The London School of Economics and Political Science

The Impact of Democratisation on Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: Regional Cooperation, Promotion of Political Values, and Conflict Management

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Declaration

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Abstract

This study examines to what extent Indonesia’s transition to democracy has impacted Jakarta’s foreign policy, particularly regarding the foreign policy-making process, its fundamental doctrine, and foreign policy strategies in three specific areas: regional cooperation in ASEAN, promotion of political values, and conflict management. The puzzle this thesis addresses is that Indonesia’s foreign policy in many ways does not conform to expectations generated by theoretical works on democratization and foreign policy. The dissertation argues that Indonesia’s democratization has affected Jakarta’s foreign policy only in a mixed and limited fashion. While Indonesia’s democratization has shaped ideas that have influenced Indonesia’s foreign policy, some traditional foreign policy pillars continue to be relevant.

First, notwithstanding Indonesia’s democratic transition, Jakarta remains committed to the principle of an independent and active (bebas-aktif) foreign policy. As such, maintaining a balanced presence of big powers remains a key explanation for Indonesia’s policies on East Asia cooperation. Second, while democratisation has led to the proliferation of foreign policy actors, foreign policy-making remains largely unaltered, with the president and the foreign minister serving as the central decision-makers. However, democratisation has changed the substance or style of Indonesian foreign policy, and such a change is discernible in efforts to shape political cooperation in ASEAN, Jakarta’s management of conflict on Ambalat dispute with Malaysia, and its Myanmar policy. Additionally, democracy and human rights now prominently feature in Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy towards the wider Asia. Significantly, however, while democracy promotion has been driven by the desire of Indonesia’s foreign policy leaders to reflect its newfound identity, human rights promotion has been lacking in Indonesia’s promotion of political values abroad due to domestic considerations. Hence, frameworks focusing on the role of identity and ideas in foreign policy flowing from democratization offer an important, yet insufficient explanation of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the cases discussed.

Using an integrative approach that draws on works on the role of leaders, the salience of institutions, and the influence of identity and ideas in foreign policy, this study contributes to the wider discussion about the relationship between democratization and foreign policy.
To my parents

Hadia Herawatie Wirajuda and Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda
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# Table of Contents

Declaration .................................................................................................................................................. 2
Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................................................ 5
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................................ 7
List of abbreviations .................................................................................................................................. 10

1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 12
  1.1 The puzzle ........................................................................................................................................... 13
  1.2 The arguments ...................................................................................................................................... 13
  1.3 Review of the literature ..................................................................................................................... 14
    1.3.1 PART I .............................................................................................................................................. 14
      1.3.1.1 Understanding the link between democratisation and foreign policy behaviour .................. 14
      1.3.1.2 Understanding the link between democratisation and foreign policy-making: actors in the decision-making processes .......................................................... 18
      1.3.1.2.1 Authoritative actors ................................................................................................................. 18
        The executive: the president and the foreign minister ................................................................. 18
      1.3.1.2.2 Non-authoritative actors ....................................................................................................... 19
        The parliament ................................................................................................................................. 19
    1.3.2 PART II .......................................................................................................................................... 23
      1.3.2.1 Understanding Indonesia’s democratic transition: from Habibie to SBY ......................... 23
      1.3.2.2 Indonesia’s democratisation and foreign affairs ....................................................................... 28
  1.4 The analytical framework ................................................................................................................ 33
  1.5 Methodology ......................................................................................................................................... 33
  1.6 Contribution of the study ................................................................................................................ 37
  1.7 Limitations of the study and possible further research ................................................................... 38
  1.8 The structure of the thesis ................................................................................................................ 39

2 Analytical framework: democratisation and the role of leaders, institutions, and identity and ideas in foreign policy .................................................................................................................. 41
  2.1 Democratisation, democracy, and foreign policy: definitions ........................................................... 42
    2.1.1 Understanding democratisation and its stages .............................................................................. 42
  2.2 Understanding the link between democratisation and foreign policy-making process .................. 46
    2.3 Democratisation and foreign policy-making actors ......................................................................... 49
      2.3.1 The role of institutions: the parliament and bureaucracies other than the foreign ministry .... 49
      2.3.2 Who governs?: The inescapability of foreign policy leaders .................................................... 52
  2.4 Foreign policy change and continuity: a brief review .................................................................... 54
  2.5 Identity, ideas and foreign policy behaviour .................................................................................... 57
  2.6 The impact of democratisation on Indonesian foreign policy: analytical framework, sources and methods .............................................................................................................................................. 63

3 Democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making process ........................................ 67
  3.1 Authoritative actors ........................................................................................................................... 67
    3.1.1 The President .................................................................................................................................. 67
    3.1.2 The foreign minister and Deplu ................................................................................................... 75
  3.2 Non-authoritative actors .................................................................................................................... 81
    3.2.1 Special Staff on International Relations ....................................................................................... 81
8 Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................. 187
8.1 Main findings .......................................................................................................................................... 187
8.2 Specific findings ....................................................................................................................................... 190
   8.2.1 Democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy-making................................................................. 190
   8.2.2 Democratisation and the Bebas-Aktif doctrine ............................................................................... 193
   8.2.3 Democratisation and Indonesia’s regional cooperation in ASEAN .............................................. 195
   8.2.4 Democratisation and Indonesia’s promotion of political values beyond ASEAN .......................... 196
   8.2.5 Democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy on Ambalat ..................................................... 198
8.3 The leaders’ factor and the differential impact of democratisation on foreign policy ....................... 200
Appendices .................................................................................................................................................. 203
References .................................................................................................................................................... 205
List of abbreviations

AEC  ASEAN Economic Community
AICHR  ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights
AIPMC  ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar
AKKBB  Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan
APSC  ASEAN Political and Security Community
APT  ASEAN Plus Three
ARF  ASEAN Regional Forum
ASC  ASEAN Security Community
ASCC  ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASSK  Aung San Suu Kyi
Balitbang  Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan
BDF  Bali Democracy Forum
BPPK  Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan
CSIS  Centre for Strategic and International Studies
DEPLU  Departemen Luar Negeri
DG  Director General
DPR  Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
EAS  East Asia Summit
EPG  Eminent Persons Group
FM  Foreign Minister
FPA  Foreign Policy Analysis
FPB  Foreign Policy Breakfast
FPI  Front Pembela Islam
Golkar  Golongan Karya
HLTF  High-Level Task Force
HTI  Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
ICJ  International Court of Justice
ICMI  Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia
ICWA  Indonesian Council on World Affairs
IR  International Relations
JIM  Jakarta Informal Meeting
KEMLU  Kementerian Luar Negeri
LIPI  Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia
Mercosur  Mercado Común del Sur
MNLF  Moro National Liberation Front
NEFOS  New Emerging Forces
NU  Nahdatul Ulama
OAS  Organisation of American States
OIC  Organisation of Islamic Conference
PAN  Partai Amanat Nasional
PBB  Partai Bulan Bintang
PD  Partai Demokrat
PDI  Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
PDIP  Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan
Perda  Peraturan Daerah
PK  Partai Keadilan
PKI  Partai Komunis Indonesia
PKS  Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
PPP  Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
Repelita  Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun
SBY  Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
SCS  South China Sea
SG  Secretary General
SKHI  Staf Khusus Hubungan Internasional
SLORC  State Law and Order Restoration Council
SPDC  State Peace and Development Council
TAC  Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
UU  Undang-undang
UUD  Undang-undang Dasar
WANTIMPRES  Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden
1 Introduction

Following the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian government in 1998, a period historiographically referred to as Reformasi, Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia with a population of around 240 million, has sought to develop a more open, transparent, and democratic political environment. The advent of a relatively free and fair parliamentary election in 1999 was crucial for Indonesia’s democratic transition, marking Jakarta’s first conscious attempt to follow democratic procedure after the fall of Suharto. The influence of this domestic political development was also seen in Indonesia’s foreign affairs. However, a quick review of Indonesia’s foreign policy during certain periods of Suharto’s administration and the post-1998 period also indicates that in many ways Indonesia’s foreign policy has remained largely unaltered, notwithstanding democratisation. Indonesia’s policy toward ASEAN continues to rely on the importance of projecting what was considered by the government to be domestic strength; Indonesia’s regional policy beyond the context of Southeast Asia continues to focus on cooperation, including strategic/security cooperation; the way foreign policy is made in Indonesia also continues to focus on the authority of foreign policy leaders in the executive. Even in relation to its basic foreign policy principles, Indonesia appears to place an emphasis on maintaining pragmatic approach manifested in the bebas-aktif doctrine. In other words, democratisation at best have had limited impact on Indonesia’s foreign policy, notwithstanding the works that have highlighted in particular the role of parliament in foreign policy (see, for instance, Rüland 2009; Murphy 2005).

This thesis aims to contribute to the emerging literature on explaining the impact of Indonesia’s democratic transition (independent variable) on its foreign policy (dependent variable). It is guided by the following central questions: how has Indonesia’s democratisation affected foreign policy decision-making in the country, and what is the impact of democratisation in relation to particular foreign policy areas and issues?

In seeking to address this central question, this research considers three important aspects of Indonesia’s foreign policy, namely, foreign policy decision-making processes, foreign policy doctrine, and foreign policy decisions, particularly in the areas of regional cooperation, promotion of political values, and conflict management. Three case studies were

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1 The period of democratisation in Indonesia, beginning in 1998, is referred to in Indonesian as the Reform period (Reformasi). In a State Address made on 16 August 2010, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) stated that Reformasi remains a work in progress. Therefore, he referred to the period from 1999-2009 as the first wave of reform (Reformasi gelombang pertama) and his second term (2009-2014) was defined as the second wave of reform (Reformasi gelombang kedua). Nevertheless, this thesis will employ the term Reformasi to describe the period since the fall of Suharto to the present.

selected in this context: Indonesia’s foreign policy towards ASEAN, Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar and towards East Asia regional arrangement, and the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia, particularly in relation to the Ambalat dispute. These cases are active points of Indonesia’s foreign policy to date and highlight the areas in which the impact of democratisation has been most visible. Essentially, these questions will be approached by focusing on the role of three factors in Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making process, which includes the role of leaders, the influence of institutions, and the salience of identity and ideas.

1.1 The puzzle
The literature on the link between democratisation and foreign policy suggests that democratising countries tend to be inward-looking, hence unlikely to actively pursue external relations. It is also assumed that democratising countries experience a rise in nationalism and suffer from weak state institutions. According to some scholars, this leads leaders of democratising countries to opt for aggressive foreign policy behaviour in relation to conflict management with other countries, especially when territorial disputes are involved. The literature on democratisation also suggests that following an increase in the number of political actors participating in foreign policy decision-making and the growing influence of public opinion, foreign policy-making is assumed to be bottom-up. Notwithstanding these theories, even a cursory examination of Indonesia’s foreign policy-making and Indonesia’s approach to regional cooperation and conflict management demonstrates that Indonesian foreign policy has defied these expectations. This makes for an important puzzle that this thesis aims to address.

For this reason, this study seeks to address the lacuna in debates about the link between democratisation and foreign policy by investigating the factors that have shaped the formulation and implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy following the nation’s democratic transition.

1.2 The arguments
The democratisation of Indonesia has had a mixed and limited impact on Indonesian foreign policy, displaying both continuity and change in the way Indonesian leaders practice it. Therefore, while in some areas the impact is salient, it is less significant in others. In relation to regional cooperation and the promotion of political values, this thesis argues that Indonesia’s foreign policy continues to emphasise the projection of ideas that are shared by the foreign policy-makers sitting in the executive. The changes are thus a reflection of the preferences of these policy-makers. In relation to conflict management, this study demonstrates that Indonesia did not advocate a military approach for the resolution of territorial disputes, particularly in ASEAN. Such a policy approach reflects a continuation of Indonesia’s foreign policy during
Suharto’s period. In essence, this was the result of the leaders’ commitment to democracy and the continuity in the way foreign policy is made in Indonesia.

The reason why the impact of democratisation on foreign policy is more limited than the theoretical literature dealing with democratising states suggests is linked to both continuity in the decision-making process as well as the continuing concern with basic foreign policy precepts. Overall, this thesis argues that Indonesia’s foreign policy following the fall of Suharto is still, by and large, determined by the preferences of Indonesian leaders. In this case, leaders became the variables that explained change and continuity of Indonesian foreign policy during Reformasi while democratisation, as a political process, only served as the context for these developments to exist.

1.3 Review of the literature
The following literature review is divided into two major parts. The first part reviews literature about the link between democratisation and foreign policy behaviour by looking at examples from a number of countries that have undergone political changes. This is followed by a review of the actors involved in the foreign policy decision-making process in democratic contexts. From these reviews, this study expects to see the ways in which democratising countries change their foreign policy and the extent to which political development affects the way foreign policy is made in these countries given the increase of political actors involved in the decision-making processes. The second part of the review explores literature that is related to Indonesia’s domestic political changes and its transition to democracy.

1.3.1 PART I

1.3.1.1 Understanding the link between democratisation and foreign policy behaviour
The link between democratisation and foreign policy behaviour has been studied by looking at the domestic features of a state, which involves the role of institutions (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 1997, 2005; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Clare 2007; Snyder 2000), certain political values adhered to domestically (Mansfield 2002; Acharya 2010; Park 2008), and political problems that accompany a democratic transition, such as reforming the military (Bruneau and Trinkunas 2005), civil-military relations (Huntington 1995), or economic issues (Galbreath 2004). In view of these features, scholars suggested that newly democratising states may have weak government institutions since the old have been eroded and the new are not fully developed (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002:301). This is characterized by the need of military and economic actors, which once benefited from the strong authoritarian regime, to secure their interests in the changing polity, frequently doing so by recruiting mass support (Mansfield and Snyder,
2002:299). Mansfield and Snyder (1995) suggest that one way to do this is by resorting to nationalist rhetoric, which could be effective in motivating collective action in the presence of weak institutions.\(^3\)

Resorting to nationalism can lead political elites to pursue hostile foreign policy behaviour (Mansfield and Snyder 1997). Some examples include military interference launched by a state to protect its citizens abroad (Adamson 2001) or lodging a claim over disputed territories (Keck 2006). While this has been a popular view concerning the impact of democratisation on external relations, competing theories do exist. To this end, Clare (2007:260, 274) suggests that even if institutions in democratising states are weak, the new democratising regimes are less likely to initiate disputes owing to a heightened domestic vulnerability. This vulnerability makes elites more cautious about foreign policy as they seek to maintain office, and as a result, foreign policy failure can be seen as a sign of incompetence, which would provide the opposition with a reason to attack the new democratic government and therefore, undermine their chance at re-election (Clare 2007:261). More specifically, in the context of East Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular, authors have argued that nationalistic sentiments could strengthen democratisation through the promotion of a positive sense of nationalism (‘democratic pride’) (Acharya 2010). Instead of instigating hostile strategies, such pride could have a positive result for foreign relations (Park 2008).\(^4\) This ‘democratic pride’ manifests in the growth of a robust civil society, the need for the democratic regime to distance itself from policies pursued by the previous authoritarian regime, and pressure to establish domestic legitimacy through economic performance (Acharya, 2010:337,353). Therefore, following a democratic transition the leadership would be more likely to look inward to install democratic infrastructure, including institutions and values, so as to avoid domestic problems that may arise following democratisation (see Galbreath, 2004:208-11).\(^5\)

Scholars also argue that inward-looking leaders of newly democratised countries have little incentive to actively pursue foreign relations in the context of cooperation within regional institutional mechanism, unless they see a domestic imperative for doing so. Such imperatives could include, among others, strengthening the progress of democratisation or resolving

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3 While the rise of nationalism may lead countries to become involved in armed conflicts, it may not hamper the process of democratisation itself. For an example of an in-depth examination on this topic, see Gutierrez (2009); regarding a specific point of discussion on nationalism and war see, among others, Comaroff and Stern (1995).

4 For instance, in spite of the territorial disputes between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima Island, and the rising nationalistic sentiment associated with it, both countries have refrained from using excessive military power as a means to resolve the claim, instead exchanging arguments based on historical and legal facts regarding the island. For details, see, among others, Cho and Kim (2011); Korea Times, 31 July 2008; and BBC, 25 September 2012.

5 For other criticisms toward Mansfield and Snyder’s analysis, see, among others, Narang and Nelson (2009).
economic problems. For example, following its democratic transition, Brazil was quick to engage with its neighbouring region by participating in the creation of Mercosur (Common Market of the South) in 1991 (Steves 2001). Mercosur was driven by the desire to nurture intra-regional trade and to reduce economic dependence on the US, as well as to counter American hegemony in the region (Heine, 2012:211; de Oliveira 2010). While informed by the spirit of nationalism and economic motives, enhancing regional cooperation was also seen as a means to secure their democratic transition. In this case, Brazil and other democratising Latin American countries signed the Santiago Commitment in 1991 to re-emphasise the principle of democracy in the OAS (Organisation of American States) (Steves, 2001:91). Recognising the fragile and vulnerable process of democratisation, leaders of newly democratised Latin American countries sought to build a collective identity and mechanism with a view to strengthening the process of democratic consolidation (Dabène, 2009:61). The regional activities of these democratising countries were intended to support internal stability while capitalising on potential for economic gain.

Some authors, for example Cox (2000) and Kunczik (1997), have also suggested that the involvement of new democracies in regional mechanisms can be linked to a desire to improve their international reputation. Policies pursued to achieve this goal have primarily involved projecting certain ideas (see, Haacke, 2003:Ch.7). In the ASEAN case, for instance, regional co-operation fostered attempts to modify the structure of the association and to question the sanctity of existing regional norms, thus encouraging a redefinition of traditional patterns of elite interaction (Acharya, 2003b: 376-7, 388). Accordingly, the newly democratised Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines supported a broadening of the institution’s agenda, permitting a more relaxed understanding of state sovereignty, and allowing issues, that were previously deemed taboo by authoritarian governments, to be addressed (Acharya, 2003b:377).

For most democracies, projecting certain ideas abroad is a way to increase their international influence and it is often a feature in their foreign policy initiatives (see, for instance, Cox et.al 2000). These ideas have generally been about, although not limited to, democracy, and the promotion of democratic ideals (see, among others, Nau 2000; Levitsky and Way 2005a; Gershman 2004; Kurki 2010; Youngs 2009). Only once certain ideas are appreciated by political leaders and the public can they be promoted abroad (McClosky, 1964; Linz 1991). In practice, there are various reasons why countries incorporate certain ideas into

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6 Apart from the discussion on the promotion of democracy, authors have also examined promotion of human rights but in a domestic, instead of foreign policy, context. For this discussion, see, for example, (Gareton 1994; Campbell and Mahoney-Norris 1998; Appiagyei-Atua 2002, Shuto 1998; and Cierco 2011). This thesis, however, will not separate the two components in such a way because human rights is often practically regarded as one of the measuring components of democracy (see, for instance, Freedom House Reports).
their foreign policy strategies, the most common reasons involving image-building in order to foster domestic and international legitimacy (see, for instance, Gorjão 2002; Kunczik, 1997:74, Carbone 2009; He 2008)\(^7\), and the removal of adversarial political regimes (Kegley Jr. and Hermann, 2002:27; Clement 2005; Goldsmith 2008; McFaul 2004). If foreign policy is considered an extension of domestic policy (Fearon 1998), then certain ideas need to be recognised and embraced internally, at least by decision-makers, before they can be projected abroad because without such recognition it is unlikely these ideas will be incorporated into the decision-making process (Wolff and Wurm, 2011:89). Once diffused, leaders can promote these ideas abroad through foreign policy strategy that may be linked, or identical, to what other countries have been pursuing (Seitz 2003).\(^8\) This linkage of policy, referred to as ‘geopolitical linkage’, is particularly salient in the connection between the West and the East (Asia) (Levitsky and Way 2005b). For example, policies on aid schemes, generally practised by developed countries, e.g. the Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)\(^9\), which was similar to the European practice on democracy promotion in other countries started particularly in the 1990s (see, among others, Youngs 2001).

For these promoted ideas to be effective elsewhere, the policy should be aimed at changing the relative power of political actors in the targeted polity (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006:919-20). For this reason, authors have generally focused on development in targeted countries in order to assess the impact of ideas promoted by other countries (see, for instance, Carothers 1999; Schraeder 2002; Doyle 2000). In countries promoting certain ideas, the preferences and strategies have become norms for decision-makers who regulate foreign policy (Wolff and Wurm, 2011:88-89). In practice, mature and consolidated democracies are more likely to promote their national values (democracy) abroad than newly democratised ones (Nau 2000; Gershan 2004). This is because consolidated democracies have had democratic ideas embedded in their state affairs, while newly democratising states tend to be preoccupied with the task of consolidating democracy at home.

Overall, this section highlights that unless certain political or economic gains can be achieved by pursuing active external relations, democratising countries are likely to be inward-looking.

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\(^7\) For detailed discussions on the relationship between image and foreign policy, see, among others, Wang (2003); Hülße (2009).

\(^8\) In the study of IR, this is often addressed as “imitation”. See, for instance, Wendt (1999:325).

\(^9\) For background information and a discussion about ODA, see JICA, “Overseas Economic Cooperation Operations”; Sudo (1992). For an examination of its implementation on other countries, see, among others, Fouse and Sato (2006); Er (2013:14); Yasutomo (2005)
1.3.1.2 Understanding the link between democratisation and foreign policy-making: actors in the decision-making processes

1.3.1.2.1 Authoritative actors

The executive: the president and the foreign minister

In general, democratisation allows for freedom of expression and political rights for citizens while executive power is constrained and accountable to other institutions, if not by the public (see Diamond, 1996:22-23). Under such circumstances, the number of actors involved in foreign policy decision-making process is likely to increase. Therefore, as a political system democratises, the role of the main foreign policy decision-makers in the executive is often challenged by other actors. These challenges could be ‘vertical’, originating from the electorate or interest groups in society, or ‘horizontal’ emanating from bureaucrats or the legislative body (Kozhemiakin 1997:61). In spite of these challenges, it should be noted that official foreign policy strategy is, ultimately, a product of the executive with the President, or Prime Minister, as the paramount decision-maker (Hill, 2003:53-54). Therefore, in some cases of democratisation, the role of the president and his foreign minister remained unchanged.

In post-apartheid South Africa, for example, it is argued that foreign policy remains a state-centric affair, emphasising the role of the president, which negates the importance of other institutions as well as the people’s participation (van Wyk, 2012:80). The centrality of the president was evident in the case of the early post-apartheid period when Mandela viewed an outward-looking policy as a prerequisite for addressing the state’s economic problems. For this purpose, he sought to immediately reinstate relations with other Southern Africans states, promoting democratisation and fostering regional development within the region utilising multilateral means through the Southern African Development Conference (SADC) (Nytagodien 1997; Lyman 1996). The parliament’s ability to influence foreign policy decision-making was further limited under Thabo Mbeki’s administration. The Mbeki’s administration created the Policy Coordination and Advisory Service (PCAS) in the president’s office as a response to the existing ‘fragmented, ineffective, and expensive’ foreign policy processes, thus allowing the president to keep the foreign policy decision squarely within his office (Nel et.al, 2004:47).

The centrality of the president was also evident in Russia’s foreign policy-making following the democratic transition. In this regard, authors have proposed similar conclusions,

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10 A more comprehensive and detailed definition on democratisation will be included in Chapter Two.
11 For practical purposes, unless otherwise stated, the term “president” will be used when referring to the political position of the head of state/government.
suggesting that democratisation has modified the relatively unconstrained foreign policy
decision-making authority of the top leadership due to the involvement of new domestic actors
(Malcolm and Pravda, 1996:552; Trenin and Lo 2005; Light, 2000:97-8). Nevertheless, they
also argue that regardless of these new actors, the authority of the president in making foreign
policy remained strong. For instance, the role of Gorbachev was salient in Russia’s refusal to
launch a military operation to preserve the communist regimes of Eastern Europe in 1989
(Brown, 1997:249). Pointing to disagreements between Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament over
the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) agreement in 1996, Malcolm and Pravda
(1996:544) assert that ‘through all the conflicts with the parliament over foreign affairs, the
executive has succeeded in retaining dominant control.’ Therefore, Russian foreign policy was
regarded as ‘the sum of the president’s personal relations with foreign leaders’ (Trenin and Lo,
2005:9). The dominance of the president, consequently, circumvented the Soviet Communist
Party Central Committee, and the Foreign Ministry, who were mainly tasked with executing
decisions already made by the president (Trenin and Lo, 2005:10).

In Thailand, the centrality of the executive following its democratisation was
represented by the prominence of the foreign minister. For instance, in 1991, in the context of
Thai foreign policy on Myanmar, Thai Foreign Minister (FM) Arsa Sarasin put forward the
approach of ‘constructive engagement’, the spirit of which was renewed by FM Surin Pitsuwan
when he introduced the concept of ‘flexible engagement’ in 1998 (Haacke 1999; Acharya
2004). These approaches indicate the dominant role of Thai diplomats – represented by the
foreign minister – over the military generals whose personal economic ties with the Myanmar
junta had existed since the 1980s (Dosch, 2006:55). For this matter, key civilian foreign
policy-makers were at the forefront of Thailand’s foreign policy and this has been an attempt
to establish civilian supremacy over the military and also to emphasise the dominance of the
Foreign Ministry (Dosch, 2006:54).

1.3.1.2.2 Non-authoritative actors

The parliament
The non-authoritative actors in foreign policy decision-making discussed here mainly involve
the parliament. Public opinion will also be discussed in the context of its ability to influence
foreign policy decisions in a democracy. In general, it is suggested that democratisation allows

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12 For a detailed discussion on this topic see Chapter Six.
13 For further explanation on the role of the military in Thailand’s democratisation between 1970s and 1990s, see
for an increase to role of the parliament. The growing role of parliament is often the result of constitutional changes (Dosch 2006; Baviera 2012). This increased role manifests in the parliament’s ability to scrutinise foreign policy decisions made by the executive and, in some cases, has allowed the parliament to propose its own foreign policy ideas. As a consequence of this change, the process of foreign policy-making can be lengthy as the executive may have to consult the parliament while making policy decisions. The example of Russia demonstrates this situation well.

In the Russian bicameral parliamentary system the parliament is able to assert its influence through the Duma (the Lower House) and the Federation Council (the Upper Chamber). They are endowed with the power to scrutinise foreign policy primarily when it concerns the ratification of an international treaty (Malcolm and Pravda, 1996:543-4) and are also permitted to work with foreign parliaments as their immediate foreign counterparts (Trenin and Lo, 2005). At times, however, the role of the parliament has been disruptive as it often opted for a foreign policy approach that was not traditionally held by the Russian government (Malcolm and Pravda, 1996:544). This was indicated by the radical approach, exposed during Yeltsin presidency and often informed by a nationalistic sentiment, on foreign policy issues that has a component of ethno-nationalism, which has in turn increased tensions between Moscow and mainly other CIS countries (see, Pravda, 1996, 203-7; Kozhemiakin, 1997:69). The centrality of the presidency in Russia, however, has allowed the president to ignore a number of parliament’s foreign policy preferences, such as those related to the CIS integration policy (Malcolm and Pravda, 1996:544). A strong presidency on the one hand, and the increasing role of the parliament on the other, has led to a political power struggle in Russian foreign policy decision-making and tensions between the two institutions was reflected in the process of most Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin (Pravda 1996). The dominance of the Russian presidency over the parliament on foreign policy issues can be traced back to the position of the Emperor during the tsarists’ period, which gave the Tsar complete decision-making control (Trenin and Lo, 2005:9).14

In Thailand, the role of the parliament was limited and occasionally, the power of the executive in foreign policy decision-making prevailed over other influences. In general, the responsibilities of the Thai parliament were less clear, except in cases where a submission to international treaties was concerned (Dosch 2006; see also, Thailand Constitution B.E. 2550, art.190). Further, in a parliament whose members were heavily linked to, if not originating

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14 Under the 2007 Russian Constitution, the role of presidency in foreign policy, as in other state policies, was strengthened by significantly curbing the role of the parliament as well as by changing the election method of the parliament members and thus, centralised the decision-making power in the hands of the president. For details, see Russian Constitution; Oliker et.al (2009)
from, the local capitalist class (Sidel, 1996:59), political issues such as foreign affairs were less attractive than business-related affairs. This was evident in an analysis of the amount of sessions held by the parliament in relation to foreign affairs as opposed to other matters between 1993 and 2002, where only 129 sessions were conducted by the foreign affairs committee while 203 sessions were held by the agriculture and cooperatives committee (Stern, 2006:57). Thus, the minimal influence of the Thai Parliament in the context of foreign policy initiatives regarding the Myanmar during the early 1990s was no surprise. A change in attitude amongst the Thai legislature in foreign affairs, however, was observable between the late 1990s and early 2000s. This change was driven by the increasing political participation of individual parliamentarians in public policy (Stern 2006). A number of individual parliamentarians actively submitted inputs for foreign policy during this period (see Dosch, 2006:59). In this regard, the parliament’s involvement was highlighted by its participation in various inter-parliamentary networks in the region, such as AIPA and AIPMC. As a result, it was possible for the Thai Parliament to establish its own diplomatic channels (see Manumpichu 2013).

In the Philippines, the 1987 constitutional amendments granted the legislature, both the Congress and the Senate, substantial authority over the foreign policy-making process. Significantly, the role of the Philippines parliament was important in treaty ratification and the appointment of ambassadorial posts (Baviera, 2012:10). Notwithstanding the rejection of the extension plan for the US military base, which resulted in the closure of the base in 1991 by President Aquino (Dosch, 2006:61; Tarling 2010), the parliament’s contribution to foreign affairs was relatively low, such that its actions were deemed to be ‘toothless expressions of concern’ (Jones, 2009:389).15 As far as public opinion in the Philippines was concerned, it was not unusual for the president to ignore public opinion when formulating foreign policy, as the public was considered mostly inattentive unless foreign policy issues had major repercussions for larger constituencies, such as the rights of overseas workers (Baviera, 2012:11; Medeiros, 2008:xx).

A theory maintained that public is inattentive and ill-informed (see Risse-Kappen 1991), hence, foreign policy decision-makers were unlikely to follow public preferences as they believe them to be irrational (Sørensen, 1998:98). This, in turn, increases the likelihood of top-down foreign policy-making (Skidmore and Hudson 1993). A competing view, however, was suggested by Headley and van Wyk (2012:5-9) who argue that given the impact of globalization and revolution in information technology, the public are not always ignorant and as a result it makes sense for them to seek more influence in the policy-making process. While this argument

15 Lately, however, there has been speculation that Washington is planning to reopen its military base in these two areas of the Philippines. For details see Tarling (2010) and Johnson (2012).
points to the factors that are likely to increase the public’s knowledge on foreign affairs, Headley and van Wyk did not explore the question of whether the government would actually follow public opinion in making foreign policy, given the dominant role of the president in most states.\footnote{For an in-depth discussion on the link between public opinion and foreign policy see, among others, Hinckley (1992), Cohen (1973, 1995), Robinson (2008), and Hilsman (1971).}

In South Africa, the state-centric model offers an example of the government’s ability to discount public opinion in foreign policy decision-making (van Wyk, 2012:81-2). As van Wyk (2012:84) contends, even during Mandela’s presidency ‘a broad participatory mechanism was never created’, despite the promise to make foreign policy-making a more people-centred activity. In Thailand, the public is permitted a role in foreign affairs, demonstrated in Thailand’s changing foreign policy orientation in ASEAN, particularly during the 1990s, which was driven by calls to emphasise human rights and democracy in the region (Lynch, 2004:352). Accordingly, as Dosch (2006:62-3) writes, Thailand’s leadership attempted to gain a positive international reputation by announcing the country’s ‘participation in the global protection and promotion of democracy and human rights’. While acknowledging the role of public opinion, in practice, even in a democracy there is a limited degree to which the government can consider public opinion as a factor in foreign policy-making (see, e.g. Risse-Kappen 1991). Thus, making foreign policy remains primarily the domain of key foreign policy-makers in the executive.

Overall, the surveyed works demonstrate that separating foreign policy actors based on their authority to make formal decisions is useful to understand which actors matter and which should be focused on when analysing the foreign policy of a democratising country. Understanding this separation is also important to discover who, in a democratic political context, decides foreign policy. In this regard, the president and the foreign minister are likely to be the major foreign policy actors. In relation to new foreign policy actors (those that did not previously have the role in foreign policy, notably the parliament) the literature suggests that notwithstanding their lack of power to make and execute state’s foreign policy strategies, these actors can still shape the government’s foreign policy preferences, albeit only to a certain degree.\footnote{For further discussions on how they matter in foreign policy, see Chapter Two. For an explanation on how the Indonesian non-authoritative actors influence foreign policy decision-making, see, primarily, Chapter Three, Four, and Five.} In short, while democratisation has been able to modify the previously closed process of foreign policy-making by allowing the involvement of new political actors, the authority of the executive over the foreign policy-making process has generally not been compromised.
In sum, the literature reviewed in Part One suggests the following: (a) democratising countries are unlikely to pursue active external relations because they tend to be inward looking. However, if they do, an active pursuit of external relation is encouraged if there are certain political or economic gains that would benefit the domestic political situation; (b) democratisation has led to a widening participation of foreign policy actors in the creation of foreign policy, highlighted by the increasing role of the parliament and, to some extent, public opinion. However, notwithstanding this development, foreign policy remains generally the domain of key foreign policy actors in the executive where the president and the foreign minister continue to be the main foreign policy actors;

Part Two below reviews the literature on Indonesia’s democratisation by highlighting domestic changes since 1999. This discussion is followed by a synthesis of the general views about the link between democratisation and aspects of Indonesia’s foreign policy, including decision-making as well the values that are reflected in foreign policy strategy. This review is useful to understand the progress of Indonesia’s democratisation and therefore important because Indonesia’s political development contextualised the way Indonesian foreign policy leaders operate foreign policy.

1.3.2 PART II

1.3.2.1 Understanding Indonesia’s democratic transition: from Habibie to SBY

A number of scholars have conducted important research on the internal political environment following Suharto’s fall, and sought to further analyse the trends in post-authoritarian Indonesia (see, e.g., Emmerson 1999; Forrester 1999; Hefner 2000; and Aspinall 2005). The general consensus of scholars who assessed the early days of Indonesia’s Reformasi was that the fall of Suharto and the subsequent transition to democracy created an uncertain, if not gloomy, mood regarding Indonesia’s future (see, Forrester 1999, Emmerson 1999). The pessimism revolved around the question of whether the democratic transition would be successful, as argued by Eklöf (1999:236):

…it remains to be seen whether Suharto’s resignation signalled the beginning of a gradual democratic transition or merely an adaptation of the authoritarian regime to shifting circumstances with no more than a broadening of elite support.

Further, even though Indonesia had its first direct election in 2004, a number of scholars were still sceptical about the future of Indonesia’s democracy (see, e.g. Kimura 2012). As noted by Cook (2006:167):
Indonesia’s sudden and rapid democratisation has meant that it is difficult to gain a clear picture of what kind of democracy Indonesia is, and how and when the period of democratic consolidation will end.

Meanwhile, Diamond (2009) argued that: ‘while Indonesia’s democratisation has been settled, it is still premature to say that democratic political systems have already been consolidated’. This is because the Indonesian leaders after Suharto must settle the unfinished problems of the past, such as corruption and separatism movements (Paul 2010), while ‘planting the seeds for the future’ (Abdollah, 2009:569).

Despite this series of doubts, from 1998, Indonesia underwent what Huntington (1991:9) refers to as the initial stage of democratisation, marking the end of the non-democratic regime. The downfall of the New Order was sparked by the inability of Suharto to manage the impact of the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) for the country, which led to street demonstrations organised by pro-democratic movements marshalled primarily by Amien Rais, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono (see, among others, Aspinall 2005; Crouch, 2010:19-20). The movement, comprised mainly of ordinary people who were protesting about price rises and middle class – which included students, lawyers, NGO activists, and religious leaders (Uhlin, 1997:46) – were motivated by a feeling of distrust towards the ruling regime and a strong desire to curb corruption, collusion, and nepotism—widely known in Indonesia as KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme). The movement demanded an overhaul of Indonesia’s political and governance system that would embrace greater openness and transparency, and the supremacy of law (including in this context, the respect for human rights) (Abdollah, 2009:530). These demands were outlined in what the Indonesians called the ‘six reform demands’ (enam tuntutan Reformasi), which included (1) respect for legal supremacy, (2) the eradication of KKN, (3) the trial of Suharto and his cronies, (4) the amending of the 1945 Constitution, (5) the application of regional autonomy, and (6) the abolishment of the military’s dual-function (dwi-fungsi militer) (Vivapemuda 2012).

After the resignation of some key members in his Cabinet, such as Ginandjar Kartasasmita (Coordinating Minister for Economic and Industrial Affairs) and Akbar Tanjung (Minister of State Secretariat), Suharto was abandoned by his closest aides thus realising that he lost the necessary political support to sustain his presidency.18 Although the economic crisis

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18 In total, there were fourteen ministers that submitted their resignations to Suharto. Apart from Ginandjar and Akbar, they were Hendropriyono (Minister of Transmigration and Forest Settlement), Giri Suseno Hadihardjono (Minister of Transportation); Dr Haryanto Dhanurirto (Minister of Horticulture and Medicine); Justika S. Baharsjah (Minister of Agriculture); Kunto R Mangkusubroto (Minister of Energy); Rachmati Bambang Sumadjiho (Minister of Public Works); Rahardi Ramelan (Minister of Research and Technology); Subiakto Tjakrawerdya (Minister of Cooperatives and Small Businesses); Sanyuto Sastroawardoyo (Minister of
appeared to catalyse the fall of the regime, to some, the crisis was no more than a context (see, for instance, Dosch, 2007:9). For example, former Indonesian Foreign Minister (2001-2009) Hassan Wirajuda believes that the 1997/98 crisis was merely a trigger for greater change in Indonesia as it was actually the imbalances between the economic growth and the political freedom demanded by the people triggered the collapse of the regime (Wirajuda, personal communication, 2010).

Indonesia’s democratic period began when the new president, Baharuddin Jusuf (B.J) Habibie, Suharto’s former vice president, was inaugurated as president on 21 May 1998. Immediately after assuming office, Habibie took the substantial step of removing the Anti-Subversion Law and government regulation regarding Pancasila as the sole basis of Indonesia’s political life. Essentially, both regulations were provisions used by Suharto’s regime to curb the political freedoms. Suharto, through his speeches in 1982 and 1983 (later formalised in 1985) required all organisations to adopt Pancasila as the ideological basis (Ramage, 1995:18; Hefner, 2000:121). Pancasila was the New Order’s manifestation of the integralist stream of thought as it provided the basis of the government’s rejection of Western notion of democracy and an ideology which rejected the idea of opposition, depicting it as un-Indonesian (Elson, 2001:240). Therefore, for Suharto, Pancasila ‘integrated all Indonesians with the basis, ideology, and ideals of Indonesia and prevented the Indonesians from inner conflicts and tensions which could become the source of division’ (Elson, 2001:239). In other words, through the use of Pancasila as the sole basis, Suharto wanted to curb the potentials for powers and ideologies that did not receive his ‘approvals’ from challenging his political power. Unsurprisingly, once Habibie lifted the Anti-Subversion Law, Islamist organisations and political parties mushroomed in the new democratic environment. Another central element of Habibie’s presidency was decision to support decentralisation. As opposed to Suharto’s centralised politics, through Law No. 29/1999 on Regional Autonomy (later amended by Law No. 32/2004), Habibie catered to public demand for more regional autonomy, essentially allowing the regions to be self-regulated on all matters apart from foreign policy, security and defence, the judiciary, fiscal and monetary matters, and religious affairs.

Indonesia’s democratisation process continued when Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of Islamic organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), was elected president following the rejection of Habibie’s accountability speech by parliament. Wahid was in office from 1999 to July 2001. His rise to presidency was the result of a highly fractured parliament, with a religious (Islamic)

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Investment); Sumohadi (Minister of Forestry); Theo L. Sambuaga (Minister of Manpower); and Tanri Abeng (Minister of State-owned Enterprises) (Kompas, 27 May 1998).

19 A greater discussion on the relevance of Pancasila in the current period and its importance in Indonesia’s foreign policy will be discussed in Chapter Four.
faction, who preferred a male president, and nationalist groups who demanded Megawati, initial winner of the presidential vote, as leader. In order to avoid political stagnation, and to calm Wahid’s supporters who were protesting outside the parliament building, Amien Rais, the then MPR speaker, formed the middle axis (poros tengah) and devised a political compromise that made Wahid president and Megawati vice president. As the son of the NU’s longest serving chair, Wahid Hasyim, and the grandson of NU’s pioneer founder, Hasyim Asyari, Abdurrahman Wahid had been chairman of NU for three consecutive terms (from 1984 to 1999). Further, according to Saiful Mujani (2003:71), Wahid was an agent who sought to modernise Muslim political culture. He always believed in pluralism, which was why his political party, PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, The National Awakening Party) – although traditionally being an inclusive Islamic party – maintained Pancasila as its ideological foundation in the 1999 election.

In the manifestation of his democratic mind-set, Wahid decided to revoke Suharto’s Presidential Instruction No.41/1967 on the restriction of Chinese religious practices and traditions in January 2000 as a means to promote religious freedom in Indonesia. Further, in his attempt to implement democratic principles, Wahid restored civilian supremacy over the military. It was during his term that civil-military relations improved, marked by, inter alia, the separation of the police from the military and the appointment of Juwono Sudarsono as the first civilian defence minister since the 1950s (Clear, 2003:178). Wahid maintained his commitment to civilian supremacy by installing Machfud M.D, a civilian and cadre of PKB, as Sudarsono’s replacement following a Cabinet reshuffle in 2000. It was also under Wahid’s presidency that the Indonesian military decided to abolish the doctrine of dwifungsi - a commanding doctrine that evolved from General Abdul Haris Nasution’s ‘Middle Way’ concept as a means for justifying the Indonesian military’s expansion into socio-political life, popularised in the mid-1950s (Honna 2003). As such, the renunciation of the dwifungsi doctrine provided a pathway for the military’s gradual withdrawal from daily political and social affairs, marked by the readjustment of its position in parliament to becoming a ‘professional Indonesian military’ (Chrisnandi, 2005:31). Additionally, the Indonesian media, for the first time since Suharto’s

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20 NU chairmanship was elected every five years.
21 For Wahid, pluralism means both descriptive and prescriptive. By this, it meant awareness that Muslims are diverse and people are religiously diverse. It also means that everyone has the right to be exclusive and inclusive. Wahid, in this sense, chose to be an exclusive person. See, for instance, Muhammad Ali, The Jakarta Post, 6 January 2010.
22 For details on the function of this doctrine, see e.g. Schwarz (1994) and Hadiwinata (2003).
23 In this context, the TNI parliamentary seats were reduced from 100 in the mid-1990s to 38 in the 1999 election (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002:47). In 2004, TNI no longer had parliamentary representatives and in the 2009 election, TNI soldiers were ordered to surrender their right to vote (see, Pikiran Rakyat, 28 June 2010). For a detailed discussion on the role of the TNI in the post-Suharto’s Indonesian politics, see Mietzner (2006).
ousting, enjoyed greater freedoms, evidenced by the increased number of publishers from 289 during the thirty-two years of Suharto’s government to 1,389, while the number of TV stations multiplied ten times to 60, including local networks (Antara, 15 February 2008). However, after a series of political crises and an allegation of involvement in several corruption cases, not to mention his erratic behaviour, Wahid was forced to abandon the presidency in July 2001 (Azra, personal communication, 2 March 2009; see also Barton, 2002:344-345).24

Following this, Megawati took over Indonesia’s presidency due to her capacity of Wahid’s vice president. During Megawati’s presidency (2001-2004), Indonesia attempted to develop a better, more stable political landscape through which it might consolidate its democratisation. One of Megawati’s achievements was promoting good governance and transparency by establishing the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK).25 During her short presidency, Indonesia was faced with multiple challenges as well as opportunities, both in terms of domestic and foreign policies. Most notably was the response of the Muslim community in Indonesia towards not only her status as a female president – she was initially rejected by a number of Islamic groups, including that of her vice president’s – but also her policies on terrorism and relations with the US following the 9/11 tragedy. Islamic groups in Indonesia has viewed President George W. Bush’s response to 9/11 as an attack against Islam, which led to mounting anti-American sentiment (Hainsworth, 2007:137). In attempts to convince the public of her pro-Islamist stance, Megawati was paired with Hasyim Muzadi, then NU chairman, in the 2004 presidential elections. It was also during the final year of Megawati’s tenure that Indonesia assumed the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2003 – a year in which, for the first time, Indonesia took the bold step of promoting democracy abroad. Megawati’s defeat in the 2004 direct presidential election led to the rise of a former general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (popularly known, and hereafter referred to, as SBY), who ran with businessman-cum-politician Jusuf Kalla of the Golkar Party.26

24Further, according to a prominent political scientist and Islamic figure, Azyumardi Azra, there were six situations involving his emotional and stubborn behaviour for which Wahid was further cornered. First, in response to Wahid’s waning relationship with the DPR over the increasing tension on Wahid’s alleged corruption cases, he seemed to condone the violence committed by his fanatical supporters, mostly in East Java. Second, he appeared to condone the abuse by certain NU ulamas of classic Islamic concepts, such as jihad, against his opponents, who were Modernist Muslims. Third, he threatened that a number of provinces, mainly with a large mass-base for NU such as East Java, would separate from Indonesia if he were unseated in the Special Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). Fourth, he asserted that, if the Session was held, he would issue a decree to dismiss parliament. Fifth, he fired the national police chief without consulting the DPR and, sixth, on the 23rd July 2001, he finally declared martial law, which finally led the MPR to hold an early special session the same day. This, in the end, resulted in Wahid’s impeachment. See Azra (2006:46).
25 The KPK, formed based on the Law No.30/2002 regarding the Formation of the Corruption Eradication Commission, is an independent body that works separately from the other law enforcements bodies – the police and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) – to probe corruption cases in Indonesia. The body has been at the forefront of this effort.
26 Golkar stands for Golongan Karya (Functional Group). It was once the strongest government party and served as the political machine of Suharto’s presidency. Jusuf Kalla was previously the Coordinating Minister for People’s
In this election, SBY and Kalla won more than 60% of the total votes. The parliamentary election, that took place in April of that same year, was contested by twenty-four political parties, the majority of which were new. The instalment of a democratic election system as well as a number of domestic achievements, such as improved economic performance, relatively peaceful conflict resolution, e.g. in Aceh, and promises to improve Indonesia’s human rights situation, served as indicators of Indonesia’s democratic potential.

