucial agenda in regard to the sustainability of an urban precinct, it is also important to consider its integration into the local and regional planning context, in order to avoid a “bubble” effect. As my primary concern in this thesis is on planning the “use” of the post-Olympic Park, I will argue that it is imperative to consider the usability of the post-Olympic Park not only as a matter of the land-use plan within the site but also as a matter of how such land use within the site can be related to the wider urban planning context, in order to avoid the “Olympic bubble”.

Furthermore, integration of the Olympic Park into the surroundings after the Games can be questioned from the viewpoint of security. As was suggested in Chapter 1, one of the benefits of creating the Olympic Park for the Games is simplified security; a venue-concentration model is much easier to control in security terms than a venue-dispersed model. Yet, in order to achieve this, the Olympic Park is surrounded by tight security with state-of-the-art technology, isolated from the neighbourhood during the Olympic Games. Fussey et al. suggest that ever-increasing concern about the security of the Olympic site also tends to bequeath physical and conceptual remnants—and this become the crucial Olympic legacy (Fussey et al., 2011). In this respect, the way of dealing with the site boundary of the Park is important, in particular its transformation from the Olympics to legacy mode, in order to evaluate how the post-Olympic site is fully integrated with the surrounding neighbourhood.

2.2 Methodological framework

2.2.1 Changes over time

Roche emphasises the importance of analysing the legacy of a mega-event in the
context of the long planning process, and criticises the failure of many existing studies to do so. Thus, although my primary research interest is the usability of the post-Olympic Park and its integration into the urban context, I will not only examine it in relation to the post-Olympic phase but also explore the process of shaping its vision before the Games are staged. In this respect, as De Vaus suggests, I will employ a methodology which enables extracting changes and continuities over the designated period. He points out that this research design requires the collection of data from at least two points in time, and claims that data collection using multiple points can be utilised to: examine long- and short-term effects, track when changes occur, plot the shape of any changes, and identify factors that precede any changes (De Vaus, 2001, pp. 119–120). As I am particularly interested in analysing how the vision of the Olympic legacy has changed over time, and in considering the forces behind the changes, this approach is beneficial to explore how the vision was established, developed and implemented. Yet, as indicated earlier in this chapter, such a longitudinal approach is absent in the existing literature on the Olympic legacy, although various authors put great emphasis on the importance of considering the legacy from the early phase of the planning process. Existing studies tend to analyse either empirical evidence in the post-Olympic phase or the planning process before the Games, but there is little research connecting the two. This means that the difference between the vision and reality of the Olympic legacy has not been widely researched.

In this time-change analysis, it is crucial to set up the timeframe to examine the changes and continuities of the targeted phenomenon, and I will take the timeframe proposed by Roche. In his text Mega-Event and Urban Policy (1994) Roche designates pre-bid, post-bid, and post-event phases, and identifies the different planning roles in each phase. Roche critically suggests that there is a significant discrepancy between what should be conducted and what in fact happens in each phase.

Firstly, in the pre-bid phase, Roche identifies that theoretically actions in four areas, (1) conceptualisation, (2) pre-bid feasibility, (3) political commitment process, and (4) bid group organisation, should be conducted, all of which are crucial in order to bring the mega-event to the city. Yet in reality he observes that vague and subjective identification is preliminarily provided for a specific project, instead of establishing an explicit and objective vision based on feasibility studies.
Subsequently, in the post-bid phase, it is suggested that actions for (1) re-evaluation, (2) post-bid feasibility study, (3) organisational planning, and (4) implementation are necessary to prepare the setting for the mega-event. Roche, however, claims that justification of the project becomes the main aim of the post-bid plan, and re-evaluation of the bid plan, and the post-bid feasibility studies which are required for a rational planning process are not fully conducted in reality.

Finally, in the post-event phase, or legacy phase, Roche claims that (1) monitoring / feedback, (2) evaluation, and (3) new concept / new commitment should be developed through a rational planning process. Yet, in reality, little attention is given to review of planned developments over time. Thus, Roche critically suggests that mega-event planning is essentially based on “situational rationality”, which he argues responds to urgent problems and without much evaluation of alternatives and cost-benefit projections (Roche, 1994, pp. 4–7). With reference to this, I will examine the degree to which the planning process for defining the vision of the usability of the post-Olympic Park and of its relation to the urban context was synchronised with Roche’s analysis of a rational and empirical planning process.

2.2.2 Contrasting the two cases

Using a time-change analysis to examine the planning process of the Olympic legacy throughout the pre-bid, post-bid, and post-event phases, I will consider the Sydney and London Olympic Parks and evaluate differences and similarities between them. One of the advantages in employing multiple case studies is the ability to identify cross-societal similarities and differences and to assess the causes (Ragin, 1987, p. 6). Ragin argues that “the identification of patterns of multiple conjunctural causation provides a basis for specifying, at a more abstract level, the underlying similarities responsible for similar outcomes and the underlying differences responsible for different outcomes” (Ragin, 1987, p. 49). Here, I will point out that my research design is not a "comparative case" study. This research method requires explicit comparative factors, which can be applied to different cities, but this is hard to achieve, even though there are certain similarities between the cases in Sydney and London. This approach and argument also can be found in Olivia Muñoz-Rojas’s successful PhD thesis submitted to the London School of Economics, which was published as *Ashes and Granite: Destruction and*
Reconstruction in the Spanish Civil War and Its Aftermath (2011). Muñoz-Rojas takes three cities in Spain, Barcelona, Madrid and Bilbao, to examine war destruction and reconstruction. Yet she argues that her approach cannot be called a "comparative case study" as explicit comparative factors cannot be set up. She rather states that "contrasting" similarities and differences is more appropriate. As my case studies have similar conditions, I will utilise the "contrasting" research design, rather than a "comparative" case study.

Regarding selection of the cases in conducting multiple case studies, Yin argues that it is crucial to set up the theoretical framework addressing the conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found or not likely to be found (Yin, 2003, p. 50). In this respect, the standardised and differentiated natures of the Olympic movement at various times are considered causes of similarities and differences for my contrasting inquiry into the Olympic cities. Roche argues that the Olympic cities are utterly standardised, as the Olympic Games are run according to the IOC rules and the International Sports Federations, and further claims that “each host city’s organising committee attends the preceding city’s event and studies it in minute detail to learn lessons from its successes and failures. This process in itself is likely to promote a certain degree of uniformity of tried, tested and successful organisational features” (Roche, 2000, pp. 135–137). Meanwhile, Roche also argues that the Olympic cities are utterly unique, because of the location and site, and it is crucial to take into account the modification of the IOC rules and nature of the Olympic movement, which has changed over time.

Given the essential character of contrasting two cases, it is crucial to carefully select the cases to be studied. Yin points out that “every case should serve a specific purpose within the overall scope of inquiry,” and suggests that “each case must be carefully selected so that it either predicts similar results or produces contrasting results but for predictable reasons (Yin, 2003, pp. 45–46). Various studies comparing multiple Olympic cities have been conducted, but the selection of the cases in previous studies does not always address this need for similar or contrasting backdrops, which Yin argues is critical. The most frequently utilised multiple case study approach is research on the cities which host the Games consecutively. Yet the selection of chronological cities is questionable from the methodological point of view. Roche’s book
Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture (2000), for example, includes case studies on Seoul (1988) and Barcelona (1992), but this is by no means the only way of utilising a comparative case study. As the political and physical contexts of two cities are highly different, the fundamental aspirations of hosting the Olympic Games are greatly different as well. I will argue that Roche simply demonstrates the different character of the Olympic cities, rather than looking at multiple cases with an appropriate methodological framework. Further, Peter Haxton’s successful PhD thesis, Community Participation in the Mega-Event Hosting Process: the Case of the Olympic Games, which was awarded by the University of Technology Sydney (UTS) in 1999, explored public participation in the Olympic planning process in two cities, Atlanta (1996) and Sydney (2000), but the rationale for his case selection includes some weaknesses. The most critical point of comparison between the two cities lies in their urban planning systems. More explicitly, the leading authorities of the Olympic planning process are greatly different between Atlanta and Sydney. While the Atlanta Olympics were fundamentally developed by a privately-led PPP with private funding, the Sydney Games were very much led by the State Government with huge expenditure of public money. Furthermore, while the urban regeneration associated with the construction of the sports complex was not conducted in Atlanta, it was an essential part of Sydney’s Olympics. Thus, the political and physical contexts of public participation in the two cities were greatly different, and without explicitly embedding such differences into the research framework it is hard to justify the selection of these cities, although they staged the Olympic Games one after the other. In addition to this, the “Olympic Legacy: Special Issue” of “Urban Design, Autumn 2010” features London and various past Olympic parks, but there is little relevant analytical overlap between London and other cities’ Olympic parks (Corteen, 2011).

In this respect, it is imperative to justify my case selection, and to align it with my research concerns. In other words, it is crucial to identify the similarities and differences between the cases of Sydney and London, and to address their connections. I will begin with addressing similarities between Sydney and London. Similarities in the physical,

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21In addition to these examples, there is an attempt to compare the case of London and its predecessor, Beijing. Yet, instead of simply comparing the different Olympic impacts in different cities, the author’s intention is to find a possible analytical framework for examining the social and economic impact by the Olympic Games in different host cities (Poynter, G. (2006) From Beijing to Bow Bells: Measuring the Olympic effects, London East Research Institute, University of East London.).
social and historical conditions of the sites for the Olympic parks in the two cities have already been touched upon in the previous chapter. Beyond the similar character of the site conditions discussed in Chapter 1, there are significant similarities between the cities in terms of the planning contexts and objectives for the creation of the Olympic Park, and I will argue that this created predictable similarities in their planning approaches to the Olympic legacy.

Firstly, Sydney and London have similar urban planning contexts. The urban planning system in both cities is formulated by a national, regional and local planning hierarchy. Regional spatial planning policy, such as the “Metropolitan Strategy” in Sydney and the “London Plan” in London, has played a significant role in identifying the area’s character within the broader region in both cities, while local planning policies have further provided detailed spatial frameworks for the area. Under such planning contexts, Homebush Bay, the site for the SOP, and the LLV have long been targeted as crucial regeneration areas to bring socio-economic changes in socially and economically deprived areas. In this respect, Sydney and London took the “proactive” approach in staging the Olympics, by which Kelly emphasises that the mega-event is exploited to change the urban settings with legacy conditions in mind, rather than the “reactive” approach, by which the character of the event is defined by existing physical urban settings (Kelly, 1989, p. 265) (Fig.2-1).

Secondly, Sydney and London also had similar Olympic planning structures. The host city usually sets up the Organising Committee of the Olympic Games, and this has significant planning powers to prepare and run the Olympic Games. The Organising Committee fundamentally works as a branch of the IOC for the specific Olympic Games, although their staff consists of the host nation or region’s political or economic elite. Yet, in the case of Sydney and London, a separate authority for planning and construction of the Olympic venues and infrastructures, the Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA) in Sydney and the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) in London, was created. This is one of the unique features in the planning of the Olympic Games in Sydney and London, therefore making them different from other host cities, such as Athens (2004) and Beijing (2008).

Thirdly, there was a significant transfer of knowledge from Sydney to London. During
the course of my fieldwork in Sydney, I met various people who were involved in planning the Sydney Games, and subsequently worked for the London Games. For example, Jim Sloman, who was the chief operating officer in Sydney and had ultimate responsibility for the planning and execution of the Sydney Games, was hired as a consultant for London’s Games. Furthermore, various personnel in the Olympic authorities visited Sydney to learn lessons from its successes and failures. When the senior leadership team of the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG) visited Sydney in 2006, Paul Deighton, the CEO of the LOCOG, suggested that “the Sydney Olympic Park helps to bring many of our plans alive.” In addition to this, Gary Cox’s exploration of the transferable knowledge of the environmental guidelines from Sydney to London suggests that there was a shared planning background between both cities (Cox, 2012). It was anticipated that these knowledge exchanges from Sydney would provide London with similar planning strategies as well as different ones. It is also worth noting that the same architects and urban designers were involved in the design process of the two Olympic parks. HOK Sports (now named Populous) was the leading firm of architects for the main Olympic stadia in Sydney and London Olympic parks, and Hargreaves Associates, who was a leading urban designer for the SOP, was subsequently hired as the leading landscape / urban designer for the LOP.

Thus, while the various similar planning contexts and the direct transfer of knowledge from Sydney to London have the potential to provide similar planning approaches, I will emphasise that there were also fundamentally different attitudes in the approach towards the Olympic legacy between Sydney and London. As the host city’s attitude to the “Olympic legacy” has been drastically altered in recent years, (see, for example Cashman, 2003), my great concern is to explore how this condition has affected the planning approach. The concept of the “Olympic legacy” in particular has become central to the Olympic movement since the Sydney Games, when Jacque Rogge became the new president of the IOC in 2001. Since then, the IOC has commenced various actions to tackle the previous problem of the Olympic legacy (Table 2-1).

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Lord Coe, who was the chairman of the London’s bidding team, claimed that “I believe we must improve on our proposals and we must aim to produce the best technical bid when we submit our candidate file. […] Jim Sloman and his team can help us deliver those goals and I am delighted that they will be working with our excellent in house team to search for improvements wherever they can be found.”

Table 2-1: The IOC’s commitment to the Olympic legacy between 2000 and 2005  
(Source: Author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Sydney staged the Games</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 2001 | - Dr. Jacques Rogge was elected as the president of the IOC on 16 July 2001  
- Start of data collection for the Olympic Games Knowledge Management programme |
| 2002 | - Olympic Games Global Impact project, preliminary research start  
- Olympic Games Study Commission, Interim Report to the 114th IOC Session |
| 2003 | - Olympic Games Study Commission, Report to the 115th IOC Session  
- A legacy aspect was added to the Olympic Charter for the first time |
| 2004 | - Further amendment of the legacy aspect in the Olympic Charter  
- Each bid city for the 2012 Games asked to address “the vision of Legacy” in their bid documents for the first time |
| 2005 | London won the bid for the 2012 Games |

Furthermore, as briefly discussed in the previous chapter, Liao and Pitts further suggest that since the 2000 Sydney Games, the age of urban sustainability has begun (Liao and Pitts, 2006). Sydney is considered as the first to adopt this strategy and London is the latest example, but there are also Athens and Beijing, which hosted the Games in 2004 and 2008. However, it is understood that when Athens and Beijing won the bids in 1997 and 2001, the IOC’s commitment to the Olympic legacy had not begun or had just begun (Fig. 2-2).

Thus, it was in London that the IOC’s actions started to take effect, and the IOC’s president Jacques Rogge declared that “London is the first city which adopted the IOC’s commitment to the Olympic legacy.”

24 Given this historical context, one of my great motivations in employing Sydney and London as case studies is to consider the significant impact of the IOC’s changing commitment to the Olympic legacy.

2.2.3 Research timeframe and challenges met

A time-change analysis and contrasting case studies are the two methodological backbones of my thesis. I will therefore conduct analysis of the planning process for the legacy of the Olympic Park in the pre-bid, the post-bid, and the post-event phases for both Sydney and London. It is then critical to define the timeframe for each phase in each case, and identify the methodological challenges in my thesis. Table 2-2 indicates the periods of each phase in Sydney and London.

24 Comments by the IOC President, Jacque Rogge, in the Annual de Coubertin lecture in London on 28 November 2008.
Table 2-2: The analytical timeframe of each phase in Sydney and London

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>Sydney</th>
<th>London</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-bid</td>
<td>Early 1960-September 1993</td>
<td>Late 1970-July 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Olympic</td>
<td>November 2000-December 2012</td>
<td>August 2012-July 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Firstly, the pre-bid phases were greatly different across cities. Some cities such as Barcelona and Sydney experienced several unsuccessful bids; the pre-bid phase for these cities can be considered to span more than a few decades. Furthermore, the beginning of the pre-bid period needs to be clarified. I will set out, in this thesis, the pre-bid phase as the time from the idea of creating the Sydney and London Olympic Parks emerged until the winning of the bid, and therefore the length of this period varies between Sydney and London. The initial idea of creating the SOP in Homebush Bay emerged at the beginning of the 1960s for the 1972 Games, and Sydney eventually won the right to stage the 2000 Games in September 1993. I will consider the period between the early 1960s and September 1993 as the pre-bid phase for Sydney. Meanwhile, the first idea of creating the LOP also emerged in the late 1970s with the feasibility study for the 1988 Games. Although this first bid was not put forward, I will take this as the beginning of the pre-bid phase for London, and designate July 2005, when London won the right to stage the 2012 Games, as its end. Thus, as the pre-bid periods in both cities can be considered empirical processes, I will carry out a comprehensive analysis of both cases.

Secondly, the post-bid phase is the fixed period between the host city selection and the Olympic Games. This period is currently designated as seven years. This period extended between September 1993 and October 2000 in the case of Sydney, and for London period between July 2005 and July 2012. This seven-year period is the time when the host city establishes the special authority for the Olympic Games to deliver all spatial settings for the Olympic Games, which will define fundamental physical character of the post-Olympic Park.

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25 The period between the host city selection and the Olympic Games has evolved throughout the history of the Olympic Games. The current seven-year period was adopted with the Seoul Games in 1988 (awarded in 1981). The duration was five years between the 1956 Melbourne and the 1968 Mexico Games, and then it was extended to six years between the 1972 Munich and the 1984 Los Angeles Games.
Finally, while it is possible to define the pre-bid and post-bid phases, the definition of the post-event phase is ambiguous, especially when it becomes a matter of empirical observation. Its beginning can be explicitly defined as the moment in which the Olympic Games are over, but the end of this period cannot be defined. In addition to such ambiguity in defining the post-event phase, the post-Olympic phase of the London case has certain limits in my thesis. I will designate November 2000 to the end of 2012 as the post-Olympic phase for Sydney, but I can only observe London’s legacy from August 2012 to July 2013 at the time of writing. Thus, while I can observe 12 years for Sydney’s Olympic legacy, London’s legacy is limited to one year. Yet, during one year, London conducted various planning actions to manage the legacy assets in the post-Olympic Park, and this will provide certain empirical data to explore my contrasting study with Sydney. Furthermore, the 12 years of Sydney’s post-Olympic phase can be considered as a period which provides valuable data to consider London’s ongoing post-Olympic planning at the time of writing. I will therefore endeavour to carry out a contrasting post-Olympic study between Sydney and London, despite the different lengths of the legacy periods in these cities.

2.2.4 Data collection

Access to data

One of the significant challenges in employing multiple case studies is that it takes more time to collect data than a single case study (Yin, 2003, pp. 44–45). Since my cases explored in this thesis are the Olympic parks in Sydney and London, key data has to be collected in both cities. In order to collect the relevant data for my thesis, I conducted two field visits in Sydney. My first trip to Sydney was in July 2007, and the main objective of this was to find out how much data were available on the Sydney Olympics. During this trip, I also conducted preliminary official document collection and two interviews with regional governmental officials who were involved in planning the SOP. Since my first visit had a time limitation, it was not enough for comprehensive data collection. Yet, since I was appointed as the visiting research fellow at the Australian Centre for Olympic Studies set up in the UTS, this provided me with the opportunity to make my second fieldwork period longer.

While a visiting research fellow in Sydney from September 2008 to January 2009, I was provided with access to various official documents, secondary literature, and numerous
slide films from the Sydney Olympic Games archived at the Australian Centre for Olympic Studies archives and the UTS library, and I also had great opportunities to interview various kinds of people who were involved in the 2000 Sydney Olympics in various phases. Further, I was able to make contact with the SOPA, which is the statutory organisation responsible for the management and development of the post-Olympic SOP since 2001. The SOPA kindly accepted my application for interviews with key personnel within the SOPA, and provided various kinds of published textual and visual data for my research. Yet other types of the documents, especially those published by the various authorities in the pre-bid phase, were extremely difficult to find, as they were archived differently in national, regional and local libraries. Thus, I found that collecting data in the pre-bid phases was more difficult than in the post-bid and the post-event phases, because not only were they older, but in addition the authors of the publication were more diverse than in the other periods.

Meanwhile, since I started my PhD in London in September 2006, I have extensively collected data on the legacy vision of the LOP. As the planning and construction of the LOP has been underway since London won the bid in July 2005, a massive number of planning and process documents have been issued by various organisations. In addition to these official documents being available while I have been conducting my PhD project, various media, such as newspapers and television programmes, have paid great attention to the planning, construction and future of the LOP. Most of these media contents are now accessible on the internet, and this made it easier to find the articles relevant to my data collection. Thus, it is relatively easy to obtain diverse kinds of official or media documents during the preparation phase of the Olympic Games, but there are also significant constraints in data collection while the Olympic project is underway. The biggest difficulty which I have encountered was access to the people who have been involved in the Olympic and the legacy planning process. Yet there were some opportunities to hear the opinions of the officials involved in the Olympic planning. Some of them, for example Lord Sebastian Coe, the Chairman of the LOCOG, or David Higgins, the Chief Executive of the ODA, have made extensive media appearances, and commented on their Olympic work. Further, while conducting my PhD work, I had the opportunity to be involved in designing the LOP, as an architect of the Olympic Park Design Team during October 2007 to June 2008. During my work, I was involved in the Olympic, legacy transformation and long-term legacy masterplans
for the LOP. These works did not entirely become open to the public, but rather were archived as progress documents. Although they are finalised visions, they suggest various opportunities and constraints in planning the legacy of the LOP. I was permitted to use these documents for my PhD thesis by Bob Allies, partner of Allies and Morrison Architects, who had long worked on the Olympic and legacy masterplans, and I consider these documents to be critical data which provide a different view from that revealed in the final public documents.

**Identifying the data**

What kind of data would be required for my research on the Olympic legacy? As my intention is to understand the planning process of defining the usability of the post-Olympic Park and its relation to the city context, evaluating the masterplan, especially land-use plan, published in the pre-bid, post-bid, and post-event phases is necessary. Given my objective to understand the usability of the specific urban precinct beyond the planning boundaries of the Olympic site, it is imperative to look at different scales of land-use plans, both within the Olympic site boundaries and with a wider local and regional scale, and examine how the spatial use of the site was represented. This representation is normally made textually and visually. Further, as my intention is not only to observe the land-use, but also to explore the forces behind it, obtaining multiple resources is required.

Methodologically, Yin suggests case studies need not be limited to a single source of evidence, but rather he encourages researchers to utilise a wide variety of sources. Yin argues that the most important advantage presented by using multiple sources of evidence is the development of “converging lines of inquiry”. Yin points out that different data should be analysed to evaluate one fact from multiple points of view, rather than addressing different facts and leading to multiple conclusions (Yin, 2003, pp. 91–92). As multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon, Yin claims that it is crucial to designate the role of each data item in the broader research framework. In this respect, it is crucial to identify the types of data utilised in my thesis and to consider how each data type will contribute to the multi-angle observation of my cases. Although various types of data can be utilised in a
case study,26 I essentially consider the following three categories of data as my research data, which can reveal different stories on one phenomenon: official documents, media articles, and expert interviews. My intention of utilising the above materials as research resources is to obtain multiple views of one phenomenon. Also, as Scott argues that there are certain different degrees of incompleteness or distortions across documents (Scott, 1990), I will argue that analysis of multiple resources would contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the research target.

As my thesis analyses two cases, Sydney and London, it is imperative to take account of obtaining similar data from both cities. As suggested before, there were certain institutional similarities in the Olympic planning between Sydney and London, and this provides the background in which similar types of official documents were published. Further, similar urban governance systems and Olympic organisations made it possible for me to find similar positions of personnel who were involved in Olympic and legacy development. During my data collection in Sydney and London, I tried to find similar publication materials and similar people and conduct interviews with them, but the resources are not always perfectly matched between Sydney and London. As suggested before, some personnel in London were not accessible during the post-bid phase, because they were too busy or tried to express their opinions as little as possible. Although some types of material were only found in one city, they still add value to the comparison. The following parts will provide a more concrete view of the different types of data which I collected.

**Official documents**

Among the different types of research resources mentioned above, the official documents are the main data to be collected and analysed in my thesis. Collecting the official documents which explain the land-use plan and its urban context textually and visually was my primary focus.

Since the vision of hosting the Olympic Games and creating the site for the event emerged, enormous numbers of documents have been published in different phases of planning by the various public authorities in Sydney and London. The most relevant

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26 Yin suggests that evidence for a case study may come from six sources: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artefacts (Yin, 2003, pp. 79–90).
official documents to my thesis are issued by the special Olympic authorities, such as the Sydney and London Olympic Bid Committees; the SOCOG and LOCOG, which are the institutions responsible for organising the Games; and the OCA in Sydney and the ODA in London, which are the statutory bodies responsible for delivering the venues and infrastructures for the Games. These documents were published by the one-off authorities established for the Olympic Games, and therefore the primary objectives of their documents were to address the visions of the Olympic sites, to inform ongoing planning and construction processes, and more importantly to justify their activities. Thus, analysing the degree to which each Olympic organisation considers the vision of utilising the Olympic Park beyond spatial and time boundaries of the Olympics during the specialised and fast-track Olympic planning process is a critical part of my analysis.

Further, in the post-Olympic phase, the publications by the SOPA, the statutory body responsible for managing the post-Olympic Park, will be investigated in depth. The documents not only demonstrate how the Olympic site was utilised after the Games, but also set out the problems with the post-Olympic Park and suggest alternative planning solutions for the future. Thus, I take these publication materials as documentation of the “living legacy”, and evaluate its evolution from the previous pre-bid and post-bid phases. Meanwhile, in the case of London, the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) took responsibility of the post-Olympic Park. Although the LLDC had various messages on the vision of the post-Olympic Park, it had not published the post-Olympic masterplan of the post-Olympic LOP at the time of writing this thesis. The LLDC follows the concrete spatial vision of the Park issued by its predecessor, the Olympic Park Legacy Company, before the Games. In addition to this, the Mayor of London published another in-depth spatial vision of the post-Olympic LOP and its surrounding area just before the Games, and these two documents are still valid. Thus, London offers a more complex planning framework of the post-Olympic site than Sydney and I will endeavour to examine how the different documents address the visions of the legacy similarly and differently.

While the official documents issued by the Olympic authorities provide an in-depth account of the Olympic site with Olympic specific views, the documents published by non-Olympic related authorities demonstrate different approaches to the Olympic site. The regional government - in my cases, the Department of Planning in the NSW
Government for Sydney and the London Development Authority in the Greater London Authority for London - have documented the Olympic sites in relation to their broader urban context in their regional urban strategies, the “Metropolitan Strategy” in Sydney and the “London Plan” in London. These documents designate not only the spatial relationship between the site and the broader city, but also the functional role of the site within the region. On a smaller scale, the local governments, such as the Auburn council in Sydney and the London Borough of Newham, also extensively published spatial strategies, and integration or segregation of the Olympic Park located in their territories would be another interesting issue to explore. In addition to these regional and local planning authorities, site-specific urban regeneration authorities overseeing the development of the site were established, most of which were formed as PPPs. The publications by these regeneration authorities more explicitly suggest the spatial character of the site, including the land-use plan, and the long-term vision beyond the Games. Exploration of the cohesion or conflict in the long-term vision of the Olympic Park between the Olympic authority, the regional or local government, and the site-specific urban regeneration authorities would suggest the divergent nature in creating a vision of an urban precinct within the broader urban context.

In addition to the above documents, during the course of my data collection, I had opportunities to obtain “semi-official documents” in both Sydney and London. These documents were created as progress reports on the Olympic planning, and circulated among the specific public bodies involved in the process. They are therefore understood as partially official documents. Some of my interviewees in Sydney kindly provided me such planning process documents, which were not entirely open to the public when they were published before the Sydney Olympics. Although they did not indicate the final plan, they suggested key benchmarks in the planning process, and therefore I considered them to be valuable document resources. In similar vein, the planning process reports, which I obtained while I worked for the LOP Design Team, provide alternative visions of the post-Olympic Park in comparison to the ones open to the public. These documents were produced by the Design Team and submitted to the related Olympic authorities or regional and local governments, and I will argue that it is valuable to examine the process of shaping the vision of the Olympic legacy.
Interviews with experts
The official documents issued by various authorities are the core resources in my thesis, but I consider that interviews with the people who are involved in producing these publications would provide the stories which are not included in the official documents. My intention in conducting the expert interviews had two aspects. I intended to obtain more detailed information about the facts suggested in the official documents and to explore the forces, aspirations, and possible constraints behind the contents in the documents. As a methodological technique, I employed “semi-structured” interviews. Bryman (2008) argues that the semi-structured interview can be employed with a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered, but the interviewee has a great deal of leeway (Bryman, 2008, p. 438). I will argue that this combination of rigidity and flexibility is suitable for my research. As I asked the interviewees about the forces or aspirations behind the official documents, the contents of the interviews needed to be specific on the one hand. On the other, I expected the interviewees to suggest alternative official documents relevant to my thesis.

As indicated earlier, I set out to find people in similar positions who were involved in the Olympic planning decisions. My selected interviewees are essentially categorised into four groups: officials from the Olympic organisations; the architects or planners from the Olympic Park design teams; government advisors on architecture, urban design and public space; and local councils. They are considered critical personnel in the Olympic and legacy planning, and most of them were also involved in the publication of the Olympic and legacy planning documents (Table 2-3).

Yet there were certain challenges in employing expert interviews in my case studies in Sydney and London. As previously suggested, accessibility of the intended interviewees in Sydney and London was different. In particular, as my time of conducting this thesis was synchronised with the preparation for the 2012 London Olympics, and my analysis can extend to a year after the event, the number of interviewees in London is smaller than in Sydney. Yet, I will again emphasise that I did not rely on the expert interviews as my primary research resources; rather my intention in conducting the expert interviews was to enrich my understanding of the official documents. In this respect, I will argue that despite the different numbers of interviewees in Sydney and London, the expert interviews added depth to my research.
### Table 2-3: Interviewee list in Sydney and London
(Source: Author (2010))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Sydney</th>
<th></th>
<th>London</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Bid</td>
<td>Sydney 1996 Bid Committee</td>
<td>David Churches (*1)</td>
<td>Deputy Director &amp; Head of Planning</td>
<td>London 2012 Bid Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sydney 2000 Bid Committee</td>
<td>David Churches (*1)</td>
<td>Executive Manager, Planning &amp; Design</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOCOG</td>
<td>Michael Knight</td>
<td>President and Olympic Minister</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOCOG</td>
<td>Jim Sloman (*2)</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>David Churches (*1)</td>
<td>Senior Director, Games Planning</td>
<td>ODA / OPLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Robert Adbery</td>
<td>Director-General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dianne Leeson</td>
<td>Director of Planning</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOP Design Team</td>
<td></td>
<td>LOP Design Team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main Stadium Design Team</td>
<td>Rod Sheard (*4)</td>
<td>Principal, HOK Sport</td>
<td>Main Stadium Design Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Mould</td>
<td>NSW Government Architect (2005–)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOPA</td>
<td>Darlen Van der Breegeen</td>
<td>Executive Manager, Design</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brian Bagshaw</td>
<td>Director, Education Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kirsty White (*3)</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auburn Council</td>
<td>Rachel Agyare</td>
<td>Senior Strategic Planner, Planning and Environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Media articles**

In addition to official documents and the interviews with experts, media articles are one of the research resources to be examined. As Scott (1990) suggests, the documentary products of the mass media are major sources of evidence for social
research. There are multiple advantages in utilising media articles such as newspaper and magazine reports and television programmes, but in particular, the following three points are beneficial for my thesis. Firstly, the media articles reflect the progress of Olympic planning more frequently than the official documents. While the official documents demonstrate the final result, the media articles often explore the background of the decision. Secondly, as the official documents tend to deal with the phenomena within their territory, facts beyond their boundaries are seldom mentioned. Media articles observe the phenomena with a much wider view. Thirdly, the media articles often feature interviews with various key personnel, whom I did not have access to. Their comments to the media by no means correspond to my research questions, but parts of the interviews featured in the media are helpful to understand the ideas behind the already publicised facts or visions. Scott however claims that it is imperative to assess media articles through the quality control criteria of authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Scott, 1990, p.143). Bryman further suggests that authenticity and credibility are problematic in media articles. He argues that media articles may contain errors and distortion, and points out that the “contextual factors” need to be considered carefully (Bryman, 2008, p. 525).

Having such methodological opportunities and constraints in my mind, I used two newspapers, the *Sydney Morning Herald* (SMH) and the *London Evening Standard* (LES), as valuable resources for my thesis. Although there are many newspapers in both Australia and the UK, I used these regional newspapers as primary media resources, rather than national newspapers, because the regional newspapers feature Olympic related news more frequently. Further, the articles in the SMH have been referred to as a valuable research resource in various academic papers on the Sydney Olympics, such as the studies by Cashman (2005, 2011) and Searle (2002). The SMH provides a valuable insight into the SOP which researchers struggle to find in the official documents.

### 2.2.5 Visual materials

Finally, I would like to mention the visual representations in my thesis. Given the designated number of words required for the PhD dissertation, it is fundamentally a textual work. Yet there is great interest to be had in examining visual materials, such as
masterplan drawings, architectural drawings, and urban/architectural images extracted from various resources, and also representing them as interpreted diagrams, which are frequently used in architectural and urban studies. Exploration of visual materials is valuable especially in comparing the different spatial visions of the Olympic Park in different phases. Yet, as different masterplans issued in different times applied different graphic standards, sometimes it is difficult to simply relate different masterplan drawings. I therefore use my own diagrams in this thesis, when necessary. These diagrams were interpreted from original masterplan drawings, and were drawn with the same graphic rules. This helps us to understand explicitly the differences between the different masterplans published in various periods. Thus, I used various original images extracted from the sources and my own interpreted spatial diagrams for the chronological and multiple case study analysis. These images are collected in the second volume of this thesis.
Part I: The Pre-Bid Phase

Chapters 3 and 4 will explore the origin and subsequent development of the visions for the Olympic parks in Sydney and London before the two cities won the right to stage the Olympic Games. Although the IOC currently recognises the pre-bid phase as the two-year period prior to the bid decision, my exploration in this part is much longer than this. As I proposed in the previous chapter, I will define Sydney’s pre-bid phase as being from the early 1960s to September 1993 and London’s as the period between the late 1970s and July 2005, and I will focus on examining the evolving process involved in shaping the vision of the Olympics and the various political aspirations behind it. Regarding the forces behind the shaping of the spatial vision of the specific urban space, I employ Roberts and Sykes’s suggestion that the changes are wrought “from within and without” (Roberts and Sykes, 2000, p. 24) and Branch et al’s argument that a “mega-event is seen as largely imposed from outside” (Branch et al., 1984, p. 55).

Thus, each of these two chapters will begin with a discussion of the evolution of the Olympic vision in the region, as a planning process integrating the Olympic impacts in the ongoing regional planning strategy. Subsequently, I will discuss the non-Olympic vision, which could emerge from an idea about regenerating the post-industrial site, and is developed in the local or regional planning context. Following discussion of various visions proposed by different regional authorities, I will explore how they come together in the Olympic site in question. As Sydney and London had different histories in regard to this planning exercise, the number of spatial plans examined in these parts are different, but I will critically examine the compatibility of the different vision as the crucial characteristic of the mixed-use urban strategy (Coupland, 1997). Along with the examination of the Olympic site, I will also examine how it relates to the broader urban context, as a crucial issue which Judd conceptualises as creating the “bubble” in the urban tissue (Judd, 1999).
Chapter 3: Sydney

3.1 Olympic vision

3.1.1 Beginning of the Olympic vision: Bidding for the 1972 Games

Sydney’s first bidding campaign emerged in the 1960s in relation to the 1972 Olympic Games, which were eventually awarded to Munich in Germany. Although the Homebush Bay area was not considered as a venue in this bid, it included the key aspects of Sydney’s subsequent Olympic bid campaigns: the strong connection with the regeneration of underutilised industrial sites as main sites for the Games, use of public–private partnerships (PPPs), and the financial constraints of the regional government. The proposed main venue in the 1972 Games bid was located at St Peters, the inner-suburb of Sydney. The initial idea of creating a sports complex was the result of one man’s political aspirations. Lord Mayor Henry Jensen put great emphasis on the lack of sporting facilities in the Sydney region and the necessity of a regional sports complex, which could be used not only by every citizen but could also hold an Olympic or an Empire Games (Little, 1997, p. 80).

However, Sydney’s bid for the 1972 Games faced inevitable financial difficulties in terms of constructing the sports complex; therefore, a PPP – a model also employed in subsequent campaigns – was planned in order to reduce public expenditure.28 Nevertheless, the Sydney Olympic proposal suffered because it coincided with the most difficult and controversial period in the history of the construction of the Sydney Opera House and the Premier of the New South Wales (NSW) region, Robert Askin, was understandably reluctant to commit his government to another high-profile project that could seriously drain State finances (Jobling, 1994. The financial difficulty of securing the construction project was thus a major trigger for Sydney withdrawing its bid for the 1972 Games.

28 The involvement of the NSW Rugby League in the construction of the main stadium and its post-Olympic usages was expected to drastically reduce the level of public expenditure.
3.1.2 Emergence of Homebush Bay as an Olympic site: Bidding for the 1988 Games

Following its withdrawal of the 1972 Olympic bid, Sydney’s aspiration to stage the Olympic Games in 1988 emerged and was synchronised with its Bicentennial celebration of European settlement in 1788. The State Government, led by the Liberal National Party, had a great interest in staging the Games, and the Citizen of Sydney 1988 Olympic Games Committee was appointed in 1970 with Deputy Lord Mayor Alderman Nicholas Shehadie as chairman (Jobling, 1994). One of the biggest concerns for the Committee was the location of Olympic venues. The Committee initially identified Moore Park and the Centennial Park area for the construction of a new Olympic stadium. Moore Park was established in 1886, and the proximity to Sydney’s Central Business District (CBD) and availability of hotels and temporary accommodation (using the University dormitories) was the reason behind the selection of Moore Park as a proposed main venue for the 1988 Olympic Games (Development Planning & Research Associates, 1971, p. 32). Yet building the new Olympic stadium and turning Moore Park into a larger sports complex meant the demolition of a whole neighbourhood around the area and therefore the proposal caused a storm of protest in 1970 and 1971 (Weirick, 1998, pp. 74–75). The architect Walter Bunning was therefore commissioned for a special one-off study reviewing the use of Moore Park and identifying potential alternative sites for Sydney’s sports complex (Howell, 1995, p. 9). The final report (called the Bunning Report) became an important and influential document for the subsequent planning decisions around Sydney’s sports complex, and it suggested abandoning the use of Moore Park and instead recommended the Homebush Bay area 14 km west of the CBD for Sydney’s sports complex site. It was the first governmental document suggesting the Homebush Bay area for Sydney’s major sports complex, and Bunning began the report by questioning the role of the sports complex:

“[w]hether the priority is for facilities for an Olympic Games or whether the continuing recreational needs of Sydney’s present and future population is to be the major consideration... [t]he prudent policy would be to select an area which would satisfy the requirements for holding the Olympic Games, but to ensure the site would fundamentally satisfy the recreational requirements of the total metropolitan population present and future, exclusive of the international event” (Bunning, 1973, pp. 1-2).
It was clear that Bunning envisaged that satisfying both Olympic and post-Olympic uses of the sports complex would be critical in deciding the location of the new regional sports complex. He pointed out the following five key factors in selecting the site:

1. Proximity to the centre of the present and future population;
2. Accessibility by private and public transport from residential areas and the international airport;
3. Affordable distance from the hotels and central city areas (20 minutes from the CBD by public transport);
4. Size of the area to be large enough to accommodate the main facilities of an Olympic Complex; and
5. Representation of the image of a young and progressive country.

These are the critical reasons why Bunning argues that the Homebush Bay area was more suitable for Sydney’s sports complex than the Moore Park area. The identification of “the geographical centre” in the region was the most crucial factor among them and Bunning was fully aware of the significant spatial expansion of Sydney’s population outwards. This eventually became recognised as the crucial advantage of Homebush Bay in the west compared to Moore Park in the east. Bunning addressed that,

“[w]hen the existing facilities were established in the Moore Park area in 1886, 65% of the population of metropolitan Sydney was living within a 5 mile radius of the Sydney Cricket Ground. Since this original establishment the population of Sydney has spread outward to the south-west, west and north to the extent that the Moore Park areas has inconvenient access for the majority of the population” (Bunning, 1973, p. 7).

The Bunning Report’s suggestion of Homebush Bay as “the centre of the geographical distribution of Sydney’s present and future population” cohered with government concerns about the lack of public facilities in the emerging western suburbs. Spearritt and De Marco point out that, as most settlement patterns in Sydney’s suburbs showed, community facilities were rarely provided in step with residential growth, and the social agencies did not have the “political muscle” to secure such facilities (Spearritt and
DeMarco, 1988, p. 67). Bunning’s notion of the sports complex was that it was not only for mega-events but also for the long-term everyday use of Sydney’s citizens. Although the physical character of the sports facilities needed for international events and local usages was very different, he nevertheless argued convincingly that the location of the sports complex had to be synchronised with the demands on such public facilities (Fig. 3-1).

3.1.3 Intensification of the sporting character in Homebush Bay: Bidding for the 1996 Games

After the last-minute withdrawal of the bid for the 1988 Games in 1979, Sydney did not enter the bidding for the 1992 Games. Yet when the Liberal Party won the election in March 1988 and Nicholas Frank Greiner became the Premier on 25 March 1988, Greiner announced in May 1988 the formation of the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen’s Council, which aimed to submit an application for the 1996 Games (Howell, 1995, p. 15). Although Sydney eventually lost the national competition for selecting the Australian bid city to Melbourne, the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen’s Council’s proposal for the 1996 Games had greatly evolved from the previous 1988 bid.

The Homebush Bay area was again designated as the main venue for the 1988 Games, and in order to make the bid proposal stronger, more competition venues were planned to be concentrated in the area (Fig. 3-2). Yet the concern with this approach was financial feasibility in terms of the regional government’s limited resources and long-term viability in sustaining the facilities. Thus, in-depth strategic long-term planning was required, and re-organisation of the regional sporting structures became the workable solution for this. The Sydney Olympic Games Citizen’s Council pointed out that relocating the existing sports facilities to Homebush Bay and selling the previous site for new development would be useful means of satisfying both financial and post-Olympic functional constraints. Two sporting facilities became the targets for this strategy: they were the existing Royal Agriculture Society’s showground at Moore Park and the Harness Racing Paceway located at Harold Park close to Sydney’s CBD.

The benefits of these facilities being relocated to Homebush Bay was to attract more people with upgraded facilities, although in the case of Harness Racing Paceway, it was also very much connected with the severe inter-state competition in Australia to stage
limited horse racing events (Cowley, 1988). Furthermore, the sale of the existing lands of both facilities would raise enough funds to build new facilities in Homebush Bay, and this was also a key benefit for the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen’s Council. Thus, the Council put great emphasis on constructing the new Royal Agriculture Society’s showground in Homebush Bay (Sydney Olympic Games Citizen's Council, 1988a, p. 57) and promoted the relocation of the Harness Racing Paceway by stating that “for the first time, all equestrian events will be held at the main Olympic site in the recently announced new Sydney Harness Racing Track” (Sydney Olympic Games Citizen's Council, 1988b, p. 2).²⁹

Although the relocation of these facilities was considered to be beneficial for the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen’s Council, the Royal Agriculture Society and the Harness Racing Association, this view was not fully shared in the regional planning context. The relocation of the showground in particular became a matter of dispute among the different authorities in the State Government, and caused public debate. David Churches, the Deputy Director of the Sydney Olympic Games Secretariat for the 1996 bid, gives some insight into the conflicts with the State Government as follows:

“[t]he democratic centre of the population in Sydney is not here (the Moore Park) but here (Homebush Bay). So the feeling (of the Bid Committee) was that facilities for the Olympic Games which would also include broad community use should more sensibly be in this location (Homebush Bay) rather than in a city centre. […] For the legacy it was good for Sydney to develop this new concept here (Homebush Bay). So moving the showground became the core part of that strategy. But it was difficult because the planning department of the State Government always had poor regard for that. They were quite opposed to this, because they’d already made up their mind that the showground should be in the city centre (the Moore Park), none of which could take the Olympic Games. They were very inflexible in their thinking about how we could use this opportunity. If I believe there was a failure right back to this stage, it was the fact that government authorities didn’t treat this as an opportunity in the right

²⁹ The new Paceway in Homebush was not included in the final bid document, yet the document suggested its possibility.
As the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen’s Council was established by the NSW Premier as a special authority for delivering the Olympic bid document, and it was independent from the NSW Department of Planning, the different views on the relocation of the Royal Agriculture Society’s showground entailed a conflict between the special and normal planning authorities. As such, it reflected the different approaches to the location of public facilities within the NSW planning structure.

In addition to this, the sale of historical public assets and development of the existing site also became both political and public concerns. The questions surrounding the future of the showground were extensively reported by the regional newspapers such as the Sydney Morning Herald, and a new housing development at the existing Harness Racing Paceway site in Harold Park created significant tension with the local municipality, regarding the legal approval of the plans due to the lack of a consultation process. Thus, the concentration of the sporting facilities in Homebush Bay was envisioned as part of a significant restructuring of Sydney’s sporting landscape, but the dispute over these urban changes critically represented the different interests of the different authorities involved.

3.1.4 Bidding for the 2000 Games

Despite a significant campaign backing Homebush Bay as a focal point for the Olympic Games, Sydney lost the Australian 1996 Olympic candidature competition to Melbourne in November 1988. Yet the scheme to bid for the subsequent 2000 Games was formulated just one month later. There were several different points in terms of the formulation of the bid proposal. First, the governance of the bid proposal was more firmly related to the regional government’s regenerative vision for Homebush Bay rather than isolating it, as had been the case in the previous bid. In this vein, the Premier Nick Greiner formed the Homebush Bay Development Strategy Committee (HBDSC). The primary focus of the Committee was not the Olympics but rather a general

30 Interview with David Churches with the author on 26 November 2008.
31 As the existing land was not designated for residential use, it needed to be re-zoned, but the Mayor of Leichhardt (the Local council) claimed that the council rejected the re-zoning proposal. Rawland Smith stated the opinion of the NSW Government that all political parties agreed to support the Olympics, and suggested the NSW Government had the power to override the decision (Holmes, P. (1988) Paceway: Key to Olympic Bid?, In Sydney Morning Herald on 20 October 1988.).
development strategy for the Homebush Bay area. It fundamentally considered the Homebush Bay area to be a highly mixed urban precinct, and sports use was one of the dominant uses at the site along with the newly established industrial/technological park, the Australian Centre. Echoing the final report to the NSW Government by the HBDSC, the Premier formed the Sydney Olympic Games Review Committee on 23 October 1989 to examine the feasibility of Sydney’s bid for the 2000 Games. The final report of the Review Committee, “the Baird Report”, was issued on 11 December 1990, and Homebush Bay was again recommended as the most appropriate location for the principal Olympic venues.

Secondly, the bid for the 2000 Games required intensifying the sporting character of Homebush Bay in a much deeper way than the previous bid had. In addition to the relocation of the Royal Agriculture Society’s showground as proposed in the previous bid, construction of new aquatic and athletic centres was recommended, irrespective to the result of the bid (Sydney Olympic Games Review Committee, 1990, pp. 5–6). This was considered as critical for Sydney to show the IOC that it already had the infrastructure ready or at least in development. The President of the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), John Coates, also claimed that:

“[u]nless at least two major Games facilities – the aquatics centre and the State athletics centre – were built, the bid would be withdrawn […] financing of the bid was solely a matter for Premier Greiner and the Federal Government but, without the infrastructure, the Australian committee would withdraw Australia's nomination” (cited in Seccombe, 1991).