1.3.2.2 Indonesia’s democratisation and foreign affairs

Based on the domestic changes, Indonesian foreign policy is said to have been has been affected primarily in three important areas: the process of foreign policy decision making, the actors involved, and the issues (Dosch, 2006:66, 2007). Dosch argues that democratisation leads to increased interaction between formal institutions and informal influences, creating a more open decision-making process which includes more actors than in previous times. Regarding foreign policy issues, the ‘new actors’ in foreign policy have been more free to introduce certain ideas that would not have been on the agenda under the authoritarian regime, such as human rights.

As far as foreign policy decision-making is concerned, other authors have generally arrived at a similar conclusion: it is affected by democratisation, which diversifies the decision-making power of the central authority, and non-governmental actors have increased influence over foreign policy-making (see, among others, Anwar 2003, 2010a; Sukma 2006; Vermonte 2005). Murphy (2005:283-84) argues that democratisation has led to a power shift from the executive to the legislature, which according to Laksmana (2011:163-64), foreign policy-making has been more complicated than ever. Further, Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making during the Reformasi period has been marked by the increasing role of the parliament (DPR), which in turn made foreign policy-making more consultative. For an examination of how political decisions are made in the parliamentary process, see, Sherlock (2010:160-178). For an authoritative discussion on the role of Deplu in response to the changing dynamics of the foreign policy-decision making process, see, Nabbs-Keller (2013).
making especially in cases that require parliamentary approval, such as the ASEAN Charter ratification (Rüland 2009). Further, the DPR, in tandem with the epistemic community, has been instrumental in persuading the government to elevate democracy and human rights in it foreign policy values (Rüland 2009:398). With the increased involvement of these actors, Indonesian foreign policy has been argued to take a bottom-up decision-making model (see Rüland 2011), therefore signalling a change in the foreign policy-making process.

While these works presented authoritative arguments about how foreign policy is made in Indonesia, only a handful of work recognised that essentially the leaders in the executive remained the key foreign policy-makers in Indonesia. In this context, Nabbs-Keller (2013) notes that the Indonesian foreign minister was the key actor in transforming Indonesia’s foreign policy particularly between 2001 and 2009. Nevertheless, an account on the role of Indonesian Presidents during these periods was not thoroughly discussed. Indeed, a discussion on the role of president is important given that Indonesia’s governing system is presidential thus, s/he has the ultimate decision-making power. Similarly, while recognising the involvement of new political actors in Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making, Novotny (2007) maintains that foreign policy has been determined by the perceptions of foreign policy “elites”. However, his study suffered from several conceptual, definitional, and factual mishaps. For instance, it failed to specify who these elites were casting the net so wide that included all ranks in bureaucracy as well as businessmen and military leaders (Novotny, 2007:69). He was unclear in who is primarily responsible for the decision-making process in Indonesia, an issue that will be tackled in this thesis. Businessmen in Indonesia are unlikely to be considered foreign policy elites and while low level bureaucrats can offer their views on certain situations, it does not necessarily mean they are in a position to make decisions. Essentially, the authority to make such decisions lies in the hands of their superior, most notably the foreign minister.\footnote{Other mishaps were minor and these include, for instance, his assertions on the year in which Indonesia gained independence (p.2) and his understanding on the notion of “rowing between two reefs” – popularised by Indonesia’s first Vice President Mohammad Hatta, in which he incorrectly applied the interpretation of “two reefs” as to involve China and the US (p.9). To this extent, Indonesia’s first vice president Mohammad Hatta initially stipulated this analogy in the context of Cold War blocs and non-alignment position of Indonesia (see, Hatta 1953).} Therefore, as this study demonstrates, other foreign policy actors who participate in the decision-making process had only limited roles in determining Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions and that the literature only partially explored Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, the salience of the president and foreign minister in Indonesia underscores the continuity, and not a change, in Indonesia’s foreign policy-making.

In terms of substances of Indonesia’s foreign policy, Dosch (2006, 2007) held that human rights and sovereignty, among other issues, became more salient in Indonesia’s post-
authoritarian foreign policy. His study, however, did not fully considered that while human rights has only occupied certain areas of foreign policy, such as Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar, the importance of sovereignty has been at the core of Indonesia’s diplomacy long before Indonesia democratised. These issues will be addressed by this thesis in Chapter Six and Chapter Four, respectively. In relation to ASEAN, Anwar (2010a) argues that Indonesia continued to put ASEAN as its foreign policy focus while making democracy and human rights important foreign policy features in this regard. However, while she mentioned that Deplu has been ‘greatly assisted by the inputs provided by think-tanks and independent scholars’ (Anwar, 2010a:139), she was not entirely clear as to how these ideas came to feature in Indonesia’s foreign policy. This lack of analysis will be addressed by this thesis by looking at the roles of ideas entrepreneurs and the preferences of Indonesian foreign policy leaders in Indonesia’s foreign policy on ASEAN (see Chapter Five).

Indeed, Indonesian leaders encouraged the prominence of news ideas following the ousting of Suharto’s regime, most notably democracy and human rights (e.g. Sukma 2011). These ideas were largely absent during most of the New Order period, where individuals were treated as an organic part of the state, thus allowing the government to avoid guaranteeing fundamental rights and liberties against the state, known as the integral state’s concept (konsep negara integral) (Feith and Castles, 1970:191). Notwithstanding the emergence of these values at the domestic level, democracy and human rights only became a foreign policy focus in 2003, when Indonesia assumed the ASEAN chairmanship (see, Wibisono 2010; Sukma 2011; Acharya 2009a). In this regard, Jakarta had included the idea of promoting democracy in the region via the Indonesia-initiated concept of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). Furthermore, in 2008, Indonesia embarked on a new foreign policy initiative to emphasise the importance of democracy and human rights by establishing the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), a forum for mainly Asian countries to share experiences of democracy (see, among others, Murphy, 2009; Currie 2010).

In addition to democracy and human rights, given that Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim country and political Islam plays a key role in domestic politics, there is

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29 At the domestic level, following his presidential inauguration Habibie was quick to introduce two national regulations that were essential to the promotion of human rights: Law No. 39/1999 regarding Human Rights, and Law No. 26/2000 regarding the Human Rights Court. Such a decision was expected to help enhance Habibie’s popularity at home and abroad.

30 This concept of amalgamation between the rights of the individual and the obligation of the state towards such rights was first introduced by Professor Soepomo, Sukarno’s former Justice Minister (1945, 1949-1950). Soepomo believed that there should not be a separation between the rights of the individuals and the obligation of the state to protect these rights, as individuals, with their own position, are obliged to help achieve the state’s greatness. In this regard, Suharto’s regime was perceived as a good example for the application of this concept. For details, see Simanjuntak (1994).
potential for Indonesia’s foreign policy to reflect Islamic values in its decisions. During the early years of Suharto’s administration until the late 1980s, Islam was not an important political feature as Suharto feared that it could challenge and ultimately overcome his authority (Sukma 2006; Vatikiotis, 1993:121). Suharto’s concern in this regard was informed by three considerations: first, Suharto was an abangan (nominal Muslim) rather than a santri (devout Muslim) (Suryadinata, 1996:14-15),31 second, the military still believed that Islam could threaten political stability and that elements of the Muslim community still wanted to establish an Islamic state (Perwita, 2007:44); and, third, Islam was not the philosophical basis of the state. In other words, although Islam is the religion of the majority, it is not that of the state. It was not until 1990 that the role of Islam in Indonesia’s politics increased, as Suharto was forced to embrace Islam as a new socio-political pillar in order to balance the power of the military after his relationship with the army soured (Ramage, 1995:50). In this case, the passing of Suharto’s strongest loyalists and the founders of CSIS, Ali Murtopo (died in 1984) and Sudjono Humardani (died in 1986), added to Suharto’s already strong suspicions of Benny Murdani, who was allegedly preparing for a leadership succession within the army, which inspired a ‘de-Bennyisation’ in 1993 (Eklöf, 2003:231). Military officers loyal to Murdani were purged after his own removal from the post of Defence Minister, bringing Suharto’s relationship with the military to new lows. Hoping that he could sustain his leadership, Suharto reached out to Islamic constituents. Consequently, in 1990, the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI) was formed to accommodate Islamic interests in politics. ICMI, while gradually becoming an important player in the politics of Suharto, also became essential for recruitment of ICMI members into the senior government ranks (Aspinall, 2005:32).

During the Reformasi era, the revival of Islam saw it become a bargaining tool for political purposes (see, for instance, Jamhari 1999; Emerson, 2005c:33). As such, strong Islamic credentials helped to elevate individuals who wished to become involved in politics. The ascendency of Wahid to the presidency32 on the one hand, and the desire of Munarman – spokesperson of the FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front) – to become a parliamentary candidate for PPP (Partai Persatuan dan Pembangunan, United and Development Party) in the 2014 election, on the other, offer examples of this phenomenon.33

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31 A definition and further discussion of this typology will be presented in Chapter Three.
32 Although Wahid came from a very prominent Islamic background, his political ideology has been ‘secular-exclusive’, meaning that he believed that the Pancasila was compatible with Islam, but perceived that the development of Islamic society and the accommodation of Islamic moral values and aspirations by the government would threaten the existence of the secular state and the tolerance towards minority groups (Baswedan 2004).
33 The decision by PPP to include Munarman, who is known as one of the top leaders of the hardline Muslim group, FPI, as a potential candidate for the 2014 parliamentary election was made public in January 2013. This decision was criticised by many. The most salient fear was that PPP was increasingly being dragged into the games
However, Islam is not a pillar of foreign policy and was given a ‘secondary place’ (Sukma, 2006:5) therefore, Indonesian foreign policy was never “Islamised” in terms of its key agendas. An example would be Indonesia’s recognition of Palestine, which was not based on demands of the Muslim brotherhood or coreligionists (Leifer, 1983:138), but rather on the spirit of humanitarianism and solidarity among nations, as enshrined in the Preamble of Indonesia’s Constitution.34 As such, the influence of religion in Indonesian foreign policy was a matter of form over substance and it has remained circumscribed during Reformasi (Fealy, 2004:143,154).

Apart from democracy and Islam, another idea that could manifest in foreign policy during the Reformasi period was nationalism. As Part One of the literature review outlines, nationalism is often prominent during democratic transitions. Traditionally, the Indonesian people have been staunch supporters of nationalism, motivated by the struggle for independence. It was an element that was greatly emphasised in the five principles of Pancasila35, and it was through ‘nationalist’ rather than ‘Islamic’ ideas that Sukarno envisioned a country in which religions could coexistence peacefully (Reinhardt, 1971:26). While in Indonesia there has not been a hostile foreign policy approach taken on the ground of nationalism, as Mansfield and Snyder (1997, 2002) hypothesised. However, ordinary Indonesians have often expressed nationalist sentiment in their own (foreign) policy preferences. Political leaders have also drawn upon nationalism when they wish to appeal for domestic support. The dynamics of Indonesian-Malaysian bilateral relations provides a good example on this (see Chapter Seven).

Notwithstanding the political freedoms introduced during the Reformasi era and the consolidation of democracy, Indonesia’s democratisation has presented a number of foreign policy options, most notably the through the increasing number of actors involved in foreign policy-making and the emergence of ideas or values that have the potential to influence foreign policy strategy. Democratisation has contextualised the emergence of these ideas and allowed for specific notions, notably democracy and human rights, to become the primary ideas featured of Islamic hardliners and thus could lose its most mainstream political supporters. Munarman, however, was found unqualified for the post as he failed to submit his papers as an administrative requirement to the National Election Commission (KPU). See, Diputra, Okezone, 31 January 2013; Merdeka, 28 June 2013.

34 The Preamble of the Indonesian Constitution, Paragraph One, states “Bahwa sesungguhnya kemerdekaan itu ialah hak segala bangsa, dan oleh sebab itu maka penjajahan diatas dunia harus dihapuskan karena tidak sesuai dengan prikemanusiaan dan prikeadilan (whereas independence is the inalienable right of all nations, colonialism must be abolished from this world as it is against humanity and justice). Further, in a public seminar in Jogyakarta, Central Java, November 2012, the Director for Middle-East Affairs of Deplu stated that Indonesia will be consistent in supporting the Palestinians to achieve their independence as such a support is ‘mandated’ by the Indonesian Constitution”. See, Islam Times, 1 December 2012.

35 Other than nationalism, Pancasila is based on humanitarianism, a representative government, social justice, and a belief in one God.
in the foreign policy arena.

1.4 The analytical framework

In approaching the main research question, this thesis employs an analytical framework with core arguments linked to literature on democratisation, foreign policy decision-making, and the relationship between identity, ideas, and foreign policy. This is primarily because the basic tenets posited by the literature on democratisation facilitate an examination of Indonesia’s political transition in light of democratisation theories. Meanwhile, the theories on decision-making suggest that in spite of the growing influence of political actors in decision-making process that resulted from an open political environment, foreign policy remains exclusively the domain of certain individuals in leadership position within the executive. Institutions other than the Foreign Ministry, such as the parliament, did not significantly matter as far as making state’s foreign policy is concerned. This underscores that even in democracies, foreign policy-making remained a top-down process. Lastly, developing a conceptual framework based on theories about the influence of identity and ideas in foreign policy allows this thesis to demonstrate that while particular ideas (most notably about democracy) featured in foreign policy, hence promotion of these ideas abroad, the process is not automatic. This process is likely to be mediated by the role of ideas/policy entrepreneurs in foreign policy decision-making and for ideas to shape foreign policy, they must be internalised and shared by primarily the foreign policy leaders.

Therefore, the framework this thesis developed will focus on the role of leaders, the salience of institutions, and the influence of identity and ideas in foreign policy. A focus on these factors permits an analysis of the impact of democratisation on, as well as the changes and continuities in, Indonesia’s foreign policy.

1.5 Methodology

In their work, Clough and Nutbrown (2007:23) distinguish methodology from method. The former provides the reason for using a particular method, while the latter refers to the ingredients of research. Put simply, method is the means with which we conduct the research (i.e. discourse analysis, interviews, or surveys) and methodology covers the justification for the method taken. The first task here is to clarify how the research was conducted. This will be followed by an explanation of the reasoning behind selecting certain methods with which to conduct the research.

36 The analytical framework will be further explored in Chapter Two.
This is a qualitative research study which employs empirical research to understand the context of events. In principle, this research seeks to understand the impact of a socio-political event that has influenced the conduct of contemporary Indonesian foreign policy by studying the perspectives of those involved in the decision-making and by exploring the causal relationship between democratisation and foreign policy. In understanding this causal relationship, one assumes that ‘particular outcomes can be explained in light of a factor that exerts the same impacts across all observations’ (Goertz and Mahoney, 2009:307).

This assumption is checked by examining case studies that reflect the influence of a factor (or a set of factors) (Sprinz and Wolinsky, 2002:10). Case studies are well defined aspects of a historical happening that one selects for analysis (Bennett, 2002:29). A case study analysis allows the author to explore a phenomenon in context using a variety of data sources (Baxter and Jack, 2008:544). This thesis selects case studies which can be categorised into two interrelated types: on the one hand, they are instrumental because they are used to provide insight into an issue – in this case, the link between democratisation and foreign policy –while on the other, they are intrinsic as the cases were specifically chosen to obtain further insight into this relationship (Stake 1995). The case study approach was chosen for a number of reasons: (i) apart from answering what, this thesis also seek to address why the impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy is, arguably, limited; (ii) the author is not involved in the decision-making process on policies related to the case studies therefore, he can only interpret the perceptions or statements of those involved in the process and cannot manipulate the behaviour of the decision-makers; and (iii) this thesis considers that the context in which foreign policy is made is important and relevant to the phenomenon under study (see also, Yin 2003).

This thesis utilises Southeast Asia as the regional context in which Indonesian foreign policy is applied, because this region, with ASEAN as the regional mechanism, has been a cornerstone for Indonesia’s diplomacy. Further, Indonesia is perceived to be the de facto leader in the region therefore, a change in the domestic political situation in Indonesia is likely to influence regional politics more generally.

The specific case studies were selected for two main reasons. First, they highlighted areas in which the impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy has been most visible. Second, these case studies are instrumental in describing the changes and continuities in Indonesia’s foreign policy following the ouster of Suharto, both at the bilateral as well as regional-multilateral level. Specifically, the Ambalat dispute with Malaysia serves as the most

37 For a distinction between qualitative and quantitative method, see, among others, Punch (1998).
38 For a declaration on this, see, the Annual Press Statement of the Foreign Minister of Indonesia (2002, point 149). See also Deplu, “Lingkaran Konsentris Deplu (the concentric circle of Deplu).”
important conflict that Indonesia has had to deal with in its bilateral relations in recent years. Therefore, Indonesian behaviour in relation to such an important case would indicate the approach to conflict management more generally. Indonesian foreign policy on Myanmar is also an important case study because Myanmar is the most egregious case and symptomatic of Indonesia’s foreign policy in general. Myanmar also serves as key case study to highlight the lack of human rights promotion in the context Indonesia’s promotion of democracy and human rights at the bilateral level. By focusing on the importance of leaders, the role of institutions, and the salience of identity and ideas in foreign policy, these case studies help to address a lacuna in the existing literature. Focusing on these variables provides a means for explaining the impact of democratisation on foreign policy and how democratisation has shaped foreign policy. These cases were selected after a preliminary study and assessment of relevant foreign policy events, which found them to be the cases that were most pertinent to the issue of democracy.

In analysing the link between democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy, the salience of the aforementioned variables was traced through literature studies and interviews with Indonesian foreign policy elites. The majority of interviews were conducted during field research in Indonesia and Singapore, between 2009 and 2011, and include meetings with former ministers, active and retired diplomats, parliamentarians, members of civil society groups, and foreign observers. The interviews were conducted thoroughly to ensure reliability and validity of the information given. For this purpose, the author used a set of questions designed in accordance with, and categorised based on, the relevant foreign policy areas to ensure that the topic is well covered and the substance of the event is revealed. In order to obtain focused answers, the questions raised during the interviews were selected based on the expertise of the source. For example, questions on Indonesia’s foreign policy activities in ASEAN regional cooperation were not raised to human rights activists or religious leaders. In other words, semi-structured interviews with open ended questions, tailored to the respondent’s position and expertise, were used.

It is important to raise questions to the respondents based on their position and expertise because a respondent is likely to respond based on their knowledge on, and experience in dealing with, certain foreign policy issues. Prior to raising the questions to the respondents, the author considered the respondents’ professional background and the likelihood for them to be able to generate the desired response towards the questions. In this context, a general type of questions were asked to nearly all interviewees. Questions such as whether one sees democracy as a foreign policy value during the Reformasi era or the general feeling that one has toward Malaysia were some of the examples. Meanwhile, questions that were linked to the selected
foreign policy areas were raised to individuals who possessed the expertise on the relevant foreign policy issues or were involved in the decision-making process with regard to these foreign policy issues. For instance, a question on the decision regarding the dispatch of the Indonesian Navy’s warships to the disputed area in the Ambalat was asked to, the first and foremost, Prof. Juwono Sudarsono, who was the Minister of Defence when the event occurred. Classifying the interview questions in such a way helps the author to obtain more specific information about the context of, and the reasoning for, the making of certain foreign policy decisions.

The interview respondents were divided into two categories: Deplu officials and non-Deplu individuals. This distinction helped the author to limit the amount of raw data and building a workable data set, before they were checked against the initial assumptions held by the author. Therefore, this separation was useful for cross-checking the interview responses with information about certain foreign policy events obtained from secondary sources in order to avoid unjustified and, to some extent, biased information (McNabb, 2010:234), which was often noted as the vulnerability of qualitative method (see Mays and Pope, 1995:119). In addition to interviews, the primary sources used in this research include unclassified governmental and legislatures documents, public statements, speeches of main foreign policy actors, written correspondence between the foreign minister and the parliament, reports, and minutes of meetings. Printed and online secondary sources were also used, including books and magazines, newspapers, journal articles, PhD and Masters Dissertations. These sources were both in Indonesian and English.

The information gathered from these sources was analysed by employing an interpretative approach. This meant that the author interpreted and constructed the meaning of texts and interviews in order to understand the context of certain foreign policy decisions and their relations with Indonesia’s democratisation.

In principle, interviews were the main primary source of data for this study because the research topic was relatively recent and hence there was a limited amount of secondary source materials available. This study also took advantage of the author’s position as someone close to primarily the former Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Hassan Wirajuda, as well as an employee of the Indonesian Foreign Service. These positions facilitated access to interviews with active, as well as retired Indonesian diplomats, and with other prominent individuals who were involved in making Indonesia’s foreign policy.

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39 For details on this approach and further discussion about the methods, see Chapter Two.
1.6 Contribution of the study

This study firstly seeks to contribute to scholarship on democratisation and foreign policy. By using the aforementioned analytical framework to examine the impact of Indonesia’s democratisation on its foreign policy, this thesis asserts, in contrast to several academic theories, that democratic transition does not necessarily lead to hostile foreign policy preferences (see, for instance, Mansfield and Snyder 2002). This is because democracy, as a basis for foreign policy action, was common amongst the Indonesian decision-makers and it, therefore, constrained aggressive foreign policy approaches. Secondly, the shared consensus in the literature suggests that, following a democratic transition, it is likely that there will be a dispersion of power in foreign policy decision-making processes. In this case, in the democratic political context, the main foreign policy-makers in the government are influenced by actors outside the executive, such as the parliament and, to some extent, public opinion, leading to a more bottom-up approach to foreign policy-making (see, e.g. Skidmore and Hudson 1993). Indonesia, however, presents a different case. Although foreign policy-making is more complex as a result of the emergence of new political actors and more consultative than during most of the New Order era, the formal authority to make foreign policy remains in the hands of authoritative actors in the executive, namely the president and the foreign minister. Thirdly, it is argued in the literature that identity affects foreign policy through the ideas or values it promotes (see Ashizawa 2008, 2013). In this regard, this thesis seeks to add to the discussion on how ideas influence foreign policy preferences through an analysis of the role of foreign policy actors and how the internalisation of values/ideas are likely to influence the link between identity, ideas, and foreign policy.

In addition to its theoretical contribution, this study seeks to add to the empirical discussion of Indonesian foreign policy during the Reformasi era. First, contrary to conventional wisdom (see, Anwar 2003, 2010a; Nabbs-Keller 2013, Rüland 2009), foreign policy decision-making patterns remain largely unaltered, with the president and foreign minister serving as the central decision-makers. Foreign policy has also been made in isolation from the public and is often guided by the interests defined limitedly by the actors in the executive, and therefore remains a top-down process. Second, notwithstanding Indonesia’s democratic transition, Indonesia remains committed to a number of traditional foreign policy aspects, demonstrated by, inter alia, the continuity of the bebas-aktif principle as the dominant foreign policy doctrine. This finding suggests that democratisation had a limited impact on foreign policy. In sum, using an integrative approach that draws on works about democratisation, foreign policy decision-making, and the link between identity, ideas and foreign policy, this thesis contributes to the wider discussion about the relationship between
democratisation and foreign policy.

1.7 Limitations of the study and possible further research

This study is limited in the following ways: First, the focus of this study is on foreign policy formation, foreign policy doctrine, and foreign policy preferences in Indonesia after the ousting of Suharto. It does not consider the outcomes of foreign policy during the Reformasi era on other states or regional/international institutions because such an analysis would require a comparative study. This being said, the focus of this thesis is essentially on the importance of domestic changes in Indonesia’s own foreign policy.

Second, as this thesis focuses primarily on political issues, directing its attention to foreign policy initiatives that are related, by and large, to a political agenda, other economic and cultural issues, have not been addressed. This is because political issues are the primary areas in which changes to Indonesian foreign policy are visible. Nevertheless, since the variables used in this thesis are generalizable, one can indeed apply them to further studies about Indonesian foreign policy on issues that are not covered in this thesis.

Third, this thesis is limited by the availability of data concerning particularly the Ambalat dispute. This is because bilateral border negotiation between Indonesia and Malaysia are still in place and, therefore, the data is sensitive and there were no final positions of countries’ as yet. For this reason, this thesis relies on the primary information provided in interviews with Indonesian policy-makers. The views of Malaysian policy-makers have not been considered in depth, and this is a potential realm for future research.

Fourth, this thesis is also limited by a focus on the examination of Indonesia’s position vis-à-vis major powers in Asia in the context of regional cooperation beyond ASEAN. To this extent, the analysis of the impact of power structure, particularly between, but not limited to, the US and China in the East Asian regional arrangements on Indonesia’s foreign policy has been very modest. This is because the main focus of this study is to examine Indonesia’s foreign policy and not the impact of the external material factors on Indonesia’s diplomacy. A further study of triangular relations between the US, China, and Indonesia in the context of regional political structure and its influence on Indonesia’s regional leadership would be instrumental for analysing the significance of external factors and power politics in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Fifth, the analytical framework of this thesis focuses on the role of leaders, institutions (in this case is the parliament), and the link between identity, ideas, and foreign policy. As a result, this thesis does not assess the patterns of interaction between, for instance, leaders in the executive and public opinion or interest groups and their impact on foreign policy—which are
common in the study of democratisation. This is because this study argues that even in a democracy, the role of leaders remains influential in deciding foreign policy. This being said, a study on the role of public opinion or bureaucratic politics in Indonesia’s foreign policy could be useful to analyse foreign policy content from a different perspective.

The final limitation concerns the timeframe of the case studies. This thesis examined case studies that occurred between 2001 and 2011 – although some reflections were as recent as 2012 and 2013. In 2014, Indonesia will undergo a general election. It is important to assess the impact of this political event on Indonesia’s foreign policy given that SBY will not be eligible for re-election as he has been in office for two consecutive terms. In this context, one may find it important to look at how the new administration will craft and practice Indonesia’s foreign policy in the areas examined by this study, in particular, and Indonesia’s foreign affairs in general.

Given these limitations, this thesis acknowledges the constraints of data and scope inherent in this study. However, it does possess a strong argument on the important impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy particularly in relation to political cooperation in the regional context.

1.8 The structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of eight chapters. This Introduction is the first. Chapter Two discusses the analytical framework, integrating theories and concepts of democratisation, foreign policy decision-making, and the relationship between identity, ideas and foreign policy. Once constructed, the framework will be used to guide the analysis made in subsequent empirical chapters. Chapter Three discusses foreign policy-making in Indonesia, focusing on foreign policy actors in Indonesia, covering both the New Order and Reformasi periods. This chapter is essential because in a democracy, traditional foreign policy actors are joined by new actors who gained their influence as a result of democratisation. Consequently, in Indonesia, foreign policy-making became more complex due to this proliferation of actors. In Chapter Four, the thesis will discuss the importance of ideas in foreign policy, by examining Indonesia’s basic foreign policy doctrine, bebas-aktif. It will also cover its implementation in the post-Suharto era. This chapter demonstrates the relationship between Indonesia’s democratisation and the principal ideas that have long guided the practice of Indonesian foreign policy.

Chapters Five to Seven address the case studies. Chapter Five discusses Indonesia’s regional cooperation following the democratisation process. Central to this chapter is Indonesia’s foreign policy in ASEAN, particularly after its 2003 chairmanship. This chapter highlights the role of Indonesian leaders, particularly the president and foreign minister, in
determining the state’s foreign policy preferences in relation to ASEAN, while not entirely excluding the influence of non-authoritative actors, especially the DPR and ideas entrepreneur, in the policy-making stage.

Chapter Six examines Indonesian foreign policy in relation to promotion of political values beyond the ASEAN context. This chapter will explore the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) initiative as a hallmark of democracy promotion in the wider Asia and Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar. This chapter will also discuss the link between democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy with regard to East Asia cooperation, where promotion of democracy and human rights was less visible. This chapter highlights the instrumental role of Indonesian foreign policy leaders in pursuing the policy of democracy and human rights promotion. Specifically, in the Myanmar case, if the Indonesian leaders were to bow to pressure from the public and the parliament, an aggressive Indonesia’s foreign policy would have been possible.

Chapter Seven analyses Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Malaysia, particularly with regard to territorial disputes and Ambalat case. This chapter will demonstrate the effect of democratisation on the way Indonesia handled territorial conflicts at sea with its neighbour by highlighting the various foreign policy preferences emerged at different levels in Indonesia. This chapter also examine a period when foreign policy could have been more hostile, despite Indonesia’s democratic identity, but was not. Chapter Eight will summarise the findings and provides the overall conclusions.
2 Analytical framework: democratisation and the role of leaders, institutions, and identity and ideas in foreign policy

This chapter sets up the framework for analysing the role of leaders and institutions as well as identity and ideas for the analysis of Indonesian foreign policy in the subsequent, empirical chapters in this thesis. Building on the theoretical literature on democratisation, foreign policy decision-making processes, and the nexus between identity, ideas, and foreign policy, this thesis opts for an analytical approach that allows us to understand who governs in Indonesian foreign policy, how the so-called ‘democratic identity’ influences foreign policy, which ideas are prevalent in certain foreign policy cases, and why they matter. This chapter shows that in analysing Indonesian foreign policy following democratisation, one should focus in particular on the role played by the Indonesian foreign policy leaders, however not to the complete exclusion of what this thesis refers to as non-authoritative actors40, i.e. the parliament and bureaucracies other than the foreign ministry, and the core ideas espoused in the context of Indonesia’s democratic identity. These factors explain why there was both change and continuity Indonesia’s foreign policy during the Reformasi era.

This chapter begins by defining democratisation and the stages it involves. The purpose here is to fit Indonesia’s transition – as discussed in Chapter One – into the theory of democratisation. It then proceeds to examine the concept of foreign policy decision-making. Importantly, this section links democratisation, as a political context, with foreign policy decision-making, as a political process. In Section Three, this chapter discusses the salience of institutions and foreign policy leaders in the making and the execution of a state’s foreign policy. Here it will be argued that irrespective of the regime type, foreign policy decision-making processes will always be dominated by a set of limited actors by virtue of their designated authority and knowledge. Nevertheless, (new) foreign policy actors who prior to democratisation had no role in the foreign policy-making process, namely, the parliament and, to some extent, certain individuals with expertise on foreign affairs, also influence the shaping of the state’s foreign policy agenda, despite their status as non-authoritative actors. This is especially likely when they hold ideas about certain foreign policy issues that are different from those of the authoritative actors. Section Four looks at the major foreign policy decision-making actors in the executive and the factors that are likely to influence these leaders to continue or chance a particular course of foreign policy. In Section Five, this chapter discusses the role of identity and ideas in foreign policy. The analysis of Indonesia’s foreign policy during the

40 For further discussion on this classification in Indonesia, see Chapter Three.
Reformasi period shows very clearly that the ideas espoused primarily by the authoritative and, to some extent the non-authoritative actors, cannot be separated from the new perceived identity of the country. These ideas are therefore important for determining the preferences for foreign policy action. Drawing on the concept of the nexus between identity and foreign policy, how ideas turn into foreign policy behaviour is discussed. Section Six will conclude with a review of the framework used in this thesis based on the preceding sections. It also offers some notes on methods to operationalize the framework.

2.1 Democratisation, democracy, and foreign policy: definitions

2.1.1 Understanding democratisation and its stages

In its simplest definition, democratisation can be understood as a transitional period experienced by a country with a non-democratic political system – usually authoritarian – as it becomes a democracy (see, among others, Huntington 1991; Mansfield and Snyder 2002, 2005). Often an election becomes a yardstick for democratisation, in that it has to be conducted freely and fairly distinguishing it from elections in non-democratic regimes, where elections are usually used as “a means for forging support for the ruler to stay in power” (Gourevitch 2002). The process of democratic transition usually consists of three stages: the end of the non-democratic regime, the inauguration of the democratic regime, and the consolidation process (Huntington 1991).

Ending a non-democratic regime.\footnote{The notion of ‘regime’ is broader than ‘government’ as changing the former would usually include overhauling the systems in which the latter operates. For greater details about this distinction, see Hagopian and Mainwaring (1987).} The existing literature suggests that the motivation for ending a non-democratic regime can entail external and internal factors. External factors include, among others, a prerequisite for integration imposed by regional/international organisations embracing democratic principles (Oguzlu 2004; Ram 2003), foreign military intervention (Mandelbaum 2004; Grimm 2008; Dower 2002), and severe economic crises (Robinson 2006; Wright 2007). Meanwhile, internal factors usually involve, for example, a struggle to define national identity (see, for example, Rustow 1970; Linz and Stepan 1996; Hsu, Tsai, and Huang 2008; Turan 1997), as was the case in Britain in the 17th century. This alone could be the raison d’être for states undergoing democratisation. External and internal factors can sometimes be intertwined, as demonstrated by the case of India, where the ending of non-democratic regimes was accomplished through the process of decolonisation.\footnote{For details on India’s process of decolonisation, see, Randall and Scarritt (1996).} In a situation of an acute economic crisis, the political transformation that democratisation entails is often a
preferred exit strategy perceived by the elites to overcome the crisis (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).\(^{43}\)

The fall of Suharto’s regime, as argued in Chapter One, is a case of intertwined internal and external factors. Internally, the end of the New Order in 1998, as argued by Wirajuda (personal communication, 2010), was caused by the paralyzed relationship between economic development and political freedom, including freedom of expression (see also, Freedman 2005:239; Heryanto and Hadiz 2005). In this case, the inability of Suharto’s government to respond to the impact of the Asian financial crisis on Indonesia, as an external factor, contributed to his weakening authority, and consequently, the security of the regime. As a result, this situation allowed the pro-democracy political forces to assert pressure on the government. It is important to remember that the legitimacy of Suharto’s regime rested primarily on a developmentalism. Therefore, once the economy underperformed, the regime’s legitimacy was severely affected.

*Inauguration of democratic regime.* Once the first stage is achieved, what follows next is the instalment of democratic regime. In many cases, this process is enabled by free and fair elections. Regular free and fair elections are often depicted as the basic procedural requirement for a country to become a democracy and, in this context, there are some minimum conditions that need to be met. A discussion on these dates back to Robert Dahl’s conceptualisation of democracy in 1971. For Dahl, democracy involves the existence of (1) the right to vote; (2) the right to be elected; (3) the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; (4) free and fair elections; (5) freedom of association; (6) freedom of expression; (7) alternative sources of information; and (8) institutions for making public policies that depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Dahl, 1971:3). These conditions should be executed with, if not complemented by, a number of democratic standards, which include effective participation of those entitled to vote, equality in voting, gaining enlightened understanding of policy alternatives, and exercising final control of the state agenda (Dahl 1998:38).

Elections should thus not be the sole determinant for ensuring the success of a democratic transition. They should rather be treated as an intermittent but essential prerequisite for democratic transition. This is because elections are expected to produce new political actors that work to make the state’s political institutions more committed to democratic principles.\(^{44}\)

\(^{43}\)Economic crisis in this case might create a focal point for opposition mobilisation. It might also cause business elites and capitalists to defect from the authoritarian regime and create a division within the regime over economic policy in response to the crisis. For an authoritative account on this, see Wright (2007).

\(^{44}\)In some cases, this means allowing for public opinion to factor in the decision-making process. However, the inclusion of public opinion in that process should not set the standard for democratic institutions because even in non-democracies, public opinion could matter. For a greater discussion about the role of public opinion in non-democracies, see, for instance, Hughes (2012), Gries (2005), and Datong (2007).
These institutions include, but are seldom limited to, parties and party systems, legislative bodies, state bureaucracies, judicial systems, and systems of interest intermediation (Schedler, 1998:100-01). In many cases, the inaugurated democratic regime would assign new leaders to those institutions where they would operate by making new regulatory systems – which usually requires amending the constitution – in order to build a democratic political polity with supporting institutions.

Democratic political institutions usually allow for public opinion to feature in their decision-making processes although the final decision outcomes may not always reflect what all of the public aspire to. Political elites in democracies tend to listen to, but do not necessarily follow public opinion, even in parliamentary democracies (see, Capling and Nossal 2003; Saalfeld 1997). Indeed, political elites often ignore public opinion in times of crisis (see, e.g., Trumbore and Boyer 2000; Allison and Zelikow 1999).45 Here the argument is that the extent to which popular opinion influences political leaders will essentially depend on the personal judgement of the leaders concerned (see, for instance, Hilsman, 1971:118-20). A good example of this was the British government’s decision to send troops to Iraq in 2003.

The success of democratic regimes in transforming political institutions is deemed to underscore the progress of a democratic transition (Dahl 1971; Huntington 1968). In other words, the absence of strong and democratic political institutions might lead democratisation to remain ‘incomplete’ (Huntington 1991). Through these transformed political institutions political elites are expected to facilitate the exercise of one’s rights as a citizen in order to strengthen the viability of a workable democratic transition (Whitehead, 2002:10; see also, O’Donnell and Schmitter 1993). Once democratic regimes are inaugurated, the political elites must deal with the third stage: consolidating democracy.

Consolidation process. In Southeast Asia’s experience, democratisation has been a challenging task as the fall of non-democratic regimes has not always led to the dismantling of the patrimonial oligarchic system of the state, such as in the Philippines (Sidel 1996; see also, Hutchcroft, 1998:20). Other problems like corruption, the consolidation of power in the face of opposition from those who were ousted during the democratic transition (such as the military), and ethno-nationalism (see, Hsiao 2008; Chang 2008; Rustow 1970), are some of the major issues that the new government must handle. Therefore, consolidating democracy is regarded as a tricky process since the new democratically elected leaders have to tackle the legacies of the old regime (Davidson 2009). Due to the generally fragile nature of the consolidation process, democratising countries may well experience a democratic setback. This occurs, for

45 For authoritative discussions about public participation and (foreign) policy-making in democracies, see, among others, Cohen (1973); Risse-Kappen (1991); Dye (2001); and Hilsman (1971).
example, when the military intrudes into the political process, particularly if it seeks to assume political leadership through non-democratic means, as in the case of Thailand’s coup in 2006 (The Guardian, 19 September 2006). A democratic setback could also be stimulated by undemocratic behaviour of democratically elected leaders demonstrated in, for example, the manipulation of election results as a means to sustain their political power (Coppedge, 2005:290; see also, Englebert and Boduniszynski 2005).

In principle, during the process of democratic consolidation one would expect that a democratising country can achieve a situation in which none of the major political actors, parties, organised interests, forces, or institutions consider any alternative to democratic processes to gain power, and that no political institution or group has a claim to veto the actions of democratically elected leaders (Linz 1990). In other words, there is a consensus among the elites to accept democratic ideas as the rules of the game and that the electorate should determine the parameters of freedom (McClosky 1964:373). In this regard, the absence of the military from daily politics and the functioning of democratic political institutions become critical. At a minimum, democratic principles involve elections and the availability of civil and political freedom, commonly referred to as ‘procedural democracy’ (e.g. Schumpeter 1976; Schedler 1998; Dahl 1971). Extending the condition of the electoral process to other major aspects of governance could lead a democratising country to adopt the values of liberal democracies, characterised by, among others, the presence of civilian supremacy, public accountability, political freedom and freedom of expression, and the principle of equality before the law (Diamond, 1999:10-13; 1996:22-23).

Importantly, democratic consolidation has become a phase where political actors submit to the constituents their moral commitment towards public accountability and democratic principles. If the consolidation of democracy is successful, a democratising country is likely to incorporate democratic principles for making that country a full-fledged democracy. In this case, a successful consolidation of democracy would help secure the transition process from undemocratic behaviour that could cause a democratic breakdown (Schedler, 1998:95).

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46 For other works on the consolidation of democracy, see, among others, Linz and Stepan (1996), who emphasised the need for a shared normative and behavioural commitment to the rules and practices of the country’s constitutional system.

47 In the table data presented in his research, McClosky’s analysis on American politics (its elites and the public, or the electorate, in general,) showed that the need for consensus on democratic ideas should be stronger among the political stratum than the electorate is premised on the assumption that elites are better educated. This gave the elites the capacity to overcome political obstacles that the general public may not be able to cope with. To this extent, the public is thought to have lack of attention to political issues, thus, the public is considered to be not a part of the state’s decision-making circle. For a complete explanation on this, see McClosky (1964: 374-5).

48 Authors have also labelled countries adopting democracy during the third wave of democratisation as illiberal democracies. For details on the reasons for such a labelling, see, among others, Zakaria (1997).
According to the above definitions, where does the case of Indonesia fit in? As discussed in Chapter One, Indonesia has indeed progressed through the three stages outlined here by ousting Suharto’s authoritarian regime, followed by a series of free and fair national elections in 1999, 2004, and 2009, and culminating in the inauguration of a democratic regime. Indonesian political elites have also reasonably inserted provisions into national laws that would ensure that its citizen’s rights are respected in order to consolidate its democracy. As a result, one would find a construction of political institutions in order to tackle the problems of the past (such as the anti-corruption Commission, or Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), the Regional Representative Council (DPD) – a parliamentarian body established to reflect the politics of decentralisation, and the Broadcasting Commission (KPI) – an independent state institution established to ensure that public information is not monopolized by the government). At the same time, the military withdrew from politics and the police was civilised. These domestic political developments suggest that Indonesia has made sufficient headway to be considered a democracy.

In relation to foreign policy, what does the transition to democracy mean? Two major possibilities are proposed here. First, the transition could render the foreign policy decision-making process more complex given the increasing role of (new) political actors who previously had no role in the policy-making environment. In this regard, particular importance falls to parliament. Second, as Chapter One notes, the notion of having become a ‘democracy’ becomes the basis for the political leaders’ foreign policy decisions. In this case, foreign policy leaders refer to the ‘democratic identity’ of their country as the underlying impetus for pursuing distinct foreign policy decisions. Put differently, foreign policy preferences are linked to the perceived new identity of the country. The ‘flexible engagement’ strategy pursued by Thailand’s government officials in 1998 in relation to the issue of Myanmar is an example of this (e.g. Haacke 1999). In Indonesia’s case, former foreign minister Wirajuda included many references to the perceived democratic identity of Indonesia in his foreign affairs speeches. At the 56th session of the UNGA (15 November 2001), for example, he noted: ‘…Indonesia today stands proud as one of the largest democracy in the world… We, Indonesians, have a natural affinity to democracy.’ Before discussing identity in more detail, however, we need to discuss the relationship between democratisation and the way foreign policy is made.

2.2 Understanding the link between democratisation and foreign policy-making process

In the study of Foreign Policy Analysis (hereafter, FPA), analysing foreign policy generally means examining its decision-making process as the way decisions are made can shape the
eventual choice of foreign policy action (Mintz and De Rouen Jr., 2010:4). In the seminal work of Snyder et.al (1962:90) decision-making is understood as a process which results in the selection among a socially defined and limited number of alternative choices intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers. Therefore, the foreign policy decision-making process can be regarded as a process of selecting available options. Notably, what matters here more often than not is the judgment of the government, as the primary decision-maker within a state, as it engages with other international actors (see also, White, 1981:3).

In general, the way foreign policy decisions are made is influenced by a number of factors. These include, but are not limited to, the rationality of the decision-makers, an issue much explored with reference to cognition (Rosati 1995, 1987; Saphiro and Bonham 1973; Holsti 1976), bureaucratic competition (Halperin and Clapp 2006; Carlsnaes 2008; Halperin 1974), public opinion (Hinckley 1992; Cohen 1973), and domestic politics (Hagan 1995; Putnam 1988; Fearon 1998; Keohane and Nye 1977). Foreign policy decision-making is of course also influenced by systemic factors, such as the international power structure (Langhorne 2005; Wohlforth 2008). Although these factors are important in their own respect, this thesis is above all interested in assessing how foreign policy formulation proceeds in the context of Indonesia’s democratisation. In other words, who shapes foreign policy in Indonesia and how has the transition from authoritarianism to democracy impacted upon the foreign policy decision-making process?

If democratisation is thought to ‘open’ up the foreign policy decision-making process beyond the top executive leadership, then an increasing role of other actors should be anticipated. These actors usually include the parliament (e.g., Dosch 2006) and interest groups (see, e.g., Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Risse-Kappen 1995). The role of the government in determining policy actions towards certain foreign policy questions is to a certain extent also compromised by the salience of non-governmental actors. The growing influence of those domestic actors in state-society relations could either expand or constrain the liberty of the foreign policy-makers in setting the state’s foreign policy agenda and priorities (e.g. Pakulski, 2012a:10). To take account of these actors, some authors have characterised the foreign policy decision-making pattern as a bottom-up process, assuming that political leaders would follow the majority voice of the public, as opposed to a top-down model where foreign policy is guided by narrowly defined interests and isolated from the public (Skidmore and Hudson, 1993:7-8).

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49 For a number of illustrations on this, see Chapter One.
Foreign policy-making is profoundly influenced by the context in which each issue occurs, internationally and domestically (Gyngell and Wesley, 2007:25; see also, Farrands 1981; Anwar 1998). That concerns, particularly, the environment where a foreign policy is made and executed. For foreign policy analysts understanding the foreign policy context is fundamental because the nature of the international system and domestic politics is not constant hence, ‘there are likely to be major shifts in the relations between the two realms as well as in the policy responses to which this shifting relationship gives rise’ (Webber and Smith, 2013:30). Every country’s foreign policy strategy is influenced by different contexts, even when they face similar foreign policy events. When Indonesia and Malaysia were involved in *Konfrontasi*, Sukarno’s domestic political survival was salient in explaining Indonesia’s position, while the Malaysian leaders were more concerned about the nation’s survival following the country’s formation (Chua 2001). In this regard, the leaders’ foreign policy responses are likely to depend on the political context, as it is important for their policies to be accepted domestically (Gyngell and Wesley, 2007:26). As Farnham (2004:445) notes, foreign policy decision-makers (especially those who operate in democracies) would find it difficult to act effectively in the international sphere if a policy lacks domestic acceptability, and for this reason they would assess domestic sentiment along with the international situation.