The NSW Government submitted the Olympic Games plan to the Commonwealth Government in January 1991. The Report, titled “Sydney Bid for 2000 Olympic Games”, set out how the development of Homebush Bay would be implemented in different stages: prior to the 1993 IOC decision, after the 1993 IOC decision and the post-Olympic phase. However, it clearly indicated that the construction of the aquatic and athletic centres (in the secondary track in the initial phase) and the sports halls, which would be part of the Royal Agriculture Society’s showground complex, would happen in the first phase, irrespective of the bid result.
Thirdly, unlike in the previous bid, this phasing strategy was necessary for the State Government to clarify both its maximum and minimum expectations in regard to the Olympic bid. The State Government also outlined two scenarios for the development of Homebush Bay, in the case of a successful and unsuccessful bid. It suggested that if Sydney’s bid was successful, various sporting facilities including the main Olympic stadium would be built before the 2000 Olympics and anticipated that commercial and industrial developments would be implemented after 2000 by selling surplus land, which could be created by staging the Games. In the case of an unsuccessful bid, it suggested that development of Homebush Bay would be slower, but the relocation of the RAS showground and construction of an additional athletic field would still be implemented (NSW Government, 1991, pp. 19–28).

Fourthly, the financial arrangements for the bid were more complex than previously. As the AOC set the hurdles for the 2000 Olympic bid higher, the construction of the aquatic and athletic centres in Homebush Bay became vital for Sydney to proceed with the bid campaign. The most critical issue for the NSW Government was to mobilise the financial resources to construct these facilities before the bid, and it had to seek the financial assistance of the Commonwealth Government. Following the evaluation of the above report, the Commonwealth Government agreed to provide an extra AU$ 300 million to the NSW Government. In addition to this, Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited was established as a private–public consortium, whose members included influential businessmen, politicians and sportspersons. It aimed at preparing and promoting Sydney’s bid and seeking funds from both public and private sources, (SOCOG, 2001, vol. 1, pp. 14–15) with a highly ambitious bid plan proposing “the greatest concentration of sports at a single site in the modern Olympic history” (Sydney Olympics 2000 Bid Ltd, 1993b, p. 6).

Fifthly, the 2000 bid was more thematised than the previous bid. It cohered with the IOC’s great championing of the enhancement of the environmental sustainability of Olympic Games. Ever-increasing concerns surrounding global warming and severe critiques of the destruction of the local eco-system caused by the Olympic Games (in particular the Winter Games) had forced the IOC to take the environmental dimension of the Olympics seriously in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Cantelon and Letters,
The IOC eventually enshrined environmental protection as the third pillar of the Olympic Movement along with sport and culture in 1994, and established the IOC Sports and Environment Commission in 1995. Against this backdrop, the bid for the 2000 Games was the first bid for the summer Olympic Games in which the IOC asked bid cities to set out the environmental dimension of their Olympic-led urban planning (IOC, 1992). The Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited took this advantage, and connected it to the regional ambition to regenerate the post-industrial site in Homebush Bay. Sydney’s bid concept of a “Green Games” in this respect can be seen as the perfect response to the IOC’s existing political concerns. Jim Sloman, the chief operating officer of the Sydney Games, explicitly pointed out that “pushing the button” the IOC wants to see is a key to a bidding campaign. In Sloman’s terms, the crucial “button” for the IOC in the 2000 Olympics bid was certainly “environmental concern”. Thus, Sydney’s concept of a “Green Games” and the masterplan image presented in the bid document certainly matched the IOC’s priorities.

The final bid proposal was submitted to the IOC in 1993, and it is worth noting that the definition of the “Sydney Olympic Park” was greatly different to previous bids. In the previous bids the Olympic Park was the area including the sporting venues, but in the 2000 bid document the term “Sydney Olympic Park” indicated the wider Homebush Bay area, thus including sporting venues, the Main Press Centre (part of the Royal Agriculture Society’s showground), and Olympic villages for athletes, media and technical staff. In other words, the term “Sydney Olympic Park” represented the broader Homebush Bay area where most of the 2000 Olympic Games would be concentrated (Fig. 3-3).

### 3.2 Industrial vision

#### 3.2.1 The industrial past of Homebush Bay

While the Olympic vision and its associated “sporting aspiration” in Homebush Bay had been shaped along with Sydney’s long history of Olympic bid campaigns, an industrial
vision of the area had also been separately developed. It was in the Newington area, west of the Homebush site, where various manufacturers had emerged in the late nineteenth century, and major industrial development in Homebush Bay had commenced at the beginning of twentieth century, when a major part of the land was sold to the State Government in 1907 for the construction of the State Abattoir (Council of the Municipality of Auburn, 1982, p. 53). The Abattoir officially opened in 1913, and it had been developed with significant meat-production capacity and was described as “the largest slaughter complex in the world” by the 1920s. The area used for the Abattoirs also significantly extended, and west of Haslams Creeks, which was the southern part of Newington, was also used for holding stock for many years. The significance of these industrial developments lies not only in their extensive role in supplying products to the Sydney region, but also in their connection to the neighbourhood. For example, the *Daily Telegraph* on 17 January 1908 stated as follows:

“The district is growing in importance as a manufacturing centre, and numbers of men are finding employment. The district is greatly favoured by manufacturers owing to its proximity to the metropolis. It is authoritatively stated that the establishment of the Abattoirs will see the initiation of several industries, which give regular employment to hundreds of men.”

Similar to this, various past newspapers and historical documents suggested that the industrial facilities in Homebush certainly had a strong economic connection with surrounding neighbourhoods through their provision of employment opportunities.

However, the economic significance of the Abattoirs declined in the 1960s, as serious problem with maintenance of the facilities arose and the State Government pursued a policy of encouraging slaughter houses in rural areas. Despite the major modernisation process undertaken between 1965 and 1976, the Abattoir struggled to secure its

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37 Historical record of Newington and Homebush Bay, archived at the Auburn Municipal Library. The area was used as an armament depot during the 1940s.


39 It is also worth noting that because of the development of the Abattoirs in Homebush, the Newington area also got an opportunity to provide homes for its workers. Although the idea of establishing a residential block in Newington for the workers in the Abattoirs did not materialise, a housing development called “River Height Estate” was promoted as a convenient location, to which workers came home from the industrial centre by crossing the bridge over Haslams Creek.
financial viability, and its land was therefore subdivided and sold in various phases until its eventual closure in 1988.

In a similar vein, the State Brickworks also experienced a rise and fall in its manufacturing significance in Homebush Bay. The State Brickworks was established adjacent to the Abattoirs by the State Government in 1911, and enlarged to 23.5 ha by 1925. Yet the Brickworks showed a declining profit margin, and were sold to the private enterprise Brickworks Limited in 1936. However, its profitability did not improve and it was eventually closed in 1940. Nevertheless, the Brickworks were re-established by the State Government after the Second World War, and extensively developed with the post-war construction boom. Its production peak came in 1969, but it too faced operational losses in the 1970s, similar to the case of the Abattoirs. The Brickworks ceased trading as a government enterprise in June 1988.

As both the State Abattoirs and Brickworks had long provided job opportunities to the area, the closure of these facilities had a great economic impact on the local Auburn Council. It was therefore deemed crucial for the Auburn Council to be able to integrate its job demands into the post-Games industrial site. This was also vital so as to keep the area’s identity as “Sydney’s industrial hub” (NSW Department of Industrial Development and Decentralisation, 1986, p. i) (Fig. 3-4).

Along with the industrial development of Homebush Bay, its role in waste dumping should be acknowledged and it is well known that the Homebush Bay landscape was shaped by both controlled and uncontrolled dumping. Sydney’s rapid expansion in the 1950s and 60s and the start of the “throw-away” society meant people and industry needed more space for their waste. Fig. 3-5 shows the evolution of landfill in Homebush Bay, and it clearly illustrates how the shape of land in Homebush Bay was manipulated over time (Fig. 3-5). An estimated 9 million cubic metres of waste and

41 Historical record of Newington and Homebush Bay, archived at the Auburn Municipal Library.
Excavation of the clay pit was abandoned much earlier and it was utilised as a municipal waste depot from the 1960s.
contaminated soils was spread over 400 hectares within the 760-hectare site by 1988.\textsuperscript{44} Needless to say, this contaminated site became a significant constraint to subsequent urban regeneration, and the location and degree of contamination was a critical factor in designating the alternative land use in Homebush Bay.

3.2.2 The evolving role of Homebush Bay in the regional planning framework

The role of the Homebush Bay area in the broader Sydney region has also been reflected in wider regional planning policies. Regarding the spatial planning of the region, the “Metropolitan Strategy” is considered the critical document in relation to Sydney’s development strategies. By the time Sydney won the bid for the 2000 Games in 1993, three versions had been issued in 1948, 1968 and 1988.\textsuperscript{45} As the main focus of the plans is addressing regional spatial strategies, the documents do not intend to identify in depth the character of specific places, but it is still critical and possible to contextualise Homebush Bay within the Sydney region from the metropolitan viewpoint. The following chronological view to the regional strategy unveils the changing role of Homebush Bay in the regional context.

Sydney’s first regional planning strategy, “the Cumberland Plan”, was issued in 1948 and enforced in 1951. It was the urban growth strategy for the period between 1951 and 1975, and promoted a close relationship between living and working within the inner Green Belt. Major living and industrial areas were therefore designated in the region in a consolidated manner, yet Homebush Bay was designated as neither a living nor an industrial area but rather as a special area (Fig. 3-6).

Although the State Abattoirs and Brickworks were in operation at the time of publication, and provided significant job opportunities in the area, from the regional viewpoint Homebush Bay was recognised as highly isolated from other parts of the region and as playing a supportive role in regional economic activities rather than a viable urban space in which living and working had a complementary relationship.

Homebush Bay was however identified differently in the subsequent regional spatial strategy, the “Sydney Region Outline Plan, 1970–2000” published in March 1968. In

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{45} The “Sydney Region Outline Plan, 1970–2000” (1968) was re-examined in 1980, and “Review, Sydney Region Outline Plan, 1970–2000” was published.
criticising the previous plan as lacking the flexibility to accommodate the scale and rate of growth in Sydney, the Outline Plan instead proposed liner-pattern development based on existing railway lines as a spatial development strategy for Sydney’s future. The Homebush Bay area was located exactly on the western expansion corridor (The State Planning Authority of NSW, 1968, p. 15). Special uses were proposed for the rural areas in the region, and half of Homebush Bay (Newington side) was designated a consolidated industrial area and the other half (Homebush side) was integrated into the “existing urban area” (Fig. 3-7). “Urban area” in this Metropolitan Strategy included the residential function, but residential use did not exist in Homebush Bay when the Metropolitan Strategy was issued in 1968. This means that while Homebush Bay was to continue to provide employment opportunities as an industrial site, it was also intended to become part of the urban tissues including residential uses.

The NSW Department of Planning later issued the regional planning strategy, “Sydney into Its Third Century, Metropolitan Strategy for the Sydney Region”, in 1988. The plan advocates the continuation of the principal development strategy of linear urban expansion along the transport corridors proposed in the previous Sydney Region Outline Plan (NSW Department of Planning, 1988, p. 45). Proximity between working and living was also again enhanced in the Metropolitan Strategy, and in order to bring more jobs closer to the workforce and to create a more convenient and lively environment, it designated three regional centres: Sydney CBD, North Sydney and Parramatta, and 16 sub-regional centres. Homebush Bay was ambiguously located in the vast carpet of “existing and committed urban” area, but this stemmed from the fact that, unlike the previous Regional Outline Plan, the Metropolitan Strategy did not take responsibility for land-use zoning but left it to local councils (Fig. 3-8).

Although the in-depth spatial strategy became the responsibility of the local council, the Homebush Bay area was under the control of the regional government, which was authorised to issue its own Regional Environment Plan. The Regional Environment Plan was a basis for State Government intervention in the planning of the region or part of the region (Gurran, 2007, p. 222)\textsuperscript{46} and the first Regional Environment Plan on Homebush Bay was issued in 1986 by the NSW Government. Although the Homebush area was part of the existing urban area in the Metropolitan Strategy, the Regional Environment Plan was a basis for State Government intervention in the planning of the region or part of the region (Gurran, 2007, p. 222)\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{46} According to Gurran, the definition of ‘region’ in the REP is very broad and can include a defined geographical region extending across two or more local governments or a particular place of declared regional significance.
Environment Plan extensively addressed the dominance of the industrial use in Homebush Bay. This implied that the term “industrial” in the Regional Environment Plan did not mean heavy industry as in the previous industrial uses in Homebush Bay but rather indicated a lighter and more high-tech industry, which could fit with other urban functions. The Metropolitan Strategy identified the significance of the industrial use in the region, but it also recognised replacement of some older industries by new industries in the inner industrial zones (Spearritt and DeMarco, 1988, p. 33).

3.2.3 New industrial development in Homebush Bay

Decline of the State-run industrial facilities and recognition of the need for “new” industrial uses in Homebush Bay in the 1980s pushed the transformation of the industrial area. Yet the opportunity for the new development began much earlier, as various pieces of the State’s own land had been released for sale. During the 1960s the area between the rail loop in the State Abattoirs site and the Parramatta Road was subdivided and sold for industrial development to provide funds for the construction of the new sales yard in the Abattoirs. An area west of the rail loop was also released for construction of a new waste transformation centre in the early 1980s, and it was also decided to conduct further release of surplus land for industrial use in 1982 and 1983 as a part of a review of the Abattoir operation.

An arrangement was reached in 1984 with Lend Lease, one of the major development companies in Australia, for the progressive release of a 50ha site for development as an advanced technology park, named “the Australian Centre”. Unlike the previous State Government-led industrial developments, these new developments were carried out by private enterprises. The consolidated way of transforming old types of manufacturing into an advanced technological park via a PPP was understood as the State Government’s general strategy for urban transformation in the region, and Homebush Bay was, in this respect, considered a model of urban transformation for the Sydney region at the time. This was also considered beneficial to the local Auburn Municipality, as it would potentially compensate for the loss of jobs in the local area. This was particularly true when one considers the limited available land for this purpose in Western Sydney. The NSW Governmental document “Development Trends in Western Sydney” recognised that the availability of land in the municipality had virtually been

47 Historical record of Newington and Homebush Bay, archived at the Auburn Municipal Library.
exhausted, and future development in the area would predominantly need to involve the redevelopment of older-style industrial properties (NSW Department of Industrial Development and Decentralisation, 1986, p. 4). Yet there were also great concerns about whether the private-led development would fit with the existing character of the area around Homebush Bay, especially along the Parramatta Road, developed as a major warehousing/distribution centre (Kennedy and Kennedy, 1982). Thus, the establishment of “the Australian Centre”, which was largely a result of the regional government’s urban “entrepreneurialisation” schemes, contained some uncertainties in terms of its future integration with the adjacent industrial use. This became a crucial factor in defining the future of Homebush Bay.

3.3 Evolution of the mixed-use vision in Homebush Bay

As indicated in the previous part, there have been various forces shaping the use of Homebush Bay. In particular, industrial use and sporting use were envisioned separately at least until 1993 when Sydney finalised its vision for Homebush Bay in the bidding for the 2000 Olympic Games. During this period, Sydney undertook three bids, in 1979, 1988 and 1993, and each bid became a significant benchmark for the subsequent visions of land use. Furthermore, between each bid, various masterplans were proposed to shape the use of Homebush Bay. Thus, there was great evolution of the mixed-use vision in Homebush Bay, as graphically demonstrated in (Fig. 3-9). In the following part, instead of describing each masterplan and the chorological evolution of the vision for Homebush Bay, I will take a more analytical approach, examining three issues during the 30-year journey of Sydney’s bid campaign. Firstly, I will examine the significance of the Olympic impacts in shaping the vision of the mixed-use Homebush Bay. I will subsequently focus on the periods between the three Olympic bids, which I will call interim periods, and investigate the various attempts made in these times. Finally, I will explore that final bid proposal which defined the basic spatial strategy for the Olympic Park in Homebush Bay in the subsequent phases.

3.3.1 Olympic impacts

Throughout the long journey of Sydney’s Olympic bid, one of the most significant
changes brought about by the bid was the intensification of sporting uses, and the degree to which sporting venues were proposed in Homebush Bay increased as the years went on. As Fig. 3-10 shows, only three venues were proposed for the Games in the 1988 Olympic bid, but the number grew to 13 including two already built venues in the 2000 bid (Fig. 3-10).

It is understood that a significant force behind this was the IOC’s influence on the host city, as the concentration of sporting venues has been strongly encouraged by the IOC. The IOC indicated in its “Manual for Cities Bidding for the Olympic Games” (1992) as follows:

“The geographical area occupied by the sports installations required to cater for the Olympic programme should be as compact as possible. This can be a vital element for the awarding of the Games. In any case, it will facilitate organization of the media centres, press access to the different sports, transport, accommodation, links with the Olympic village, logistics in general” (emphasis added) (IOC, 1992, p. 51).

Venue concentration was thus clearly indicated as an essential factor for winning the bid, and thus this can be understood as an example of Preuss’s concept of the “Prisoner’s dilemma” in which he argues that bid cities would offer more than the IOC required without knowing other bidders’ proposals, in order to win the right to stage the Games under severe inter-urban competition (Preuss, 2004, p. 290). Given the marked increase in the popularity of hosting the Games since the 1980s (Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Shirai, 2008), Sydney had to intensify the sporting vision of Homebush Bay much more, and this eventually had crucial impacts in the defining of the spatial character of the future Homebush Bay.

In addition to the increase of sporting venues in Homebush along with Sydney’s bids, there were also significant changes in the area that sporting uses occupied in Homebush Bay. The 1988 proposal (1979), which evolved from the Bunning Report (1973), proposed the sporting and residential area be located at the periphery of the Homebush Bay area, because it respected the existing State-owned industrial use located in the middle of the area. However, sporting uses gradually evolved to be concentrated in the
centre of the area. This was partially because of the closure of the State Abattoirs and Brickworks, but it also represented the dominance of sporting over industrial use at the site. The bid plan for the 1996 Games (1988), in particular, gave crucial momentum to the prospect of changing the previously envisioned industrial use at the core of Homebush Bay to sports at the heart of the area, constraining industrial use to the periphery of the site. However, this caused the spatial isolation of the already established high-tech industrial park, the Australian Centre. The bid committee for the 1996 Games, the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen's Council, clearly stated the great demand for light industrial uses in Homebush Bay and therefore strategically located the Media Centre with the legacy transformation in mind (Sydney Olympic Games Citizen's Council, 1988a, p. 124). Yet it failed to integrate the existing industrial use into the bid plan, as the Committee considered it as incompatible with ongoing bid components.

A further significant impact of the Olympic bid to the spatial vision of Homebush Bay was to trigger the residential development in Homebush Bay. All three bids proposed to construct the Olympic village in the area and convert it into saleable residential units afterwards. This strategy was also synchronised with the NSW Government’s urban consolidation policy, as the Sydney Olympic Games Citizen's Council for example clearly states:

“[t]he construction of the Olympic villages and their transformation into the consolidated residential areas after the Games allow a major demonstration of the Government commitment to urban consolidation” (Sydney Olympic Games Citizen's Council, 1988a, p. 58) (emphasis added).

This urban consolidation had been promoted by the NSW Government, in particular by the Department of Environment and Planning, to satisfy diverse residential needs with lower infrastructure and social costs for local and regional government (NSW Department of Environment and Planning, 1984, pp. 4–5). The Department of Environment and Planning had also greatly enhanced the involvement of the private sector in implementing the urban consolidation in terms of the local council’s area target of provision of residences (NSW Department of Environment and Planning, 1984, p. 31). Against this backdrop, each bid committee proposed constructing the Olympic
villages as close as possible to the sporting venues, which has been the IOC’s favoured approach, and proposed to locate them at the primary location in the area. In the later phase of the bid, it was envisaged that the private sector would contribute to the implementation of the Village, but questions were raised about whether the Bid Committee, which consisted of influential regional business and political leaders, could integrate local demand for post-Olympic housing in the Bid proposal.

3.3.2 Interim periods

Between Sydney’s three Olympic bids were two interim periods, which I will stress as crucial phases shaping the mixed-use vision further. Yet there were significant differences between the spatial visions and the political interventions in these two periods. The first interim period between the bids for the 1988 Games (1979) and 1996 Games (1989) was dominated by the industrial vision of the new Homebush Bay. As a legacy of the bid for the 1988 Games, the State Sports Centre and the Bicentennial Park were constructed at the south-east side of Homebush Bay, and this became “the nucleus of a new recreation zone for the Western part of Sydney”, which fitted into the Government’s urban strategy of shifting activities away from the CBD and established Parramatta as an alternative centre (NSW Department of Environment and Planning, 1982, p. 6). However, other than these new sporting recreational uses, the focus in this period had been to create the new Homebush Bay as a first-class industrial site, in the shadow of ongoing uncertainty regarding the continuation of the existing State industrial facilities. There were various masterplans issued by both public and private sector actors in this period, but most of them considered the core of Homebush Bay as being for industrial use.

The McLachlan Study (1982) conducted at the request of an inter-departmental Steering Committee under the auspices of the NSW Department of Environment and Planning, the Hub Scheme (1983) proposed by the Impetus Consulting Group, a consortium of private professional firms with planning and development expertise, the Lend Lease Plan (1985) conducted by the developer which established the Australian Centre at the site, and the Regional Environment Plan (1986) undertaken by the NSW Government all saw Homebush Bay as “Sydney’s first technology, industry and business park” (Homebush Bay Development Strategy Committee, 1989, p. 27). However, the problem was that there was no single authority which took responsibility for the development of
Homebush Bay, and this made each plan different and lacking a cohesive approach. Residential use, which synchronised with the regional government’s urban consolidation policy, for example, was initially proposed in the McLachlan Study (1982), but this was not continuously represented in the subsequent plans. Integration of existing uses, such as the already established sports precinct and the adjacent industrial neighbourhood, also varied in each plan. Although the Homebush Bay area was designated as under the regional government’s planning control in the later phase of the first interim period, its planning role was nonetheless limited, and formulating the strategic long-term spatial plan was not part of the remit. Thus, the various masterplans published in the first interim period greatly represented each author’s aspirations rather than integrated various spatial conditions and requirements into one plan.

However, the second interim period, which was between the bids for the 1996 and 2000 Games (1989–2003 working period) took a more strategic approach. As indicated earlier, as soon as Sydney lost the bid for the 1996 Games, the NSW Premier established the Homebush Bay Development Strategy Committee (HBDSC) to examine an integrated, coordinated development strategy for the precinct.48 The primary objectives of the HBSC were to advise the Government on all aspects of the development of Homebush Bay, to formulate options for development strategies and appropriate means of implementation, and to recommend to the Government a programme of future land use, staged development and management of assets to secure long-term benefits for metropolitan Sydney (HBDSC, 1989, p. 1). The HBDSC published the final report, “Report to Government, 30th June, 1989: Homebush Bay development strategy”, on 30 June 1989, and as soon as it was accepted by the NSW Premier the Property Service Group (PSG) was subsequently established, which was responsible for implementing the strategy for developing Homebush Bay. The PSG followed the recommendations of the HBDSC and its strategic plan, “Homebush Bay Business Plan”, was published in August 1990. The main concern of the HBDSC and the PSG was not sports use in Homebush Bay as in the Olympic bid plan, but they rather explored a more comprehensive approach, including housing, commercial, industrial, and sports/recreational uses. The two planning documents published by the HBDSC and PSG in the second interim period demonstrate the State Government’s significant

48 The Committee also considered the future development strategy for the contingent sites, where existing activities were proposed to relocate to Homebush Bay, such as the RAS Showground at Paddington, the E.S. Marks Field at Kensington, the Harness Racing Club at Harold Park, and the Granville Showground at Clyde.
intention to regenerate the entire Homebush Bay area.

However, as the HBDSC’s approach was to create a speculative vision of Homebush Bay to maximise its land use, and the PSG’s role was to create a feasible strategy to implement the development, the masterplans proposed by both bodies were different in various aspects. For example, the HBDSC proposed to change many existing areas in the west of Homebush Bay to more profitable uses such as residential and commercial, but the PSG planned to maintain these areas as much as possible, predominantly for industrial uses. Despite the difference between their speculative and practical approaches in the two schemes, there were shared strategies in these plans, which I argue became critical in the subsequent Olympic Park plan. Firstly, as the 1996 bid plan indicated, the HBDSC and PSG recognised that the existing Australian Centre would not fit with their future spatial strategy, and left it an unresolved issue in regard to subsequent development. “Compatibility” between different uses in the mixed-use urban strategy has been considered as one of the crucial concepts (see, for example, Grant, 2002), and this had to be recognised in realising the “mixed-use” urban quarter in Homebush Bay. Yet the existing Australian Centre was left as an isolated island in the new Olympic site. Secondly, the “entrepreneurial” approach was greatly prioritised by both authorities. The HBDSC plan clearly stated that development of additional commercial uses would be an important means of achieving financial returns along with the industrial use of Homebush Bay (HBDSC, 1989, p. 3) and the HBSC masterplan demonstrated how such economic priorities would be maximised spatially. In the wake of the HBDSC’s proposal, the PSG also adopted a mixed-use approach to maximise the financial returns from the regeneration of Homebush Bay. While the HBDSC’s approach was to generate them via multiple land uses, such as residential or commercial, the PSG fundamentally aimed to do so mainly by making surplus land in Homebush Bay available to the private sector. Due to the unknown result in the bidding for the next Olympics, the focus on industrial use was strongly connected to the PSG’s objective to generate income that would offset the cost of developing Homebush Bay and achieve the social benefit of creating the jobs within the area. Both plans sought financial profit by different methods, with their planning strategy reflecting the neo-liberal approach of regional government, which had been applied to many regeneration projects on

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49 The PSG plan suggested that “the major land development use will be industrial which would occupy 107 hectare out of around 197 hectare available for developers.”

State-owned land in the Sydney region. (see, for example, McGuirk and Dowling, 2009).

3.3.4 Finalisation for the vision of the Olympic site

Sydney finalised the spatial vision of the bid for the 2000 Games in 1993, which had been shaped through the various planning exercises that had taken place since the previous bid (Figs. 3-11 and 12). As indicated earlier, the 2000 bid proposal was managed by the public–private consortium, the Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited, which examined the spatial layout of the competition venues, Olympic villages and supporting facilities in Homebush Bay. However, another authority, the Homebush Bay Development Corporation (HBDC) was established in 1992 under the Growth Centres Act – which was also under the umbrella of the previously established PSG – to implement the masterplan and manage the development of Homebush Bay. The HBDC played a key role in overseeing the development of Homebush Bay. Its role was connected to the PSG, but it liaised closely with the Bid Limited, so that the Olympic planning would be incorporated with the comprehensive masterplan for Homebush Bay (HBDC, 1992p. 10). This organisational structure reflects the vision of Homebush Bay for the 2000 Olympic bid. The Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited published the final bidding document, “Sydney 2000, Share the Spirit”, in 1993. However, similar to the previous bid documents, its main focus was to demonstrate how to organise the Olympic Games, and did not include an overall land-use plan for Homebush Bay.50 Thus, as a comprehensive land-use plan, the HBDC issued “Homebush Bay Area Draft Structure Plan” in the same year, which stated: “the masterplan concept is for Homebush Bay to become a multi-functional centre for the Sydney region at the centre of Sydney’s population” (HBDC, 1992, p. 6).

Nevertheless, there were some discrepancies between the visions for Homebush Bay of the Bid Limited and HBDC. The 2000 bid proposal was formulated by modifying the previous PSG plan with its vision of optimising the value of land, and it is understood that the spectacularisation of Homebush Bay for the Olympic Games had a great

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50 The bid document followed the structure in which the IOC asked the bid city to answer various questions on organising the Olympic Games. Regarding the spatial setting of Homebush Bay for the Olympic Games, it suggested that in-depth architectural plans of the Olympic villages and competition venues were indicated separately, and therefore it is hard to understand the comprehensive vision of the whole Homebush Bay for the 2000 Olympic Games and beyond.
influence on these modifications. In this respect, the 2000 bid proposal was understood as a mixture of the inherited plan from the HBDC and the new speculative Olympic vision led by the Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited. However, in the process of formulating the masterplan for the Olympic bid, there was a conflict between the Bid Limited and the HBDC, as their primary concerns were different. David Churches, the former Executive Manager, Planning & Design of the Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited, suggested that:

“[t]he design of Homebush Bay was done by the NSW Government (the HBDC), and the Bid team (the Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited) was simply not involved in it. [...] I was completely unhappy in the bid period with the design work that the Government was doing. I thought that it completely lacked imagination. So we formed, in fact I rang a few friends, a committee which involved a number of Sydney architects. [...] I used it to create a strong case with stronger design.”

As Churches suggests, there were little interaction between the Bid Limited and HBDC in shaping the long-term vision of Homebush Bay. This was further highlighted in the ways they envisioned utilising the existing Brickpit. As the large hole left by the State Brickworks was approached differently by the Bid Limited and the HBDC, tension between the organisations emerged. Andre Andersons, an architect who was involved in the design of Homebush Bay for the Olympic Bid, emphasised that:

“The Harbour plays a great role in Sydney's self-image, so it seems crazy not to avail yourself of the unique opportunity to bring the Harbour into the site. [...] The ability for us to access the Olympic site by water would be wonderful and the greater the emphasis placed on the Harbour connection with the Olympics site, the greater the chance of selling it internationally” (cited in Hawley, 1992).

Like Churches, Andersons stressed his dissatisfaction with the HBDC’s approach to the Brickpit. He emphasised the need to use it as an opportunity to sell a positive image of Sydney in the bid. Utilisation of the Brickpit could certainly demonstrate how Sydney’s

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51 Interview with David Churches on 26 November 2008.
“Green Games” would materialise and the SOBL considered this a great strength of the bid. But the HBDC had a different view, pointing out that the architects’ proposal would not be viable financially and operationally. The HBDC instead proposed to fill the Brickpit with rubbish and transform it into a supermarket, offices and car park area (Hawley, 1992). Thus, the plan for the 2000 Olympic bid was shaped by both the Olympic special private–public body and a non-Olympic urban strategic public institution. However, the different priorities of the two organisations also caused certain conflicts in envisioning the land use of Homebush Bay (Fig. 3-13).

It is here important to emphasise that, while the final plan for Sydney’s winning bid by both the Bid Limited and HBDC was greatly concerned with how the new urban precinct would be related to the bay, its relationship with the existing neighbourhood – the Silverwater and Parramatta Road industrial area – was not fully considered. This can be further identified in the presentation model for the new Sydney Olympic Park which was made as part of the Olympic bid, as those neighbourhoods were represented as if they were empty green spaces. The responsibility of the Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited was to assemble the bid components to win the inter-urban competition, and the consideration of integrating the Olympic site into the wider urban tissues have been considered out of scope, but considerations regarding urban integration should have been within the scope of the HBDC, as its planning boundary went beyond the potential Olympic site and extended to the adjacent Newington and Rhodes Peninsula area (Fig. 3-14). Yet the Draft Structure Plan by the HBDC did not mention these areas, and more critically little suggestion was made on how the new Olympic site would be positioned in the Homebush Bay area. Too much focus on the land-use vision and little consideration of the relationship with the surroundings suggests a high potential for the new Olympic Park to be isolated from the wider urban tissues, which Judd refers to as a “bubble” effect in the creation of a special urban quarter (Judd, 1999).

3.4 Concluding remarks

Olympic impacts on urban regeneration

This chapter examined the origin and evolution of the Olympic Park in Homebush Bay
during Sydney’s 30-year pre-bid phase. The Olympic vision in Sydney had evolved greatly with the city’s strong intention to win the bid, and this had shaped the sporting vision in Homebush Bay. The decision to create the Olympic Park in Homebush Bay rather than upgrade the existing Moore Park was a good fit with Sydney’s regional development policy towards the west and, in this respect, the IOC’s preference for concentration provided the rationale for the regeneration of Homebush Bay. In addition to this, the IOC’s great concern with environmental sustainability at the time of bidding for the 2000 Games also encouraged Sydney’s “Green Games” concept and its reflection in the spatial character of the Olympic site in Homebush Bay. Thus, I will stress that Sydney employed the Olympics as an opportunity to shape the vision of Homebush Bay. Yet, at the same time, I will also argue that there were certain constraints in this regard. The necessary of increasing the number of sporting venues in the Olympic site, which had been favoured by the IOC, forced Sydney to re-consider the sporting structure in the region, which caused various political conflicts, and intensification of sporting use also entailed a considerable challenge to the mixed-use vision in Homebush Bay. Thus, I will suggest that Sydney faced both opportunities and constraints in employing the Games as a powerful vehicle to regenerate Homebush Bay.

**Governance of the Olympic bid**

Behind the development of the spatial vision of Homebush Bay, there was also a significant evolution in the structure of the governance of Sydney’s Olympic bid over time. It was different bid committees that pushed Sydney’s different Olympic bids, and although they contained powerful political and business leaders in the region their planning powers were limited due to their temporary nature. Thus, the great involvement of the regional government was imperative in composing the spatial concept for the Olympic bid. Along with more recognition of the regenerative potential of Homebush Bay, the special authority for development of the area was established, and this contributed to more in-depth consideration of Homebush Bay, while the Olympic bid committee focused on refining the bid proposal rather than tackling the comprehensive masterplan for the Olympic site. In the later phase of Sydney’s bid campaign, various statutory development agencies were established to create a detailed masterplan for Homebush Bay, but their view was not synchronised with the bid committee’s spatial aspirations. As the dispute over the usage of the existing Brickpit demonstrated, the discrepancy between the vision for the Olympic Games and the
long-term financial viability of the site became apparent. Keiser et al. suggest that mediating the different interests is one of the crucial issues of the urban land-use planning (Kaiser et al., 1995). It became clear that this mediation was not fully conducted in the pre-bid phase, but rather kept as an issue for the subsequent phase.

**Mixed-use vision**

Along with intensification of sporting use in Homebush Bay came significant changes to the industrial vision for Homebush Bay. I argue that the origin of the mixed-use vision of Homebush Bay emerged from the juxtaposition of the new sporting vision with the existing industrial areas in the site, rather than envisioning the mixed-use urban precinct from scratch. In this respect there was not a “vision” as such at the beginning, and the notion of a mixed-use Olympic Park was shaped in line with the NSW Government’s commitment to restructuring the industrial use of Homebush Bay and to creating a sporting complex there. Much of the literature on post-industrial cities suggests significant transformation of industrial sites into spectacular urban spaces, in the age of urban competition (see, for example, Ward, 1998). Yet, in the case of Homebush Bay, I suggest that it was not a simple transformation from industrial to alternative but rather a spontaneous process that involved restructuring the industrial use and introducing the spectacular new sporting use. I therefore suggest that the mixed-use vision of Homebush Bay should be read as a representation of this spontaneous process.

I will further point out that the degree to which different functions were integrated in the land-use plan for Homebush Bay clearly increased as other financially profitable uses, such as residential and commercial uses, were introduced, along with the rise of the market value of Homebush Bay. However, as each masterplan with its differing spatial/functional configurations shows, it was difficult to balance the different aspirations for utilising the site. The compatibility of different functions, such as the relationship between sports, industrial and residential uses, was relatively poorly explored in each masterplan, and sometimes specific functions were planned as an isolated area within the site. There was little attempt to identify how such functional co-ordination would work in reality at the time of bidding, but in reference to the existing literature on “mixed-use” urban strategy (see, for example, Coupland, 1997), the compatibility between different uses needs to be more carefully considered.
Urban integration
Looking through the various land-use plans which I examined in this chapter, I suggest that, while the functional roles of the new Olympic Park in the Sydney region and the land-use plan within the site have been extensively addressed in various planning documents (although they were contested ones), its relation to the existing surroundings was only ambiguously identified, especially after the complexity in the land-use planning increased. This recalls Judd’s critiques on the tourist precinct as “bubble” in the city (Judd, 1999), wherein he observes a clear disconnection between the specialised urban quarter and its surrounding neighbourhood. The designated spatial boundary of the Olympic Park was physically isolated from the wider Auburn Council by the Western Motorway, but there were still adjacent urbanised neighbourhoods in Homebush Bay. Although the responsibility of the Homebush Bay Corporation went beyond the Olympic site to cover the entire Homebush Bay area, the initial vision of the Olympic site was significantly isolated in terms of the local urban tissues. This was particularly apparent after the industrial vision of the Olympic site decreased and the more sporting-led mixed-use vision came to dominate, while other parts of the Homebush Bay still remained the same. Thus a sense of synchronisation between the Olympic site and adjacent areas was missing from the initial planning process in the pre-bid phase; in order to avoid Judd’s bubble effect, this needs to be taken into account in the beginning.
Chapter 4: London

4.1 Olympic vision

4.1.1 Proactive versus reactive approach: Bidding for the 1988 Games

London hosted the Summer Olympics in 1908 and 1948, but these two Games were staged in the city without the need for a significant bid campaign. The 1908 Olympics was initially awarded to Rome but due to the eruption of Vesuvius in April 1904 the IOC decided that the Games would be transferred to London. After 36 years, London was initially selected as the host city for the 1944 Games. However, because of World War Two, the 1944 Games were cancelled, and the IOC officially awarded the 1948 Olympics to London by conducting a postal ballot (Gold and Gold, 2011 [2007]-a, pp. 24–31). The urban impacts of these two Games were relatively limited to the area of the Olympic stadium (Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Liao and Pitts, 2006), but London’s attempts to stage the third Games began in the 1970s and had wider urban regenerative aspirations.

The first documents on London’s bid appeared in 1979, when the Greater London Council (GLC) conducted a feasibility study for the 1988 Olympics, which were eventually awarded to Seoul. The report argued that London already had most of the required facilities and accommodation to host this gigantic sporting event, but also confessed that “the major current deficiency is the main Olympic stadium” (GLC, 1979, pp. 9–12). The report set out two different scenarios for providing the main Olympic stadium: (1) The construction of a new stadium as a new National Sports Centre in Docklands or (2) the renovation and improvement of the existing Wembley Stadium (Figs. 4-1 and 2). This can be considered as a comparison between a proactive approach (Docklands plan) and a reactive approach (Wembley plan), and the GLC used the following analytical points to compare the advantages and disadvantages of the Docklands and Wembley strategies:
1. Acceptability of the bid;
2. The legacy (sports facilities and housing etc.);
3. Conformity with the local urban plans (regenerative effect); and

Although the report suggested that both options could be acceptable to the IOC, the GLC was worried that a Wembley-based Games would appear second rate if another city offered many brand-new facilities. The GLC suggested that the concentration of the stadiums in the Olympic Park and adjacent to the athletes village in the Docklands-based Games would prove attractive to the IOC. However, while the attractiveness of the proposal was crucial in conceptualising London’s bid, there were various concerns about risk. The most critical issue was certainly the cost of staging both options. The GLC conducted a preliminary cost analysis for each option, and suggested that the Docklands-based Games would cost over GBP 750 million, while the Wembley option would cost GBP 436 million. In addition to this, the Docklands-based Games were highly reliant on the completion of the Jubilee Line, and the feasibility of such work was uncertain. The GLC further envisaged that, before knowing whether or not the IOC had accepted the bid, the land for the new Olympic Park had to be available, and the relocation of the existing users and preparatory work needed to have started (GLC, 1979, pp. 12–13, 130).

The GLC’s comparison between the Docklands and Wembley options went beyond the conceptualisation and implementation of the proposals, and the legacy aspect was in many respects similarly critical in evaluating the bid strategies. The most crucial issue was the post-Olympic usage of the new Olympic stadium in the Docklands. It envisaged that construction of a new stadium would lead to demolition of Wembley Stadium (a home for national football games) and closure of Twickenham Stadium (a home for national rugby games), although there was considerable emotional attachment on the part of London citizens to both stadiums (GLC, 1979, p. 14). While the legacy of the post-Olympic stadium was an issue of risk management, the legacy of the athlete village was a matter of opportunity. The GLC recognised that conversion of the Olympic village to diverse sized residential units would be in “sympathy” with Newham Borough Council’s Becton District Plan and provision of housing with the creation of a new National Sports Centre would act as a “catalyst” for other regeneration projects in
the Docklands. Moreover, it would be “in conformity” with the GLC’s policies for the Docklands and the “Docklands Strategic Plan” published by the Docklands Joint Committee in 1976. Meanwhile, the report suggested the Wembley option, which planned to utilise temporary housing, would “not bring any substantial gain” in policy terms to the council’s strategic objectives (GLC, 1979, p. 48, pp. 129–130).

Although a great deal was made of the regenerative effect of the Docklands Games in the report, the GLC vaguely indicated that:

“The choice of strategy should depend very largely on London’s objectives in promoting a bid for staging the Games. If the objective was simply to host the Games at minimum cost compatible with a potentially acceptable bid, with minimum risks and uncertainties and a very real possibility of breaking even, the Wembley option would be chosen. If however the objective was to meet the Council’s stated policies for the regeneration of Docklands, then the Docklands option could further those policies by acting as a catalyst for a range of developments within the sharp discipline of Olympic deadline” (GLC, 1979, p. 14) (emphasises added).

There were various reasons behind this ambiguous conclusion but, as the report repeatedly addressed, the uncertainty of the financial arrangement including the private sector’s involvement in the Olympic project and the question about the value for money in spending public money were crucial issues. Thus, despite an in-depth analysis of the potential for staging the Games in the capital, London did not put forward its Olympic vision. Nevertheless, I will argue that the contrast between the Wembley and Docklands proposals was inherited by the subsequent bid study.

4.1.2 Fragmented governance: Bidding for the 2000 Games

Following the withdrawal of the bid for the 1988 Games, London joined the national bidding selection process for the 1992 Games. Although some of the British Olympic Association (BOA) executives believed that London was the only city capable of bringing the Olympics to the UK, London lost against Birmingham in 1985 (Hill, 1992, pp. 95–96). London’s appeal to be host city appeared again in regard to the 2000 Games in the 1990s. Three different organisations showed an interest in hosting the 2000
Olympic Games in London: London Olympic 2000 led by Lord Coe (who eventually became the head of the Organising Committee of the London Games), Tarmac, the building material company, and the London Council for Sport and Recreation, a mixture of representatives of 33 London councils and various sports.

Regarding the Games site, the initial feasibility study conducted by the London Council for Sport and Recreation identified four broad locations – Wembley, the Docklands, Paddington and Liverpool Street – all of which were located on the envisaged regional development corridor (Fig. 4-3), and the study also recognised the importance of the concentration of the main stadium and Olympic village in a single large development site close to the city centre. The study therefore proposed to relocate Wembley Stadium and the Olympia Exhibition Hall to the Docklands, with better transport links and to create a compact Olympic model in the area (Coopers&Lybrand Deloitte, 1990, pp. 19–21, 34). The proposed Olympic site was scattered along the River Thames, and this was also considered as in harmony with future development of the area’s infrastructure network (Fig. 4-4).

By the time the final document was submitted to the BOA in 1991, the idea of relocating Wembley Stadium and other facilities to the Docklands had been abandoned. Nevertheless, the London bid organisers still emphasised how the Docklands-based Games in 2000 would provide a “window of opportunity” (London Olympic 2000 Campaign, 1991, p. 8). The rationality of the proposal was the need for regeneration of vast swathes of under-used land in the Docklands that were covered by various national and regional policies, such as the importance of balancing development between East and West London as suggested by Regional Guidance for the South East (RGP9 by the UK Department of Environment) and the UK Government’s “Strategic Planning Guidance for London (RGP8)”.

Despite London’s great emphasis on regeneration of the East Thameside as a vital part of the identity of London’s bid for the 2000 Games, London lost the national competition to become the candidate city for the 2000 Games. One of the greatest reasons behind this was the failure to unify the three different groups involved in the bid.

Furthermore, it referred to various official reports suggesting the urgent need for renewed infrastructure in the East Thames area, such as the South East Regional Planning Conference (SERPLAN) report and the London Planning Advisory Committee (LPAC)’s annual review.
Hill points out that each group had its own interests in hosting the Games: Coe’s London Olympic 2000 focused on a festival of sports utilising existing sports facilities, while the London Council for Sport and Recreation recognised construction of new facilities and urban regeneration triggered by the Games as the essence of the Olympics. He also puts great emphasis on the absence of a single authority as a disadvantage for London’s bidding campaign, and suggests that this led to the loss against Manchester, which had solid local support (Hill, 1992, pp. 105–108). Indeed, the governance structure of London had greatly changed since 1986, and when the bidding campaign for the 2000 Games was developed at the beginning of the 1990s London did not have a single governance structure but was rather a collection of local boroughs. Lack of an overarching authority made the bid plan uncertain, and the report to the BOA Evaluation Committee clearly pointed out the risk of cost over-run and the lower probability of London delivering on its promises (Savills, 1991, p. 6).

4.1.3 A different approach: Bidding for the 2012 Olympic Games

Following the unsuccessful bid for the 2000 Games, there was little impetus for London to immediately bid for another Olympic Games. According to the BOA, its people spent time with the voting constituency of the IOC and received the very clear message that “only when you return to the table with London will we believe that you are serious about hosting a future Olympic Games” (BOA, 2007). Thus, the BOA decided to focus on the 2012 Games as the target for the next bid (CMSC, 2007, p. 9). While the bid for the 2012 Games inherited some of the aspects of the previous bidding campaigns, there were also fundamental differences from the previous attempts.

Firstly, while the previous bid for the 2000 Games was conducted during a period when there was no single government for greater London, the bid for the 2012 Games coincided with the establishment of the Greater London Authority (GLA) and the election of the Mayor of London. Thus, in contrast to the previous fragmented political commitment to the bid conceptualisation, the governance of the bid for the 2012 Games, in particular regarding the creation of the spatial strategy, was more concentrated and empowered the Mayor of London and his development authorities. As a result, the regenerative concept could be more realistic and potentially more integrated with the wider urban development strategy. Looking at the mechanism for legislating the GLA and the new London Mayor in the late 1990s, Newman and Thornley suggest that one of
the reasons why a new metropolitan authority was needed was to make it possible for London to bid for the Olympics, as the right to stage the Olympics is awarded to a city, and without a legitimate authority a city cannot host the Olympic Games (Newman and Thornley, 2004, p. 157). Thus, it was unrealistic for London to bid for the Olympic Games after the abolition of the GLC in 1986. Under the process of legislating the GLA and Mayor, the Department of Environment, Transport and Regions in the UK Government stated that organising actions for the Olympic bid was one of the new Mayor’s duties (Department of Environment Transport and Regions, 1998, p. 13), and this mayoral role was certainly linked with his responsibility for drawing up a new “Spatial Development Strategy” for London. The first Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, had long identified East London as the primary target for such regeneration. Thus, the Olympic vision initially proposed by the BOA and the regenerative objective in East London set by the regional and national governments for the further economic growth of the capital city were firmly connected, through the empowerment of the Mayor of London.

Secondly, compared to previous bids, there was a clear process of decision making in which the national government and the Mayor of London were involved. As Newman also suggests, the initial decisions regarding London’s bid for the 2012 Olympic Games were taken by the national government and the Mayor of London and his development agency subsequently developed the vision. However, I will here point out that there was no smooth transition from the national to the regional government, but rather they represented slightly different views on the Olympics and associated urban regeneration in East London.

Like the previous bids, the bidding process for the 2012 Games began with the question of the location, which originated in the previous bid’s two reactive and proactive approaches to the Games. The BOA conducted an initial feasibility study in 1997, which once again compared Games at East and West locations (Lee, 2006, pp. 5–6). However, the decision on the location for the Olympic site became a matter of dispute among the BOA, regional and national government. The BOA’s records indicate the following:

53 The feasibility study was commissioned by the double Olympian David Lukes, and the final report concluded in 2000 as a 395-page document.
“At that stage the BOA had used sites in the West and East of London as possible options for the Olympic site. But the Mayor insisted that the East London option was the most viable because of the regeneration opportunity that it created. The Government however were yet to be convinced of the merits of the bid and the possibility that it could be successful” (BOA, 2007) (emphasis added).

This passage clearly reveals that there was a disagreement in regard to the regional and national government’s concerns as to the priorities of the bid. While the Mayor of London’s view was that the Olympics was a catalyst for accelerating regeneration in the Lower Lea Valley (LLV), which was one of the crucial priorities set out in his spatial strategy for London, the national government was more concerned with the financial risk of putting the Games in East London and thus undertaking the massive regeneration project associated with them. In order to explore the costs and benefits of the Games being staged in the LLV a consultant company, ARUP, subsequently conducted further feasibility studies, and a summary of the report was published in November 2002. ARUP concluded that expenditure in staging the Games in the LLV would be GBP 1.796 billion and income would be GBP 1.302 billion, which meant there would be a GBP 494 million loss involved in staging the Olympics in London. Yet the report greatly emphasised that this was a “specimen proposal” and the deficit would be covered if it considered intangible benefits such as tourism and the economic benefits created by physical legacies (ARUP, 2002, p. 11). ARUP further suggested that a “mixed-use commercial and residential area” should be centred on the LLV and that “Olympic cachet” would act as a magnet to attract long-term investment in this area (ARUP, 2002, p. 8).

Thus, the ARUP report did not fully address the financial deficiency of hosting the Games in the LLV, but suggested a highly optimistic economic forecast. 54 Corresponding to the ARUP report, the Culture, Media and Sports Committee (CMSC) of the national government published “A London Olympic Bid for 2012” in 2003. The report fundamentally supported London’s bid, but suggested that it should not do so at

54 When we think of the eventual budget of the 2012 Games in the LLV (GBP 9.3 billion confirmed by the DCMS in 2007), the optimistic nature of this view needs to be highlighted.
any price. The CMSC recognised that “the heart of a modern Olympic bid appears to be the binary development of the main stadium and Olympic village and their inter-relationship”, but at the same time it was greatly concerned about the construction of a new stadium and Olympic village, regarded as imperatives in ARUP’s report (CMSC, 2002, pp. 18–19). The national government’s concerns about the financial uncertainty was still apparent, and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) once again addressed the importance of determining the extent to which Wembley was to be used for Olympic events, while it also implied the possibility of utilising a temporary stadium for the Olympics in order to resolve the difficulty of post-Olympic utilisation and to avoid additional further public subsidies (DCMS, 2003, pp. 4–5).

Nevertheless, despite the financial uncertainty, the DMCS officially announced the Government’s support for the London bid on 15 May 2003, and Poynter suggests that there were various factors which pushed the UK Government into serious consideration of bidding for the 2012 Olympic Games. These included the success of the Manchester Commonwealth Games in 2002, the possibility that the 2012 Games would come back to Europe after Beijing won the right to stage the 2008 Games, Sydney’s success in selling a positive image to the world during the 2000 Olympics, and the UK Government’s desire to redeem itself after the failure of previous mega-projects such as the Millennium Dome (Poynter, 2009, p. 184). The Government’s announcement of support for London’s bid spurred the Mayor and his development agency’s involvement, but it should be emphasised here that the various feasibility studies conducted prior to the decision were not objectively observed, and therefore the financial uncertainty surrounding a Games in the LLV was handed over to the regional government.

The third identical point in regard to the bid for the 2012 Games was the Mayor’s commitment to an in-depth spatial strategy for the Olympic site. As the political boundary of the four local boroughs crosses at the middle of the site, commitment on the part of the Mayor was imperative, and his economic development agency, the London Development Agency (LDA), thus played a leading role in creating the initial vision of the Olympic site and in its long-term strategy. One of the key issues for the Mayor and the LDA was if the Games could be synchronised with the regeneration of the LLV and East London that was now underway. Thus, the LDA commissioned a
masterplan consortium headed by EDAW, a planning and landscape design company based in London, to prepare two masterplans: one with the Olympic Games and the other if the bid is unsuccessful. It also requested the consortium to consider the extent to which a successful bid would contribute to their following four key regeneration objectives:

1. Land assembly to facilitate comprehensive redevelopment;
2. The delivery of transport infrastructure improvements;
3. The achievement of an enhanced scale of environmental and infrastructure improvements; and
4. The furtherance of community development objectives.

Certainly, the Mayor and the LDA expected a catalytic effect to be created by the Olympics in relation to their ongoing urban agenda, and tried to achieve more than they could do without the Olympics. In addition to this, the LDA prepared the masterplan for the Olympic site in the LLV for both the Olympics and legacy modes. The authority recognised that the masterplan should be a 20- to 25-year long-term regeneration plan, and the Olympics would be only the midpoint of this much larger plan. It further stated that:

“The masterplan is the skeleton... the absolutely fundamental components of the really big moves in terms of land use and the relationship with those land uses has to get right now” (GLA, 2003, p. 3).

This much longer view was certainly required to make the Olympic masterplan a good starting point for further development, but the challenge for the masterplan team was to finalise the planning application by the time of the IOC’s inspection of the city in 2005. It was a political decision that planning permission for the Olympic Park and the legacy masterplan should be obtained before the IOC members’ visit and the LDA published its statement on the Olympic and legacy masterplan in May 2004. The masterplan was finalised in a relatively short period, and therefore did not completely match the final bid proposal subsequently issued by the London 2012 bid committee. Thus, the masterplan underlined the “physical changeability” necessary to accommodate Olympic and post-Olympic demands as a key feature of the spatial strategy, but some crucial
aspects such as the massive spatial transformation of the Olympic stadium after the Games were not addressed. The idea of the legacy was to be refined along with the development of London’s bid conceptualisation.

4.1.4 Conceptualising the "Olympic legacy" in international and regional contexts

One of the identical parts in London's bidding campaign was massive promotion of the Olympic legacy. The term “legacy” was widely used in the various national and regional governmental documents, to refer to the benefits of hosting the Olympics for London and more widely for UK citizens. The promotion of the Olympic legacy fitted quite well within the regional context. As indicated earlier, the dilemma for London in bidding for the 2012 Games revolved around the regional and national aspirations for regenerating the LLV in East London and the difficulty inherent in embedding the Olympics’ spatial requirements, in particular the need for the new Olympic stadium, became the central matter of dispute in both national and regional politics. Against this backdrop, the physical changeability of the Olympic facilities became a practical means of mediating between the Olympic and post-Olympic spatial demands, as well as an symbolic way of representing the London’s tackling the Olympic legacy.

The promotion of London’s “Olympic legacy” cohered with the IOC's great campaign to promote the ongoing benefits of an Olympic Games. As was briefly discussed in Chapter 2, this tendency began after Jacque Rogge became President of the IOC in 2001, and since then the term “legacy” has frequently been emphasised by the IOC. This was reflected in a modification of the host city candidature process, and the bidding process for the 2012 Games was a kind of milestone for the IOC because the legacy became one of the critical aspects for the first time. For example, the bid cities were asked to respond to the IOC’s question asking how their vision for the Olympic Games fits into the candidate city or region’s long-term planning strategy (IOC, 2003a, p. 70). This situation certainly influenced the competition for the right to stage the 2012 Games.55

Mike Lee, the marketing director of London’s bidding campaign, suggests how the London team had been conceptualising its bid in such a way as to beat the French

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capital. One of the strong advantages of Paris was its urban setting for the Games; while London’s plan was to construct the new Olympic stadium in the new Olympic Park in the LLV, the Paris bid proposed an existing stadium as the main venue. Lee recognised that having already built a national stadium, the Stade de France, was an advantage for Paris, and felt that “London had to offer something more” (Lee, 2006, p. 98). It was certain that in terms of the degree of preparedness before the bid, which the IOC often sees as an important factor in deciding the host city, Paris had a much stronger position than London. London therefore needed to change the focus of the bidding campaign, paying attention to after the Games rather than before the Games. The London bidding team knew that the IOC had concerns about the problems facing post-Olympics host cities and they tried to harness these concerns into a strong sales point for London to promote its bid. Lee thus stated that “London 2012 wanted to show it was a “listening bid” which cared about sport and the Olympic Movement” (Lee, 2006, p. 105).

Although London’s initial idea of promoting the legacy was mainly about the so-called “sporting legacy”, which means inspiring young people to take part in sports by hosting the Games in London, the concept was further developed in regard to the urban setting. The London bid team found out that the urban legacy was a critical concern for the IOC, and had been since Jacque Rogge took the presidency and had taken various actions to promote it such as the “Olympic Games Study Commission”. However, most of the candidate cities for the 2012 Games, in particular the frontrunner Paris, had not actively addressed it. It was therefore very strategic for London to take this as its identity. Lee suggests as follows:

"The city's legacy argument [i.e. Paris] was nowhere near as strong as that of London's – the Games would not change Paris in the same way they could transform East London. But the French capital was perceived as a very safe bet. After the problematic build-up to the 2004 Athens Games, that was seen as a sound reason for the IOC to give the Games to the city” (Lee, 2006, p. 119) (emphasis added).

Thus, the London bidding team greatly emphasised the urban legacy as their strong sales point for the bidding campaign, and this concept was impressively visualised at the final presentation for the host city election which took place in Singapore in 2005.
London showed what the Olympic Park in the LLV would look like during the Games, and more importantly how it was going to be transformed into the biggest urban park in Europe after the Games (Fig. 4-5). It was the first time in the history of the host city election that a candidate city had set forth its vision of the Olympic site beyond the Games. There is no doubt that this visualisation of the Olympic legacy contributed to London’s eventual win against Paris. Yet it is also crucial to look at London’s vision of urban legacy as it was presented in Singapore. The vision of the post-Olympic site which the London bidding team presented is almost an image of parkland covered by natural green and rivers, with few buildings being drawn except for some of the sporting venues and the Olympic village. Yet, as the LDA’s Olympic and legacy masterplan demonstrated, one of the greatest motivations for regenerating the LLV is to bring economic prosperity by creating a new mixed-use urban quarter in the LLV – thus, London's aspiration was to an extent hidden behind the impressive greenery of the post-Olympic Park.

4.2 Diverse vision for the LLV

4.2.1 Industrial past

The Lea Valley is the area that stretches north to south along the River Lea, a tributary of the River Thames, and the 2012 Olympic site is located in the lower part of the Lea Valley region (i.e. the LLV), which consists of four London boroughs: Hackney, Waltham Forest, Newham, and Tower Hamlets. One of the key characteristics of the LLV prior to the Olympic development was its tradition of industrial use, and the historical development of this greatly depended on two factors. One was the development of the London Docklands. As the River Lea connected to the River Thames, industrial development along the Thames influenced the formulation of the industrial area in the LLV. Pewesey suggests that the industrial development in the LLV has a great relationship with the rise and fall of the London Docklands and points out that River Lea has long been recognised as an appropriate area for industrial activities, in particular the silk-weaving industry that flourished there in the 16th and 17th centuries (Pewesey, 2001). As another factor, the LLV’s industrial base has greatly depended on the metropolis. Pewsey argues that ever-increasing demand from the
metropolis for processed goods of all kinds and people’s unwillingness to have noxious industries situated in their own area led to the industrial development in the LLV (Pewesy, 1993). This brought continuous business opportunities to the area, but at the same time it led to a concentration of dangerous industries. It was during the 1960s that trade at the London Docks reached its peak but the evolution of shipping technologies, in particular the emergence of containerisation, was about to change the fate of the London Port (Naib, 1998). Along with the closure of these Docks, regeneration of the London Docklands became the target of national and regional government’s economic development strategies, and the London Dockland Development Corporation was founded in 1981 to play a crucial role in conducting “market-led” urban regeneration projects along the Thames as part of the Thatcherite approach to planning that lasted until its winding up in 1998 (Bernstock, 2009).

The Lea Valley region was, however, not included in the London Dockland Development Corporation’s planning boundary, and therefore it was left out of the boom in urban regeneration led by the Corporation. The broader “Lea Valley region” was seen for the first time as a whole region in the Government’s plans for economic regeneration of the area in the 1990s. This was triggered by the designation “Lea Valley region” as eligible for support under Objective 2 of the Regulations of the European Structural Funds in 1994. The strategy, which was indicated in a paper presented to the European Commission, aimed to turn the Lea Valley into a more modern competitive, diverse and expanding location, with consideration of social and economic integration (Cattell, 1997, p. 3). Gradual integration of the LLV into the political regeneration agenda cohered with the restructuring of the rail network in the region. Stratford, which had acted as “a strategic centre of a rail network” since the opening of Stratford station in 1839 by connecting London and other parts of south-eastern England, further enhanced its role through the introduction of the Dockland Light Railway, an extension of the Jubilee Line, and the forthcoming Cross Rail Project. Beyond this local and regional transport development, Stratford is becoming something of an international “gateway”. The construction of the Stratford International Station as part of the high-speed Channel Tunnel Rail Link, which connects mainland Europe and Central London, transformed the LLV from “Gateway to the Metropolis” to the “Gateway to Europe” (Pewesy, 2001).
4.2.2 Mixed-use vision: Residential and job opportunities

The transformation of the industrial vision in the LLV was also recognised in the regional spatial planning framework. London's spatial strategy published before the decline of the London Docklands and more recent ones clearly suggest different approaches. “The County of London Plan” prepared by Patrick Abercrombie and John Henry Forshaw in 1943, 56 “the first real move to a planning of London”, 57 recognised the importance of the industrial base in the LLV for the London region. Abercrombie and Forshaw recognised London as a collection of villages (Fig. 4-6), and designated the Port and Thames and the Lea side as one of four characteristic areas of London (Abercrombie and Forshaw, 1943, pp. 3-4). The area along the River Lea was located at the edge of the London County Council’s area, but they described it as the primary source of London’s commercial life Abercrombie and Forshaw, 1943, p. 25). Although he understood the importance of the London Docklands and the Lea side, however, he was not satisfied with the existing conditions in the Lea side, and thought a plan was needed to improve them. Abercrombie and Forshaw pointed out that:

“The Lee Valley can be regarded as the right arm of the docks and Thames-side industrial areas. As with Thames-side industries, there are several residential pockets which require eliminating. [...] A clear-cut policy on canal side use, either for industry, amenity or residential, but not a mixture of the three, is needed”(Abercrombie and Forshaw, 1943,p.111).

It was clear that they considered a mixture of industrial and residential use to not be ideal, and that a mono-functional approach should be encouraged. Although the mixed-use planning was greatly encouraged in the following plans in this area, in particular, in the regeneration plans for declined London Docklands which highly emphasised revitalisation of industrial use and creation of new residential use, Abercrombie and Forshaw thought mixture of different use would be problematic.

However, the London Plan published before London’s bid decision clearly took a very different approach. Firstly, it unambiguously addressed the need to reform the uneven

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56 As “The County of London Plan” was published after the city had been destroyed by severe air attacks, it fundamentally showed the future vision within the boundary of the London County Council (LCC) after the War.
development in London and underlined the necessity of accommodating inevitable population and economic growth. Against this background, the London Plan argued that re-centralisation was vital for the city to maintain its status as “a world city” instead of a mere dispersion of people and businesses (Newman and Thornley, 2004, p. 153).

Gordon and Travers further state that a “go east strategy” reversing the established westerly bias of growth would be a way of accommodating large-scale population and job growth (Gordon and Travers, 2010). In this respect, regenerating under-used land in the Docklands to the east was therefore perfectly fitted (at least in rhetorical terms) to achieving the above objectives, which could also be a factor in justifying the huge investment in new public transport links to the area. The London Plan identifies 28 opportunity areas in the region and 11 areas located in the East London region (Fig. 4-7).

The LLV was designated an important opportunity area and Stratford a crucial Major Centre in the area, with the London Plan then stating that together with the Isles of Dogs it would be a “key beneficiary” of the substantial improvement in transport capacity and accessibility (Mayor of London, 2004, pp. 244–245).

Secondly, the London Plan greatly enhanced the high-density mixed-use approach, and this planning policy was encouraged to develop the LLV, which was a great contrast with Abercrombie’s early suggestion of a single-use vision. The London Plan in particular proposed including new job and housing opportunities at the mixed-use development in the LLV and Stratford areas, by creating 30,000 new jobs and 4,500 new homes at Stratford and 8,500 new jobs and 6,000 new homes in the LLV area by 2016 (Mayor of London, 2004, pp.242–247). The London Plan further proposed to intensify the retail character of the area as a part of the mixed-use element and, in particular, to designate Stratford a “new mixed use European Business Quarter for London” (Mayor of London, 2004, p. 250). In a similar vein, the mixed use, especially the provision of housing (including affordable ones) and job opportunities, was encouraged by the Thames Gateway, which included the LLV in its planning boundary. The London Thames Gateway Development Corporation, which was established in June 2004 to oversee the regeneration of the London river and the LLV over 20 years, considered the opening of the Stratford International Railway Station and hosting the 2012 Olympic Games in the LLV as “engines for growth” in terms of the development.
of the wider London Thames Gateway area. It aimed to “create a network of compact mixed use, mixed tenure neighbourhoods complete with good public transport, shops, leisure facilities, schools, healthcare and jobs” (London Thames Gateway Development Corporation, 2005, p. 1) (Fig. 4-8).

4.2.3 Cohesion between old and new

While the new mixed-use vision was greatly enhanced by the London Plan and the London Thames Gateway, it was crucial to consider how the new vision would co-relate with existing uses in the area. The London Plan fundamentally recognised that “London is highly diverse and constantly changing, but developments should show an understanding of, and respect for, existing character” (Mayor of London, 2004, p. 175). In the case of the LLV, it understands that the area has traditionally been the location of low-grade industry and railways and that this has created barriers in the LLV, a situation which needs to be improved through the planning framework. However, instead of making a new town from scratch by eliminating the existing industrial pockets, it proposes to optimise the existing use and integrate new mixed-use developments on surplus land in the LLV (Mayor of London, 2004, pp. 248–249).

The cohesion between the existing and new land use was also crucial to the local government. As the Olympic boroughs (Newham, Hackney, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest and Greenwich), which shared a political boundary in the middle of the Olympic site, were recognised as one of the most deprived areas in the UK, the provision of new housing (in particular affordable social housing) and job opportunities had long been an important factor in defining the local planning objectives (Vigor et al., 2004). The spatial strategy for the LLV issued by Newham Council, for example, highlighted the “mixed-use” strategy in the LLV as a means of satisfying social demands and encouraging diverse economic activities in the area. Yet, at the same time, the council also underlined the importance of “enhancing the condition, quality and appearance of the valley's existing employment and residential areas in order that they can contribute to and benefit from this change” (London Borough of Newham, 2000, p. 2). Thus, Newham Council’s view on the mixed-use development was not to impose an entirely new development on the site but rather to encourage the existing uses through the new

58 The London Thames Gateway Development was part of the central government’s greater urban regeneration plan along the River Thames and the Thames Estuary, run from the Department for Communities and Local Government.
development. In a similar vein, prior to the recognition of the LLV as the Olympic site Hackney Council saw the potential for Hackney Wick, which would become part of the future Olympic site, as new development land. The council particularly saw Hackney Wick as an area that could create jobs because of the transport improvements in the area (London Borough of Hackney, 1995, p. 13). Yet it also underlined the desirability of cohesion between the existing and new use in the area, stating that the council would seek “the twin objectives of protecting existing community services and accommodating newly arising community needs”.

4.2.4 Recreational and sporting vision

While the transformation of the industrial past to the new mixed use required cohesive ways of mixing the existing and new uses in the LLV, a clear recreational and sporting vision had also been shaped in the wider Lea Valley region. Along with the industrial uses proposed in the Abercrombie Plan in 1943, Abercrombie had also recognised the importance of the Lea Valley region as the Metropolitan Parklands. His view of the Lea Valley was that it represented an “opportunity for a great piece of constructive, preservative and regenerative planning” and he proposed a “giant green wedge along the Lea Valley” (Elks, 2008; Lea Valley Regional Park Authority, 2000a). Abercrombie’s vision was realised in 1967 by the establishment of the Lea Valley Regional Park, in order to meet the recreational, leisure and nature conservation needs of London, Herefordshire and Essex. The Lea Valley Regional Park Authority was also established to bring the Park into reality either through its own operation or by encouraging other agencies. While the first Park Plan by the Park Authority in 1967 emphasised “informal recreation” in the Lea Valley, the revised 1986 Plan committed to the provision of a balanced programme of formal and informal development, taking account of the changing nature of leisure trends. Although the Plan proposed to provide sporting facilities along with the refinement of the environmental quality of the Park, the Park Authority faced severe financial problems in sustaining the leisure facilities such as Pickets Lock Sports Centre and the non-revenue generating parklands (Elks, 2008; Lea Valley Regional Park Authority, 2000a). Thus, the Park Plan was revised to keep in mind the environmentally and financially sustainable development of the Lea Valley Regional Park.

59 www.leevalleypark.org.uk
60 Against this backdrop, the 2000 Park Plan suggested three different types of landscape; landscape conservation,
Part of the eventual Olympic site was in the Lea Valley Regional Park and most of the area was designated as an “area for leisure, regional sporting excellence and recreation with enhanced green links and open space available for outdoor sports, informal recreation and nature conservation”. The Plan put great emphasis on redevelopment of the existing Lea Valley Sports Centre, Lea Valley Cycle Circuit and the Hackney Stadium, and suggested that this would enhance the sporting character of the Lea Valley Regional Park and complement the other leisure facilities at Picketts Lock and Bronxbourne (Lea Valley Regional Park Authority, 2000b, p. 118). However, in the end all these existing sport facilities located in the Olympic site were eventually demolished to pave the way for the Olympic development.

In addition to this, it is worth mentioning that there was a proposal to build the national athletic stadium on the site of Picketts Lock Sports Centre prior to the Government’s decision to bid for the 2012 Olympic Games in 2003. The idea of building a 50,000-seat athletic stadium with warm-up track and railway station in Picketts Lock emerged in connection to London’s aspiration to host the World Athletics Championships in 2005. Picketts Lock was selected though a national competition for the site of the Championships, but it was eventually abandoned because of its GBP 110 million cost and the event was eventually relocated to Helsinki (BBC, 2001b). Although the idea of constructing the national athletics stadium disappeared, it nevertheless led to the creation of Lea Valley Athletic Centre on the same site at a cost of GBP 16 million, as a legacy of the bid for the 2005 World Athletics Championships. The new sporting facility certainly enhanced the vision of Lea Valley Regional Park Authority as a place for sporting excellence, but it left political uncertainties, as Lord Coe, one of the most powerful promoters of London’s bid for the 2012 Games, underlined in 2001:

"We now have a situation where we probably will have no World Athletics Championships in 2005, we haven't got a national stadium and we probably won't be able to mount a bid for the 2012 Olympic Games” (BBC, 2001a).

 enhancement and investment area.
4.3 Spatial vision for the LLV

4.3.1 Patchwork of the spatial vision
As discussed above, various planning authorities had the different vision in utilising the LLV, and they separately produced spatial visions within their planning areas. Thus, by the time of the spatial strategy for the Olympic site developed by the LDA, various spatial strategies for the future Olympic site had already been proposed by different planning authorities. Their planning boundaries and the area of the future Olympic site were not the same, but each masterplan did cover part of the Olympic site. Thus, I will stress that the spatial strategy in the LLV, in particular in the area for the Olympic site, was a patchwork of different spatial aspirations, which had never been stitched together. The following part will briefly discuss the different spatial strategies for the Olympic site area that had been created by the different authorities.

One of the most influential urban developments in terms of the vision for the Olympic site in the LLV was the Stratford City masterplan, which had had its planning application granted in 2004. The development site covers 73 hectares across rail lands, which had become redundant as a result of the decline in industrial use of the railways. The masterplan was created as a result of the joint venture between Chelsfield, Stanhope and the landowner, London and Continental Railway, and represented the largest urban regeneration project within the M25 circular road since 1940. This GBP 1.3 billion project addressed the synchronisation between the regenerative aspirations for Stratford and the LLV set out in the draft London Plan and the Thames Gateway, and suggested that it would catalyse further development of the area. Echoing the primary regenerative objectives of these regional planning frameworks, i.e. the provision of housing and job creation, Stratford City proposed a mixed-use urban quarter in which residential, retail, office and social facilities such as schools would be included, in the form of a high-density urban block within a clear grid of streets. The concentration of the residential blocks proposed to the north of Stratford City later became the site for the Olympic village for the 2012 Games (Figs. 4-9 and 10).

Stratford City was conceived as “European” not only because it would have the

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62 www.chesfield.com/project/stratford-city
Stratford International Rail Station in the middle of the site, which would connect the site to the continent, but also in its spatial character, in regard to which one could easily find similarities with Barcelona’s urban blocks. Although the developers identified it as “European” or a “new piece of city”, they also affirmed that the project would not be isolated from the surrounding neighbourhoods. The developers emphasised that the park and street proposed in Stratford City, in particular the central spine of the site, would connect them seamlessly (Chelsfiled et al., 2003, p. 1). The masterplan further identified the fundamental functional character of the adjacent areas, and indicated how Stratford City would have different relationships with the neighbourhoods (Fig. 4-11).

Yet there were some doubts about this urban integration strategy. Firstly, looking at the future image of Stratford City, a clear contrast with the adjacent existing areas was visible. Secondly, planning for Stratford City should have had timely overlaps with the Olympic masterplan but it was not integrated into the Olympic proposals, as the developers recognised the future Olympic site, where the Aquatic Centre was eventually built, as being for industrial use. This suggests that the Stratford City plan composed by the private consortium was entirely separate from the Olympic planning process. In addition to this, the connection to the Olympic site was also poorly addressed. Finally, Stratford City was eventually implemented quite differently from the initial proposal. The area adjacent to the Olympic site was filled with a vast shopping mall called the Westfield Stratford City Shopping Centre, and the vertically mixed urban form that was envisaged was eventually abandoned as the developers sought a more economical urban form (Moore, 2011). Thus, while Stratford City did initially aim at synchronisation with various urban planning schemes and existing urban tissues, it would eventually become a highly specialised area, just which Judd might call a “bubble” in the city.

Prior to the creation of the Stratford City plan by the private consortium, as indicated earlier in this chapter, the local boroughs also produced spatial strategies that covered the Olympic site area. Indeed, Newham Council’s planning framework for the LLV (2000) covered most of the future Olympic site. The masterplan was proposed by the Spanish architectural office, MBM Arquitectes, who had made a great contribution to the spatial planning for the Barcelona Olympics in 1992. The Barcelona Games were widely recognised as a successful Olympics due to their regenerative approach (Gold and Gold, 2011 [2007]-b, see also Serra, 1995; Monclús, 2011). Although the impact of
the London’s Olympic bid was not touched on in this report, the Council expected a regeneration of the post-industrial site into a residential-based mixed-use area (London Borough of Newham, 2000, p. 4). Its spatial strategy proposed a linear development along the River Lea which would be an extension of the exiting urban area in the council boundaries. Thus, the council clearly divided the parts for the high-density mixed-use area and others with existing land use (either open space or current urbanised use) (Fig. 4-12). In a similar vein, the Unitary Development Plan by Hackney Council (1995) also demonstrated how the new development would spatially co-relate with the existing urbanised area. The council envisioned a new development area, and retained the existing spatial character in the middle. Thus, between Hackney Mash (located in southern periphery of the council boundaries) and the northern part of the future Olympic site were designated as the job-creation area (London Borough of Hackney, 1995) (Fig. 4-13).

Thus, what is clear in these council plans published before the designation of the boundary of the Olympic site is that the spatial character of the area which would be integrated in the future Olympic Park was defined in light of the council’s broader urban conditions and its development strategies. It is therefore apparent that when these different spatial visions issued before the subsequent Olympic plan by the LDA (including that for Stratford City) are stitched together, there was less cohesion and we can notice that there were some areas which were hardly touched by any planning frameworks. In this respect, the spatial strategies in the LLV at the time of the formulation of the vision for the Olympic site and the legacy were highly fragmented, and this leads the question of how the new Olympic masterplan would integrate these fragmented previous visions in a single spatial development framework.

4.3.2 Olympic and legacy masterplan for the 2012 Games
The Olympic and legacy masterplan in the LLV was published by the LDA in May 2004.\footnote{The report was issued under the name of the LDA, but EDAW, HOK Sports, Allies and Morrison, Foreign Architects et al were the practical masterplanners behind this report.} It made London the first Olympic city to possess an in-depth spatial strategy for both the Olympic and post-Olympic period (Fig. 4-14). Regarding this spatial strategy, the abovementioned diverse visions were to be integrated in the post-Olympic masterplan (the so-called the legacy masterplan), and the Olympic masterplan was thus...
recognised as a starting point for subsequent developments. Thus, in order to examine the relationship with various prior spatial strategies, the legacy masterplan came to be the one which would represent the various spatial aspirations.

The legacy masterplan clearly inherited Newham Council’s vision of a linear spatial setting in which most of the future development would be located at the periphery of the Olympic site, and the vast parklands would be positioned in the middle. Having the central spine which would form the Olympic Concourse along the River Lea was considered a highly practical and unique spatial setting for the Olympic Games, and it was also considered a way of underscoring the strength of the spatial setting for the Games to the IOC (LDA, 2004, p. 17) The challenge for the LDA was to find a way of leaving vacant land for subsequent development at the periphery after the Games. Given the fact that London would not need to retain the all of the Olympic venues after the Games, the LDA came up with the idea of constructing them as temporary facilities and dismantling the after the Olympics in order to pave the way for subsequent development (Fig. 4-15).

With this legacy spatial layout, the LDA conceived of the post-Olympic site as a mixed-use urban quarter, which reflected the various planning objectives for the LLV. The legacy masterplan identified the core of the post-Olympic site as residential, and the legacy masterplan proposed this was built along the waterways. It also recognised the need for industrial use which would provide job opportunities for local residents, but the industrial use suggested in the masterplan did not mean the existing industrial use but rather indicated “technology based intensive industry” (LDA, 2004, p. 44). The provision of the residential area and job opportunities were certainly synchronised with the regenerative vision for the LLV set down in the London Plan, the Thames Gateway and the local plans by the Newham and Hackney councils. Furthermore, having legacy sporting facilities with leisure and recreational purposes can be understood as a response to the sporting and recreational visions proposed by the Lea Valley Regional Park Authority. In this respect then, the 2004 Olympic and legacy masterplan by the LDA can be understood as the culmination of the previously fragmented land-use visions set out under different political frameworks.

However, the legacy masterplan proposed by the LDA also contrasted with previous
spatial strategies in some respects, in particular with the previous plans by the local councils. Firstly, the LDA’s proposal aimed at a much higher-density urban development compared with the previous plans. The Newham plan, for example, concentrated residential development in certain areas along the River Lea, but the LDA’s legacy masterplan suggested high-density urban blocks on most of the available land in the post-Olympic site. The London Plan issued by the Mayor of London in 2004, for example, designated 6,000 new homes would be built in the LLV area, but the LDA’s legacy masterplan suggested that 30,000 new homes would emerge in the LLV by the end of the 15-year development period (LDA, 2004, p. 44). This significant increase in levels of residential development can be understood as a means of addressing the massive public investment in the regeneration of the area, but its end result is that much of the Olympic site would be occupied by residential blocks which would likely be built by private sector organisations and little space would be left for public parklands. Furthermore, as the case of the Stratford City would eventually reveal, this would cause great gaps with the existing neighbourhood, all of which were built as low-rise town houses.

In addition to this, there was also something missing in the LDA’s Olympic and legacy masterplan. The London Plan and the Newham Council offering suggested some mediation between the existing residential and industrial uses and new development, rather than commencing the regeneration from scratch. Furthermore, the Lea Valley Regional Park Authority recommended the upgrading of the exiting sporting facilities located in the Olympic site. Yet the LDA put great emphasis on the low value of the existing site, in particular the industrial use including warehousing and distribution centres, and opined that “all existing uses will be cleared” in order to pave the way for a “new” Olympic Park (LDA, 2004, p. 44). It was certain that the LDA initially tried to make a “tabula-rasa” for the Olympic development by displacing the existing uses.

Finally, while the masterplan by the LDA demonstrated an in-depth vision for transforming the Olympic site into the mixed-use urban quarter after the Games, the document also included a spatial strategy for the LLV area beyond the boundary of the Olympic site (Fig. 4-16). The spatial strategy along the River Lea from the north of the Olympic Park to the River Thames was not included in the first London Plan, and the Olympic masterplan therefore created the foundation for the subsequent Mayor’s
Opportunity Area Planning Framework which would be published after the bid (see Chapter 6). Although the legacy masterplan clearly aimed to deliver much higher-density urban development in the post-Olympic site, it stated that post-Olympic land use would be integrated into the adjacent areas and emphasised the current disconnection of both side of the river, suggesting the Olympic site would change from a “barrier” to a “bridge”. The 2004 Masterplan in particular recognised the five areas with their different spatial characters and proposed that the Olympic Park would be merged into these five areas (Fig. 4-17). Yet the LDA envisaged that these existing areas would also be redeveloped in the longer term as part of the Olympic legacy. Thus, the LDA asserted that the regeneration strategy was “structured around existing and new communities” and would “knit together old and new” (LDA, 2004, pp. 13–14), but the question this gave rise to was just where this “old” community would be. The document also paradoxically suggests that the park edge would be defined and reinforced (LDA, 2004, p. 34), but this may lead the Olympic site to be somewhat segregated in the wider urban tissue. Thus, integration of “old” and “new” was contradictorily addressed in the document, and I will argue that this dilemma can be seen to exemplify the difficulty of mediating the old and new within a massive urban regeneration project.

4.4 Concluding remarks

Olympic impacts on urban regeneration
This chapter has explored the evolution of London’s Olympic bid, in particular examining how the vision of the Olympic site was conceptualised well before London won the right to stage the 2012 Games in 2005. London’s long journey in terms of its Olympic bid had involved a great deal manoeuvring in search for the location of the Olympic site. In particular, whether to take a “reactive” or a “proactive” approach had been a critical question for London in considering how the city could utilise the Olympic effect in its regional development strategy, but the proactive approach had always been the preferred option due to the regenerative opportunities which the Olympics would trigger in East London. While London had seen the Games as an opportunity to catalyse significant urban regeneration, it also had a dilemma in regard to integrating more than what the city needed into a “winnable” bid proposal. In the case
of London, that was construction of the new Olympic stadium at the Olympic site in East London. In this respect, I argue that the Olympic impacts should be considered something of a “double-edged sword” for London and its urban development strategy.

**Governance of the Olympic bid**

In order to make the proactive bid proposal more realistic than speculative, London’s long bidding story underlines the need for strong political leadership and, in this respect, the formation of the single London government was a crucial part of the 2012 bid plan. Nevertheless, during the process of conceptualising the bid proposal for the 2012 Games, there were conflicting views on Olympic-led urban regeneration in East London. In particular, the central government’s concern about the risk and regional governments’ regenerative aspirations were highlighted in this chapter, and various feasibility studies were undertaken to flesh out both aspects. Yet the time constraints governing the finalising of the bid left the risk of a possible financial deficit as a result of hosting the Games in the LLV unresolved, and the regenerative opportunity was more emphasised by the Olympic bid organisation. This echoes Roche’s identification of a “subjective” feasibility study in the pre-bid phase rather than objective one (Roche, 1994), which can leave a potentially negative legacy in subsequent phases.

Furthermore, I wish to point out that it was crucial to conceptualise the “Olympic legacy” in a comprehensive way and to consider how different organisations involved in the bid could integrate it into their political aspirations. I will stress that there was a well-founded background that allowed London to address the Olympic “legacy” both regionally and internationally. At the regional level, emphasising the benefit of a “legacy” in particular in relation to the new urban quarter in East London was a good fit with the Mayor of London’s objective of improving the economic imbalance between East and West in the city. Meanwhile, as the bid for the 2012 Games was the first host city election wherein the IOC tested their new questions regarding promoting the “Olympic legacy”, London also distinguished itself in taking the most advantage from this condition. I thus argue that London succeeded in blending its own regional agenda of regenerating the LLV with the international gesture of helping the IOC address its concerns in relation to the future of the Olympic movement. However, I further point out that different representation of the legacy vision at regional and international level shows the need for different rhetoric at different stages. What should be addressed and
what should not be addressed certainly depends on each political occasion.

**Mixed-use vision**

London’s challenge in creating the mixed-use vision of the Olympic site was mediation of the Olympic requirements and the various spatial visions for the LLV issued by different planning authorities prior to the Olympics and the legacy masterplan by the LDA. Recognition of the need for housing and job creation as well as everyday sporting facilities rather than just ones for mass events was well articulated in the LDA’s masterplan, and its design strategy addressing “physical changeability” was a good response to the Olympic and legacy demands. Nevertheless, the LDA’s masterplan did not consider integrating exiting uses into the Olympic site, despite suggestions from the various planning frameworks such as the London Plan, local plans and the masterplan by the Lea Valley Regional Park Authority. One can argue that disconnection with the past makes the future planning process easier, but London’s approach of disconnection from the past and connection to the future did entail an interruption in the seamless urban evolution. Roche argues that planning of a mega-event should be an “organic extension of previous developments” (Roche, 1994, p. 45) and in this respect London’s vision for the future clearly went against this organic approach, with the pre-bid masterplan clearly suggesting that the area would be a completely new urban quarter with the traces of the past wiped away. However, I argue that the Olympics should not be conceived of as delineating the line between the past and future, but rather be the glue connecting them.

**Urban integration**

This critique on the disconnection with the past can be applied further to the integration of the post-Olympic site and the surroundings. As Judd suggests, there is a “bubble” effect often observed in creating new urban quarters in the city. Yet, in the case of the Olympic Park in the LLV, concerns about the surroundings were greatly emphasised in the LDA’s Olympic and legacy masterplan, and a wider spatial vision was in place in the document incorporating the surroundings stretching to the River Thames. Furthermore, the LDA proposed to merge the post-Olympic Park into the surrounding neighbourhood rather than having it stand out in the area. Nevertheless, regardless of these assertions the question may be posed as to whether this Olympic fringe area would maintain its exiting spatial character and would be able to co-exist with the new
urban quarters. While the LDA masterplan addressed what Hiller calls “urban boosterism” in regenerating the wider LLV area (Hiller, 2000), consideration of the area’s historical connections was less at the forefront.
Part I Conclusion: Similarities and differences in Sydney and London

Chapters 3 and 4 examined the initial planning process in the creation of the Olympic site in Sydney and London, and the findings in this part suggested that there were some shared experiences, but also significant differences between the two cities. As a conclusion to Part I, I will summarise these similarities and differences in the emergence and shaping of the vision of the Olympic sites in Sydney and London.

Olympic impacts on urban development strategy

In the initial phase of bidding, Sydney and London manoeuvred between a reactive and a proactive approach in integrating the Olympic impacts on the regional development strategy. The significance of the Olympic impacts as what Hiller calls an “intruder in the host city” provided Sydney and London with the opportunity to either enhance the existing urban structure or conduct a new urban regeneration (Hiller, 2003). The choices between Moore Park or Homebush Bay in Sydney and Wembley or East London exemplified this. There is no doubt that the regenerative objectives for the declined post-industrial sites in Homebush Bay and East London were a great trigger for both cities to take a proactive approach, but I will also argue that the Olympic forces and the severe inter-urban competition to win the bid they entail greatly affected this crucial decision. My in-depth historical exploration of Sydney and London reveals that, behind this final decision, both cities had conducted various feasibility studies to identify the benefits and risks of both reactive and proactive spatial settings, with both cities coming to believe that a proactive approach was imperative in making the proposal attractive to the IOC.

While this Olympic vision and the competition provided the rationale for the regeneration of the Homebush Bay and LLV areas and the creation of the Olympic parks there, it was also greatly influential in defining the spatial character of the Olympic site. Both cities recognised that a high concentration of sporting venues would be an advantage in the bid, and therefore it was imperative for Sydney and London to intensify the sporting vision of the Olympic site, which Preuss terms “the prisoner’s dilemma” (Preuss, 2004, p. 290). Thus, the increased number of competition venues concentrated in Homebush Bay as well as the need for integration of the main Olympic
stadium into the LLV site despite uncertainty regarding long-term use represented the powerful Olympic forces shaping the vision of the Olympic site. As a result, how to cope with the dominance of the sporting vision became the crucial issue in shaping the mixed-use vision of these post-Olympic sites.

Furthermore, I stress that the integration of the IOC’s political concerns at the time of bidding into their spatial visions of the Olympic site was crucial in both Sydney and London succeeding in their bids. Sydney’s speculative “Green Games” concept and London’s promotion of “the Olympic legacy” were both embedded into the spatial concept of the Olympic site and, in this respect, the Olympic site can be understood as what Lefebvre calls a “representation of space”, where the conceptualisation of space is prioritised (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 38).

**Governance of the Olympic bid**

Sydney and London experienced almost 30-year bidding processes in their respective quests to win the right to stage the Olympic Games, and the governance of the Olympic bid evolved significantly during these periods. What we have seen in Sydney and London was an evolution from a fragmented governing structure at the beginning to a more concentrated Olympic planning structure in the later phase of the bid. The concentration of the planning structure here does not mean the provision of planning powers to the Olympic bid committee but rather the establishment of a statutory body with responsibility to control the spatial strategy of the Olympic site in a close relationship with the bid committee. The bid committee in both cities was fundamentally an independent organisation consisting of influential political and business leaders in the city, but its planning power in the pre-bid phase was limited. It was therefore imperative that there was great involvement on the part of the regional governments in the spatial planning of the Olympic site. The production of the in-depth Olympic and legacy vision for the Sydney bid was made possible through the creation of the Homebush Bay Development Corporation (HBDC), the statutory organisation which oversaw the regeneration of Homebush Bay at the time of the bid for the 2000 Games in Sydney, and the great involvement of the Mayor and the LDA for the London 2012 bid, which was enabled by the establishment of the statutory authority for the greater London region.
Although the planning structure became more organised in the later phase of the bidding process, however, this did not guarantee a cohesive vision shared by the bid committee and the regional planning authority. It was not so visible in the case of London, but the case of Sydney suggests that the Olympic bid committee and the statutory planning body had directly conflicting visions. The fundamental aim of the bid committee was to win the bid, and this aim therefore tends to create a distinctive spatial setting intended to make the bid proposal attractive. Meanwhile, the regional authority had a more managerial and entrepreneurial approach to the site, in which the regional government focused on creating a feasible spatial plan and justifying the financial investment in the massive urban regeneration scheme of post-Olympic development. Thus, echoing Roche’s critique of the feasibility study conducted in the pre-bid phase, I will argue that the planning structure was simplified during the bid period but that the gap between the spatial strategy of the Olympic organisation and the regional authority nonetheless calls into question the inter-relationship between the spatial speculation and the practicalities proposed in the pre-bid phase (Roche, 1994).

Mixed-use vision: Accumulation of the various aspirations
One of the most crucial aims of this part was to explore the origin of the mixed-use vision for the Olympic sites in Sydney and London. My view here is that this vision was shaped during the long journeys of the bidding campaign in both cities. Homebush Bay in Sydney and the LLV in London were subject to spatial visions intended to satisfy the regional socio-economic development strategies, such as provision of housing, job opportunities and social facilities. The Olympic vision was added to these non-Olympic visions, but the way they were mixed in one urban quarter is different between Sydney and London. Sydney fundamentally aimed to establish a regional sporting precinct as a legacy of hosting the Olympics, and this was considered a means of enhancing regional economic prosperity. Meanwhile, London’s primary view of the LLV was to change the socio-economic situation in East London for the better, and hosting the Games had been considered a trigger to accelerate wider socio-economic regeneration. In this respect, the fundamental reasons behind the mixed-use vision for the Olympic site are different. This different origin is reflected in the different spatial strategies in Sydney and London. Sydney had struggled to combine sporting and industrial use, but London’s challenge was to transform the Olympic-sized sporting legacy to a more applicable scale for post-Olympic uses and utilise it to enhance the diverse spatial developments in the
post-Olympic site. In other words, while Sydney tackled the compatibility of different uses in the mixed-use urban precinct, which various authors point out as crucial for urban vibrancy (Coupland, 1997), London tried to avoid such a challenge. Furthermore, while Sydney’s vision had been shaped historically, London’s legacy vision was planned from scratch, being clearly based on the assumption that existing uses would be cleared away to pave the way for new development, an approach sharply in contrast to Jacobs’ argument of the need for various aged physical artefacts for urban diversity (Jacobs, 1961, pp. 244–260). Thus, I stress that both cities had different reasons for envisioning a mixed-use Olympic Park and these would bring different challenges in the future, as these visions would entail some potential problems which the existing literature has pointed out in realising the mixed-use urban precinct.

**Urban integration**

Finally, while the initial vision of the Olympic Park was founded in the pre-bid phase, different approaches to the integration into the wider urban tissue between Sydney and London are also visible. One of the potential benefits of having the leading authority responsible for the development of the Olympic site was to consider it within the wider urban context, to avoid the aforementioned “bubble” effect (Judd, 1999). The planning boundaries of the statutory authority which defined the final bid masterplan in both Sydney and London went beyond the Olympic site. Yet, while the LDA conducted the spatial analysis of wider LLV area, the HBDC’s view was limited to the Olympic site, and there were little suggestions on how the Olympic Park and its surroundings would be harmonised. In other words, Sydney’s approach was more inward looking, while London attempted to mediate between in and outside the Olympic site. Despite seeking a more contextual approach in the wider urban area, however, London lacked a historical viewpoint which considered the relationship between the old and new urban areas in the LLV. Although the regional and local planning policy had pointed this out in the pre-bid phase, the LDA failed to address how the creation of the Olympic Park as a legacy of hosting the Olympic Games would relate to the existing neighbourhood.
Part II: The Post-Bid Phase

The second part of this thesis (chapters 5 and 6) will explore the post-bid phase, which is the seven-year period between the host city's selection and the Olympic Games. There are some critical analytical points relating to the planning process of this period, which my discussion in this chapter will focus on. Firstly, as Roche has critically suggested, the final plan may show significant changes to the vision for the legacy of the Olympic site from the one initially proposed in the bid (Roche, 1994). Given my research interest in the changes of the spatial vision and the reasons for such changes, I will examine how the vision for the Olympic site evolves during the period, along with the changes in governance of the Olympic planning. Secondly, along with the development of the vision of the Olympic Park, this is the period when some of the facilities are built and the spatial framework of the Olympic Park is established, part of which will become a significant physical legacy. Thus, I will examine the process of the implementation. In particular I will shed light on the involvement of the private sector, through PPPs in the implementation process, and explore how this manipulates the initial vision. Thirdly, I will look at the Olympic site beyond the site boundaries, and in particular explore how each site is contextualised within its wider planning context. Following Part I, Judd’s conception of the urban “bubble” (Judd, 1999) will be the underlying analytical framework for the relationship between the Olympic site and its urban tissue. My exploration here is to examine both local and regional planning contexts, and to identify different planning relationships in relation to the emerging Olympic site. As indicated in Chapter 2, there has been a fundamental transformation in the IOC regarding its attitude to the Olympic legacy between these two periods. Thus, at the end of this part, I will explore the differences as well as similarities between Sydney and London.
Chapter 5: Sydney

5.1 Governance of the Olympic legacy and its reflection of the spatial vision

Sydney won the right to stage the 2000 Olympic Games at the host city election held in Monte Carlo in September 1993, and the Games became a great impetus to facilitate further development of Homebush Bay. After winning the bid, the Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited, led by a powerful consortium organised by most influential public and private people in Sydney who tried to promote Sydney’s successful bid, was dissolved, and further actions were conducted largely by various public bodies in the NSW Government (Fig. 5-1).

In the initial phase of the post-bid period, the different authorities had different roles in shaping the vision of the Olympic site in Homebush Bay, and this fragmented planning structure certainly reflected the divergent nature of the spatial strategy developed in this period. The overall spatial strategy of Homebush Bay, for example, was devised by the NSW Department of Planning and the Homebush Bay Development Corporation (HBDC). The NSW Department of Planning created the governmental spatial strategy for Homebush Bay, “the Sydney Regional Environmental Plan No.24 (SREP. 24)”, as a basis for state government intervention in the area (NSW Department of Planning, 1994; Gurran, 2007, p. 222), and the HBDC prepared the detailed document for land use and the transport network, “Structure Plan” (HBDC, 1994) (Fig. 5-2). The draft versions of both documents were issued prior to the bid, but after re-evaluating the feasibility of the previous documents and incorporating the bid decision and public consultation, the two documents were revised in different ways.