As highlighted in this thesis, for Indonesia the democratic political system served as the general context for foreign policy strategies during the *Reformasi* period. As Chapter Three notes, Indonesia’s top executive decision-makers did not only themselves believe in the value of democratisation, but they also regularly met with the parliament, which has considered itself a key locus of democratic reform. This demonstrates that these decision-makers felt it was ‘necessary’ to incorporate *Reformasi*’s key values of democracy and human rights into Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda to reflect the post-Suharto political changes in the country. As we shall see, this development is particularly relevant to foreign policy on ASEAN, not least given Indonesia’s leadership role in the Association. This leadership role has ranged from Indonesia’s exercise of the grouping’s chairmanship to the wider region’s relationship with Indonesia as the Association’s *primus inter pares* (see, Chapter Five and Six). Similarly, the traditional foreign policy doctrine, *bebas-aktif*, which was promulgated by the Indonesian foreign policy leaders in response to the international political antagonism at the time of the Cold War, has also served as an important context (see Chapter Four). These contexts then have influenced the way the Indonesian founding fathers perceived the country’s international status.

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50 In practice, these context can also intertwine thus, foreign policy analysts must assess two or three contexts together in order to explain the policy outcome. See, for instance, Milner and Mukherjee (2009); Galbreath (2004); and Putnam (1988).
and place in world affairs (see Weinstein 1976). In the next sections, the thesis explores the extent to which institutions and leaders matter in foreign policy.

2.3 Democratisation and foreign policy-making actors

2.3.1 The role of institutions: the parliament and bureaucracies other than the foreign ministry

A transition to democracy usually has an impact on the role of the institutions, most notably the parliament, by way of allowing their views to be considered in the decision-making process. Foreign policy issues which contain other dimensions not traditionally handled by the foreign ministry would also require inputs from affected government institutions such as the TNI in relation to Indonesia’s decision concerning the Ambalat case, or Komisi I regarding the ratification of ASEAN Charter.

Non-authoritative actors such as parliaments are more likely able to influence some decisions when they hold ideas that are different from the ones maintained by the main foreign policy actors. They thus become the proponents of new ideas and are sometimes recognised as policy entrepreneurs (see, e.g. Checkel 1993). Indeed, acknowledging the influence of the DPR, former foreign minister Wirajuda argued that ‘parliamentary diplomacy is an important component of Indonesia’s total diplomacy’ (BKSAP, 2009: foreword).

The role of the parliament in foreign policy is often regarded as that of counter-balance the executive (Hill, 2003:253). As such, the parliament plays a role in the decision-making process, either through supervision, scrutiny, or the investigation of the government’s policy initiatives (Hill, 2003:256). As the literature review in Chapter One notes, these parliamentary roles in the foreign policy decision-making practice in a democracy shape the state’s foreign policy agenda. Thailand and the Philippines are examples of how the parliament was able to persuade, if not pressure, their respective governments to follow a certain foreign policy direction. In a mature democracy, such as the US, the parliament (the Congress) has often acted as a constraint on a president’s decision (see, e.g., Mitchell, 2005:215). To this extent, as Mitchell argues, the knowledge a number of Congressmen or Senators had on certain issues provided the basis for the salience of the Congress in the US foreign policy decision-making process. Further, the Congressmen’s influence derives from the fact that the US Constitution

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51 A more detail discussion on policy entrepreneurs is included in Section 4 of this chapter.
52 For the purpose of this study, when parliament, or the DPR, is referred to, it is usually emphasised on the Komisi I unless otherwise stated.
53 For a more general discussion on the influence of the parliament in foreign policy and its relations with democratisation, including their illustrations, see Chapter One.
grants Congress the formal authority to declare war, raise an army, and prepare for the common
defence, in addition to ambassadorial appointments and making treaties (Peterson, 1994:220).54

In principle, the agendas of members of parliament are heterogeneous as they have
different perceptions of and varying interests towards foreign policy issues (see Putnam 1988).
It is unlikely, therefore, for them to have a single preference in relation to a particular foreign
policy issue (see, e.g. Milner, 1997: Chapter 3 and 4). Hence, the precise role of the parliament
in the foreign policy decision-making process is likely to be issue-based. In Southeast Asia, a
particular issue that generally attracts the attention of parliamentarians is sovereignty. For
instance, the failure to renew the military bases agreement between Manila and Washington in
1991 was partly driven by parliamentary concern about the continued presence of the US
military in the Philippines’ territory. Issues over sovereignty matters are likely to feature
especially during a democratic transitions as playing upon nationalist sentiment is often used
by political actors seeking to stay in office (see Mansfield and Snyder 1995). In Indonesia, the
involvement of the members of the DPR in the Ambalat dispute was motivated by their
perception that Ambalat was a problem of sovereignty, triggered by Malaysia’s intrusion into
Indonesian territory (see Chapter Seven).

The influence that parliament can have on foreign policy suggests that relations between
the government and the parliament always need to be readjusted (Manning, 1977:307). This is
because parliament is able to influence and occasionally set the foreign policy priorities of the
government. Nevertheless, the diversity of interests among the members of parliament and their
political partisanship limit the inability of parliament to consistently shape foreign policy
(Frankel, 1969:29; see also Barnett and Spano 2008).

Similarly issue-bound is the role played by other institutions such as other ministries or
the military and, to some extent, civil society organisations. For instance, the role of the military
and the defence ministry is usually conspicuous when a foreign policy issue has security or
defence implications (see, e.g. Woodward 2002).55 In this case, the military or the ministry of
defence will usually make their views known and these will normally be duly considered by the
foreign ministry, the foreign minister, or even the president. Depending on the political context
at hand, the input by the security establishment may occasionally dominate the thrust of the
president’s foreign policy decision and as such will prevail over the preferences put forward by
the foreign ministry. The advice given to President Habibie by the Indonesian senior military

54 For an authoritative discussion on the influence of the Congress in the US foreign policy-making process, see,
among others, Abshire (1979), Manning (1977) and Schlesinger (1972).
55 For a discussion on the influence of the military in non-democratic system, see, among others, Silverstein (1982).
leadership regarding the likelihood of the East Timorese to vote in favour of integration with Indonesia is an example where the TNI shaped foreign policy agenda (see Chapter Three).

In practice, the salience of the link between the main foreign policy decision-makers in the executive and the parliament, or even public opinion, is likely to be shaped by the issue type and by the prior information held by each actor. Therefore, their opinions may differ from each other (Cunningham and Moore, 1997:655; see also Witkopff 1990:135). However, in democracies, there is a considerable variation in the way the government would ‘follow’ public pressures. In principle, the salience of pressures on the government is likely to be determined by the degree of centrality of the political system (Risse-Kappen, 1991:487-88). For example, in the democratic political system of France, foreign policy decision-making is highly centralised hence, public pressures acquire only a marginal role in influencing the state’s foreign policy action (Risse-Kappen, 1991:493; 1995:20-22). To this extent, those who enjoyed the formal authority of making foreign policy were likely to consider the public as not being fully informed about the foreign policy substance (Almond 1950). In consequence, the public’s attitude was considered a poor source of foreign policy making, meaning a decision would usually stem from the elite’s consensus (see Dye 2001).56

In sum, the parliament and other institutions can be influential by shaping the foreign policy agenda of the government due to the ‘opening’ of the policy-making process following a democratic transition. This could normally shift the policy-making process to be bottom-up. Further, their role is noteworthy because they hold different ideas from the ones the authoritative actors maintain. In Indonesia, the parliament’s influence in foreign policy is usually exercised through various channels in foreign policy-making. Although they are not formally authorised to make foreign policy, the involvement of new meaningful players, in particular the parliament, has made the foreign policy-making process more complex and more consultative than was the case under Suharto’s authoritarian system. However, while the increasing salience of the parliament is noteworthy, in practice the foreign policy leaders in the executive are more likely to determine the state’s foreign policy decisions because they are responsible for formally making and deciding foreign policy.

56 In different cases, where countries are highly decentralised, popular opinion may have a considerable result of influence, such as in the case of the US defence expenditures policy-making. For details, see Ostrom and Mara (1986:838).
2.3.2 Who governs?\textsuperscript{57}: The inescapability of foreign policy leaders\textsuperscript{58}

Defining the actual foreign policy decision-makers is instrumental because although foreign policies cover various issues, ranging from politics to economics and from defence to the environment, the state’s foreign policy is decided primarily by those actors who are given formal authority to do so. Usually these actors are also limited in numbers (Hill, 2003:53). Only after clearly identifying who the foreign policy decision-makers are can one investigate the rationale for a state’s foreign policy action.

Traditionally, the operationalization of foreign policy in most countries is entrusted to the foreign minister (Frankel, 1969:27). S/he would have the formal authority to shape the foreign policy agenda/priorities of a state. The foreign minister operates in a bureaucratic setting provided by the foreign ministry. While the foreign minister is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy, it is very likely that the final foreign policy options considered by the foreign minister are the result of the interactions between the minister and his or her subordinates. In this context, while it is important to recognise that such interactions demonstrate that there can be multiple ideas present within a single decision-making environment (Holsti, 1976:20), it is unlikely, although perhaps not entirely impossible, for a policy option to result from mere intermittent meetings at the lower levels and to be adopted as the state’s foreign policy without approval from the minister. The selection of the foreign minister is subject to the preferences of the head of government in the form of the president or Prime Minister (hereafter PM).

In operating foreign policy, participation from ministers or bureaucracies other than the foreign ministry is likely. For example, when a matter concerns defence arrangements with another country, the defence minister will normally be involved. Likewise, the minister for manpower will convey his expertise and concerns in the case of migrant workers affecting bilateral relations. In this context, Legro (1997:37) introduces a framework for determining which ministries matter and when. He outlines three dimensions: the extent to which the bureaucracy has a monopoly on expertise, the complexity of the issue, and the time period available for action. In general, the foreign minister and his/her staff usually possess the expertise in foreign affairs compared to the bureaucrats from other ministries. This is underpinned by a number of factors including, but not limited to, the minister’s interest and experience in foreign affairs (Hudson, 2006:38-9). An experienced foreign minister generally

\footnotesize 57 This phrase “who governs” is borrowed from Christopher Hill’s work in his attempt to define the prominent office holders in an administration dealing with foreign policy. For details, see, Hill (2003:53).

\footnotesize 58 A different term had also been used to describe those who govern the foreign policy within a state, such as ‘foreign policy executive’ (Hill, 2003:56-62), and ‘foreign policy elites’ (Wibisono 2010; Novotny 2006, 2007). While Hill identified clearly those considered to be in his ‘executive’ category, Wibisono and Novotny failed to do so. In this thesis, however, the term of ‘foreign policy leaders’ is used interchangeably with ‘foreign policy authoritative actors’ and therefore, does not account for the non-authoritative actors. The authoritative actors discussed in this study are in principle leaders in the foreign policy context.
faces less pressure from his peers in the cabinet. This, in turn, increases the salience of the foreign minister and his staff in determining the foreign policy content.

As regards the time period for action, there are situations when foreign policy issues require an immediate response. This implies short decision-making cycles. In this case, the foreign minister’s ideas on what action to take tend to become crucial and although at some point coordination exists, normally the foreign minister is likely to have the leading role in making plans and – eventually – decisions. The role of the Indonesian foreign minister in the decision to hold the emergency Tsunami Summit in Jakarta ten days after the large-scale devastation of Aceh’s coastline in December 2004 demonstrates the salience of those three dimensions in practice. In short, although the foreign minister may face interference from other bureaucracies, these acts of interference are likely to depend on the issues and the context of the foreign policy event. However, such instances of interference are unlikely to hamper the formal authority of the foreign minister as a principal foreign policy decision-maker within a state.

Apart from the foreign minister, another main authoritative actor in making foreign policy is the head of government, who in some countries is separate from the head of state. In Britain, for example, although the Queen is the head of state, foreign policy is actually formulated by the government, led by the PM. The content is likely to depend on the platforms of the ruling party (see Williams 2004). By comparison, in France it is the head of state – the French President – who oversees foreign policy, with the foreign minister working closely with the president rather than the PM (e.g. Wright 1978). It is important to note that the dominance of the president in democracies can be as significant as in authoritarian countries. The cases of Russia and South Africa, as Chapter One demonstrates, are examples where the president remained central to foreign policy issues despite the democratic transition. The discussion on these countries suggests that the president has been more than a mere ‘policy director’ as s/he was, in many instances, the ultimate decision-maker of the country’s foreign policy (see also Spanier and Uslaner 1982:59). In this regard, while the foreign minister is a leader by account of his knowledge, expertise, and experience in dealing with foreign policy matters, and hence has the capacity to ‘lead’ the operationalization of foreign policy, the president leads by virtue of his/her formal authority to commit resources in foreign policy (Wildavsky 1991:14-17).

As the top office-holder, the salience of the president/the PM is, to a major extent, inevitable in determining the country’s foreign policy direction. Indeed Hill (2003:55) asserts that those who occupy the highest positions in a state govern foreign policy, thereby having the opportunity to dispose of a great deal of influence (see also Domhoff 1990:19; Higley 2010:163). By virtue of this understanding, therefore, the authority of these persons could
undermine the influence of other actors, i.e. the parliament. For instance, on the relationship between the White House and the Congress, Peterson (1994:224-25) notes:

… when the executive has steered a mainstream course considered by policy elites to be in the best interest of the country, Congressional pressures have been more of a nuisance than a policy determinant.

It has been suggested so far that leaders are important in examining foreign policy. Focusing on the role of leaders is important because even when the decision-making environment is complex and multiple ideas are present, the foreign policy executive, i.e. the political leaders in charge of foreign policy, has remained crucial in determining the policy decisions.59 Thus, the president – as the main foreign policy actor – acts beyond his/her capacity as a ‘policy director’ (see, e.g., Halperin and Clapp, 2006:16-17). The continued salience of leaders in making foreign policy, therefore, indicates that foreign policy decision-making is essentially a domain of a few actors, particularly those in the government. This is because foreign policy is understood as government activities concerned with the relationship particularly between states and international or regional organisations in the context of international relations (White, 1981:3). Indeed, foreign policy is normally limited to a small number of actors due to the nature of the issues, which can be specialised and overwhelmingly comprehensive. (Hill, 2003:69). In this regard, the foreign policy leaders can marginalise other actors located ‘outside’ the formal decision-making circle and this is likely when foreign policy is (a) decided centrally by a limited number of actors within the government, and (b) if the ideas maintained by those actors are irrelevant to the foreign policy issues at hand. Consequently, Alden and Aran (2012:19) note:

Foreign policy is the product of … individuals in leadership positions identifying foreign policy issues, making judgements about them and then acting upon them… [Therefore] individual leaders of states exercise a seminal influence over the foreign policy process by dint of their experience, outlook and limitations, and hence, were worthy of special attention.

2.4 Foreign policy change and continuity: a brief review

Being a product of individuals in leadership positions, foreign policy can therefore be continued or changed based on leaders’ decisions. In this context, it is important to review the possible reasons for foreign policy continuity and change. Foreign policy continuity is likely to occur, even under new leadership, when leaders appreciate or calculate that the existing policies are less hostile to their (or their parties’) interests or when those policies have been effective in achieving their intended goals (see, e.g. Chalmers 1997; Anwar 2003:79; Lynch and Singh

59 This focus is of course different from “leadership”, to which it defines the relations involving those who lead and their followers). For a discussion on the difference between leaders and leadership, see Ahlquist and Levi (2011).
Leaders also continue pursuing an identical foreign policy platform if they are bound to deal with pressing domestic priorities, such as economic issues, over foreign policy matters (Cameron, undated). Others have also emphasised the importance of a perceived national image, i.e. the country’s ‘appropriate’ position in the international structure, as a source of foreign policy continuity (see Kuchins and Zevelev 2012). To this extent, Kuchins and Zevelev argue that although Putin had been successful in reclaiming the top leadership role in the country, Russian foreign policy in general would continue as the domestic debate about Russia’s image as a great country in international politics has remained influential in shaping the preferences of whoever leads Russia. Specifically, they assert that ‘subordinating Russia’s foreign policy goals to that of the West…would greatly overshadow the country’s image as a great power’ (Kuchins and Zevelev 2012:149).

While leaders can maintain a foreign policy platform, foreign policy change is also likely (see, e.g. Doeser 2013; Welch 2005). As Hermann (1990:11) notes:

...when leaders change foreign policy, such decisions are the result of the determined efforts of an authoritative policymaker, frequently the head of government, who has the conviction, power, and energy to compel his government to change course (italics added).

Here, an important question is when do leaders change foreign policy and when is such a change the result of the domestic political context? Authors suggest that foreign policy is subject to change particularly when new foreign policy leaders assume office (Alden and Aran 2012:23; Gorjão 2002; He 2008). A leader changes the policy if the current approach did not serve the interest of the political groups that supported his/her ascendancy to power (Carroll et.al. 2012). An example is the relationship between Habibie’s decision to hold a referendum for East Timor and the preference of the Islamic group, particularly ICMI (see Crouch 2003). However, this is not to say that those supporting political groups are key decision-makers in foreign policy (see, e.g. Merle 1978 on the role of political parties in foreign policy).

It is also important to note that foreign policy leaders, as a member of the wider spectrum of the political elites, act in order to preserve their political position. As Schwartz (2009:177) notes, political elites are ‘ambitious people seeking office for individual recognition, career advancement, and the power to affect societies.’ To this extent, foreign policy leaders adjust foreign policy if their position is threatened by domestic political pressures (Hagan 1995:124). Hence, adjusting foreign policy could be seen as an effort to lessen domestic costs a leader faces (Hagan 1995:124; Welch 2005). As Welch (2005:8) notes, ‘foreign policy is most likely to change dramatically when leaders expect the status quo to generate continued painful losses.’ In the domestic political power struggle, these losses could relate to the loss of political power,
which, for political leaders, is costly. To overcome this kind of situation, Hagan (1995:128-31) proposes three alternative political strategies. The first is accommodation, which emphasises a situation where decision-makers respond to opposition with restraints in foreign policy by allowing bargaining among players, hence, foreign policy compromise. The second is mobilisation, in which foreign policy issues are manipulated by the regime in an effort to retain power. This manipulation could involve, among others, leaders’ appeals to nationalist sentiment. And the third is insulation, where leaders reduce or deflect domestic constraints by ignoring, utterly suppressing, or co-opting the opposition with political favours or concessions on other policy issues. As Chapter Six indicates, these strategies are not unusual for foreign policy leaders to pursue, especially when a foreign policy issue is thought to have a major political repercussion on domestic politics.

Leaders may also change foreign policy if the domestic political landscape experiences a significant change that led to the existence of a new perceived identity (see, e.g., Tsygankov 2013; Maloney 2002). Authors that have looked at the role of identity in foreign policy suggest that the former matters as the source of the latter by shaping the state’s interests (e.g. Banchoff 1999; Lee 2006). In consequence, foreign policy change could correspond to the change in national identity as exemplified by, for instance, the new anti-militaristic political culture in Japan and Germany following the end of World War II (Berger 1996).

However, identity cannot directly influence foreign policy. It is the ideas, norms, or values (i.e. nationalism or patriotism) – that have been used interchangeably in explaining foreign policy (e.g. Checkel 1993; Price and Tannenwald 1996; Doty 1993; Katzenstein 1993) – that become a source of foreign policy action (see, e.g. Ashizawa 2008:581; Sjösted 2013). In other words, a redefinition of identity could motivate leaders to pursue new foreign policy ideas which, in turn, would reflect the newly defined identity. Sukarno’s Indonesia devised the term NEFOS (New Emerging Forces) in 1963, as a response to what he called the “OLDEFOS” (Old Established Forces), as a reflection of Indonesia’s non-aligned identity. In this case, the Cold War dominated bi-polar world led Sukarno to pursue a foreign policy based on the idea of non-alignment (see Leifer, 2001:202). More recently, the democratic identity of Indonesia has led the Indonesian foreign policy leaders to pursue new foreign policy ideas in ASEAN, emphasising the promotion of democracy and human rights (Acharya 2003b). This suggests that identity influences foreign policy by ‘shaping and generating interests’ that would guide

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60 Authors have also sometimes used different terms, i.e. norms and values, to define the same thing (see, e.g. Scott, 1971:81). Due to this fluid conceptualisation and usage of these terms, in employing them in this study, this thesis does not rigidly distinguish their definitions and functions. This is because they could result from an understanding of identity held by the foreign policy actors; hence, they can be determinants of foreign policy action.
the final policy decision (Jepperson et.al 1996:60). To provide a better understanding on the relationship between identity, ideas, and foreign policy, the next section will discuss how identity functions as a source of the authoritative actor’s foreign policy preferences.

2.5 Identity, ideas and foreign policy behaviour

In IR, Constructivism offers the most comprehensive account on the role of identity and ideas in foreign policy. Authors whose works are related to this theoretical strand define the interactive relationship between ‘ideas’, ‘norms’, ‘interest’ and identity, albeit in different manner. Some argue that identity informs interests (see, for instance, Adler, 2002:103; Ruggie 1997:24), while others maintain that interests presuppose identity (e.g. Wendt, 1999:231). Therefore, in the latter, certain norms or values that have been generally accepted and have enjoyed validity over a certain period of time will shape the state’s identity (Müller 2002; see also, Wendt, 1994:390). This thesis, nonetheless, is not dedicated to addressing these differing views among scholars. This study, instead, seeks to understand how identity functions as a foreign policy source.

A useful study on this matter was conducted by Kuniko Ashizawa. In analysing Japan’s foreign policy preferences in the creation of APEC and the ARF, Ashizawa advances a ‘value-action framework’. Treating identity as a concept perceived by foreign policy-makers about what their country is and what it represents, Ashizawa (2008:581) suggests that ‘a conception of state identity provides policymakers with a particular value, which sometimes becomes the dominant value, hence defines the preference of state foreign policy.’ Three factors are essential here.

First, she treats identity as a concept held strictly by policymakers. Therefore, the non-policymakers could have different concepts of ‘what constitutes an identity’ from those maintained by the policymakers. Put differently, identity is fluid. In this case, the fluidity of identity determines the ability of the foreign policy decision-makers to highlight certain identities that matter in, or the implication of a particular identity on, foreign policy action (cf. Saideman, 2002:188). Depending on the issues, the history, and the interaction with others, one or more identities may become more important than others (Dawisha 2002).

The second factor concerns the nexus between identity and values. In her other work, Ashizawa (2013:13) defines value as ‘some sort of pro-attitude toward action of a certain kind’; where one kind of action was equated to a state’s foreign policy (Ashizawa, 2008:578). Reflecting the works of social psychology and sociology, Ashizawa (2008:581) argues that values arise from identity in the sense that the latter generates an actor’s motivational disposition which makes, in the actor’s cognition, some actions more legitimate than others,
hence leading the actor to have a pro-attitude towards a certain action. For example, Japan’s multilateral preference in its cooperation in Asia Pacific regional arrangements was practised by Japanese foreign policy decision-makers in line with the ‘reassurance’ value. This value emphasises that any initiatives by Japan should not arouse Asian neighbours’ fears about its resurgence as a dominant power in the region. Japan was identified as a ‘one-time aggressor in Asia during the 20th century’ (see Ashizawa 2013). Put concretely, identity informs values which make the foreign policy executive determine the appropriate preference for its foreign policy strategy.

The third factor involves the relationship between values and preferences. Ashizawa (2008:580) identifies the role of values as the key variable in explaining a foreign policy action. In this context, she posits that the values perceived by foreign policy decision-makers lead them toward particular preferences in their country’s foreign policy (Ashizawa, 2008:579). This thesis follows this logic of relations between identity and ideas. The New Order regime had not envisaged a foreign policy based on promoting democracy because the policy-makers did not identify Indonesia with a liberal democracy. For instance, Murdiono (the former Minister of State Secretary and a Suharto’s confidant) once asked whether it was ‘for the sake of democracy that we will ruin this country?’ (Schwarz, 2000:304). Put differently, in Indonesia what the key policy-makers make of the country informs their ideas that are then pursued through foreign policy.

Indeed, this conceptualisation of the nexus between identity and foreign policy suggests two elements. First, in order for identity to matter in foreign policy it requires an intermediary factor – here it is values – and it is values that determine foreign policy action as they shape the preferences of the foreign policy decision-makers. For this reason, the relationship between identity and foreign policy is likely to be context-dependent because, as previously noted, the nature of identity is fluid which then makes the function of identity in foreign policy indirect and limited (see Ashizawa, 2008:594). Therefore, identity may serve as a weak predictor of foreign policy if treated separately from other elements it produces. Second, while Ashizawa notes that values explain foreign policy, her framework lacks analysis on value processing. She only briefly and thus, inconclusively, described three patterns in value processing without further elaboration. These include: (i) an innovative conceptual solution to transform conflicting preferences; (ii) values omission which lead to one dominant value; and (iii) this dominant value subordinates others and commands preference (Ashizawa, 2008:580). Consequently, these patterns lead to several questions, such as ‘how policymakers “omitted” values’ and ‘what are the processes involved at the omission stage’. Analysing values or idea processing is important because if identity is fluid, hence ‘producing’ different kind of values
at the same time, then one would need to know which values are constitutive for a specific foreign policy context in a specific time.

It has previously been argued that ideas motivate foreign policy action. Goldstein and Keohane (1993:5) suggest that ‘actions taken by human beings depend on the substantive quality of available ideas, since such ideas help to clarifying principles and conceptions of causal relationship, and to coordinate individual behaviour.’ More specifically, Blyth (1997) notes that ideas provide the necessary conditions for successful collective action among agents and facilitate changes in the foreign policy options. The former suggests that ideas can bridge the interests among agents and can also help redefine them, meanwhile the latter stress that ideas can also be a precondition for these changes (Blyth, 1997:246).

The salience of ideas in foreign policy usually starts at the outset of as well as during the decision-making process (see Checkel, 1993:276). In this case, ideas are useful both as roadmaps and focal points in influencing foreign policy behaviour (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993:12). Ideas as roadmaps suggest that ideas become important when actors believe in the causal link they identify (see also Ekengren, 2011:119). For example, after the Second World War, a group of well-placed government actors in the US and Britain shared the idea that the Keynesian economic approach would serve as the most efficient means to prosperity, thus helping to build new political coalitions and legitimating US hegemonic power (Ikenberry 1993). Being focal points, ideas define cooperative solutions or act as coalitional glue to facilitate the cohesion of particular groups (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993:12). In this case, an adherence to shared ideas is necessary to ensure coordination, to signal commitments, and to promote cooperation among the decision-makers with divergent preferences (Garrett and Weingast, 1993:205).

As far as the intermediary variable is concerned for ideas to influence a foreign policy (Kingdon 1984), both institutions and individuals are seen as transmitters in this case. To this extent, the former are important as ideas are institutionalised and institutions matter in foreign policy (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993:20-23; Drezner 2000; Sikkink 1991; Goldstein 1988). However, the latter suggest that the importance of institutions is reducible to the choice made by individuals because individuals are essentially the basis for institutions to exist (see Blyth, 1997:ftn.73). Determining which is more important in transmitting ideas into foreign policy could be a matter of what perspective one takes in analysing a case study. For instance, those examining a question from an actor-based perspective have argued that agents, instead of institutions, are salient in this context (see, e.g., Ekengren 2011; Nicholson 1999). These definitions suggest that ideas or values shared among the decision-makers matter in foreign
policy. However, they did not specify how they matter. The following pages will address this question.

It is useful in this case to refer to some works that espouse the internalisation of norms. John Finley Scott (1971:88) identifies internalisation of a norm as ‘the propensity to conform to the norm, that is to behave in the way the norm reinforces.’ Therefore, one is said to have internalised a norm when one is disposed to give the norm a certain kind of role in one’s practical reasoning (Brennan et.al, 2013:196). The same can be said about ideas. Ideas, therefore, are ‘subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions’ (Parsons, 2002:48). In relation to policy-making, ideas could determine behaviour after they are accepted by most, if not all, decision-making actors (e.g. Rousseau, 2006:7). In other words, internalisation becomes an important element in understanding the causal effect of ideas/norms in explaining foreign policy behaviour (e.g. Sjösted, 2013:147). Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s work (1998) provides a useful explanation on this subject.

Finnemore and Sikkink suggest three stages for internalisation to take place. First, ideas/norms would need to emerge and often such an emergence was the result of the activities of ideas entrepreneurs. New ideas or norms can emerge from ‘outside’ before they are fitted by ideas entrepreneurs into ‘local’ or ‘internal’ traditions and practices (e.g. Acharya 2004). For example, it is likely for a promotion of democracy to take place in a country as a result of the interaction between the domestic and external actors advocating democratic reform (see, e.g., Gleditsch and Ward, 2006:917, 919). The domestic actors would then become ideas entrepreneurs in promoting in their own country. The second stage is characterised by the acceptance of those ideas/norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:903). In their study, enhancing legitimacy (both national and internationally) and maintaining self-esteem have been the main purpose for why state’s leaders accept certain ideas. Gorjão’s study (2002) on President Habibie’s attempt to claim domestic and international legitimacy by pursuing a policy that reflected a value of democracy – freedom of expression – in East Timor provides an example of this. In the third stage, ideas may become so accepted that they are internalised by actors and achieve a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality that makes conformance with the ideas almost automatic (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:904). At this stage, ideas entrepreneurs often engage in activities to highlight and call attention to issues by using terms that dramatize them (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1999:268). In this context, internalisation is concerned with how individuals gain new information through various activities, such as observation, which may change their views on
certain issues and lead to a change of preferences (Sjösted, 2013:149, 156).\textsuperscript{61} The call made by the Indonesian parliamentarians and long-time ASEAN observers for the ASEAN Charter to state more explicitly about sanctions mechanism before the DPR agreed to ratify the Charter, by referring to the EU systems, demonstrates such activities (see Chapter Five).

To reiterate, ideas can translate into foreign policy behaviour when they are transmitted by either individuals or institutions. As hinted above, policy entrepreneurs are essential in this context. Although there has not been a generic definition of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (see, among others, Kingdon 1995; Mintrom 1997; Checkel 1993; Roberts and Kings, 1991:152; and Doig and Hargrove 1987), ‘policy entrepreneurs’ has been used to label those individuals operating inside or outside the government who are able to influence setting the agenda by virtue of their knowledge, position, and relationship with the primary decision-makers as well as personal characteristics.\textsuperscript{62} Their influence usually leads to changes in the policy content by way of innovatively raising new, if not reproducing, ideas (see, e.g. Mintrom and Norman 2009). More often than not, policy entrepreneurs introduce new ideas by offering a new way of assessing certain foreign policy questions (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Entrepreneurs thus, become an important agent in channelling ideas to policy. In this case, although some policy entrepreneurs are located ‘outside’ the formal foreign policy-making environment, they are able to shape the agenda or the preference of the authoritative actors by advocating new ideas.

While they can be influential in setting the policy agenda, their salience depends on a number of activities, which include problem identification, networking in policy circles, shaping the terms of policy debates, and building coalitions (Mintrom, 1997:739). Problem identification is an essential and perhaps the most fundamental element to ensure the success of policy entrepreneurs in asserting their influence. It could bridge between the perception of the leaders in power and the entrepreneurs with regard to the existence of certain problems (see, Checkel, 1993:279). If, for instance, the foreign policy leaders do not share the view that a certain problem exists, they could dismiss the entrepreneurs’ ideas. Carter and Scott (2010:420) pointed out two situations that generate entrepreneurship, namely, policy vacuum in which there is no existing administration policy to deal with the problems at hand and policy correction where the entrepreneurs attempt to redefine the issues and policy goals by highlighting the inadequacy of the current approach.

In addition, building a policy coalition, especially with political parties represented in parliament, is also important for policy entrepreneurs who have no political affiliations or have

\textsuperscript{61} Other authors have similarly treated the ‘internalisation’ of ideas as an explanatory element for foreign policy behaviour, albeit using different language. See, for example, Acharya (2009b:14).

\textsuperscript{62} The discussion on this theme, however, is focused more on those outside government.
limited access to the decision-making circle. Coalitions can help channel the entrepreneurs’ ideas into the policy-making process, as consensus may be needed in support of their ideas (see, Risse-Kappen, 1991:485). Once the political support is obtained by the entrepreneurs, it is possible that the new ideas they held (re)shape the government’s initiatives through the foreign policy consultation process between the parliament and the government. Therefore, apart from building coalitions, policy consultations also facilitate the transmission of new ideas advocated by the policy entrepreneurs. Another way for the policy entrepreneurs to channel their ideas into the decision-making circle is by developing links with the change-oriented bureaucrats who are already inside the policy-making bureaucracies (Roberts and Kings, 1991:163). In Indonesia’s case, the role of policy entrepreneurs and their attempt to shape the policy agenda was particularly apparent in the case of the ASEAN Charter’s ratification process as well as in drafting the concept of the ASEAN Political-Security Community that was championed by Indonesia (see Chapter Five).

Choosing the right moment is also important for policy entrepreneurs as it provides the appropriate opportunity to advance their ideas (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:895). Such an opportunity is regarded as a policy window (Kingdon 1995). For example, political reform, on the one hand, and the changing external environment salient to Soviet politics under Gorbachev, on the other, provided the window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurs in the country to influence Gorbachev’s policy decision-making process (Checkel 1993:277,280). In Indonesia, the transition to democracy was pushed by the middle-class, who have been the main entrepreneurs espousing the need for Suharto’s resignation following the lack of political freedom and his inability to respond to the economic crisis (Uhlin, 1997:46). The lack of freedom and the government’s failure to manage the crisis were the window of opportunity for regime change in Indonesia. In principle, when policy windows open, policy entrepreneurs are usually people who immediately seize the opportunity to initiate action (Zahariadis 2007). However, while policy entrepreneurs from outside the government’s foreign policy institutions can influence the content, they cannot and do not have control over the policy-making process. Hence, political networks to either the parliament or the government are essential for them.

Once we assume that ideas are internalised and channelled into the decision-making environment, the next exercise is assessing the impact of these ideas on foreign policy, which, essentially, is an empirical task. One needs to discern therefore which ideas are eventually adopted by the main decision-makers and why. In this case, understanding the context in which

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63 For a discussion on policy entrepreneurs that came from the parliament, see Carter and Scott (2010).
64 For greater details on the activity structure of policy entrepreneurs and their function in the policy process, see Roberts and Kings (1991).
foreign policy operates is important.\textsuperscript{65} For example, examining the interests of the actors involved in making foreign policy could offer a way to understand which ideas matter and why.

Cortell and Davis (2000:70) introduce three practical indications to assess the salience of ideas in the domestic realm (foreign policy is made at the domestic level, hence classified as domestic activities). First, internalised ideas appear in the domestic political discourse. Here, the ideas proponents will invoke them to justify institutional or policy change. Specifically in the case of Indonesian foreign policy during the Reformasi era, FM Wirajuda launched bureaucratic reforms in Deplu to reflect on ‘the values of Reformasi’ (see, e.g. Nabbs-Keller 2013; see also Chapter Three). Taking this into account, one can then assume that the idea of good governance and accountable decision-making stem from the principled values of democracy that had taken effect at least in the primary foreign policy institution in Indonesia. The second indication involves changes in domestic regulations and procedures where other domestic institutions exist to monitor compliance of the government. As Chapter Three notes, the role obtained by the DPR in scrutinising Indonesia’s foreign affairs was the result of the multiple amendments to the Constitution, particularly between 1999 and 2002, as well as the enactment of Law No.37/1999 on Foreign Relations. These regulations came in concurrence with Indonesia’s democratic changes. The third is changes in the policies. According to Cortell and Davis (2000:71), domestic political discourse is the most important indication in this context as changes therein will likely precede and accompany changes in institutions and policy and as such provide evidence as to the reasons for change. Indeed, the empirical study carried-out by this research provides some insights into the salience of democratic values in explaining Indonesia’s foreign policy decision in some specific areas of diplomacy.

2.6 The impact of democratisation on Indonesian foreign policy: analytical framework, sources and methods

This chapter devises the analytical framework that will be used to assess the extent to which democratisation has impacted Indonesia’s foreign policy. The salience of three variables are instrumental for understanding democratic Indonesia’s foreign policy approach in the context of ASEAN’s political cooperation and Southeast Asia, notably the role of the foreign policy leaders, the influence of institutions, and the role of ideas that guide the foreign policy preferences.

Two assumptions are essentials. The first suggests that democratic transition influences foreign policy decision-making by way of introducing ‘new’ domestic political actors in the

\textsuperscript{65} For instance, in selecting preferences, a connection has been made between managing conflicting ideas and the importance of leader’s position and decision-making style (e.g. Peterson 1997; Kowert 2002; Verbeek 2003).
decision-making milieu. However, the literature on foreign policy decision-making suggests that despite the domestic political changes, the president and the foreign minister – as well as the ministry of foreign affairs – remain the highest authority in the making of foreign policy. The second suggests that democratisation leads to a redefinition of the state’s identity, hence foreign policy modification is likely (see, e.g., Acharya 2003b). Yet, as previously noted, the relationship between identity and foreign policy is likely to be mediated by certain political values or ideas derived from the way identity is interpreted (Ashizawa 2008, 2013; Sjösted 2013). In turn, these ideas determine foreign policy preference. An empirical study that focuses on Indonesia’s foreign policy formulation and the actors involved, as well as on the foreign policy context and the interests pursued by the Indonesian foreign policy authoritative actors could help us to understand the extent to which certain ideas influence foreign policy decisions.

Recent scholarship analysing the relationship between Indonesia’s democratisation and foreign policy has focused on the perceptions of the foreign policy elites (Wibisono 2010; Novotny 2007), the importance of identity (in this case Islamic) (Sukma 2006; Azra 2006; Anwar 2010b), and the salience of democratic values in foreign policy (Sukma 2011; Anwar 2010a). Others have looked at the bureaucratic reform within Deplu and its relation to the way foreign policy is made (Nabbs-Keller 2013) and also at foreign policy change (He 2008). These works emphasise the importance of democratisation but do not adequately explain how democratisation makes a difference. This thesis aims to answer exactly that question by looking at the three factors of the importance of leaders, institutions, and ideas in foreign policy. By addressing this question, this study hopes to complement the existing scholarship on Indonesia’s foreign affairs during the Reformasi era.

These three factors cannot be treated as mutually exclusive and therefore must be looked at simultaneously in order to explain the impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy. While such an impact will be explained through the salience of the three factors, an understanding of the context of certain foreign policy decisions is useful to assess the change and continuity in Indonesia’s foreign policy and to investigate why democracy has more relevance in certain foreign policy decisions than in others.

In doing so, this thesis analyses the salience of the three above-mentioned variables by employing an interpretative method.66 Specifically, this thesis interprets the meanings of texts as primary source, such as speeches and statements as well as interviews with relevant sources (see, e.g. Sjösted 2013; Doeser 2013 for recent works that apply similar method). As this study seeks to understand the impact of a socio-political process that contextualises the conduct of

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66 This discussion concerns the method used to apply the framework and approach the research question. For a discussion on the methodology, see Chapter One.
Indonesian foreign policy, interpreting the content of speeches or statements as well as documents (i.e. internal reports or minutes of meetings) that were written during the Reformasi era is important.

An interpretative text study is also useful to ascertain which ideas have been internalised. For example, this study posits that Indonesia is a democracy because the state’s constitution includes provisions that correspond to democratic ideals such as human rights or the limitation of presidential tenure. In essence, this method calls for the interpreter’s (the author) attentiveness to a network of textual relations in constructing their meaning (Elkad-Lehman and Greensfeld, 2011:264). Specifically, the interpretative approach examines foreign policy by focusing on the thinking and action of individual decision-makers in order to understand decisions from the decision-makers’ standpoint by reconstructing their reasons (Carlsnaes, 2008:123-24). To this extent, this thesis pre-identifies new foreign policy approaches through an interpretation of a number of relevant foreign policy documents and information. These are obtained through various forms of communication with Indonesian foreign policy decision-makers as well as foreign policy experts. The readings from these activities, in turn, guide the examination of the primary research question of this study.67

Being an external researcher, an interpretative method is devised because the author was not involved in the making of foreign policy decisions in relation to the cases examined in this thesis. This nature of being an ‘outsider’ therefore creates a limit on how the author gains specific insights about the decision outcomes in relation to the case studies. As mentioned in Chapter One, detailed information on the Ambalat case was not entirely obtainable following the refusal of the officials in Deplu to disclose them on the grounds that negotiations are still on-going. Being close to Hassan Wirajuda (the Indonesian Foreign Minister between 2001 and 2009) and to other decision-makers in Deplu, impacted upon this research in no uncertain terms. On the one hand, this allowed for easier access to individuals and written sources, specifically unpublished documents such as the minutes of meetings between the foreign minister and the DPR. On the other hand, there were some interviewees (mainly in Deplu) who declined to provide a specific answers as they assumed that the author ‘would know better’ about the foreign policy issues at hand given the family relationship with Hassan Wirajuda. This view was misleading because the author did not and does not have full knowledge about all key issues and decisions that Wirajuda was involved with in the context of his ministerial portfolio. Family ties also created occasional feelings of ‘awkwardness’ or ‘discomfort’ on the part of active

67 For criticism of interpretative approach, see, for instance, Bevir and Rhodes (2003:40-42).
diplomats who shared their own thoughts about the policies taken by the top leaders. As a result, they preferred to be anonymous when stating their views.

The author’s appointment to Deplu and his training at the Diplomatic Academy in 2010 allowed him to gain further empirical insights about Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy in general and, to some extent, about Jakarta’s relationship with ASEAN and Southeast Asia. This, in turn, provided some preliminary relevant information in relation to the theme of this research. Being an active diplomat also allowed the author to attend several events, such as closed-door seminars, where he interacted with a number of high-ranking Indonesian political and foreign policy representatives as well as foreign intellectuals. Such events provided an opportunity for the author to conduct personal conversations as well as to build connections with these prominent individuals, who subsequently, at least occasionally, became points of contact for additional information.
3 Democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making process

This chapter assesses the link between Indonesia’s democratisation and foreign policy-making and argues that the impact of democratic transition in this regard is ambiguous. On the one hand, Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making process remains essentially top-down, emphasising the importance of the president and the foreign minister as the key foreign policy actors. On the other, policy-making is more consultative than it was during the New Order era, indicating some changes in the nature of decision-making.

This chapter discusses Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making by examining the actors involved, which will be classified into two: authoritative and non-authoritative. The former has obtained the formal authority to make and action foreign policy decisions. The latter is generally not entitled to make and execute the state’s foreign policy, yet it can shape and influence foreign policy decisions although sometimes only indirectly. For this reason, the ability of non-authoritative actors to assert their ideas into foreign policy is likely to depend on their position in, and access to, the decision-making circle.

This chapter consists of four sections. The first section discusses the authoritative actors in Indonesian foreign policy, emphasising the role of the president and the foreign minister. The second section then examines non-authoritative foreign policy actors. The analysis in these two sections will essentially cover both the Suharto and the Reformasi periods. Section Three investigates how foreign policy is currently made under the democratic regime in Indonesia by looking at the role of leaders, the parliament, and to some extent, policy entrepreneurs and discusses the link between democratisation and foreign policy-making. The final sentence summarizes the link between democratisation and the way foreign policy is made in Indonesia.

3.1 Authoritative actors

3.1.1 The President

During the New Order period, Indonesia’s governmental system was heavily influenced by the tales of pewayangan (traditional puppetry), an expression of Javanese traditions (Anderson 1972). Javanese beliefs adhere to symbolism, which includes, amongst other things, ceremonies\(^68\) that are often practised by most Indonesian leaders of Javanese descent. Javanese beliefs also postulate that a concentration of power is itself a constant quantum in the universe

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\(^{68}\) For a detailed discussion on how Javanese culture has strongly influenced Indonesian politics and how the Palace had adhered to Javanese tradition see Anderson (1972).
and its existence is self-justifying. In political terms, this could be understood as the concentration of power in one would require a proportional diminution elsewhere (Anderson 1972). In other words, the manifest sign of a man of power is when the said man focuses on his own personal power (Anderson 1972).

Suharto, a four-star retired general who came from a peasant family, allegedly held a mystical Javanese belief of himself as being the personification of Semar – a wayang figure believed to be wise and divine, therefore considered as one of the sacred, if not the most sacred, wayang character in the Javanese mythology – which led him to occasional meditation rituals in the sacred Semar Cave in the Dieng Plateau, Central Java (Hein, 1986:55). For Indonesians, wayang is a vehicle of culture, conveying religious principles and moral values ideally held by humankind. In the tales of pewayangan, Semar is described as a symbol of ordinary people, who, despite his humble appearance with bulging rear and belly, is wise and capable of solving big problems. In addition, he cries upon witnessing the suffering of others, which explains why he has watery eyes (www.oneearthmedia.org, 30 November 2008).69 Being raised in a family with a strong Javanese tradition, Suharto maintained a spiritual connection with Javanese mystical teachings. He reportedly collected heirlooms to achieve the concentration of his power, which meant his leadership was more as resembling a king than a president (Eklöf 1999). In addition, Suharto was reported to be an abangan Muslim. In Java, Muslims are divided into two camps: abangan and santri. Clifford Geertz asserted that abangan is a reflection of a religious syncretism which, in essence, is an amalgamation of earlier religious systems, the substance of which become so thoroughly blended with Islam that they become part of daily practice and belief. It focuses a great deal of attention on symbolism, such as rituals adopted mainly from Javanese culture, and animistic aspects. Meanwhile, santri gives more attention to Islamic doctrines and rejects abangan Islamic rituals (Mahasin, 1981:172-75). For instance, for santri, praying in accordance with Islamic teaching is more important than the traditional native selamatan prayers, which led to the former being dubbed the ‘purer Muslims’ (Schwarz 2000).