64 NSW Department of Planning (1993a) Draft Sydney Regional Environmental Plan No. 24 : Homebush Bay Development Area Sydney. HBDC (1993) Homebush Bay Area Draft Structure Plan, Sydney. Draft SREP. 24 was published in June 1993, and the Draft Structure Plan in September 1993. Although it was uncertain if Sydney could win the bid at the time of publication, these draft documents were written under the assumption of Sydney’s successful bid.
Furthermore, different spatial aspirations were developed in the NSW Government. The HBDC, for example, took a practical approach, and suggested as the Olympic site a more isolated place in the Homebush area. “The Structure Plan” by the HBDC addressed “protection” of the Olympic site from the surroundings as an important feature of holding major events there (HBDC, 1994, p. 4).65 It was understood that after the bid, the management of major events would become a serious issue, and therefore the HBDC proposed to isolate the core area of Homebush Bay by a “loop road”, which would provide an efficient logistical route for major events by seamlessly connecting areas within the site during the event. Isolation of the core area of Homebush Bay from the surroundings was further observed in the geographical detachment of the Bay. The strong relation between the water and sports was a strong image within Sydney’s bid concept, “Green Games.” Sydney's bid proposed to use the existing Brickpit as the Olympic Tennis Centre and amphitheatre, which would connect the industrial past and the future, but this crucial element was abandoned soon after the bid was concluded. Peter Mould, the NSW Government architect during 2005 to 2012, pointed out that contamination of the Bay was much worse than expected in the bid, and an in-depth soil study of the Brickpit had not been conducted prior to the bid.66 This, the HBDC altered the vision of Homebush Bay drastically, based on the more serious feasibility studies, and as a result the Olympic site lost its spatial connectivity, instead becoming a juxtaposition of different functions enclosed in the loop road.

While the HBDC had sought the practical feasibility of the Olympic site in Homebush Bay, the Property Service Group (PSG), the property arm of the NSW Government, had looked for a strong identity for Homebush Bay, in order to promote Sydney’s vision further. To this end the PSG organised a workshop called “Urban Design Studio” from 28 November to 5 December 1994, and invited leading domestic and international experts in various fields such as urban planning, architectural design, transport and ecology (NSW Government, 1994). The PSG believed that the regeneration of Homebush Bay would be a great opportunity to promote Australian excellence to the world, and good design would add value both economically and socially. One of the

65 This was also indicated in NSW Department of Planning (1994) Sydney Regional Environmental Plan No. 24 : Homebush Bay Development Area Sydney., p. 7.
Peter Mould worked on the Homebush Bay development, and as a government planning officer, and later became the NSW Government Architect during 2005 to 2012.
most notable participants in the workshop was the French architect Jean Nouvel, who has designed various award-winning architectural projects all over the world. Nouvel defined his role as finding the architectural/urban design solution to symbolise the “Australian identity” and set it as “a model for the rest of world” (Nouvel, 1994). After studying various options for the topographic patterning of the site, Nouvel designated the Brickpit as the epicentre of Homebush Bay, organising various venues around it, even though the new Structure Plan suggested the uncertainty of utilising it (Fig. 5-3).

Although media outlets such as the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) praised Nouvel’s approach of finding “specificity” or looking at the “genius” of the existing site, his scheme was not always welcomed. Although the workshop sought fresh ideas for the development of Homebush Bay, it also addressed the need for the new proposals to find a balance between the inherited planning agencies’ requirements and the unseen potential for the area (NSW Government, 1994, pp. 1–2). In this respect, his scheme was considered unique but difficult to integrate historically so as to garner the planning consent needed for Homebush Bay. In addition to the difficulty of integrating a one-off design workshop into a planning process which already had a long history, it was organised at a time when the political regime in NSW was changing, and there was a significant risk that the following government would not adopt its predecessor's plans. Eventually, despite the great effort and cost invested to seek an identity for Homebush Bay which would be directly related to the promotion of the city’s positive image to the world, the results of the workshop including Nouvel’s idea were never published. The Urban Design Studio workshop was criticised in the statement “the designs have disappeared into the recesses of the Government bureaucracy”, although the government spent more than AUD 500,000 to obtain various speculative spatial ideas for Homebush Bay.

Thus, the visions of Homebush Bay created in the period of the Liberal Government after Sydney won the bid manoeuvred between practicality and speculation, and this was certainly reflected in the highly fragmented governance of the Olympic planning. The instability of the vision for Homebush Bay caused the serious delay of the construction of the Olympic Park, which had led various media critiques on the NSW.

67 “Top French architect has designs on Olympic site”, SMH, 5 December 1994.
Also “He changed the way we think about Architecture”, SMH, 7 December 1994.

In April 1995, the government of NSW changed from Liberal to the Labour, and Bob Carr became the Premier of NSW. As soon as he took the position, Carr started reforming various political systems. One of the significant changes was the re-organisation of planning powers in the State Government. Lack of strategic long-term planning of cities' development in Australia had been highlighted by the National Prime Minister, and Carr followed suit. He recognised that fragmentation of planning power had prevented the strategic planning of the region, and he began the reform of the planning structure in NSW. A streamlined planning structure was also applied to the ongoing Olympic planning. It is considered that the previous “fragmented” planning structures had caused “the lack of the clarity about the direction of the project, about issues of scope, size and planning, and the degree of private sector involvement” (Cashman, 2011, p. 41), and had also been one of the biggest reasons for the delay of some Olympic construction, such as the main Olympic stadium and the athletes' village. David Churches, senior director of Games Planning at the Olympic Co-ordination Authority, further confirmed that:

“We had change of government in NSW and with the change of government, the incoming government had to take much stronger control over the Olympic project in particular with construction.”

In order to centralise planning power and accelerate the process for the Olympic project, Carr’s government created the Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA) under the Olympic Co-ordination Authority Act issued on 30 June 1995. The function of the authority included planning for and provision of Olympic venues and facilities, Olympic Games co-ordination and reporting with/to the NSW Government, development of the Sydney Olympic Park development area, and acquisition and dedication of land. Under this system, while the Sydney Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (SOCOG) had responsibility for the “soft” side of the Olympic

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69 Carr, for example, ordered the winding up of some statutory planning authorities, and transferred their planning power to the Department of Planning and Urban Affairs. Carr stated that “for the first time, we have a Planning Department that can drive the strategic plan for Sydney and other bureaucracies will have to surrender their powers”.

“Carr’s vision splendid over Sydney”, SMH, 6 April 1995.

70 Interview with David Churches on 26 November 2008.
Games,\(^71\) the OCA took great responsibility for preparation of the “hard” side of the Games.

In addition to the creation of the OCA, the government also appointed Michael Knight as the Minister for the Olympics (Fig. 5-4). Michael Knight was a member of Carr’s Labour government, and in the new Olympic governance model, the OCA was directly under his control. Knight justified the newly-created streamlined planning structure for the Olympic project as follows:

“[t]he two Games venues - the 80,000-seat main stadium and the Olympic village - are behind schedule because inter-agency rivalry has caused confusion, jealousy and duplication,”\(^72\) (emphasis added).

The creation of the OCA and concentration of the decision making process was a crucial turning point, and the change to the Olympic planning structure was certainly reflected in the masterplan for Homebush Bay, as Knight suggested that the finalisation of the masterplan had been a priority for the new government.\(^73\) In September 1995, only five months after the new Labour government was established, the OCA unveiled the modified masterplan for Homebush Bay, clarifying various issues such as the relocation of the RAS showground and usage of the Brickpit, both of which had been targets of public debate in Sydney. The Premier of NSW, Bob Carr, stated that:

“It finally locks into place the sporting and commercial precinct, the rail link, bus access and road system as well as creating huge public open space.”\(^74\)

It is certain that the streamlined planning structure system made it possible for the new government to finalise the masterplan in such a short period, and in this respect, one can argue that publication of the new masterplan justified reform of the Olympic planning structure. Yet the spatial strategy unveiled in the new masterplan showed the limits of the fast-track planning. Although the new masterplan document stressed that there was continuity with previous planning schemes (OCA, 1995, p. 17), the spatial image shown

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\(^71\) The Organising Committee is the institution which every host city has to create as the Games’ operating organisation under the host city contract with the IOC.


\(^73\) Ibid.

in the new masterplan in 1995 had drastically changed from the bid proposal.

The masterplan of Homebush Bay at the time of bidding represented an organic mixture between built forms and the natural environment, and in particular, the connection between the Bay and sports stadia, in order to support Sydney’s “Green Games” concept (Figs. 5-5 and 6). The new masterplan in 1995, however, created a division between built forms and the natural environment, or to use another word used in the masterplan, there was a “juxtaposition” of extensive conservation and open areas with dense urban districts (OCA, 1995, p. 28). The inherited identity of the urban design in Homebush Bay and the organic configuration of built forms and the natural environment disappeared, and instead, a “grid-patterned road system” was introduced, which would divide the central area of Homebush Bay into various precincts (Figs. 5-7 and 8). Unlike the previous planning documents, the term “urban core” was extensively used in the new masterplan, suggesting the area would become a “new city” in the western area of Sydney, and grid-patterned roads became the elements to separate various functions within this “urban core”.

Given the complexity of the “urban core”, creation of an urban “grid” was a workable solution to accommodate the diverse uses, built forms, lease-holders, and histories which had to fit in the area. The “urban core” area, in fact, contained an existing light industrial area and sporting area operated by the State Government, the new sporting area containing the main Olympic stadium which would be operated by the private sector, and the new showground area, which would host one of the biggest annual events in NSW. The central area of Homebush Bay was thus divided into different pieces of land by grid-patterned roads, which would enable different areas to be managed by different operators.

Application of a “grid” in urban design can be seen from different perspectives. Sue Holly, a former planning officer for the Sydney Games, utilised the term “cohesion” to identify the role of the new masterplan in creating a “unified Olympic precinct”, when she gave a lecture at the Olympic Conference in Athens in 2006. It is certain that Holly justified the application of the “grid” to mediate various differences located in Homebush Bay. In a similar vein, Dianne Leeson described the chaotic condition created by the involvement of the private sector, as follows:
“They (private companies) came along with their own designers and landscape designers, and similarly I think half a dozen designers worked for the showground. So what we were getting was always competing views. At one stage, it will be a terrible mess.”

Furthermore, a former senior director of the OCA, David Churches, provides a different view of the system. He points out that the decision to apply the grid system did not only come from a feasibility perspective in the fast-tracked Olympic planning context, but also from the intention to integrate a long-term post-Olympics vision. This also recalls Koolhaas’s view of the grid system as a spatial framework for future opportunity, which he recognised through his observation of the New York city grid (Koolhaas, 1995). While Olympic planners indicated the advantage of the grid system, it can be critically observed that this was an expression of “control-ness”. “Control-ness” in urban space has been widely criticised as a method of erasing urban liveliness. Richard Sennett, for example, suggests that “neutrality” is a crucial concept of “grid” systems in cities, and it represents “a space of social control”, in his book “The Conscience of the Eye: the Design and Social Life in Cities” (Sennett, 1990, pp. 46–62). In his view, a grid system homogenises the diversion of the urban space, despite the various social and historical backgrounds of the space. His critical view of “control” rather than mediation is illustrated in the phrase “organise and juxtapose critical land uses” in the new masterplan document (OCA, 1995, p. 18). In fact, David Churches also admitted that “[t]he concept of planning in Australia unfortunately is not conceptual, it’s actually controlling” In this respect, the grid system ironically represented the difficulty of mediating different land uses that existed or would exist in the site.

Beyond the practical aspects of the masterplan, the disappearance of the previous concept of integration of nature and history and the strong impression of “control-ness” were widely criticised. SMH called the new masterplan a “safe option”, reporting that it was just a massive grid, and that it was described by architects as “reasonable rather

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75 Interview with Dianne Leeson on 7 July 2007.
76 Churches fundamentally supported the previous organic spatial approach, as he thought the presentation of “Sydney-ness” should be livelier and very much integrated with nature. Yet at the same time, as Holly indicated, he thought that the grid was going to make the site’s layout easier to understand when it was very busy.
77 Interview with David Churches on 26 November 2008.
78 Interview with David Churches on 6 January 2009.
than splendid”. The SMH further criticised the new plan as “staid, boring mediocrity”, lacking international significance. These comments were greatly related to the question of the centralisation of the planning process, although the new government strongly argued for the advantages of the new planning structure for the Olympic project.

5.1.2 Impact of the 1996 Atlanta Games

There is no doubt that the change of the regional government in 1995 was the great catalyst for changes in governance of the Olympic planning and spatial vision of Homebush Bay. In addition to this, various people involved in the Sydney Olympic planning suggested in their interviews that the 1996 Atlanta Olympics had a great impact on the ongoing planning of the Homebush Bay Olympic site in Sydney, and also triggered further changes of the spatial strategy. What created a great impact on Sydney’s Olympic governance and spatial strategy was the risk of the global media exposing the planning failure of the Olympic Games and the need for greater government involvement in the Olympic planning to avoid this risk.

The Atlanta Games can be characterised by a highly strategic approach largely led by business sectors in the city. Instead of creating various new Olympic facilities, it strategically forecast the long-term usability of required facilities, and carefully planned new developments in light of the solid financial viability of the legacy use. Atlanta’s approach to eliminating the long-term burden of the physical Olympic legacy and using the Games to push urban regeneration, which business leaders considered necessary for their long-term future, can be considered one way of adapting Olympic impacts to a city’s development strategy (Gold and Gold, 2011 [2007]-b, pp. 42–44). Yet such highly privately-led Olympic planning, in which the city government’s involvement was minimal, caused various problems during the Olympics. Lack of public funding certainly led to little investment in urban infrastructure, and this caused severe traffic congestion. Furthermore, administrative problems, security breaches, and over-commercialisation were highly criticised as stemming from the “failure of American public-private partnership” (Chalkley and Essex, 1999, pp. 387–389). Thus, one of the biggest lessons which Sydney learnt from the Atlanta Games was their

80 “Games vision ‘boring mediocrity’”, SMH, 15 March 1996.
operational failure caused by a lack of government involvement. As Michael Knight suggests:

“Atlanta had a huge impact on increasing the connection with the government. What became pretty apparent to me [...] is that unless the government was more involved, we couldn’t do this. We couldn’t do this without the greater government involvement and without the greater integration of the Government, Organising Committee (the SOCOG) and OCA.”

Knight uses the term “pressure” in talking about the impact from the Atlanta Games, as Sydney organisers recognised the importance of international exposure of the Olympic Games after seeing the problems of the Atlanta Games. As Knight suggests, this led to the provision of more planning power to himself as the Minister for the Olympics, and the creation of a special governmental agency responsible for all traffic issues related to the Olympic Games. Yet, it was not as straightforward as it eventually appeared. According to Churches, increasing the government's involvement was difficult, because the contract with the IOC was legally made by the Organising Committee, not by the city Government. Therefore, it created a complicated relationship between the IOC, the Organising Committee and the NSW Government, which the IOC had never experienced. Yet the State Government’s strong argument that the government (not the Organising Committee) would pay for construction and take financial risks and long-term risks made it possible to modify the planning structure of the Sydney Games.

The change of administrative structure for the Olympic planning had various impacts on the ongoing masterplan for the Homebush Bay site, and indeed the long-term vision of the Olympic site. Since transportation was not the OCA’s responsibility, it could focus more on delivering the venues and public spaces required for the Games. The crucial finding from the Atlanta Games for the Sydney planners was the importance of crowd control in the Olympic site. Michael Knight pointed out that one of the things that people did not appreciate was the size of what Atlanta did. Overcrowding in the city centre was one of the issues for the Atlanta Olympics, and Sydney planners recognised

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81 Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008.
82 Interview with David Churches on 26 November 2008.
83 Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008.
it as a crucial point in staging successful Games. Chris Johnson, the Government Architect during the Olympics and a key figure of the Olympic Design Review Panel, notes that after seeing the logistics of the Atlanta Games, Sydney planners began to recognise that they needed more open spaces in the core of Homebush Bay. The masterplan, therefore, needed to be modified drastically to create bigger open spaces. Yet this had both positive and negative opinions, in particular when considering the use after the Olympics. Churches, for example, commented:

“If you’ve see the photographs during the Games, the whole of the boulevard was full of the people. People talk about it afterwards and say ‘no, it was a waste’. But that wasn’t a waste. That was actually necessary for it to be safe and pleasant during the Games.”

Johnson similarly recognised that they would build on a bigger scale than necessary, but he indicated that it would be good to celebrate the “big stimulation” represented by the Games and its legacy, because he envisaged that the city would catch up as the region’s population continuously grew. Although there was uncertainty about its legacy usage, the OCA adopted the argument for the expansion of the public spaces. It appointed George Hargreaves, an American landscape architect and professor at Harvard University, who also contributed to the landscape design of the London Olympic Park for the 2012 Games, to design the core of Homebush Bay, especially the public domain in the urban core. The OCA unveiled the modified masterplan in 1997. Although the new plan was still based on the grid pattern proposed in the previous masterplan, it clearly showed bigger urban spaces, by creating a 60m wide Olympic Boulevard as the spine of the site, while the area around the main stadium and the indoor arena were kept as large open spaces for the event (Fig. 5-10).

When the OCA decided to create the bigger open spaces, this required restructuring the spatial layout in the Olympic Park, by relocating some venues out of Homebush Bay. The Velodrome, which was located near the Olympic stadium and indoor sports and entertainment centre, became the target. Michael Knight indicated that it became obvious that the area that the Velodrome occupied could be used for temporary facilities.

84 Interview with Chris Johnson on 15 January 2009.
85 Interview with David Churches on 29 November 2008.
86 Interview with Chris Johnson on 15 January 2009.
(crowd control and ticketing), both at the time of the Games and beyond, and the
government decided to relocate the Velodrome.87 Jacques Rogge, the head of the IOC’s
Co-ordination Commission for the Sydney Games and the president of the IOC from
2001 to 2013, also stated as follows:

"There are advantages and disadvantages in concentrating big venues in the
same place. We believe it is a very good idea to move the velodrome out of
Homebush Bay in terms of landscaping, scenery, crowd control and avoiding
too much congestion...It will leave a better legacy for Sydney in the future. The
legacy is very important for the city."88

Although both Knight and Rogge mentioned that the Velodrome was relocated not only
for the Games but also in view of its legacy, it is certain that their comments were based
on the organisational point of view, in particular the event management viewpoint. But
the cycling federation and users had different views. They were concerned about the
legacy. The president of the NSW Cycling Federation, Alex Fulcher, argued:

"If they wanted it to be viable after 2000, well they can just forget it in outlying
areas. This has nothing to do with not supporting the west, it's just not going to
work if it's not in a central location."89

Johnson said that relocation of the Velodrome would benefit the other area by the
Olympics, as in Barcelona, which provided multiple Olympic sites for the city’s
long-term strategic growth.90 Meanwhile, others claimed that securing the Velodrome’s
viability after the Olympics should be prioritised, and worried that unless an appropriate
location and transportation were provided, it would not work. Thus, the issue of
relocating venues exemplified the conflict between operational success during the
Games and the post-Olympic utilisation. But it seems to me that operational concerns
were more prioritised in defining the spatial character of Homebush Bay, and
prioritising the Games’ success in the age of global exposure of the Olympic Games was
the great impact of the Atlanta Games on Sydney’s spatial strategy.

87 “Cyclists angry as Olympic velodrome is moved west”, SMH, 24 September 1996.
88 “No more changes to Games site, vows Knight”, SMH, 26 September 1996.
89 “Cyclists angry as Olympic velodrome is moved west”, SMH, 24 September 1996.
90 Interview with Chris Johnson on 15 January 2009.
5.1.4 Legacy consideration during the preparation phase

Many modifications of the masterplan for Homebush Bay and changes in the size and settings of sporting venues had set the spatial character of the Olympic site as well as the vision of the site beyond the Games. In addition to this, it is imperative to explore explicitly the degree to which planners and organisers considered the legacy during the preparation phase, in order to directly connect with my research question.

The Olympic Co-ordination Act was issued on 30 June 1995, and indicated that the function of the OCA was not only to plan and construct the Olympic venues and facilities within the agreed timeframe and budget, but also to ensure they were suitable for post-Olympic uses. The Act further defined the role of the OCA to include consideration of the long-term requirements of Sydney and the economic development of the Homebush Bay area (NSW Government, 1995). By this definition, it is understood that tackling the “legacy” was as important for the Olympic planning authority as preparing the stage for the Games. Although the term “legacy” is now almost central in Olympic planning in both practical and academic spheres, during the Sydney preparation phase, “legacy” and similar words were not so visible to the public. Michael Knight observed:

“Legacy wasn’t front and centre even at the time that Sydney [was part of] the Olympic movement. Now in subsequent years, the IOC thought more about legacy. So the IOC requirements for the legacy are much greater than ten years ago.”91

David Churches further pointed out:

“I think Sydney has quite advanced the idea of the legacy, but never presented them in a consolidated way, because nobody asked.”92

Thus, when searching for the term “Olympic legacy” used in media outlets such as the SMH during the post-bid period, we cannot find many articles with the phrase. Richard

91 Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008.
92 Interview with David Churches on 29 November 2008.
Cashman, who addressed the importance of the Olympic legacy during the bid, says the “Olympic legacy” concept was relatively new in academic circles at the end of the 1990s (Cashman, 1999; Cashman, 1998). Yet the interviews with the planners and organisers of the Sydney Games, and some minutes of meetings of the IOC sessions, show that different people had different perceptions of this concept. Jacques Rogge, the chair of the IOC’s Co-ordination Committee for the Sydney Games, claimed:

“The Coordination Commission had checked to see if the Host City Contract and bid documents had been respected and any changes that were made were improvements to the legacy left to the city” (IOC, 1995) (emphasis added).

His view represents the IOC’s view that the various changes made by the host city after the bid had to be related to the legacy, and given all of the IOC’s approvals of Sydney’s modification of spatial settings, the IOC believed that Sydney had changed the Olympic planning due to concerns about the legacy left to the city. Yet this is only one view, and the views of planners and organisers in Sydney are more complicated. Many planners indicated that the challenge was to find a balance between Olympic planning and legacy planning during the post-bid phase, and confessed that little time was spent on the future. David Churches suggested as follows:

“The OCA had enormous responsibilities in terms of building the site, studying and management of the site, and many other things towards the Games. But we really needed an organisation from at least two years before the Games which had no other responsibility other than looking to the future. The OCA had that responsibility, and David Richmond who was the head of the OCA was quite open about the fact that we didn't have much work done on this. It’s because everybody was working very heavily on the Olympics and Paralympics. His view simply says that there were not enough people in Australia to do the future planning and Olympic planning spontaneously” (emphasis added).

Chris Johnson similarly recalled that:

“In terms of long-term legacy, we were strongly driven by making the project

93 Interview with David Churches on 29 November 2008.
work for the Olympics, not spending too much time worrying about what will happen after the Olympics. Maybe that’s right, maybe that’s wrong.”94 (emphasis added).

These comments suggest that the pressure of delivering the venues on time and organising a successful event were prioritised over the post-Olympics period, yet others argue that while planners spent much time on the Olympic preparation, certain legacy aspects were involved in it. Dianne Leeson pointed out:

“In terms of the Olympic venues, the sporting facilities and village, we did a lot of work on what Sydney needed after the Olympic Games. [...] So we had a question about which venues would be permanent, which ones would be temporally. And of the permanent ones, we considered what we really wanted after the Games, and what kind of configuration was needed for the Games.”95

Sporting venues were central elements of the Olympic Games, and delivering them was a crucial part during the post-bid phase, as suggested by various people. Yet Leeson argues that there were careful considerations of how the Olympic and legacy requirements could be mediated in each construction project and met within the limited timeframe. Thus, the legacy was one of the crucial factors in the sports planning. Then, the question emerges as to what was missing in the phase. Michael Knight clearly addressed this question. He indicated:

“We thought about legacy when we were bidding. For example, we were not building Sydney Olympic park for a 17-day sporting festival. We were building Sydney Olympic park for the longer term. We thought about the legacy in that sense. We didn’t think a lot about how we’d operate the Sydney Olympic park in the future, we didn’t think a lot about what the mix of commercial, residential and sporting would be.... We were thinking about creating a massive parkland that would be an enormous legacy forever. We never necessary thought about where the money would come from in 2015 for the operation of the Centennial Park Land, so that wasn’t that level of the detail

94 Interview with Chris Johnson on 15 January 2009.
95 Interview with Dianne Leeson on 7 July 2005.
but we were thinking about the legacy in terms of the things we would be building. Knight clearly confirmed that while the Olympic planners had considered the legacy of the sporting aspects, which were directly connected with the Games, and of the parkland located at the periphery of the Olympic site, the non-sporting features in the core areas had not been addressed. Furthermore, the future management method of the Olympic Park was also less developed. As indicated in the beginning of this part, considering the long-term economic development of Homebush Bay was a crucial part of the OCA’s responsibility, but there was insufficient consideration of the future mixed-use and management of the Park, both of which would be highly related to the economic sustainability of the site.

During the preparation phase, the OCA issued many planning documents, but most of them were on the masterplan for Homebush Bay during the Olympic Games and announcements of the construction process in the park. Future spatial plans were rarely addressed in a concrete way. The illustrative plan attached to the 1995 masterplan document was probably the only legacy plan published during the post-bid phase. Creation of a mixed-use urban centre and financial returns were considered crucial to the “health of cities” in the masterplan, and as discussed in the previous part, the partnerships with the private sector were recommended as an implementation method (OCA, 1995, p. 30, 71). Nevertheless, the 1995 masterplan lacked any concrete vision, and just showed the broad direction of the site, which reflected the visual plan issued at the same time.

Figs. 5-11 and 12 show the two masterplans, one for the Olympics and another for the legacy (Figs. 5-11 and 12). The differences between the two plans are identified in two areas: the existing business centre in the urban core and warehouse area located on the adjacent western site of the Sydney Olympic Park (SOP). These two pictures suggest that in both areas, existing areas would be completely erased and changed to the new commercial area defined by grid streets. Highly abstract grid-patterned land forms were shown as a post-Olympic commercial development opportunity area, and Peter Mould,

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96 Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008.
who served as the Government Architect between 2005 and 2012 and was also involved in the SOP masterplan during the preparation phase, pointed out that grid-pattern streets would make the post-Olympics development easier. Mould’s suggestion, which reflects Sennett’s conception of “grid as neutrality”, proposed to leave a “blank canvas” for further development (Sennett, 1990, pp. 46–62).

It seems that the planning strategy of “leaving it open to the future” instead of defining an in-depth future vision was also supported by other planning officers. Chris Johnson, the predecessor of Mould, argued:

“We didn’t think of extra building to fill the vacant space, extra layers to be added. [...] It’s very hard to look at what will happen 20 years ahead. It’s a matter of leaving an opportunity for development. Legacy consideration was there but not by exactly defining what will happen in the future” (emphasis added).

It is understood that Johnson’s term “extra layers” meant non-sporting use in the urban core, and he fundamentally supported the idea of leaving opportunities for the future, rather than detailed legacy planning. Timing of legacy planning was further addressed by Knight. Yet his view came from more operational concerns about the Olympic Games.

“[a] lot of what you do with the legacy you can’t do before the Games. You need bigger open spaces in Sydney Olympic Park to cater for 400,000 people on the biggest day in the public domain. You’ll never need that again. So you can start arranging buildings in that area, commercial buildings that you could never have during the Games. It would have been a nightmare if 6,000 employees of the commonwealth bank were here during the Games. [...] So you can’t do a lot of things before the Games, and you shouldn’t do things before the Games. [...] The growth (of the city) is organic.”

Knight’s practical viewpoint echoes John Bale’s conceptualisation of the sporting

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97 Interview with Peter Mould on 25 November 2008.
98 Interview with Chris Johnson on 15 January 2009.
99 Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008.
landscape as a “topophobia”, or landscape of fear, which requires separation from “a
daily life” (Bale, 1994, pp. 145–146). Thus, for various reasons, the planning for
mixed-use development was rarely conducted before the Games, and this eventually led
to severe problems and the “post-Olympic hangover”, which I will discuss in depth in a
later part of this thesis.

Against this backdrop, Churches suggested the need for an organisation which focuses
on legacy aspects of the Olympic Park before the Olympics. In my interview, when I
asked what was missing before the Games, Churches replied as follows:

“I think the main thing was management. To achieve legacy you need to create
some sorts of dedicated structure that makes sure that it happens. And we didn’t
have that. [...] I think, on the legacy, it probably can’t be external to the
country but I think needs to be external to the Organising Committee.” 100

As he recognised the difficulty of mobilising Olympic staff for non-Games related
activities, Churches argued that an independent body should look at the legacy. Yet he
admitted the difficulty of having such organisation in reality, due to the limited financial
resources made available by the State Government during the Olympic preparation
phase.

5.2 Implementation of the vision

5.2.1 Involvement of the private sector

While the spatial vision of Homebush Bay had been shaped by various masterplans,
construction of the Olympic venues was conducted simultaneously. In the context of the
Olympic project, the idea of employing the private sector had been considered for a
long time. The previous Liberal government, for example, invited private companies to
design, build, operate and maintain the stadium under a lease-hold from the OCA, in
order to reduce the cost and risk which the State Government would bear (Searle, 2002).
In general, due to intense inter-state competition in Australia to attract global investment,
upgrading infrastructure and developing the state land has been imperative for each State Government in Australia. Against this backdrop, the NSW Government frequently employed PPPs for major urban development to reduce the state debt (Searle and Bounbds, 1999), and Carr’s government followed in this wake. In the 1995 masterplan, it clearly addressed the need to “promote private enterprise opportunities” as one of twelve critical points (OCA, 1995, p. 5). This was intended as a means of not only reducing capital costs, but also of expanding the economic returns to the government. In this respect, the meaning of PPPs in the new government was greatly different from the predecessor’s understanding. A comment of David Churches exemplifies this well. He suggests that:

“...[i]n fact the Conservative government had a very strong view that the Games should not have any cost to the tax payer at all, in the English expression ‘small is beautiful’, you should do things as minimal as possible. The Liberal government also had a view that it should be very much private sector led. When the government changed, their view was that the government should have a much stronger role, and there should be a much bigger legacy, both a built legacy and a social legacy. They still wanted private sector involvement, but this did not mean that private sector involvement would reduce the cost, but private sector involvement should allow more things to occur”\(^\text{101}\) (emphasis added).

Such transformation, which can be identified as a change from “managerialism” to “entrepreneurism” in urban governance (Harvey, 1989), reflected the change in the scale of the sporting venues. The government had been considering which venues should be built with the funding from private sectors and which ones from states’ tax. Churches further explained:

“During the bid period...[t]he government considered that it would attract private sector investment in all small venues, but would have to pay for the Olympic stadium and what is now called the Super Dome that was the Coliseum during the bid, and the village would have to be have re-subsidised. In fact what happened was the complete opposite. We found that it was quite

\(^{101}\) Interview with David Churches on 6 January 2009.
Thus, two main venues, the Olympic stadium and the indoor sports area, the Super Dome, were funded with contributions from the private sector, and their capacity was increased from the bidding phase. As the former chief planning officer, Dianne Leeson, mentions, there had been a debate about the capacity of the Olympic stadium. The capacity of the stadium increased from 80,000 (bid) to 110,000 seats (post-bid), and it became the biggest stadium in Olympic history. In a similar vein, the capacity of the Super Dome increased from 15,000 (bid) to 21,000 (post-bid), and it became the biggest indoor arena in Australia.

Constructing two large event facilities in Homebush Bay represented the State’s intention of attracting much bigger events which the existing venues could not hold. The existing state facilities, the Sydney Cricket Ground and Sydney Football Stadium at Moore Park (42,000 seats) and the Exhibition Centre at Darling Harbour (10,000 seats), had been the major event venues for the region, but both of them had a limit in terms of capacity. The State Government therefore expected that the bigger event facilities in Homebush Bay would create opportunities to host bigger regional and international events. While enlarging sporting features in Homebush Bay with the involvement of the private sector would bring some opportunities, potential risks were also suggested. One of the apparent dangers in increasing the capacity of the sporting venues was the post-Games use of these facilities. Churches indicated that:

“There were a lot of arguments that the capacity of the stadium should be 60,000 or 80,000 in the legacy mode, and the final decision was that while we wouldn’t fill to 80,000 regularly, we couldn’t host a major international event without it being 80,000. So it didn’t matter if we only used the capacity once or twice a year.”

102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 The stadium was financed by a special funding method which relied on debt financing, a government capital injection and the sale of 30,000 GOLD memberships which would allow each member to buy tickets to the Olympic and post-Olympic events held in the stadium up to 2031, and importantly, would provide them an equity share in the stadium. The Olympic stadium was to cost A$690 million with a government contribution of approximately A$124 million (SOCOG (2001) Official Report of the Games of the XXVII Olympiad, Sydney, 2000., p. 65). Similarly, for the right to operate the venue, the Super Dome was built by the Abigroup development company at a cost of A$197 million (the State Government contributed A$142).
It was certain that there were not enough major sporting and cultural events in Sydney to fill the 80,000 seats in the stadium, and the planners in charge of the Olympic site, such as Churches, firmly envisaged the infrequent utilisation of the stadium after the Games. Yet, as Churches suggests, the opportunities which the stadium would bring overwhelmed the risks. Searle further pointed out that there would be an ongoing competition between the Olympic stadium and the existing state-run stadia in the region, as most regular sporting matches would fit more comfortably in the smaller existing venues located closer to the city centre (Searle, 2002, pp. 851–855). Thus, the sporting facilities in Homebush Bay were enlarged a great risk of forcing the regional government to restructure the existing sporting facilities in the region.

5.2.2 Vision of “Green Games”: the gap between the promise and implementation

In addition to the construction of the Olympic venues, the construction of the Olympic village highlighted the discrepancy between what was promised and what was implemented. The Olympic village was also conducted through a PPP, between the OCA and one of the largest Australian developers, Lend Lease. The story of the village offers another example of the uncertainty of employing PPPs, by highlighting the considerable gap between the bid proposal and the implementation plan for the Games.

While the bid file said that sustainable materials such as recycled timber would be used for construction of competition venues (Sydney Olympics 2000 Bid Ltd, 1993a), this speculative vision was compromised during the preparation phase. The SMH often criticised the compromise of the “Green Games” concept of the Sydney Olympics, labelling them the “Plastic Games” or “PVC Games”.

Within the limited period of the implementation phase, completion becomes more of a priority than speculation, and Sydney’s process exemplified this. Implementation of the “Green Games” vision, which was based on the environmental guidelines published in 1992, was widely questioned during the Games.

Compromise did not simply come from time pressure, but also sometimes from the delivery method for the venues, the PPPs. In the early stage of the preparation phase,

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“The PVC Games”, SMH, 26 October 1996.
the NSW Government feared that the private sector input predicted in the bid would not materialise (IOC, 1995, p.31). Yet once private sector organisations came on board, it became apparent that their priority was greatly different from the bid promise. The cases of the Olympic village and the indoor arena, the Super Dome, are good examples. As the private sector did not fully agree to proceed with the idea of an eco-village for the Olympic village, the State Government had to subsidise unexpected costs, and this eventually led it to give up the bid concept (Weirick, 1998, pp. 78–79).

Furthermore, the bid proposed to encourage spectators’ use of public transport to the Homebush Bay site. Yet in the case of the Super Dome, private-sector initiated construction and the plans for management beyond the Olympic Games led to the construction of a car park to attract visitors from a wider area, and this overwhelmed the Olympic organisers’ sustainable approach (Searle, 2002, p. 854). Thus, although the concept of “Green Games” had been kept as a critical part of the Olympic planning, difficulty in anticipating the delivery method and the issue of post-Olympic utilisation led to the abandonment of some bid promises.

Technically, the contents of the bid proposal have a legal validity defined in the host city’s contract with the IOC, and therefore, the host city fundamentally has to follow what it proposed in the bid document. If it wants to change something indicated in the bid file, it needs to negotiate with the IOC and related sports federations (IOC, 1997a, p. 39). Yet, when looking at the activities of the previous host cities, it can be seen that it was rare to implement a bid completely as proposed and in most cases there is a discrepancy between what a city proposed and what actually materialised. When interviewed about this discrepancy, Michael Knight replied as follows:

“When you bid, you’re bidding along with other bidders, saying please give our city the Games, give it to us not to them. So you are in a very weak position when you bid. After you become a host city, you’re moving to a different arrangement of partnership with the IOC, partnership with a national committee, and partnership with sports federations in delivering the Games. That’s a very different arrangement”\textsuperscript{106} (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008.
As Knight’s comment suggests, from the bid to post-bid phases, there was a fundamental power shift between the IOC/other sports federations and the host city, and there was a certain alteration of the bid proposal. In this respect, the bid proposal can be understood as the beginning of negotiation or compromise process, rather than a fixed vision. Furthermore, “place promotion” has been widely identified as a key feature of selling a city in a global context (Ward, 1998; Gold and Gold, 2005). But in the context of the Olympic bid, I will stress that the host city needs to conduct more than simple place promotion – that is, to a certain degree, to attract the IOC’s interest at the time of bidding.

5.3 Integration of the Olympic vision

Following the discussions of changes in the planned vision of the SOP and the implementation process, I will initiate a further discussion on the area beyond the boundary of the SOP, asking how the SOP was positioned within the wider urban context, which relates to my other research question in this thesis. My concern here is the relationship between the SOP and the Sydney region and Auburn local council, in which a major part of the SOP is located.

5.3.1 Process of recognising the SOP in the regional strategy

During the post-bid phase, recognition of the SOP in Sydney’s regional strategy changed over time. After Sydney won the bid in September 1993, several spatial strategies for the Sydney region were issued in different political contexts (Meyer, 2005). The first one was “Sydney’s future” by the Liberal government in October 1993. This was the discussion paper for the subsequent metropolitan strategies, setting out proposals for planning and managing the Greater Metropolitan Region. The crucial point of this document was the recognition of the importance of integrating ecologically-sensitive planning approaches and the growth of the regional population (NSW Department of Planning, 1993b). Yet, as it was published just one month after Sydney’s victory in the bid, it is understandable that there was little indication of the Olympic project in this strategy.
The following regional strategy, “Cities for the 21st Century”, issued by the same government in 1995, did indicate that the SOP had an important role within the Sydney region. Given the specific nature of the Olympic project, for which many human and financial resources were to be concentrated in the region, the aim was for this to become a showcase of Sydney’s ability to conduct massive yet sustainable urban regeneration, and “Cities for the 21st Century” suggested that the SOP would exemplify the Ecologically Sustainable Development guideline. It was proposed in the bid as a natural planning method to promote Sydney’s “Green Games”, and later it was integrated into the regional planning standard. In addition to the Ecologically Sustainable Development guideline, the SOP was identified as one of the key areas for the regional open space and housing strategy in which mixed residential and commercial development was encouraged. In particular, it is worth noting that the access route between the airport and the SOP was targeted as an area in which to improve visual quality in the region (NSW Department of Planning, 1995, pp. 71–80).

Nevertheless, Homebush Bay was not recognised as a city centre in the region, and instead was identified as an area supporting Parramatta, the existing second-largest city centre in the region. “Cities for the 21st Century”, for example, suggests that various facilities such as the airport and university in Parramatta would have opportunities to encourage economic activity, “taking advantage of proximity to the Olympic site” (NSW Department of Planning, 1995, p. 92). Furthermore, the strategy encouraged a “compact city model” which needed a strategic land-use and transport combination, but the SOP was not developed to reflect this model.

The subsequent regional spatial strategy published by a different government recognised the SOP as one of the strategic emphases for the Sydney region for the first time. Cashman pointed out that David Richmond, the director general of the OCA, and his organisation contributed to a change of attitude towards the SOP in the State Government. According to Richmond, the “conventional view” of a centre regards it as a “mixed-use” urban area rather than a sports-oriented precinct, and the close proximity to the existing centre, Parramatta, had prevented the SOP from becoming another strategic centre (Cashman, 2011, p. 69). Richmond's view suggests that while the previous regional strategy reflected the understanding that the SOP’s close proximity was positive for the existing city centre's development, the Olympic planners, in
contrast, considered that this would be negative for the SOP in the regional context.

Given the close relationship between Homebush Bay and Parramatta, designation of the SOP as a new strategic centre could also be a potential risk to the latter. Searle argues that it could reduce further development opportunities in Parramatta, and indeed its growth did not proceed as previously planned (Searle, 2002, p. 857). Searle gave the example of the city’s severe internal competition between the new sporting facilities in the SOP and the existing state-owned ones. Such internal competition could occur at various levels. It is understand that contextualising the new SOP in the Sydney region was highly important for its long-term viability; otherwise it would have been isolated physically, economically, and socially. Hosting the Olympics and creating the SOP at Homebush Bay was initially pitched as one of the methods of balancing the economic inequality between east and west in the Sydney region, but in the process of realisation, it would paradoxically cause severe competition between old and new urban centres in the region.

5.3.2 Divorce from the local council

While the SOP had gradually come to be recognised as one of the key centres in the regional context, there was a considerable gap between the SOP and the adjacent local council, Auburn, regarding the vision for the SOP. Owen argues that the Olympic development in Sydney was fundamentally planned from a regional and national viewpoint, and local government was less involved in the process. There was an overwhelming move towards entrepreneurialism in state urban politics, as characterised by the centralisation of power, privatisation, and relaxation of the planning process, which bypassed the normal planning system (Owen, 2002). These characteristics of the Olympic planning certainly caused various problems in sharing the long-term vision for the SOP between Auburn Council and the NSW Government and its specific Olympic organisation, the OCA.

Auburn Council, located in the western part of the Sydney region, was known for its low socio-economic profile, characterised as an industrial council, and called a great “Australian back-yard”. There is no doubt that the task of conducting the massive urban regeneration of Homebush Bay and creating the SOP was far beyond Auburn’s capacity. The Council, in its document on the financial impact on the Games, clearly stated that
“development is having and will have impacts on Auburn that are beyond the capacity of Council to manage” (Auburn Council, 1998, p. 3). Similarly, from the Olympics’ organisational side, David Churches indicated that the Olympics were truly outside the capability of Auburn. Yet, aside from the question of the local council’s capability, there was a lack of relevant communication or information sharing between the local and regional governments. The statutory and specific approval system for the Olympic project certainly caused a lack of interaction between them. Searle and Bounds pointed out that State Environment Planning Policy No. 38, giving the State Government’s Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning sole authority to approve Olympic projects, became a trigger to reduce the local government’s involvement in the developments for the Games (Searle and Bounds, 1999, p. 171).

Thus, lack of openness and accountability became serious problems in the fast-track planning process utilised for the Olympic Games, and Auburn Council complained a great deal that little information was provided (Dunn, 1999, pp. 24–27). The Council even claimed that “the OCA had rejected Council’s early approaches, despite the emergence of the true significance of the issue.” The question of openness to the Council can be further demonstrated by the fact that it had been misunderstood that Auburn would need to take responsibility for Olympic facilities despite the OCA’s great effort in finding private companies which would take care of them (Auburn Council, 1998).

In contrast with Auburn Council’s critiques, some of the Olympic organisers had a different view. David Churches, for example, questioned local councils’ attitudes towards the Olympic project:

“[w]e had a panel from all of the local government areas that were affected by the Olympic Games, but they just treated (the Olympic site) like all the other areas. So there was no detailed involvement at all.”

This comment clearly shows the different attitudes between the Olympic organisation whose responsibility was only the Olympic Games and the local councils to which the

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107 Interview with David Churches on 6 January 2009.
108 Interview with David Churches on 6 January 2009.
Games’ development was one of their many concerns. Nevertheless, lack of communication was evident in the Olympic planning during the post-bid period, and the political climate caused a discrepancy in the spatial vision for the SOP, in particular the long-term usability of venues and the area.

One of the most significant issues was usability of venues in the SOP. The State Government and the OCA had envisioned that the sporting opportunities created by the state of the art facilities in the SOP would make Homebush Bay a great event precinct for the region, attracting national and international visitors. However, Auburn's view was that they should be accessible to the local community. Thus, the local and regional governments had different intentions for the sporting facilities in the SOP. As previously discussed, some of the venues were constructed and operated with commercial priorities in mind, and this made the entry fee to the venues relatively high for the local community. Lenskyj sharply criticised the fact that the post-Olympic sporting facilities would be only for elite sports, and questioned accessibility for local communities with a low socio-economic profile (Lenskyj, 2002, p. 129; also (Owen, 2002, p. 31). Furthermore, the resulting severe competition between existing sports facilities, such as the Auburn/Lidcombe Swimming Centre, and new ones in the SOP was fully recognised by the Council (Auburn Council, 1999).

In addition to the post-Olympic usability of the sporting area in the SOP, there were various conflicts regarding usability of the adjacent area. The area between the M4 Western Motorway and the SOP, which was under private ownership, was a focus of this clash between local and regional authorities. As it is located next to a motorway which is recognised as Sydney’s spine connecting the east and west of the region, it had been a convenient location for logistics, and warehouses had occupied this area. The land-use map of Auburn Council therefore designated it as a part of a larger industrial area in Auburn Council (Fig. 5-13).

Yet, for the Olympic planners, this area was seen differently. It was a crucial area, being between the SOP and the motorway. If this area became a part of the SOP, it would create a much wider frontage to the main transport corridor in the region. There was indeed an effort by the Olympic planners to ask the State Government to purchase this land, although it was eventually rejected, as the government believed that the SOP had
already acquired a vast and sufficient area for development. Nevertheless, the legacy masterplan issued in 1995 suggested that this industrial area would become a part of the SOP after the Games, and turned it into a large housing area, although the masterplan did not show any details of this area. The different view of the long-term land use of this area represents the Olympic planners’ intentions for the SOP’s possible application to the neighbourhood. Chris Johnson, the NSW Government architect at the time, pointed out:

“Put the Olympic site here and that will create a catalytic effect to the surrounding area, rather than the reverse happening” (emphasis added).

According to Johnson, the changes would happen outside the boundaries of the SOP, rather than the SOP integrating the character of the existing surroundings, and the idea of turning the existing industrial area into a large housing area was based on this catalytic concept.

In a similar vein, the Olympic village site, which was oddly surrounded by an industrial area and the regional prison, was also seen differently by Auburn and Olympic authorities. The local council saw that the village was heavily based on commercial requirements rather than the needs and requirements of the Council (Auburn Council, 1998, p. 13). Johnson argues that the fact that the village was sold at double the price of other areas contributed to the rise of property values in the area. Thus, both areas discussed above clearly show the conflict between local and regional authorities regarding the long-term strategy for the areas in and around the SOP. One can argue that this reflects the managerial view of the local government and the entrepreneurial view of the regional government. In this respect, when staging the Olympics, local and regional governments respond differently, rather than simply seeing all levels of governance transfer from a managerial to an entrepreneurial approach.

109 Interview with David Churches on 29 November 2008.
110 Interview with Chris Johnson on 15 January 2009.
111 Ibid.
5.4 Concluding remarks

Evolution of governance and spatial strategy
The first part of this chapter examined the changes in governance of the Olympic planning and the associated modification of the spatial vision of the Olympic site between 1993 and 2000. Sydney fundamentally had three different planning periods in the post-bid phase, according to the different planning approaches, and they were divided by two major factors: changes of governance and spatial vision. The first factor involved the changes in the regional government in 1995 and the experience of the Atlanta Games in 1996. What we have seen in terms of the changes in planning structure of the Olympics was the transformation from a fragmented to a more concentrated planning system, and the changes of regional government triggered this. In addition to this, the failure of the Atlanta Games put more pressure on the Olympic organisers in Sydney, and this also led to further amendments. Various authors have also pointed out that concentration of planning power for the mega-event was necessary to finish all required preparation work within the designated timeframe (for example, Hall, 1992, pp. 119–135), but scant literature has touched on its spatial consequences. In the case of Sydney, it led to the rationalisation of the spatial vision by abandoning speculation in the bid proposal or previous government attempts, and application of the grid system also represented the prioritisation of risk control rather than opportunity, which may have decreased the future potential for the mixed-use urban precinct. Furthermore, as a lesson from Atlanta, the government involvement increased. The master planners focused more on the spatial needs for the Games, and the vision of the SOP became based more on the Games time than on legacy concerns. I will further argue that another force behind this approach was Sydney’s concern about the risk that the city might expose the planning failure to the world, and this recalls Roche’s concept of the “Olympic media city” (Roche, 2000, pp. 147–150).