Coming into power on March 12th, 1967, when Indonesia was economically devastated in the aftermath of the tumultuous years experienced under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and his Konfrontasi campaign, Suharto was the man the nation hoped would be the satrio piningit – the man who would get things done and lead Indonesia to better times.70 Suharto came into

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69 Translated from Bahasa Indonesia as derived from One Earth Media, “Characteristics of Semar”.
70 Satrio piningit is a Javanese term for “the hidden knight”. In Javanese traditions and belief, satrio piningit is a person whose life was characterised by suffering. Coming from a poor family, satrio piningit is a person people would initially turn a blind eye to. The character evolved from the very old Javanese book called Masasar, written by Joyoboyo (a spiritual adviser to the Kingdom of Majapahit). The Masasar itself was believed by the traditional Javanese population to be the book that contained Joyoboyo’s predictions of the future. This information was told to the author of this thesis in his childhood as he comes from a traditional Javanese family background.
office when Indonesia’s political situation was unstable, following the organised coup launched by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in September 1965 by kidnapping six army generals and one first-level officer.\(^{71}\) To date, they are known as the seven revolutionary heroes. Suharto, then as the Commander of the Army Strategic Command (Pangkostrad), together with Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo – then the Commander of the Army Para-Command Regiment (RPKAD), now known as the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus) – was in charge of quelling the PKI’s operation. Marked by the order of the March 11th (Surat Perintah 11 Maret, popularly known as Supersemar)\(^{72}\) 1966 the then ill Sukarno gave Suharto the mandate to take all necessary measures to overcome the worsening security and political condition in Indonesia, primarily that in Jakarta and in Central Java. This means that Suharto assumed the highest authority to restore national stability. However, it was not until 12 March 1967 that Suharto was formally inaugurated as Indonesian President by the MPRS (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, the Temporary People’s Consultative Assembly).\(^{73}\)

As a result of his strong Javanese background, Suharto’s way of political decision-making was also influenced by Javanese concepts and traditions. He believed in the central role of a natural leader who can bring together all the conflicting and contradictory views before combining them in such a way as to maintain cooperation, harmony, peace, balance, and overall efficiency (Hein, 1986:71). For this reason, Suharto attempted to ‘Javanise’ the Indonesian governmental system by assigning Javanese to almost every key position in the military, administration, and the bureaucracy (Maulidina, 2003:3). Hailing from a humble family and having spent his career in the military, Suharto had only a minor interest in foreign affairs, not to mention that he had never been exposed to foreign trips before assuming the presidency. Before becoming president, he was abroad only once, when he accompanied General Nasution to inspect military attachés in Bonn, Paris, and Belgrade in 1961 (Hein 1986:49).

However, his ambition in supporting Indonesia’s improving economy, given the 600% inflation rate when he first took the helm from Sukarno, led Suharto to be a pragmatic leader. He believed that economic dissatisfaction could create domestic unrest that, in the end, would negatively impact national security and stability (Suryadinata 1996). Therefore, in his era, the commanding principle was Trilogi Pembangunan (Trilogy of Development) that highlighted the need for growth, stability, and equality (Hein, 1986:134). Foreign affairs came into focus


\(^{72}\) The substance of the original copy of the Supersemar has not been without controversy in Indonesia as its whereabouts remain unknown.

\(^{73}\) This being said, the actual duration of Suharto’s presidency was 31 years and 2 months, and not 32 years as most commonly addressed. For greater details on how Suharto assumed power, see, among others, Vatikiotis (1993), Eklöf (1999); Jenkins (1984).
when he recognised that Indonesia’s development depended on the surrounding countries (Sukma 1995). This view led him to undertake efforts to build a peaceful regional environment. Indeed, Suharto normalised relations with Malaysia in August 1966 and supported the formation of ASEAN in 1967. Suharto’s decision to send foreign minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja to Moscow to foster economic cooperation indicated the extent of his interest to pursue a foreign policy oriented towards economic development. As Suharto stated:

The Indonesian people forbid the development of communist ideology on Indonesian soil, but this does not imply that Indonesian people do not desire friendly close relations with the socialist and communist countries (quoted in Hein, 1986:41).

Overall, Suharto’s foreign policy approach at the time emphasised cooperation to secure peace and to improve living standards (Weinstein, 1976:170-75; see also, Sukma 1995).

As far as decision-making was concerned, the rise of the New Order ultimately unveiled an autocratic style of foreign policy formulation, which became almost exclusively the domain of Suharto and his close aides (Sukma, 1997a:239). To this extent, Suharto made decisions based on his own assessments, which in turn determined the guidelines, priority, and alternatives for Indonesia’s foreign policy. His position as president combined with his Javanese traditional beliefs meant that his understanding of foreign policy formulation amounted to a ‘statist’, top-down approach, which left foreign policy isolated from public constraints (Hudson and Skidmore, 1993:7-8). Its implementation, however, was placed in the hands of his confidants, who naturally possessed ample access to Suharto (Sukma 2006).

Politically, Suharto was supported by the armed forces. This had, during most of his regime, enabled him to pursue his ideas without any interference from his political opponents. The Indonesian Constitution also assured the role of Suharto as the key decision-maker. In Article 10 the Constitution of 1945 stipulates that ‘The President holds the highest authority over the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force’. In practice, this meant that Suharto could use the military for his own benefit. Ultimately, being the axial figure in Indonesian politics, the decision-making process of the New Order had its roots in the personal role of the president himself (Suryadinata 1996). As noted by Jenkins (1984:37),

Soeharto stood at the apex of the pyramid. His appointees sat in each of the key executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. His writ extended into every department and into every state-run corporation. In short, he had established himself as the paramount figure in a society in which deference to authority is deeply rooted.

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74 Aside from the Constitutional argument, the status of the President being the Panglima Tertinggi was authorised by the Decree of the MPRS No.IX/MPRS/1966.
To this extent, Indonesia’s foreign policy was Suharto’s foreign policy. This argument can be understood in two ways. First, the cultural background of Suharto had led him to transform the political system of the New Order into a stage of *pewayangan*, with him believing he was a king with Semar’s characteristics. Consequently, Javanese political culture became the psychological and operational milieu for Suharto’s foreign policy decision-making process. In this case, he opted to administrate Javanese practice into the political system because by doing so he could extensively impose his authority. Psychologically, Suharto’s perception of applying Javanese traditions in his political environment rendered him a solo player in the whole process of policy-making in Indonesia (Eklöf 1999). While treating the political environment as a resemblance of the *pewayangan*, Suharto’s views of Javanese culture also implied that the execution of his foreign policy relied on certain trusted individuals.

Second, it can be said that while it is difficult to spell-out which policy came directly from him, given the closed nature of the decision-making process, personal relationships and favouritism among Suharto’s subordinates and protégés mattered. In this context, the foreign policy decision-making process of the New Order resembled Javanese beliefs whereby access to the centre is paramount. Indeed, there is no dispute that Suharto was the centre of power during the New Order era (Hein 1986; Leifer 1983).

Being at the core of decision-making in Indonesia, Suharto had to control the military, and, more specifically, the army. The involvement of the military (hereafter, the TNI)\(^\text{75}\) in New Order policy-making processes was reasonably strong because the basis of Indonesia’s security practice comprised four elements: the state, the regime, the nation, and the individual citizen (Sebastian 2006b). As such, the TNI had a unique role because they were present in every regional capital in the form of a military command, so as to ensure order and stability; as part of the *kekaryaan* (functioning) policy, officers were appointed to high-ranking positions in civilian departments\(^\text{76}\), which often led to them being involved in resolving issues beyond their fixed responsibility (Liddle, 1996:19). Indeed, military secondment was a means for the president to ensure effective control of the bureaucracy (Nugroho, 1996:46). In addition, the involvement of the TNI in Suharto’s political environment was spurred by the *dwì-fungsi* (dual function) doctrine (see, for instance, Crouch 1985; Sebastian 2006b). Established as a middle way by General Nasution in 1966, the *dwì-fungsi* doctrine replaced the Army’s doctrine *Tri*

\(^{75}\) It should be noted that during the period of Suharto, ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*) was the formal name of the military and it comprised of the Navy, the Army, The Air Force, and the Police. In 1999, the Indonesian government decided to change the name by using the old term, which was the TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*).

\(^{76}\) “Echelon” (eselon) here refers to the hierarchical bureaucratic rank of government officials. In Indonesia, Echelon I is a rank just below ministerial position. Secretary General of a ministry, Directors General, Inspectors General and Deputy Ministers all fall into this category. Echelon II mainly refers to Directors, Heads of Bureaus and the Secretaries of the Directorates General. They report to Echelon I.
*Ubaya Cakti* (Ubaya’ means promise, and ‘Cakti’ refers to sakti or divine power) (Anderson, 1972:4). *Tri Ubaya Cakti* contained (1) the Doctrine of Basic National Security; (2) the Doctrine of Kekaryaan (civic action); (3) the Doctrine of Development (Sebastian, 2006b: 42-43). As a result, this doctrine justified the military’s involvement in bureaucratic decision-making, and to a considerable extent, Indonesia’s socio-political affairs (Kristiadi 1999:50).

Nevertheless, should the military be considered as an authoritative foreign policy actor? There are two ways to answer this question. First, if we look at the Constitution, the military is structurally positioned below the president. Therefore, whilst military officers were likely to be involved in the foreign policy decision-making process with respect to the kekaryaan role at Deplu, as demonstrated by an Army officer who filled the Directorate of Security and Communication of Deplu in 1970 (Suryadinata, 1996:39), they were not entitled to determine foreign policy content as this would be the sole authority of Suharto. The second answer is related to the function of the TNI itself. According to Agus Widjojo, a retired Lieutenant General who served as Chief of Territorial Affairs and subsequently Deputy Chairman of MPR, the TNI was no more than an instrument for the political purposes of the government (Widjojo, interview with the author, 16 December 2009). In its manifestation, as Widjojo suggested, the TNI “would abide by and secure (akan mengikuti dan mengamankan) any political decisions made by the government”. Further, its main role was related to primarily domestic security affairs (Widjojo, interview, 16 December 2009). In sum, while the TNI was argued to have been the most powerful institution in Indonesia’s society (Haseman, 2003:229), its function and position in the political structure did not permit it to be considered an authoritative actor in foreign policy decision-making during the Suharto era. Therefore, the military could only influence foreign policy indirectly through the function of kekaryaan.

Following Suharto’s resignation in 1998, Indonesia had a number of constitutional amendments, however, they are yet to significantly alter the authority of the president in the foreign policy decision-making context. Thus, subsequent presidents have enjoyed the same privileges as Suharto in terms of occupying the apex of the decision-making process in Indonesia. The main difference lies in how they implement their preferences when making foreign policy. Admittedly, other factors can influence their preferences and decisions, but in general the presidents’ views towards certain issues remains the main determinant.

The decisions made by President Habibie over the 1999 East Timor referendum exemplified the significant role of the president. In brief, Habibie included the so-called “second option” alongside the autonomy which granted the East Timor a broad range of powers as a policy option after receiving a letter, which appears to have been inspired by the 1988 New Caledonia Matignon Accord, from the Australian PM John Howard in January 1999, suggesting
that the Indonesian government should consider a referendum in the manner of the Bougainville model (Leaver, 2001:6).77 The option for a referendum was apparently never consulted upon with then-Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, hence leaving confounded Indonesian diplomats and leaving them no choice but to include it in the negotiation between Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN in New York (Alatas, 2006:151, 155-56). The decision to incorporate the “second option” was influenced primarily by Habibie’s belief in the likelihood that the East Timorese would vote for special autonomy and thus remain united with Indonesia. This was based on reports originating from pro-integrationists, which were channelled by senior military figures (Jago, 2010:379).78 In the end, the Popular Consultation, held on 30 August 1999, resulted in the separation of the province with 78.5% of the population voting against the special autonomy offered by the Indonesian government, as opposed to 21.5% who voted in favour (www.un.org, 3 September 1999).

When Abdurrahman Wahid came into office, he demonstrated the authoritative role of the president in the foreign policy domain. Wahid’s personal approach to foreign policy and his “erratic and unpredictable” behaviour, made diplomacy a high profile affair during his presidency (Azra, interview with the author, 2 March 2009). For example, having in mind the need to rehabilitate Indonesia’s international image and the domestic economy, in only two years Wahid travelled abroad more frequently than Suharto did in thirty-two years in power (Murphy, 2005:267). Despite his extensive travels, his diplomatic approach was unsuccessful in producing concrete outcomes (Suryodiningrat 2001). This situation was worsened by the fact that his foreign minister, Dr. Alwi Shihab, was entrusted to overcome the domestic political issues that Wahid had to confront, including his souring relationship with the DPR and internal party problems (see, Liputan 6, 15 April 2001).79 The dominant role of President Wahid also showed in his plan to establish diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv as a result of his interpretation of the bebas-aktif doctrine, an interpretation based on the “ecumenical diplomacy” approach, which, according to Shihab, essentially meant that Indonesia “opens all of its windows to make

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77 Other factors that have been involved in Habibie’s decision to offer referendum to the East Timorese include the Islamic factor and the influence of ICMI – the Islamic group headed by Habibie from which he selected his advisors during his presidency (see, e.g. Crouch, 2003: Chapter 9) as well as socio-economic issues that were damaging Indonesia’s international image (e.g. Booth 2004; Gorjão 2002). However, the loss of international image was also related to the human rights violations allegedly perpetrated by the Indonesian military (see, for instance, Tanter et.al 2006). For personal reflections on Habibie’s decisions in the East Timor case, see Habibie (2006:229-65).

78 The questions posed in the referendum were the following: ‘Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?’ or ‘Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia?’ For greater detail on the political process prior to the popular consultation, see Alatas (2006:178). For accounts on the role of the UN in East Timor, see, among others, Jago (2010) and Schrijver (2000).

79 To this extent, it was reported that Deplu’s diplomats had to deliver documents that required the minister’s approval to the Palace. This is because Shihab, being Wahid’s closest inner-circle, had to remain with Wahid most of the time for his responsibility as Wahid’s head of lobbying team.
friends with anyone without discriminating any countries or nations” (Metro TV, 15 January 2011). Predictably, this plan led to an outcry at home, with Islamic groups being the staunchest critics. According to Suryodiningrat (2001), Wahid apparently interpreted *bebas-aktif* policy as being ‘too independent and too active’, which, amounts to a ‘no policy’. In 2001, Wahid was impeached by Indonesia’s parliament following his alleged involvement in a corruption scandal (BBC, 30 April 2001).

Wahid’s successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was seen to be less active in addressing foreign affairs compared to Wahid as she dedicated her attention largely to domestic issues (Azra, interview, 2 March 2009). 80 Hence, during her presidency (2001-2004), Indonesia’s foreign policy was generally shaped by her foreign minister, Dr. Hassan Wirajuda, a career diplomat.81 This, however, did not mean that Megawati was inattentive to Indonesia’s foreign affairs. Instead, she sought to bring Indonesian foreign policy back to basics by allowing the foreign minister to take charge and by reviving Indonesia’s place in ASEAN (Anwar, interview with the author, 23 August 2011), a step that rekindled the best part of the New Order administration where “bureaucracy would be more comfortable following a familiar and well-tested path of foreign diplomacy” (Anwar, 2003:79). Accordingly, the focus on cooperation in the ASEAN and Southeast Asian context occupied the core of Indonesia’s foreign policy concentric circle (Anwar, 2003:79-80).

Although Megawati allowed her foreign minister to oversee Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy in general, a number of foreign policy initiatives demonstrated nevertheless that the president was the key decision-maker. Megawati’s attempt to nurture international support for her presidency by accepting Australia’s PM John Howard’s visit to Jakarta in February 2002 is an example. This visit was strongly rejected by Indonesian parliamentarians who generally viewed the Australian government as a supporter of separatist movements within Indonesia (particularly in regards to East Timor) (Anwar, 2003:88). However, Megawati waived the objection of the DPR and decided to continue with Howard’s visit because she realised the importance of good relations with close neighbours (see, Wibisono, 2010:252-55). This action supports the argument presented in Chapter Two, that those who occupy the apex of the decision-making structure hold a great deal of authority that could in practice win over the preferences of other actors (see, Hill, 2003:55; Domhoff, 1990:19).

80 There were six priorities in Megawati’s Cabinet working programme: 1) maintaining national unity; 2) continuing reform and the democratisation process; 3) normalising economic life; 4) upholding law, restore peace and security, and eradicating corruption, collusion, and nepotism; 5) restoring Indonesia’s international credibility; 6) preparing for the 2004 general election. Apart from the fifth point, all were ‘domestic’ in nature. For details, see Djadjijono (2001:129-30).
81 In the case studies, the dominant role of foreign minister Wirajuda will be illustrated primarily under Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2003. For details, see Chapter Five.
Under SBY’s leadership, the dominant role of the president in foreign policy decision-making process continued. Dubbed the country’s ‘foreign policy president’ (Djalal, 2008: 284-5), SBY concentrated foreign policy decision-making within his inner circle. This was illustrated by his decision to establish a separate office from Deplu to deal with foreign affairs, namely the office for Special Staff on International Relations (SKHI). Being Indonesia’s ‘foreign policy president’, SBY, assisted by foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda, proved to be the main architect for the benign foreign policy strategy, such as those seen in the Ambalat case (see Chapter Seven), as well as Indonesia’s strategy in spreading democracy to the region via the BDF initiative (see Chapter Six). In summary, irrespective of the democratic transition, in Indonesia the role of the president remains generally important in shaping Indonesia’s foreign policy, which was assured by the Constitution. As we will see later in the case studies, Indonesian foreign policy content is often a reflection of ideas or perceptions held by the president, as foreign policy leader.

3.1.2 The foreign minister and Deplu

For most of the duration of Suharto’s administration, the role of Deplu and the foreign minister was often overshadowed by his autocratic governing style. As a result of the *kekaryaan* function of the military in civilian bureaucracy, in addition to the assessment that Indonesia needed security and stability, a number of military officers occupied Deplu’s highest echelons, such as the Director General for Information and Cultural Affairs, which was held by Major General Suyono in the 1980s (Hein 1986; Sukma 1997b). For example, Emmerson (1983) asserts that in 1981 about fifty percent of Deplu’s highest echelons were taken by the military. This was because Deplu was considered essential to national security, justifying a greater presence of military officers (Emmerson, 1983:1227). The high rate of military occupancy in Deplu meant that Suharto, having full control over the TNI, also significantly influenced foreign policy decision-making through the presence of these military officers, thus, raising questions about the relevance of civilian career diplomats in Indonesia’s foreign policy formulation.

The minimised role of Deplu was primarily visible in the context of economic foreign policy, illustrated by, among others, the run-up to the 1994 APEC Summit in Bogor, Indonesia. In the weeks just before the Summit, President Suharto appointed economic technocrats, primarily from the Planning and Development Ministry as well as senior economists, to manage APEC matters for Indonesia and among them were Prof. Widjojo Nitisastro, a prominent economist who became Suharto’s personal adviser for APEC affairs, and Prof. Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, the National Coordinator on APEC matters. They were the key actors in

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82 A more detailed discussion on SKHI will be included in the Section Two of this chapter.
drafting the policy paper that would eventually be known as the Bogor Declaration (Anwar et.al, 2010:15). The Deplu diplomats, on the other hand, were only assigned to plan regular APEC senior officials’ and working group meetings (Drajat, undated: 326). While, in general, Suharto’s decision was the most salient in shaping the overall idea of the New Order’s foreign policy, there have also been specific foreign policy cases where the foreign minister played an important role in executing the policy strategy. The case of ASEAN’s establishment in 1967 and Indonesia’s diplomacy in pursuit of the international recognition of Wawasan Nusantara concept, as explained below, were some of the examples.

In general, the Indonesian foreign ministers during Suharto’s period were figures whom the president believed would not challenge his political authority. Suharto’s first foreign minister was Adam Malik. Being slightly disinterested in foreign affairs, Suharto designated Malik to perform two of the most important jobs at the time. First, together with one of Suharto’s confidants, General Benny Murdani, Malik was involved in the dialogues to end the Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia (Nordin 2006). Second, following the aftermath of Konfrontasi, Malik became one of the architects of ASEAN’s establishment in 1967. As Leifer (1983:119, 122) contends, ASEAN was an Indonesian initiative that arose from formal talks between Malik and his Malaysian counterpart, Tun Abdul Razak. Malik’s prominence in New Order foreign affairs was recognised by one of the staff at Deplu, Ambassador Wisber Loeis, who was at the time a junior diplomat. Loeis notes that Malik’s role was “unchallenged” and “very dominant” as Suharto had been confident of Malik and his political credentials (Loeis, interview with the author, 5 August 2011). Two main factors contributed to Malik’s dominance over foreign policy. The first one was Suharto’s limited interest in foreign affairs during the early period of his presidency. Second was Suharto’s complete trust in Malik to establish and maintain diplomatic relations. In domestic politics, Malik, together with Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, was part of the triumvirate of the New Order regime (Hein 1986; Elson, 2001:140).

When Malik ascended to the position of Vice President in 1978, an academic-cum-diplomat, Prof. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Remaining in office for ten years, Kusumaatmadja gained Suharto’s trust due to his modest character, his limited political ambition, and his lack of mass support (Hein, 1986:190). One of the major achievements of Indonesian diplomacy under his leadership was the international recognition of Indonesia’s Wawasan Nusantara (National Archipelagic Outlook) during negotiations leading to UNCLOS (UN Conference on the Law of the Sea) 1982, which allowed

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83 For a more detailed account on the role of Deplu in the dynamics of the policy-making process preceding the 1994 APEC Summit, see Drajat (undated).
Indonesia to expand its territorial sovereignty.\textsuperscript{84} However, Kusumaatmadja’s apolitical stance also meant that he did not automatically gain unrestricted access to the president; unlike some of Suharto’s key political entourage, namely Murdiono (the Cabinet Secretary, later the State Secretary) and Sudharmono (later the Vice President). Both gentlemen shared Suharto’s background as military officers and as functionaries of the government’s political party, Golkar (Suryadinata, 1996:38-40).

The late Ali Alatas, then a 56 year-old civil servant, was installed to replace Kusumaatmadja in 1988. Under his leadership Deplu continued to be the main laboratory for making foreign policy and Alatas himself was a highly regarded diplomat. However, even under Alatas Deplu’s influence in shaping the overall agenda of Indonesian foreign policy was, in some cases, still overshadowed by a number of factors. For instance, Alatas and Deplu were not on the front line so far as economic diplomacy was concerned, such as in the aforementioned case regarding the run-up to the 1994 APEC Summit. It is important to note that with economic development and stability as his political platform, Suharto’s foreign policy put a strong emphasis on securing loans for the benefit of national growth, hence ‘development-based foreign policy’ (Murphy 2009; Weinstein, 1976:171). However, on foreign political and security affairs, Alatas’ influence was instrumental in the making of the majority of Indonesia’s foreign policy strategies in the period from 1988 to 1998 concerning ASEAN. An example would be the enhanced interaction model to approach the Myanmar issue, which was initially raised as Indonesia’s objection against Thailand’s flexible engagement concept, but was then adopted by the Association (Kuhonta 2006; Acharya 2009a).\textsuperscript{85}

Clearly, the prominence of the foreign minister and Deplu under Suharto’s presidency depended on the issues at hand as well as the president’s preferences. In general, Deplu remained authoritative due to its ability to formally formulate and execute policy and the foreign minister holds a central role in this regard. This is because bureaucratic institutions, such as Deplu, presented a sphere where information and ideas were processed and later conveyed to the top decision-maker. As underscored in Chapter Two, although different foreign policy options were the result of intermittent meetings between lower level bureaucrats, they would require approval from leaders in the bureaucracy prior to being adopted as a policy. In this case, the highest authority is the foreign minister. Therefore, the foreign minister joined the president as a main foreign policy actor during the New Order regime.

During the \textit{Reformasi} period, apart from the East Timor case that occurred during the Habibie presidency and the turbulent political situation under the leadership of Wahid, the role

\textsuperscript{84} A more detailed account of this concept will be given in Chapter Four.

\textsuperscript{85} For details, see Chapter Six.
of Deplu and the foreign minister remained crucial in determining foreign policy content (Sriyanto, 2009:133). Legally, the authority of the foreign minister in particular, and Deplu in general, was not diminished by democratisation. Instead, their authorities were strengthened by the passing of the Law No.37/1999 regarding Foreign Relations. This Law identifies the president and the foreign minister as the central authorities in managing Indonesia’s foreign relations (see Article 6 of the Law). The practical application of this stipulation in terms of the influence wielded by the foreign minister occurred under Megawati, who fully supported Wirajuda’s management of Indonesia’s foreign relations, including reforming Deplu to become a fully civilian institution.

Wirajuda was a diplomat by training. He initially had little knowledge about foreign affairs. After joining Deplu he was able to pursue his higher education at various prestigious universities, including Oxford, Fletcher, Harvard, and Virginia Law School—the latter being the institution from which he obtained his Doctorate. This education, in conjunction with Deplu’s internal diplomatic courses, gave Wirajuda knowledge in foreign affairs. On certain occasions, his expertise made his ideas more prominent than others in the making of Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy. For example, with regards to promoting human rights, Wirajuda was one of the masterminds behind the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) in 1993. Furthermore, during his career as foreign minister, he pursued a number of initiatives that focused on promoting democracy in order to reflect the values of Reformasi in Indonesia’s foreign policy (Nabbs-Keller 2013) as well as to strengthen Indonesia’s very own democratic consolidation (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012).

Taking the helm from Shihab, Wirajuda saw the need to reform Deplu for two purposes. First, a reformed institution would help with coordinating and changing Indonesia’s diplomatic approach from being thematic, e.g. political and security affairs, to being regionally based. For this reason, he aimed to balance Indonesia’s bilateral, regional, and multilateral diplomacy, which was reflected in the new bureaucratic structure of Deplu, introduced in 2002 (see Appendix I). Changing the structure in such a way was also pertinent to Megawati’s foreign policy as she endeavoured to revitalise the country’s primacy within ASEAN. Second, the bureaucratic reform was necessary to reflect the values of Reformasi, and to ensure the transformation of Indonesia’s foreign policy (Nabbs-Keller, 2013:56). In this case, the reform was a reaction against a foreign policy-making process during the New Order period, which was dominated by an oligarchy of the military, as manifested in the kekaryaan policy (Nabbs-Keller, 2013:69). Before proceeding further, it is essential to briefly discuss this bureaucratic reform project and to examine whether the reforms have enhanced the authority of the foreign minister in the foreign policy decision-making process.
In general, as a formal foreign policy institution, Deplu consists of two major divisions: the supporting units, which primarily consist of bureaus, and the operational units, which deal with daily foreign policy issues. While supporting units are supervised by a Secretary General responsible for the management of the office, including budget or staffing issues, the head of the operational units is the Director General (DG). The first reform (known as *benah diri*) was launched in 2002. Fundamental to this reform was the bureaucratic restructure in the form of the creation of the position of spokesperson and the Public Directorate, as well as revitalising the role of the Policy Analysis and Development Body (*Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan, BPPK*). In essence, the formation of the spokesperson role and the focus on Public Diplomacy functions were undertaken in response to public demand for accountability (Wirajuda, personal communication with the author, 2010). After their establishment, both roles were immediately filled by diplomats known to be very close to Wirajuda, namely Dr. Marty Natalegawa and Umar Hadi, as ministry spokesperson and person in charge of public diplomatic affairs respectively. These individuals had served under Wirajuda for several years prior to him becoming foreign minister.

As far as the BPPK is concerned, the reform was intended to revitalise its role as Deplu’s internal think-tank. Following the reform, BPPK has been more involved in the policy planning given their assessments of existing policy strategies. Its meetings involve the foreign minister and the head of BPPK, in addition to other relevant units. However, in practice, it has been difficult for BPPK to play a significant role in the policy-making process within Deplu. As Arthauli Tobing, who led BPPK from 2007 to 2009, noted, the main factor was that most diplomats believed that policy should be drafted by relevant units. ‘It took me quite some time to notify them that we do exist,’ Arthauli complained (interview with Arthauli Tobing, 28 December 2011). As a result, at the lower level of bureaucracy, the BPPK staff members were often perceived as ‘second-class employees’ within Deplu (Tobing, interview, 28 December 2011). Such a mind-set hampered the intended rejuvenation of the BPPK and apart from its presence in nearly every regular meeting conducted by the foreign minister, the salience of this body in supporting the policy-making process has been, at best, questionable. This situation has continued under Marty Natalegawa’s leadership as foreign minister (2009-2014). An example concerns the formulation of Indonesia’s foreign policy white paper between 2012 and 2013; notably, the original BPPK’s draft was ignored by the foreign minister’s office, BAM (*Biro Administrasi Menteri*), and eventually it was the BAM’s version that was ratified.

In 2005, marked by a ‘right-sizing’ policy, which involved increasing the number of diplomats, and decreasing the number of administrative staffs (by halting new recruitment of the latter) as well as liquidating and merging some working units (see *Appendix 2*), Wirajuda...
instigated the second bureaucratic reform. In principle, of around 4000 staff members at the
time, Wirajuda aimed to decrease this ratio from 2:1 (administrative staff to diplomat ratio) to
1:2 (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). Pursuing the ‘right-sizing’ policy, Wirajuda’s goal
was to create an effective bureaucracy and strengthen the units available to support Indonesia’s
diplomacy. In addition to increasing the number of Indonesian diplomats, a meritocratic
promotion system was introduced. Wirajuda emphasised the need for an open and fair
promotion system to support the career progression of all staff. Dino Djalal (who later became
Presidential Special Staff for International Relations-cum-spokesperson and speechwriter),
Teuku Faizasyah (who later replaced Dino in 2010), and Marty Natalegawa (who in 2009
became foreign minister), were among the beneficiaries of this meritocratic promotion system.
At mid-career level there were also a number of diplomats who were seconded to the Palace or
the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Law, and Security Affairs in order to further their career
development.

The ability of the foreign minister to control the creation of foreign policy, in some
cases, leads the executive to surpass the DPR in foreign policy-making process as demonstrated
by Indonesia’s passing of UN Resolution 1747 in 2007 regarding the Iranian nuclear case.86
The Indonesian Permanent Mission in New York supported this resolution, which imposed
tighter sanctions and an arms embargo on Iran. Notably, Indonesia’s position on this issue was
taken without consultation and approval from the DPR. This aligned with Wirajuda’s ideas
about appropriate foreign policy practice, whereby its implementation falls solely into the
government’s domain (Detiknews, 29 March 2007). Further, the situation confirms what Legro
(1997) argues, as stipulated in the previous chapter, in underscoring the importance of the
foreign ministry in handling foreign issues, as bureaucrats operating in the ministry and the
minister himself usually possess more expertise in diplomacy compared to other institutions
involved in the making of foreign policy. To be sure, in this case, the government was not
obliged to seek for approvals from the DPR because according to the 1945 Constitution (and
the Law No.37/1999), parliamentary approvals are required only when treaty ratification is
concerned. And since a vote for UN Resolution in the aforementioned case was not treaty
ratification, by law, such approvals were not required.

Overall, this section suggests that the authoritative foreign policy actors hold formal
power to make foreign policy decisions in Indonesia. Indeed, during both the New Order and
Reformasi periods, Indonesia’s foreign policy-making remains the domain of the leaders. In
relation to the theoretical chapter, this confirms Hill’s statement (2003:53) on foreign policy

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86 For the full content of the Resolution, see United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747.
being an area of policy that is administered by the president and the foreign minister who possess the formal authority in determining foreign affairs.

3.2 Non-authoritative actors

Within the executive branch, two non-authoritative bodies are important: the Presidential Special Staff on International Relations and the Presidential Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. Both were founded during SBY’s presidency and functioned as advisors on foreign affairs attached to his office. Outside the executive, the parliament and, to a certain degree, prominent foreign policy observers as well as policy/ideas entrepreneurs, have also been influential in shaping Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda. These actors are, in principle, non-authoritative because parliament and ideas entrepreneurs do not have the formal authority to make and execute state’s foreign policy. However, while parliament can affect foreign policy by virtue of their power to scrutinise government’s decisions through policy consultations and policy coalitions, ideas entrepreneurs87 can influence foreign policy by introducing new ideas and transmitting them through various channels, such as presidential speeches and access to leaders.

3.2.1 Special Staff on International Relations

The office of the special staff (otherwise known as SKHI, Staf Khusus Hubungan Internasional) was established in 2005 and is a coordinating body on foreign policy between Deplu and the Palace. Headed by a Special Staff (Staf Khusus) of an Echelon I level, the SKHI was intended to be an exclusive group of foreign policy advisors to the president, somewhat resembling the West Wing of the White House (Djalal, interview with the author, 2 June 2010). Following its formation, President SBY appointed Dr. Dino Djalal to be the special staff on international relations.

According to Djalal’s book about SBY’s leadership style called Harus Bisa (2008), his acquaintance with SBY dated back to when Djalal was a Political Counsellor at the Indonesian Embassy in Washington. At the time, SBY was a Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs. They met in Washington when Djalal assisted SBY with his speech during the latter’s visit in early 2000. Their professional ties grew and following SBY’s first nomination as a presidential candidate in 2004, Djalal joined his campaign team as a foreign affairs advisor. With such a close and personal relationship between the two, Djalal was able to influence Indonesia’s foreign policy, particularly via his access to the president and by occupying a speechwriter position, which allowed him to assert his foreign policy ideas through the speeches.

87 For a detailed discussion on ideas entrepreneurs, see, among others, Mintrom (1997), Checkel (1993), and Mintrom and Norman (2009).
he wrote for the president. An example is Djalal’s attempt to revamp Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy doctrine (bebas-aktif) by introducing the concept of an omni-directional foreign policy, which he thought an appropriate foreign policy approach in relation to promoting the ‘new Indonesia’ (Indonesia baru) identity.88 This particular speech was delivered at the LSE on 31st March 2009. The speech was drafted by Djalal, and Deplu was consulted merely to reconfirm certain parts of the speech, particularly those highlighting Indonesia’s policy on specific issues, i.e. on ASEAN and on Myanmar.

However, the foreign minister was not entirely pleased with Djalal’s attempts to insert his ideas into foreign policy forums. For this matter, the former FM Wirajuda dubbed Djalal an ‘unguided missile’ for his action that at times surpassed his role as a staf khusus, who was non-authoritative in Indonesia’s foreign policy context, and interfered with policy-making and its implementation (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012).89 Wirajuda’s statement about Djalal on the one hand, and Djalal’s role in foreign policy on the other, reflected the competition between foreign policy institutions in Indonesia and demonstrated that the relationship between Deplu and SKHI was not always on good terms, contrary to what was suggested by a former SKHI’s staff member.90 Essentially, there is a competitive relationship between those who actually make, decide, and execute foreign policy and those who influence foreign policy decisions. It is competition as to who is able to submit and win support for ideas in the foreign policy arena. As revealed from the interviews with both parties, the views exchanged by Wirajuda and Djalal about each other’s part in foreign policy-making were quite critical, if not harsh. Djalal noted his occasional frustration with Deplu’s workspace, arguing that

in Deplu, business is conducted in a regular and monotonous fashion with a lack of ground-breaking innovation. As a result, Deplu’s staff was hardly thinking outside the box. At times, this has caused a congestion in exchanging information between my office and Deplu. Deplu’s bureaucratic constraints have hindered it from coping with my office’s work-speed (Djalal, interview, 2 June 2010).

Responding to Djalal’s view, Wirajuda strongly asserts that,

[the] process of foreign policy formulation and its implementation is in Deplu. Dino’s role was just to ‘add colour to the painting’ as it was Deplu who prepared the inputs for Presidential speeches. SBY’s speech-making pattern follows either of the two: Deplu – President – Dino; or Deplu (raw material) – Dino – President (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012).

88 A more detailed discussion on this concept will be included in Chapter Four.
89 This view was likely to be informed by, among others, Djalal’s attempt to influence the decisions on discontinuing the existence of the US Navy-controlled NAMRU-2 (Naval Medical Research Unit) in Indonesia, which had led Djalal to occasionally openly challenge the Indonesian Health Minister at the time. For details, see The Jakarta Post, 24 April 2008.
90 The interviewee concerned requested anonymity. This interview was conducted in Jakarta, 14 May 2010.
Legally speaking, the SKHI is not a state institution with decision-making power as it has no constitutional mandate, nor is it regulated by the law on foreign relations. However, the personal relationship between Djalal and SBY contributed to Djalal’s ability to indirectly influence the foreign policy decision-making. In other words, Djalal’s ample access to the president and his role as the president’s speechwriter provided a window of opportunity that have allowed him to channel his ideas into the decision-making process. Although Djalal left the SKHI following his appointment as ambassador to the US in 2010, SBY was known to frequently seek Djalal’s assistance, especially regarding, but not limited to, the writing of foreign affairs speeches. For instance, Djalal was frequently seen in SBY’s entourage on the president’s diplomatic trips. During a press briefing session at the ASEAN Summit in Bali in November 2011, SBY was caught looking for Djalal’s assistance to respond to a question raised by a foreign journalist despite the nearby presence of Foreign Minister Natalegawa and the new Staf Khusus Dr. Teuku Faizasyah. Therefore, occupying the position of a staf khusus does not, per se, guarantee influence over foreign policy content; far more important are personal relations and access to the president, at least as regards the incumbent.

3.2.2 Presidential Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs

Known publicly in Indonesia as Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden or Wantimpres, the body was formed in 2006 and composed of nine members (mainly former ministers and senior politicians) selected by SBY. Meeting once every two months, the role and function of this body, similar to the DPA (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, The Supreme Advisory Council) during the New Order, were to advise the president on key strategic issues.

When it was first formed, SBY appointed Ali Alatas to the post of foreign affairs adviser. In this capacity, one of Alatas’ major tasks was the drafting of the ASEAN Charter as

91 In July 2014, Djalal was appointed Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister.
92 Wantimpres members are selected based on the expertise on the issues that attracted the president’s attention. When it was first established (2006-2010), the nine issue areas were: foreign affairs (covered by Ali Alatas, former FM), environment and sustainable development (covered by Prof. Emil Salim, former environmental minister), political affairs (covered by Rahmawati Sukarnoputri, sister of Megawati Sukarnoputri), economic affairs (covered by Dr. Syahrir), religious affairs (covered by Ma’ruf Amin), defence and security (covered by TB. Silalahi, a close aide of SBY), legal affairs (Adnan B Nasution), social-cultural issues (covered by Prof. Subur BS, one of the founders of the Democratic Party—SBY’s political party), and agricultural affairs (covered by Prof. Iradi Gani). The second tenure of Wantimpres (2010-2014) was focused on the following issue areas: economy and environment (covered by Prof. Emil Salim), inter-religious affairs (covered by Ma’ruf Amin), education and culture (covered by Prof. Meutia Hatta, former minister, daughter of Indonesia’s first Vice President Mohammad Hatta), development and regional autonomy (covered by Prof. Ginandjar Kartasasmita, senior politician), defence and security (covered by Widodo AS, former minister), foreign affairs (covered by Hassan Wirajuda, former FM), legal and state-administration affairs (covered by Prof. Jimly Asshiddique, former speaker of the Constitutional Court), governance and bureaucratic reform (covered by Prof. Ryaas Rasyid, former minister), people’s welfare (covered by Siti Fadhilah Supari, former health minister). Extracted from Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden, “Profil Anggota (Member’s Profile).”
93 For a detailed account of the DPA, see Hein (1986:110-113).
Indonesia’s representative in the ASEAN’s Eminent Persons Group (EPG). Alatas sought to promote Indonesia’s interest in expanding democratic values within ASEAN by securing support for the concept of human rights protection. Consequently, the Indonesian draft of the ASEAN Charter came to be known later as the ‘Alatas Paper’ (Report of the Indonesian Foreign Minister 2004-2009:78). In 2010, Hassan Wirajuda was appointed to replace Alatas, who died in December 2008. Wirajuda and SBY had both sat in Megawati’s Cabinet as Foreign Minister and Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, respectively, and were therefore familiar with each other. Wirajuda felt that his closeness with SBY came as result of similar views on Indonesia’s foreign affairs (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). As a Wantimpres member, Wirajuda was frequently included in SBY’s presidential trips abroad between 2010 and 2011.

Being merely an adviser, both Alatas and Wirajuda did not have any formal foreign policy-making authority. However, given their close relation with the president, as well as their expertise on foreign affairs and previous experiences as foreign ministers, a number of foreign affairs initiatives have been undertaken at the suggestion of these two foreign affairs adviser. While Alatas was influential in drafting the ASEAN Charter, a more recent example of Wirajuda’s role in foreign policy context was Indonesia’s initiative to hold an informal discussion regarding the South China Sea between China and the ASEAN claimants during the 2011 ASEAN Summit in Bali.

3.2.3 The Parliament (DPR)

With regards to decision-making processes, during the New Order period the DPR was frequently considered a rubber stamp body for the government’s policies (Ziegenhain 2008). The Indonesian Parliament was then divided into two chambers: (1) the MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly), whose tasks included outlining the State’s Policy Guidance (Garis Besar Harapan Negara, or GBHN) in order to determine the government’s programme, electing and inaugurating the president, and monitoring the execution of the GBHN by the president by holding a general assembly once in five years, congruent with the presidential term; (2) the DPR (or People’s Representative Council). In the DPR, foreign affairs were scrutinised by Komisi I (Commission I), one out of eleven Commissions.

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94 This is an unpublished document and a final memorandum of FM Hassan Wirajuda to the President that was also handed-over to Wirajuda’s successor, Marty Natalegawa, in 2009.
95 From 2011 onwards, Hassan has travelled less frequently with SBY because he was given another responsibility in Indonesia, in relation to foreign policy and public policy education.
96 The Constitutional amendments brought on by the Reformasi saw the creation of an additional chamber to the Indonesian Parliament: the DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah), which was equivalent to Senate.
During the New Order period, the parliament was never a wholly elected body. In 1987 and 1992 elections, for example, civilian politicians appointed by Suharto occupied 400 of the parliament’s seats, the majority were Golkar members, and the remaining 100 seats were reserved for appointed military officers (Liddle, 1999:41). Given such a configuration, parliament was an ineffective institution, lacking legitimacy and authority to perform its real duties of monitoring, budgeting, and legislating. This is apparent from the fact that from 1982-1997, the DPR never proposed any bills. Indeed, all bills were drafted by the government and became laws without exception (Ziegenhain, 2008:73). In this regard, the Komisi I had a poor record of scrutinising or influencing the foreign policy decision-making process (Fealy, 2001:106). Following the political demise of Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia organised its first direct and open parliamentary election in April 1999.

In October 1999, the parliament held a General Assembly to ratify the first amendment to the Indonesian Constitution. One outcome was an increased role of the DPR in the area of foreign policy. This role involved, primarily, holding up ambassadorial appointments, control over foreign policy expenses, and overseeing foreign policy execution (Murphy, 2005:260). There are three key points that explain the parliament’s strengthened role.

First, there is the aforementioned first Constitutional amendment. The amended Article 13 of the Constitution states that the government should consider the DPR’s decision in determining ambassadorial posts abroad as well as its position on the posting of foreign ambassadors to Indonesia—although the latter condition is an uncommon practice in diplomacy. In practice, Komisi I rejected the posting of Myanmar’s Ambassador to Indonesia, which was immediately followed by the suspension of the posting of Jakarta’s Ambassador to Yangon, as a form of protest against the continued detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (Sambuaga, 2009:7). This decision was a reflection of the principle to “engage international affairs based on the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, and the value of democracy and human rights” (Sambuaga, interview, 30 March 2010).

Second, the direct election of DPR members provided them with stronger legitimacy to execute the parliament’s aforementioned three main functions. Apart from drafting and ratifying national regulations and overseeing the execution of the government’s programme, the DPR members are also responsible for approving/rejecting the state budget. Once approved, the Ministry of Finance then executes the expenses. And third, the increased role of the DPR

97 There were only three political parties allowed to operate by the government at the time, namely Golkar, the Unity and Development Party (Partai Persatuan dan Pembangunan, PPP), and the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokasi Indonesia, PDI). As a result, the factions in the parliament represented these parties plus Fraksi ABRI (the military faction).
98 Theo Sambuaga is a senior Golkar politician. He chaired Komisi I from 2004 to 2009.
99 For the complete task of the DPR, see DPR’s Website, “Tugas dan wewenang (task and responsibility).”
was also motivated by the desire to redress the overwhelming dominance of the executive, especially in relation to policy-making process (Rüland 2009). In other words, in view of the spirit of Reformasi, the DPR was to be a balancing force to the executive. In this context, all laws needed to be scrutinised by the DPR before being applied.100

Decision-making in the DPR takes place in the committees, with the plenary usually serving as a forum to raise issues of the day (Sherlock, 2010:166). Between 2004-2009, Komisi I, comprising 49 members and supported by 20 members of staff, held three meetings per week, which made it one of the most active and vocal groups within the DPR (Rüland, 2009:381).101 With Deplu as its mitra kerja (counterpart), Komisi I meets regularly by way of a general hearing session (Rapat Dengar Pendapat Umum, RDPU) to discuss a wide range of issues, such as updates on contemporary diplomatic issues and issues related to the Ministry’s budgeting programme, and working meetings (Rapat Kerja otherwise known as Raker) to discuss more specific foreign issues at hand, such as border problems. Through these meetings, the DPR members raise and subsequently channel their ideas or preferences into the policy-making process. As will be discussed further in Chapter Five, the exchange of ideas between the DPR, the government, and a number of relevant policy entrepreneurs takes place in these meetings.

In foreign affairs, the DPR has been very active on several issues, particularly those that have generated nationalist outcries, such as in cases confronting issues of sovereignty, or concerns about human rights and citizen protection. An example is when the DPR refused to meet Australia’s PM John Howard in September 2002 given prevailing sentiments regarding Australia’s involvement in the East Timor conflict (Dosch, 2007:58-9). As discussed in Chapter Two, the DPR’s response to those kind of issues, including making an appeal to nationalist sentiment, serves to increase the popularity of the DPR members since they are politicians whose primary goal involves maintaining office (see, e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Hagan 1995).