Legacy planning
While Olympic planners had focused on the spatial setting for the Games, many academics and media outlets criticised the lack of legacy planning for Homebush Bay. Yet my findings in this chapter are that there were different perceptions regarding the degree to which Sydney prepared for life beyond the Games. Sydney's planners had
many thoughts about the post-Olympic usability of the sports facilities created in Homebush Bay, but what Sydney really did not consider beyond the Games were the non-sporting elements in Homebush Bay, and indeed the vision of the mixed-use urban precinct. Although the State Government and its sub-organisations had created the vision of a mixed-use Homebush Bay long before the bid decision in 1993, this was totally missing during the preparation phase. It was envisaged that this would create a serious gap between the Olympic and post-Olympic development, and leave the post-Olympic Park less viable as an urban precinct. Yet it is also important to listen to some planners in Sydney suggesting a more open approach in which the planning would leave vacant spaces for post-Olympic development. The argument that in-depth legacy planning should be done after the Games, due to the unpredicted changes that would happen in the Olympic-related area, and the difficulty of predicting the regional economic conditions beyond the Games, seems to have a certain persuasiveness. It is also certain that mixing Olympic events and other everyday life within the same site will cause many problems. I will suggest that the discussion of this should be further developed, using the case of London’s legacy planning.

Implementation of the vision
During the period of preparation for the 2000 Games, Sydney constructed various facilities, and as a core strategy of the delivery method, I have discussed the application of PPPs to Olympic projects. The benefits of PPP in reducing the public expenditure on the mega-project and risk of the private sector’s limited involvement with great concern about its own benefit have been well discussed (for example, Flyvbjerg, 2003). Yet, I will stress that PPPs applied to the construction for the Olympic stadium and the indoor arena represented the regional government’s entrepreneurial approach to urban governance, in which the government tried to organise more a commercial event with larger expenditure. Yet this inevitably led to significant conflict with existing sporting venues in the region, and in this respect, Sydney’s entrepreneurial approach was built on the sacrifice of existing sporting structures. In other words, PPPs would accelerate restructuring of the existing urban structures for economic prosperity. Meanwhile, PPPs employed in the construction of the Olympic village exemplified the limit of the private sector’s involvement in public projects. The problem highlighted here is the discrepancy between the public and private sectors’ interests in the PPPs. It became apparent that while the public sector aimed to achieve the initial bid promise with less public money,
the private sector’s interests related more to financial returns with less investment. Thus, the involvement of the private sector in the Olympic village had a great impact on the realisation of the bid promise, and the uncertainty of the PPPs was further spurred by the fast-tracking planning process towards the absolute deadline of the construction.

**Urban integration**

Regarding the integration of Homebush Bay with its wider surroundings, there were different political intentions on different scales. The consideration of Homebush Bay in the regional context was not so active during the preparation phase, although the initial idea of putting the major Olympic site of the 2000 Games in Homebush Bay stemmed from the State Government’s aspiration of balancing economic inequality between east and west in the region. Yet, at the end of the preparation phase, the importance of Homebush Bay in the region had gradually become recognised. This, however, led to some conflicts with existing regional centres, in particular the adjacent Parramatta. This reminds one of how the creation of a new urban centre for further development of the city might lead to the decline of other parts of the region; therefore, the region clearly needed a more coordinated spatial strategy, but one was not fully developed during the preparation phase.

On the neighbourhood scale, there was a fundamental difference between the Olympic authority and local government in understanding how the SOP would be related to the surroundings. While the OCA took a “proactive” approach by arguing that the creation of the SOP would catalyse changes to the neighbourhood, the Auburn Council expected a more “reactive” approach to the SOP by suggesting that some essences of the neighbourhood should be integrated into the SOP. Despite these different standpoints, this chapter unveiled that there was not a solid mechanism of integrating communication between the two authorities. The discrepancy between the Olympic and local authorities also became apparent in regard to the land use of the site adjacent to the SOP, reflecting the different political aspirations for the Olympics. Various authors suggest that, in the process of planning the Olympic site, local interests tend to be ignored, and the priorities for urban development are set by the Olympic authorities (for example, Hiller, 2003). This argument was fully applicable in the case of Sydney, and leaves another question regarding whether this tendency has carried on even after the Olympic Games.
Chapter 6: London

6.1 Governance of the Olympic legacy and its reflection of the spatial vision

As soon as London won the right to stage the 2012 Olympic Games in Singapore in July 2005, the delivery structure was set up as a partnership of various stakeholders. Similarly to Sydney’s Olympic governance after 1995, when the State's Government changed, there were fundamentally two bodies involved in the governance of the London Games in London’s initial post-bid phase. Yet, unlike the case of Sydney, this delivery structure had already been proposed in the bid document, and Alison Nimmo, director of design and regeneration at the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), stated that “we weren’t starting from scratch, because we had a clear idea of what the overall delivery structure would be. We had done a lot of work in the bid phase” (ODA, 2007a, p. 15).

While the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG) had responsibility for promotion and operation of the Olympic Games, the ODA was created as a public body delivering (1) permanent venues and other facilities in the London Olympic Park (LOP, eventually named the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park); (2) other Games facilities outside the LOP; and (3) transport infrastructure and services to support the Games. In short, it is understood that the ODA built the set and LOCOG put on the show, and the Olympic Board oversaw the entire London Games and took responsibility for coordinating the work of LOCOG and the ODA, resolving and determining issues raised by members, and, importantly, ensuring a sustainable legacy following the Games (ODA, 2007a, pp. 10–14) (Fig. 6-1).\footnote{The Olympic Board comprises the Olympics Minister (the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport) representing the government’s interests, the Mayor of London (representing the GLA) and the Chairs of LOCOG and the BOA. ODA (2007a) Annual Report and Accounts, 2006–2007., p. 14).}
Although empowerment of the ODA to deliver the Olympic infrastructure on time was addressed in the bid, several issues were altered or clarified further, after various debates in parliament. Firstly, the planning area of the ODA became larger than the LDA’s area for the 2004 planning application (Figs. 6-2 and 3). One of the most significant differences between the two was inclusion of Stratford City. While the earlier application did not include this vast area, it was a part of the ODA’s control. Yet, as unveiled in a later part of this chapter, it became a matter of conflict between the ODA and the private sectors responsible for the development of Stratford City.

Secondly, prior to the bid, a planning application was granted by the local boroughs, but the bid document stated that the ODA would have special power to grant in-depth planning permission for the LOP. By doing so, the ODA would develop and approve the Park, but this dual function of the ODA was criticised as it was thought that it would lead to a political conflict between the local boroughs and the ODA and eventually local interests would be ignored, to prioritise delivery of the Olympic project (House of Commons, 2005, pp. 25–26). Thus, the Planning Decision Team, whose office was located in a different place to the rest of the ODA, was formulated within the ODA to ensure local boroughs' and others’ interests would be integrated (ODA, 2011, p. 3).

Thirdly, the bid file suggested that the ODA would have a special power to purchase land, compulsorily if necessary (London 2012 Bidding Committee, 2004, p. 33), but after the bid, the responsibility of securing the land for the LOP went to the LDA. Thus, the LDA bought the land, and the ODA simply borrowed it from the LDA for the Olympic Games. It is certain that the ODA’s role was decreased after the bid, but this land ownership system left the LDA with a huge burden, and had a great impact on the legacy planning of the LOP, which I will discuss later in this chapter.

To clarify the above issues, “the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006” clearly set out that delivering the best vision possible to meet Games and legacy requirements within the budgeted cost and time available was a crucial role of the ODA (ODA, 2007f, pp. 1–2). Given this condition, much emphasis had been placed on the simultaneous process of Olympic and legacy planning. The ODA, for example, suggested that, for the first time ever, Olympic and Paralympic operations and post-Games use were fully integrated at the outset of the planning process for the
Games (ODA, 2007a, p. 16), and its Chief Executive, David Higgins, also stated that “the ODA’s design vision starts from Legacy”.\textsuperscript{113} Yet, as discussed in Chapter 4, the spontaneous planning for the Olympics and legacy was already emphasised before the bid decision in 2005, and in this respect, the Olympic organisers rephrased the initial arguments after the bid. Since there was fundamental continuity between the pre-bid and post-bid phases regarding the planning structure and spatial concept, the initial masterplan for the LOP could be understood as developing from its predecessor.

The ODA submitted the initial important planning application for the masterplan of the LOP, “Olympic, Paralympic & Legacy Transformation Planning Applications”, in February 2007. The 2007 masterplan for the LOP was considered to be the biggest planning application in the UK, covering large areas of the Lower Lea Valley, and spanning many years of development. Although the planning area of the ODA became larger than the area within the spatial boundaries of LDA’s previous planning application, the area designated for this planning application became much smaller than the ODA’s area of authority. Stratford City was excluded from the planning area, as it was independently developed by a private consortium, and critically, the Olympic village, whose construction and post-Olympic management would be conducted by the private sector, was also excluded from this Olympic site-wide planning application.

The new 2007 masterplan provided an in-depth explanation of the spatial settings for the period of the Olympic and Paralympic Games and the vision for how they would be transformed to create a “platform for legacy communities development” (ODA, 2007c, p.7) (Figs. 6-4 and 5). Thus, the concept of physical changeability inherited from the LDA’s bid masterplan issued in 2004 was further elaborated by explicitly defining permanent or temporary venues and infrastructure, and clarifying between front of house (publicly accessible areas) and back of house (logistical areas connected by the loop road around the LOP) in each of the competition facilities. This was crucial to identify the changeability of the LOP in this masterplan.

The concept of physical changeability was further applied to the design principles for the infrastructure and public domains in the Park. An in-depth explanation of the changeability of these elements across the LOP was provided in a supplementary document for the planning application, “Olympic Park, Urban Design and Landscape

\textsuperscript{113} Comment on the London Olympics Symposium organised by the Evening Standard in June 2007.
Framework” (ODA, 2007g). The emphasis on physical changeability in the Park reflected the ODA’s primary objective – provision of “the strategic backbone for future development” – and this was further embraced by the concept of a “robust but flexible” planning framework encouraged by Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE), which had provided design advice to the ODA and its masterplan team regarding the development of the LOP (Fig. 6-6). The idea of the “robust but flexible” planning framework was an important spatial concept applied in the initial phase of the Olympic and legacy masterplan, as it inevitably involved the uncertain future of the Olympic site. It is considered that the initial responsibility of the ODA was to provide the “robust” part, which would be left as permanent legacy of the Olympic site. But Lucy Carmichael, the planning adviser of CABE, suggested that during the course of the Olympic planning, the distinction between the robust and flexible became blurred, as what was once considered a permanent structure became a temporary one, and vice versa.114 Thus, the initial spatial planning by the ODA was greatly influenced by the previous LDA plan, but needed to accommodate various changes happened after the bid.

6.1.2 Limits of the ODA

Although the ODA had been greatly involved in shaping the vision of the Olympic legacy, the authority had certain limits. As the land of the LOP would be transferred to the LDA, the Lee Valley Regional Park Authority and others after the Games, it was imperative to collaborate with these future land owners to integrate the legacy vision into the Olympic vision. Yet the ODA’s primary responsibility was the preparation of the spatial setting for the Games with the envisaged future demands, not co-ordination of the diverse aspirations of different stakeholders. Thus, before the LDA commenced its in-depth legacy masterplan in the beginning of 2008, the ODA conducted various legacy masterplan studies in order to create the Olympic masterplan. This was called “the strategic backbone for future development” (ODA, 2008b, p.12), which was drawn based on the vaguely recognised future visions.115 Indeed, the ODA categorised its scope into four phases: site preparation, Olympic Games, Paralympic Games, and legacy transformation. These phases were separated in order to identify the differences

114 Interview with Lucy Carmichael (CABE) on 7 February 2008.
115 Although the ODA commissioned the masterplan design team to conduct in-depth studies of various areas in the Olympic Park following the Games, they were mainly internal studies within the ODA, and have never been published in a consolidated form.
between each phase, the 2007 masterplan, and what the ODA had focused on within its planning power up to the transformation of the LOP, rather than to provide in-depth spatial settings after the Games.

While the 2007 masterplan extensively addressed the spatial changeability to accommodate the different Olympic and post-Olympic demands for the Olympic site, as suggested earlier in this chapter, the ODA’s planning role is limited by its ambiguous definition of the future usability of the site. Along with the official masterplan, the ODA conducted various legacy studies, in which it aimed to contextualise the Olympic and legacy transformation masterplan. Yet this involved the difficulty in mediating various stakeholders’ aspirations, and the development of the Olympic stadium area clearly represented the uncertainty of the legacy masterplan under the ODA’s lead.

Although it was never made public, the Olympic legacy masterplan team, led by EDAW (now AECOM) and Allies and Morrison Architects, was commissioned by the ODA to study the how the post-Olympic stadium would be transformed and new urban tissue would be created over the next 30 years. The EDAW consortium took the Olympic stadium as a catalyst for further transformation of the surroundings, rather than an icon of the London Games’ memory. They looked at some of the historical stadia in Europe to analyse the relationships with their surroundings. In addition to this, they referred to some enclosed public plazas, such as the one in Lucca in Italy, which had been embedded in the urban fabric. An urban plaza merged into the city structure would be their final goal, and it seems to me that the masterplan team considered the most crucial role of the stadium to be its catalysing effect on the transformation towards an urban plaza, without a specific function. This process started with the transformation from an 80,000 seat stadium used for the Games to a 25,000 seat athletic stadium with a sports academy. The team also included some residential blocks in this phase, which would become the “DNA” for further residential development around and the stadium. According to the consortium’s scenario, the stadium would eventually be altered to form an urban plaza, and the sporting elements would disappear (Fig. 6-7).

Not many past Olympic host cities envisioned the long-term future of the Olympic stadium in such a way, and in this respect, one can argue that London took a highly advanced planning approach. Yet this was not fully welcomed by other stakeholders, in
particular by the sporting alliance. Rod Sheard, a principal architect of the London Olympic stadium, suggests that there were “different schools of thought on the legacy”. When I asked him how he incorporated the legacy development around the stadium into the initial design, he replied as follows:

“Well, that is a political question. [...] There are two schools of thought about legacy, when it comes to the London stadium. One school of thought represented by Seb Coe says that we promised the IOC that this is going give London a good sporting legacy. And the critical part of that is a 25,000 seats athletic stadium. And therefore it’s our opportunity to make that 25,000 seat legacy stadium as useful as we can make it for London. And therefore it should be a centre of excellence. [...] So this side, if you follow the philosophy, a legacy of this side is the 25,000 seat bowl surrounded by busy stuff but all sports related, using the Park around the stadium for training.”

“Another school of thought says that this is an important part of London, even neglected for years. It is a really important urban quarter, and an opportunity for London to grow a whole new suburb or whole new environment. So it should be a busy urban centre. And the philosophy probably is represented by Richard Rodgers, because he is a champion of busy urban quarters. And therefore the sports nature of it should be compressed as much as possible. [...] What we want to do is bring in much residential, commercial retail, and really makes this a viable and exciting place. The park is still there up to the river; but all around it is great spaces, great living accommodation. Yes, we can have a little bit of sports, but it should not dominate.”

Thus there were two different views, a sporting point of view and an urban point of view, represented by different powerful people in Olympic politics, with different ideas of how to utilise the area around the legacy stadium. Sheard goes on:

“I suppose that there are two schools of thought. [...] We did a little bit of legacy work with Allies and Morrison six month ago. They were really representing one side, and we represented a sporting side. And the matter was

116 Interview with Rod Sheard on 30 May 2008.
trying to bring them together. I think that it is still early days to know [...] the set up the LDA will take over the legacy work [...] where will it go? I really don't know. But in the perfect world, you can mix those two together, and end up with a bit of both, but not compromise one.[...] You can achieve both in the perfect world."\textsuperscript{117}

Sheard acknowledged that the views of the master planner, Allies and Morrison, and the stadium architect were based on different “schools of thought” at the time of the interview, but stated that these different visions could theoretically be merged. This clearly shows that different stakeholders expressed different visions, and this was difficulty in creating a solid legacy masterplan was a limitation of the ODA’s speculative legacy planning.


It the wake of the ODA’s speculative planning for the post-Olympic site, the LDA was tasked with preparing the in-depth Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF) based on a solid feasibility study. The LDA initially created the post-Olympic masterplan before the bid, but its further commitment to the Olympic legacy vision began with the appointment of the design team in January 2008 to develop the LMF. The LMF team was made up of the previous masterplan design team appointed by the ODA and the newly appointed Dutch architectural and urban design/planning office, KCAP.\textsuperscript{118} In this respect, the LDA expected certain knowledge transfer from the previous master planners, while it expected new ideas from KCAP. The LDA’s approach to the vision had two folds.

Firstly, the LDA’s approach became more reactive and policy-based, compared to the ODA. While the ODA’s legacy vision was based on speculation, the LDA intended to create an in-depth long-term spatial strategy which would address the key physical, economic, social and environmental drivers of change of the future LLV (ODA, 2007b), and in order to identify the key drivers, the LDA extensively addressed the synchronisation with existing planning policy applicable to the regeneration of the LLV.

The spatial response to the existing wider development policies can be understood as a

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{118} KCAP Architects & Planners is a Dutch office for architecture, urban design and urban planning, founded by Kees Christiaanse in 1989.
strong influence of the previous 2004 masterplan issued by the same authority before the bid. The strong argument of the LDA for the refinement of the LMF was to achieve both social and economic sustainability, which was backed by two national and regional planning policies (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005). In broader terms, the national planning policy, “Planning Policy Statement 1: Delivering Sustainable Development”, which was fundamentally built on the “three legs” of the sustainability concept – social, economic and environmental sustainability – became the crucial guiding principles for the LMF (ODA, 2007b, p. 14), and the term “sustainable legacy communities” was utilised to underpin the LMF. Although “sustainable legacy communities” was vaguely defined, balancing the social and economic development through the spatial planning was greatly emphasised in the LMF. In addition to this, as a response to the regional socio-economic development policy, the Mayor’s strategic planning guidance, “Lower Lea Valley (LLV), Opportunity Area Planning Framework”, became the important policy reference (Mayor of London, 2007a). As discussed in Chapter 4, the origin of the Olympic bid was greatly connected with the Mayor’s (Ken Livingstone’s) socio-economic regenerative aspirations for the LLV, which had sought the provision of a variety of housing and job opportunities along with economic development to balance uneven economic prosperity between East and West London. As the LLV Opportunity Area Planning Framework was set up as a concrete planning framework for improving the socio-economic conditions in the wider LLV with the qualitative objectives of new homes and jobs and spatial distribution, this became a basic reference to conceptualise the Olympic site as a “place where people would live and work” (ODA, 2007b, p. 22). The LMF’s approach however was not to enhance this mixed-use vision within the site, but rather to embed it within the adjacent urban fabric. The LMF therefore designated six areas within the LOP, and proposed that each area have different land-use proportions and combinations (LDA, 2009b). This distributive approach had also been proposed in the previous bid masterplan by the LDA, and the LMF followed a similar path with in-depth analysis of possible land-use mix scenarios (Figs. 6-8 and 9).

While the LDA rhetorically addressed the socio-economic sustainability of the post-Olympic site, it became apparent that the LDA’s great concern about paying off the debt accumulated by buying the land for the LOP was more prioritised. As indicated earlier, it was the LDA’s responsibility to assemble the necessary land for creation of the
Olympic Park by handling the Compulsory Purchase Order for the designated area, and redeeming the initial investment for purchasing the land through the sales and lease of the LDA’s land was crucial. However, such deficiency was initially suggested in the bid preparation phase, when ARUP conducted a feasibility study of the Olympic-led regeneration. ARUP suggested a significant deficit from the construction of the Olympic Park in the LLV, but optimistically pointed out that indirect economic benefits associated with this would cover the deficit. Yet the LDA sought more direct financial returns to compensate for the initial investment, and therefore the scale of the new development in the post-Olympic site was crucial for the authority.

Against this backdrop, prior to finalising spatial vision of the post-Olympic Park, the LDA and the appointed LMF design team conducted an architectural massing study to identify the scale of the new development and its spatial consequences in the area. Its initial document, “The Legacy Masterplan Framework, Ambitions and Limitations”, preliminarily showed five spatial options of the post-LOP, whose differences can be seen in the layout of the building density along with its relation to the open space and the legacy facilities within the site (LMF Design Team, 2008) (Fig. 6-10).

The schemes varied from a park surrounded by high-rise buildings to a considerably low-rise model, and the provision of development areas and social infrastructure such as open spaces and community facilities differed between these options. There was no doubt that the selection of a preferred option became a crucial issue not only for the LDA but also for wider stakeholders, and it was the Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group whose voice eventually had the greatest influence in designating the direction of the LMF scheme. The Steering Group consisted of the Mayor of London, the Minister for the Olympics and various leaders from central government and the local boroughs who had been affected by the Olympic development. While the Steering Group intended to maintain “ambitions” in the LMF, it encouraged more integration with local communities and private companies, to secure both the social and economic viability of the LOP (Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group, 2008).

After authorisation of the preferred option (so-called Output-C) by the Steering Group (Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group, 2009a), the LDA published the LMF document for the purpose of public consultation in February 2009. The published
version of the LMF’s vision of the post-Olympic site addressed the Steering Group’s concern of balance between the social and economic demands of the post-LOP area, which also echoed the national and regional regenerative aspirations. Yet it also greatly reflected the LDA’s great concern about paying off the debt accumulated by intensifying the development within the LOP, in particular the housing development, to maximise the revenue from the sales of land (Fig. 6-11).

This high-density model was critiqued by different levels of authority. The boroughs expressed some anxiety to the government that this could limit the quality of the space and could lead to “unacceptable densities of housing development and inappropriate forms of economic activity, undermining the ability to create sustainable communities”, although the host boroughs’ leaders agreed to make the post-Olympic vision “ambitious” while balancing social and economic sustainability. This high-density urban model backed by the LDA’s entrepreneurial approach was further criticised by the central government, arguing that the provision of “sustainable communities” should be the top priority for the site, and encouraging the LDA to respect this, even though there were pressures to extract maximum value from sales of land and a property increase (CMSC, 2008, p. 42). Thus, the LMF’s primary objective was to create the spatial strategy to satisfy the social and economic demands of the LLV, which were defined by other wider spatial strategies, but it was necessary to integrate the LDA’s financial obligation to compensate for the initial investment of land purchased for the creation of the Olympic Park.

6.1.4 Change of the legacy governance: OPLC (2009–2012)

While there was doubt about the LDA’s high-density model proposed by the LMF, the global economic downturn hit London and its property market in late 2008. Along with the recession, discovery of the shortfall in the LDA’s Olympic funding strategy, with a tremendous gap between the expenses for purchasing the land and possible income gained by selling the land in the post-LOP area, became a crucial trigger for further modification of the governance of the post-Olympic site in the LLV. Boris Johnson, the newly-elected Mayor of London in May 2008, played a crucial role in examining the ongoing Olympic legacy planning by the LDA, and addressed the need for a new

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governing body responsible for the development of the post-LOP site.\textsuperscript{120} The Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) was established as a joint venture by the Mayor of London and the central government in May 2009. The OPLC took over the ownership of the LOP and venues inherited by the site, having responsibility for developing the Park for the longer term. The majority of OPLC staff were transferred from the LDA, in order to avoid the loss of knowledge. In establishing the OPLC, there was a negotiation on the land debt between the Mayor of London and the central government which lasted for many months, and eventually it was agreed that the OPLC would be free from the land debt (GLA, 2010a, p. 20). This was a crucial point for the OPLC in defining the development strategy for the post-Olympic site. Ricky Burdett, the Chief Adviser for the ODA and the OPLC, further pointed out the differences between the LMF conducted by the LDA and the new legacy planning strategy of the OPLC as follows:

"The biggest difference between the LDA and OPLC was [...] in the LDA's scheme which had many options with the KCAP and others, their priority was only one [...] to maximise the amount of floor volumes in order to increase land value. So they actually acted like hyper capitalists. [...] When the OPLC came along, they did not have such a view. The OPLC's view was how we would generate a piece of the city. An important shift happened, because the government decided to write off the debt of the land. So the OPLC did not start from minus one billion. [...] that's quite important...as achieving a certain number of jobs and homes puts a lot of pressure on the site. [...] That's a big difference in the aspirational objectives. [...] The OPLC feels that if it breaks even, it is a success."\textsuperscript{121}

The OPLC's independence from the land debt not only changed its long-term vision for the Olympic site, but also brought more business opportunities for the organisation. Baroness Ford, the Chair of the OPLC, had a different understanding of the importance of not having debt, considering that:

"success would be dependent on the OPLC's ability to attract investment and

\textsuperscript{120} After the mayoral election, Johnson appointed David Ross, the Deputy Chairman of Carphone Warehouse, as his adviser for the Olympic legacy and finances. Ross urged the mayor to establish a separate organisation responsible for the legacy planning. GLA (2010a) The Finances of the Olympic Legacy, Part 1: Olympic Park Transfer and Continuing Liabilities., pp. 13–14.

\textsuperscript{121} Interview with Ricky Burdett on 21 February 2012.
Thus, the OPLC had committed to re-evaluate the previous LDA’s legacy vision, and re-evaluate the balance between the economic viability and social usability of the post-Olympic Park, without the great pressure of maximising the financial return from the site. This means that the LMF published by the LDA was no longer valid for the new organisation, and the OPLC conducted an intensive design charrette to reflect its vision (OPLC, 2011, p. 71). Following various studies, the OPLC submitted the planning application for the long-term development of the LOP, “Legacy Communities Scheme (LCS)” in September 2011. Although the LCS stated that it was established based on the previous studies, in particular the LMF, there were some crucial differences from the predecessor. Firstly, the LCS aimed to create a less dense development than the one previously proposed in the LMF, which was certainly made possible by the removal of the financial burden of paying the LDA’s debt. While the LMF designated 10,000 to 12,000 homes to be built within the LMF site (LDA, 2009b, p. 101), the LCS proposed that 6,800 new homes would be created in the future Olympic Park (OPLC, 2011, p. 79). The vision of creating a less dense urban quarter was spatially explained as an adaptation of “London-ness”, which became one of the core spatial strategies of the LCS (Figs. 6–12 and 13). The LMF encouraged more mid-rise block or high-rise tower housing typologies in the post-Olympic site, but the LCS suggested that:

“London’s tradition of building streets lined with terraced houses has created some of the city’s most attractive neighbourhoods and provides inspiration for much of the new housing proposed in the LCS” (OPLC, 2011, p. 73).

Beyond the reduced spatial density which was certainly made possible by exemption from land debt, the strong influence of the Mayor of London could be observed. Since the OPLC was established by the central government and the Mayor of London, it is highly possible that the Mayor’s preference for traditional buildings rather than the high-rise towers encouraged by the previous mayor, Ken Livingstone, was directly integrated. Matthew Carmona further points out that the new plan reflected Boris Johnson’s clear preference for a traditional London vernacular, while the previous plan had lacked “London-ness” (Carmona, 2012, pp. 41–42).
In addition to this, the LCS aimed to incorporate wider interests, in particular sporting uses, into the future LOP. Although the LMF documents extensively addressed the integration of various stakeholders, it was subsequently revealed that a full consultation was not fully conducted, when Baroness Ford, the Chair, and Andrew Altman, the chief executive of the OPLC, were questioned on the process of the legacy planning by the Culture, Media and Sports Committee in April 2010. Altman admitted as follows:

“On the sporting issue, the Chair initiated a process with the main sporting bodies around the country to get their specific comments and review of the Masterplan. Many felt that they had not been sufficiently engaged, that sport was not as prominent in the Masterplan [LMF] as it should be, that it was hard to find even the reference to sport in the Masterplan, so we specifically asked each of those sporting bodies to give us comments. [...] I think it will result in a lot of positive changes, not only in the Masterplan but also importantly to the ongoing commitment of each of the sporting entities to the Park. I would say that the core issue is not so much a design issue per se as getting the ongoing commitment to the use of the Park by all the sporting entities so that it continues to be a premier centre for sport activity [...] We are right now in the process of refining the Masterplan. [...] You will see the reflection of a lot of the comments that were received through that community engagement, as well as through the specific engagement with the sports bodies, and that will be there” (CMSC, 2010, pp. 17–18).

Creation of a mixed-use urban precinct had been planned since the bid phase, and in particular the sporting use had been designated as the core, because various sporting venues would be inherited as the Olympic legacy. Yet an in-depth concrete strategy for integrating sports into the mixed-use Olympic Park had certainly been missing from the previous plan. The LCS masterplan therefore pointed out that “securing the sporting legacy” was one of the key issues in conceptualising the long-term vision of the Olympic site. This sporting vision aimed not only to provide the sporting venues but also to establish the accommodation for athletes coming to the Park. The Chair of the OPLC argued that this could be achieved without allocating the money from the OPLC, but by attracting the sporting organisations which could contribute the financial support
Thus, the reform of the governance of the Olympic legacy and subsequent revision of the spatial strategy site not only became a significant turning point for future vision of the post-Olympic site, but also provided an opportunity to correct previous planning failures and find more opportunities.

Yet, within two years after the establishment of the OPLC, Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, addressed the need for further reform of the governance of the LOP. One of the biggest triggers for the Mayor to consider a new organisation was his ambition to control the Park more directly, and enable its development to synchronise with the surroundings. The Mayor launched a public consultation for transfer of the OPLC to the Mayoral Development Corporation in February 2011. The Mayor emphasised the integration into the Mayoral draft replacement London Plan published in 2009, which identified the Olympic Park and surrounding area as “London’s single most important project for the next 25 years”, and indicated his ambition of “convergence” to close the deprivation gap between the host boroughs and the rest of London (Mayor of London, 2011, p. 5). Prior to the consultation, the Mayor had considered the creation of a single organisation with the full range of planning power, in order to avoid duplication and confusion caused by various planning bodies working on the regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley, and aimed to obtain greater political and economic accountability to London’s residents (Mackay, 2010).

These ambitions of the Mayor were certainly integrated into his arguments as to why the new Mayoral Development Corporation was needed, and after responding to the preliminary public consultation, the new LOP governing body, the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC), was officially established. It took over the responsibility for the long-term development of the LOP and its surroundings from the OPLC on 2 April 2012. As Johnson had suggested previously, the LLDC became a “single point for contract” for regeneration – landowner, developer, planning authority and investor. The OPLC’s staff and knowledge were transferred to the new LLDC, and the LLDC suggested that planning powers for the LOP and surrounding area would also be transferred from the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation and the ODA in October 2012, after the Olympic Games (LLDC, 2012a). Thus, the governance of the Olympic legacy in London was concentrated, and significant planning power had been given to the Mayor.
6.2 Implementation of the vision

6.2.1 Uncertainty of the public and private partnership: Olympic village

Due to the high cost involved in regenerating the large post-industrial area in the LLV, it was imperative to rely on the private sector’s money to build certain parts of the Olympic site. In the case of London, the most visible part of the private sector’s involvement was the construction of the Olympic village located in the north-east of the Olympic site. The site of the Olympic village had previously been a part of the Stratford City development whose planning permission was granted in 2004, and it subsequently incorporated the initial Olympic planning permission of the LDA before the bid decision in 2005. As discussed in Chapter 4, Stratford City was fundamentally proposed by a private consortium, and after gaining the planning permission, the site was divided into southern and northern parts by the Stratford International rail line cutting through the middle of Stratford City. The southern half was developed as a vast shopping mall by an Australian developer, Westfield, and the northern part was developed by Lend Lease, which also built up the Olympic village for the 2000 Sydney Games as discussed in Chapter 5. The Olympic village was aimed to provide the accommodation for 17,000 athletes and officials during the Games, and to be turned into privately owned and lettable housing after the Games, including 50% affordable units, which corresponded to the Mayor’s housing policy in the wider London region (Lend Lease and ODA, 2007). The project was carried out as a PPP between the ODA and Lend Lease, and the planning permission was submitted in August 2007. Employing the PPP to deliver the Olympic village within the seven-year timeframe was considered a way of achieving this with less public expenditure, with cohesive development between the adjacent Stratford City project and the Olympic site.

Yet, during the course of developing the Village, there were number of difficulties in conducting the PPP. The first problem came as a broader issue of the development history as a part of Stratford City, just after London won the bid and the LDA issued the Compulsory Purchase Order in 2005. As the village was located next to Stratford City, it was necessary to secure certain the access to the transportation hub and the Olympic site through the privately developed Stratford City. As the Compulsory Purchase Order covered the entire ODA planning area including Stratford City, it principally had the
planning power to control the site within Stratford City. Yet there were strong voices against the Order as a killer of development, which escalated the tension between the private developers and the Mayor of London at the time, Ken Livingstone. It was eventually resolved by removing the Compulsory Purchase Order from Stratford City except for the certain access to the Olympic village (BBC, 2005). Although the significant power of the LDA’s Compulsory Purchase Order over the Olympic site was widely criticised (for example, Davis and Andy Thornley, 2010), Stratford City was treated as an exceptional case. Since the site of the Olympic village was deeply affected by the previous Stratford City masterplan, although it was developed with the public authority’s involvement, there was difficulty in mediating public and private interests. The problem of the inherited attitude from the past development plan can be further identified in the spatial strategy of the Olympic village. Fig. 6-14 clearly shows the existing urbanised area on the top and the newly developed Olympic village on the bottom (Fig. 6-14). The Olympic village was designed according to a high-density urban block model, but this was clearly contrasted with the adjacent neighbourhood, which Judd might have called a “bubble” in East London (Judd, 1999).

When submitting the planning application, the ODA and Lend Lease explained that “the Olympic Village followed the precedent set for previously approved proposal for the Olympic Village in 2004”, which allowed “a higher density and height of development on the same scale” (Lend Lease and ODA, 2007, p. 53). Looking at the 2004 Olympic masterplan, it clearly suggested that the Olympic villages would consolidate the area as part of the new residential quarter of Stratford City (LDA, 2004, p. 20). The LDA’s focus on the adjacent ongoing Stratford City development rather than existing neighbourhoods was further demonstrated by the fact that the 2004 bid masterplan graphically emphasised the spatial cohesion with urban blocks of Stratford City. Stratford City was initially envisaged to be filled with smaller blocks of buildings and create urbanised streets connecting the different parts of adjacent areas, but instead it was developed as the vast shopping mall, Westfield Stratford Shopping Centre, afterwards. Yet the Olympic village did not correspond to this change, nor did it alter the planning direction towards a more integrative approach to the adjacent neighbourhoods. Tim Urquhart, the development director of the village at Lend Lease, suggested that there was no time to go back to outline planning, and the team had to stick to the previous masterplan’s spatial setting. Thus, the village was constructed as
what Wainwright severely criticised as “an alien chunk airlifted in from a Spanish suburb” (Wainwright, 2012).

Beyond the great influence of the previously private-led development on the development of the Olympic village, the uncertainty of the PPP was highlighted when the project faced a severe financial downturn at the time of the credit crunch in 2008. It was originally planned to raise the funding amount of GBP 550 million from public money and the remaining GBP 450 million from the private sector, led by Lend Lease. Lend Lease had difficulty in raising the funds for the development in such economic climate. It was eventually decided in 2009 that the Olympic village would be publicly-owned by raising GBP 324 million from the central government including GBP 261 million GBP from the Olympic contingency fund (BBC, 2009). It was further decided to reduce the current size of the Olympic village by abandoning the site of Clays Lane, where the LDA demolished the site of the existing Clays Lane Estate to pave the way for the construction of the Olympic village. While the central government justified the public ownership of the village as the means of delivering the Olympic facilities and securing interests of tax payers, it also pointed out that the Olympic village needed to be re-sold as soon as the market would recover, to reduce the financial burden of the public sector (BBC, 2009). Thus, in 2011 half of the Olympic village was sold to the private consortium of Qatari Diar, the Qatari Royal Family’s company, and British developer Delancey for GBP 557 million as private housing, while Triathlon Homes was appointed to manage the other half of the village as affordable housing which would be available after the Games (BBC, 2011a). Thus, the development story of the Olympic village exemplified the risk of a PPP, as the private sector’s involvement was highly dependent on the current economic “instability and volatility” (Harvey, 1989, p. 11). It should also be noted that the public sector’s involvement in the PPP in the case of the village represented the government’s entrepreneurial urban governance, which prioritised short-term turnover rather than long-term investment in the development.

6.2.2 Blurring of use and exchange value

While the development of the Olympic village exemplifies the limit of the PPP, the story of the Olympic stadium and aquatic centre tells of the difficulty in securing the “use value”, while the Olympic authority tried to raise “exchange value” of these facilities. The initial bid proposal and the subsequent masterplan put great emphasis on
the physical changeability of the Olympic site and venues in order to mediate both Olympic and post-Olympic demands. The message of the bid committee and the various levels of government regarding the post-Olympic demands was to make the post-Olympic venues accessible to local residents. The role and spatial adaptation of the Olympic stadium, for example, was clearly identified as follows in the bid proposal:

“Olympic Stadium – conversion [from 80,000] to a 25,000 seat multipurpose venue with athletics at its core. It will become a house of sport with training facilities, offices and sports science and sports medicine facilities”


The concept of reducing the size but keeping the primary function of athletics which both elite and non-elite players could enjoy was considered one of the biggest promises made to both the IOC and London residents, and as suggested in Chapter 4, it conveyed the power of London’s bid to the IOC. This concept was further greatly contrasted with the “iconic” Olympic stadium in Beijing, for which it had been difficult to find post-Olympic usage except for tourism, and London clearly addressed the departure from the inherited problem of the past Olympic stadium.122 When the final design of the London Olympic stadium was unveiled in November 2007, and ODA promoted it as a “living stadium” which included sporting use and community access throughout the year (ODA, 2007h) (Fig. 6-15).

Despite the ODA’s great promotion of the “living stadium”, it soon became apparent that the potential for athletics to attract spectators and revenue was limited (Dyckhoff, 2012, p. 250). In a similar vein, Baillieu criticised the stadium design as being based on an assumption rather than a confirmation of long-term use (Baillieu, 2007). Many critiques also pointed out the need for a football team's involvement in order to financially sustain the post-Olympic stadium. Even former IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch indicated that “it is critical the venue be used for football after the Games to stop it becoming a white elephant” (Warner, 2007). Since the unveiling of the London Olympic stadium in November 2007, the utilisation after the Games had been unclear, and the struggle between athletics and football clearly illustrates the difficulty in

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122 Tessa Jowell, the Olympic Minister at the time, suggested “This is probably the last Olympic stadium that we are going to see on this kind of scale” in an interview with the BBC on 12 November 2007.
securing the “use value” which had been promised since the bid, under the pressure of raising the “exchange value” to make the legacy stadium financially sustainable. The debate on the post-Olympic stadium went on in the central government, as follows:

“...[t]he Candidature File stated clearly that athletics would be at the core of its legacy use. The ODA is working to a concept of a “Living Stadium”, with permanent seating for 25,000, to form a centrepiece for the local community, with a programme of events and a mix of uses that make sure that it is used throughout the year. ...There is some controversy over the proposed legacy use for the stadium. The local authority, the London Borough of Newham, would prefer to see a major football club (such as West Ham United) as an anchor tenant for the Stadium once the Games have concluded. It implies that the “Living Stadium” concept advanced by the ODA might not be realistic or sustainable...” (CMSC, 2007, p. 34) (emphasis added).

Uncertainty of the “living stadium” concept materialising spurred the argument for demolition of the stadium and creation of a new stadium for football from scratch, which would be completely against the initial bid proposal.123 Various media articles reported different opinions on the future usability of the post-Olympic site, but a firm decision was not made before London hosted the Olympic Games in the summer of 2012 (Figs. 6-16 and 17).

The problem of undefined usage of the post-Olympic stadium was not only confined to the matter of the sustainability of the building, but also impacted on the wider urban planning. The LCS, the latest spatial strategy of the post-Olympic Park issued before the Olympic Games, presented an in-depth account of the legacy Park, yet given undefined post-Olympic usage, the stadium quarter was not included in the LCS document. Due to the different use between large football events and community based activities, its impacts in the area would be significant, and echoing Harvey’s argument that “exchange values can determine use values by creating new conditions” (Harvey, 2009, p. 190), exclusion of the area would have been likely unless this problem was resolved. Thus, the difficulty in mediating the use and exchange values in the post-Olympic stadium had

123 In a football stadium’s ideal physical setting there is close proximity between the rectangular pitch and the stand seating, but the planned Olympic stadium had an athletic track between the fans and the pitch.
great impacts on the spatial planning of the post-Olympic Park.

6.2.3 Inclusion of local needs? The case of the aquatic centre

While the story of the Olympic stadium tells of the conflicts between use and exchange values in legacy, the aquatic centre exemplifies the difficulty in including local needs, which various authors point out as an issue in the case of mega-event planning processes (for example, Hiller, 2003, pp. 103–104). The aquatic centre, designed by internationally well-known architect Zaha Hadid, played a critical role in representing the architectural achievements in the Olympic Park, but at the same time, its utilisation was also crucial to materialise London's legacy concept. 124 Coexistence of elite and non-elite users and commercial and non-commercial use in the post-Olympic aquatic centre was particularly emphasised in the beginning of the bidding phase (London 2012 Bidding Committee, 2004, p. 95). Thus, similarly to the Olympic stadium, the bid committee proposed to reduce the seating capacity to incorporate envisaged post-Olympic usability, and after the bid, the ODA confirmed that it should change from 17,500 during the Games to 2,500 in legacy (Fig. 6-18).

Furthermore, the ODA stipulated that in-depth usability of the post-Olympic pools would be determined through the public consultations. As a general approach to conduct the legacy planning, the ODA suggested that:

“...[i]f the spaces and buildings it will create are to be successful after the Games, local communities and the wider public must be involved in the design process. Targeted community involvement can help create a sense of ‘ownership’ and pride and also help ensure facilities” (ODA, 2007e, p. 12) (emphasis added).

The planning documents for the aquatic centre, such as the one prepared for the planning application, clearly indicated the process of public participation, and stated

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124 The architect, Zaha Hadid, addressed her role in designing the facility, as follows:

"It has been an exciting challenge for my office to create an innovative design which will provide an outstanding building for the Games themselves, as well as a world-class aquatics complex for the community afterwards" (emphasis added).

that those voices were integrated into the final design.\textsuperscript{125} Yet there was an issue regarding this community involvement process: the creation of a “leisure water” or leisure pool facility. When the final design of the aquatic centre and the planning application were submitted in November 2007, the issue of a leisure water facility was not presented to the public, although this had been one of the political topics debated by various stakeholders. The CMSC suggested in early 2007 that:

\begin{quote}
“The submission from the London Borough of Newham voiced concern that the design being proposed at the time that the submission was being prepared did not provide for “leisure water” when in community legacy use. [...] there was clear evidence of leisure pools being most used by the local community, [...] a mixed leisure and traditional use was more in line with a Government focus on sporting activity rather than “organised” sport. [...] We have considerable sympathy with the views expressed by Newham Borough Council on legacy use of the Aquatics Centre. [...] We note that discussions are still under way between the Olympic Delivery Authority and the Host Boroughs, and we strongly recommend that the design for the Aquatics Centre should provide for a mix of leisure use and traditional “lane” swimming” (CMSC, 2007, pp. 34–35).
\end{quote}

As clearly indicated above, the local borough had called for the integration of a leisure facility into the new aquatic centre, but even though this can be understood as a matter of architectural planning, integration of a leisure water feature was eliminated in the process of architectural design because of the cost of the construction. Thus, the task came to the Olympic Park masterplan team rather than being in the architect’s scope of work. It was October 2007 when the EDAW consortium commenced the study of urban development around the aquatic centre, and the integration of a leisure water facility was one of the crucial tasks which the team had to consider.\textsuperscript{126} Since there was no space available for the leisure function in the already planned aquatic centre, it was proposed in the lower part of the adjacent residential building. With the proposed leisure water facility, the masterplan team envisaged that the “use value” of the aquatic centre would be drastically increased, as it would attract not only elite athletes but also a wider

\textsuperscript{125} For example, ODA (2008a) Aquatic Centre Detailed Submission, Technical Report, Statement of Participation.

\textsuperscript{126} “Olympic Park & Site Wide Infrastructure Design, Notification of Compensation Event by the Employer”, issued on 22 October 2007 by the ODA to the EDAW consortium.
audience. The team further suggested that by adding educational and office spaces, it would be used by educational bodies such as the University of East London (EDAW Consortium, 2008, pp. 28–31). It is certain that provision of a leisure water facility would not only increase the “use value” of the legacy Aquatic Centre, but also raise the “exchange value” by securing various sources of income.

Yet the difficulty in implementing the scheme proposed by the EDAW Consortium was in the PPP. The leisure water facility was originally to be constructed with contributions from the Newham and Tower Hamlets boroughs (GBP 5.5 million from Newham and GBP 1.5 million from Tower Hamlets), with the other large part of the cost from the private sector. Yet, because of the credit crunch, private developers were no longer able to provide enough funding to construct the facility, and it was clear that funding from local boroughs alone would not be enough to realise the project. Thus, the idea of creating the leisure water facility was cancelled, leaving an uncertain sporting legacy (Fig.6-19). When we look at the subsequent masterplans, such as the LMF by the LDA and the LCS by the OPLC, there was a clear separation between the aquatic centre and the adjacent new buildings, and the integration of the leisure facility was absent. The story of the leisure water facility exemplifies the difficulty of keeping “use value” in the long-term planning process, while “exchange value” has always been prioritised. This seems to be particularly true in the case of PPPs, in which private developers are usually interested only in what brings the highest financial return (Flyvbjerg, 2003, pp. 73–106).

6.3 Integration of the vision

6.3.1 The LOP in wider regional planning strategies

The integration of Olympic-led urban development with the wider regional context has been questioned by various academics (for example, Cashman, 2003), and this had been a crucial issue in the case of post-bid Olympic-led urban planning in Sydney. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 4, the Olympic project was tightly connected with the wider London spatial strategy from the beginning of the bid, and the structure for integrating the LOP into the regional context greatly evolved after London won the bid. This part will unpack the synergy between the vision of the post-Olympic site and London’s wider planning context.
The first point of departure should be the Mayor of London’s spatial strategy for the region, the London Plan. After Ken Livingstone, the Mayor of London, launched his first version of the London Plan in 2004 (before London won the bid), he continued to update his regional spatial strategy. During his tenure, the final updated version of the London Plan was issued in 2008, and this was greatly different from the 2004 version. One of the most substantial changes from the previous plan was the integration of maximising the Olympic opportunity along with tackling climate change. The impact of the Olympics had already been identified in the previous plan even though London did not know the bid result, but the 2008 Plan indicated it more explicitly. The updated London Plan, similarly to the predecessor, pointed out that the post-Olympic Park needed to synchronise the housing and employment targets set in the Plan through the creation of mixed-use urban centres across the LLV, but put greater emphasis on the catalytic role of the Olympic development for the wider LLV and the Thames Gateway (Mayor of London, 2008, pp. 313–314). Thus, while the previous plan prioritised the development of Stratford, and indicated the LLV separately, the 2008 Plan integrated Stratford as a part of the LLV, and spatially extended the regenerative focus from 374ha (2004 Plan) to 1,446ha (2008 Plan). Along with enlargement of the opportunity area, the targets for new jobs and new homes were drastically increased, as indicated in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1: Target job creation and housing provision indicated in various London Plans
(Source: Author, 2013, based on Mayor of London, 2004; Mayor of London, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of issue</th>
<th>Author (Mayor of London)</th>
<th>Opportunity area</th>
<th>Area (Ha)</th>
<th>New jobs</th>
<th>New homes</th>
<th>Target period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Livingstone</td>
<td>Stratford</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>by 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LLV</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Livingstone</td>
<td>LLV including Stratford</td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>by 2026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to correlate the regenerative aspirations and spatial distribution in the LLV, Mayor Ken Livingstone issued an in-depth spatial strategy for the area in January 2007, called the “Lower Lea Valley Opportunity Area Framework”. The LLV Opportunity Area Framework is Mayoral Strategic Planning Guidance, seeking to maximise the use of the designated area by transforming the LLV into a “mixed-use city” district, while enhancing the area’s rich landscape and waterways (Mayor of London, 2007b, p. 1).
Along with the Mayoral housing and job targets, the functional concepts in the LLV were termed “water city”, “thriving centres”, “neighbourhood and communities” and “working valley”, and the framework demonstrated how they would be scattered in the area.

This was not established from scratch. The LLV Opportunity Area Framework clearly drew on the 2004 Olympic and Legacy Planning Permission, and it formed the basis of the land-use proposals set out in it. The Opportunity Area Framework of course needed to integrate the changes of the planning vision for the LOP since the 2004 masterplan; the document also encouraged the synergy between ongoing and future transformations of the LLV and the LOP (Mayor of London, 2007a). The Opportunity Area Framework, in particular, proposed to intensify the employment locations along the west side of the River Lea (indicated in purple in figures 6-19 and 20) by transforming the existing residential use, and as compensation, it suggested more residential development in the Olympic Park (Fig. 6-20). Thus, the LLV Opportunity Area Framework provided a great rationale to intensify the development within the LOP, while it envisioned the drastic changes of the land-use pattern of the wider regeneration.

After the tenure of Ken Livingstone, Boris Johnson was elected as the new Mayor of London in 2008, and re-elected in 2012. As soon as he took the mayoral position, Johnson announced the modification of the existing London Plan prepared by his predecessor. The draft version of Johnson’s London Plan was issued in 2009, and finalised in 2011. Although he reformed the London Plan, he kept the LLV Opportunity Area Framework as it was. Johnson addressed the need for maximising the Olympic legacy to improve the socio-economic conditions in the LLV more than previous London Plan, but the fundamental strategy for the LLV and the LOP, which enhanced housing and job opportunities, largely followed the previous London Plan. Yet one of the important aspects Johnson added to the spatial concept for the LOP within the wider regional context was enhancement of the global vision. In the beginning of his London Plan, Johnson addressed his aspirations for London as a global city. Although Livingstone also recognised the importance of surviving inter-urban competition across the globe, Johnson explicitly addressed this vision by saying that London had two objectives: London’s world city status and being one of the best cities in the world to live. Johnson then argued that these two aims would not be opposite, but
complementary to each other (Mayor of London, 2011, p. 5). His strategy was adapted to the vision of the LOP. Along with housing and job opportunities in the Olympic Park, the latest London Plan clearly stated:

“The Mayor will, and boroughs should the Olympic Park and venues as international visitor destinations for sport, recreation and tourism” (Mayor of London, 2011, p. 44) (emphasis added).

Close proximity to the new Stratford International station had been one of the advantages of the LOP, but the concept of the post-Olympic Park as a global destination had not been addressed in the bid. Most of the planning policies issued after the bid had greatly focused on the regenerative benefits which would satisfy the local and regional needs. Yet Johnson wanted to add his global aspirations as a new dimension of the LOP, and this would need further considerations of how the global, regional and local visions would be integrated in the post-Olympic site.

6.3.2 The legacy vision in the local planning context

While there had been synergy between the LOP and regional planning frameworks, it should be questioned whether such interaction had been visible on the local scale. One of the well discussed critiques of the planning of the mega-events is of bypassing the local planning authorities in the fast-track process (for example, Hall, 1992; Hiller, 2003). Thus, in the following part, I will discuss how the Olympic planning was embedded in the local planning context.

As indicated earlier, there had had various solid systems of integrating local authorities’ voices into the Olympic planning process. Firstly, when evaluating the planning application related to the Olympic site, members of the local authorities joined the Planning Decision Team, to reflect their concerns about the decision making. The Planning Decision Team was established by the ODA to gather support for the planning decisions on its own project by integrating the local authorities, and in this respect, the ODA declared itself the Local Planning Authority for the Olympic Park Area (ODA, 2006, p. 2). This kind of joint venture for planning decisions between the specialised statutory body for the Olympic site and local planning authorities was further employed when the LLDC was formulated in 2012. Yet, while this provided opportunities for the
local authorities to reflect their interests in the development of the post-Olympic Park, this was again a system for the LLDC to justify its own planning decisions by integrating other voices.

Secondly, the Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group was formulated in 2008, to supervise and co-ordinate the range of work and secure a regeneration legacy of the Games for east London, focusing both on the Olympic Park itself and on the wider benefits for the whole area (GLA, 2010b, p. 4). The Mayor of London chaired the Steering Group and leaders of the five Olympic boroughs became the core members. The minutes of the Steering Group meetings revealed that the Steering Group had made crucial decisions on development strategies for the post-Olympic Park, such as the approval of the LMF development option. The Steering Group had provided important opportunities to hear about the planning process of the LMF or subsequently the OPLC, and to provide comments on it. The meeting minutes of the Steering Group also suggests that the debate on creation of the Strategic Regeneration Framework began in late 2008, and the first version was approved in October 2009 (Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group, 2009b). This was also the moment that all members of the Steering Group agreed on the principle of “convergence” as the unifying theme for maximising the regenerative benefits for the five host boroughs. Thus, in my view, the local authorities’ voices in the Olympic planning process evolved from situational to more strategic, as the local authorities gradually became more co-operative and took collective actions rather than evaluating others’ visions.

The first stage of the Strategic Regeneration Framework was issued in October 2009 by the five Olympic host boroughs, and the concept of “convergence” was further elaborated as follows:

“Within 20 years the communities who host the 2012 Games will have the same social and economic chances as their neighbours across London” (Olympic Host Boroughs, 2009).

As indicated above, given the social and economic disadvantages of the residents in

127 Although the meeting was conducted “behind the curtain”, the meeting summaries of the Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group posted on the London 2012 website, for example, reveal that the preferred option of the LMF was one of the great concerns among the attendees.
their councils, the Olympic boroughs designated the Strategic Regeneration Framework as a means of equalising these and other areas, in particular the west part of London, over next twenty years. As a reflection of this socio-economic ambition of the spatial strategy, the Strategic Regeneration Framework identified provision of new homes and places for business across the five boroughs as key development principles. These two had also been extensively addressed by the Mayor’s LLV Opportunity Area Framework or the various post-Olympic masterplans issued by the different Olympic bodies. Yet the Strategic Regeneration Framework emphasised that the location, scale and timing of development needed to support convergence. The Strategic Regeneration Framework’s view of the exiting neighbourhood in the Olympic boroughs was “less coherent and more fragmented”, but it also recognised the importance of “tailoring solutions to the diverse needs of their local communities”. Thus the Olympic boroughs declared that:

“We believe that the [statutory spatial planning] system is already too complex and wish to see simplification rather than the creation of further additional separate plans” (Olympic Host Boroughs, 2009, p. 22).

It seems to me that this is quite a strong argument from the local boroughs. While both Olympic authorities and the regional development authorities had produced numerous spatial planning frameworks to identify the possible vision of the Olympic site and the wider area, the local boroughs considered a different approach necessary to accommodate the diverse character of the local neighbourhoods. In other words, this can be considered a critique of the current complexity of the planning framework. Although the Strategic Regeneration Framework did not provide a concrete method for incorporating the Olympic opportunities into the diverse local neighbourhoods, this clearly represented a need for an alternative planning approach to improving spatial quality while maintaining the existing “sense of place”, the term repeatedly used in the Strategic Regeneration Framework.

6.4 Concluding remarks

Evolution of governance and vision of the Olympic legacy
This chapter examined the planning process of defining the vision of the post-Olympic
site during the seven years of London’s post-bid phase. We have witnessed the evolving vision of the legacy of the LOP during the preparation phase, and I will suggest that this was both an expected and unexpected process. I have demonstrated three different periods of the Olympic and legacy planning, which corresponded to the change of governance and associated modification of the spatial strategy. Throughout each of these three phases, there was a leading authority to shape the vision of the Olympic and post-Olympic site, and its political aspirations had significant impacts in defining the spatial vision of the LOP.

Discussion of the legacy vision of the post-Olympic site after the bid began with the physical changeability which would accommodate the Olympic and post-Olympic demands in the LOP, and then evolved towards identification of socio-economic integration into the legacy development. While the Olympic authorities as well as various government addressed the balance between social and economic benefits of the creation of the LOP, the conflict between maximising the social value and economic return was ironically highlighted when the economic sustainability of the Park was placed in danger at the time of the recession. The intervention of the Mayor of London and subsequent establishment of the OPLC became the new trigger to change the balance between the social and economic values of the post-Olympic site. In this respect, I will stress that London’s legacy planning process exemplifies the fragility of long-term urban planning, which is based on highly speculative assumptions and is sensitive to the political power struggles between various stakeholders involved in the project.

Implementation of the vision

While the governance and spatial planning of the Olympic legacy had been a crucial issue in the post-bid phase, it is certain that the financial arrangements for implementation of the vision had also been important. London employed a PPP for construction of the Olympic village, but the implementation process of the village demonstrated the uncertainty of using PPPs in the Olympic project. It is widely believed that the private sector’s involvement in a public project is limited to certain occasions where they can see the financial surplus (Flyvbjerg, 2003). The collapse of the PPP for the village project at the time of the credit crunch exemplified this fundamental problem of the PPP, and suggested the danger of relying on the private sector for much of the delivery process. Furthermore, the decline of integrating the leisure waster facility into
the privately developed building next to the aquatic centre due to the recession also suggests the limited difficulty in collaborating with the private sector in a time of economic uncertainty.

In addition to this, I will further point out that concern about the economic viability of the future Olympic facilities became a great threat to the promised “use value” of the legacy venue, and the story of the Olympic stadium exemplified that fragile balance between “use and exchange value” of the legacy development. What became apparent to me was that the initial proposition of enhancing “use value” lacked a solid feasibility study of financial viability, which Roche identified as a typical problem of the bid component (Roche, 1994). This raises the question of whether the London’s bid proposal of “physical change ability” was overwhelmed by the rhetoric to respond to what the IOC wanted to hear and the justification of Olympic-led urban regeneration in the LLV.

Urban integration
While the vision inside the LOP was developed in seven years of the post-bid phase, in various ways it was also connected with the broader urban planning context to identify its socio-economic role in the wider urban tissue. The divorce from the wider planning context was one of the great dangers in conducting the urban regeneration project associated with mega-events, and Judd’s concept of the urban “bubble” suggests the spatial consequence of an isolated planning process. Yet, in the case of London, the vision of the legacy for the Olympic Park was well articulated within various regional planning frameworks. As an inheritance from the bid phase, the role of the LOP, in particular its post-Olympic role, had been well integrated into the Mayor’s development strategy to address the uneven development between west and east in London. Thus, there were various planning frameworks and authorities to consider the way in which the LOP would be integrated into the wider urban tissue. After securing the Olympics in 2005, the expectations for creating the LOP and its catalytic effect in wider LLV area became high, and housing and job opportunity targets became higher than in the bid. Boris Johnson’s further request that the LOP be a global destination added further ambitions to the role of the site in the wider London region, but this conflicted with local aspirations to focus on the mediation between existing and new development in local areas. The local boroughs’ “convergence”, a crucial concept of maximising the
Olympic legacy for equalising the socio-economic unbalance in London, certainly did not involve renewing the whole area of the LLV, but rather sought cohesion between existing and new development in the area. Although the London Plan initially addressed this before the bid, after the bid, such conception seemed to erode. In this respect, I will stress that the biggest issue for London to overcome may not be avoiding the urban bubble, but rather mediating the divergent nature of the spatial aspirations attached to the post-Olympic Park.
Part II Conclusion: Evolution from Sydney to London

Evolution of Olympic governance and the spatial vision

One of the aims in this part is to identify the significant changes of governance of Olympic and legacy planning and its reflection of the spatial vision of the Olympic site in the seven years of the post-bid phase. Sydney and London experienced considerable changes of planning structure, and they had a great impact on the vision of the Olympic site. Sydney and London each had three different phases in terms of governance of the Olympic and legacy planning, and I will point out that the reasons for these changes were “intended” and “unintended”. The concept of “intended” and “unintended” is pointed out by Mangan and Dyreson as a key factor for understanding the Olympic legacy (Mangan and Dyreson, 2010), and I have seen both factors in the evolution of the planning structure and spatial vision in both cities. Changes of the regional government and impact of the Atlanta Games in Sydney, or creation of the OPLC caused by discovery of the financial shortfall of the LDA in London, was not envisaged when the city won the bid, while the transition of the leading legacy body from the ODA to the LDA in London was expected at the beginning of the post-bid phase.

Among these changes in Sydney and London, I will in particular stress that change of the regional government had a significant impact on both the planning structure and spatial vision of the Olympic site in the post-bid phase. Concentration of the planning power in the OCA in Sydney and establishment of the OPLC with different financial arrangements in London were certainly made possible by the strong intervention of the new political power, which was the change of regional government in Sydney and election of the new Mayor in London. The change of planning structure, importantly, created the momentum for altering the spatial strategy developed in the previous political regime. While the OCA utilised the vision of Homebush Bay rather than the speculative proposal of the previous political government, the OPLC drastically changed the density of the post-Olympic development in the LLV compared to the previous high-density urban model proposed in the LMF. However, the question should be asked as to whether the revised spatial vision fit the initial objectives of creating a mixed-use vision of the post-Olympic site. Application of the grid system by the OCA turned Homebush Bay into a more controlled rather than interactive space, which is
fundamentally against the maximising the benefit of a mixed-use urban strategy suggested by various authors (for example, Coupland, 1997). Meanwhile, the OPLC’s strategy of lower density (fewer houses) than in the previous LMF also led to the question of whether it would contribute to the realisation of the initially envisioned mixed-use concept, which included provision of affordable houses. Thus, while the new spatial strategy created by the new political regime provided an alternative view to solve ongoing problems in the post-bid phase, it also left some questions in the subsequent phase.

Legacy planning

It should be noted that there were fundamentally different legacy planning climates between Sydney and London. When Sydney conducted the planning for the 2000 Games, the term “legacy” was not commonly utilised in the sphere of Olympic studies and practices. Yet, when London commenced its planning for the 2012 Olympics, the word “legacy” became central in Olympic discourses. Against this backdrop, one of the most contrasting planning issues between Sydney and London was the degree to which each city tackled the spatial vision of the post-Olympic Park. Sydney and London initially set the future vision of the Olympic Park as a mixed-use urban quarter, and this was clearly addressed in the bid phase. Yet Sydney primarily focused on the spatial setting for the Games, and paid little attention to the post-Olympic mixed-use vision during the post-bid phase. Meanwhile, London undertook a considerable amount of work for the entire mixed-use vision of the post-LOP area. It seems that London took a more advanced approach to the legacy planning vision, but in London’s case it also demonstrated the difficulty in fixing the spatial vision in seven years. As the ODA initially addressed, advance planning effort for the legacy was able to contribute to the smooth transition to the subsequent post-Olympic phase without creating a considerable gap between the two phases. Beyond this, I will suggest that having a more comprehensive vision was the way of enhancing the communication between different stakeholders, which made it possible to provide great opportunities for various stakeholders to address their aspirations. The proposed vision of the LMF, for example, triggered the discussion in the Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group, and although the LMF’s proposal was eventually abandoned, this led to the creation of the Strategic Regeneration Framework. I will argue that even though the vision of the legacy was a “placeholder”, it certainly contributed to the subsequent discussion of the
post-Olympic development.

**Implementation of the vision using PPPs**

As part of the Olympic facilities constructed during the post-bid phase would become a considerable legacy after the Games, Part II has examined the implementation process of some Olympic facilities in the Park. I have in particular looked at the involvement of the private sector in realisation of Olympic facilities and its opportunity and risk. Both Sydney and London employed PPPs to implement certain parts of the Olympic construction in the post-bid phase, and reduction of the financial burden of the public sector was one of the main drivers of collaboration with the private sector. Yet, during the course of the construction process, it became clear that there were various risks in employing PPPs. Firstly, echoing Flybjerg’s point on the strong presence of the private sector’s financial benefits in PPPs (Flyvbjerg, 2003), I will argue that there was a danger that the initial vision of the Olympic site/building would materialise only when the public authority’s political intentions were synchronised with the private sector’s interests. Indeed, Sydney and London employed PPPs for the construction of the Olympic villages, and neither village was constructed in the way the Olympic authority envisaged in the beginning of the post-bid phase. The construction process in Sydney, which was supposed to follow the environmental standard set in the bid, and the collapse of the PPP in the Olympic village construction in London exemplify the private sector’s fragile involvement in the public project. This was in particular highlighted in the situation of what Harvey calls “considerable economic instability and volatility” in the current world (Harvey, 1989, p. 11), as the delivery method of the village project in London was greatly altered when the city hit a severe recession.

Secondly, what became apparent to me is that employing PPPs for the implementation of the Olympic project showed an imbalance between “use and exchange value”. Enlargement of the Olympic stadium and indoor arena in Sydney, whose “exchange” value the private sector aimed to increase without a solid forecast of the usability, and the dispute over the post-Olympic stadium in London suggest the struggle to maintain the “use value” of the Olympic venue initially proposed in the bid phase under the tremendous pressure of financial viability, which would require the increase of “exchange value”. Although it was not so visible in Sydney, the struggle between “use and exchange value” was the core point of discussion in defining the mixed-use vision
of the post-Olympic Park in London. Enhancing the “use value” in the LOP was emphasised to justify the benefit of hosting the Games, but it seems to me that “exchange value” eventually became more of a priority in order to avoid further public expenditure on the Olympic Park and venues in London. As Harvey suggests, the exchange value can determine the use value by creating new conditions (Harvey, 2009, p.190); this tendency put initial promise danger. In this respect, the OPLC’s approach to the lower-density model faced a great challenge in mediating use and exchange value.

**Urban integration**

Divorce of the specialised urban quarter from its surroundings has been a crucial issue in the realm of mega-events and urban studies, and I will suggest that Sydney and London provide a stark contrast in this respect. Although the creation of the SOP was initially expected to create a major centre and shift economic prosperity to the west in the region, it had been difficult to embed the SOP as a part of the regional development strategy. The problem of creation of a new urban centre lay in the potential conflict with existing urban centres in the Sydney region. While the critical issue for Sydney in the post-bid phase had been the isolation of the SOP from the wider planning context, London had a different story. The Mayor’s London Plan and its in-depth area framework, LLV Opportunity Area Framework, raised the ambitions for the Olympic Park much higher than what had been envisaged in the bid, and the LOP was expected to carry out various roles in the region. Meanwhile, on the local scale, there was a significant discrepancy between the local Auburn Council and the Olympic authority in Sydney, regarding how the SOP would be related to the local neighbourhoods, and critically a solid mechanism of integrating the local’s interests was absent in developing the SOP. London in turn had established various formal opportunities to integrate (or at least hear) local authorities’ voices.

While London took a more connected planning approach to the regional and local planning framework, Sydney’s process was understood as what Thornley might call “enclave development” (Thornley, 2000), and this led to the great danger that the SOP would be an urban “bubble” (Judd, 1999) in the local and regional urban tissue. Although there were various planning frameworks identify the role of the Olympic Park to satisfy each planning objectives in London, the challenge was to mediate local and regional aspirations for the LOP given the complexity of the planning context. In
particular, as the regional aspirations became much higher in the process of constructing the LOP, there may have been a great danger in ignoring coherence between the new and old development in the area, which both local and regional authorities had addressed before the bid. This remained a crucial point for the local authorities, but it seems that regional aspirations came to focus on more catalytic urban renewal of the LLV. Thus, I will stress here that London’s planning context certainly originated from a desire to avoid the “Olympic bubble”, but mediating regional and local development interests through relevant planning policy was still the challenge for London.
Part III: Post-Olympic Phase

The third part of this thesis (chapters 7 and 8) will explore the post-Olympic phase. The duration of the post-Olympic phase needs to be clarified here, as it could have an unlimited timeframe. As suggested in Chapter 2, my target timeframe for the post-Olympic phase in Sydney extends from after Sydney’s hosting of the Olympic and Paralympic Games in September and October 2000 to the end of 2012, and London’s post-Olympic phase is defined as starting with the conclusion of London’s Paralympic Games in September 2012 and lasting to the end of June. While the twelve-year period of Sydney’s post-Olympic phase provides a lot of empirical data, London’s legacy phase which I can explore is relatively short. Yet London’s legacy planning was conducted before the Games, and after the Games, it has been further elaborated, with some crucial planning actions undertaken in this short period. In addition to this, the findings about Sydney’s post-Olympic phase will provide useful accounts to consider against the various actions happening in London’s post-Olympic development. Thus, although the chapter on London’s case is shorter than the chapter on Sydney, I consider that Chapter 8, in particular the evolution from Sydney to London in the legacy planning, will play a crucial role in considering my research question. My focus in examining the post-Olympic phase is two-fold. Firstly, I will explore the interaction between the implementation and the planning of the post-Olympic site. Hall suggests that the continuous action of review and design is a fundamental characteristic of the recent planning processes (Hall, 2002 [1975]), but Roche points out that such processes are rarely implanted in the post-event phase (Roche, 1994). In the case of Sydney’s legacy phase, I will examine how the post-Olympic authority redefined the vision of the post-Olympic site. In particular, the vision and realisation of a mixed-use development in the site will be analysed in depth. Meanwhile, in the case of London, it is too early to see such interaction between implementation and planning, and I will focus on the legacy planning framework and the risks which might emerge in the ongoing legacy development process. Secondly, as in Part II, which looked at the post-bid phase, Judd’s conception of the “tourist bubble” (Judd, 1999) will be examined in the context of the relationship between the post-Olympic site and the surroundings, as a crucial analytical point of the legacy planning. While Sydney and London showed a great contrast regarding their vision for integrating the Olympic Park into the wider urban tissue in the post-bid phase, this part will further examine how the conditions did or did not change in the post-Olympic phase.
Chapter 7: Sydney

7.1 The governance and spatial planning of the post-Olympic Park

7.1.1 Uncertainty after the 2000 Games

Sydney staged the Olympic and Paralympic Games from 15 September to 29 October in 2000.\textsuperscript{128} It is considered that the Sydney Games were particularly successful, as the president of the IOC at the time, Juan Samaranch, declared them “the best Olympics ever”. Sydney’s great promotion of the “Green Games” concept, and the globally well-received hospitality of the Sydney people and volunteers contributed to the “best Olympics ever”. During the Olympic Games, 200,000 to 400,000 people came to the SOP each day (SOCOG, 2001, p. 187) and watched the competition.

After the events, the OCA, which took responsibility for constructing the venues and infrastructure for the Games, conducted physical transformation work within the SOP. This included downsizing the competition venues, such as the Olympic stadium and the aquatic centre, both of which utilised temporary seating systems in steel structures to accommodate the Olympic capacity, and dismantling temporary structures in the Olympic site. Decreasing the size of the competition venues based on predicted legacy demands and employing the various temporary structures removed after the events were well planned by the Olympic organisers before the Games, in order to mediate the Olympic and legacy demands in Sydney.

Yet, within six months of the Sydney Games, the Olympic precincts became the target of criticism by various parts of the media, and the terms “ghost town” and “white elephant” were frequently used to describe the condition of the post-Olympic site. As some transformation works were underway and the SOP was not ready for legacy uses, it might not have been appropriate to criticise the Olympic site as a “white elephant” just a few months after the Olympics, but that did not stop the regional newspaper, the SMH (for example, “Empty Olympic stadium” (Moore and Verrender, 2001)).

\textsuperscript{128} Olympic Games from 15 September to 1 October and Paralympic Games from 18 to 29 October in 2000.
contrast between the 400,000 crowds during the Olympic Games and the empty space after the Games was further highlighted by the international media. CNN, for example, reported on the SOP in July, 2001 as follows:

“... Despite the stunning sell-out success of the 2000 Games, Sydney's $200 million Olympic Stadium is shaping up as a white elephant of mammoth proportions...While the massive Stadium Australia has managed to secure some major events like international rugby games and football (soccer) matches, what it lacks is an anchor sporting team that can keep the crowds coming back...The problems are not confined to the main stadium. Most days, this sprawling complex resembles little more than a state-of-the-art ghost town.”

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Considering the legacy of the SOP was one of the OCA’s responsibilities during the preparation phase, but as indicated in Chapter 5, little had been done except for the plans to downsize the Olympic venues. Facing this situation, the OCA created various cultural events at the SOP in the beginning of 2001 in order to attract people, but this failed to attract citizens’ attention, and visits to the Olympic site were far below the 20,000 to 30,000 a day which were considered necessary to make the SOP viable (Peatling and Jacobsen, 2001). The problem of the post-Olympic site was also well recognised in the regional parliament. The Premier of NSW, Bob Carr, defended the post-SOP by using the example of the Darling Harbour, the redevelopment project located in the centre of the city of Sydney, which as Carr noted took some years to revitalise the regenerated area. Carr, however, was concerned about the location of the SOP, which is away from the CBD, and addressed the urgent need for a development plan for the post-Olympic site (Ryle and Kerr, 2001). In addition to the emptiness of the SOP, the public subsidies to sustain the Olympic site for the longer term were of great concern to the NSW citizens as well as politicians. The OCA envisaged that it would take at least ten years for the SOP to become a self-sufficient site (Peatling and Jacobsen, 2001), and this triggered discussions in the NSW Cabinet to consider the various options for the utilisation of the post-Olympic site (Peatling, 2001).

7.1.2 Initial post-Olympic visions of the OCA

While some problems were identified in the post-Olympic site, the OCA issued the first post-Olympic masterplan, the “Vision for beyond 2000”, in December 2000, which became the starting point for further elaboration of the spatial planning of the SOP in the coming decade. The document indicated a broad vision for the future development of the SOP, without providing concrete plans for the Olympic site. It certainly echoed various concerns of the media and the NSW Parliament at the time, and Michael Knight, the Olympic Minister of the Sydney Games, stated:

“…the sports facilities alone are not enough to guarantee the viability of Sydney Olympic Park in the future. Many other developments, working in harmony with the existing facilities at Sydney Olympic Park, will be required if the taxpayers of NSW are to realise the full value of their investment in the site” (OCA, 2000, p. 2).

The uncertainty of sustaining the SOP with only the sporting venues and the need for solutions to avoid public subsidies were central in the public criticism. The first post-Olympic document clearly attempted to tackle these issues, and three key concepts, which can be understood as vital elements of a “mixed-use” urban strategy, were pointed out. Firstly, the “Vision for beyond 2000” stressed that a “diverse range of activities” were needed for the post-Olympic site to become a daily attraction. These included various kinds of urban activities ranging from special events to daily office work, in order to bring life and vibrancy in to the post-Olympic Park. Secondly, related to the above vision, “cohesive development” between different uses, in particular coexistence of sports and commercial facilities, was recognised as a crucial factor for the SOP to maximise the significant Olympic legacy and future potential. Thirdly, financial “self-sufficiency” was raised as a crucial issue, and justified the need for commercial development. The document once more suggested that the commercial development should cohere with other uses within the site. The “mixed-use” urban precincts had been considered even before Sydney won the bid for the 2000 Games in 1993 (see Chapter 3), but this idea was invisible throughout the post-bid phase (see Chapter 4). The “Vision for beyond 2000” suggested a re-consideration of the mixed-use urban strategy for the SOP.
Although the first post-Olympic masterplan was only thirteen pages long, as Michael Knight suggested during my interview, these concepts were carried through to the following masterplans,\textsuperscript{130} and cohesion between sports and commercial uses in the mixed-use development at the post-Olympic site was repeatedly emphasised in the next several years.

“...over the next 20 years, 25 years, you will see a lot more commercial development, you will see a lot more residential development. Key for us is to get the balance right between those two things, commercial / residential and great sports events that happen here, and also great parklands.”\textsuperscript{131}

While the key concepts for post-Olympic development were clearly suggested, their application in the spatial strategy was only vaguely demonstrated in the “Vision for beyond 2000”. The OCA drastically limited its focus to the central part of the SOP including the adjacent industrial site, and proposed to subdivide five precincts within the SOP: Brickpit, East, Town Centre, Core and South West (Fig. 7-1). The OCA identified the fundamental character of each area, but it was clear that this was only indicative rather than practical, and more in-depth spatial planning of the post-SOP was yet to come.

In the wake of the “Vision for beyond 2000”, which set out the key planning concept for the post-SOP, the OCA asked four architects how the idea of “mixed-use”, “everyday life” and “self-sufficiency” could be spatially implemented. The four architects were also requested to consider the design solutions for integrating the post-Olympic SOP into the urban tissues and transportation strategy. Although various studies were conducted before the bid, regarding the mixed-use development, the invited architects were asked to refer to the 1995 masterplan issued by the OCA as a point of reference and other past studies were largely ignored.

The invited architects proposed various fascinating spatial concepts which they considered necessary to sustain the SOP as a vibrant area for the longer term. Tony Caro Architects, for example, was of the view that the new Homebush Bay should become “a

\textsuperscript{130} Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008.
\textsuperscript{131} Comment in the video “Sydney Olympic Park, from the Beginning...” by the SOPA
piece of the city” and achieve a human scale by inserting new gentle buildings between the large scale Olympic physical forms. They represented their idea as the classic juxtaposition of public and private architectural language (OCA, 2001b, pp. 51–61) (Fig. 7-2). Meanwhile, Lacoste + Stevenson shed light on the urban “rhythm” of a day, and demonstrated how new additional urban programmes such as work and retail would fit with the uneven rhythm of sporting events (Fig. 7-3). Although they did not provide an idea of how these rhythms would be created spatially across the site, their proposal was a direct response to the OCA’s concern about “urban vibrancy” in the post-SOP (OCA, 2001b, pp. 39–48).

Each architect proposed various ideas to revitalise the SOP, and they once more stressed the “mixed-use” strategy. As a crucial implementing strategy for achieving a mixed-use post-Olympic site, they proposed to focus on new high-density development around the rail station in the Town Centre and to enhance the residential development in the post-Olympic SOP. These two ideas became influential factors in the subsequent masterplanning, although they were not developed as imaginatively as the architects originally envisioned (Searle, 2008b, p. 96).

7.1.3 Establishment of the Sydney Olympic Park Authority

The OCA was eventually dissolved at the end of June 2002, and the new statuary body, the SOPA, was established on 1 July 2001. The responsibility of the SOPA was defined in the Sydney Olympic Park Authority Act 2001 as follows:

“(a) to promote, co-ordinate and manage the orderly and economic development and use of Sydney Olympic Park, including the provision and management of infrastructure,
(b) to promote, co-ordinate, organise, manage, undertake, secure, provide and conduct cultural, sporting, educational, commercial, tourist, recreational, entertainment and transport activities and facilities,
(c) to protect and enhance the natural and cultural heritage of Sydney Olympic Park, particularly the Millennium Parklands,

132 It is certain that their conception of designing in relation to time in the urban area was influenced by the Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas’s early work on the Yokohama Project, in which Koolhaas proposed to bring various new activities to vitalise the fish market area where the peak activities are limited in a specific duration of a day (see Koolhaas, R. (1995) S.M.L.XL, Monacelli.).
(d) to provide, operate and maintain public transport facilities within Sydney Olympic Park,
(e) to liaise with and maintain arrangements with Olympic organisations, such as the International Olympic Committee and the Australian Olympic Committee Incorporated”

As the Act clearly stated, enhancing the mixed-use strategy with economic development in mind was fundamental to the role of the SOPA. In order to transfer the valuable knowledge of the SOP, most of the staff in the previous OCA were transferred to the new authority, and the director-general of the OCA, David Richmond, became the first chairman of the SOPA. Richmond had been keen on the need for a legacy organisation even before the Games, and he was also a great promoter of integrating the SOPA into the wider regional context (see Chapter 5). In this respect, the appointment of Richmond as chair of the post-Olympic organisation was considered a rational choice for the SOPA. Furthermore, the creation of the SOPA was imperative to empower a single organisation to take care of the Olympic site in the post-Olympic political climate in the region. Michael Knight suggested that the financial resources given to the OCA greatly decreased compared to the preparation phase. He stated that:

“In a preparation for the Olympic Games, the Olympic coordination authority became very powerful within government. It had formal power to direct other government departments. It pretty much got any resources it wanted. But when the Games were over, the power was gone. It had an impact on post Olympic planning, because the body that was trying to do the planning for the Sydney Olympic Park, the remains of the OCA, was no longer a powerful body within government. If you’re going to have something done, it’s much rather done when the body is powerful rather than when the body is essentially powerless. And so that impacted the resources that were available, and impacted on a lot of things.”

Knight argued that the OCA had difficulty in implementing the post-Olympic masterplan due to the limited financial resources, and it was imperative to renew the

133 Interview with Michael Knight on 30 October 2008.
7.1.4 Post-Olympic Masterplan 2002

Following the two initial post-Olympic documents issued by the OCA, the SOPA published the first in-depth masterplan, “Sydney Olympic Park, Masterplan 2002”, in May 2002 to provide a framework for further development of the post-Olympic site. It proposed a spatial development strategy over 10 to 15 years (up to 2012–2017), based on identification of the post-Olympic problems as well as the potential for the site. The 2002 masterplan intended to establish the SOP as “a special event precinct and mixed-use centre” in Western Sydney by suggesting that it should become Sydney’s premier destination for various events, as well as having employment-generating uses (SOPA, 2002, pp. 15–16, p. 53). Although the 2002 masterplan tried to combine two different concepts, it had certain constraints.

Firstly, as the fundamental spatial layout was established by the 1995 masterplan for the Olympic Games, the way of distributing different functions and areas available for new developments were spatially limited. The grid patterned road system installed in the SOP also strictly defined the boundaries of different parcels of land. Thus, as inherited from the 1995 Olympic masterplan and the initial post-Olympic document, “Vision beyond 2000”, the 2002 masterplan subdivided the Olympic site into the eight precincts, and provided a distinct land-use in each precinct (SOPA, 2002, p. 79) (Figs. 7-4 and 5). The two distinctive uses, sports and employment-generating uses, were also clearly confined in different precincts in the post-Olympic SOP. The Authority proposed to concentrate new development around the railway station (Town Centre precinct indicated as “A” in Fig. 7-4), while it aimed to enhance the sporting and entertainment activities in a separate area of the SOP where the legacy sporting facilities were located (Northern Events (C), Sydney Showground (D), and Southern Events (F) in Fig. 7-4).

Secondly, the 2002 masterplan was constrained regarding the employment and commercial development targets, due to potential conflicts with the surrounding urban centres. The masterplan targeted a daily workforce population of 10,000 people, with 110,000 m² floor space for commercial development concentrated in the Town Centre.

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134 Prior to this, the OCA had issued the draft version in June 2001, and the final masterplan was adapted by the minister of planning of the NSW. Refer to OCA (2001a) Sydney Olympic Park : Draft Post Olympic Masterplan, Homebush Bay, NSW.
precinct. Yet the OCA initially recognised that 20,000 to 30,000 people daily were needed to sustain the SOP for the longer term, and the target number proposed in the masterplan is much smaller than this. While the SOPA identified that business and commercial uses were complementary to the functions of the region, it also stressed that they should not significantly impact on the future commercial development in the Parramatta CBD. In a similar vein, retail uses also had development constraints as they might have obstructed the viability of other retail centres such as Burwood (SOPA, 2002, p. 17). Thus, although the 2002 post-Olympic Park masterplan envisioned a “mixed-use” town centre as the means of creating a “diverse range of activities” and “self-sufficiency”, the ambition had certain constraints due to the need for cohesive development in the region.

7.2 The development of the SOP since 2001

7.2.1 New construction
The SOPA adapted the final version of the post-Olympic masterplan in July 2002, and this became the initial planning framework for new construction projects within the SOP boundary. The process of implementing the vision proposed in the 2002 post-Olympic masterplan took time, and by the end of 2012, the initial vision of the post-Olympic site developed in 2002 had not fully materialised (Fig. 7-6).

The commercial development was commenced by selling the surplus land of the SOP to private developers, and this provided the crucial financial resources for the SOPA to run the post-Olympic site. Yet the story of the development of the commercial projects in the SOP reveals the difficulty of creating them from scratch. The first commercial development in the post-Olympic site was an extension of the existing low-rise office block in the eastern side of the Australian Centre. As the images of the SOP before the 2000 Olympics showed, this high-tech industrial park was developed a long time ago. After the Olympics, the GPT Group, a private real estate company, acquired the first building in July 2001, and subsequently developed three low-rise office buildings. The Group finally developed them as the QUAD Business Park with 23,400 square metres of lettable space in a 31,900 square metre site (Fig. 7-7). The GPT Group considered
that “the Quad Business Park is located in the Sydney Olympic Park precinct which provides tenants with a unique amenity in an iconic location” and suggested that “the location is particularly attractive to tenants wishing to offer their staff the opportunity for work/life balance”. In a similar vein, the existing hotel business established before the 2000 Games was also expanded. Novotel and Ibis have remained opposite the site of the ANZ Stadium and the aquatic centre, and another hotel, the Pullman Hotel, was built at an adjacent site in 2005. The 18-storey hotel was the first five-star hotel opened in Western Sydney since the 2000 Olympics (Fig. 7-8). Thus, the first major commercial development was begun by extending the existing buildings, rather than creating anything from scratch.

The slow pace of development in the post-Olympic Park in Sydney was widely recognised in the realms of both Olympic research and practice, but according to Richard Cashman, it was only after 2005 that new construction in the post-Olympic site was accelerated and changed the skyline of the SOP (Cashman, 2011, pp. 89–90). The opening of the first Commonwealth Bank office in 2007, and subsequent expansion in 2008, marked the first commercial development from scratch, and it became a significant moment in the development of the post-Olympic site for the SOPA. The seven storeys and total 280 metre length (including the public space between the two buildings) of the three office blocks not only changed the physical setting of the Town Centre, but also brought in 3,500 daily staff. The Commonwealth Bank opened the new workplace in the SOP in order to be located in its strategic growth area, Western Sydney, and to create a campus style office, which could not be realised in the existing CBD area. The Bank further mentioned that building a state-of-the-art office complex would create a synergy between the Bank and the SOP’s “green” concept. Along with the creation of the new workplace, various restaurants and shops were opened on the ground floor, in order to support daily activities. The opening of the Commonwealth Bank office triggered further urban development of the Town Centre. The small pocket park in front of the office, called Jacaranda Square, was opened in 2009, and another office block on the opposite side of the Bank office was completed in 2010.

In addition to these commercial developments in the Town Centre precinct, a new residential development was planned and commenced at the adjacent site, the eastern side of the Australian Centre precinct. The residential development had been planned since the first post-Olympic masterplan issued in 2002, but its realisation took some time. The developer that initially planned to develop the residential project eventually withdrew from it, as it decided to focus on the city rather than the suburbs (Cashman, 2011, p.103). Another developer, Billbergia, took over the luxury residential tower development. The developer planned a three-stage development, and the first tower was completed in 2012. The second tower, named the One Australia Tower, will be the highest residential tower in Western Sydney and is due in 2014. As its advertisements suggest, one of the target groups of customers for this residential development was people employed in the SOP, and the lifestyle of close proximity between home and work has been promoted as follows:

"In most parts of the world you have to travel far to enjoy such recreational, entertainment and sporting facilities, but at One Australia Avenue they are on your doorstep. [...] It is a great place to work and live, so demand for accommodation continues to be strong as Sydney Olympic Park evolves into a major suburb."138

It is certain that new residential development was planned as “exclusive” accommodation, and it seems that there will not be any space for the affordable housing which the 2002 masterplan intended to include in the post-Olympic SOP. While the developer has fully utilised the advantage of the close relationship with sports to add value, a mixed-use strategy, in particular the combination of sports events and commercial development, has been emphasised by the SOPA in order to meet its management cost expectations of the post-Olympic site. Some sports representatives in the SOP also welcomed these new developments, considering that they also helped to raise funds for them (Cashman, 2011, p. 112). In this respect, the juxtaposition of these two land-uses created a “give-and-take” relationship, although some of the SOPA planners noticed that the proximity between sports stadia and residential buildings needed special care, in order to avoid disruption of daily life caused by traffic and noise.

7.2.2 Maximising the usability of inherited facilities

While the post-Olympic masterplan put great emphasis on the post-Olympic SOP becoming a mixed-use urban centre, the SOPA recognised that new developments in the post-Olympic site would take some time to materialise, and the SOP initially needed to survive with only the existing physical elements in the Park. The post-Olympic masterplan also clearly suggested that it was imperative for the SOPA to maximise the usability of these venues to maintain the SOP as a major event area. Thus, the SOPA and venue operators in each sporting venue needed great efforts to maximise the existing facilities in the post-Olympic site (Shirai, 2009) (Fig. 7-9). For example, the SOPA encouraged the SOP to become a major site for business events. Yet before major commercial development happened in the post-Olympic site, there were only one hotel and a number of sports facilities left in the SOP. It is obvious that there was a limit on the capacity to host major business events. Nevertheless, the sporting facilities left in the post-Olympic site were utilised as a venue for business meetings and conferences (Fig. 7-10). In this respect, the legacy facility in the SOP was no longer mono-functional architecture, but included multiple, sometimes unexpected, uses; the architect Bernard Tschumi calls such multiple uses “cross programming” or “hyper programming”. According to Tschumi, utilising architecture for an initially unplanned purpose or juxtaposing different uses in a single architecture would be necessary in the age of uncertainty (Tschumi, 1999). In the case of the SOP, in particular, right after the Olympic and Paralympic Games, before the post-Olympic development materialised, it was imperative to look for “cross programming” or “hyper programming” to maximise the venues and generate various activities in the vast space.

Thus, maximisation of the inherited buildings in the post-Olympic site was crucial for the SOPA from the beginning of the management of the post-Olympic site, and the authority desperately sought various types of events, including sporting, entertainment and business events as well as community events. As a result of extensive effort to utilise the sporting facilities, the number of visitors who came to the SOP increased (Figs. 7-11 and 12).

The SOPA in particular managed to secure various international and national premier sporting and entertainment events after the Olympic Games. For example, it secured the hosting of the Rugby World Cup in 2003 in the post-Olympic stadium (Stadium
Australia, later changed to the ANZ Stadium) and the Swimming World Cup in 2005 at the Aquatic Centre. The Medi Bank International Tennis Tournament also moved its venue to the Tennis Centre in the SOP from 2000. Furthermore, the controversial V8 Car racing has been staged annually since 2009, despite great opposition by the residents and even the officers from the SOPA, due to the great risk of damaging the natural resources of the parklands, which has been considered one of the great legacies of the Olympic Games. Yet it should be noted that the increase in events was accomplished through the intense competition over the limited event programme within the Sydney region. Regarding the sports and entertainment events, the SOP was in competition with the existing sporting events precinct located in the CBD area, the Sydney Cricket Ground. As the popularity of the SOP as a major event precinct increased, it decreased the profitability of the Sydney Cricket Ground (Searle, 2002, pp. 851–854). In a similar vein, the SOP has competed with the existing business centre close to the CBD, the Darling Harbour redevelopment site, for business events. Darling Harbour was redeveloped in the late 1980s to contain a number of convention exhibition halls, and was used as one of the venues for the 2000 Olympic Games. While Darling Harbour promoted its close proximity to the Sydney CBD, the SOP pointed out its uniqueness as a healthier work environment away from the CBD (Cashman, 2011, p. 110). Both developments were initiated by the State Government, but it seems to be clear that events in the SOP could lead to the competition with already established events precincts.

7.2.3 Further challenges

Although it took some time, the mixed-use vision for the post-Olympic site proposed in the beginning of the 2000s was gradually realised, and the construction of new buildings and the hosting of various events have been celebrated in the SOPA’s annual reports as evidence of the transformation. Yet there are still various challenges for the SOPA to overcome, in particular on “cohesive development” and being “self-sufficient”, both of which were key concepts for post-Olympic development.

Cohesive development

Firstly, despite the authority’s great emphasis on the materialisation of the “mixed-use” urban core, how it has been embedded into the post-Olympic site has been questioned. As the post-Olympic masterplan shows, the post-Olympic site was divided into different
“precincts”, and different land-use strategies were given for each area. Post-Olympic development has been conducted based on this precinct strategy, and this led to uneven developments throughout the SOP. While development in the Town Centre and adjacent site intensified, to bring the daily workers and residents into the SOP, the spatial character of events precincts, where various legacy stadia are located, stayed the same, although some post-Olympic developments were expected in these areas. Importantly, there is little interaction between these two contrasting areas. Thus, there is a question as to whether the post-Olympic development created a truly mixed-use urban area, or just a juxtaposition of different land-uses.

“Cohesive development” in the post-Olympic site is also questionable when we look at “time” and daily life in the SOP. The interview with the SOPA planning officers pointed out that managing “everyday life”, in particular coordinating the peak time of different uses in the SOP, has been a great concern in the post-Olympic site (Breggen, 2008, pp. 122–124). Each precinct is operated with a different rhythm throughout a day / month / year, and this also accelerated the uneven vibrancy of the post-Olympic site. The Events precincts, for example, have been utilised differently throughout the year. Fig. 7-13 clearly indicates the uneven distribution of the events in the ANZ Stadium and Acer Arena. In a peak month, July or August, there were events in both stadia on most weekends, but in the summertime (December-February), few events were organised. In fact, in December 2007, no events were organised in the stadia. Furthermore, the events in the Events precincts mostly happen on Friday or on the weekends and it remains quiet on other days of the week (Fig. 7-14). Such events also occupy only a couple of hours. Thus, it is hard to create continuous liveliness in the precinct throughout a day, week and year, in contrast to the SOPA’s promise to create a 24-hour, 365-day vibrant urban area.

Meanwhile, new commercial developments have created daily work in the post-Olympic site; in particular, the opening of the Commonwealth Bank office was seen as a significant change. Yet these activities also have certain rhythms throughout a day and month, with the vast majority of activity taking place during office hours on weekdays. Outside of working time, the commercial precincts seemed to be empty. Even during working hours, most people stayed in their offices, and the precincts

139 Interview with Craig Bargley and Darlene Van der Breggen on 24 November 2008.
remained quiet outside of commuting and lunch times (Fig. 7-15). In contrast with the Town Centre, the parklands attracted most visitors during the weekends, and various events have also been organised at weekends. In addition to these different rhythms in the SOP, when major events were staged in the Events precincts, there has been crucial disruption of activities in other precincts, because of the noise and traffic control. Thus, designing time in the post-Olympic site has been a crucial issue along with the implementation of a mixed-use urban core, but it seems to me that the SOP still lacks a strategy for how to coordinate these different rhythms; Lefebvre’s term “eurhythmia”, or association of different rhythms (Lefebvre, 2004, pp. 67–69) applies here. There is also no strategy to create a sense of “everyday life” in the post-Olympic site. I will therefore argue that the mixed-use approach should be not only a matter of how the different functions are distributed spatially but also of how they are experienced across time.

Self-sufficiency

In addition to the “cohesive development” concept in the post-Olympic site, another initial idea of the post-SOP, “self-sufficiency”, needs to be questioned. The aspiration of creating a mixed-use urban core was to make the post-Olympic site financially “self-sufficient”. The SOPA has therefore extensively released State-owned land to the private sector either as long-term leases or free-hold sales. Fig. 7-16 shows the changes in land sales and lease activities of the SOP from 2001 to 2010. It is clear that the income from land sales and leases increased from 2001, although there was not a continuous increase throughout the period. When comparing 2001–2002 with 2009–2010 it can be seen that the revenue from land sales and leases almost doubled (Fig. 7-16).

The involvement of the private sector in large scale projects has been widely recognised, and one of the arguments for seeking public-private partnerships is to reduce public expenditure (for example, Flyvbjerg, 2003). In the case of the SOP, there were some variables regarding the public subsidies from the NSW Government, yet when comparing 2001–2002 with 2009–2010, it is clear that the amount of the public contribution was nearly same (AUD 36.3 million in 2001–2002 and AUD 33.6 million in 2009–2010), while the revenue from the land sales and lease in the same period

140 The income during the 2005 to 2008 financial years includes the land sales of the Lidcombe Hospital site.
increased from AUD 9.4 to 17.5 million (Fig. 7-17).

What happened in the SOP can be considered to contradict the typical public-private partnership in which the financial burden on the government should gradually decrease. Yet this may not be surprising when the strategy before the Games is considered. When the State Government used a public-private partnership in constructing some of the competition venues in the SOP during the preparation phase, it intended to achieve more with the private money rather than reduce its own financial contribution. I will argue that this funding strategy towards the mega-project by the State Government was inherited after the Games. Harvey suggests that recent urban governance in developed countries in particular has changed from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989). But in the case of the governance of the SOP, as the State Government has been greatly involved regarding the finance, its strategy can be understood as a mixture of entrepreneurialism and managerialism, or in Glen Searle’s terms, a mixture of neo-corporatisation and neo-statism (Searle, 2008b). Thus, the application of the mixed-use strategy was not directly related to the “self-sufficiency” in the post-SOP, and realisation of independence from the public subsides still remained as a challenge for the SOPA.