The DPR’s increasing role in foreign policy decision-making is most obvious in relation to issues concerning treaty ratification (Sambuaga, interview, 30 March 2010). In such cases, the government has faced significant political challenges from the DPR regarding the ratification of international agreements. The Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between Indonesia and Singapore offers a useful illustration. The Singapore-initiated DCA, signed in April 2007, was crafted as a package linked to the Indonesia-initiated Extradition Treaty (ET) that Jakarta was eager to conclude. The DCA contained provisions that allowed Singaporean

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100 For an explanation of how the parliament works in democratic Indonesia, including coverage of the process of making a bill, see Sherlock (2010, chapter 8).

101 The membership of Komisi I for the 2009-2014 period has increased to fifty members.
military personnel to train in certain parts of Sumatra. For this reason, the DCA was not ratified by the DPR in view of Indonesia’s respective sovereignty, economic, and environmental considerations. Environmental reasons also played a role as fishermen operating in the Natuna area worried that the military training might ecologically damage the sea, leading to a scarcity of fishes that eventually could have a negative impact on their income (Antara, 18 July 2007). As a result, the whole package stalled despite a renewed commitment made by the Indonesian and the Singaporean governments in 2012 to renegotiate it.

However, in spite of the increasing assertiveness of the DPR, as Sambuaga has put it (interview, 30 March 2010), a number of limitations have curtailed its influence in shaping foreign policy. First, the DPR members are limited in their knowledge and understanding of foreign issues. Their involvement in, and statements on, foreign policy issues – specifically those that are related to sovereignty and nationalistic sentiment – have frequently been premised on a lack of information and familiarity on the matters at hand, hence, their responses have rather been motivated by anger (Sambuaga, interview, 30 March 2010). This supports the idea that a parliament, in general, is a heterogeneous body whose members have different perceptions of and interests towards diplomatic issues (Putnam, 1988:443). This limits the extent to which they can effectively craft a state’s foreign policy (see, Barnett and Spano 2008). Second, in Indonesia, foreign affairs have not generally been an electoral issue. Accordingly, the salience of the DPR is likely to be higher in domestic than in foreign affairs. Third, the DPR as a whole has been struggling to mitigate its negative image due to numerous corruption cases involving its members. A public survey held in 2010 revealed that 78% of the people in urban Indonesia believed that the DPR was the most corrupt state body in Indonesia (Media Indonesia, 21 April 2011). The inability of the DPR to distance itself from its negative image has encouraged observers to label the DPR ‘the ugly face of democracy’ (see, e.g., Mietzner and Aspinall, 2010:9).

In sum, in comparison to the New Order period, there has been an increase in the influence of the DPR during the Reformasi era. Especially in, but not limited to, foreign affairs, the Indonesian parliament is no longer a rubber stamp body. The role of the DPR members in determining foreign policy has increased, as illustrated by the cases of the rejection of the Myanmar’s ambassadorial appointment as well as blocking the DCA ratification, as presented in the above. The increased role of the DPR has also made foreign policy-making more complex than during the New Order period. To this extent, foreign policy-making is more consultative, providing the DPR with greater opportunity to scrutinise government’s policy and to channel new ideas into the policy-making process. Notwithstanding this change, being a large and heterogeneous body, in addition to the shortcomings noted by Sambuaga, the DPR is at heart
non-authoritative in the state’s foreign policy decision-making process. Apart from scrutinising the state’s budget and ambassadorial appointments, and its right to ratify treaties, the DPR’s role in foreign policy remains quite limited. In practice, this limitation has made the parliament an institution whose ideas, or preferences, can be ignored by the government, as highlighted above in relation to Iran’s apparent nuclear ambition.

3.3 **Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making process: change or continuity?**

This section investigates how foreign policy has been made during the Reformasi era, arguing that Indonesia’s foreign policy-making is essentially top-down, with authoritative actors as the key decision-makers. They shape the initial focus and preferences of foreign policy in line with what they believe to be Indonesia’s interest. This supports the idea raised in Chapter Two, that foreign policy is essentially a product of individuals in leadership position (see Alden and Aran, 2012:19). However, in a democratic system the role of parliament and idea entrepreneurs cannot be ignored because leaders, to some extent, accept inputs from these actors.

That being said, if approval from the DPR is required, particularly agreement in case of treaty ratifications, then the foreign minister needs to initiate the bill. In this case, three stages must be met before a law comes into force (Sherlock, 2010:165). Stage one involves the delivery of the bill from the foreign ministry to the Speaker of the DPR. Once received, the bill is then sent to a steering committee (*badan musyawarah*) – whose members consist of the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the DPR and representatives from all political party factions. The steering committee will then designate *Komisi I* to examine the bill. It is during this specific stage that policy consultations, in the form of general hearing sessions and working meetings, are held between the *Komisi I* members and the foreign minister. During this process, if required, the *Komisi I* may also invite members of the relevant epistemic community for public consultations. Once the process within *Komisi I* is concluded, the bill will then be presented to the working committee (*panitia kerja*) – whose members consist of representatives from factions in *Komisi I*. This committee will then finalise the bill.

In stage two, the finalised bill is presented to the steering committee, who will either approve or reject it; if approved, it will be submitted to the plenary. If unanimous approval is not achieved, the working committee will resend the bill to the *Komisi I* for further examination. The plenary, in this case, will decide whether the bill can be approved by the DPR. When the bill is approved, in stage three, the Speaker passes the bill to the foreign minister who will submit it to the president for signing. The newly-sanctioned international/bilateral treaty then enters into force once the law becomes effective.
During the aforementioned process, particularly in stage two, political lobbying and expert inquiries sometimes compel the foreign minister to engage more intensively with non-authoritative actors. For instance, in 2008, Deplu organised at least 320 public campaigns, including policy workshops with academics and policy experts, to raise awareness about, and support for the ratification of, the ASEAN Charter (Assignment Report of the Foreign Minister, 2009:69). Although those academics and policy experts do not have authority in foreign policy-making, they can sometimes be influential. Their support can, on the one hand, legitimate the decision to ratify the Charter and, on the other, apply pressure on the DPR to immediately approve its ratification.

If a decision does not require the DPR’s approval, the process is simpler. The policy options are discussed mainly by the governmental actors, although the discussions can also involve individuals outside the government. The drafting process of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) concept paper in 2003 offers a good example of this point (see Chapter Five). The initial concept for the APSC came from Rizal Sukma, who tabled the idea at a seminar organised by the Indonesian Representative Office for the UN in 2003 (see, Emmerson 2005a). After deliberation involving foreign minister Wirajuda, the ASEAN unit within Deplu, and also Sukma himself, Sukma’s ideas were reconceptualised as to omit certain words from his original proposal that were thought to be too sensitive for other ASEAN members, such as human rights. This example suggests two important factors. First, non-authoritative actors can shape foreign policy content by generating ideas that are then considered by the main foreign policy-makers. Sukma’s credentials as a prominent foreign policy expert and his access to the decision-making circle have been instrumental in channelling his ideas into the foreign policy-making arena. This situation highlights the importance of networking with those in the decision-making circle in order for ideas entrepreneurs to influence foreign policy (see Mintrom 1997). Second, the example also confirms the salience of leaders in determining the final content of a state’s foreign policy decision. Additionally, the making of this specific policy seemed to involve only limited actors and deliberation was made away from the parliament and public attention, thus, indicating a top-down process.

In summary, Indonesia’s foreign policy-making continues to be top-down because democratisation did not lead to a significant alteration to the role of key foreign policy-makers’ in the executive. While the multiple constitutional amendments between 1999 and 2002 and the Law regarding Indonesia’s Foreign Relations provided the DPR to have a bigger role in foreign policy, such a role was limited to specific foreign policy matters, such as ambassadorial appointment and the ratification of international agreements. In fact, these regulations reinforce the control of the president and the foreign minister in conducting Indonesia’s foreign affairs.
Therefore, the principal authority to make Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions remain in the hands of a limited number of major foreign policy actors in the executive. In relation to the public, in making foreign policy the key foreign policy actors in the executive have been unlikely to follow the preference of public opinion, as the decisions on Myanmar and on the Ambalat case, as noted in Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, respectively, illustrate. The public was instead utilised merely to nurture legitimacy towards certain foreign policy decision, as the case of Deplu’s public campaign on the ASEAN Charter revealed.

Overall, Indonesia’s current foreign policy decision-making system demonstrates continuity by maintaining the salience of leaders as the state’s major foreign policy-makers. While suggesting that Indonesia’s foreign policy-making is top-down, this section also argues that foreign policy-making in Indonesia during the Reformasi period has essentially been more consultative than during the New Order era. Above all, the foreign minister is expected to attend policy forums organised by the parliament where policy scrutiny is likely. This development reflects a change in the policy-making process, specifically by way of making foreign policy more of a consultative process.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the link between democratisation and foreign policy decision-making in Indonesia. It has highlighted the actors involved in that process. These actors are classified based on their decision-making power: authoritative and non-authoritative. The former comprised of the president and the foreign minister as well as the decision-makers in Deplu since they formally make and decide the state’s foreign policy, while the latter comprises the DPR, institutions other than the foreign ministry, and policy/ideas entrepreneurs. While the non-authoritative actors can neither formulate nor conduct the state’s foreign policy, they can influence its content by shaping the views of the key foreign policy actors in the executive. Policy consultation, political networking, and the privilege to compose presidential speeches, provide channels to access the top decision-makers.

This chapter has demonstrated that the top political leaders play an essential role in making Indonesia’s foreign policy. As such, it confirms the view that Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions are driven by the interests and ideas of individuals in leadership positions in the key decision-making institutions (MacIntyre, 2003:101). This condition remains relevant despite the political reforms that have taken place since 1998. At the same time, however, the roles of the DPR and, to some extent, ideas entrepreneurs cannot be ignored as they have gained importance during the Reformasi era. In relation to the increasing role of the DPR, foreign
policy decision-making in Indonesia during the *Reformasi* period has been more consultative than during the most of the New Order.

Consequently, notwithstanding the consultative processes, the salience of leaders demonstrates the continuity in the way foreign policy is made during *Reformasi* and highlights the differential impact of democratisation on foreign policy. In the next chapter this study will discuss the relationship between Indonesia’s democratisation and the *bebas-aktif* foreign policy doctrine, as the latter is an important manifestation of ideas and identity that have long underpinned the conduct of Indonesia’s diplomacy.
4 Democarisation and the bebas-aktif doctrine: a competition between ideas

As the previous chapter shows, the formulation of foreign policy in Indonesia is characterised by both continuity and change. Continuity because foreign policy is still largely dictated by authoritative actors, but also change because since Reformasi there has been increasing scope for non-authoritative actors to provide input to policy. This chapter will explore one aspect of Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy basic doctrine, bebas-aktif. The bebas-aktif doctrine held that Indonesia should be independent in deciding its foreign policy course while continuing to play a proactive role in the establishment of world peace. Essentially, bebas-aktif is an idea put forward by Indonesia’s first vice president, Mohammad Hatta, who sought a conceptual basis for appropriate international behaviour in the context of the Cold War for Jakarta following Indonesia’s independence. These principles have continued to inform foreign policy decision-making during the Reformasi period because of three factors. First, the doctrine is still supported by ideas that reflect and define Indonesia’s national identity. Second, the expectations linked to the bebas-aktif principle are in fact widely shared by policy-makers, making the doctrine also a foreign-policy norm. Third, the vague definition of its components allows for the principle to be implemented pragmatically by people across the political spectrum.

Because the doctrine is so open to interpretation, it has been subjected to challenges throughout the Reformasi period. These challenges were mainly a result of the attempts made by some non-authoritative actors to shape foreign policy based upon new competing ideas about foreign policy approaches in the context of Indonesia’s new emerging democratic identity. As the chapter will show, however, whether new ideas take effect in changing the bebas-aktif doctrine remains dependent on approval from the country’s authoritative foreign policy-makers. Without their consent it is unlikely that the bebas-aktif doctrine will change.

This chapter is structured as follows. Section One examines the origins of Indonesia’s bebas-aktif doctrine and the values it enshrined. Section Two will briefly discuss the practice of bebas-aktif during the New Order regime and consider whether the notion of ‘bebas’ in bebas-aktif is implemented at the expense of other priorities, namely the principle of non-alignment. The third section examines the bebas-aktif doctrine in the context of Indonesia’s Reformasi period. This section explores the extent to which new ideas, propagated by non-authoritative actors, have made decision-makers re-interpret the bebas-aktif doctrine or push its practice in a different direction. Section Four explains the link between democratisation and the continued existence of the bebas-aktif doctrine and explores how the doctrine continues to exist despite the political reforms. This chapter will end with a summary of the link between
democratisation and the bebas-aktif doctrine.

4.1 The origin and the basic pillars of the bebas-aktif principle

4.1.1 Bebas-aktif: a response to the competition of power

Although initially derived from the former PM Sjahri’s speech in February 1948, Mohammad Hatta, the first VP and then-de facto PM as well as foreign minister, was the first to articulate the government’s position of bebas-aktif in September 1948. This speech, entitled ‘Rowing between the Two Reefs’ (Mendayung diantara Dua Karang), was delivered before the KNIP (the National Committee of Central Indonesia) as a statement against the hostile world of two major blocs into which Indonesia was immediately born (see Weinstein, 1976; Hatta, 1953). Popularised at the wake of Indonesia’s independence, Hatta reminded the nation:

Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideals? The Indonesian government is of the opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a passive party in the area of international politics but it should be an active agent entitled to decide its own standpoint with the right to fight for its own goal, the goal of a fully independent Indonesia (Hatta, 1953:446).

Drawing on Hatta’s statement above, it is clear that bebas then meant Indonesia should not favour either of the two opposing blocs and follow its own path as Jakarta manoeuvred the various international issues; aktif suggested the need to work pro-actively to maintain peace and alleviate tensions generated by the two blocs caused by endeavours supported by most members of the United Nations (Hatta, 1953:444).

Trying to emphasise the non-aligned position of the republic, in 1952 PM Wilopo reaffirmed that Indonesia’s policy of independence required that it should not take sides in the struggle between the two opposing blocs, and that it must not remain neutral, but respond to international incidents when they occurred based on Indonesia’s national interests and its status as a member of the UN (Hatta, 1953:446). Wilopo’s statement underlined two important foreign policy principles. One, Indonesia was committed to multilateralism and that whenever a problem arose, it should first refer to the UN because Indonesia was not an ‘anti-social state’ secluded from the larger international community (Hatta, 1953:443). Two, being independent did not necessarily equate to being neutral. Hatta believed that the two were different because ‘neutrality’, based on international law, reflected ‘a condition of impartiality towards belligerent states’ (Hatta, 1953:443). Meanwhile, Indonesia’s foreign policy was not constructed with reference to belligerent states, but constructed for the purpose of strengthening and upholding peace (Hatta, 1953:443-4).
At the time, the *bebas-aktif* doctrine served Indonesia’s priority to sustain domestic priorities designed to overcome economic, social, and administrative shortcomings and to accommodate the sense of national revolution used as a standard by which governments could be judged (Leifer, 1983:29). An independent Indonesia, born in the wake of the Second World War, felt that a non-aligned position was important to prevent its citizens, who were impoverished, from being further economically deprived. While serving Indonesia’s domestic purposes, the doctrine was also a deliberation of the international aspiration of Indonesian leaders to justify the country’s rightful and natural position of leadership, particularly in Southeast Asia (Weinstein, 1972:367). To this extent, *bebas-aktif* meant more than just anti-colonialism and non-alignment (Leifer 1983).

Pertinent to Indonesia’s international aspiration was the sense of ‘regional entitlement’—strongly held by foreign policy elites in Jakarta—which was fundamental to understanding *bebas-aktif* and had its foundation in Indonesia’s revolutionary pride, the size of its population, its land and maritime dimensions, natural resources, and strategic location (Leifer, 1983:173). Both Sukarno and Suharto espoused such a sense of regional entitlement and it is still considered meaningful by the present Indonesian foreign policy elites. For instance, according to an analyst who works as the Deputy for Political Affairs at the Indonesian Vice President’s office, the notion of ‘regional entitlement’ remains significant in the sense that Indonesia would want to lead the region and provide intellectual impetus, in addition to steering ASEAN’s commitments (Anwar, interview, 23 August 2011). A further discussion of this matter will take place in Chapter Five.

That said, the vague nature of *bebas-aktif* allows Indonesian foreign policy elites to interpret and consequently, implement, the doctrine in a malleable fashion. During the revolutionary period, this had led to a sour relationship between Sukarno and Hatta. During the mid-1950s, with support from the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), President Sukarno intensified diplomatic ties with China and the Soviet Union. Sukarno’s action prompted Hatta, who was Vice President at the time, to resign in July 1956 following his disagreement with Sukarno over the increasing involvement of the PKI in governmental affairs (see, Leifer, 1983:Ch.2). This feud inevitably ended the romance of Sukarno and Hatta, also noted as the *dwi-tunggal* (two as one), built during the revolutionary period.
4.1.2 Bebas-aktif: its basic pillars

As Hein (1986:14-27) summarizes, there are five philosophical and legal pillars that underpin the existence of the bebas-aktif doctrine.\(^{102}\) It is important to explore these pillars in order to comprehend the underlying rationale of Indonesia’s foreign policy and how it is related to Indonesia’s diplomatic practice.

The first pillar is the Constitution of 1945 (UUD 1945). Ratified one day after the Proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945, the Constitution served as the commanding source of all laws in Indonesia. As such, it outlined the initial stance of the Republic as a new independent country in 1945. It also asserted the means and objectives for which Indonesia was created, and its legal system. The first line of the Preamble (Pembukaan) of the Constitution specifically acknowledged that ‘whereas independence is the inalienable right of all nations, colonialism must be abolished from this world as it is against humanity and justice’. The inclusion of this line is noteworthy considering that Indonesia proclaimed its independence from the Dutch at a time when the concept of self-determination was yet to be recognised in international law due to the conflicting views amongst Europe, Australia and the US (Hassan Wirajuda, personal communication, 2010).\(^{103}\) For the Dutch, in the case of Indonesia, self-determination was only to be achieved by an agreement regarding independence. However, the Dutch proposal was unacceptable to Indonesia’s nationalist leadership because if independence came as a product of an agreement, then it was not an inalienable right, contradicting the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution (Wirajuda 2005). In essence, the principle of anti-colonialism was, and is still, embedded in bebas-aktif foreign policy.

The second pillar is national interest. Indonesia’s national interest can be defined in two ways. First are Indonesia’s ‘aspirational’ interests (Wirajuda, personal communication, 2010), which include the primary goals of the state namely (1) the protection of Indonesians, (2) the promotion of the country’s general welfare, (3) the guarantee of education for all Indonesian people, and (4) the participation in the world order based on freedom, perpetual peace, and social justice. These goals are stated in the fourth preamble of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution. Second, Indonesia’s other national interests are commonly expounded in the government’s

\(^{102}\) In this thesis, the author adapts to Hein’s summary on the principles in question however, the elaboration of each principle is not solely based on his work but rather is developed mainly from the author’s own knowledge and complemented by several references to existing works.

\(^{103}\) The notion of the right of self-determination was first legally introduced in the UN Charter, which entered into force on 24 October 1945 – about two months after Indonesia declared its independence. The principle of self-determination was originally derived from, and further advocated by, American leaders as their attempt to support the political independence of the colonised countries. For further details on the original concept of self-determination see Throntveit (2011). For the debate on the notion of right of self-determination in the UN, particularly for indigenous peoples, see Xanthaki (2007). For a brief summary of the UN documents that include the provisions on self-determination and an Indonesian perspective, see The Jakarta Post, op.ed, 29 November 1999.
strategic goals; thus these other interests are normally short-term and different from one regime or even government to another. During the New Order regime, Indonesia’s strategic goals were introduced once every five years through the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)-designed GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara), or Policy Guidelines, that delineated the priorities of the Suharto government. Following the fall of Suharto, the GBHN have no longer applied in Indonesia’s political system and were replaced by an ordinary Cabinet programme defined by the president. As previously mentioned, bebas-aktif should be applied to pursuit Indonesia’s national interests.

The third pillar is non-alignment, which was emphasised with Indonesia’s participation in the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Belgrade in 1961—a legacy of the Bandung Asian-African Conference (KAA) in 1955 (Hein 1986; see also Tan and Acharya 2008). The non-alignment policy allowed Indonesia to remain impartial in the context of ideological confrontation between two major blocs at the time without having to forego its idea to oppose colonialism in Indonesia and elsewhere (Weinstein, 1976:163). According to one observer, the spirit of non-alignment was the core reference of bebas-aktif (Smith, 1999:239) and was included in Sjahrrir’s speech about the bebas-aktif principle in February 1948. Through his statement, Sjahrrir expressed his disapproval of the idea to align with the Soviet Union, exemplified in a treaty of consular affairs with Moscow, which had been negotiated by Suripno, a PKI figure, a month before (Leifer 1983:19). Hatta and Sjahrrir were Indonesia’s two main proponents of non-alignment. They strongly resisted any efforts designed to bring the young republic into alignment with the two existing blocs. As Indonesia was seeking support against the Dutch and searching for recognition in the international arena, at home the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was attempting to mobilize in support of the government’s closer ties with the Soviet Union. Led by Muso, the PKI enacted a strategy of Jalan Baru untuk Indonesia (A New Road for Indonesia), suggesting an alliance with the Soviet Union as the only means of winning the struggle against Dutch colonialism (Sebastian 2006b). Hatta, in his capacity as incumbent vice president, rejected this strategy. As a response to this extreme left movement, Hatta then initiated the concept of bebas-aktif—the idea introduced in Sjahrrir’s speech seven months earlier (Sebastian 2006b).

The fourth pillar of bebas-aktif is Pancasila. Serving as the state ideology under Suharto and later as a philosophical principle for Indonesians in the Reformasi period, the ideas contained in Pancasila reflect Indonesia’s identity and nationalism (Hein 1986). Derived from Sanskrit, Panca means five and Sila means principles, consisting of (1) belief in the supreme God; (2) the idea/principle of a just and civilised humanity; (3) the idea of Indonesian unity; (4) the idea that democracy should be guided by the inner wisdom of unanimous deliberations
amongst its representatives; and (5) the principle of social justice for all Indonesians. For Indonesians, *Pancasila* was instrumental to Indonesia’s foreign policy during the first five decades as it unified all Indonesians, therefore leaving no reason for any groups in Indonesia to pursue a state policy deviating from *Pancasila* (Sabir, 1987:22). Proposed on June 1st, 1945, *Pancasila* served as an alternative ideological solution offering compromises between the nationalist and the Islamic political camps.

In subsequent debates, the nationalist camp advocated a purely nationalist, if not secular, set of principles for the state, whereas the Islamic camp intended to make Indonesia an Islamic state. The latter for instance proposed the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*), which was infamously recognised to have asserted the ‘obligation for all Muslims to follow Syaria (*dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*)’. The nationalist camp opposed this idea. In principle, therefore, the underlying intent of *Pancasila* was to address the religious challenge inherent in the Jakarta Charter, and to render feasible a more flexible approach to religious freedom and religious minorities by enshrining ‘a belief in One Supreme God’ (Anshari 1981).

During the Suharto period, *Pancasila* was being imposed on the people as an ideology of oppression (Douglas Ramage, interview, 9 August 2011). In this context, *Pancasila* indoctrination took place in various forms, intended to nurture the spirit of nationalism and patriotism, such as the obligation for all civil servants as well as students throughout elementary to university level to participate in the routine debriefing on *Pancasila*, known in Indonesia as *Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila* or P4. The justification for this indoctrination was Suharto’s concerns about the danger of communism and the ekstrim kiri (extreme left) (Aspinall, 2005:5). *Pancasila* thus became an unchallenged ideology, and attempts to subvert were regarded by the regime as makar (acts against the legitimate government). Since the Reformasi era, the role of *Pancasila* has been challenged as a consequence of the resurgence of other values, mainly Islamic, that were suppressed during the Suharto regime. To this extent, some observers believe that an ideological competition is occurring between those still promoting *Pancasila* and those who forcefully advance Islam as the proposed state ideology (Burhanuddin Muhtadi, interview, 22 August 2011; Abdul Mu’ti, interview, 11 August 2011). As Abdul Mu’ti, a Muhammadiyah leader, notes: “during the first years of Reformasi, there was a sharp competition of norms and identity in the domestic political debates, which led to undermining the role of *Pancasila*” (Mu’ti, interview, 11 August 2011).

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104 This is the informal translation of Pancasila from Bahasa Indonesia made by the author. For details on the uses of *Pancasila* in Indonesian politics see Ramage (1995: chapter 1).
Insofar as having *Pancasila* as an underlying principle of the *bebas-aktif* foreign policy, Indonesia’s conduct of its foreign affairs has been morally based on faith in God, but not on one particular religion. Thus, despite being the most populous Muslim nation in the world, Indonesia is neither an Islamic state nor a secular one (Azra, 2006:89), and the country’s foreign policy has never had any religious basis (see, Sukma 2006; Azra 2006). The other postulates of *Pancasila* indicate strong moral values as the basis of the *bebas-aktif* foreign policy (Hatta, 1953:450-1). For instance, the fourth *Sila* enshrines a democratic way of decision-making by emphasising a consensus reached through deliberation. A consensus-building way of decision-making (*musyawarah*) consequently became the preferred method for dealing with external affairs and later became substantiated in Indonesia’s foreign policy in the region. As Chapter Five notes, Indonesia has been a strong supporter of this approach being progressively implemented in ASEAN.

The last pillar of *bebas-aktif* is national unity. It is reasonable to expect a country as vast and as diverse as Indonesia, constituting more than 13,000 islands on which live more than 200 ethnicities, to ensure its sovereignty and national integrity. As emphasised in the third *Sila*, Indonesia has perceived itself as a united entity in spite of the diversity, which it embraces. Hence, the national motto is *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* or Unity in Diversity. During the period of Guided Democracy (1957-1965), which also marked the increased role of Sukarno in foreign policy, the *bebas-aktif* doctrine was aimed at gaining further support to sustain national unity and underpin a pattern of power of which he was the principal beneficiary (Leifer, 1983:56). For this reason, Sukarno often referred to the idea of nationalism in the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy. The radical policy to retain Irian Jaya (or known today as Papua) from the Dutch in 1962 and konfrontasi with Malaysia were some examples of Sukarno’s idea to boost Indonesia’s national integrity through a strong anti-colonialist stance (Sukma, 1995:310). The importance of national unity was sustained during the New Order period. This was accentuated by the concept of the National Archipelagic Outlook (*Wawasan Nusantara*), as a way for Indonesians to see Indonesia in its geographical sphere as one unified entity (*satu kesatuan yang utuh*) based on the Constitution and *Pancasila*. From a historical standpoint, *Wawasan Nusantara* was a significant and important binding factor for Indonesia considering that it was at once composed of, and divided by, several kingdoms; the Javanese Majapahit in the east and the Sumatran Srivijaya in the west were the two largest kingdoms.

The concept of *Wawasan Nusantara* was invoked in order to justify an ‘enlargement’ of Indonesian territory based on international law. The existence of Law No.4 Prp.1960\(^\text{105}\) in

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\(^{105}\) The Law regulates the new delimitations of Indonesia’s territorial seas from 3 nautical miles as stated in the Staatsblad 1939 No. 442, to 12 nautical miles as asserted by the 1957 Djuanda Declaration. According to the
Indonesia was only to address a unilateral means for recognising Indonesia’s maritime territory when it lacked international recognition. Under this condition, the most efficient means of gaining such recognition was to have Wawasan Nusantara as part of international law (Mauna, 2005:391). The ‘diplomatic struggle’ for this recognition had its roots in the 1957 Djuanda Declaration, which outlined that Indonesia—as an archipelagic state (negara kepulauan) — maintains its sovereignty over territorial seas of 12 nautical miles (nm) as opposed to 3nm as initially regulated under the Dutch legal regime (Mauna, 2005:362). This Declaration also serves as a main reference to determine Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200nm from the starting point of the territorial seas (Mauna, 2005:362). The concept of Wawasan Nusantara was finally agreed at the third meeting of the UNCLOS in 1982. This entitled Indonesia to control the exploitation and security of its archipelagic waters (Sebastian, 2006b:178), a concept that was once denied by President Reagan who believed that the possession of natural resources at sea should be under private control (Wanandi, 1994:35). In short, the Wawasan Nusantara concept was proposed by Indonesia in order to gain international recognition for its geographical unity and therefore its territorial integrity. It is clear, therefore, why national unity is considered one of the principles underpinning the bebas-aktif formula.

Those pillars were manifestations of Indonesia’s identity as perceived by its leaders during their time in power. For example, Sukarno’s initiated Pancasila was a political idea that served as a cooperative solution to facilitate the cohesion of different groups in Indonesia, particularly nationalist and Islamist camps, which later underpinned the principle of the bebas-aktif doctrine. Similarly, the non-alignment principle was also derived from the perception of Indonesia as a newly independent state. Hatta envisioned relying on the moral strength of conciliation for the newly independent Indonesia acquiring its own standing in international affairs (Hatta, 1953:452). For this reason, as a frail nation born immediately after the World War II, pursuing international cooperation without being dragged into one of the competing blocs was essential if the twin ideals of social justice and prosperity were to become a reality (Hatta, 1953:441).

Generally, the underpinning ideas and principles of bebas-aktif were accepted by Indonesian foreign policy-makers as the basis for the practice of bebas-aktif doctrine. Some of these ideas, such as the concept of Wawasan Nusantara, have also been internalised as they were included in the national regulations. More generally, this analysis suggests that the bebas-

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Staatsblad, territorial seas were measured starting from the low water line (garis air rendah). Indonesia felt that such a measurement was inappropriate because it left the country with pockets of high seas, which would complicate the monitoring of Indonesia’s territorial integrity. Through this Law, Indonesia asserts that territorial seas of archipelagic states should be measured by connecting the outer points of the outer islands (titik terluar dari pulau terluar). For details on the content, see Law No. 4 Prp.1960 (UU No. 4 Prp.1960).
aktif doctrine served to encapsulate Indonesian identity, as constructed by the political leadership (Anwar and Crouch, 2003:2). Therefore, the salience of the key foreign policy-makers in the executive became the defining factor in Indonesia’s foreign policy as, in practice, they were able to maintain the relevance of the bebas-aktif foreign policy idea.

4.2 Bebas-aktif foreign policy: its implementation during the New Order period

The vague definition of bebas-aktif and the dominance of Suharto in Indonesia’s decision-making process contributed to the design and implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions. During the New Order, the Suharto government pursued a pragmatic foreign policy approach by ‘constantly maintaining a balance in Indonesia’s relations with the existing powers’ (Weinstein, 1972:367) to ensure Indonesia’s territorial security and integration. In practice, this was evident in the case of the Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), signed in December 1995 between Indonesia and Australia. Through the AMS, Indonesia and Australia agreed to a ‘security cooperation’ initiative, circumventing the term ‘alliance’. Among other things, this agreement was not relayed by Indonesia to its ASEAN neighbours, and was the result of eighteen months of personal diplomacy between Suharto and Australia’s Paul Keating (Sukma, 1997a: 235). As Sukma asserts, the then Indonesian Foreign Minister, Alatas, was not entirely aware of the initial process of the AMS; also Suharto opted to send State Secretary Murdiono to announce the AMS to the ASEAN countries at the 1995 ASEAN Summit in Bangkok. In other words, the AMS was a manifestation of the president’s centrality in Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making process.

The AMS stressed three elements that both countries agreed: (i) to consult regularly at the ministerial level on common security issues; (ii) to consult in the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests and, if appropriate, to consider measures which might be taken individually or jointly and in accordance with the processes of each party; and (iii) to promote beneficial cooperative security activities (Sukma, 2004:76-77). The content of the AMS, especially the second point, provoked questions as to whether Indonesia’s decision had undermined the spirit of bebas-aktif foreign policy. Interestingly, however, a line of criticism about Indonesia’s participation in this agreement was not made on the basis of the bebas-aktif principle. For instance, a prominent military figure Lieutenant General (Ret.) Hasnan Habib reacted negatively to the AMS, calling it ‘Australia’s successful diplomatic coup’ towards Indonesia’s military ability (Sukma, 1997a:236). This was because both countries were committed to each other in providing mutual defence assistance in the case of a foreign military attack.
For the Australians, the AMS was significant largely due to the ‘fear psychoses’ that Australia’s main security concerns had to come either from or towards Indonesia (Singh, 2002:60). Moreover, the Australian defence strategy was based on the assumption that Indonesia constituted Australia’s main threat and with so many Australians travelling through, or across, Indonesia, the country was regarded as: ‘uniquely positioned to pressure Australia without resorting to invasion’ (O’Connor, 1997:5). This view about Indonesia continued to exist in Australia, particularly following the 2002 Bali bombing which took no less than 200 lives (most of whom were Australians), and it was reported that in 2004 around 31% of the Australians regarded Indonesia as being the main threat to their national security (ABC, 25 August 2004). Therefore, a stable Indonesia was key to Australia’s security and the AMS was to serve as a mechanism to reduce tensions between the two countries (O’Connor, 1997:6).

For Indonesia, the AMS was the first security agreement ever established with another country within close proximity of Indonesia’s geographical region. In line with Indonesia’s strategic interest, the decision to forge the AMS with Australia did not suggest that Indonesia would prevent it from opposing any attempt by major powers to interfere in Southeast Asian regional affairs (Sukma, 1997a:240). It is worth noting that the idea of strengthening military ties in the region had been an aim of Indonesian leaders even since the early years of Suharto’s presidency. In 1970, for instance, the former Indonesian Armed Forces Chief General Maraden Panggabean stressed that Indonesia would be in a ready position to provide military aid to its ASEAN partners facing a security threat, although, in the end, this proposal went unsupported by other ASEAN member countries (Acharya, 1991:160-1).

Suharto’s thirty-two years in power emphasised the need for stability in support of Indonesia’s economic development and his foreign policy consistently pursued this purpose in a flexible and pragmatic manner (Murphy, 2009:68). As outlined by Ruslan Abdulgani, the Indonesian Foreign Minister between 1956 and 1957:

*Bebas-aktif* is not a static dogma; it is a guide for action… Its implementation should be flexible enough to allow us to dynamically determine our stance in response to every development in the international environment (Abdulgani, 1988:9-10).

Indeed, the case of the AMS demonstrates such flexibility and pragmatism. In view of the relevance of *bebas-aktif* principle, Sukma argues that while the AMS case may have implied a new interpretation of the *bebas-aktif* doctrine under the New Order regime, it did not necessarily abandon the spirit of Indonesia’s authoritative foreign policy principle (Sukma 1997a). He further asserts that by keeping all options open, Indonesia was able to contend with potential security challenges in the region, for example those posed by China. Therefore a certain degree of flexibility was needed, and the AMS demonstrated that there was a loosening of the once
rigidly applied meaning of *bebas-aktif*.\(^\text{106}\) Similarly, Anwar (1998:510) notes that the signing of the AMS indicated a shift in Indonesia’s *bebas-aktif* foreign policy, as a response to new security realities in the region. Further, the generally muted domestic reaction to Suharto’s decision regarding the AMS was very much attributed to the structure of policymaking and its top-down mechanism under the New Order regime.

The case of the AMS suggests two points in the context of Indonesian foreign policy. First, the *bebas-aktif* foreign policy doctrine is deliberately vague, allowing its implementation to serve the interest of the political regime in power. In this context, it served Suharto’s interest in maintaining state security and stability as well as territorial integrity. For the New Order, as Chapter Three notes, regime security was synonymous with Indonesia’s security. In this light, the AMS served as a roadmap, suggesting a causal link with Suharto’s need to ensure his regime security. Therefore, the AMS was indirectly used to protect Suharto’s regime from external security threats that could come from Australia. Second, the AMS was a manifestation of the importance of ideas held by Suharto, as the top foreign policy decision-maker, that would define the content of Indonesia’s foreign policy during the New Order. For this matter, the summit diplomacy between Suharto and Keating was conducted without Alatas’ knowledge. To this extent, it was also Suharto’s belief that working with Australia would help to build mutual trust and reduce any political tensions (Sukma, 2004:71). As Suharto stated, ‘the AMS is expected to eradicate the doubts of the Australians about Indonesia’s position’ (Sukma, 1997a: 235). In short, the AMS case demonstrated that the implementation of *bebas-aktif* during the New Order’s period was likely to be determined by the regime’s self-interest.

### 4.3 *Bebas-aktif* during the Reformasi era

As argued in the preceding chapters, while the role of foreign policy leaders is authoritative in foreign policy, other actors are involved in Indonesia’s foreign policy-making and can be influential by introducing new ideas into the decision-making circle. This section demonstrates that during the Reformasi period, the concept of *bebas-aktif* has not been free of challenges. At the conceptual level, there have been attempts, mainly proposed by the non-authoritative actors, to challenge its relevance and redefine the doctrine in the context of a democratic Indonesia. In a televised interview, for instance, Rizal Sukma argued that ‘there is nothing special about the *bebas-aktif* principle because all countries in the world would claim the same foreign policy principle as this is a universal and normative principle’ (*Metro TV*, 15 January 2011). In the

\(^{106}\) It is important to note here that the AMS signing had provided for a rather different outcome to that of the Indonesian PM Sukiman who, through his FM Ahmad Subarjo, signed a similar agreement with the US in January 1952, which was responsible for the collapse of the Sukiman Cabinet one month later. For details see, Clark (2011:293).
same interview, Hassan Wirajuda, known to be a staunch supporter of the principle, was quoted as saying, in response to Sukma’s view:

not every country is pursuing a bebas-aktif (independent and active) foreign policy although they would always try to secure their national interest. But it is all about the means…i.e. NATO as a form of alliance with a major country. And remember, there are only few countries that are consistent with their stance with regards to Israel.

One year after his presidential inauguration, SBY stated in his first major speech delivered before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA) meeting in Jakarta107 that the conceptual elements of bebas-aktif were as follows: first, foreign policy should be conducted in a constructive manner. This would mean that Indonesia should be able to turn adversary into friend, and friend into partner, and put its siege mentality and overly defensive attitude to rest. Second, Indonesia must not become involved in any military alliance and should instead work to develop a non-threatening posture to the region. Third, Indonesia should remain attentive to the regional and international issues that could affect the country. Fourth, bebas-aktif should involve the projection of Indonesia’s international identity, which, among others, encompasses the world’s largest Muslim population, the third largest democracy in the world, and advocate for the developing world. Fifth, Indonesia’s foreign policy was to reflect Indonesia’s ‘true brand of nationalism’ which is not a narrow, but rather ‘open and outward looking’ (Yudhoyono 2005). These principles reflect the will of the Indonesian elites to picture an Indonesia that is different from that of pre-Reformasi hence, an identity of a ‘new Indonesia (Indonesia baru)’.108 Consequently, this newly asserted identity prompted attempts to redefine the bebas-aktif concept. Central to these attempts were the ones presented by Dino Djalal in his position as SBY’s special staff and speechwriter.

4.3.1 ‘All-direction foreign policy’ and ‘million friends, zero enemies’ diplomatic approach: replacing ‘bebas-aktif’?

The most profound controversy revolving around the bebas-aktif foreign policy doctrine rests on a concept introduced by Dino Djalal. In Djalal’s view, Indonesia should have an ‘all-direction foreign policy’, underpinned by a ‘million friends and zero enemies’ diplomatic

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107 The speech was titled “An Independent and Active Foreign Policy for the 21st Century”, and delivered on 19 May 2005.

108 The term “Indonesia baru” was a public expression coined during the Wahid and Megawati presidencies, a symptom of the hope for a change under the new leadership in Indonesia during the early years of Reformasi. For a more detailed account, see Sukma (2001:ch.8).
approach (Djalal 2012).\textsuperscript{109} The notion was first announced during SBY’s speech at the LSE on 31 March 2009 where he stipulated:

I have vigorously pursued what I call an ‘all-direction foreign policy’, a post-Cold War 21\textsuperscript{st} century foreign policy outlook where Indonesia seeks a ‘million friends and zero enemies’. That is because we know that our international engagement is the key to our success, to our security, to our prosperity. Our economy cannot survive while the global economy collapses. We cannot have a destiny that is separate from that of our immediate neighbourhood, Southeast Asia, and our region, East Asia.\textsuperscript{110}

On 14 August 2009, SBY reiterated the concept in a state address before the DPR during the commemoration of Indonesia’s 64\textsuperscript{th} Independence Day. He stated:

Today, Indonesia can freely engage in an all-directions foreign policy where we can be friends of any parties for the pursuance of our national interest, be it the East, the West, the North, and the South. We can freely conduct the diplomacy of a thousand friends and zero enemies because the more we are friends with others, the safer and prosperous our country will be. All of these are indeed conducted based on principle of independence, sovereignty, equality, and mutual benefit.

In an interview with the author (2 June 2010), Djalal suggested that the concept was his. As Djalal explains, ‘all-direction foreign policy’ essentially means that Indonesia must be able to effectively connect with all sides: East and West, North and South, in order to affirm Indonesia’s assertiveness in global affairs (Djalal, 2012: 45). This idea was based on Djalal’s belief that Indonesia’s democratisation should be translated into the country’s international relations by readily engaging with other countries, because the more friends Indonesia could nurture, the more secure and prosperous Indonesia would be (Djalal, 2012: 45). Publicly known for favouring optimistic and motivating views, Djalal’s convictions about Indonesia’s international relationships is likely to have been influenced by his open-minded persona which was forward-looking and opportunity-driven (Djalal, 2012: 43-5). Djalal also stipulated that ‘zero enemy’ is the idea that ‘presently no foreign countries consider Indonesia as an enemy and conversely, no state is considered by Indonesia as its enemy’ (Djalal, 2012: 44). This provocative idea is problematic for two reasons. First, Djalal had used his subjective interpretation to exaggerate the ideas he thought to be maintained by foreign leaders about Indonesia. Unless Djalal was involved in the political and the decision-making in foreign countries, such an interpretation requires further evidence. Second, in the context of Indonesia’s domestic politics Djalal undermined the perception held by other actors in the executive who might have different thoughts about the definition of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. As Chapter Six

\textsuperscript{109} Normally, in the study of foreign policy or international relations, this would be noted as “omni-directional” foreign policy. However, the term used in this thesis would follow the original term described by Djalal, which is “all-directions.”

\textsuperscript{110} The title of the speech was Indonesia: Regional Role, Global Reach, delivered at the LSE on the 31 March 2009. Attended by the author.
notes, for instance, the TNI was very unlikely to treat the Malaysian Navy as a friend in the context of the Ambalat dispute.

While Djalal had successfully channelled his ideas into SBY’s foreign policy speeches, giving the impression that the status of Indonesia’s bebas-aktif had come into question, critics were persistently against Djalal’s aforementioned ideas. One of the major criticisms highlighted the contradiction between Djalal’s concept and the relevance of national interest in foreign policy. As Ikrar Nusa Bakti, an Indonesian political observer, argued:

There is no such thing as foreign policy in all directions. There should be a focus that is in-line with geographical and national interest, and that the country must pursue a realistic foreign policy that can improve our domestic situation, inter alia welfare, democracy, and justice (The Jakarta Globe, 22 October 2009).

Indeed, while countries can be friends or allies with one another, the national interests of a country are not always similar to another. Significantly, as argued by Weinstein (1972:367), every nation has its own enemies. This statement, however, should not be interpreted as confrontation between states; it should rather be seen in a context where the ways in which countries pursue their national interest are likely to create tensions. For example, it is unlikely that the Indonesian leadership would consider Israel a friend at the cost of Palestine’s freedom, and it is implausible that Indonesia would act ‘friendly’ with Malaysia when territorial disputes are involved. Put simply, while Indonesia has been actively promoting democratic values and peaceful dispute settlements in the region, considering all parties as friends would be imprudent. As asserted by an Indonesian journalist Fardah (Antara, 23 August 2010): ‘being kind to neighbours is noble, but when it concerns national sovereignty, dignity is at stake and firm actions seem to be valued more’.

This being said, Djalal’s ‘million friends and zero enemies’ diplomatic approach became problematic as the slogan ‘all-directions foreign policy’ could be interpreted as an indecisive foreign policy course. In addition, pursuing such a diplomatic approach rivalled the original spirit of bebas-aktif, which underscored the importance of national interest as the rationale for the government to implement foreign policy decision. As Hatta emphasised,

The policy of the Republic of Indonesia must be resolved in the light of its own interests and should be executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face… The lines of Indonesia’s policy cannot be determined by the bent of the policy of some other country, which has its own interests to service (Hatta, 1953:446).

Further, Djalal’s ideas about the new foreign policy concept were not supported by his peers in Deplu. A senior level diplomat interviewed by the author (16 August 2011) questioned the benefit of implementing the slogan and wondered whether other countries would treat Indonesia
the same way if its foreign policy was guided by Djalal’s concept.\textsuperscript{111} The diplomat further added that Indonesia might have to revise its Diplomatic and Service Passports with regards to the restriction of their use \textit{vis-à-vis} Israel and Taiwan. In the eyes of the former foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda, Djalal’s foreign policy concept could not even be considered as a policy, and was more accurately described as a mere rhetorical statement which was ‘domestic cosmetic’ (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). Wirajuda added that since he did not believe in the term, he preferred not to use it as a guidance for his foreign policy decisions.\textsuperscript{112}

From the above case, how can we explain the link between democratisation and the salience of ideas in Indonesia’s foreign policy? First, democratisation led policy-makers to perceive Indonesia as having a new identity, hence, the ‘new Indonesia’ (cf. Acharya 2003b). At the conceptual level, Djalal’s ideas were informed by this new identity as Djalal himself noted that democratisation should be translated into a foreign policy ideal that espoused openness and pragmatism. Therefore, a democratic identity of Indonesia led Djalal to embrace certain ideas that were thought to be able to represent this identity in the leaders’ foreign policy decision. This is linked to the argument maintained in Chapter Two, emphasising the unlikelihood that identity would directly influence foreign policy and the importance of ideas as a bridging variable between identity and foreign policy. Second, Djalal’s ideas were diffused into foreign policy decision-making through the speeches Djalal wrote for the president. In this regard, his position as the president’s special staff and speechwriter facilitated the channelling of Djalal’s foreign policy ideas. Third, while Djalal was able to channel his concept into the foreign policy-making circle, his ideas have failed to take effect in the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy since authoritative foreign policy-makers, namely the foreign minister as well as some of the Deplu’s diplomats, did not share his ideas. Consequently, Djalal’s foreign policy ideas were ultimately not salient to Indonesia’s foreign policy because they did not appear in the domestic political discourse (unlike the idea of revitalising ASEAN in Indonesia’s foreign policy that appeared in Deplu’s new bureaucratic structure), nor were there any changes in the national regulation—such as in the Law on Foreign Relations—and in policy strategies following the announcement of these ideas. To be sure, if Djalal’s foreign policy concept had been accepted as a new doctrine for Indonesia, then an opening of diplomatic relation with, for instance, Israel would have been possible. Fourth, the failure of Djalal’s ideas to redefine the \textit{bebas-aktif} doctrine was also caused by his non-authoritative role in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{111} For ethical purposes, the person interviewed requested to remain anonymous when quoted. The material is available for presentation to the panels upon request.

\textsuperscript{112} Publicly, Wirajuda was only noted to have referred to Djalal’s concept once during his 2004-2009 term (see, Wirajuda, speech at Pejambon Coffee event, 22 January 2009).
decision-making structure. Being merely an adviser, Djalal lacked the formal authority to create foreign policy and therefore, his influence in foreign policy was dependent on authoritative actors, most notably the president and the foreign minister. These leaders could ignore (or adopt) new foreign policy ideas based on their preferences and interpretation of national interests.

4.3.2 The Islamic factor

A discussion of the relationship between political Islam and the bebas-aktif doctrine during the Reformasi period is important for two reasons. First, as a result of Habibie’s decision to revoke the Anti-Subversion Law and to eliminate Pancasila from being the sole principle for Indonesia’s political life (see Chapter One), political Islam became one of the most prominent influences to emerge in Indonesia’s domestic political environment. Second, Islam constitutes the majority religion of Indonesia (around 90% of the population) and Indonesia’s Muslims approximately make up 89.5% of the total Southeast Asian Islamic community (Fealy, 2004:138). In other words, Indonesia’s identity as a Muslim majority country was likely to assume greater significance in its foreign policy.

When Leifer wrote about Indonesia’s foreign policy back in 1983, he asserted that Islam would constitute the unresolved problem of Indonesia’s national identity where in the pluralistic society of Indonesia, despite the quantity of its followers in Indonesia, there was, in practice, a considerable variation in adherence to orthodoxy (Leifer, 1983:137). Nevertheless, Leifer was also convinced that the Muslim groups would ‘not give up aspirations for the incorporation of Islamic values into the constitutional structure of the state’ (Leifer, 1983:39). This was confirmed when a number of Islamic political parties in the parliament, notably the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, the Unity and Development Party), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, The Crescent and Star Party) and PK (Partai Keadilan, Justice Party), which was the precursor to the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice and Welfare Party), attempted to reinstate the Jakarta Charter. This took place at a time when the Constitution was undergoing amendments between 1999 and 2002, although in the end these efforts failed to obtain support from other factions in the parliament (Amal and Panggabean, 2004:62).

As a societal force, the revival of political Islam initially began in the 1990s when Suharto ‘blessed’ the formation of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association or ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia) as a result of his declining relationship with the

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113 According to Greg Fealy, Muslims make up almost half of the Southeast Asian population and about 18% of the world’s estimated 1.2 billion Muslims in 2004. By 2009, as revealed by Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, the global Muslim population increased to 1.57 billion people, with the largest concentration in Asia (61.9%); meanwhile Middle Eastern countries constituted only 20% of the world’s Muslims. For the complete overview of the 2009 data, see Koran Tempo, 10 October 2009.
According to Vatikiotis (1997:133), to a certain extent the establishment of ICMI accommodated the hopes of young Muslim intellectuals that Indonesia could become more Islamic than it had previously been. With several ministers coming from the organisation, ICMI was recognised as Suharto’s attempt to accommodate Islam in politics. Nevertheless, there were suspicions and cynicism regarding the creation of ICMI. One view suggested not only that ICMI came to be Suharto’s new source of legitimacy, but it was also used as Habibie’s—then chairman of ICMI—vehicle to achieve his political ends (Hefner 1993:25). Further, Abdurrahman Wahid also harshly criticised the organisation for promoting a rigidly exclusive, and thus dangerous and undemocratic form of Islam (Hefner 1993:21).

Apart from ICMI, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah have taken leading roles as the two prominent schools of thought in the discourse of Indonesia’s political Islam. Founded in 1926, the NU, which in English means ‘The Awakening of the Scholars’ (Leifer, 1983:138), was an effort by Islamic clerics to preserve the religious culture of Traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia. In the study of Islam, ‘Traditionalists’ favour classical doctrine and interpretations of older generations of scholars within established schools of thought (Ali, 1978:129-31). NU’s political power, according to Hefner, has much to do with its followers’ culture, which is deeply imbued with populist nationalist sentiment (Hefner, 1999:46). On the other hand, Muhammadiyah, established fourteen years before NU in 1912, reflects a Modernist approach concerning the interpretation of teaching and values and thus, it emphasises the importance of personal interpretation (Layish, 1978:264-5). Muhammadiyah followers are generally more urban, wealthy, and formally educated than the NU’s (Hefner, 1999:47; Schwarz, 2000:327).

While ICMI, NU, and Muhammadiyah have been actively involved in domestic politics in their own respects (see, among others, Hefner 1993, 1999), their role in influencing foreign policy and their attempt to make it more ‘Islamic’ was less influential. Indonesia’s bebas-aktif doctrine has never served the Islamic interest of Indonesia. An example is how Indonesia’s recognition of Palestine has not been based on any religious sense of Muslim brotherhood, but was based rather on the spirit of anti-colonialism enshrined in the Indonesian Constitution and in the 1955 Asian-African Conference (Leifer, 1983:138). Indonesia’s decision to join the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, now the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), was also not based on religious considerations but instead on economic grounds (Azra, 2006: Chapter 6; Perwita 2007). During the New Order, the reasons that Islam was only a peripheral factor in foreign policy were threefold. First, as previously stated, Suharto was an abangan rather than a santri Muslim, which means that his understanding of Islamic teachings were

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114 For a brief discussion on Suharto’s waning relationship with the military, see Chapter One.
influenced by Javanese syncretism (Suryadinata, 1996:14-15). Second, the military, Suharto’s commanding source of power, still believed that Islamist mobilisation could threaten political stability as there were elements of the Muslim community who wanted to establish an Islamic state (Perwita, 2007:44). And third, Islam was not the basis of the state. Taking into account these considerations, Sukma (2006:5) argues that Islam was only ever given a secondary place in foreign policy.

Nevertheless, with the downfall of Suharto’s regime and consonant with SBY’s statement regarding the conceptual properties of the bebas-aktif foreign policy that Indonesia’s foreign policy should embrace Islam as the country’s self-declared international identity, one would expect the Islamic factor to be instrumental in Indonesia’s foreign policy (Anwar, 2010b:51). Further, Indonesia’s key foreign policy-makers were proudly calling Indonesia a place where Islam and democracy peacefully coexist, utilizing the moderate identity of Indonesian Muslims as a foreign policy asset. Further, as former foreign minister Wirajuda noted, Indonesia, as the world largest Muslim-majority country, had a responsibility to demonstrate the peaceful face of Islam at a time when the world was experiencing misperceptions of Islamic culture (Wirajuda, 2007b: 3). By labelling the country in such a way, Indonesian foreign policy-makers wanted to position themselves in the middle of the conundrum, therefore playing a bridging role in the Muslim world as well as in the relations between the West and the Muslim community. An example was when Indonesia initiated a world conference of the Sunni and Shiite in Bogor, 2007, aimed at mitigating the conflict between the two groups in Iraq. The conference, however, did not go as planned and failed to bring in the significant representations from both groups, leading Wirajuda to blame Iraq’s instability for the failure (Detiknews, 3 April 2007). Indeed, a success in organising such a meeting would have further elevated Indonesia’s image as being a moderate Muslim country and had the potential to nurture political support from the Muslim constituents at home.

The above discussion argues that the impact of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign relations was limited and depended on the potential for Muslim constituents domestically (Fealy, 2004:143). Put simply, policy initiatives with Islamic dimensions were aimed at gaining sympathy for and further boosting legitimacy from the Muslim audience at home. Further, the inability of the Islamic voice to factor in foreign policy was compounded by the fact that in parliament, the Islamic-based political parties had failed to gain a substantial number of seats. In the 2009 election, for instance, garnering around 24% of the total votes, it was unlikely for the Islamic parties to determine Indonesia’s foreign policy in a way that would fulfil Islamic
aspirations (see Pemilu Indonesia 2009).

Consequently, the Islamic influence upon foreign policy appeared only as a form over substance, and was driven largely by domestic political concerns, rather than a deep philosophical or emotional commitment towards international Muslim solidarity (Fealy, 2004:154; see also, Anwar 2010b).

Therefore, political Islam has limited influence in the bebas-aktif doctrine. Essentially, this was a result of the low tolerance for political Islam as an underlying political idea in Indonesia, and complicated by the low number of votes obtained by the Islamic political parties. The exclusion of Islam from Indonesia’s foreign policy practice was also a result of opinions held by the key foreign policy decision-makers about political Islam itself. As mentioned, Suharto was an abangan Muslim while his foreign ministers, particularly Alatas, despite being of Arab descent, was not influential enough to include Islam as a factor in foreign policy because of the dominant role of the president in deciding the foreign policy content at the time. During the Reformasi era, although President Wahid possessed a strong Islamic background, his views on political Islam were inclusive in the sense that he supported “an Indonesian society and not just an Islamic one” (Hefner, 1993:21). Megawati was known to be a staunch nationalist and her ascension to the presidency was opposed by the Islamic faction within the DPR, as Chapter One noted. Her interest in political Islam only went as far as the impact of certain foreign policy issues affected public opinion (Azra, interview, 2 March 2009).

During SBY’s presidency, the considerations of political Islam have been mentioned more openly in leaders’ foreign policy speeches. While certain foreign policy decisions indicate that authoritative foreign policy actors recognise the role of Islam in Indonesia’s politics, Indonesia’s foreign policy practice in general still has not been guided by Islamic precepts. If it was otherwise, it is likely that Indonesian foreign policy decision-makers would have pursued assertive, or even aggressive, strategies whenever a case with Islamic dimensions occurred.

In short, despite their Muslim affiliations, most, if not all, Indonesian presidents have not been inclined to entertain political Islam in their foreign policy agenda. Therefore, Islamic precepts have had a limited influence on the implementation of the bebas-aktif doctrine.

4.3.3 Nationalism

In Indonesia, the idea of nationalism is embodied in the tradition of domestic politics, since it is an inherent part of Indonesia’s political tradition that materialised during Indonesian’s struggle for independence (Leifer, 2000:155). The decision by the student movements to signify their political aspirations in removing Suharto around the date of the nation’s Awakening Day

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115 The full result of the election is as follows: the non-Islamic parties: Demokrat Party: 20.85%, Golkar 14.45%, PDIP 14.03%, Gerindra 4.46%, Hanura 3.77%; the Islamic parties: PKS 7.88%, PAN 6.01%, PPP 5.32%, and PKB 4.46%.
(20 May) was an example. During the Sukarno period, Indonesia’s foreign policy was highly motivated by the spirit of nationalism. The politics of *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia was an example. During the New Order era, a number of Indonesia’s diplomatic strategies emphasized the importance of territorial sovereignty and integrity, as exemplified in the pursuit of the concept of *Wawasan Nusantara*. Following Indonesia’s democratisation, nationalistic sentiment has emerged prominently (see, among others, Aspinall and Berger 2001; Bertrand 2004). Foreign policy cases that entail a certain nationalistic sense, such as those related to territorial entitlement, could immediately attract public’s attention (see Chapter Seven). To this extent, Indonesia’s nationalism experienced a change in temperament in that it is no longer seen as a discourse propagated by the government, as it was during the Suharto period, or a combative stance as it was during most part of Sukarno’s period (Leifer, 2000:155-56). This sub-section illustrates the extent to which the implementation of *bebas-aktif* doctrine has been affected by emerging ideas of nationalism during the *Reformasi* era.

Following the US war on terror, in 2006 the American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, sent John Bolton (later made the US Ambassador to the UN) to Jakarta to meet then Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda and urged Indonesia to endorse the US-designed arrangement, named the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). According to the US Department of State official website, PSI is a bilateral agreement between the US and other countries that allows the former to intercept the delivery and the development of weapons of mass-destruction. Under this mechanism, the US would possess the legal right to conduct rapid action consent procedures for boarding, search, and seizure (Stølsvik 2007). With regards to the meeting between Wirajuda and Bolton, Wirajuda described that in attempts to persuade Indonesia to endorse the PSI, Bolton acted arrogantly and was in unilateralist spirit (Wirajuda, personal communication, 9 October 2010). Bolton failed to impress the Indonesian side and Wirajuda rejected the US proposal. There were two reasons for this decision. First, on the basis of the primacy of Indonesia’s national sovereignty, the implementation of the PSI arrangement was likely to breach Indonesia’s territorial jurisdiction. Second, in the eyes of Indonesian foreign policy-makers, the PSI arrangement was at odds with Indonesia’s foreign policy principle of supporting multilateralism and UNCLOS 1982 (*Gatra*, 20 March 2006).

The above example suggests that the practice of the *bebas-aktif* principle has continued to be informed by nationalism. However, it did not manifest in an overtly aggressive foreign policy strategy. As Sukma notes (2012:45), the strongest expression of nationalism in the implementation of *bebas-aktif* during the *Reformasi* period has been in Indonesia’s consistent opposition to the presence of foreign powers in the region, thus maintaining the aspiration for a free and neutral Southeast Asia. One of the reasons for why nationalism did not manifest in
an aggressive foreign policy decision is because Indonesia’s state’s institutions remain effective, even following democratisation. Notwithstanding Indonesia’s democratic transformation, the primacy of the president and the foreign minister as well as Deplu, as the primary foreign policy institution determining Indonesia’s foreign policy remained. As Chapter Three notes, their foreign policy decision-making authority was not weakened despite an increase in the importance of other actors in the foreign policy-making circle. This argument thus challenges the proposition held by Mansfield and Snyder (2002), who believed that democratisation led to weak state’s institutions because ‘the old ones have been eroded while the new ones were yet to be installed’. Apart from this, the focus of Indonesian leaders to maintain domestic economic stability (see Chapter One), on the one hand, and their conformity to the perceived democratic identity of Indonesia (see Chapter Seven), on the other, also contributed to the absence of hostile foreign policy behaviour despite the existence of nationalistic spirit in the conduct of Indonesia’s diplomacy. Being a tradition that had underpinned the bebas-aktif doctrine since its inception, combined with the vague nature of the doctrine, it was always unlikely that Indonesian foreign policy-makers would pursue a policy agenda that contradicted nationalist sentiment. And so it has proved. In this regard, a foreign policy decision that underscores respect for Indonesia’s territorial integration and sovereignty is likely to characterise the implementation of bebas-aktif.116 This is because Indonesia’s security concerns had been primarily internal, such as insurgencies and territorial disintegration, rather than external military (Anwar, 1998:511).

Overall, this section discusses the extent to which Indonesia’s democratic transition impacted the traditional foreign policy doctrine of bebas-aktif. It highlighted conceptual challenges and the widening participation of actors in the decision-making circle, which led to a competition between ideas. However, the reason why bebas-aktif continues to be invoked and practised irrespective of the 1998 political reforms is that the idea of conducting foreign policy in such an independent and active way has become entrenched in the minds of foreign policy decision-makers. Indeed, the dominant role of Indonesia’s authoritative foreign policy leaders illustrates why new ideas and political changes that emerged during the Reformasi period have not redefined, let alone replaced, the prominence of the bebas-aktif as Indonesia’s principal foreign policy doctrine. The continued legitimacy of bebas-aktif was evidenced by the decision-makers’ rejection of other concepts, such as those proposed by Djalal. The lack of support to buy into the rhetoric of an omni-directional foreign policy concept has extended to the idea of

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116 In this context, it is important to mention that the Indonesian government had forged a bilateral agreement with the Australian in 2006, noted as the Lombok Treaty, as a means for Indonesia to reassure Australia’s recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty by, one of the methods, not granting any support to separatist movements in Indonesia. For details, see, among others, Barry (2006); Davies (2012); Neumann and Taylor (2010).
Islam as a political driver; hence Indonesia’s foreign policy has not been guided by religious precepts despite the increasing influence of political Islam at the domestic level. In this regard, references to moderate Muslims in SBY foreign policy speeches are best viewed from the angle of domestic politics rather than as a response to external factors. Such references made by SBY can be linked to his desire to nurture domestic political legitimacy for his foreign policy programme. This relates to Farnham’s argument (2004:445) about the need for leaders to secure the domestic public’s acceptability of the government’s foreign policy decisions. The commitment of Indonesian leaders to maintain *bebas-aktif* as the underlying principle of the country’s foreign policy also reflects a continuity in Indonesia’s foreign policy practice in the post-Suharto period. This is because *bebas-aktif* is vague, allowing leaders to implement it pragmatically in order to serve the interests at hand.

**Conclusion**

*Bebas-aktif* was derived from the worldview held by the Indonesian foreign policy leaders at the dawn of independence, based on the historical and cultural experiences Indonesia underwent following the colonial period. Central to this worldview was the idea that Indonesia should maintain its non-aligned stance in the context of the competition between two major blocs, and anti-colonialism. Non-alignment and anti-colonialism have been the main ideas underpinning the *bebas-aktif principle* within Indonesia’s foreign policy. During the Reformasi period, highlighted by the attempt to redefine Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine, *bebas-aktif* received renewed scrutiny. In the event though, democratisation has not led to contemporary nationalism to take the form of foreign policy radicalism. This is the result of three factors: first, foreign policy institutions in Indonesia were not weakened despite the political transformation; second, political leaders remained focus on the promotion of Indonesia’s economic development; and, third, the political leadership bought into a commitment to Indonesia’s new democratic identity.

In short, this chapter highlights that democratisation has led to a redefinition of identity in Indonesia, primarily in terms of democracy. This change in Indonesia’s international identity led to the emergence of different ideas about how to most appropriately describe Indonesia’s foreign policy principles. However, these ideas were unlikely to change *bebas-aktif* as this doctrine had reflected Indonesia’s national symbol and diplomatic pride (Dosch, 2007:33; Anwar and Crouch 2003), while maintaining its function as an ideological buffer for the country (Wirajuda 2010). Consequently, key foreign policy-makers have continued to adopt the practice of *bebas-aktif* as the guiding principle for Indonesia’s foreign policy. Therefore, *bebas-aktif* will continue to serve as the main yardstick against which for all foreign policy decisions are assessed (Idle IV 1956).
5 Democratisation and Indonesia’s Regional Cooperation in ASEAN

This first case study will explore the impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy in the context of regional cooperation, particularly with regards to ASEAN. This chapter argues that democratisation has contextualised the changes in Indonesia’s foreign policy in relation to ASEAN political cooperation. Indonesian leaders have pursued foreign policy preferences that are different from those of the New Order era, such as the promotion of democratic values and human rights. Notwithstanding the decision-making power held by authoritative actors, both ideas entrepreneurs and the DPR have strongly promoted these values. The drafting of the ASEAN Political-Security Community concept paper and the ratification of the ASEAN Charter, respectively, demonstrated the role of these non-authoritative actors.

The first section of this chapter discusses Indonesia’s regional foreign policy strategy during the Suharto administration. Suharto’s ideas regarding national and regional resilience was prominent in guiding Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions in ASEAN’s political cooperation. Section Two examines Indonesia’s foreign policy during the Reformasi era, highlighting the promotion of democratic values and human rights following Indonesia’s chairmanship in ASEAN during 2003. This section will also investigate Indonesia’s initiatives in relation to the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN human rights body (AICHR). Section Three considers the relationship between democratisation and Indonesian foreign policy on regional cooperation in ASEAN by focusing on the importance of leaders in determining the final foreign policy content.

5.1 Regional cooperation in Suharto’s Indonesia: establishing a leadership

5.1.1 The function of ASEAN for Suharto’s Indonesia

Shifting away from the high-profile and militant foreign policy of Sukarno, Suharto’s Indonesia pursued a low-key foreign policy, aspiring to create a peaceful region that would effectively contribute to Indonesia’s effort to stabilize its political and economic situation at the time. For Suharto, Indonesia’s domestic stability was achievable with the nurturing of regional and international solidarity. To this end, Suharto, in his New Year address delivered on 31 December 1966, stated:

in order to create an inter-nations solidarity, Indonesia’s striking yet arrogant leadership, and its role as if Indonesia is a champion, pioneer, etc have been left behind… And our foreign policy in the future will be guided to repair Indonesia’s international relations (Suharto, cited in Bandoro, 1994:2).
About eight months after this speech, on August 8th, 1967, Indonesia signed the Bangkok declaration with the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, which came to be the foundational document leading to the establishment of ASEAN. This Declaration included the seven purposes of the ASEAN, which were: (1) to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development of the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations; (2) to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; (3) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields; (4) to provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres; (5) to collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples; (6) to promote South-East Asian studies; and (7) to maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.

ASEAN, as the declaration stipulated, was established primarily to foster stability in the Southeast Asian region, pursued through economic and cultural cooperation. Suharto designated Adam Malik, as foreign minister, to orchestrate ASEAN’s establishment. Following the signing of the Bangkok Declaration and echoing Suharto’s idea about regional stability, Malik maintained that

“...the nations of Southeast Asia should consciously work towards the day when security in their own region will be the primary responsibility of the Southeast Asian nations themselves. Not through big power alignments, not through the build-up of contending military posts or military arsenals, but through strengthening the state of our respective national endurance, through effective regional cooperation and through cooperation with other states sharing this basic view on world affairs. It is here that the importance of such an organisation as ASEAN comes to force (quoted by Sebastian, 2006:185-86).”

It was an age of uncertainty for Indonesia’s future with rising economic inflation, exceeding 600% in 1966/67 alone. At the regional level, a peaceful Southeast Asia was at stake due to various conflicts. The Vietnam War was raging; Malaysia and Singapore had just broken their union; and the Philippines still had a communist rebellion to deal with. Indonesia’s external affairs were no less problematic. Most Indonesians were suspicious, if not openly hostile, towards Beijing over the domestic political and social chaos sparked by the failed putsch by
Communist elements in the armed forces in 1965. *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia was just formally ended. For all these reasons, according to Anwar (2005:4-8), ASEAN served Indonesia’s interest through a number of reasons. First, ASEAN was helping to restore and preserve Indonesia’s international and regional credibility. Second, ASEAN served to prevent potential conflict, and to create a more harmonious and peaceful Southeast Asia. Third, ASEAN was a security buffer for the member countries, and through ASEAN, Indonesia tried to replace the danger zone with the ring of friendship. Following the termination of *Konfrontasi*, ASEAN was expected to nurture regional partnership and cooperation among Southeast Asian countries. Fourth, the creation of a ring of friendship would help Indonesia to focus more on its internal problems. Fifth, ASEAN would serve as an important tool for its member countries when dealing with other parties. Anwar believed that due to their sizes and power, the Southeast Asian countries needed ASEAN in their engagement primarily with the major powers (see also Tay, 2000:155). Sixth, with the introduction of the concept of national and regional resilience, ASEAN has been an autonomous and non-aligned regional organisation. Seventh, ASEAN helped Indonesia enhance its international position and importance in the region and beyond. And eight, ASEAN facilitated bilateral military cooperation among member countries.

In the attempt to detach from the competition between the great powers during the Cold War period, in 1971 the Southeast Asian countries agreed to declare the region as a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality, marked by the signing of ZOPFAN Declaration (Chin, 1993:171). For Indonesia, with communism still considered by most of the leadership a prominent threat to security and stability, the ZOPFAN Declaration and the notion of a ‘neutral’ Southeast Asia was a useful ideological buffer against the spread of communism. It was under the auspicious spirit of the Declaration that the then Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas reiterated during the 1992 ASEAN Summit in Singapore the relevance of ZOPFAN as the central mechanism for ASEAN regional order (Chin, 1993:180). In debates prior to the Declaration’s endorsement by ASEAN, Indonesia insisted on the removal of any references to ‘external guarantees’ for Southeast Asia’s security (Yahuda, 2004:84). This was a response to the preferences of Malaysia and Singapore that China be named the guarantor of Southeast Asia’s formal neutralization (Yahuda, 2004:65). The elimination of all references to external powers as security guarantors made it possible for the Southeast Asian countries to remain as key factors in maintaining regional security, as asserted in Malik’s speech.

Aspiring to an independent Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s foreign policy was guided and characterised by a security approach derived from Suharto’s ideas about the prominence of domestic resilience.
5.1.2 ‘Regional resilience’: the primacy of ideas and Suharto’s authoritative role in the region

Notwithstanding the focus on economic and cultural cooperation, ASEAN has been concerned with security and peace since its formation (Leifer, 1999:26). The termination of Indonesia’s *Konfrontasi* policy against Malaysia was the seed for the birth of ASEAN (Hein 1986; Emmers 2003). Therefore, ASEAN was expected to strengthen peace in the absence of interstate war since the inception of the Association in 1967, by increasing the importance of smaller states through institutionalism which delegitimized the use of force and through the respect for non-interference in internal affairs (Alagappa 2010). Over time, ASEAN governments prioritised regional security over other matters (Scalapino, Sato, and Wanandi, 1990:114)—a practice that was not explicitly outlined in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967. For Indonesia, this was interpreted as, and translated into, a foreign policy that put ASEAN and its international economic relations at its centre (Anwar, 2000:77), while continuing to embrace the importance of an independent Southeast Asia.

Suharto’s regional security concept was derived from Indonesia’s internal cognisance of the importance of building national strength to support the economic development that the country was fostering at the time. The concept of ‘resilience’ was a consequence of the common view held by Indonesian foreign policy elites about the country’s vulnerability to a divide and rule approach undertaken by stronger foreign powers (Weinstein 1976). One year after this concept was endorsed as Indonesia’s national security doctrine, in 1974, Suharto made public that:

...national resilience covers the strengthening of all the component elements in the development of a nation in its entirety, thus consisting of resilience in the ideological, political, economical, social, cultural, and military fields (quoted in Emmers, 2003:19).

In addition, as outlined in the 1979/80-1983/84 REPELITA (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun*) document, Suharto’s five year development plan, national resilience was conceptualised within a framework of self-reliance:

Indonesia’s national interest should only rely upon Indonesians, not other nations. The decision for Indonesia to discard any opportunity to join a union or defence pact will only strengthen the need to rely upon ourselves.117

Suharto’s national resilience concept was based on the idea that a state that is internally strong does not have to fear external provocations (Narine, 2002:13). Following this national endorsement, ‘national resilience’ soon became ‘regionalised’, and was known as ‘regional

117 The originial document is in Bahasa Indonesia and translated by the author.
Regional resilience is different from the idea of prioritising regional autonomy in the sense that the latter focuses upon ‘reducing the roles of external powers in regulating the regional order’ (Anwar, 1994:174). According to Bandoro (2008), Suharto tabled the concept during the first ASEAN Summit in 1976 and incorporated it in the Bali Concord 1976 and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). In his speech delivered at the opening of the 1976 Bali Summit, Suharto asserted that:

our concept of security is inward-looking, namely to establish an orderly, peaceful and stable condition within each territory, from any subversive elements and infiltration, wherever their origins may be (quoted by Emmers, 2003:18).

Suharto believed that his concept of resilience would, in essence, strengthen the convictions of the countries in the region regarding the close relationship between political stability and economic development at both the national and regional levels (Bandoro 2008). Suharto’s believed that ensuring their own security was an inherent responsibility of ASEAN member states, which should be built on the foundation of economic development and and regional independence stance vis-à-vis international ideological antagonism and bloc politics (Anwar, 1994:175). General Ali Murtopo, one of Suharto’s confidantes, also believed that regional resilience was a determining factor in the stability of the individual Southeast Asian countries and the region as a whole. Taking a more militaristic view, Murtopo (1975:54) believed that this was the “proper response towards the possible threat posed by the super powers that may endanger the stability of Southeast Asia”. Therefore, Indonesia wished to regionalise the national resilience concept, in order to protect the political stability of the ASEAN states (Sebastian, 2006a:179).

Indeed, Suharto’s assertion of the concept of resilience in the region presents two points about Indonesia’s regional foreign policy at the time. First, Suharto’s efforts were driven by the primacy placed on non-alignment inherent in the bebas-aktif doctrine. In emphasising the importance for ASEAN governments to be independent in looking after the region, Suharto envisaged a Southeast Asia that reflected Indonesia’s foreign policy values. In lieu of efforts to maintain an independent Southeast Asia, Indonesia was also active in brokering peace-talks whenever regional security was at stake. An example of this were the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) I and II on the Thai-Cambodian conflict in the late 1980s and Indonesia’s mediatory role in the conflict between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the government of the Philippines in 1993. This proposition leads to the second point, related to Indonesia’s aspiration for a regional entitlement. To this extent, the guiding, if not dominant,

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118 The term ‘regionalised’ as used here is borrowed from Sebastian (2006a:ch.12).
position of Indonesia in the region clearly reflected Jakarta’s ‘expectation of a regional order influenced by its own managerial position’ (Emmers, 2005:651). Specifically, such a leading role was pursued by projecting political and security values to the region and encouraging other ASEAN members to follow.

Notwithstanding the promotion of the regional resilience concept, Indonesia remained committed to the implementation of the ASEAN way—a long standing framework relying on respect for national sovereignty and the non-interference principle, of avoiding bureaucracy and supra-national arrangements, and placing an emphasis on consensual decision-making processes (Emmers, 2003:3).\footnote{For the analysis of the understandings and practices as well as the development of the ASEAN way, see Haacke (2003).} Therefore, Indonesia’s participation in, and support for, ASEAN-extended regional arrangements was essentially influenced by the relevance of ASEAN’s existing norms in Indonesia’s own foreign policy interests. Indonesia’s support for the creation of the ARF in 1994 was largely attributed to ASEAN’s centrality in this arrangement and to the similarities between ARF’s work-style and that of ASEAN (Sukma 2004). This similarity emphasised, amongst other things, the processes governing institutional constraints, on dialogue over coercion, and on inclusion over exclusion (Ba, 1997:647). Indonesia was not willing to divert from its preferred method of cooperation within ASEAN, even in interfaces with non-ASEAN countries. For this reason, working under a style that was successfully developed by ASEAN over the years enabled Indonesia to lead the intramural relationships between the ASEAN member countries; thus, ASEAN became a comfort zone for Indonesia’s regional diplomacy.

5.2 Post-Suharto’s Indonesia regional cooperation: changing preferences

5.2.1 The 2003 ASEAN Summit

Following Suharto’s fall, the magnitude of Indonesia’s domestic problems has, in many ways, forced the ruling government to neglect ASEAN-centred cooperation. In addition, Indonesia’s regional cooperation in ASEAN was limited by the tensions between Indonesia and its neighbours, for instance strained relations as a results of Habibie’s statement that Singapore was merely a ‘little red-dot on the map’ (Haacke 2003; Caragata 2000). It was not until 2001 that Indonesia started to normalise its ASEAN foreign relations under the Megawati presidency.

In 2003, ASEAN was under Indonesia’s chairmanship. The Indonesian leaders seized this opportunity to substantively reclaim their leadership over the body. For this purpose, Indonesian foreign policy-makers promoted new political ideas within the
region, notably democracy and human rights. As acknowledged by Indonesia’s current foreign minister Marty Natalegawa in a speech before the Asia Society in New York in 2010:

I remember back in 2003 when we also began the process of our chairmanship of ASEAN, our then Foreign Minister Dr. Hassan Wirajuda posed the question to myself, then the Director General of ASEAN, how are we going to handle this, how are we going to develop our thoughts on ASEAN chairmanship. In other words, then as it is now, I’m convinced and I’m determined to ensure that Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN does not simply mean procedural issues, in the sense of simply chairing meetings. We must show leadership, shaping and forming ASEAN as it proceeds ahead (italic added).

The ASEAN chairmanship afforded Indonesian leaders the opportunity to diffuse political ideas throughout the region. Indonesia’s role in promoting democracy and human rights has been a hallmark of the post-Suharto’s regional foreign policy. Consequently, Indonesia also sought to change the traditional pattern of ASEAN’s intra-mural cooperation by advocating democratic values through the ASEAN Political-Security Community concept paper, the ASEAN Charter, and the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights.

5.2.2 The ASEAN Political-Security Community

ASEAN has been dubbed a security community, which was intended to focus on cooperation to resolve disputes and conflict within the regional grouping (Acharya 1991), long before the ASEAN member states themselves institutionalised the concept of ASEAN Community. During the ASEAN Summit in October 2003 in Bali, at which the Bali Concord II was signed, the ten member states agreed upon three pillars of cooperation to support the creation of an ASEAN community, which envisioned transforming the primarily elitist and inter-governmental regional organisation into one that was more people-oriented (Anwar, 2010a:133) by 2015. These pillars involved political-security, economic, and socio-cultural aspects.

In June 2003, Indonesia took the initiative to introduce the concept of the ASEAN Security Community, or the ASC (which was later renamed ASEAN Political Security Community, APSC), to stress the importance of ASEAN as a zone of peace (Wibisono, 2009:208) as well as to balance the economic preoccupation in ASEAN (Severino, 2006:355). Indonesia felt the need for ASEAN member countries to promote political

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120 For a thorough discussion on security community in general, see Deutsch (1961). For an authoritative work on security community in Southeast Asia, see Emmerson (2005a).

121 ASEAN Community is desired to have three pillars, namely the APSC, the AEC (ASEAN Economic Community), and the ASCC (ASEAN Socio-cultural Community). However, the concept of the socio-cultural was the least popular compared to the APSC or the AEC For details, see, among others, Narine (2009).
development as a means to ‘bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region coexist peacefully in a just, democratic, and harmonious environment’ (see Bali Concord II, 2003).

The APSC concept paper originated from Rizal Sukma’s presentation at the Indonesian Permanent Mission in New York, June 2003. Recognising the declining role of ASEAN in responding to regional political and economic challenges, Sukma (2003) urged Indonesia to reinstate ASEAN’s relevance by leading a transformation within ASEAN. He also noted the importance of the 2003 Summit as an opportunity for Indonesia to ‘redefine the ASEAN’s principles’ by proposing new ideas that would allow for ASEAN to evolve into a security community. As Sukma continued, the idea of ASEAN Security Community should provide a sense of purpose, a practical goal, and a future condition that all member states should strive for. To this extent, Sukma underscored the need for greater cooperative involvement between ASEAN member countries when human rights issues are at stake.

Taking into account the diversity in the political systems of ASEAN member states122 (Stubbs, 2004:226) as well as the complexity in the regional interactions (Acharya, 2009a:122), Indonesian leaders were careful in drafting the ASC concept paper, the content of which was reflected in the 2004 ASC Plan of Action. As a result of numerous meetings involving Sukma, Wirajuda, and relevant officials of the ASEAN unit at Deplu, it was agreed that the draft should exclude a number of terms considered to be sensitive for other ASEAN members, including ‘human rights’ (a term that initially appeared in Sukma’s paper). Also, the draft avoided bluntly using the term ‘democratise the region’ and incorporated a lighter term, ‘political development’.123 This compromise facilitated the acceptance of the Bali Concord II amongst ASEAN member nations as, in the end, ‘no countries openly objected to the notion of political development’ (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012).

As the Bali Concord II stipulated, politically developing the region meant ASEAN member countries were encouraged to pursue democratic values while allowing for a more open and democratic atmosphere in inter-state interactions. Such a development would eventually effect the way Indonesia perceived ASEAN’s non-interference principle, which

122 According to a Freedom House Report in 2008, Southeast Asia consists of a mixed degree of political freedom with Indonesia being the only country categorised as ‘free’, with the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore as ‘partly free’, and Myanmar, joined by the remaining ASEAN members, as ‘not free’. Freedom House rates political freedom of world countries on a range of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, 3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free, and 5.5 to 7.0 Not Free. For the complete survey and methodological information of the Freedom House, see Freedom House Report (2008), “Methodology”.

123 For a comparison of the draft of ASC Plan of Action 2004, see Acharya (2009a:263).
constituted ‘the traditional pattern of elite socialisation’ in ASEAN (Anwar 2010a; Acharya 2003b). This openness was immediately effective following the Bali Concord II was signed, when Megawati called for Myanmar to make public the timetable of its roadmap to democracy (The Jakarta Post, 10 November 2003). In ‘questioning’ the sanctity of the non-interference principle, Adian Silalaihi, the former DG for ASEAN at Deplu, stated:

We still adhere to those principles (of ASEAN), but I believe that on this issue (non-intervention) we are more open now... Indonesia is more open and flexible because of the democratisation process (quoted in Acharya, 2009a:254).

Moreover, Wirajuda believed that the underlying consideration for this development was the changing characteristics of security problems in the globalising world, which was characterised by trans-boundary issues. To address these problems countries needed to cooperate with one another irrespective of jurisdictional boundaries (Wirajuda, personal communication with the author, 2010).

Although it challenged the non-interference principle, Indonesia had, in practice, benefited from the practice of this principle. An example was the haze problem generated from forest fires in Kalimantan and Sumatera which forced Malaysia and Singapore to protest against Indonesia at a UN session in 2006 (The Jakarta Post, 26 August 2006). As a result of this protest, Indonesia was forced to organise the 2006 Environment Ministerial Meeting on Trans-boundary Haze Pollution and in that meeting Indonesia was urged by its neighbours to ratify the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Trans-boundary Haze Pollution (Acharya, 2009a:253). The Indonesian DPR refused to ratify the Agreement, as Agusman Effendi, chairman of the DPR’s Environmental Commission, argued that Indonesia was ‘not ready’ for the ratification and instead blamed the illegal forestry activities conducted by ‘other ASEAN countries’ as the source of the haze problem (Koran Tempo, 15 October 2006). Indonesian officials also maintained that the haze problem was an internal problem and therefore it should not be subject to interference from external parties (The Jakarta Post, 26 August 2006).

In the context of promoting ASEAN’s political development, for Indonesia, the imperative for ASEAN to adhere to a shared democratic political system was fostered by three reasons. First, adhering to a democratic political system could reinstate Indonesia’s leadership role in the region. The 2003 ASEAN chairmanship presented an opportunity to seize and reaffirm Indonesia’s regional leadership, as it ‘may have to wait for another ten years before the chairmanship comes again’ if it wanted to push for such a security initiative (Acharya, 2009a:259). This window of opportunity was used by Sukma, as a policy entrepreneur, to channel new foreign policy ideas into Indonesia’s foreign policy-
making process. Sukma’s ideas were reproduced by the foreign minister, which resulted in the alteration of certain elements, including the notion of human rights, which led them to be incorporated in the final proposal. To this extent, as mentioned in Natalegawa’s speech, Sukma’s paper contributed to Indonesia’s search for a theme to distinguish its regional leadership (Emmerson, 2005a:179). Given the focus on domestic economic issues and Indonesia’s democratic consolidation, Indonesia’s attempt to reinstate its regional leadership was thought to be more effective if pursued through a foreign policy that promoted the importance of related ideas and values. This is also because Indonesia’s foreign policy has always been based on ‘values and principles shared by all Indonesians which reflect the country’s unique historical, cultural, and political experience’ (Sukma, 1995:305). Overall, the 2003 Bali Summit ‘witnessed Indonesia’s re-emergence to the role of group leader, or at least, demonstrated Jakarta’s desire to begin to steer the direction of the grouping again’ (Smith, 2004:423).

Second, as ASEAN was to take a strategic step towards wider regionalism, ongoing political divisions between member countries threatened to risk ASEAN’s credibility and focus. The role of ASEAN as a primary driving force in the multi-regional organisation depended on its own internal consolidation. In this context, Wirajuda (interview, 12 January 2013) noted that ASEAN’s centrality in existing ASEAN-sponsored regional arrangements should not be taken for granted. The issue of ASEAN cohesiveness should not be underestimated by member states because – as Dewi Fortuna Anwar warned – the Association had been able to play its current role given that the major countries had been ‘permitting’ ASEAN to do so (Anwar, interview, 23 August 2011). Through a speech delivered at a public lecture in Berlin, Wirajuda (2007a) also highlighted the importance of political cohesiveness among ASEAN members through subscribing to the shared values of democracy and human rights, in order for ASEAN to be effective. Similarly, SBY (2005) held that ASEAN is expected to ‘develop and nurture common values, particularly those that promote human dignity and freedom.’ In other words, Indonesia sought to end ideological divisions in ASEAN and only when this effort is successful that Indonesia could further strengthen the claim of being a regional leader.

Third, building international credibility as a democratic country could positively contribute to Indonesia’s democratic consolidation process at home and, as Acharya (2003b:378) argued, could also facilitate greater support from international donors for regional projects (see also Vaughn, 2001:34 -5; Seniwi and Mohd. Sani, 2012:682). Above all, the APSC reflected the need for domestic peace and stability in Southeast Asia, which in turn would contribute to the process of democratic consolidation at home.
(Vermonte, 2005:27). The APSC was also seen a manifestation of Indonesia’s intellectual leadership in the region (Anwar, interview, 23 August 2011).

5.2.3 ASEAN Charter

At the 2005 ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN leaders agreed to establish an ASEAN Charter, a legally binding document that was expected to bring about a ‘deepening of regional integration and making ASEAN a more cohesive, legalised, institutionalised, and rule-based organisation’ (Rüland, 2011:11). In other words, by imposing a definite legal structure, institutionalising the rules and roles of ASEAN bodies, and giving ASEAN an international legal personality, it was hoped that ASEAN would transform its informal nature into a formal one (Hung, 2010:836). To this extent, some have even compared ASEAN with the EU (see, among others, Rachminawati and Syngellakis 2012). As the Chairman statement of this summit stipulated, the Charter, in essence, would serve as ASEAN’s constitution.

For the purpose of drafting the Charter, a ten-person Eminent Persons Group (EPG), with representation from each of the ASEAN countries, was formed. 124 Among the 28 recommendations contained in the Blueprint of ASEAN Charter, initially prepared by the Indonesian representative Ali Alatas (hence ‘the Alatas’ Paper’), the EPG stressed the need for ASEAN to update its principles and objectives in line with new regional geopolitical realities through the following: (a) a strengthening of democratic values and respect for human rights and fundamental freedom; (b) narrowing the development gap among ASEAN countries; (c) substantiating the role of the ASEAN Secretariat and its Secretary General by entrusting them with monitoring compliance of ASEAN agreements; and lastly (d) to cultivate ASEAN as a people-centred organisation by raising the level of participation of, inter alia, civil society representatives as well as human rights groups in ASEAN’s activities (Koh, 2009:51). The blueprint was finalised by a High Level Task Force (HLTФ), which was comprised of ASEAN member states’ senior officials and mandated the draft of the ASEAN Charter. Indonesia was represented by Dian Triansjah Djani, then the DG for ASEAN Cooperation.

When the EPG recommendations were incorporated into the HLTФ in 2007, it was argued that the Charter’s final draft was watered-down by the latter, as it disqualified a number of recommendations (Sukma, 2008:44). The disqualified recommendations included, amongst others, the recommendation on the decision-making mechanism, on transforming ASEAN to

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124 The EPG consists of elder statesmen from each of the ASEAN countries, namely Aun Porn Moniroth (Cambodia), Nguyen Manh Cham (Vietnam), S. Jayakumar (Singapore), Ali Alatas (Indonesia), Tun Musa Hitam (Malaysia), Fidel Ramos (Philippines), Khamphan Simmalavong (Laos), Kasemsamornsun Kasemri (Thailand), Than Nyun (Myanmar), and Pehin Dato Lim Jock Seng (Brunei).
be a people-centred organisation, and on the dispute settlement mechanism (see Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, December 2006; see also Leviter 2010). In response to this situation, Alatas expressed his great disappointment (see Chachavalpongpun 2008), while others described that the Charter was ‘neither bold nor visionary’ and that it ‘failed miserably’ (Sukma, 2008:44, 47). Within the DPR, the Charter was initially criticised, highlighting the weak enforcement of sanction mechanisms, the consensus-based decision-making style, and on the lack of opportunity for people’s participation in the ASEAN decision-making process (see Sukma, 2008:45; Rüland 2011; Sastra 2008). These criticisms intensified during the public consultation between the panitia khusus for the ASEAN Charter within the DPR and six academics and long-observers of ASEAN.125 On 10 September 2008, Rizal Sukma, for instance, asserted that ASEAN was ‘still caged in the illusion of the past’ and criticised the lack of avenues for popular participation, whereby the people were merely made ‘passive recipients’ of the decisions taken by ASEAN.126 Similarly, Jusuf Wanandi, a leading Indonesian scholar, insisted that Indonesia should not place ASEAN in the inner circle of its foreign policy any longer and instead suggested a new initiative, which was short-lived, called ‘East Asia G-8’, an overarching body for strategic dialogues and for hard traditional security cooperation, comprising Australia, China, India, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Russia, and the US (with ASEAN represented by the chair and the secretary-general) (The Jakarta Post, 3 November 2008). Indonesian Parliament members highlighted that the Charter failed to introduce two mechanisms, namely on sanctions and on voting, to replace ASEAN’s consensual decision-making process. For instance, while making a reference to the EU systems, Sutradara Gintings of the PDIP maintained that sanctions and a compliance mechanism should be considered by ASEAN (Report of the Public Hearing, 10 September 2008). Another legislator, Djoko Susilo, questioned how the Charter could persuade the Myanmar junta to democratise the country and improve its human rights track record (The Jakarta Post, 5 February 2008). These shortcomings led to the debates about whether Indonesia should ratify the Charter in its current form.