7.3 Revision of the post-Olympic masterplan

7.3.1 Vision 2025
The post-Olympic development in the SOP was conducted based on the masterplan issued in 2002, but while implementing the strategy the SOPA updated the future vision for the Olympic site. New challenges, including the need to synchronise with the regional development strategy, were major forces to push further modification of the masterplan. The first revision was commenced just one year after the publication of the 2002 masterplan. The new masterplan was based on the previous 2002 masterplan (SOPA, 2003, p. 19), but there were various reasons for the update. Firstly, as the director of planning of the SOPA, Craig Bargley, clearly suggested, the greatest trigger for preparation of the Vision 2025 was the need for synchronisation with the ongoing preparation of the new Metropolitan Strategy, which was eventually published in
The new Metropolitan Strategy, called “City of Cities, A Plan for Sydney’s Future”, would aim to provide the regional spatial development strategy for the coming 25 years, while the previous SOP masterplan had targeted only a 7–10-year timeframe (up to 2012). The SOPA therefore needed to demonstrate the equivalent timeframe vision for the SOP. The Vision 2025 extended its timeframe to 2025, and also accommodated the State’s target of employment and housing provision, which expected 12,000 new jobs and 17,000 dwellings in the Auburn Council area by 2031 (NSW Government, 2007). Secondly, the new vision stemmed from the problems in the field. As discussed in the previous part of this chapter, the SOPA recognised the uneven use of space and time in the SOP, and considered the need for a “critical mass of people that can generate a viable and vibrant town 24 hours a day, 7 days a week” (SOPA, 2004a, p. 19).

Against this backdrop, “Vision 2025” was published in 2004 to seek planning consent from the NSW Government for its proposal to intensify the mixed-use urban strategy (SOPA, 2004c, p. 10). Following the ambitious employment and residential targets set in the regional strategy, the SOPA’s targets were also set drastically higher. While the 2002 masterplan designated 10,000 daily workers and 3,000 residents in the post-Olympic site, the Vision 2025 intended to increase this to 24,500 daily workers and 25,000 residents by 2025 (SOPA, 2004c, p. 14). The strategy also mentioned the inclusion of affordable housing, which was suggested in the 2002 masterplan but not fully implemented as suggested earlier. The changes to the targets for employment and housing also led to modification of the spatial strategy. While the 2002 masterplan focused on commercial developments in the Town Centre, the Vision 2025 proposed to extend this development focus beyond the Town Centre (Fig. 7-18).

When we compare the land-use plans proposed in the Masterplan 2002 and the Vision 2025, they show a clear transformation from a low density to a high-density model, in particular with regard to the number of residential blocks / towers. While there were still open spaces scattered across the previous plan, these areas were filled with buildings in the new plan. In addition to the greater density of the site, there were other crucial differences between the two plans. The 2002 plan fundamentally did not touch the Events precincts, but the new plan proposed to insert additional functions, in order to

141 Interview with Craig Bargley on 24 November 2008.
reduce the empty spaces between the venues and use these areas more frequently. This strategy stemmed from the fundamental problems which the post-Olympic site had suffered, and responded to many comments obtained through customer surveys which the SOPA had undertaken. Craig Bargley, a director of planning, and Darlene van der Breggen, an executive manager of design at the SOPA, stated:

“By our customers’ survey, we know that one of the issues that visitors to the Sydney Olympic park do not feel comfortable with is the grand space around the stadium. [...] We have looked at some stadium developments in the USA, where the stadium is built in the city centre and offers an active façade to the city.”\(^\text{142}\)

The Events precincts have been considered the great legacy to be inherited, but in the Vision 2025, the SOPA changed that view, and began to see it as a part of the city. The new masterplan therefore emphasised the post-Olympic site as a new “town” rather than a major event destination for the region (Fig. 7-19).

Furthermore, the long-term spatial strategy of the Vision 2025 proposed to replace the existing industrial site, the Australian Centre, with a new residential area in the future (Fig. 7-20). The Australian Centre existed even before the SOP was created, and although it hardly cohered with other parts of development in the SOP, it played a significant role in providing employment opportunities in Western Sydney. Yet, due to the ambitious target of creating new residential blocks, the Centre will disappear in the near future. In a similar vein, while the previous plan kept all sporting facilities in the SOP, the new plan proposed to change some minor facilities so that they would have other functions. All of these replacements, or in other words the disappearance of the past, stemmed from the SOPA’s great intention to be part of the Metropolitan Strategy by making a major contribution to the ambitious target for housing provision in Western Sydney. Another motivation was the authority’s objective to maximise the financial returns by selling the surplus land to developers, and decreasing the degree to which the SOP would be dependent on the State Government.

7.3.2 Masterplan 2030

\(^{142}\) Interview with the author on 27 November 2008.
Ten years after the Sydney Games were concluded, the SOPA officially launched the new “Masterplan 2030” in 2010, following the public display of the draft version in 2008. The previous masterplans had covered the entire SOP area, but the new plan focused only on Urban Core area. Nevertheless, the new documents suggest that the new masterplan was built on the previous masterplans (SOPA, 2010, pp. 20–24). All the post-Olympic masterplans addressed the “mixed-use” strategy and this was continued in the Masterplan 2030, but the concept of “self-sufficiency” was not emphasised in the new document. This reflected the spatial strategy of the Masterplan 2030, and creates a great contrast with the previous Vision 2025. The Vision 2025 intensified new development, residential development in particular, across the site, but the Masterplan 2030 took a more compact approach by concentrating on different uses in different sites (Figs 7-21 and 22). There were various reasons for this fundamental shift of spatial strategy.

Firstly, the influence of the Metropolitan Strategy lessened in designating the land-use strategy, compared to the previous Vision 2025. One of the great intentions of the previous plan had been to integrate the SOP into the Metropolitan Strategy. The SOPA therefore needed to demonstrate its capacity to meet the employment and residential targets set by the strategy. Yet, at the time of issuing the new plan, the Metropolitan Strategy had already been published and recognised the SOP as one of the specialised centres in the Sydney region. Thus, the pressure on the SOPA was reduced, and this was reflected in the planning target of the Masterplan 2030. The 2030 plan drastically decreased the residential target from the 25,000 residents in the Vision 2025 to just 14,000. Michael Knight, the former Olympic Minister before the Games and a Chairman of the SOP since 2008, also addressed the need for appropriate development patterns for the post-SOP rather than blindly applying a high-density urban model to the site (Figs 7-23).

Secondly, the SOPA also found physical constraints which would prevent the future development. The site currently used for the golf practice field but proposed for a new residential area, for example, was found to be unsuitable for residential use due to heavy site contamination. Craig Bargley, the director of planning in the SOPA, suggested that

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143 Refer to SOPA (2008), Sydney Olympic Park, Draft Masterplan 2030, Homebush Bay, NSW.
some of the site remediation works had not been fully conducted for the Games. The fast-track planning before the Games created some physical constraints for the post-Olympic development, and the lack of an in-depth legacy vision was another factor contributing to the problematic conditions in the area. For example, as the former planning director of the OCA, David Churches, suggests, the OCA established the pipeline in the most convenient location for the construction because there was no in-depth post-Olympic masterplan.

Thirdly, the SOPA also faced difficulties in replacing the existing uses with others. The Vision 2025 proposed to replace the existing Australian Centre with new mixed-use residential blocks in the longer term, but the SOPA found that the existing leaseholders had a different vision for utilising the site. They wanted to maximise the opportunity of the business park, which was one of the biggest in Western Sydney, and preferred to maintain the site as a mono-functional area rather than a mixed-use residential area. Thus, the SOPA recognised that mixed-use would theoretically work in the post-Olympic Park but it was difficult to realise in practice. Yet the Masterplan 2030 still proposed to convert the southern part of the Australian Centre, which was developed as a centre for the sports institutions in the NSW region, to residential use in the future. Bargley and Breggen pointed out the powerful voice of this concentrated sports community and the difficulty in replacing the established land-use.

This more mature relationship with the regional strategy and recognition of various constraints within the site led to a drastic change to the land-use plan, although the concept of “mixed-use” was kept as a key planning concept. Thus, instead of the speculative approach in the previous Vision 2025, the new Masterplan 2030 took a more practical approach, in which different land-uses were spatially organised with certain rationality, mediating different uses in the post-Olympic site, rather than just juxtaposing them. For example, the SOPA recognised the commercial area located between the Stadia precincts (previously called the Events precincts) and the future residential areas as a buffer zone mediating the major events and everyday life. The Masterplan 2030 also recognised the importance of educational functions in the post-Olympic site, which had been organised next to the commercial centre, and it

144 Interview with Craig Bargley on 27 November 2008.
145 Interview with David Churches on 6 January 2009.
146 Interview with Craig Bargley on 27 November 2008.
proposed to concentrate them in the areas where the legacy aquatic and athletic centres were located. In other words, the new masterplan proposed to extend the role of sporting venues by combining them with various educational uses. While the initial 2002 post-Olympic masterplan vaguely identified the spatial strategy of a mixed-use urban core which Glen Searle called “tabula rasa for developers” (Searle, 2002), the latest Masterplan 2030 seeks a more determined approach based on the practical opportunities and constraints in the existing site. The 2030 document indeed contains many pages for planning “control and guidelines”, which strictly define various aspects of future development in the SOP.

However, while the Masterplan 2030 provides in-depth spatial guidelines within the SOP, there is less focus on the relationship with the surroundings. Terms such as “neighbourhood” or “community” are used in the document, but they are mostly referring to areas within the SOP, and do not extend beyond the boundary (SOPA, 2010, p. 62). Thus, the question of integrating with the neighbourhood needs to be further investigated.

7.4 The post-Olympic site within the regional and local context

7.4.1 The SOP in the regional context

2025 Metropolitan Strategy, “City of Cities, A Plan for Sydney’s Future”

Before the Games, despite the intention to integrate the SOP into the wider regional context as stated by the OCA, and in particular by the director-general, David Richmond, the SOP did not become the part of the regional strategy (see Chapter 5). It was only after the Olympics that the SOP was formally integrated into Sydney’s regional strategy. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the SOPA’s publication of the alternative post-Olympic masterplan, “Vision 2025”, was synchronised with the preparation of the new regional strategy, Metropolitan Strategy, “City of Cities, A Plan for Sydney’s Future”, published in 2005. It targeted the regional development up to 2031, anticipated that 1.1 million more people would be added to Sydney’s population between 2004 and 2031 and emphasised the great demands on housing and employment
in the Sydney region. It also envisaged that inter-city competition among the global cities and the pressure of urban sustainability prevailing in the world would have a great impact on Sydney’s spatial development strategy. (NSW Government, 2005). The strategy identified Sydney as a city with various consolidated cities, by designating 29 strategic centres which could be categorised into four different types, “global Sydney”, “regional city”, “specialised centre” and “major centre”. The strategy also identified three “global economic corridors” – North Sydney to Macquarie Park, city to airport and Parramatta to city – in order to connect the spatially isolated centres and create a strong network between them. “City of Cities” designated Parramatta as the second CBD in the Sydney Region, and the area connecting the existing Sydney CBD and Parramatta was emphasised as a crucial economic corridor for the region to develop further in the age of inter-city competition (Fig 7-24).

Within the Metropolitan Strategy, the SOP was combined with the adjacent Rhodes area and recognised as a “specialised centre”. The Olympic Park / Rhodes specialised centre is also integrated into the Parramatta to city global economic corridor, which is defined as the “strong economic corridor from Macquarie Park through Olympic Park-Rhodes towards Parramatta to bring the higher skilled jobs to Western Sydney and complement the existing the Global Economic Corridor to the east” (NSW Government, 2005, p. 66). The sub-regional strategy of “City of Cities” further identified that:

“Olympic-Rhodes will develop as a major economic driver for the metropolitan area and will provide substantive new employment and dwelling opportunities, as well as retail and recreational facilities, for the Sydney Region” (NSW Government, 2007, p. 66).

The SOP was now officially embedded into the future growth strategy of the Sydney region with ambitious employment and housing targets, but one of the problems recognised in implementing the concept of the SOP in the Parramatta–city global economic corridor was transport links. The Parramatta–city corridor has been set up on the Western Motorway, which was located next to the SOP, connecting the city and Parramatta. The railway connecting the existing and new CBDs runs slightly off the

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147 A specialised centre is defined in the Strategy as a “place where such as hospitals, universities and major research and business centres perform the vital economic and employment roles across Sydney”.

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Parramatta–city corridor, and there was no direct train connecting the Sydney CBD and the SOP. The shuttle rail system connecting the SOP and Lidcombe, the closest railway station on the Western Line of the City Rail network, was constructed for the Games, and this was the only rail connection to reach the SOP from other parts of the region. Yet, as the Metropolitan Strategy encouraged public transport as a means of sustainable development in the region, lack of direct public transportation has become critical to realising the idea of the Parramatta–city global economic corridor via the SOP.

**The Metropolitan Plan for Sydney 2036**

Renewal of the Metropolitan strategy was planned to take place every five years, and the updated version of the strategy, the “Metropolitan Plan for Sydney 2036”, was accordingly published in December 2010. The 2036 strategy fundamentally continued the previous strategy, but encouraged further growth or renewal of the city centres. It also promoted more a compact development model for city centres, and this triggered some changes in the status of the SOP as the specialised centre in the region. The 2036 strategy specified that:

> “The 2005 Metropolitan Strategy identified Sydney Olympic Park–Rhodes as a single Specialised Centre due to their geographical proximity and potentially complementary role. However, each has developed as a distinct centre with an employment base of more than 8,000 jobs and they are now identified as two Specialised Centres. Over time, both Sydney Olympic Park and Rhodes have the potential to take on the role of more traditional Major Centres with a mixture of housing, retail, office–based employment and services complemented by good public transport and access to open space and recreational facilities” (NSW Government, 2010a, p. 67).

This policy encouraged the SOP to be a more compact and self-contained specialised centre. Furthermore, the 2036 strategy once again put great emphasis on the further employment growth in Western Sydney, in which half of the new jobs would be created (NSW Government, 2010b, p. 5). This emphasis was certainly reflected in the increase of the employment target for the SOP from the current 4,000 (2006 base) to 23,000 by 2036 (NSW Government, 2010a, p. 134). While other major centres also raised their employment targets (by an average of 49%), the SOP growth rate was one of the highest
in all the strategic centres in the region (475%). Thus, the regional strategy now recognised the SOP as a crucial strategic centre, not only as an event destination but also as an employment and residential centre. It therefore became highly important to integrate the SOP into the wider regional transport network, which the previous Metropolitan Strategy could not achieve.

While the 2036 strategy aimed to strengthen the strategic centres in the region, it also emphasised further enhancement of the connections between city centres. Thus, the new Metropolitan Strategy proposed alteration of the major regional transport network, and this became a great opportunity to address the lack of direct public transport connecting the Sydney CBD and Parramatta via the SOP. Although they were not confirmed plans but rather speculation to optimise the potential of strategic centres, the 2036 Strategy suggested two major public transportation lines in the future, and the SOP was identified as a junction of two lines (Fig. 7-25).

Some of these ideas have been studied in further detail. For example, the NSW and Commonwealth Government have been conducting a feasibility study for a new Western Metro Link since 2008. The new rail network would be independent of the existing City Rail network, with transfer opportunities at key points, and the construction project would be jointly funded by both governments (the Commonwealth (AUD 20 million) and NSW (AUD 10 million) Governments)\(^\text{148}\). The feasibility study identified that a quarter of a million commuters utilised the existing City Rail between Parramatta and Sydney CBD on a typical weekday, and another half million people would be added to this over the next 25 years. Thus, upgrading the existing rail system is imperative, and both governments considered that a new independent route through more potential areas including the SOP would match the regional development strategy (Fig. 7-26).

Construction of the Western Metro Link would be beneficial to emerging centres such as the SOP, but at the same time would have negative impacts on some of the existing centres. The existing City Rail, which runs through the Strathfield, Lidcombe and Auburn stations, has a long history. These existing stations are located to the south of Parramatta Road, and the western suburbs have been developed around these stations.

Yet a new rail link might leave these existing centres out of the growth corridor in the region. The Western Metro Link concept to construct an independent line was withdrawn in 2010, but the idea of upgrading the exiting City Rail Western Line with a direct connection to the SOP emerged. Better transportation links for the SOP would bring more development opportunities to the post-Olympic site, but inevitably mean a sacrifice of development opportunities for other (mostly less developed) existing areas.

7.4.2 The SOP and the neighbourhoods

As discussed above, the SOP has gradually embedded into the regional planning framework, establishing its role in the region. This leads to another question: how can such a politically focused place have a relationship with the local neighbourhoods? During my fieldwork in Sydney, one of my friends, who was born and grew up in Sydney, said to me that “the Olympic Park is like a spaceship”\(^\text{149}\) Her view of the SOP as a “spaceship” suggests that the SOP is in danger of being independent from the neighbourhoods, or in Judd’s term, becoming a “bubble” in the urban tissue (Judd, 1999). Integration of the SOP into the neighbourhoods is crucial, and this has been identified and discussed since the construction of the SOP. The previous OCA view of the integration of the SOP into the surrounding community was based on the catalytic effect of the SOP on the neighbours, rather than the SOP integrating the local characteristics into its site (see Chapter 5) (Fig. 7-27). How has this idea been inherited (or not) in the post-Olympic period? There are three adjacent neighbourhoods which were within the OCA’s planning control but excluded from the SOPA’s control. These three areas are now parts of Auburn Council’s planning boundary, and they have different social and spatial relationships with the post-Olympic site.

Newington was the site of the Olympic village during the Games, and it became part of Auburn Council after the Games. Residences in Newington were developed with the post-Olympic physical transformation in mind, and converted into family homes after the Games in accordance with the concept of a self-contained community suburb with residential, retail and community facilities. As it was developed as a part of the SOP for the Games, the physical relationship between the two was well considered. Newington faces a rich landscape with the river in the SOP, and this has added a luxury resort atmosphere to it (Mivac Lend Lease Village Consortium, 2001, p. 31, p. 46). With these

\(^{149}\) Conversation with the author on 23 December 2008.
attractions, it has continuously attracted many upper–middle class buyers after the Games, and the number of residents in Newington increased 73%, while the population increase in the Auburn area was 16%. Yet it also became clear that, in terms of housing price, the expensive Newington area was greatly different from other areas in Auburn, which has been considered a place of socio-economic disadvantage.

Furthermore, Newington and the adjacent industrial area also created a great contrast, and some of the residents in Newington have complained about this uncomfortable spatial relationship to Auburn Council. The Council however did not have any plans to mediate the two different uses, and the significant contrast between Newington and its adjacent industrial area remains.

In a similar vein, Homebush West has developed a part of the land as luxury residences. Although Homebush West still contains various industrial uses and small shops, the new area’s spatial strategy published in 2004 designated it primarily as a waterfront residential area with provision of public space and community facilities for residents (NSW Department of Infrastructure Planning and Natural Resources, 2004). The land-use strategy for Homebush West was synchronised with the adjacent SOP, in particular the public space in the parklands, and in this respect, a positive interaction between the SOP and Homebush West was planned. Although Homebush West does not have any adjacent areas except for the SOP and Homebush Bay, it became apparent that the socio-spatial character of this geographically isolated area is greatly different from that of the other parts of Auburn.

While these two newly developed areas have certain planning synchronicity with the SOP, but less socio-spatial connection with other parts of Auburn Council, the Carter Street Precinct, the area between the SOP and Western Motorway, has a different story. This area was within the planning boundary of the OCA before the Games, and the OCA tried to change the existing industrial use to another which would fit more with the SOP, while the Auburn authority wanted to maintain it. After the Olympics, planning power for the Carter Street Precinct was returned to the Auburn local government area, and a new masterplan for the area was prepared as a part of the Auburn development

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151 Interview with Rachel Agyare, the senior strategic planner of the Auburn Council, on 10 December 2008.
control plan. The latest plan suggests the need to “ensure that new development is of the highest quality and complements the high public profile and special character of the precinct given the local, national and international significance of Sydney Olympic Park” (Auburn Council, 2010, p. 3). In contrast to the pre-Games period, the Local Plan suggests transformation of the existing industrial use to something that would fit with the post-Olympic site. Yet the planners for the SOPA and Auburn Council noted difficulty in the transformation. Craig Bargley, a planning director of the SOPA, pointed out that the clash between different visions by different authorities on this land-use is still the issue. Even though different authorities agreed that the area was designated for industrial use, its target users were different. While the SOP intends to bring in white-collar work, Auburn Council’s target would be blue-collar work. The regional government’s view is close to Auburn’s. 152 Meanwhile, Rachel Agyare, the senior strategic planner at Auburn Council, stressed the importance of securing the local employment opportunities which the area has been generating. Thus, despite the objective of developing this industrial area to co-exist with the SOP, the physical and functional character of the area has been kept the same as before the Games at the time of writing this thesis, and this has been a great physical barrier between the SOP and other areas of Auburn Council (Fig. 7-28).

Generally, there is a fundamental spatial and social barrier between the SOP and other parts of the Auburn Council area. Spatially, the urban core of the SOP is surrounded by the parklands, and this offers great open spaces for local residents without any charges, but at the same time, this also becomes a significant barrier between the local people and the urban core of the SOP. Furthermore, the M4 Western Motorway runs between the SOP in the north and other residential areas in the south, and there is little physical connection between them. Bargley suggested that the river running from north to south could be utilised to connect the SOP and the southern residential area, but implementation of the plan needs to overcome various spatial, financial and political constraints. In addition to the physical barrier separating the SOP and the Auburn Council area, there are certain social barriers. While the parklands have attracted local residents with a multi-cultural background (Cashman, 2011, pp. 179–180), the social accessibility of various facilities in the SOP has been questioned. For example, the entry fee to the local swimming pools in Auburn Council, such as the Ruth Everuss Aquatic

152 Interview with Craig Bargley on 27 November 2008.
Centre, is AUD 3, but the entry fee to the aquatic centre in the SOP is AUD 7. While the SOPA has promoted the post-Olympic SOP as the primary location for various events, as Lenskyj identified, the social accessibility of the legacy facilities has been less addressed by the authority (Lenskyj, 2002), and this has been one of the crucial points contributing to the SOP’s current situation of the Olympic “bubble.”

Thus, the question is whether this situation will be improved politically. The political relationship between the SOPA and Auburn Council is not straightforward. As Rachel Agyare, the senior strategic planner at Auburn Council, suggests, there have been certain contributions from the SOP to the Council. For example, the SOP undertook a major part of the new housing provision set out in the Metropolitan Strategy; otherwise the Council would have had to find an alternative location to fulfil the regional requirement. Yet there is no solid system to integrate the Council’s demands with the ongoing development of the post-Olympic SOP. While Auburn Council requested that the SOP integrate the provision of affordable housing for local people into the new masterplan, that request has hardly been integrated into the SOP’s future vision.

7.5 Concluding remarks

7.5.1 Governance and planning

One of the typical observations by academics and the media on the Sydney’s Olympic site after the Games has been on the low usability of the legacy stadia and subsequent slow development, but little attention has been paid to what happened in the post-SOP in the decade after the events, and what kinds of planning efforts have been made. This chapter examines these two questions in Sydney’s experience of dealing with the Olympic legacy. Sydney’s legacy planning began with recognition of the problems which occurred just after the Games, rather than creating an ambitious socio-economic target for the future. The OCA pointed out three concepts which stemmed from the mixed-use strategy, “diverse range of activities”, “cohesive development” and “self-sufficiency” of the post-Olympic site, to activate the SOP for the longer term. It


154 Interview with Rachel Agyare on 10 December 2008.
seems to me that these three concepts have been kept at the core in a series of post-Olympic masterplans published by the OCA and SOPA, but the intentions behind each plan and intensification of development at the post-Olympic site have been different. These factors were based on the problems (critique of the “white elephant” facilities) or intentions (integrating the SOP into the metropolitan strategy) which the SOPA identified at the time of planning, and became uncertainties in the post-Olympic planning rather than being strategically identified. In this respect, I will argue that Sydney’s post-Olympic masterplan was reactive rather than proactive. Thus, the post-Olympic masterplan represents what Glen Searle describes as a “keno-like post-Modern city” (Searle, 2008b), rather than being an example of strategic urban planning.

7.5.2 Implementation of the legacy vision

In order to make the post-Olympic Park socially and economically sustainable, the SOPA employed a mixed-use strategy by which the post-Olympic authority has tried to achieve an unprecedented combination of a special place for major events and an urban quarter filled with everyday activities. It is generally believed that a mixed-use urban strategy is the best way of achieving a sustainable urban precinct (Coupland, 1997), but in the case of the post-SOP, there were various challenges. Firstly, what became apparent from the daily experience of the post-Olympic site in Sydney was the difficulty of combining the event-led land-use and other everyday life, such as home and work. As John Bale points out, sporting events often turn into a “topophobia” where the massive crowds’ movement and noises are in conflict with local residents (Bale, 1994), and the SOPA has struggled to mediate these two different urban functions. Furthermore, the SOPA has focused on the spatial relationship between different uses in the SOP, but the authority has lacked a concept of how to mediate the different rhythms of activity in different areas in the post-Olympic site. This led to uneven uses of the SOP, which was full of spectators for event days, then became a less-active urban area on days without events.

In addition to the failure to create a sense of “everyday life” in the post-Olympic site, another objective, achievement of “self-sufficiency”, is not certain, as the SOPA still needs a certain amount of subsidies from the State Government. Due to the great efforts to attract private sector involvement in developing the post-Olympic site, the authority’s
income increased since 2002, but the amount of the public subsidies did not show a drastic decrease. This can be understood as showing that the PPP in the governance of the post-SOP did not represent a typical PPP relationship in which private money replaces public expenses for the implementation of a mega-project. In the case of the post-Olympic SOP, as seen in the preparation phase for the Games (see Chapter 5), the private money encouraged the SOPA to achieve more rather than to reduce the dependency on taxpayers’ money.

7.5.3 Urban integration
Integration of the post-SOP into the wider urban tissue was a complex issue, as the political context on the regional and local scale was different after the Games. While the SOP had never been recognised as an integral part of Metropolitan Sydney before the Olympics, the 2005 Metropolitan Strategy identified the SOP for the first time as a specialised centre in the region, carrying certain responsibility in provision of jobs and housing. This changing relationship with the Metropolitan Strategy had a significant impact on the spatial strategy for the post-Olympic site, in particular in defining the density of the urban core in the SOP. More importantly, as the importance of the SOP became greater, it led to changes in the direction of the regional development corridor together with the regional public transportation network. This means that some existing centres located along the existing economic corridor would be greatly affected. In this respect, the success of the post-Olympic Park in the regional context would be built on the sacrifice of politically weaker centres.

Meanwhile, the SOP’s relationship with the adjacent neighbourhoods has been more complex. Some adjacent sites have developed as affluent residential areas in one of the most economically deprived regions in Australia. These areas have had a close relationship with the post-Olympic site physically but showed a clear contrast in terms of their socio-spatial profile. It also became apparent that both Auburn Council and the SOPA identified the need for mediation between the SOP and other parts of the Council, but they have different political agendas and this prevented further actions. Furthermore, the post-Olympic site has spatial and social barriers which make it harder for local residents to access the heart of the SOP. Thus, although there is still a “bubble” in the local context, its shape is no longer as simple as being just the SOP.
Chapter 8: London

8.1 Governance of the post-Olympic site and surroundings

8.1.1 Concentration of the planning power

London staged the Olympics Games from 27 July to 12 August, and the Paralympic Games from 29 August to 9 September in 2012. The LOP (officially re-named the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park after the Games) was the focal point during that time. Since the Games, the LOP has been closed to remove temporary venues and seating, and is now undergoing a transformation to the post-Olympic spatial setting. Although some permanent sporting venues and some parts of the parklands will need more time before they are opened to public, it was planned for the LOP to be fully accessible again in April 2014.

The fundamental character of the governance of the post-Olympic site was set before the Games. As indicated in Chapter 6 (London in the post-bid phase), in April 2012, following the dissolution of the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) established in 2009, the Mayor of London established the mayoral urban development company, the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC), whose responsibility is not confined to development and management of the post-LOP, but also includes the surrounding areas, as follows:

“The purpose of the Mayoral Development Corporation is to promote and deliver physical, social, economic and environmental regeneration of the Olympic Park and its surrounding area, in particular by maximising the legacy of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, by securing high-quality sustainable development and investment, ensuring the long-term success of the facilities and assets within its direct control and supporting and promoting the aim of convergence.”

155 http://www.londonlegacy.co.uk/about-us/what-we-aim-to-achieve/.
After the Games, the LLDC’s Planning Functions Order came into force on 1 October 2012, and it obtained the full range of planning functions within both the LOP and the surrounding areas, which belong to the London boroughs of Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest (Fig. 8-1). The LLDC’s planning power includes not only evaluation of the planning applications in the planning boundary, but also Local Plans in the LLDC’s boundary area, which used to be the responsibility of the planning authorities in the local boroughs.¹⁵⁶ The LLDC also has the power of charging a Community Infrastructure Levy, which the Corporation may use when it considers it necessary for new developments designated in the Local Plan. Thus, the LLDC obtained strong planning powers including the Community Infrastructure Levy, and the two-year project, called the Local Development Scheme to produce Local Plans in its planning boundary, is now underway (LLDC, 2012b, pp. 3–13).

In addition to the transfer of local boroughs’ planning powers to the LLDC, the empowerment of the LLDC coincided with the dissolution of the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation, which was established in June 2004 to oversee the regeneration of the London River and the Lower Lea Valley over the next twenty years, aiming to “create a network of compact mixed use, mixed tenure neighbourhoods complete with good public transport, shops, leisure facilities, schools, healthcare and jobs” (London Thames Gateway Development Corporation, 2006, p.1). Before reaching its twenty-year timeframe, the National Government’s promotion of the “Localism Bill,” which stated that local authorities should have more responsibility for the development of their area, along with the severe economic recession triggered by the collapse of Lehmann Brothers in 2008, created the conditions for the reform of the public sector across London. It was decided that the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation would be formally dissolved in January 2013, and prior to the end of the Corporation, its planning powers were handed to the local boroughs and the LLDC in October 2012. The staff of the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation were also transferred to the LLDC and the GLA (London Thames Gateway Development Corporation, 2012). The dissolution of the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation meant that more concentrated power was given to the LLDC regarding further development of the LOP and Olympic Fringe areas.

¹⁵⁶ http://www.londonlegacy.co.uk/planning-policy-and-decisions/.
8.1.2 Preparation of the area spatial strategy

While the LLDC became the planning authority responsible for overseeing the post-Olympic site and the surroundings, Boris Johnson published further spatial planning guidance for the LOP and surroundings, “Olympic Legacy Supplementary Planning Guidance”, in July 2012. The intention of the Supplementary Planning Guidance was “to supplement and apply London Plan policy to the area by setting out the Mayor of London’s strategic priorities and long term vision for the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park and its surrounding areas in a single spatial planning document” (GLA, 2012, p.7). The Supplementary Planning Guidance was also designated to have same planning power as the Mayor’s spatial strategy for the wider Lower Lea Valley, “Lower Lea Valley (LLV) Opportunity Area Planning Framework”, issued by the former London Mayor, Ken Livingstone, in 2007.

As Fig. 8-2 indicates, both the Supplementary Planning Guidance and the Opportunity Area Planning Framework were positioned under the London Plan regarding planning hierarchy, but the relationship between these strategies was clearly defined (Fig. 8-2). In fact, the two strategies have geographically different aspirations. While the Opportunity Area Planning Framework stretches the development area along the River Lea, connecting with the River Thames, the Supplementary Planning Guidance detaches the project area from the Thames, stretching it further north around the LOP (Figs. 8-3 and 4). Since the areas designated for the Supplementary Planning Guidance and the Opportunity Area Planning Framework are different, the OLSPG simply replaces the Opportunity Area Planning Framework where the two areas overlap (GLA, 2012, p. 127). Thus, in the current planning framework, the northern part of the LLV will be developed with the new Supplementary Planning Guidance while the southern part still follows the existing Opportunity Area Planning Framework. Although the Supplementary Planning Guidance and the Opportunity Area Planning Framework are located in the same place in London’s spatial planning hierarchy, the degree to which each planning document indicates land-use strategy in the area is different. While the Opportunity Area Planning Framework aims to identify the overall strategy throughout the LLV with a more carpet-like land-use strategy in the area, the Supplementary planning guidance provides more detailed and specific guidance for the area.

157 The OLSPG is also utilised as a framework for the decisions and planning priorities of the LLDC under the umbrella of the Mayoral London Plan.
Planning Guidance intends to provide a more concrete spatial vision in the designated area. Unlike the Opportunity Area Planning Framework, the Supplementary Planning Guidance further subdivides the area into five different “Olympic Fringes”, and intends to characterise each area differently.

In addition to the LLV Opportunity Area Planning Framework, there is another planning framework which defines the future of the Olympic Park. The LLDC inherited the previous “Legacy Communities Scheme” (LCS) issued in 2011 by the predecessor, the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC), as a long-term spatial strategy for the LOP. The LCS boundary was inherited from the Planning Delivery Zones used for the 2007 Olympic Masterplan issued by the ODA in 2007, and the area covered by the Planning Delivery Zones is much smaller than the Supplementary Planning Guidance boundary. Furthermore, importantly the area defined as the Olympic Park is different between the LCS and the Supplementary Planning Guidance. The LCS’s recognition of the LOP is fundamentally the same as that defined in the 2007 masterplan. As the LOP included various elements which would integrate with the urban surroundings in the post-Olympic landscape, such as the converted Media Press Centre and the International Broadcasting Centre in Hackney Marsh and the legacy aquatic centre and adjacent new residential block along Carpenter Road, the post-Olympic LOP had been considered the collection of these different urban functions in the LCS, where different Olympic boroughs would have different visions for their utilisation. Yet the Olympic Park designated in the Supplementary Planning Guidance mainly included the sports facilities and public park along with various canals, and most of the urbanised areas to be created after the Olympic Games were excluded. They became the part of other Olympic Fringe areas to reflect their functional character. 158 Although there might be uncertainty regarding the integration of the newly transferred parts from the LOP into the existing urban tissue, this can be considered a way to ease management of the post-Olympic Park, because the urban functions left in the Supplementary Planning Guidance’s Olympic Park will be more simplified than those in the LCS.

Furthermore, the planning boundary of the LLDC is different from that of the LCS and Olympic Legacy Supplementary Planning Guidance (Figs. 8-5, 6 and 7). These

158 The legacy aquatic centre and adjacent new residential block along Carpenter Road are planned to remain with the LOP in the OLSPG.
different planning boundaries in different planning frameworks make understanding the socio-economic strategies difficult. While the Supplementary Planning Guidance provided for 2,154 dwellings to be created within the Olympic Park, the LLDC calls for 8,000 homes to be built in the Park by 2030, and the LCS’s vision is far beyond the Supplementary Planning Guidance’s target. The numbers indicated in the plans are different, and the designated area sizes also vary. Although it is suggested that the Supplementary Planning Guidance area carries similar socio-political aspirations in terms of the land-use as the previous LLV Opportunity Area Planning Framework, “Homes and Communities, Business and Employment, Open Space and Sustainable Development” (GLA, 2012, pp. 18–54), the cohesion between the different strategies is hard to recognise. Thus, now there are different planning frameworks which provide a future vision for the post-Olympic Park, and they have different spatial and socio-economic strategies. These multiple strategies would cause confusion in defining the future of the Olympic site. In addition to this current planning complexity, as suggested earlier in this chapter, the LLDC will create the new Local Plans within the planning boundary, and this will add further complexity. The Mayor of London once pointed out the conflict between organisations responsible for the long-term development of the Olympic site, and this was a strong motivation for him to reform the legacy governance before the Games. Yet this problem still exists after the creation of the LLDC, and I will argue that this remains a crucial problem for London’s legacy development in the future.

8.2 Transformation of the post-Olympic site

8.2.1 Chobham Manor: uncertainty of private-led development

The LLDC characterises the post-LOP in two halves: the South Park as “a buzzing hive of cultural activities, commerce, social interaction and entertainment” and the North Park as “a tranquil area with wetlands and landscaped parklands” (LLDC, 2012e). Both parks include the Olympic facilities to be transformed for the legacy uses and new developments which would be built in the vacant areas created after the legacy transformation (Fig. 8-8). At the time of writing, one year after the Games and just before the LOP re-opens in the summer of 2013, there was little construction underway
for the new developments in the post-Olympic site. The planning process for new
developments however has been pushed forward during the transformation period, in
order to commence the construction as soon as the site is ready.

Various planning activities are simultaneously underway, but the LLDC determined that
the first development plan in the post-Olympic LOP would be the development of
Chobham Manor, located in the north of the Olympic village site. The LLDC designated
that Chobham Manor would be built in line with London’s DNA, which Boris Johnson
put great emphasis on before the Games, aiming to construct mews houses and terraced
houses with private gardens and open squares, along with tree-lined avenues and
intimate streets (LLDC, 2012d, p. 4). The LLDC has called on private developers to
complete this work and Taylor Wimpey, one of the UK’s largest house-builders, and
London and Quadrant, a social housing landlord, were selected to develop the 9.3
hectare site with 870 new homes, a new health centre and nurseries, which will become
a compact self-contained urban quarter. The consortium is expected to develop the
project over the next two decades (Kollewe, 2012). The new houses will be built on the
infrastructure legacy of the Games such as the heating, telecommunication network and
fibre optic broadband, which were created with public money for the Games. The
LLDC tried to create some public benefits out of this private-led development, and one
third of the houses will therefore be affordable housing.

Yet the crucial question is whether the consortium can maintain and realise the vision of
a mixed community within a mixed-use urban quarter over the next two decades. Some
debates on the athletes villages come to mind. The athletes village, which was built with
government funds, and later half of the units (1,400 homes) were sold to the private
developers, Qatari Diar and Delancey, as profitable housing. Triathlon Homes, the
consortium of East Thames Group, Southern Housing Group and First Base, took
another half to develop as affordable housing. This arrangement seems to be a way of
achieving the social and economic objectives which have been promised since the bid,
but some authors pointed out uncertainty in guaranteeing the provision of housing. One
of the warnings was that there is a difficulty in defining “affordable” housing in the
local context, which traditionally meant homes for working-class and low-income
people, but now implies homes for graduates and young professionals (Cooper, 2012).
Furthermore, Rowan Moore, the architectural critic, points out the difficulty in
maintaining a unified vision in a long-term plan, with regard to the case of the Olympic village. Referring to the history of the Olympic village since the first vision of creating a “new metropolitan centre” in the beginning of the twenty-first century, Moore suggests that the current urban condition of the Olympic village represents a mixed history of sold and re-sold sites by different owners and developers, and lacks a unified vision. He implies the need for the involvement of the public sector to realise a cohesive spatial vision throughout the development site (Moore, 2012).

8.2.2 Media Centre: integration of the post-Olympic facilities into the local neighbourhood

The post-Olympic transformation of Hackney Wick in the LOP, including the Media Press Centre and International Broadcasting Centre, has been planned by the LLDC and the London borough of Hackney. Hackney Wick within the LOP has long been anticipated as an employment hub for the local area, in particular in business related to digital media. Ken Livingstone, the former Mayor of London, once suggested in 2007 that the Bollywood film industry would become the primary tenant of the legacy Media Centre, but it was eventually decided that it would become a hub for the media industry. This would include a data centre which would fit with the preference of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, to turn London’s East End into a technology centre to rival California’s Silicon Valley. Although there was some criticism of the transparency of the tender process in defining the lease-holder of the post-Olympic Media Centre, a consortium called iCity and consisting of Infinity, a data centre provider, and Delancey, the developer that owns the Olympic village, was chosen in July 2012. The Mayor of London and the UK Prime Minister initially intended to create a media business hub as the legacy of the Media Centre, but in a slight modification of the initial plan, the iCity became a centre for media enterprise and academic education, in which BT Sports, Hackney Community College, Hackney Technical College, Loughborough University, and Infinity SDC would all occupy space (iCity, 2012) (Fig. 8-9).

While who was going to use the post-Media Centre was the crucial legacy issue, how it would affect the local neighbourhood was another concern, which Hackney Council has

long identified as crucial triggers for the area’s economic development. The Local Development Framework of Hackney identified Hackney Wick as follows:

“[The Legacy Media Centre is an opportunity for an innovative employment led mixed development attracting economic growth to the area, to increase physical and functional connectivity to neighbouring areas and improved natural and built environment. This will also support its development as a new and cohesive neighbourhood as part of an integrated urban place and destination” (London Borough of Hackney, 2010, p. 40) (emphasis added).

The question for Hackney Council has been how the post-Olympic Media Centre will become part of Hackney Wick, and this was included in the Council’s in-depth spatial strategy for Hackney Wick, “Hackney Wick Area Action Plan” issued in September 2012, just after the Olympic and Paralympic Games. This means that the borough of Hackney was working on the area’s spatial strategy long before the owner and tenants of the post-Media Centre were determined. The Hackney Wick Area Action Plan planning boundary includes the post-Olympic Media Centre, the post-Olympic Multi-use Area used as the Handball Arena during the Games, the adjacent new development area and part of the Olympic parklands (Fig. 8-10).

The Action Plan recognises three equally important characteristics; (1) Hackney Wick Hub as the new heart of Hackney, where heritage buildings and new architecture would create a mixed-use environment, (2) Hackney North as an existing residential neighbourhood, and (3) the “Creative Media Centre” including various facilities and open spaces located in the post-Olympic site (Fig. 8-11). The fundamental character of the area is designated in terms of how the employment, residential and community uses would be distributed and connected (London Borough of Hackney, 2012, pp. 17–36).

As Hackney’s economic condition has drastically changed with the decline of the traditional inner-city industries and the relocation of existing businesses by the Olympics, along with the emerging new cultural business in Hackney Wick (London Borough of Hackney, 2012, p. 7), it is certain that securing employment was identified as one of the most crucial issues for the Council to sustain the local economy. The London Plan 2011 therefore identifies some parts of Hackney Wick as the Mayor’s
Strategic Industrial Land and, in particular, the eastern part of the Lee Navigation was identified as an Industrial Business Park (London Borough of Hackney, 2012, p. 34). The designation of the “Creative Media City” in the area including the post-Media Centre certainly follows in this wake. Yet in addition to being a business hub, significant parts of the post-Olympic Media Centre will be used for educational purposes, as the future tenants of the iCity clearly suggest. Having educational opportunities is beneficial to the other Action Plan areas. Yet, in order to maximise this additional value, the Area Action Plan needs to integrate it, which currently it does not. When the Hackney Wick Action Plan was published, inclusion of education was not considered, but rather came as a result of the iCity consortium’s great efforts to fill the post-Media Centre as much as it could. If this will be a combination of media related business and academic / community education, the term “Creative Media City” may also not be appropriate any more. Thus, I will argue that the post-Olympic Media Centre was integrated into the local planning context to a great degree, but determination of the post-Olympic uses of the Media Centre and issues of the Local Plan were not synchronised in a timely manner. It is therefore crucial to mediate these different matters in the post-Olympic planning.

8.2.3 Olympic stadium: accessibility to the post-Olympic facilities
As discussed in Chapter 5, usability of the post-Olympic stadium has been debated throughout the preparation phase of the London Games, but there was no solid confirmation about the future of the stadium before the Olympics. It was after the Games that some of the uncertainties about the post-Olympic stadium became clear. Firstly, West Ham United, a football club in the Premier League, was confirmed as the anchor tenant of the post-Olympic stadium after severe turmoil between two Premier League football clubs, West Ham United and Tottenham Hotspurs (see BBC, 2011b). The decision to appoint West Ham as a future tenant was made by the LLDC, and London Mayor Boris Johnson, the chair of the LLDC, suggested that “we can secure a terrific future for this much loved and iconic venue” (BBC, 2012a).

Secondly, the financial arrangement for operating the post-Olympic stadium was established. The appointment of West Ham as an anchor tenant means that the football club will contribute GBP 15 million for the post-Olympic adaptation, and pay an annual lease for the long-term operational cost of the stadium. In addition to this, the London
borough of Newham will contribute to the long-term operation of the stadium. Newham Council decided to invest GBP 40 million in the post-Olympic transformation work. More importantly it set up a joint venture managing the post-Olympic stadium with the LLDC, called Newham Legacy Investment Limited (the E20 Stadium Limited Liability Partnership), in order to secure benefits from the post-Olympic stadium for the longer term, including:

- A minimum 35% equity share in the Olympic stadium and island site;
- Year round access to the 400m community track;
- Ten exclusive mass participation events in the stadium per year for Newham residents;
- Millions of tickets to West Ham United matches held in the stadium from 2016;
- Additional tickets to sports and other entertainment events held in the stadium;
- A training and education centre in the stadium;
- A majority of new jobs created on the site to be filled by Newham residents.161

Thirdly, the post-Olympic stadium secured the hosting of various international sporting events in the near future. It obtained the right to stage the World Athletics Championships in 2017, and the post-Olympic stadium would be the main venue for the event. This became a strong factor in keeping the athletics track as the London Bid Committee had promised to the IOC, even though the anchor tenant of the post-Olympic stadium would be a football team which would prefer not to keep the athletics track. There is no doubt that Lord Coe, who made the bid promise of leaving an athletics stadium as a legacy of hosting the 2012 Games, played a critical role in bringing the event to London, and this decision was detached from a series of discussions on securing the financial viability of the post-Olympic stadium before the Games. Furthermore, it was decided that the UK would host the Rugby World Cup in 2015, and the post-Olympic stadium would be used as one of the competition venues together with Twickenham Stadium and Wembley Stadium in London. It should be noted that although the event will be a national event utilising various stadia across the country, using the Olympic stadium as the third venue in London meant that another city lost the opportunity to be a host.

161 Ibid.
Against this backdrop, the transformation of the post-Olympic stadium was finalised and planning permission for the Olympic Stadium transformation was granted to the LLDC in May 2013. The 80,000 seating stadium used during the Games will be converted into a 60,000 seat multi-purpose stadium, instead of the 25,000 seats initially planned at the time of bidding. It will keep the athletics track but the post-Olympic stadium will have retractable seats so that football matches and the 2017 World Athletics Championships can be staged in the same stadium (Peach, 2013). The documents prepared for the planning application state that “the LLDC is seeking to deliver a commercially viable combination of uses that achieves both year round community access and wider public benefits” (LLDC, 2012c).

Yet the accessibility for locals is somewhat uncertain despite Newham Council’s great investment in the future of the stadium, and despite the continuous emphasis on the benefits to Newham residents of the Mayor of Newham, Sir Robin Wales. The planning application document includes an estimated plan for the events that will be staged in the post-Olympic stadium. It suggests that more than half of all weekends will be occupied by large scale events and annually there will be a minimum of 99 spectator events. Thus, there might be very few days in which the local residents can access the stadium throughout a year. Furthermore, the LLDC suggests that there will be another 400-metre athletic track adjacent to the post-Olympic stadium, termed a “Community Track,” which will accommodate community events and be a warm-up track for the athletics events (LLDC, 2012c). Given the high utilisation of the post-Olympic stadium for more commercially beneficial events, and the preparation of a new “Community Track”, it may be possible that local residents will mainly use this secondary athletic field. In addition to this, the LLDC’s future plan suggested that the area to the south of the post-Olympic stadium, the Marshgate Wharf area, will be converted into a new neighbourhood (Fig. 8-12). (The LCS does not show any development plan of this area.) Thus, there is a danger that this “Community Track” will disappear and pave the way for new housing developments in the future. Thus, despite Newham Council’s great involvement in the future of the post-Olympic Park financially and politically, Newham residents’ access to the iconic stadium may not be fully granted. Similarly, access to the aquatic centre after the Games may not be fully secured, despite the Olympic authority extensively claiming that the entrance fee to the Centre would not be different from that
of other local leisure centres in the Council (BBC, 2012b).

8.3 Concluding remarks

Governance

London had set up the fundamental planning structure of the post-Olympic site before the Games, and the LLDC has taken a crucial role in the management and development of the LOP for the longer term. None of the past Olympic host cities prepared the governance of the legacy before the Games to the degree that London did. The concentration of planning power in the host cities before the Games is well discussed in the realm of Olympic studies (for example, Hiller, 2003) but little has been said about empowerment of the special authority taking care of the legacy after the Games. In the case of London, great planning power has been concentrated in the LLDC, and its planning boundary was extended beyond the Olympic site. Transfer of planning powers from the local authorities to the LLDC stemmed from the Mayor of London’s intention of maximising the investment not only for the LOP but also for a much wider area, and of cohesive development in the designated area.