In an attempt to nurture public support for the ratification of the ASEAN Charter, Deplu organised no less than 320 public events, including policy workshops with academics and policy experts, mostly held between July and October 2008 (Assignment Report of the Foreign Minister, 2009:69). This could be considered political lobbying by Deplu because during the

125 These include: Banyu Perwita (an academic at Parahyangan University), Bambang Cipto (an academic from Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta University), Bazis Susilo (Dean at Airlangga University), Rusdi (a human rights activist from Imparsial), Joseph Prasetyo (a member of the National Human Rights Commission), and Rizal Sukma (Director of CSIS).

126 During this hearing session, Sukma presented his paper entitled ‘The Last Wish’ (Permohonan Terakhir). This paper basically contains his arguments regarding why the DPR should not ratify the ASEAN Charter.
aforementioned public consultation at the parliament, Sukma was the only one who rejected the ratification, while three others—namely Perwita, Susilo, and Rusdi—indicated their support for the ratification, whereas the positions of Prasetyo and Cipto were unclear (Report of the Public Hearing, 10 September 2008). For instance, Perwita noted that ‘in order to change the existing voluntary compliance tradition in ASEAN… we need to ratify the ASEAN Charter’, while Susilo held that ‘we are not against the ratification, however, we are also open to future amendments of the Charter based on our national interests’ (Report of the Public Hearing, 10 September 2008). In defence of the final version of the Charter, the then foreign minister Wirajuda, in a meeting with the DPR on 6 October 2008, held that the bold and visionary EPG recommendations reflected ‘idealistic concepts which were not necessarily realistic to be achieved in the negotiation process at the HLTF and the ministerial level’ (Deplu, 6 October 2008). This is because the ASEAN Charter was a product of inter-governmental negotiations based on compromises designed to accommodate divergent positions that were the result of different national interests of the Association’s member countries (Severino, 2009:8). Wirajuda also maintained that a consensus-based decision-making style was still preferred by ASEAN countries (Deplu, 6 October 2008). For Wirajuda, Indonesia stood to benefit from this decision-making style, as a voting mechanism was regarded as easily leading to Indonesia becoming out-voted, especially on controversial issues such as human rights. On the issue of sanctions, Wirajuda suggested that explicitly stating this provision in the Charter was unnecessary, as a decision on sanctions would be agreed to by the Summit (Deplu, 6 October 2008). In practice, the imposition of an unwritten sanction had taken place in ASEAN when the leaders of the Association decided in 2005 to urge the Myanmar junta to ‘relinquish’ the impending 2006 ASEAN chairmanship intended for Myanmar, following the lack of progress in Myanmar’s road map to democracy (Acharya, 2009a:257). Indonesia then ratified the Charter on 8th October 2008, nearly one year after the Charter was signed in Singapore in November 2007.127

For Indonesia, the ASEAN Charter was a strategic imperative because Indonesia was a staunch supporter for the promotion of democracy and human rights (Volkmann, 2008:78). Since the ASEAN Charter highlighted these values, the Charter would serve Indonesia’s regional political and security aspirations and would institutionalise the political ideas projected through Indonesia’s foreign policy, as reflected in the aforementioned APSC concept. Consequently, the enactment of the Charter was seen to allow Indonesia’s ideas of democracy and human rights to be accepted, and shared, by other ASEAN members because the Charter

127 Singapore was the first to ratify the Charter, followed by Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines.
was legally binding for all ASEAN member states. This, in turn, would internalise the idea of democracy and human rights at the ASEAN level. Only when these ideas are internalised could Indonesia’s goal to politically develop ASEAN be achieved.

5.2.4 The creation of the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)

One of the most crucial elements in the Charter has been the agenda setting out the ASEAN human rights mechanisms. According to Singapore’s Ambassador-at-Large Tommy Koh and Dian Triansjah Djani of Indonesia, both present in HLTF meetings throughout 2007, it was not until the seventh and eighth meeting that the discussion intensified as the group was exposed to the contentious issue of the creation of a human rights mechanism (Koh 2009).

During the seventh meeting held in Bali, June 2007, the group was able to consult on human rights issues with the four heads of the national human rights commissions in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Myanmar requested that the views in this meeting be turned into a concept paper by the Secretariat rather than the HLTF, and this idea was ultimately endorsed (Koh, 2009:58). Evidently, the Myanmar officials present at the meeting sought to avoid the possibility of the outcome being scrutinised by the junta leader considering the irritations that human rights issues were likely to cause Yangon.

The eighth meeting held in Manila one month later saw the group divided into three camps. The CLMV countries opposed the creation of a human rights mechanism, while Indonesia and Thailand were in favour of, and the rest took the middle ground (Koh, 2009:58). Following this deadlock, the ASEAN-6 were able to persuade the CLMV camp to follow the former’s position (Reuters, 30 July 2007). In the end, this meeting, as further described by Koh (2009), adopted the following as a text on the human rights issue:

ASEAN shall/may establish an ASEAN human rights body, at a time acceptable to all ASEAN member states to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of ASEAN.

128 By far, Tommy Koh’s (2009) account provided the most detailed explanation on the stages leading to the creation of the AICHR.

129 Interestingly, however, efforts to promote the establishment of human rights mechanisms in the region were started in 1993 when the ASEAN Foreign Ministers acknowledged the consideration of the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism of human rights, as a response to the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights which decided the need for establishing regional and sub-regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights where they do not already exist. The attempt to substantiate this process continued when in 1995 an informal Working Group for ASEAN Human Rights mechanism was formed, constituting individuals and groups who were working with government offices or have a particular concern in promoting human rights in the region. In 2000, the group submitted a recommendation paper to the governments of ASEAN although the reaction from the latter was muted. The group continuously held meetings until 2006. The group has continued to exist up to the point of writing this thesis. For details, see Phan (2008).
At the tenth HLTF meeting in Chiang Mai in September 2007, the ASEAN member countries accepted that the Charter would include a provision on establishing an ASEAN human rights body. On this occasion, they focused on (i) the function of the human rights body, (ii) the draft of the terms of reference (ToR) of the human rights body, and (iii) the deadline for the completion of the ToR (Koh, 2009:62). In response to this development, the group was divided, with the CLMV camp at one end arguing that the ToR must be concluded before the signing of the Charter and that the human rights body would only have a consultative status, while on the other, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand arguing that the ToR should be discussed separately by a group of experts after the signing of the Charter. They also wanted the human rights body function to extend to monitoring (Koh, 2009:62).

The Chiang Mai meeting was intense, as an exchange of strong words occurred and one participant threatened to pack his bag and go home (Koh, 2009). Although Koh did not mention who the delegate was, a senior Indonesian diplomat admitted in private that it was the Indonesian representative. Ultimately, the HLTF decided that the ToR of the human rights body were to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers.

At the AMM in Phuket in July 2009, following the ratification of the ASEAN Charter by all member states, ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed upon the ToR for the creation of a human rights body. In frequent consultation with human rights experts from each country, the Indonesian, Thai and the Filipino delegations, who were supported by active and vibrant national human rights organisations, insisted that the human rights body be equipped to investigate certain human rights abuses, while others resisted such a proposal (Currie 2010). In the process of creating a human rights body, Deplu had continuously consulted the Jakarta-based human rights NGO, Human Rights Watch (HRW), to ensure congruence between Indonesia’s regional stance and domestic aspiration (Djamin, interview, 8 August 2011).

In the negotiation process for the creation of the AICHR, Jakarta faced a situation of ‘one against nine’ since Indonesia was unwilling to alter its position, advocating for a more ‘progressive’ body (Suryodiningrat 2009). The division continued when the Association decided the mechanisms for selecting the members of the human rights body. Despite such turbulence, the ToR were adopted, with the authority of the body limited to a consultative role (see AICHR ToR, Article 3). Also, ASEAN member countries were not interested in adding to their responsibilities by submitting an additional report to the AICHR review mechanism in addition to what they had already done with regard to the UN obligatory human rights reports (Hsien-Li, 2011:76). Disappointed with the adopted version, Indonesia criticised the ToR for

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130 A senior level diplomat mentioned this to the author in 2009.
131 Rafendi Djamin was the HRW Indonesia’s Representative and is Indonesia’s Representative at the AICHR.
being ‘far below the international standards’ (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012; see also Currie, 2010:7). For this reason, Indonesia agreed to accept it after a provision for a five-year mandatory review was secured therein (see AICHR ToR, Article 9.6). Despite the limitations, the AICHR was formally endorsed on 20 July 2009.

The creation of AICHR demonstrated ASEAN’s willingness to adapt to new political realities in the region, as suggested by the EPG report. It also reflected ASEAN’s interest in conforming to global cultural scripts, where human rights institutions were a normal part of regional community structures (Munro 2011). Others have also posited that AICHR was derived from the need for ASEAN to secure its identity as a legitimate institution in the community of modern states, hence emulating the West (Katsumata 2009). In other words, ASEAN was concerned about its international image. Being criticised by Western countries for its failure to uphold basic principles of freedom, the creation of AICHR was a substantive effort by ASEAN leaders to boost the Association’s credibility vis-à-vis human rights.

5.2.5 Indonesia and the AICHR

For Indonesia, the establishment of the AICHR was a manifestation of the Charter’s demand. The Indonesian diplomats believed that the new human rights body could be a useful tool for promoting Indonesia’s political aspirations for a more democratic ASEAN. This belief was illustrated by the selection of Indonesia’s representative to sit in the AICHR.

Typically a former or active government official would be appointed to this post, but Indonesia and Thailand, in a fashion that ‘derailed’ expectations, opted to select a non-government official for this post.132 In Indonesia, the selection process lasted about five weeks, from September 3rd to October 10th, 2009. During this process, Deplu formed a selection committee, consisting of representatives from government, civil society, and the media, who were tasked with providing recommendations to the foreign minister. Two candidates were considered as a result of this process. The first candidate was Marzuki Darusman, a former Attorney General and a former Chairman of Komnas HAM (the National Human Rights Commission), who was also a member of Komisi I and known for his credentials as a human rights defender. He was also a close friend of Hassan Wirajuda. The second candidate was Rafendi Djamin. The DPR members initially preferred Marzuki for the post. However, Wirajuda opted for Djamin with the hope that a non-governmental representative “could be

132 AICHR comprises of one representative from each ASEAN member country for a duration of three years and may be re-appointed for only one more term. For the 2009-2012 term these representatives are: Rafendi Djamin (Indonesia), Pehin Dato Hamid Bakal (Brunei), Om Yentieng (Cambodia), Boukeut Sangsomsak (Laos), Muhammad Shafee Abdullah (Malaysia), U Kyant Thin Swe (Myanmar), Rosario G Manalo (Philippines), Richard Magnus (Singapore), Sriprapha Petchcharamesree (Thailand), Do Ngoc Son (Vietnam). For the complete background of each of these individuals, see ASEAN, “ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission of Human Rights.”
more vocal to the region because he will not have any governmental burden and that he would be more acceptable to the human rights activists at home”.133

Many have argued that ASEAN is an elites-centred organisation, established by non-democratic political regimes (e.g. Anwar, 2010a:133). For this reason, Deplu officials welcomed the election of Djamin to represent the country in the AICHR, as it illustrated Indonesia’s support for a people-centred ASEAN. This view, however, was not shared by human rights activists at home, who argued that the AICHR and the subsequent appointment of Djamin only reflected a people-centred ASEAN if the mechanism worked effectively (Currie, 2010:11). Despite this view, Djamin’s appointment sparked hope within civil society who anticipated that the AICHR would eventually be able to address human rights violations taking place in ASEAN countries. Inspired by this expectation, they attempted to bring cases of human rights abuses in Indonesia to the AICHR despite the fact that AICHR possesses no authority to investigate human rights cases under the ToR (The Jakarta Post, 29 March 2010).

Over time, the role of the AICHR may erode the practice of ASEAN’s policy of non-interference. At least this is what Indonesia has been aspiring to since Deplu first introduced the APSC idea in 2003. Such aspirations were evidenced by a number of comments made by Indonesian diplomats. For instance, PLE Priatna, a senior diplomat, argued:

> With the existence of AICHR, the ASEAN countries should no longer be resistant and hiding behind non-interference principle to isolate or to divert the human rights cases from being discussed (Kompas, 7 August 2009).

Furthermore, Wirajuda (2008), at Foreign Policy Breakfast (FPB) meeting in Deplu held to communicate the ASEAN Charter to Indonesian government officials and civil society groups, stressed this point even further by arguing that:

> the fact is that non-interference principle is a dynamic concept. Gross violations of human rights can no longer be claimed as domestic matters, which therefore means discussing the problem would be interpreted as violating this principle. Other ASEAN member countries were concerned because they think Indonesia was interpreting the concept way too advanced. Nevertheless, Indonesia has no intention to interfere in [the domestic affairs of] other ASEAN countries, but since ASEAN is a family [it should act in the way a family would] when a member of the family is in trouble, other family members may discuss it for the good will in helping to find the solution.134

In spite of the existence of the AICHR, its failure to act beyond mere consultation has invited intense public criticism. Some have described the AICHR as a ‘toothless tiger’ (Hector 2010;

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133 As expressed by a senior level diplomat to the author in several personal communications during the process of this writing.

134 The Foreign Policy Breakfast (FPB) on this theme was conducted in Deplu on 1 February 2008. A number of academics, politicians, businessmen, NGO members, and other members of Indonesia’s epistemic community were present at this meeting.
Kelsall 2009), and feared that the consultative nature of the body would hinder ASEAN from protecting human rights in the region (The Jakarta Post, 23 March 2009; AFP, 20 July 2009). Adding to this criticism, it was argued that the ASEAN way limited the AICHR’s function (McCarthy 2009). An Indonesian rights activist Wahyu Susilo held that ASEAN non-interference principles would make things even worse. He argued:

the weakness of the AICHR ToR was its orientation on the promotion element and neglecting the protection aspect, as [ASEAN] is still adhering to the principle of non-interference. [Further], the monitoring mechanism is simply non-existent (Sinar Harapan, 23 July 2009).

In responding to these criticisms, ASEAN leaders asserted that it was ‘better to have any type of mechanism than none at all’ (Suryodiningrat 2009). For instance, the former ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan pointed out that the endorsement of the body by the ASEAN member states would be a ‘good beginning’ for the human rights situation in Southeast Asia (AFP, 20 July 2009). In this context, although AICHR’s role stressed an advisory role rather than an enforcement capacity,

it has the potential to act as a trigger to further discussion on human rights issues in member states and open avenues for others. [Therefore, its existence] is remarkable and is an essential first step towards ASEAN’s stated goal of respecting and protecting human rights (Kelsall 2009).

In essence, although the role of the AICHR was primarily advisory, it could ‘indirectly’ pursue the task of investigation as the body mandated to ‘obtain information from other ASEAN member states on the promotion and protection of human rights’ (AICHR ToR, Article 4.10) and to ‘prepare studies on thematic issues of human rights in ASEAN’ (AICHR ToR, Article 4.12). In this context, Munro (2011:1190) suggested that these particular activities would require AICHR to collect certain relevant information which could, in turn, lead to the investigation of particular abuses, hence it ‘could become a formidable body with wide-ranging powers’. This particular perspective regarding the ToR compelled Indonesia to accept the document in spite of its initial reservation. As explained by Rafendi Djamin (interview, 8 August 2011):

There is an avenue to ensure that the victims’ voices are heard because here there will be dialogue which means we can bring in the victims to talk… Therefore, promotion, or in this case exposure (of human rights cases), will have an implication on the protection of human rights.

So far, this chapter has argued that Indonesia’s foreign policy as regards regional cooperation in ASEAN has consistently been underpinned by certain values, derived from political leaders’ interpretations of domestic realities. During the New Order era, Suharto launched the concept
of regional resilience, which was tied to the concept of national resilience, to steer fellow ASEAN states to a consensus that would help foster regional stability and the exclusion of foreign powers from the region. During the Reformasi era, Indonesian foreign policy-makers continued to rely on the projection of domestic political values. But now it was human rights and democracy that were the key salient points in this projection. At the conceptual level, embarking upon a foreign policy that promoted domestic values was an important feature for Indonesia’s regional cooperation because it had been effective in achieving the intended goal, i.e. maintaining the image of, and giving substance to, Indonesia’s regional leadership status.

5.3 Democratisation and Indonesia’s regional cooperation in ASEAN: the role of leaders and change in the foreign policy substance

The discussion in this chapter contends that Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy in relation to regional cooperation in ASEAN has emphasised the importance of providing an intellectual impetus, focusing on promoting certain ideas derived from the domestic political context. During the Reformasi era, these ideas have mainly been democratic values and human rights. In this regard, Indonesia’s foreign policy on regional cooperation experienced a change because the New Order regime had not promoted these values to the region. Democracy and human rights became a new focus for Indonesia’s diplomacy because they were seen as the best instruments to enhance the legitimacy of Indonesia’s democratic regime and to repair the country’s international image (Sukma, 2011:111), confirming what Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:903) had argued about the rationale for leaders to accept certain ideas, as pointed out in Chapter Two. Habibie’s ratification of international human rights agreements, such as, the 1984 UN Convention against Torture (ratified in September 1998) was an example.

Domestically, unlike Islamic precepts as discussed in Chapter Four, democracy and human rights were incorporated into national regulations, as demonstrated by the revocation of Pancasila as being the sole principle for Indonesian organisations and the establishment of Law No.26/2000 about human rights courts. Furthermore, in a recent survey 79% of Indonesians indicated that they prefer democracy to any other political system (Berdikari, 12 October 2012). These examples show that democracy and human rights have essentially been accepted and internalised in Indonesia. To this extent, on the one hand, the external propagation of democracy was believed to contribute to the strengthening of Indonesia’s democratic consolidation at home (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). On the other hand, human rights promotion was the result of the obsolete idea of an integralistic state, implemented during the majority of the New Order period (see Chapter One: 30). Advocating these values in the region was regarded as an
effective way to give substance to Indonesia’s aspiration to become a leader in the region (see also Anwar, 2000:30, 37).

This thesis also argues that there was a considerable role of policy entrepreneurs in shaping Indonesia’s leadership and foreign policy strategy in ASEAN. Central to this was Rizal Sukma. As highlighted in the discussion on the APSC, Sukma raised the importance for Indonesia to find new themes to give meaning to its 2003 ASEAN Chairmanship. Around the same time, the Indonesian foreign minister was also finding ways to distinguish Indonesia’s chairmanship, as the aforementioned Natalegawa’s speech indicated. In this case, Sukma identified the problems ASEAN and Indonesia were facing, including the lack of leadership and centrality. In other words, Sukma noticed a policy vacuum within ASEAN and Indonesia’s role within that vacuum (see Carter and Scott, 2010:420 for theoretical support of this argument). Indeed, problem identification was essential to ensuring the success of an idea entrepreneur in asserting his/her influence (Mintrom 1997:739). Sukma’s ability to identify the promotion of democracy as a new theme for Indonesian foreign policy and his subsequent role in influencing the agenda were linked to his knowledge, as he had been a long-time observer of ASEAN, and of his networks with primarily foreign minister Wirajuda. Sukma’s role in this case suggests that the argument raised by Mintrom and Norman (2009) regarding the influence of policy entrepreneurs that usually leads to policy changes as they innovatively raise new ideas, can be applied to how a policy entrepreneur matters in Indonesia.

While Sukma was able to shape the foreign policy agenda, his ideas could not be considered the formal strategy of Indonesia’s foreign policy because he was not entitled to make one. To this extent, the presence of foreign minister Wirajuda in the decision-making process became important for ensuring that Sukma’s ideas were incorporated in the final foreign policy decision. If Wirajuda did not share Sukma’s ideas, then they could have been dismissed by Wirajuda because he had the formal authority to make and execute state’s foreign policy. That being said, as someone accustomed to the political practices between the ASEAN governments, Wirajuda noted the possible risk should Sukma’s ideas be adopted in full. In this regard, if the notion of ‘human rights’ was sustained, then an outright rejection of the APSC concept by other ASEAN member countries was possible and this would have led to embarrassment for Indonesia during its ASEAN chairmanship.

Wirajuda’s decision to make democracy and human rights part of Indonesia’s position regarding ASEAN intramural cooperation also amounted to a foreign policy change from Suharto’s major foreign policy decisions. Such a change was related to the shift in the domestic political landscape that led to the existence of a new political identity. In this regard, democratisation changed Indonesia from an authoritarian country to become a democracy.
Hence, Indonesia’s new identity motivated Indonesian leaders to pursue foreign policy preferences based on ideas that would have reflected Indonesia’s new democratic identity (see also Acharya 2003b). This is not unusual because identity was said to influence foreign policy through ideas and values resulted from leaders’ conception of ‘what constitute a state’s identity’ (Ashizawa 2008). Democratisation also provided an opportunity for Wirajuda to reassert Indonesia’s aspirations for regional leadership (Nabbs-Keller, 2013:68). If Indonesia had not democratised, it would have been unlikely that Indonesian leaders would pursue a foreign policy informed by democratic values. Therefore, democratisation served as the context for Indonesian leaders decision to change the substance of foreign policy concerning ASEAN political cooperation by incorporating the ideas of democracy and human rights.

As far as the role of the DPR is concerned, the case of the ASEAN Charter demonstrated the influence of the DPR in foreign policy, as they scrutinized the proposal made by the executive in relation to the urgency for Indonesia to ratify the Charter. This was evident at the public consultation organised by the DPR, which involved a number of experts. As a result, the ratification process in Indonesia took longer than in any other ASEAN countries because of the lengthy policy-making process in this regard (see Chapter Three, Sect.3.3 for an explanation on this process). It is argued in Chapter Two that the parliament’s attention on foreign affairs is likely to be determined by the context of the issues concerned. In this case, human rights issues became one of the questions underscored by the DPR members. This is unsurprising given the salience of human rights in Indonesia during the Reformasi era. Further, as Chapter Three notes, the role of the DPR is significant in, amongst others matters, treaty ratification. Indeed, the case of the ASEAN Charter ratification process demonstrated the relevance of these arguments. Additionally, unlike the case of Singapore-initiated DCA, the ratification of the ASEAN Charter would not have any vivid repercussions for Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty. This made the Charter more acceptable to the DPR. The DPR’s final approval, which had led to the Charter’s ratification, was linked to the perceived potential benefits of the Charter for Indonesia, as Wirajuda previously outlined. Therefore, a stalling of the ratification was perceived at the time of threatening Indonesia’s aspiration for regional leadership.

The role of parliament was also apparent in its influence over the person selected to represent Indonesia at the AIC HR. The DPR had preferred Marzuki Darusman to fill this position. Notwithstanding the DPR’s preference, however, foreign minister Wirajuda opted for Rafendi Djamin. As previously hinted, this selection was driven by the need to provide examples to the domestic audience about Indonesia’s support for ASEAN as a people-centred organisation in the future. If Wirajuda had followed the DPR preference,
this would have lent support to the arguments about Indonesia’s support for ASEAN’s elitism.

**Conclusion**

This chapter investigated the relationship between democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy on regional cooperation in ASEAN. It highlighted the importance of ASEAN for Indonesia as a regional buffer against perceived external threats but also as an avenue whereby Indonesia could demonstrate its leadership. This leadership style was exhibited mainly by promoting political ideas. During the New Order era, Suharto advanced the idea of ‘regional resilience’—a concept largely informed by Indonesia’s national practices. During the *Reformasi* period, the Indonesian leaders emphasised the promotion of democratic values and human rights among their foreign policy preferences. This demonstrates that while Indonesia’s foreign policy regarding regional cooperation in ASEAN was driven by ideas that were prominent domestically, the instalment of a democratic regime in Indonesia has led to a change in the kind of ideas that Indonesia should promote.

The decision to include democratic values was linked to three factors: Wirajuda’s commitment to reflecting the values of *Reformasi*, and hence changing the foreign policy strategy, the attempt to distinguish Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN while maintaining ASEAN’s political unity, and the influence of policy entrepreneurs in Indonesia’s decision-making circle. In the context of this change, the influence of ideas entrepreneurs and the parliament in shaping foreign policy must not be ignored. They were able to identify the policy vacuum and raised ideas to address it. Nevertheless, as they were essentially non-authoritative, the foreign minister played an instrumental role in determining the policy content. This was linked to foreign minister Wirajuda’s position in the decision-making structure and his experience on ASEAN’s political issues, including on managing ASEAN intra-mural cooperation.

Overall, during the *Reformasi* period, Indonesian foreign policy on regional cooperation in ASEAN has been largely determined by the prominence of leaders, although one cannot exclude entirely the role of policy entrepreneurs and the parliament. In terms of substance of foreign policy, democratisation contextualised the Indonesian leaders’ decisions in making democracy and human rights important political values guiding Indonesia’s position on ASEAN intramural cooperation.
6 Beyond ASEAN: Democratisation and the Promotion of Political Values

In the previous chapter, this thesis notes that one of the boldest changes to Indonesian foreign policy in the post-Suharto era was the recognition of democracy and human rights as important political values to be projected abroad. This chapter will further discuss Indonesia’s promotion of democracy and human rights in the context of democratisation by looking at two different levels of cooperation: regional and bilateral. In the former, Indonesia’s activities are explored through an analysis of the Bali Democracy Forum (hereafter, BDF) initiative pursued in Asia and on the cooperation in the context of East Asia regional arrangement. In the latter, Indonesia’s bilateral foreign policy is examined with regard to Myanmar as Myanmar is the most egregious case of respect for democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia. This chapter argues that while Indonesian leaders actively promoted democracy and human rights in ASEAN context, in the wider Asia and East Asia cooperation more generally democratisation has had a differential impact marked by Indonesia’s limited promotion of political values. These limitations include the lack of human rights promotion, as also visible in, to some extent, Indonesian foreign policy on Myanmar.

In the first section, this chapter highlights Indonesia’s foreign policy in the context of BDF, where the promotion of democracy was a major goal, and East Asia cooperation, where it was not. Section Two analyses Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar. This section discusses the preferences on different levels in Indonesia by highlighting the changes in the Indonesian leaders’ policy toward the junta and demonstrates Indonesia’s limited human rights promotion in Myanmar. Section Three analyses the link between democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy on the promotion of political values by highlighting three factors: the salience of leaders, the foreign policy change, and the limits of this foreign policy strategy.

6.1 Promotion of democracy and human rights in Asia

While Indonesia has been actively promoting democracy and human rights in ASEAN, a similar foreign policy approach has been only partially observable in the wider Asian region.\textsuperscript{135} The promotion of democracy in this region was limited to a mechanism for ‘sharing best practices and experiences’, without bold initiatives to create a code of conduct, if not legal documents, similar to what ASEAN had. This was manifested in the Bali Democracy Forum initiative.

\textsuperscript{135} For the purpose of this research, the notion of ‘Asia’ is limited to ‘Asia’ in general and ‘East Asia’ in particular. As such, it includes neither Asia-Pacific nor Indo-Pacific. It also exclude ASEAN since Indonesia’s regional cooperation in this context has been discussed in the previous chapter.
Further, when regional cooperation involved major countries, as the cooperation in East Asia did, Indonesia did not place democracy promotion and human rights on the agenda. Instead, Indonesia’s focus in the East Asia regional context was dominated by attempts to maintain the balance of influence between the major powers by pursuing a policy motivated by the consideration of security. Therefore, the impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s promotion of political values in the wider Asia and in East Asia context was limited.

6.1.1 Bali Democracy Forum (BDF)

In December 2008, the government initiated the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) as a response to the absence of a regional mechanism to promote democracy in Asia (Sukma, 2011:115). As such, the BDF was an instrument for encouraging democracy as part of Indonesia’s wider Asia strategy (Wirajuda, 2008a; see also The Jakarta Post, 14 November 2008). In other words, the BDF was a means for Indonesia to place democracy at the centre of strategic regional discourse in the wider Asia (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012).

The BDF was designed to be the first intergovernmental annual forum in Asia to promote the discussion on democracy, including the exchange of views and the sharing of best practices and experiences. To this extent, Sebastian (interview, 5 December 2012) noted: ‘democracy is something that Indonesia should highlight in its foreign policy because Indonesia has to demonstrate to the region that democracy is working.’ The purpose of the BDF was to increase regional cooperation on democracy, adhering to democratic principles at the regional level which would, hopefully, strengthen democratic consolidation at the national level (Hadi, 2008:4). To date, BDF participants were not limited to democracies, but also included those who were ‘interested to learn about democracy’, hence, participation was inclusive (BDF concept paper, 6 March 2008).136 Its inclusivity and its dialogue method made the BDF an attractive forum for non-democracies such as China and Myanmar. As demonstrated by the BDF IV conference in 2011, these non-democracies were given equal opportunities to share their views on, and practices of, ‘democracy’.

While the BDF worked at the governmental level, considering that promotion of democracy in some countries could be a sensitive matter, the Indonesian leaders had established a semi-governmental agency, the Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD), to support the work of the BDF at the second track level.137 Being a university-based entity, the IPD is better

136 BDF I was attended by 40 participants; BDF II by 48 participants; BDF III had 44 participants; and BDF IV by 80 participants. For details see, Deplu, “BDF Information Sheet”.
137 The IPD was a result of Australia’s commitment to supporting the BDF, demonstrated by its contribution of USD 3.6 million to the IPD in 2008 alone (Erawan, personal communication, 2011). As a semi-governmental organisation, the IPD relied primarily on the state-budget for its main funding and donations from donor countries. In a year the IPD must conduct three to four major activities, and each costs the institute USD 100-150 thousands
positioned than the government when working with the public and with civil society groups from other countries because it is not restricted by any formal principles of inter-state cooperation. Indonesia’s engagement with Egypt following the political change of the latter, for instance, was particularly driven by this second track diplomacy. In this case, allowing for the IPD to engage other countries reduced the potential for allegations that Indonesia was interfering in Egypt’s domestic affairs. As pointed out by an IPD patron: ‘the government does have certain limitations, we (the IPD) don’t’.  

Critics of the BDF, however, have highlighted its informality, in a sense that there has not been any legally-binding agreement created by this forum, and government-centric nature, which were perceived to lessen the capacity of the forum, as it restricted government officials in reaching out to political forces of targeted country (Jemadu 2008). Aleksius Jemadu, an Indonesian foreign affairs observer, held that civil society organisations should be involved as they often operate in the ways that are different from the governments. Jemadu also added that the BDF lacked discussion on the security of the region. Similarly, while praising the BDF initiative, Sebastian (interview, 5 December 2012) noted that Indonesia ‘should keep the political and security aspects balanced because Indonesia has been more focused on the political aspect of democracy, since it reflected Indonesia’s new identity’.  

Responding to some of these criticisms, in his public address during the BDF IV meeting in 2011, SBY stated that the BDF would not be formalised as it was ‘an avenue to freely share experience and exchange minds’ (Tempo, 8 December 2011). Indonesian foreign policy leaders held that Indonesia is not ‘in the business of imposing values, but rather sharing them’ (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). To this extent, through the BDF, Indonesia encouraged participants to nurture their own democratic values from within (Adenan 2011). Such a move by the Indonesian government suffered from an obvious shortcoming; if Indonesian leaders believed that democracy should come from within, then promoting democracy through the BDF would ultimately be irrelevant. In addition to this, notwithstanding that participation in the BDF was inclusive, the concrete outcome of this initiative was not clear. If its ultimate goal was to encourage democracy in non-democratic countries in the wider Asia then by far the effectiveness of the BDF in achieving this goal is unclear since there was no evidence of countries democratising because they attended this forum. The lack of power of the BDF to further encourage democratisation in non-democracies in Asia could be tied to its nature as being merely a place for countries to ‘share best practices and experiences’. If the Indonesian  

(Erawan, interview, 16 September 2011). For further details about the IPD, see Institute for Peace and Democracy <http://www.instituteforpeaceanddemocracy.org/about-ipd>, accessed on 12 April 2012.

138 A private conversation with one of the IPD patrons during a workshop on IPD capacity building in Sanur, Bali, July 2011, attended by the author.
leaders failed to build the BDF capacity in making it more authoritative in promoting democracy, the BDF could in the long term sustain as merely a regional talk-shop.

Overall, this section suggests that Indonesia’s decision to create the BDF was linked to the absence of pre-existing regional initiatives that fostered democracy. This section also highlights that Indonesia’s policy strategy in promoting democracy in the wider Asian region was a significant departure from the New Order Indonesia, which was averse to the notion of democracy itself (see Schwarz, 2000:304). In this light, the BDF initiative was an attempt to emphasise Indonesia’s soft power, as a regional promoter of democracy (Rüland, 2011:18).

6.1.2 Beyond the BDF: an absence of democracy and human rights promotion in East Asia

While the BDF was recognised as Indonesia’s hallmark of democracy promotion in Asia, it failed to include the promotion of human rights. More generally, Indonesia’s promotion of democracy and human rights in Asia has been limited. In the context of East Asia cooperation, for instance, Indonesia’s approach has been motivated by ideas derived from the identification of the country’s fragile position in international affairs (see Weinstein 1972), hence its policy of maintaining a balanced presence of big powers. For Indonesia, its participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS) regional cooperation was driven by the role of ASEAN in driving the focus of EAS (see Ba 2009). This meant that non-ASEAN member countries were required to accede to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) prior to joining the EAS (Kun, 2009:21-22; see also Severino, 2004:6; Seah, 2009:200). Having been involved in a regional cooperation shaped by the competing influences of long-time rivals in the region, particularly, although not limited to, China and Japan (see Ayson 2009), Indonesian leaders did not prioritise democracy and human rights promotion. This reflected the views of Hassan Wirajuda who argued that:

…in the integration process of East Asia, Indonesia holds its strategic interest in the political, peace, and security front… that is not to see China as the only dominant player. In this case, East Asia should be defined with a balanced and inclusive approach to prevent the accumulation of power in China’s hand (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012).

Indeed, when supporting the establishment of EAS in 2005, Indonesia had already become a democracy. The ASEAN Political-Security Community initiative had been launched in

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139 Since its inception in 2008, BDF has not put human rights as the main theme of the forum. For details, see Institute for Peace and Democracy, “Bali Democracy Forum”.
2003, marking Indonesia’s first attempt to promote democracy and human rights in the region. Instead of emphasising promoting democracy and human rights, Indonesia’s initial support towards the creation of EAS was influenced by Japan’s idea of minimising Beijing’s dominance in East Asian regional arrangement by including the presence of other major and middle powers, such as the US, India, Australia, and New Zealand (Jeshurun, 2007:334; Nakamura, 2009:193). In this regard, by following Japan’s lead, Indonesian leaders would like to diplomatically dampen the potential for China to rise to regional dominance in the East Asia regional setting. This preference was tied to the perception held by most Indonesian leaders that Indonesia is vulnerable and operating in a hostile and uncertain international environment (Leifer 1983; Weinstein 1972, 1976).

In light of this diplomatic preference, Indonesia welcomed the US participation in the EAS, as indicated by foreign minister Natalegawa in 2010 in Washington (see The Department of State, 17 September 2010). For Indonesian leaders, the involvement of the US in the EAS could act as a counter-balance to the growing influence of Beijing (Emmers 2011; Lee 2011; Severino, 2011b:10). Obama’s decision to attend the EAS meeting in Bali in 2011 and to withdraw US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan by that year (see Murphy, interview with the NBR, 17 November 2011), as well as his agreement with the Australian PM Julia Gillard regarding the gradual deployment of the US Marines in Darwin, which would be up to 2,500 personnel by 2017, were indicative of the increasing presence of the US in East Asia and the Pacific, more generally (see, ABC Australia, 17 November 2011; Togo, 2012:83: Kun 2009). According to some observers, this was the manifestation of Secretary Clinton’s promise to make the US ‘a force for peace and stability, and a guarantor of security’, as indicated in her 2010 speech in Hawaii (Storey 2011; Rajan 2012; see also The Jakarta Post, 19 January 2010). While welcoming the presence of the US in East Asia, the Indonesian leaders were aware of the challenges they might face in managing a regional platform which included major powers. This concern was expressed by President SBY in his remarks at the Opening of the 2011 ASEAN Summit. He called for the EAS countries to identify common principles that would guide the relations participating states (ASEAN, 17 November 2011). But even with this statement, Indonesia did not make democracy promotion and human rights the ‘guiding principles of interstate relations’, let alone mentioning BDF as Indonesia’s diplomatic vehicle to promote democracy in Asia. Instead, being the ‘key to Southeast Asia security’

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141 It was also revealed during the EAS meeting in 2011 that the US planned to increase the capacity of the regional military partners and to equip the regional maritime police and civil authorities under the cooperation framework in maritime security. For details, see the White House (19 November 2011).
(Dibb, 2001:836), Indonesia sought to maintain ASEAN’s centrality and to prevent the US and China from dominating the agenda in the EAS cooperation (Wihardja 2011; see also ASEAN, 17 November 2011).

According to Novotny, Indonesia’s fear of China’s dominance was partially attributed to the long history of Chinese expansionism, particularly when the old Chinese Empires sought to spread their authority and dominance over the Indonesian Sultanates (Novotny 2004). Apart from this history, China’s alleged involvement in the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the rise of communism in Indonesia in the 1960s also contributed to Indonesia’s suspicion about China (see Sukma 1999). Consequently, fear was prominent amongst the decision-makers in Deplu. As Hamzah Thayeb (interview with the author, 25 August 2011), a former DG for Asia-Pacific and African Affairs noted,

Indonesia envisions a peaceful and prosperous region... [That is why] it is important to engage China from early on and we responded to China’s increasing role by welcoming the US, Russia, India, and Australia.

Such an attitude was also maintained by Hassan Wirajuda who, while reluctant to label China as a ‘threat’, suggested: ‘in diplomacy, you just cannot rely on the goodwill of others as China in the future might change its stance’ (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012).

The above discussion contends that Indonesia’s foreign policy on democracy and human rights promotion in the wider Asia was limited in terms of geopolitical areas where this policy strategy was pursued. While there were some significant changes in Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy that allowed for the promotion of democracy and human rights in Asia generally, in relation to East Asia cooperation Indonesian foreign policy leaders continued to focus on the importance of security and the relevance of Indonesia in this context. This was demonstrated by the ‘balanced and inclusive’ approach aimed at minimising the dominance of a single power in the region – in this case, China. Indonesia’s fragile international position had a direct impact on how it conducted itself in regional cooperation, highlighting two considerations noted in Chapter Two.

First, with regard to the link between identity, ideas, and foreign policy, conceptualisation of Indonesian identity by leaders in Jakarta influenced the formulation

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142 Indonesia’s participation in other regional arrangements, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), was influenced by the relevance of ASEAN centrality, which had meant that Indonesia did not abandon the importance of ASEAN as a regional buffer when Indonesia engaged with other major countries. This indicated that the concept of Indonesia as being a vulnerable country beyond the Southeast Asia’s cooperation was salient for the Indonesian leaders. For details on Indonesia’s foreign policy in relation to the ARF, see, among others, Sukma (2004:78-81). For a discussion on the establishment of the ARF see, for instance, Ba (1997); Midford (2000); Yuzawa (2005). For the link between the ARF and the ASEAN’s centrality, see Rolls (2012), Emmers (2003), and Leifer (1996).
of foreign policy ideas (balanced and inclusive), which later translated into foreign policy action (by accommodating the presence of other major countries) in the region. This supports Ashizawa’s argument (2008:594) about the indirect impact of identity on foreign policy with ideas or values as intermediary variables (Chapter Two: 57-58). Indonesia’s concern about the likelihood of China’s domination in the region was channelled into foreign policy by individuals, primarily the Indonesian foreign minister as well as high-ranking officials at Deplu, who stood at the apex of Indonesia’s foreign policy-making.

Second, the analysis highlighted the change and continuity within foreign policy. While the changes involved a recognition of the values of democracy and human rights in foreign policy toward the wider Asia, the continuity underscored the importance of security in Indonesian foreign policy vis-à-vis major countries in East Asia. This continuity was served by the idea of maintaining a balance amongst regional powers that characterised Indonesia’s approach to East Asia regional cooperation. This is because Indonesia’s regional activism since Suharto’s period had been influenced by the fear of domination by other countries leading to Jakarta’s emphasis on the centrality of ASEAN (in the ARF context) and the ‘balanced and inclusive’ approach (in the EAS context). In this regard, Indonesian leaders continued a similar foreign policy approach because unlike in Southeast Asia where Indonesia was perceived as the de facto leader, in East Asia regional cooperation Indonesia did not have leadership status. Had Indonesia obtained such a status, it would not have welcomed the US strategy to continue their presence in the region, and would not have feared the potential for China’s dominating role. Continuing a similar foreign policy approach served Indonesia’s intended goal in preventing the likelihood for unipolarity in international system outside the ASEAN context (cf. Chapter Two: 55).

6.2 Promotion of democracy at bilateral level: the case of Myanmar

While Indonesian leaders have pursued different foreign policy approaches in wider Asia, where democracy promotion was visible, at bilateral levels promotion of political values was most observable in Myanmar. This is because Myanmar is the most striking case as far as democracy and human rights issues are concerned, and pursuing a policy that focuses on these issues in Myanmar would strengthen Indonesia’s role as a leader in Southeast Asia’s political cooperation.

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143 This thesis uses the designation “Myanmar” rather than “Burma”, reflecting how the country is recognised internationally, including in the United Nations.
6.2.1 Myanmar in ASEAN

Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997 during the same period as Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), and Cambodia (1999). Myanmar was under military rule following General Ne Win’s coup in 1962. The 1974 Constitution ended the decree-based military rule of the Revolutionary Council – comprised of military officers led by General Ne Win himself – by mandating the formation of an Eastern European model single party socialist state, which gave birth to the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) (Steinberg, 1999:8). In 1988, the military coup that ‘toppled’ the ruling BSPP gave way to the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). This coup made no meaningful difference to the nature of the regime, because institutionally speaking, the SLORC was the military (Steinberg, 1999:11). SLORC was ‘replaced’ in name by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. This replacement was undertaken to boost the confidence of foreign investors who, at the time, were leaving the country in response to the economic tremors initiated by the Asian financial crisis (Case, 2003:380). The fact that Myanmar’s junta did not want to embarrass itself following its admission to ASEAN also contributed to the change of regime name (Sundararaman, undated). Similar to the previous ‘succession of power’, however, the SPDC was essentially run and dominated mostly by the same top military figures of the disposed SLORC, causing it to be labelled a ‘cosmetic exercise’ (Eldridge, 2002:73).\footnote{In November 2010, Myanmar had its national election. Following this election, in March 2011 SPDC was dissolved and General Thein Sein became president. Sein and a number of former members of SPDC abandoned their military ranks and uniforms to become a fully civilian state apparatus. Indeed, these events were indicative of Myanmar’s initial step for democratic transition. For details, see Egretau (2012:30-33).}

Myanmar’s initial plan for admission to ASEAN received mixed responses from other ASEAN member. For instance, according to Haacke (2006:42), in the early 1990s Malaysia was reluctant to support ASEAN plans to grant Yangon membership in the light of Islamic sensitivity and solidarity, emphasising the junta’s reckless treatment of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State in 1992. Apart from Malaysia, an objection regarding Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN was also filed by two ASEAN democracies, the Philippines and Thailand (see, among others, Roberts 2010). Pressures on ASEAN to decline Myanmar’s admission also came from the EU and America. The strong western criticism was a result of the deteriorating human rights situation in Myanmar since the SLORC/SPDC began ruling the country. For instance, although Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) was allowed to compete in the 1990 Myanmar election, and despite the fact that it successfully secured 60% of the total votes (Case 2003), or 392 of 485 seats in the parliament\footnote{For a complete result of the 1990 election, see Han (2003).}.
a result that would have allowed the NLD to govern the country, the junta authoritatively denied NLD victory.

In their attempt to minimise increasing international pressure, ASEAN leaders experimented with a number of methods to engage the junta. In 1991, Thai FM Arsa Sarasin made public the Thai policy of constructive engagement, aimed at rejecting interference by external powers, particularly the Western countries, which may have isolated the country (Acharya, 2009a:129). The concept of constructive engagement emphasised the need for ASEAN countries to develop stronger diplomatic ties with and increasing economic presence in Myanmar, as they could improve Myanmar’s economic position, thereby gradually encouraging political change (IDEA, 2001:ix; Acharya, 2009a:133). However, the success of the concept in bringing the desired changes to Myanmar was not achieved as, ultimately, it failed to lead to political liberalisation and economic progress for the Myanmar people. Aware of the mounting criticism, on 10 July 1995, two years before Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN, the junta released its most iconic political detainee, Aung San Suu Kyi. Suu Kyi had been detained for six years from 1989 after being involved in protests that were seen by General Ne Win as an attempt to nurture public hatred towards the military (Observer, 23 July 1989). Further, Malaysia – that was previously objected Myanmar’s admission – changed its stance by 1997, urging Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN. This change of position was driven by the aspiration of the Malaysian government under Mahathir for ASEAN to be inclusive of all ten Southeast Asian countries (Steinberg, 2001:238). In other words, support for the junta’s admission to ASEAN would support the realisation of the Malaysian-initiated ‘One Southeast Asia’ concept (Acharya, 2009a:131). Myanmar was formally admitted to ASEAN in 1997.