Various research papers published for the London Olympics put great emphasis on the need for authorities to coordinate legacy development both within and outside the LOP (for example, MacRury and Poynter, 2009; Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, 2010). In this respect, creation of the LLDC and the provision of the great planning power beyond the Olympic site to the Corporation can be seen as a way of avoiding Judd’s conception of the “bubble” effect (Judd, 1999). Yet the planning context of the LOP and its surrounding areas is much more complex, and various planning frameworks have identified the vision of the area. In particular, the London Mayor’s planning framework for the LOP area, “Olympic Legacy Supplementary Planning Guidance,” and the LLDC’s “Legacy Community Scheme” were crucial, but they have discrepancies regarding their spatial and economic visions. Thus, it is imperative to coordinate between them, and more importantly to establish a clearer planning structure to mediate these difference.
Development of the post-Olympic site
The LLDC has determined that the post-Olympic site will be a place of rich parklands, legacy stadia and five newly-built neighbourhoods along the waterways. At the time of writing this thesis, we cannot see much implementation of new neighbourhoods, rather than transformation works of the infrastructure, public realms and legacy stadia in the Park. Yet planning of these new developments has been undertaken, and there might be some uncertainties in these developments. Firstly, as we have seen in this chapter, most of the new developments employed private investment, and there is a great concern as to whether the privately-led developments will maintain the initial public interests such as provision of affordable housing or local residents’ access to the legacy stadium. MacRury and Poynter suggest that the “leverage” model of private and public partnership tends to prioritise commercial rather than social interests, which became highly problematic in the case of the Atlanta Olympics (MacRury and Poynter, 2009).

Secondly, post-Olympic developments are inevitably defined by different timescales in planning. Definition of primary uses, designations of the private sector’s involvement, and integration into the local action plan are conducted using different timelines, and therefore there are some discrepancies in the vision of development. The post-Olympic development of the Media Centre exemplifies the gap of vision caused by different planning timescales. In the case of London, it seems to me that there are many planning frameworks defining the spatial vision of each post-Olympic development, in particular the usability of the post-Olympic site and venues within it. I will argue that it is quite crucial to coordinate the different timescales in different planning frameworks, and to accommodate various changes that may happen in the longer term. In a similar vein, the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development pointed out that preparation of both the long-term and short-term strategies would be crucial to maximise the social and economic legacy of the Olympic development (Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010). London has addressed the long-term vision of the post-Olympic Park, but little has been discussed about strategy for the shorter term.
Part III Conclusion: Reflection from Sydney to London

Governance and planning
Chapters 7 and 8 highlighted the different approaches to planning of the post-Olympic site between Sydney and London. Sydney fundamentally undertook the legacy planning after the Games, but London commenced it far before the Games were concluded. It is therefore considered that while the Olympic Games were a significant transition point between the pre and post-Olympic periods for Sydney, London tried to connect these two phases as seamlessly as possible. Peter Hall suggests that urban planning is the continuous process of reviewing and designing (Hall, 2002 [1975]), and planning for an Olympic site is no exception, as both cities have demonstrated through their production of numerous legacy masterplan documents even before the Games. Yet there was a great contrast in the fundamental mechanisms for generating new plans in Sydney and London, and I will argue that Sydney's approach was reactive and London’s was proactive. Sydney’s approach can be understood as a more conditional approach, as the SOPA renewed the post-Olympic masterplan when the authority identified problems or opportunities. Meanwhile, London issued an in-depth post-Olympic masterplan before the Games, and kept it as the backbone for further development of the post-Olympic site.

Sydney’s reactive legacy planning caused slow implementation of the post-Olympic development, and this generated a negative image of the Olympic legacy. In addition to this, the relationships between plans were not based on a review and re-design process, but a more scattered relationship, although there are common key concepts in the different post-Olympic masterplans. Meanwhile, London’s proactive approach enabled immediate transformation from the Olympic to the post-Olympic development, but I will suggest that there may have been some limitations in London’s proactive approach. As it was issued in advance based on some assumptions, it may have encountered some unexpected outcomes. Within a year of the Games, some unexpected post-Olympic uses for legacy facilities were identified such as the need for a secondary athletics field for local communities and the educational use of the post-Media Centre. Furthermore, the Olympic project is framed by different spatial strategies issued with different timescales. Thus, unless there is a flexible mechanism to synchronise different plans, each vision
will become an isolated strategy. Meanwhile, Sydney’s reactive approach may be flexible enough to accommodate the ongoing changes, if it is promptly renewed. In my interview with Kirsty White, who worked on post-Olympic planning in both Sydney and London, she suggested that “London's planning approach to the legacy may not be so different from Sydney's ad-hoc post-Olympic planning, it may eventually require many revisions to adapt to what really happen in the Olympic Park.”\textsuperscript{162} Thus, I will argue that London’s legacy approach has some advantages over Sydney’s reactive post-Olympic planning, yet it still requires flexibility to integrate the various changes that will happen in the future.

The limits of mixed use

It has been recognised that the application of a mixed-use urban strategy is necessary for an urban quarter to be sustainable, and both Sydney and London envisioned the post-Olympic site as a “mixed-use” urban quarter. In the legacy phase, we can explore whether this idea applies in the case of post-Olympic sites in which various legacy sports stadia and other urban functions such as residences and offices are mixed in one place. One of the rationales for employing a mixed-use urban strategy is to make a vibrant urban quarter by collecting diverse functions, but Coupland points out that the way in which the different land-uses are mixed is highly crucial, as it may lead to conflict between different uses (Coupland, 1997). Sydney has struggled to create a vibrant post-Olympic site by implementing a mixed-use strategy, and the difficulty lies in the management of the conflict between special events and everyday life. I will here stress that one of the great lessons learnt from Sydney is the importance of considering different rhythms in different urban activities in the post-Olympic site, and Sydney still lacks this in the current post-Olympic spatial vision. Lynch, the author of “The Image of the City”, has also emphasised the importance of designing for time in urban planning. Lynch suggests that designing the short-term aspects such as the rhythm of daily activities is crucial, as well as envisioning a long-term future for a city (Lynch, 1972, p. 71).

The uneven distribution of rhythms in the post-Olympic site in Sydney was further highlighted when it was combined with the mixed-use spatial strategy. The SOP was subdivided into different pieces of lands, and a specific character was set for each

\textsuperscript{162} Interview with Kirsty White on 3 June 2008.
precinct. This approach confined different urban activities to different precincts, and there was little interaction between them. In the case of London, the latest spatial strategy for the post-Olympic Park suggests that unlike Sydney, the entire site was subdivided into smaller neighbourhoods, and each will have a variety of uses. Thus, different characters of uses in the post-LOP are proposed in much closer proximity than in Sydney, but different temporal uses of different buildings, in particular legacy facilities and newly developed residential buildings, get less attention than the spatial vision in various post-Olympic planning documents. Yet the experiences in Sydney suggest that allocation of time is equally important as spatial arrangement.

Another aspect of employing a mixed-use urban strategy is financial viability, and the term “self-sufficiency” has been emphasised as an important concept in the post-Olympic site in Sydney. Both Sydney and London largely relied on the private sector to implement the mixed-use post-Olympic Park, but this has a certain limit, which is the discrepancy between the public authority’s and private sector’s interests. As one of the public benefits for investing in the Olympic-led urban redevelopment, both cities, in particular London, promised to provide affordable housing in the post-Olympic area. Yet, in the case of Sydney, developers have promoted post-Olympic residential developments as exclusive residential towers, and it has been hard to integrate the affordable housing which the regional and local governments wished for. Similarly, in the case of London, there has been doubt as to whether the developers appointed to construct the post-Olympic housing could keep the initial promise of providing a designated number of affordable homes. Furthermore, the gap between public and private interests can be seen in the development of sporting facilities in the post-Olympic site. Both Sydney and London needed the private sector’s involvement in sustaining a legacy stadium, but enhancement of commercial value prevents public access, in particular for local residents from a relatively low socio-economic group. This happened in Sydney, and London should avoid similarly limited accessibility, which would cause the social isolation of the post-Olympic site.

**Urban integration**

Integrating the post-Olympic site into the wider urban tissue and avoiding the creation of an Olympic “bubble” was identified as a crucial issue in both cities even before the Olympics. Yet Sydney and London have experienced quite different stories. In the
regional context, Sydney made significant efforts to integrate the post-Olympic SOP into the regional spatial development strategy after the Olympic Games, which it was not able to achieve before the Games. Yet, as a negative effect, recognition of the SOP as an important centre in the region eventually led to the alteration of the regional development corridor, and left existing local centres dangerously absent from the development framework. This suggests the difficulty of putting a new regional centre in the existing development strategy. London, in turn, embedded the Olympic Park into the Mayor’s spatial development strategy from the time of the bid, because the Olympic site was recognised as an important epicentre to push the Mayor’s development strategy further. Yet Sydney’s lesson tells us that too much political attention to the Olympic site will weaken development opportunities for other areas, unless a cohesive development strategy is implemented.

On a local scale, it seems to me that the name of the legacy authority clearly represents each city's intention for the post-Olympic site in the local urban tissue. As the name of the Sydney “Olympic” Park Authority suggests, Sydney intended to maintain the significance of the Olympic Games after the Games were over. London however changed the name of the post-Olympic authority from the initial “Olympic” Park Legacy Company set up before the Games to the subsequent London Legacy Development Corporation, without mention of the “Olympic” aspect. This implies that, in London, the significance of the Olympics would fade into the urban tissue.

The SOPA shrunk its planning boundary by releasing the former Olympic village site and some adjacent areas, and has focused development within the SOP after the Olympics. Meanwhile, the LLDC’s planning responsibility was expanded to the surrounding areas. It is certain that this causes significant differences between the two cities regarding the relationships between the Olympic site and the neighbourhoods. In the case of Sydney, the post-Olympic SOP still has significant contrasts with the adjacent neighbourhoods, except for the former Olympic village site and the newly developed high-end residential areas. It became apparent that the political intention for the borders of the SOP is also different between the SOPA and the local council. In this respect, the post-Olympic site can be recognised as spatially and socially isolated from the local context, creating the Olympic “bubble”. In contrast to this, the expansion of the LLDC’s planning responsibility to include the adjacent areas around the LOP and
the Mayor’s OLSPG reflect the emphasis on the integration of the post-Olympic site into the local urban tissue. Yet there are various planning frameworks in the area, which overlap with each other. Thus, London needs to coordinate them; otherwise this could cause some confusion in planning priority, and the significant concentration of planning power in the LLDC may lead to potential conflict between the LLDC and local authorities.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

The final part of this thesis assembles findings in my research on the Sydney and London cases and conclusions demonstrated in the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic phases (Parts I, II and III). This chapter further discusses my research concerns and evolving legacy vision through time (from the pre-bid phase to the post-Olympic phase) and place (from Sydney to London), along with relevant theoretical accounts. In Chapter 1, I raised questions about the evolution of the legacy vision of its relation with governance, in particular the origin and changes of the mixed-use strategy, and its urban integration in Sydney and London. I then asked about the evolution from Sydney and London and remaining challenges which Sydney and London shared. Based on this, I will discuss the following first three enquires separately in this chapter, by contrasting the two cases and highlighting remaining challenges for both cities.

Firstly, in relation to my first research question, which asked about the evolution of the vision of the Olympic legacy and its governance, I will discuss the following three aspects. Firstly, I will discuss the different objectives of legacy planning in the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic phases, in which different planning climates were created by the Olympics as an “intruder” into the urban planning process of the host city (Hiller, 2003). Secondly, I will highlight the governance of legacy, in particular the significant differences between Sydney and London, by suggesting its timescale and spatial reach. Thirdly, following the evolution from Sydney to London, I will discuss entrepreneurial governance as a remaining challenge in current legacy planning.

Secondly, I will discuss evolution of the “mixed-use” Olympic Park from the viewpoint of urban compatibility, which various authors consider crucial to create a “sustainable” urban quarter (for example, (Coupland, 1997; Grant, 2002). My focus here is on observing the initial envisioning of the mixed-use Olympic Park, and on revisiting the planning process to explore how the potentially divergent natures of the political and economic aspirations were mediated in the post-Olympic site.
The third part of this chapter considers the urban integration of the post-Olympic site in the wider local and regional context thorough the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic phases in both Sydney and London. Judd’s concept of the “tourist bubble” (Judd, 1999) has been the core theoretical backbone throughout the previous chapters in examining the urban integration of the post-Olympic site in both cities. Failure to integrate urban development triggered by the mega-events into the urban tissues has been addressed by various authors, but little research has explored it in different spatial and time scales. Thus, my observation spanned both the smaller local scale and the wider regional scale in different phases.

Finally, following the above three discussions, I will connect my findings in this thesis to wider research on Olympic legacy. As my research aimed to extend the time and spatial scales of the existing research on the Olympic legacy, I will discuss how the lessons from Sydney and London demonstrated in this thesis could contribute to long-term planning of the Olympic legacy. This chapter concludes by bridging the findings in this thesis and the IOC’s ongoing planning policy on the Olympic legacy. I hope that I will provide a useful account for further practical as well as academic exploration of the long-term planning for the legacy.

9.1 Long-term planning: vision of legacy and governance

The first aim of this thesis was to explore the evolving vision of the Olympic legacy in the longer-term timeframe, along with its relationship with planning governance. My underlying analytical focus throughout this thesis was on the Olympics as “external forces” to the host city as suggested by Hiller. He points out that the “externality” would become both opportunities and constraints for the host city, and my exploration therefore added the timescale to Hiller’s conception (Hiller, 2003).

9.1.1 Planning the Olympic legacy in different phases

Throughout my long-term exploration in Sydney and London, it became apparent that the fundamental objectives of planning the Olympic legacy in pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic phases evolved under the different planning climate in which the Olympic
formulated both opportunity and constraints as external forces to the host city (Hiller, 2003), and Sydney and London correspond to this differently.

In the pre-bid phase, Sydney and London had the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to regenerate Homebush Bay and LLV, respectively, but at the same time both cities had to accommodate planning constraints which were more rigorous than IOC’s spatial requirements, which Preuss calls the “prisoner’s dilemma” (Preuss, 2004). Intensification of venue concentration in Homebush Bay and the final decision of integrating the new Olympic stadium into the LLV rather than utilising the existing Wembley Stadium represent integration of significant pressure to win the bid. Thus, planning the legacy in this period was intended to mediate different spatial aspirations of different political powers, and demonstrated the spatial vision beyond the Olympic Games.

Subsequently, in the post-bid phase, while there was opportunity to demonstrate its planning achievement to the global media (for example, Sydney’s effort to present the Green Games planning as discussed in Chapter 5 or London’s demonstration of physical changeability of the Olympic venues indicated in Chapter 6), delivering the spatial setting for the Games within the fixed seven-year timeframe, which the IOC requires of the host city, became a great planning constraint for Sydney and London. Yet developing the legacy vision of the Olympic site was also clearly identified as a role of the Olympic authority in Sydney and London. The challenge for both cities was to achieve these objectives within the fixed timeframe, but the two cities treated the legacy planning differently. The legacy planning for Sydney in this phase was mainly meant to prepare the Olympic spatial setting with envisaged post-Olympic usability, but it was only part of the initial legacy vision set up in the bid. Meanwhile, legacy planning for London was more extensive than in Sydney’s approach and London’s officials conducted various planning exercises to define the whole vision of the post-Olympic site.

Finally, in the post-Olympic phase, the direct relationship between the Olympics and the city disappeared, and some of the venues and infrastructure remained as physical inheritances from the Games, which became both opportunities and constraints for further development of the post-Olympic Park. The legacy planning in this period was
intended to maximise these physical inheritances from the Games on the one hand. On the other hand, it aimed to enhance the new developments where the land was available in the post-Olympic site, as both cities indicated that the post-Olympic Park would become a new piece of the city. Sydney and London took different approaches in utilising Olympic impacts after the Games. Sydney’s approach was “infusive”, while London took a more “diffusive” strategy. While Sydney aimed to identify the post-Olympic SOP as a specialised urban precinct with the identity of a global destination for major events in the region by maintaining the significance of the Olympic brand, London has emphasised that the post-Olympic site would be integrated into the adjacent neighbourhoods, and the significance of the Olympics would disappear.

9.1.2 Governance of the Olympic legacy, its timeframe and its spatial reach
The above different recognition of the Olympic legacy in different phases between Sydney and London was firmly related to the governance of the legacy. I have examined the evolving governance of legacy planning and demonstrated different ways of arranging the planning structure for the Olympic legacy. In the case of Sydney, there was a clear distinction between the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic phases, in which the most powerful organisation primarily focused on the planning required for each phase, but this created considerable discrepancy between the planning and implementation. In London, in contrast, there was planning overlap between different phases, and this enabled the smooth transition between different phases and prevented a planning gap, which had caused the regional government to lose a significant amount of public money in the case of Sydney. In this respect, the governance of the Olympic / legacy planning should go beyond Roche’s clear distinction between the pre-bid, post-bid and post-event phases and planning objectives in each phase (Roche, 1994), and a more overlapping planning approach is needed to bridge different phases.

In addition to the timeframe of the governing structure of legacy planning, there is a fundamental difference between Sydney and London regarding the spatial reach of the Olympic organisation’s planning power in the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic phases. I have argued that this led to significant contrast in the relationship between the post-Olympic site and its adjacent neighbourhoods. In the case of Sydney, there was a narrowing process. Sydney’s bid committee and the statutory development authority for
Homebush Bay covered the wider area of Homebush Bay including the SOP, but in the subsequent post-bid phase, the OCA’s planning boundary only included the SOP and a few adjacent sites. The SOPA subsequently further reduced its planning boundary to inside the SOP, and furthermore the latest post-Olympic masterplan only covers the central part of the SOP. Meanwhile London made more organic changes, in the context of which I observed the process of repeating expansion and reduction. The LDA’s planning concern before the bid was far beyond the LOP, and included the long-term vision for the LLV. Yet the ODA’s planning power was further reduced, and this body developed the spatial plan only within the LOP. The LMF led by the LDA extended the vision beyond the Olympic site, but its spatial strategy fundamentally focused on the LOP in the pre-bid phase. Yet the latest LLDC planning boundary was once again expanded beyond the Olympic site.

While Sydney’s inward planning approach led to the creation of the “post-Olympic bubble”, London’s approach can be understood as more spatially overlapping governance to avoid the post-Olympic site becoming a bubble in the urban tissue. It is widely recognised that establishment of special authorities and concentration of planning power in them are necessary in planning and delivering the Olympic facilities and infrastructure within the time limit (for example, Hall, 1989a; Hiller, 2003). However, there is little research on the spatial reach, and the cases of Sydney and London suggest the importance of evolution of the spatial boundary of Olympic authorities.

9.1.3 Uncertainty of the entrepreneurial urban governance

Although London had more timely and spatially overlapping governance for planning its legacy, my findings in this thesis also suggest that there were still some uncertainties, as London as well as Sydney had experienced various unintended outcomes in the long-term planning process. Throughout my examination, I have in particular emphasised the uncertainty in “entrepreneurial” urban governance (Harvey, 1989). It was employed differently in different phases in Sydney and London. In the initial phase, it sought to redeem the initial investment in regeneration of the post-industrial site and construction of various stadia in the park. After the Games were over, it was employed to reduce the management cost of the post-Olympic Park and achieve a “self-sufficient” urban quarter. Sydney clearly identified that sports themselves could not maintain the
vast site of the Olympic Park, and London similarly addressed the need for the housing and commercial development in the vacant area left on the site after the Games. The degree to which new housing and commercial developments were planned in the post-Olympic site varied, depending on the financial objectives of the leading authority at the time responsible for selling and leasing the surplus land. The scale of the housing and commercial developments proposed in the various masterplan documents issued in the post-Olympic phase in Sydney significantly varied (Chapter 7), and in a similar vein, the building density proposed for the post-Olympic site in London was greatly different between the LMF of the LDA and the LSC of the OPLC (Chapter 6). There was a significant political intervention behind these fundamental changes, and in this respect, the mixed-use strategy for the post-Olympic site triggered by urban entrepreneurialism represents Harvey’s argument about the political economy of place rather than territory (Harvey, 1989, p. 7).

Yet the legacy planning has been sensitive to the economic conditions, and I have demonstrated that unintended outcomes in various phases has been firmly associated with what Harvey calls “entrepreneurial” urban governance (Harvey, 1989), which is realised through the application of a PPP. The private sector has been involved in the planning process differently in different phases in Sydney and London, but its fundamental dependence on the market economy spurred uncertainty in legacy planning. Harvey suggests that “the speculative qualities of urban investments simply derive from the inability to predict exactly which package will succeed and which will not, in a world of considerable economic instability and volatility” (Harvey, 1989, p. 11). Indeed, proposed development density of in the post-Olympic site in both Sydney and London Parks oscillated between extremely high and relatively low over time, and this represented the economic aspiration of entrepreneurial urban governance and the instability of the market economy. Furthermore, Harvey’s suggestion of uncertainty of planning due to economic instability and volatility was highlighted by the great impact of the credit crunch in 2008, which Sydney experienced in the post-Olympic phase and London in the post-bid phase. As demonstrated in Chapter 7 for Sydney and Chapter 8 for London, this economic uncertainty became a significant trigger of change of ongoing development in the Olympic site, which was exemplified by the change of the financial arrangements of constructing the Olympic village in London and cancellation of ongoing post-Olympic development projects in Sydney.
In addition to the unpredictable nature of the entrepreneurial governance, the divergent nature of the public and private sector’s interests in PPP has been identified, and in particular, it became more evident in the post-Olympic phase than in previous phases. Different views of the future vision of the SOP between the SOPA and the private lease holders in the post-Olympic phase represented their different prioritisation of increasing “use” or “exchange” value through long-term development, and eventual application of the private sector’s preferred approach to the post-Olympic spatial strategy suggested dominance of “exchange” value in the post-Olympic landscape. Difficulty in satisfying both use and exchange values was also highlighted in the post-Olympic utilisation of the Olympic stadium and aquatic centre in London, whose use value has been greatly addressed as a community benefit of staging the Olympic Games. Yet it is apparent that it has been difficult to secure use value of the post-Olympic facilities while maintaining financial viability by increasing exchange value of the venue.

9.2 Mixed-use vision: evolution of urban compatibility

As a more concrete exploration of the spatial vision of the Olympic site, this thesis examines the origin and evolution of the mixed-use vision for the post-Olympic Park in the long-term planning process, with the compatibility of different uses in the post-Olympic site being considered a crucial matter in spatially accommodating different planning aspirations. This reflects a much discussed issue in mixed-use urban development in general. A land-use pattern represents a high-stakes competition over an area’s future (Kaiser et al., 1995, pp. 6-8), and “compatibility” between different uses is the key for long-term mixed-use urban strategy (Coupland, 1997; Grant, 2002). In my thesis, it was necessary to look back on the evolution of “compatibility of different uses” throughout time. My observation of the long history of Olympic legacy planning in Sydney and London shed light on different planning roles in different phases for the long-term vision of the Olympic site.

9.2.1 Origin and evolution of the mixed-use vision

In the pre-bid phase, I have demonstrated that there were different political intentions
for the Olympic site in Sydney and London, and this created different spatial strategies for the post-Olympic site. Creating a regional sporting centre and restructuring post-industrial urban space to provide new job opportunities, in particular for West Sydney, was the initial motivation for regenerating Homebush Bay, but these two aims have been promoted by different political powers in the NSW region. Land-use plans of Homebush Bay before the bid clearly revealed the ever-changing political power conflict between the Olympic and non-Olympic authorities, but critically, “compatibility” between the sporting and other uses in the post-Olympic site was not fully resolved in the masterplans issued before the Games. While tackling “compatibility” between Olympic and non-Olympic uses was a crucial issue for Sydney, London tried to avoid such challenges. Meanwhile, unlike Sydney, London’s initial intention was to transform the sporting venues used for the special events into facilities for everyday uses which would be part of the urban neighbourhood legacy. London did not have a political intention of establishing a new event based sporting precinct in the capital, but had a strong national and regional objective of regenerating the LLV, which would provide residential and job opportunities in East London. This created the basic spatial strategy of avoiding the potential conflict between sports and other residential and commercial development in the Olympic site.

Subsequently, the post-bid phase was conceived as the phase in which the initial spatial strategy for mixed use would be further elaborated along with the preparation for the Olympic Games, but what became apparent in the post-bid phase was the difficulty in maintaining the initial mixed-use vision in the post-bid phase, in which various economic and political uncertainties were involved. Sydney inherited an unresolved relationship between various uses proposed in the bid, but the fast-track planning process and lack of a legacy authority in this phase led the OCA to focus on the Games related sporting vision, and little has been considered about the non-Olympic vision of the post-Olympic site. Against this backdrop, “controlling” possible incompatible uses by application of the grid system in the urban core of the SOP became the crucial spatial strategy in Sydney, rather than seeking the solution for “mediating” them. Meanwhile, London had a different path in the post-bid phase. As it set the spatial strategy of avoiding potential conflicts between the Olympic and non-Olympic visions, the fundamental aim for London in this phase was to develop each vision within the anticipated framework set in the previous phase. The ODA developed the Olympic
related venues and infrastructure with speculation on possible future scenarios, and the LDA conducted in-depth post-Olympic development scenario development. Yet as Chapter 6 established, there was a certain discrepancy between the ODA’s envisaged future and the LDA’s legacy vision, and this became more crucial when London faced political and economic uncertainties in maintaining the initial post-Olympic spatial strategy. This also revealed that London’s initial vision of avoiding “compatibility” between the sporting and other uses in the post-Olympic site was built on the highly sensitive political and economic climate before the bid.

9.2.2 Experience: limits of the mixed-use vision
In the post-Olympic phase, the compatibility of the different uses in the Olympic Park became real. The SOPA simultaneously conducted the evaluation of the planning outcomes for the site and updated the existing masterplan in the post-Olympic phase. What the SOPA identified as a problem was the limit of the current idea of the mixed-use Olympic Park, which clashed with the authority’s primary idea of balancing special events and everyday life in the post-Olympic Park. Their findings were also recognised as contrasting with Jacob’s suggestion of “conditions for city diversity” (Jacobs, 1961). Firstly, different uses were spatially confined in different precincts set up in the previous phase, and there was little interaction between them; rather they were just juxtaposed in one large urban area. Secondly, different uses have different activity rhythms throughout a day and year, and the SOPA has struggled to manage different rhythms, although it put great emphasis on a vibrant urban quarter activated 24 hours and 365 days. Jacobs argues that there is a need for small blocks which create an intricate pool of urban fluidity and a need to spread people over periods of the day (Jacobs, 1961, p. 204, 241), but the SOPA found that these ideas were not fully realised. The crucial issue found here was that the different uses occupied different land held by different land lease holders / venue operators who had different aspirations for their own sites, and this prevented the creation of a cohesive long-term vision. This reflects Searle’s suggestion of the spatial outcomes of development as the product of stakeholder interaction in which different stakeholders have varying abilities to exercise power (Searle, 2008a, p. 219).
9.3 Urban integration

The third aim of this thesis was to understand the process of integrating the Olympic site into the wider regional and local spatial development strategy, and Judd’s concept of the “bubble” was the reference to examine urban integration of the Olympic site. While hosting the mega-event is widely recognised as the part of the regional economic development strategy for the host city, there is little research examining its mechanism in the longer term, and also few studies highlight the different integration processes into the regional and local urban context.

9.3.1 Regional context: conflict within the region

Prior to the bid, Sydney and London aimed for the Olympic site to be a strategic location to equalise the uneven socio-economic development in the region, but Sydney and London had different paths in embedding the Olympic site in the regional spatial development strategy. In this thesis, I highlighted the differences from the viewpoint of conformity and conflict with existing urban development centres in two cities. While Sydney showed difficulty inserting the Olympic Park as a new urban centre into the existing regional spatial strategy, such problem was less identified in London, as development of the Olympic Park has led to upgrading of the already designated regional development centre.

In the case of Sydney, the integration of the SOP into the wider regional development strategy was not fully conducted before the Games, and it was five years after the Olympics when the SOP was first integrated into a part of the regional development strategy as a specialised centre. I argued that one of the great difficulties in embedding the SOP into the wider regional spatial strategy was the conflict with the existing centres in the region. This sensitive relationship with the existing regional centres recalls Searle’s suggestion of potential “inner-urban” competition caused by the urban restructuruing due to “inter-urban” competition. In this context he observes difficulty in sustaining the new Olympic stadium as limited events are available after the Olympic Games (Searle, 2002). Meanwhile, London’s bid proposal was formulated in line with the regional development strategy proposed in the Mayor’s London Plan issued before the Games, which already recognised LLV as one of the major centres in the greater
London region. After winning the bid, the regional strategy was further updated to maximise the regenerative benefit of the Olympic site, and the socio-economic target of the post-Olympic LOP, such as provision of residences and job opportunities, has been expanded. Furthermore, the post-Olympic LOP was designated as a global tourist destination, and thus the Olympic site currently carries various regional aspirations.

While Sydney and London contrast in the process of recognising the Olympic Park within the regional development strategy, in Parts II and III of this thesis, I stressed that the two cities have challenges in reconciling the Olympic Park as a new regional centre and existing urban areas. What the case of Sydney demonstrated after recognising it as a new development centre in the region was that the rise of the Olympic Park as the new regional development focus caused the decline of the existing adjacent centres. The initial justification for regenerating Homebush Bay and creating a mixed-use Olympic Park was synchronised with the socio-economic improvement of the western part of the Sydney region, but ironically it has changed the regional development growth corridor, and left some adjacent existing centres out of the regional strategy. Meanwhile, in the case of London, as suggested in Chapters 4 and 6 (London’s pre and post-bid phases), cohesive development with other existing areas in the wider Lea Valley has been questioned since the bid. While significant planning resources would be poured into the Olympic site, how the surrounding area would balance existing and renewed urban quality has been the local authority’s concern. Thus, as I argued, a more cohesive development strategy was needed to integrate the Olympic Park into wider and narrower urban tissues.

9.3.2 Local context: bordering the Olympic Park

While my examination of the urban integration of the Olympic Park on the regional scale focused on the relationship with existing urban centres, I have looked at the Olympic Park on the smaller local scale, from the political, spatial and social viewpoints. Politically, it has been widely pointed out that one of the negative impacts of the mega-event for the host city is failure in integrating the local interests (Hall, 1989a; Kelly, 1989; Thornley, 2000). In the case of Sydney, the SOP has been isolated from the local planning context throughout the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic phase. In other words, the local Auburn Council was detached from the development of the SOP. Political power of the Olympic authority before and after the Games has been greater
than that of the local Auburn Council, and this created a mechanism in which little input from the local council has been integrated into the planning process in the post-bid and post-Olympic phases. Meanwhile, London has extensively addressed the cohesive development between the Olympic Park and the surroundings since the bid. London has created various mechanisms to integrate the local council’s view into the decision-making.

Judd’s conception of the urban “bubble” spatially implies a precinct with a “well-defined perimeter” and a socially “segregated island of affluence” from the surroundings (Judd, 1999). Thus, my exploration was to observe how these spatial and social barriers would be weakened in the long term in order to avoid the “bubble” effect. In the case of Sydney, the spatial challenge was to improve the isolated physical setting of the Olympic site inherited before the bid, and to erase the traces of secured Olympic precincts for the Games after the event. Yet it became apparent that Sydney has not paid enough attention to the “boundary” of the Olympic site throughout time, except for the newly developed neighbourhood triggered by the Games. Thus, spatial isolation of the post-Olympic site is still apparent in Sydney. On the contrary, London has put great emphasis on how to weaken the boundary of the Olympic site, and how to merge the Olympic site and the adjacent site after the Games. It seems to me that London’s planning approach has been creating what Sennet terms “borders”, where different groups interact, rather than “boundaries”, where things end (Sennett, 2004). It is certain that realisation of spatial “borders” requires the interaction between the Olympic and local authorities, but that was hardly visible in the case of Sydney.

Meanwhile, weakening social barriers, in other words, gaining “accessibility” to the post-Olympic site (Lenskyj, 2002), has been the key to examine the social connection between the Olympic Park and the surroundings. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, the post-Olympic site in Sydney became a relatively expensive area to access, compared to the other public leisure facilities in the local council, because the generation of profit became crucial for the sporting facilities in the SOP. Furthermore, the various facilities in the SOP have been promoted by developers as the doorstep for luxury housing emerging in the Olympic Park. As indicated earlier, the weaker position of the local council in the decision-making of the post-Olympic planning has made it difficult to improve this. Similarly, there might be signs of difficulty in securing local access to
London’s post-Olympic Park when we look at the post-Olympic planning process for the Olympic stadium; the LLDC, the Premier League and the local council would be involved in management of the stadium, as discussed in Chapter 8. Although the LLDC and the local council have pointed to the physical legacy as the local benefit, this may be uncertain given the dominance of the private sector in management of the facilities. Thus, “social accessibility” has been deeply related to the power relations in the PPP set up for construction and management of the Olympic venues and public space in the Olympic sites, which was in tandem with Thorley’s suggestion of “conflicts between economic priorities and community needs” (Thorley, 2000, p. 698). This leads to the need to establish the mechanism to integrate the local voices into the PPP in the post-Olympic site planning, in order to avoid creating a social “bubble” in the post-Olympic site.

9.4 Wider implications of this thesis on the research on Olympic legacy

9.4.1 Towards long-term planning: need for long and short-term views

One of my strong intentions in conducting this research was to examine the Olympic legacy over a long timescale, which most of the existing literature does not touch upon, despite the current growing interest in research on the Olympic legacy. As the term “legacy” implies, the Olympic legacy is fundamentally the phenomenon after the event, but this thesis demonstrated that planning of the legacy is a quite long journey, which spans long before the bid to far beyond the Games. In the long term, the city experiences political and economic uncertainties, and this could cause significant impacts on the change of governance and spatial vision of the legacy, as in Sydney and London. Searle points put that current planning theory increasingly recognises the difficulty in making a long-term plan by forecasting fluidity of the spatial relationship (Searle, 2008b, p. 105). In order to accommodate these changes, establishing a “robust and flexible” planning framework has been addressed by the Olympic authorities in Sydney and London. Yet the robustness and flexibility in the spatial development strategy were not clearly defined, and there is a great danger that robustness in the legacy planning has been blurred by the political climate, and flexibility has become the justification of the unintended changes and inability to pursue the initial concept.
While a “robust and flexible” planning vision was necessary to conduct long-term planning, my empirical findings in this thesis indicated that legacy planning also involves short-term planning of the post-Olympic site. One of the crucial findings in this thesis is the importance of evaluating the everyday life in the post-Olympic site in Sydney, and incorporating it into the legacy planning. In a general sense, little attention has been paid to designing time in urban planning, compared to spatial planning. Lynch, a great cultivator of spatial planning in modern cities, put great emphasis on establishing a temporal and spatial model of the city to include short-term fluctuations as well as long-term changes (Lynch, 1972, p. 71). Jacobs, a great provocateur of liveliness in the contemporary city, also stresses “significance of time spread” in activating a city district (Jacobs, 1961, p. 200). What became apparent in Sydney’s post-Olympic Park was the uneven distribution of the various activities in terms of time, and failure to activate the post-Olympic site throughout a day and year. This recalls Lynch’s argument that allocating time, in particular choosing and distributing time, is as important as defining spatial quality. Moreover, Lynch suggests that temporal modifications will often have spatial consequences (Lynch, 1972, pp. 73-74), and this was exactly what happened in the post-Olympic Park when the spatial layout of different uses in the urban core was considered, which had a great impact on the long-term spatial strategy of the SOP.

The short-term planning is usually conducted well during the Olympic Games, to prevent the potential conflict of overlapping events in the Olympic site, but the sense of the short term is gone after the event. Due to the unprecedented nature of the land-use mix in the post-Olympic site and potential conflict between them, it is crucial to integrate short-term planning of the city, as well as to carry on the long-term development strategy of the site.

9.4.2 Spatial scale of the urban legacy

While incorporating analysis of the timescale was one of my great motivations for conducting this research, considering it on various spatial scales was another crucial point in this thesis. Essex and Chalkley suggest that Olympic urbanisation has historically extended from the construction of the mono-stadium to the Olympic quarter, such as the Olympic Park, and further point out that it became a matter of the host city’s
strategic urban development vision, in which the connection between the Olympic quarter(s) and other parts of the city was crucial (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). Yet, as suggested in the introductory chapter, current studies of the Olympic legacy fundamentally focus on either the architectural scale examining the usability of the post-Olympic facilities, or the wider regional and local urban scale looking at post-Olympic impacts of various aspects on the host city. There is relatively little research focused on the Olympic quarter, and more critically, work connecting different scales of the urban legacy is largely missing.

My research connected these different scales, and demonstrated the inseparable nature of these different scales. My empirical study in Sydney and London suggested that usability of the post-Olympic Park played the crucial role in defining the spatial character of the post-Olympic Park, and the spatial character of the post-Olympic Park was highly related to the regional development strategy. Vice versa, the regional development strategy is certainly connected with the way of using the legacy stadium. This thesis also explored the governance of the different scales of the urban legacy, and identified the leading organisations/authorities managing and developing venues, the Olympic Park and the regional spatial strategy in the post-Olympic climate.

Furthermore, this thesis also suggested the importance of the small scale in large-scale urban regeneration. The importance of considering the smaller scale in the urban quarter is addressed by Lynch and Jacobs. Jacobs’ argument about the need for small elements in the urban precinct, as well as smaller urban blocks, is highly connected with urban diversity, which she put great emphasis on as a crucial factor in a contemporary urban quarter (Jacobs, 1961, p. 193, 241). Jacobs’ argument about the need for smallness in the urban precinct has been influential in the current “compact city” or “urban village” idea which has greatly enhanced mixed-use urban strategies. Meanwhile, Lynch recognises small-scale artefacts as being more identifiable for recognising the image of the city district (Lynch, 1960, p. 67).

Yet, as Hiller suggests that the governance of the Olympics was determined by “external forces” (Hiller, 2003), the demands made by the Olympic Games on venues and public space is normally larger than what the city needs afterwards, and therefore tackling the scale is a crucial issue for the mediating the Olympic and post-Olympic usability of the
Olympics site. Sydney celebrated its large-scale stadia and public space in the global celebration during the Olympics, but they became the fundamental problem for the legacy use. London however has kept a sense of small-ness, and physical changeability for mediating the Olympic and post-Olympic demands has been extensively addressed since before the bid. Critically, however, Lynch argues that scale is not a matter of the urban precinct, but rather an issue of physical cohesion with wider surroundings.

9.4.3 Implications for the IOC’s policy: temporal and spatial dimensions
This thesis can also be referenced in relation to the current IOC policy on the legacy. The IOC has extensively noted that one of its roles is “to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries” (IOC, 2011) since Jacque Rogge took the presidency of the organisation in 2001, and various actions in this regard have been undertaken by the IOC. For example, methodology of the legacy planning has been proposed in the Technical Manual for the host city, and the Olympic Games Global Impact Study and the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Programme were introduced as means of collecting empirical data on planning and impact of the Games from the bid to the post-Olympic phase to transfer the experiences of a host city to the successors. The IOC’s effort to create shareable knowledge of legacy planning has contributed to the foundation of the legacy planning in the new host city, and the findings on temporal and spatial aspects of the Olympic legacy explored in this thesis could contribute by connecting with the IOC’s current planning policy.

Firstly, the IOC’s current system of evaluating the legacy in the host city targets up to three years after the Games, because the host city’s organising committee is wound up after the Games and the IOC’s supervision of the research has certain time limits. Yet my empirical exploration in Sydney showed significant differences in the post-Olympic site three and ten years after the Games. Thus, the three-year evaluation of the Olympic legacy may not be relevant as a reference point for subsequent host cities, as drastic changes happened six years after the Games in the case of Sydney.

Secondly, the IOC has encouraged identification of the legacy use of the Olympic facilities as early as possible, and confirmation of early post-Olympic use has been recognised as positive in the bid phase. Current discourse on the legacy planning also emphasises the advantage of early commitment to the legacy, and the IOC has greatly
enhanced such proactive legacy planning of the host city. For example, the IOC’s “Technical Manual on Venues” stipulates that “As part of the candidature phase the intended Post-Games of all competition and training venues must be identified” (IOC, 2007, p. 106). Yet, as this thesis has demonstrated, the vision of the legacy tends to evolve throughout the long-term journey of the Olympic and legacy planning. The planning structure needs, in addition to the spatial vision, flexibility to accommodate future changes.

Finally, the IOC’s bid document has long asked the host city about different aspects of the bid components, and integration of the Olympics into the long-term regional planning strategy has been one of the crucial points of the evaluation. In addition to this the post-Olympic usability of each competition venue was examined as a crucial issue of the Olympic legacy. Yet the IOC pays little attention to other scales of the urban legacy at the time of bidding. In particular, the local level of the urban legacy is little touched upon. This thesis argues that the urban legacy should be expand from the architectural scale to the urban scale, as they are highly connected. In this respect, the IOC’s current concern with the Olympic legacy needs to bridge different scales of the urban legacy in the host city.

9.4.4 The final note: Lessons learnt from Sydney and London

As the final note of this thesis, I would like to summarise the key findings in my exploration in Sydney and London, which could be valuable lessons for future host cities.

Firstly, many authors and the IOC address the need for legacy planning from the bid phase onwards, but this thesis has demonstrated that the vision of the Olympic legacy changes intentionally and unintentionally throughout the pre-bid, post-bid and post-Olympic phases. Thus, I argued for the need for flexible governance of the legacy, in order to correspond to the changing visions throughout time. In other words, political connections between different planning phases are crucial. In particular, I emphasised that London had more advanced thinking than Sydney on the overlapping legacy governance bridging different phases of Olympic planning to ensure that the vision of the Olympic legacy could be carried out, and in this respect there was a certain evolution from the 2000 to 2012 Olympic Games.
Secondly, this thesis explored a mixed-use strategy as a practical method for sustaining the Olympic Park beyond the Olympic Games. The mixed-use urban strategy has been widely considered a useful approach in this respect, but my empirical study on Sydney and London suggested that urban planners had to consider the approach to mixing different uses in an Olympic site, otherwise the mixed-use approach would not fully work. One of the crucial elements was the need for a balance between the social and economic dimensions, as economic concerns have often overwhelmed social ones. In particular, this is crucial in the case of entrepreneurial governance, which both Sydney and London applied, and it was apparent certain public initiatives were necessary to make PPPs workable in the mixed-use Olympic site. In addition to this, this thesis suggested the need to integrate time factors in mixed-use urban development, as it affects the compatibility of different uses. Much of the current discourse of mixed-use urban planning focuses on the spatial relationship of the different land use, but I put great emphasis on the fact that the temporal relationship is equally crucial.

Thirdly, the investigation of the degree to which the post-Olympic Park is integrated in the local and regional spatial strategy beyond the boundary of the Olympic site was one of the important parts of this thesis. As the Olympic Park attracts more political and economic attention than any other area in the city even in the post-Olympic phase, the post-Olympic site drastically changes the socio-economic landscape in the region. Thus, I stressed that constructing a cohesive development strategy in the region is imperative so as to avoid triggering uneven urban development in the city. In terms of local scale, this thesis suggested bordering the Olympic site instead of creating a clear boundary is crucial in mediating the post-Olympic site and surrounding areas. In this respect, compared to Sydney's approach of maintaining the "Olympic" identity of the Park, London's approach of eroding the "Olympic" significance of the post-Olympic Park is highly suggestive, as an attempt to embed it in local and regional urban tissues.

The essence of the above findings in this thesis is the creation of appropriate connections between different political, spatial and functional elements in sustaining the legacy beyond the Olympic Games. I would like to underline that this could certainly be applied to future host cities. As was suggested in the introductory chapter, Sydney and London both used a highly concentrated venue location model, which led the
construction of the Olympic Park, and the above findings are certainly useful for this model. Yet the next Summer Olympics host cities – Rio de Janeiro in 2016 and Tokyo in 2020 – have taken different approaches to the mono-clustering Olympic Park model seen in Sydney and London. Tokyo in particular has applied a dispersed model in which individual venues are placed in a certain area in the city centre. Yet the need for flexible legacy governance and a strategic view in regard to integrating the post-Olympic site into the local and regional context are equally important to Tokyo. Although Tokyo will not have any Olympic Park as an urban legacy, my suggestions for a mixed-use strategy could also be applied to the 2020 host city, as the 2020 Tokyo Olympics organiser is now seeking a mixed-use approach in regard to sustaining the legacy venues. Thus, I hope that key findings obtained from my research on the Sydney and London Olympic parks will become lessons for subsequent host cities, regardless of whether or not they employ a similar Olympic Park model to that used by Sydney and London.
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Appendix: Chronology of Olympic-related planning documents and regional strategies

The following tables show the major publications for Olympic-related planning documents and regional strategies discussed in this thesis, along with crucial Olympic and political incidents.
## Sydney

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Olympics / Homebush Bay planning document</th>
<th>Regional development strategy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Sydney Region, Outline Plan 1970-2000</td>
<td>State Planning Authority of NSW</td>
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<td>1968s</td>
<td>Bidding for the 1972 Games</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>Bidding Report</td>
<td>Walter Bunning</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>Olympic Games, Sydney 1988. Submission to the Australian Olympic Games; Bidding for the 1988 Games</td>
<td>NSW Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Land Lease Masterplan</td>
<td>Land Lease</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>REP</td>
<td>Department of</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Olympic Games, Sydney 1996. Submission to the Australian Olympic Games; Bidding for the 1996 Games</td>
<td>Sydney Olympic Games Citizen's Council</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>Homebush Bay Strategy Committee, Report to Government</td>
<td>Homebush Bay Strategy Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Draft REP</td>
<td>DEP</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>REP No. 24</td>
<td>DEP</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Sydney Bid for 2000 Olympic Games</td>
<td>NSW Government</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Sydney 2000, Share the Spirit</td>
<td>Sydney Olympic 2000 Bid Limited</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Homebush Bay draft REP No. 24</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>New Labour Government established</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Homebush Bay site guide</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Sydney Olympics</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Sydney Olympic Park : vision for beyond 2000</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>Sydney Olympic Park : Draft Post Olympic Masterplan</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>Sydney Olympic Park : Master Plan adopted by the Minister for Planning on 31 May 2002</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Sydney Olympic Park, Vision 2025 - A Town of the Future</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Sydney Olympic Park, Draft Masterplan 2030</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>Sydney Olympic Park, Masterplan 2030</td>
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<td>Metropolitan Strategy - City of Cities, A plan for Sydney's Future</td>
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<td>Metropolitan Plan for Sydney 2036</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>London’s Olympic Challenge (Feasibility study of London’s hosting)</td>
<td>Coopers &amp; Lybrand Deloitte</td>
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<td>Bidding for the 2000 Games</td>
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<td>The BOA asked David Luckes to undertake a feasibility study into a possible London bid</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>GLA established, Ken Livingstone becomes the Mayor of London</td>
<td>GLA established, Ken Livingstone becomes the Mayor of London</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>London Olympics 2012 Costs and Benefits – Summary</td>
<td>ARUP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Draft London Plan</td>
<td>Mayor of London</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>A London Olympic Bid for 2012</td>
<td>CMSC</td>
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<td>Government Response to 'A London Olympic Bid for 2012</td>
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<td>The UK Government announced its support for London's bid (15 May 2003)</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Olympic Precinct &amp; Legacy, Design</td>
<td>LDA</td>
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<td>London Plan</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>London won the bid in Singapore</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lower Lea Valley, Opportunity Area Planning Framework</td>
<td>Mayor of London</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group established</td>
<td>ODA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Olympic Park Urban Design and Landscape Framework</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>LMF Team appointed</td>
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<td>Boris Johnson becomes the Mayor of London</td>
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<td>5 Olympic Boroughs</td>
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<td>An Olympic legacy for the host</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>LLDC established</td>
<td>Mayor of London</td>
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<td>ODA PDT functions passed to the LLDC</td>
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<td>Local Development Scheme</td>
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