For ASEAN, the decision to accept Yangon was partly attributed to the influence of material factors because the regional bloc wanted to reduce, if not isolate, external influences. In essence, it was to lessen Myanmar’s economic dependence on China (Haacke, 2006:42, 58; Steinberg, 2001:236; Ohmar, interview with the author, 17 May 2012). China, as a foreign policy issue in Myanmar, could not be separated from the domestic reality of ethnic Chinese living in Myanmar (Steinberg, 2001:227). In 2012, for instance, it was estimated that 3% of the total population were Chinese.146 This being said, Chinese economic assistance and Beijing’s physical presence in Myanmar was so important that the two governments agreed to authorise a visa-free entry for people from both countries in order to facilitate border trades (Steinberg, 2001:229). In international fora, Beijing had been the junta’s close ally in securing Myanmar’s

146 It has been estimated that Myanmar’s total population will reach around 56 million by July 2013. Among other ethnic groups living in Myanmar were the Burman (68%), Shan (9%), Karen (7%), Rakhine (4%), Indian (2%), Mongolian (2%), and others (5%). For details see, CIA World Factbook (2012), “Burma”.

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diplomatic interests. 

For this sort of diplomatic protection and support, the SPDC rewarded Beijing with substantial access to Myanmar’s natural resources (Haacke, 2011:133). According to a Myanmar pro-democracy activist, Khin Ohmar, the inclusion of Myanmar in ASEAN was also seen by other ASEAN leaders as an effort to ‘civilise the military generals’ (Ohmar, interview, 17 May 2012; see also Roberts, 2010:113).

The intensity of criticism against Myanmar’s junta, however, did not waiver even after its successful admission into ASEAN particularly from Washington – to which human rights and democracy have been a central theme of its foreign policy. During the July 1998 AMM in Manila, for example, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, openly called for the immediate implementation of freedom of movement in Myanmar. In response to Western criticisms and taking into account the failure of Thailand’s previous diplomatic approach as well as influenced by the impact of Myanmar problems have had on Thailand, in June 1998 Thai FM Surin Pitsuwan introduced the concept of ‘flexible engagement’. Flexible engagement stressed the need for ASEAN members to allow public commentary and collective discussion on fellow members’ domestic policies when these have either regional implications or adverse effects on the disposition of other ASEAN members (Haacke, 1999:583). Essentially, this idea was a desire to loosen the implementation of the association’s non-interference principle. Thai authorities believed that Myanmar’s enduring military suppression and its internal conflicts could affect Thailand’s national security in three possible ways: the drug smuggling from Myanmar to Thailand; the spill over of the fighting between the Myanmar Army and insurgents into Thai territory; and the increasing influx of Burmese refugees to Thailand (Katanyuu, 2006:827-29).

However, Pitsuwan’s counsel that ASEAN adopt the policy of flexible engagement was rejected by other ASEAN member states. The concept was regarded as contradictory to the principle of non-interference long favoured by the majority of the autocratic states in ASEAN (Webber, 2012:17). It was a contradiction in three respects. First, it would have allowed ASEAN member countries to criticise each other’s policies publicly; second, it suggested that public criticism of member states would be considered ASEAN policy; and third, it would have threatened the practice of the non-interference principle (Haacke, 1999:584-5). The non-interference principle was understood as each state’s freedom from unsolicited verbal involvement by foreign-state linked authorities in what were considered to be home affairs

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147 For instance, China consistently voted against any UNGA votes concerning the human rights situation in Myanmar between 2006 and 2011. For details, see the United Nations General Assembly, “Resolutions on Myanmar, 2006-2010”.

148 Secretary Albright emphasised the need for the Myanmar’s NLD and its leader, Suu Kyi, to be able to move freely in their own country and therefore called ASEAN members to act more strongly against Yangon to ensure the political freedom of the Myanmar people. For details, see the US Department of State, 27 July 1998.
(Haacke, 1999:583). Consequently, the non-interference principle could be regarded as beneficial for ASEAN’s authoritarian governments, useful in underpinning the political legitimacy of the regime.

Five years after being released, in 2000 Suu Kyi had to return to detention after she made repeated attempts to meet her supporters outside Yangon – a condition that was forbidden by the junta. Again, the situation invited primarily Western criticism, especially when the junta had also forbidden Suu Kyi from seeing her late husband, Michael Aris, who was then dying of cancer in the UK, even before she was re-detained. Aware of the unrestricted and open pressures from the West, in 2005, the junta eventually made public that it would not insist on its turn as ASEAN chair in 2006 offering an excuse that the Myanmar government would be preoccupied with its national reconciliation process (Wilson, 2007:85). Within ASEAN, however, Southeast Asian leaders were generally reluctant to strongly criticise the junta. The junta consistently invoked the ASEAN policy of non-interference to shield itself from criticism from other ASEAN member states, in addition to the consensus and non-confrontational approach practiced by the members of the Association (Ohmar 2006; Steinberg, 2001:237-38).

In this case, while seemingly refuting Western criticism on Myanmar membership in ASEAN, the leaders of the association embarked on a rather soft approach by engaging, instead of isolating, the country, as the Thai initiatives demonstrated.

6.2.2 Indonesia’s policy towards Myanmar: articulations of preferences at different levels

6.2.2.1 Indonesian foreign policy leaders

Indonesia supported Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN without reservation. Indonesia’s support was driven by the historical political relationship between the two countries. Myanmar was a key supporter of Indonesia during the latter’s struggle for independence in the 1940s, mainly by providing military radio broadcasters to spread the news about Indonesia’s struggle to the outside world. Indeed, as noted by Ambassador Wisber Loeis – a retired diplomat and a former member of the New Order’s National Stabilisation Council who served for most of Suharto’s regime – Indonesia’s decision to accept Myanmar was heavily driven by political considerations, as the two countries had both nurtured similar political regimes and would therefore support each other in regional politics (Loeis, interview, 5 August 2011). In fact, in 1993 during the visit of Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, the then First Secretary of the SLORC,

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149 For instance, in the wake of the 2005 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Rotterdam, the Dutch authorities refused to issue a visa for the Myanmar economic minister as a statement of dissatisfaction from Europe on the deteriorating human rights situation in Myanmar. The Dutch decision eventually resulted in a boycott by ASEAN ministers. For details on the EU critics, see Europolitics, 16 September 2005.

150 Myanmar becomes ASEAN Chair in 2014.
to Jakarta, it was argued that the Myanmar junta openly expressed its intention to study the concept of Indonesia’s military dual-function, as the SLORC searched for a more sustainable political format (Sundhaussen, 1995:768-9). Suharto’s visit to Yangon in the same year as Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN, accompanied by his eldest daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, who reportedly had investments in Myanmar, unabashedly illustrated this support (Paul, 2010:76).

However, Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, which was followed by Indonesia’s democratisation, led to gradual changes in Indonesia’s position towards Myanmar. In objection to Thai’s flexible engagement approach, Indonesia came up with the term ‘enhanced interaction’ (Haacke 2005). According to the late Ali Alatas, then Indonesian foreign minister, ‘flexible engagement’ was inapplicable because:

First, Myanmar has joined ASEAN thus, became a part of ASEAN family. In this sense, ASEAN cannot choose to engage or not to engage Myanmar. There is no flexibility. Second, all ASEAN member states have the obligation to help each other as part of a family. Third, interactions among all ASEAN member countries are inclusive of all issues of common interest and comprehensive in all areas of ASEAN cooperation. Fourth, all ASEAN member countries – not just Myanmar, should enhance these interactions among themselves, not just with Myanmar. And fifth, to enhance is to improve on something existing (Alatas quoted in Chalermpanalanupap 2010).

The notion of ‘enhanced interaction’ was perceived by his ASEAN peers as ‘less intervention-oriented’ (Acharya, 2009a: 178). ‘Enhanced interaction’ would encourage ASEAN members to talk openly with each other on ‘views that may originate in one country but have an impact on other ASEAN countries’ (Kuhonta, 2006:348). The materialisation of such an interaction included keeping the Myanmar issue an internal problem of ASEAN by encouraging the junta to discuss its internal matters within the context of ASEAN. This was not an easy process as Myanmar was often reluctant to do so; nevertheless, according to Alatas: ‘ASEAN policy of ‘enhanced interaction’ was at work, therefore ASEAN countries must be careful not to interfere in Myanmar internal affairs’ (quoted in Yuzawa, 2007:112).  

The Indonesian leaders’ changing policy on Myanmar was more apparent and, at times, assertive, particularly in calling for the implementation of political freedom in Myanmar, when Indonesia assumed the 2003 ASEAN Chairman. Such calls were found in comments made by primarily Indonesian foreign minister, and members of the DPR. For them, Indonesia’s new democratic identity was the foundation for the change in Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar (Piccone 2012).

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151 For the limitations of the practice of ‘enhanced interaction’, see Haacke (2005:199-201).
In May 2003, prior to the October ASEAN Summit, members of the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) ambushed Suu Kyi and her NLD convoys in Depayin, in Sagaing Division, northwest side of Mandalay. This was viewed as the junta’s reaction to the political visit of Suu Kyi since her release from house arrest in May 2002 (AIPMC 2005; McCarthy, 2010:337). Suu Kyi was then taken to hospital for the wounds she suffered and then sent back to house arrest. The incident outraged ASEAN leaders, although ASEAN member countries responded differently to this incident. While Malaysia’s Mahathir, who was at the time of the incident about to leave office, urged his ASEAN colleagues to take firm action by expelling Yangon from the bloc, Thailand’s PM Thaksin Shinawatra ‘defended’ Yangon. Shinawatra, in this case, published the Bangkok-planned ‘road map towards democracy’, which showed what ‘enhanced interaction’ meant for the Thais (see McCarthy 2010). Indonesia, as ASEAN Chair, proposed that an ASEAN ministerial delegation be sent to Myanmar with the task of encouraging the Junta to hasten democratic reforms (AIPMC 2005).

In the event, Yangon declined Thailand’s initiative and instead designed its own ‘road map’, which included ‘seven steps to a disciplined democracy’ However, after a period of intensive quiet diplomacy, the junta eventually agreed to accept Ali Alatas in September, one month before the Summit, as an attempt to secure Suu Kyi’s release (Haacke 2006). While Alatas was able to meet PM Khin Nyunt and Deputy FM Khin Maung Win on the last day of his visit, he failed to meet Suu Kyi who, at the time, was still recovering from surgery in a local hospital (VOA, 23 September 2003). Alatas failed to secure Suu Kyi’s release. According to a report, the junta used his presence in Yangon as an attempt to reduce international and regional pressure on them (AIPMC, 2005:8). For the Indonesian government, the release of Suu Kyi could have greatly elevated Jakarta’s ASEAN leadership credentials, given that Indonesia held

152 Following the incident, Myanmar Foreign Minister Win Aung made a trip to several ASEAN countries conveying a letter from the junta leader General Than Swe explaining that the reason for Suu Kyi’s arrest was that she was allegedly reported to have been planning an uprising against the Junta and that Suu Kyi was in a stable health condition despite the raid and the detainment. For details see, for instance, Haacke (2006). For the chronological account of the incident, see AIPMC, (2005).

153 The Thai-initiated road map’s plans included five phases: (i) the release of Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders as well as the reopening of the NLD headquarters and the provincial offices that were closed since the incident; (ii) conducting an investigation of the incident; (iii) drafting a constitution that embraces the military, the pro-democracy groups, and the ethnic groups followed by the adoption of the actual constitution; (iv) the implementation of the adopted constitution which would lead to national elections; and (v) the inclusion of independent international monitors to oversee the election. See, Larry Jagan, Bangkok Post, 9 August 2003.

154 These steps are: (i) reconvening the National Convention (NC) that has been adjourned since 1996; (ii) implementing the process of the NC towards the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system; (iii) drafting a new constitution based on the NC; (iv) adoption of the constitution based on a national referendum; (v) holding free and fair legislative elections according to the new constitution; (vi) convening of the parliament attended by the members of parliament according to the new constitution; (vii) building a modern, developed, and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by parliament, and the government and other central organs by the parliament. See, Htet Aung, Irrawaddy opinion, August 2007.
the ASEAN chairmanship at the time. However, as ASEAN diplomacy and Indonesia’s lobbying were unsuccessful in this case, Suu Kyi remained a detainee even during the Summit. Myanmar ignored the threat made by Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda that the junta’s decision could result in Myanmar’s situation being discussed as the Summit’s main agenda (AFP, 8 September 2003). As it turned out, Myanmar’s situation was not discussed at the summit, with Indonesian threats not materialising.

The Indonesian leaders were frustrated by the way the Myanmar government responded to Indonesia’s threat and by the failure to keep its promise made in July 2003 when foreign minister Win Aung told Wirajuda that Suu Kyi would be released before the November 2003 Summit. President Megawati expressed her irritation by calling on Myanmar to make the timetable of the road map public (The Jakarta Post, 10 November 2003). Unsurprisingly, the junta declined to do this. In November 2004, Wirajuda made an unannounced two-day visit to Yangon where Myanmar’s PM Soe Win met him. Although the details of the meeting were not made public, an Indonesian diplomat told the author (personal communication, 2011) that the meeting raised the concerns of the newly installed Indonesian President SBY about developments in Myanmar’s political situation. SBY’s visit was also meant to gather first-hand information about the likelihood of Myanmar’s policies with respect to ASEAN and to Myanmar’s democratisation process, following the removal of Khin Nyunt, Soe Win’s predecessor, who was charged by the junta of being involved in corruption (Burmanet News, 12 November 2004).

The ASEAN countries, however, persisted. In 2006, Malaysian FM Syed Hamid Albar, in his capacity as an ASEAN envoy, went to meet the generals in Yangon. However, the junta did not accept his visit as ASEAN envoy and did not allow Albar to meet either Suu Kyi and other democratic voices, or the head of state General Than Shwe (Kuppuswamy, 2006: paper no.1781). As a result, Albar returned early to Malaysia with empty hands. According to Khin Ohmar, the junta generals justified rejecting Albar by pointing to the non-interference policy maintained within ASEAN (Ohmar, interview, 17 May 2012). The failure of the Albar visit also raised disappointment on the side of Myanmar’s advocates of democracy. U Myint Thein, the NLD spokesperson, stated:

> we are saddened... he (Albar) left the country without meeting the democratic forces. We know that the Malaysian FM came to Burma as an ASEAN envoy to study Burma’s democratic reform, therefore he should meet with the opposition, but that was not the case.155

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155 For the complete position of the NLD on Albar’s visit, see NLD Express, 28 March 2006.
Myanmar agreed to release Suu Kyi on 13 November 2010, six days after Myanmar had its parliamentary election. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a military backed party won the election, which brought General (Ret.) Thein Sein to the presidency. The NLD participated in the parliamentary by-election on 1st April 2012 and won 43 of the 44 contested seats, a result which allowed Suu Kyi to become, for the first time, an active political practitioner in parliament (The Telegraph, 3 April 2012).

While Indonesian leaders have critically changed their policy on Myanmar, particularly with regard to promoting democracy in Myanmar, this change was still limited by the practice of non-interference principle in Southeast Asia. Indonesia continued to respect Myanmar’s sovereignty and national territorial integrity in its policy decisions. The Indonesian leaders were fully aware that however much they wished to push for democratisation in Myanmar, they needed to be careful that it was done without violating the main principle of inter-state relations, including respecting the legitimate Myanmar government. This was evident in the banning of the meetings involving exiled political leaders of Myanmar in Jakarta, as discussed later. While democratisation in Indonesia impacted the way Jakarta perceived the principle of non-interference, especially regarding the promotion of democracy and human rights, the notions of sovereignty and national integrity remained key pillars of the bebas-aktif policy (see Chapter Four). Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar could not compromise on the notion of state sovereignty and national territorial integrity or that of other countries, including in the context of intra-mural relations between ASEAN countries. As Alatas suggested:

Respect for sovereignty will remain a basic principle for ASEAN, but increasingly we realise that we have to be flexible, that we have to be non-doctrinaire in some of these things. We realise that we have to reinvent ourselves in order to remain relevant, in order to remain effective (ASEAN, 7 January 2004).

Regarding Myanmar’s territorial integrity, Indonesian former foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda noted that the country was ‘highly diversified’, therefore, ‘pushing Myanmar too hard on democratic transition could cause disintegration’ (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). Wirajuda contended that a disintegrated Myanmar could potentially cause greater problems for both Indonesia and the region. SBY made a similar argument during his speech at the LSE on 31 March 2009:

I notice that in the West, discussions on Myanmar tend to focus on the ‘democracy’ aspect. This is of course important. But there is another aspect which does not get enough attention: Myanmar’s national unity and territorial integrity. We simply cannot allow Myanmar to break apart, because that will lead to a bloodbath and a humanitarian disaster that would undermine regional order and stability.
While the call for political liberalisation was prominent in Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar, the same cannot be said for Indonesia’s promotion of human rights in relation to the Myanmar people. This was demonstrated by the Indonesian leaders’ relatively inactive response toward the issue of Rohingyas. The issue of boatmen, in particular Rohingya Muslim refugees seeking asylum, was a particular concern for Indonesia because they were often stranded in Indonesia’s territorial waters. For instance, in 2009 391 boatmen left Myanmar and reached Aceh province, on Sumatera Island. On the one hand, the Acehnese greeted them, yet on the other, the local government was unable to provide them with proper public facilities such as sanitation, due to the lack of funding (Gelling 2009).156

The issue of the Rohingya also affected public opinion, particularly that of Islamic extremists in Indonesia, towards the Myanmar Buddhists, who they believed were responsible for the oppression of fellow Muslims. In May 2012, a 27 year-old Buddhist female, Ma Thida Htwe, was raped and murdered in Rakhine state by a group of alleged Muslim men (ICG Report, 12 June 2012). The Report noted that one day later, when these men were detained by the police, crowds of Buddhists besieged the local police station, demanding that the suspects be handed over. Violence erupted when on 3 June 2012, a group of Buddhists stopped a bus in Toungup town and beat ten Muslim passengers to death (ICG Report, 12 June 2012). There were more than 4000 houses burnt, and seventeen mosques and fifteen temples were destroyed in three months (June-August 2012) (Antara, 18 August 2012). Apart from the communal violence, the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine were continuously discriminated against by the government by, *inter alia*, denying their citizenship and restricting their rights to work and to study.157

The impact of this communal conflict spilled-over to Indonesia. While the sympathy for the plight of the Rohingya was shared by the mainstream – such as NU and Muhammadiyah – who called on President SBY to respond firmly on the Rohingya issue (see NU Online, 29 July 2012), it also triggered radical action from the Islamic extremists. A plot to bomb Buddhist temples in Jakarta and Solo were uncovered, as well as an attack against a Chinese temple in South Sulawesi, and attempted attacks on the Glodok Market in Jakarta’s Chinatown and on

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156 The majority of the refugees had actually made Australia their destination. However, in order to reach Australia they had to pass through Indonesian territorial waters. In 2009, in the wake of the refugees fleeing out of troubled countries, mainly from Myanmar and Sri Lanka, the Australian PM Kevin Rudd suggested an ‘Indonesian solution’ to the problem. This approach essentially emphasised Australia ‘support’ for Indonesia to solve the refugee problem in ways conforming to humanitarian principles. Indonesia, on the other hand, believed that the original motives of these refugees were economic reasons hence Jakarta regarded them rather as ‘economic migrants.’ The Indonesian government, therefore, was of the view that they should be repatriated to their countries of origin. In other words, the Indonesian government denied Australia’s proposal regarding the ‘Indonesian solution’ and instead urged Canberra to work together in addressing the problem. See, for instance, Topnews, 30 October 2009; Pearson, The Jakarta Globe, 6 November 2009.

157 For details on the communal conflicts between the Buddhists and Muslim community in Myanmar, see ICG Reports, “Crisis Watch Database: Myanmar”. For a discussion about communal conflicts in Indonesia, see, among others, Malley (2001); Schulze (2002).
the Indonesian Police Mobile Brigade headquarter in Jakarta as well as government buildings, throughout 2012-2013, were manifestations of the Indonesian Muslim extremists’ response towards what happened in Myanmar (IPAC Report, 9 October 2013). These groups, particularly composed of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI)\(^{158}\) and the Islamic Ummah Front (FUJI), stated that their action was a reaction against the Indonesian government’s inability to act firmly in defending the Rohingya in Myanmar (IPAC Report, 9 October 2013). The IPAC Report noted that the extremists’ actions were supported by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir\(^ {159} \) – a hard-line Islamic cleric – who declared that ‘jihad in Myanmar was an obligation to all Muslims’ (see also Schulze, 4 December 2013).

In April 2013, SBY visited Myanmar and although it was not in the formal agenda issued by the President’s Special Staff for International Relations Dr. Teuku Faizasyah (Presidential Press Statement, 21 April 2013), he urged President Thein Sein to act firmly against anti-Muslim violence. SBY contended that this case could affect ‘the regional stability, in general, and Indonesia, in particular, for being a Muslim majority country’ (Vivanews, 24 April 2013). The Muslim extremists in Indonesia were dissatisfied with this statement and condemned SBY for visiting Myanmar when violence against Muslims was erupting (IPAC Report, 9 October 2013). In July 2013, two low-explosive bombs exploded in the Ekayana Temple in West Jakarta and the police found a note in the location supporting the struggle of Rohingya in Myanmar (BBC Indonesia, 5 August 2013).\(^ {160} \) This event indicated a continuing dissatisfaction amongst Indonesia’s Islamist groups against the Indonesian political leaders who, they believed, had failed to promote human rights and protection in Myanmar.

In responding to the Rohingya issue, Indonesia’s foreign policy was not hostile since Indonesian leaders did not follow the preference of the Islamic extremists who called for jihad against Myanmar’s Buddhists. This can be linked to two factors. First, foreign policy-making patterns. If Indonesia applied a bottom-up model then a hostile foreign policy approach would have been likely. This is because foreign policy in Indonesia continued to be a top-down process, and the leaders dominated foreign policy preferences in the case of Myanmar. The

\(^{158}\) Although often depicted as an extremist, FPI had been asked by the former Chief of the Indonesian Police, General Timur Pradopo, to assist him in overseeing Jakarta’s security during the month of Ramadan. For further details, see Tempo, 7 October 2010.

\(^{159}\) Ba’asyir was detained in 2003 by the Indonesian authorities because of passport fraud, although particularly the American authorities believed that he was linked to terrorist networks of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Violation of the immigration law was the only factor that the Indonesian authorities could prove during his trials. For details, see Hainsworth (2007:137); Moore (2004); and Harvey (2004). Ba’asyir is currently serving fifteen years in jail for financing Jihadis training in Aceh. He has also just recently supported the Islamic Khilafa and will be swearing to Caliph Ibrahim (Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi) – the man believed to be the leader of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). For details, see Arrahmah, 13 July 2014.

\(^{160}\) In Indonesia, incidents involving different faiths have risen particularly between 2008 and 2011. For details see Wahid Institute Reports 2008 and 2009; Kompas, 9 February 2011; and Vivanews, 8 February 2011.
second was the absence of Islamic considerations in Indonesia’s foreign policy. As Chapter Four notes, Indonesia’s foreign policy was not significantly and substantively influenced by religious factors, therefore, it was unlikely for Indonesian foreign policy leaders to use Islam as grounds for making the state’s foreign policy.

The uncritical response to the human rights situation in Myanmar can be assessed on the grounds of Indonesia’s domestic human rights considerations. A number of events perceived widely as violating human rights, ranging from the assassination of Munir Said Thalib, a vocal human rights activist, on his flight to Amsterdam from Jakarta on 7th September 2004 (see Razak 2009),¹⁶¹ to incidents of religious intolerance against minorities that occurred particularly between 2008 and 2011 (see, among others, Wahid Institute 2008, 2009; Kompas, 1 June 2008; Kompas, 9 February 2011), hindered Indonesia from being an active human rights promoter abroad. Following these domestic events, the Indonesian government was heavily scrutinised by the international community at the recent UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) held at the UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, in May 2012. The Review highlighted, among other aspects of human rights reports, the increasing trend of religious intolerance and the government’s response to this matter.¹⁶² Taking these domestic considerations into account, Indonesian leaders would face difficulty in promoting human rights abroad when ‘domestic order is not even in order’ (Ramage, interview, 9 August 2011). Therefore, human rights promotion was unlikely to substantially make for Indonesia’s bilateral foreign policy priority more generally if it was not clearly pursued toward Myanmar.

The Indonesian leaders also preferred to combine Indonesia’s dialogue approach with the imposition of Western sanctions in Myanmar. For Indonesia, the Myanmar issue had damaged ASEAN with regard to its image and international reputation. Hassan Wirajuda called it ‘a wedge in ASEAN cooperation’, emphasising the impact on ASEAN’s external cooperation, particularly with the US (Assignment Report of the Foreign Minister, 2009, Section B5:84). The US was a consistent advocate of the imposition of economic sanctions on Myanmar in the hope that such a policy would lead to a change in the political system of the country (Clapp 2010; see also Reuters, 17 May 2012).¹⁶³ Up to 2009, there were four stages of sanctions

¹⁶¹ For details on this case, including the investigation and trial processes, see The Jakarta Post, 22 June 2008.
¹⁶² For the full Report on Indonesia, see United Nations, Universal Periodic Review Second Cycle on Indonesia, May 2012.
¹⁶³ In a meeting between the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Myanmar’s FM Wunna Maung Lwin in February 2012, Clinton made public the US policy to suspend the sanctions and to allow US investments, particularly in mining and energy industries as well as financial services. This decision was made after the Thein Sein government conducted the 2010 elections that the opposition was allowed to contest. Nevertheless Washington was cautious in lifting the law that regulated sanctions on Myanmar, as President Obama called the political progress in Myanmar nascent. For details see, Agence France-Presse, 17 May 2012.
imposed by Washington (Steinberg, 2010:180-82).\textsuperscript{164} However, driven by an increasing frustration with the unchanging situation in Myanmar, the US State Department worked to revise US sanctions policy as indicated by the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton after meeting her Indonesian counterpart, Hassan Wirajuda, during her visit to Jakarta in February 2009. Clinton sought support from Indonesia with respect to Myanmar. Clinton stated that:

We are going to work closely and we are going to consult with Indonesia… Imposing sanctions has not influenced the junta, and reaching out and trying to engage has not either (The Jakarta Post, 18 February 2009).

Responding to Clinton’s statement, during his reciprocal visit to Washington in June 2009, Wirajuda suggested that US sanctions have made ‘the local people suffer even more’ (The Jakarta Post, 9 June 2009) and thus failed to create a significant change in Myanmar.

Therefore, Indonesia posited a ‘regional solution for a regional problem’ model, noting the ineffectiveness of the Western sanctions policy and by keeping the Myanmar issue within the ASEAN context. In contrast to the Western approach, Indonesia developed its own strategy for engaging the junta. In this case, Indonesia took a ‘balanced method’ by combining the support for the imposition of Western sanctions and Indonesia’s dialogue approach (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012). By taking this pragmatic approach, Indonesian leaders felt ASEAN should remain the key in managing the Myanmar issue without openly surrendering Myanmar to any mechanism outside of ASEAN. In September 2009 in New York, US officials made public that Washington had opted to embark on a new approach towards Myanmar, which would combine the existing sanctions and high-level dialogues (Haacke, 2010:154). It would, however, be an overstatement to suggest that the new approach owed much to the suggestions made by Wirajuda earlier, as the ‘high-level dialogues’ element in this policy was meant to involve the US high officials and not ASEAN leaders. This was indicated by the visit of the US Assistant of Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, together with the US Ambassador to ASEAN, Scot Marciel, to Myanmar to meet the junta leaders and Suu Kyi following the announcement of the new policy (Steinberg, 2010:191).

Overall, while Indonesian foreign policy leaders promoted democracy in Myanmar, it could not act in an aggressive way that, in turn, would challenge the conventional Westphalian principles of inter-state relations. To this extent, the Indonesian leaders pressured the junta only through diplomacy, particularly since 2003, while respecting Myanmar’s sovereignty. This section also noted that Indonesian leaders did not actively promote human rights in Myanmar despite the impact of Rohingya issues on the Muslim groups and public opinion more generally.

\textsuperscript{164} For details on US policy towards Myanmar, see Steinberg (2010).
in Indonesia. Apart from the existence of non-interference principle that has, to some extent, limited Indonesia’s diplomacy in Myanmar, domestic considerations with regard to events that affected the respect of human rights in Indonesia have also been the factor that explained the absence of human rights promotion abroad. Indeed, the lack of focus on the side of Indonesian leaders with regard to human rights promotion has raised concern from members of the DPR. The following section will discuss the preferences and responses of members of the Indonesian Parliaments in relation to Indonesian policy on Myanmar.

6.2.2.2 Indonesian Parliament

Being the people’s representative, members of the DPR have more freedom to express their preferences and response toward the Myanmar case. These preferences occasionally included critics toward the junta expressed more openly and manifested in more concrete actions. Within the DPR, the issue of human rights promotion in Myanmar influenced these actions.

One of the bold initiatives of the DPR was raised in 2004, when members of Komisi I collectively urged the Indonesian government to refuse Myanmar’s forthcoming chairmanship in ASEAN. A report revealed that

*Komisi I is urging the government to decline Myanmar to act as the chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee until Myanmar is able to demonstrate its progress in restoring democracy, the respect of human rights, the release of Suu Kyi, and the national reconciliation process as the government of Myanmar has promised (Report of Activities of the First Commission Hearing Session II-IV, 2004-2005).*

Also in 2004, the Indonesian DPR welcomed the formation of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar (hereafter, AIPMC), in November in Kuala Lumpur. In a statement in response to the establishment of the AIPMC, the Indonesian Parliament underlined that it ‘should respond to regional situation…particularly when it is against the respect of the universal human rights principles’ (BKSAP, 2009:88). The DPR’s support in the establishment of AIPMC was made on the basis that first, Myanmar had helped Indonesia during the latter’s struggle for independence in 1945 and as the Myanmar people suffered under the junta regime, the DPR felt the need to ‘take concrete action in managing the situation in Myanmar’; second, the fear that political instability in Myanmar would have an impact on the wider Southeast Asia region; third, Indonesia’s Reformasi served as a ‘wake-up call’ for the people’s power in bringing about changes; and fourth, the junta has detained people who won seats in the 1990 election (see BKSAP, 2009:89-90).

The AIPMC includes parliamentary representatives from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and Cambodia. Focusing its activities primarily on promoting democracy in Myanmar, the AIPMC engaged in second track diplomacy and worked alongside
the ASEAN Summit. It also built networks with members of the Myanmar Parliament in-exile (BKSAP, 2009:89). According to the then AIPMC president, Eva Kusuma Sundari of the Indonesian PDIP, the focus of AIPMC was essentially to advocate the rights of the Burmese in response to the brutal acts of the military, in which she viewed as the prominent adversary of democracy (Sundari, interview with the author, 18 May 2012).

As an inter-parliamentary network among ASEAN member countries, the way AIPMC worked in each of these countries is different. According to Lee Jones, the ability of AIPMC to drive liberal policies towards Myanmar did not depend on the availability of liberal institutions in the respected countries. In Malaysia and Singapore, for instance, institutions are considered ‘illiberal’ yet the AIPMC legislators in Malaysia were able to critically debate Myanmar. In Singapore, activities even involved a public protest, an activity normally prohibited in the country. This was organised outside the Myanmar Embassy following the state’s violent act against Buddhist monks in 2007 (Jones, 2009:392,395). The fact that membership of the AIPMC did not include all ASEAN members highlighted the divisions within ASEAN with regards to the Myanmar issue. The non-members of the AIPMC, particularly Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar itself, viewed the Myanmar issue as the internal problem of the Burmese given these countries’ inclination towards the strict implementation of the non-interference principle.

To state even further its support for a political change in Myanmar, DPR invited Myanmar’s members of parliament in-exile, among them Khun Teddy Buri, Chair of Members of Parliament Union (MPU), to attend the General Assembly in conjunction with SBY’s state of union address delivered before the parliament on 16 August 2008 (Antara, 14 August 2008; BKSAP, 2009:89). The MPU accepted the invitation and attended the Assembly. In that same year, the DPR also rejected the placement of the designated Myanmar Ambassador to Indonesia in Jakarta, and also asked the Indonesian government to delay the posting of an Indonesian Ambassador in Yangon as a mark of dissatisfaction with the development of Myanmar’s democratic transition (Sambuaga, 2009:7). In August 2009, a two-day meeting of the Myanmar government in-exile held in Jakarta and also attended by Western diplomats. The Indonesian Police, however, banned this meeting. In this regard, Deplu’s spokesperson Dr. Teuku Faizasyah stated publicly:

We cannot issue permits for political activities of the government in-exile in our sovereign area, whoever it is. It is the matter of principle and not made upon request of

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165 For details on AIPMC activities, see AIPMC, “Activities”.
166 Eva Sundari was the AIPMC President for two periods (2008-2012).
167 For more details on the practise of AIPMC in each of the ASEAN countries, see, for instance, Jones (2009).
168 For the complete statement of Khun Teddy Bury in relation to this visit, see NCGUB, 17 August 2008.
the (Myanmar) embassy. The ban is consistent with Indonesia’s recognition of only one Myanmar government (The Jakarta Post, 13 and 14 August 2009).

The ban was suspected by one of the activists to have been influenced by the pressure of the military junta (Associated Press, 13 August 2009). The repercussions of such a policy were striking. One day after the banning, a group called Indonesia Solidarity for Burma, which was comprised of human rights activists, parliament members, and experts, expressed their dissatisfaction with the Indonesian government’s decision, which they saw as ‘bowing to Myanmar’s military regime at the expense of Indonesia’s own democracy and sovereignty’ (The Jakarta Post, 14 August 2009). To this end, the AIPMC reacted bluntly and expressed its disappointment to the media. Eva Sundari told the media that:

… the plan to organise the meeting had been reported to the Police since May 2009 without objection. But suddenly, the Police informed us two days before the meeting about its cancellation due to objections from the Myanmar Embassy (The Jakarta Post, 14 August 2009).

Similarly, Marzuki Darusman, also from AIPMC, was quoted as saying:

We do understand the sensitivity of the Myanmar issue, the objection from the Myanmar Embassy and the position taken by the Foreign Ministry. However, as a democracy, the government’s ban should not take place. They could have helped by finding solutions to have the meeting go on without having to insult the Myanmar government. … The ban was a big Indonesian failure on the international stage, considering Jakarta had always thrown its weight behind democracy in Myanmar at regional and multilateral forums (The Jakarta Post, 14 August 2009).

The Indonesian government’s decision to ban the meeting demonstrates that any support for the activities of the exiled Myanmar government could not be made public as it would have violated the principle of respecting Myanmar’s sovereignty and its government’s legitimacy. As privately acknowledged by a mid-level Indonesian diplomat in the ASEAN’s Political-Security Section of Deplu to the author (personal communication, 2010): ‘It was too sensitive for the junta, therefore we have to be careful in supporting these kinds of activities’.

Acharya (2010:337,353) argued that democratisation in Indonesia created a feeling of ‘democratic pride’, accentuated by the growth of a robust civil society and the desire of the democratic regime to pursue policies different from those of the previous non-democratic regime. Democratisation in Indonesia has also contextualised the emergence of the notions of democracy and human rights in primarily domestic political arena where new civil society organisations – such as Kontras (Commission on Missing Persons and Violence Victims, established in 1998), PBHI (Association of Legal Assistance and Human Rights Affairs of Indonesia, formed in 1996 but only became active in late 1990s), and IMPARSIAL (the Indonesian Human Rights Monitor, created in 2002) – emerged mostly in the fields of human
rights (Hadiwinata, 2003:72). These emerging organisations were essentially part of the rising middle-class in Indonesia, who, in 1998, raised the ‘Six Reform Demands’, including respect for legal supremacy and human rights. Therefore, Indonesia’s transition to democracy gave the democratic regime the task to resolve some of the problems of the past, including unresolved human rights abuses (Sukma, 2011:118; see also Abdullah, 2009:569). With an increasing role of the DPR in policy-making, marked by numerous public consultations it organised (see Chapter Three), it was not unusual for civil society to build networks with (members of) the parliament. These networks then became the channel for civil society to push their agenda into the policy-making process where ideas mattered in shaping preferences, which influenced the final policy actions (see, Risse-Kappen, 1991:490-492; Checkel, 1993:276; Ashizawa 2008). Therefore, it was likely that DPR became interested in human rights issues because of the influence asserted by these civil society groups.

Overall, this section suggests three points with regard to Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar. First, a change took place in the Indonesian leaders’ policy approach, namely from being ‘accommodative’ during the Suharto’s period to being ‘critical and assertive’ during the Reformasi era. Second, although critical and assertive, the Indonesian foreign policy leaders did not actively promote human rights in Myanmar. A combination of external and internal factors, namely the respect for non-interference at the international level and Indonesia’s human rights considerations at the domestic level, respectively, hindered Indonesian leaders from vigorously promoting human rights abroad, and in Myanmar, more specifically. Third, while a limitation existed on the side of the Indonesian government to promote human rights, the DPR based its policy preferences on, and actions toward, Myanmar largely on human rights considerations. However, DPR could not initiate formal Indonesian foreign policy on Myanmar because it did not have the authority to do so. The banning of the meeting it organised in 2009 in Jakarta with Myanmar government in-exile was an example. In short, although the DPR could influence the focus of Indonesian leaders, the authority to make and decide the content of Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar remained in the hands of Indonesian foreign policy leaders in the executive.

6.3 Democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy on the promotion of political values: the importance of leaders, the changing preferences, and its limits

In Chapter One, this thesis discussed the likelihood of countries to promote democracy through foreign policy as a means to increase its international status. It was also argued that democratic ideas must be recognised by the foreign policy decision-makers as political norms that guide foreign policy before they could be promoted abroad (Wolff and Wurm, 2011:88-89). This
means that democratic values had to be internalised before being promoted abroad. In Chapter Two, internalised norms or values are said to exist when they become the basis for practical reasoning for one’s behaviour (see page 60). Further, given that foreign policy leaders were supposed to behave in accordance with internalised norms, these norms could be found in domestic political discourse (see Chapter Two: 63). To this extent, the preceding chapters have included evidence that democratic and human rights values were salient in Indonesia’s domestic political realm.

This chapter demonstrates that Indonesia’s foreign policy initiatives in relation to Myanmar and the BDF were manifestations of Indonesian leaders’ commitment to democracy. Generally, ensuring political freedom in Myanmar became the reason for Indonesian foreign policy leaders to pursue strategies emphasised the promotion of democracy. This was evident in, among others, Wirajuda’s call for the junta to release Suu Kyi. Indeed, success in transforming the political situation in Myanmar would contribute to Indonesia’s leadership role and status in the region as well as in repairing Indonesia’s international image. Taking into account Indonesia’s role as a democracy promoter, MacIntyre (interview, 28 July 2011) noted: ‘the strategy positively contributes to Indonesia’s international standing and assists its diplomatic abilities’. Additionally, Hassan Wirajuda and Juwono Sudarsono, respectively, acknowledged the importance of raising its international status as a democracy as it would ‘simplify Indonesia’s relationship with major powers, such as the US’ (Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012), given that democracy is ‘an image largely applauded by the West’ (Sudarsono, interview, 5 August 2011).

Indonesia’s democracy promotion in Myanmar was practiced on two different tracks; first track – diplomacy engaged by the Indonesian foreign policy leaders in the executive — and the other was second track, highlighted by a number of initiatives made by the DPR and its members. Being authoritative actors, Indonesian foreign policy leaders determined the formal content of Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Myanmar by, inter alia, continuously respecting the junta as Myanmar’s only legitimate government, and hence banning the Myanmar’s government-in-exile meeting in Jakarta. The DPR (as a non-authoritative actor in foreign policy) could only propose initiatives outside the state’s formal foreign policy decisions. This supports the argument developed in Chapter Two about the importance of leaders in determining foreign policy because even in democracies the role of the parliament in defining the state’s foreign policy decisions is limited by the authority of the foreign policy decision-makers in the executive. This authority includes the power to change Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Myanmar from being accommodative during the New Order’s era to being assertive during the Reformasi era. This change was linked to the domestic changes in Indonesia,
highlighted by the salience of democracy as Indonesia’s new identity (Sukma 2011; see also Chapter Five).

While in relation to Myanmar Indonesia’s promotion of democracy was apparent, there were a few limitations in the link between democratisation and Indonesia’s promotion of political values abroad in general. First, Indonesia’s promotion of democracy in Myanmar and in Asia through the BDF programme was not accompanied by a bold promotion of human rights. The relatively inactive response of the Indonesian government towards the Rohingya issues and the absence of a human rights mechanism in Asia initiated by Indonesia indicated a disconnect between Indonesia’s human rights promotion at the domestic and ASEAN levels, and at the bilateral and wider Asia levels. The early days of Reformasi were noted as a ‘hopeful period for human rights’ (Hamid, interview with the author, 10 August 2011), underscored by Habibie’s decisions to annul the Anti-Subversion Law, ratify the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (through Law No.5/1998), the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (through Law No.29/1999), and issued Law No.39/1999 on human rights (Vermonte 2005). Nonetheless, in later years, a number of events that affected the respect for human rights at the domestic level have impacted Indonesia’s promotion of human rights abroad more generally and in Myanmar more specifically. Consequently, the absence of the human rights aspect suggests that Indonesia’s promotion of political values was pursued only partially.

Second, Indonesia’s promotion of democracy at the bilateral level was also limited to Myanmar while with other non-democracies in Southeast Asia, Indonesia did not pursue similar foreign policy strategies. For example, Indonesia did not promote democracy in Vietnam, a country with poor human rights records. Further, the absence of democracy and human rights promotion was also observable in Indonesia’s foreign policy towards the Muslim world. In the OIC, for instance, Indonesia was not known to have promoted democracy in its members, which were mostly non-democracies. Instead, Indonesia’s engagement in the OIC has remained driven by economic pragmatism (Perwita 2007). Djalal (interview, 2 June 2010) noted that the reason Indonesia focused on Myanmar was because Myanmar continued to be under the international spotlight while others were not. This indicates the limited areas where Indonesia’s foreign policy promotes democracy. Therefore, the scope of Indonesia’s promotion of political values

169 Vietnam’s political structure recognises four political apparatuses, namely the Communist Party, the State, the Government, and the National Assembly. Each and every one of them are comprised of members of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) as the ruling party. For details on the Vietnamese state structure and how decisions are made in Vietnam see, for instance, Lucius (2009). For details on the Vietnamese Communist political system see, among others, Porter (1993).

170 For instance, in 2009, the central government in Hanoi put a former army officer, Lt. Col. Tran Anh Kim on trial and sentenced him to five and a half years imprisonment after he was charged for subversion as he advocated the need for democratic reform in the country. See, Wall Street Journal (29 December 2009).
was not all-inclusive even in ASEAN where Indonesia claimed its status of regional leader. In the ASEAN context, as the previous chapter demonstrated, promotion of democracy and human rights has been the consideration that shaped the practice of Indonesian foreign policy in Southeast Asia, where Indonesia sought to influence ASEAN’s intramural political cooperation by introducing new themes and ideas to the Association. While in ASEAN Indonesia took a leading role, in the multilateral level, such as in the UN, Indonesia was less active in promoting democracy in Myanmar. Between 2006 and 2010, Indonesia either abstained from, or voted against, any UN General Assembly resolution related to Myanmar’s human rights situation (Sukma, 2011:116).\(^1\) In January 2007, as Sukma illustrates, the Indonesian Mission in New York opted not to support the US-backed UN Security Council resolution criticising Myanmar’s human rights record, by arguing that the problem did not qualify as a threat to international security and would therefore be better addressed at the regional level. One possible reason for Indonesia’s decisions in that regard was the idea to keep the Myanmar issue discussed at the regional level, utilising the ASEAN framework. Indonesia may have been adamant in tolerating international influence, if not interference, in managing human rights issues that are supposedly the domain of the ASEAN forum as it could have impacted Indonesia’s reputation as a regional leader.

Third, in Asia Indonesia’s promotion of political values was also limited by its scope since, in this context, the BDF has been Indonesia’s hallmark of democracy promotion in this region, but, at the same time, there was an absence of similar foreign policy strategy in the cooperation at the East Asia level. To this extent, the foreign policy preference of Indonesian foreign policy leaders was mainly based on security considerations hence, the idea of maintaining a ‘balanced and inclusive’ presence of major countries in the East Asia regional setting. This being said, Indonesia’s democratisation had no effect in the country’s foreign policy with regard to cooperation in East Asia context.

Consequently, these factors underline the differential impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy of promoting political values beyond ASEAN, marked by a change in Indonesia’s policy preferences in relation to Myanmar and, to some extent, in Asia (as the BDF initiative demonstrated) and a continuity in Indonesia’s foreign policy on regional cooperation beyond Southeast Asia (as the ‘balanced and inclusive’ approach in East Asia suggested).

\(^1\) For the list of the UNGA resolutions on Myanmar during the aforementioned period, including the voting records, see United Nations Bibliographic Information System, “United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Myanmar, 2006-2010.” The UN General Assembly has, from 1991 to 2011, issued twenty-one resolutions on Myanmar particularly focused on democratisation and human rights issues. For the list of these resolutions, see United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Burma, 1991-2011.
Conclusion
This chapter discusses the extent to which democratisation has impacted Indonesia’s promotion of political values by assessing Indonesia’s policy in the wider Asia and East Asia cooperation, as well as on Myanmar. This chapter argues that while democratisation contextualised the Indonesian leaders’ decision to promote democracy and human rights, the practice of this strategy was limited. This limitation includes aspects of human rights – where in certain case they were absent, and the areas where promotion of political values were pursued. In this case, Indonesia’s promotion of democracy was apparent in the Myanmar context and in Asia with respect to the BDF, but less observable in the East Asia’s cooperation.

The BDF initiative, however, has not had concrete outcomes for Indonesia as it is merely an avenue for ‘sharing best practices and experiences’ and not explicitly meant to be a means for changing political regimes elsewhere. Indonesia’s focus in the East Asian regional context was also less about democracy promotion and more about security. In this case, Indonesia’s approach was highlighted by attempts to continuously maintain a balanced presence of major powers in the region and avoid domination by a single power. In these areas of cooperation more generally (BDF, East Asia, and Myanmar), the respect for non-interference principle and some domestic considerations have limited Indonesia’s practice of human rights promotion.

Overall, this chapter asserts while the role of leaders remained important in determining Indonesia’s strategy of democracy promotion primarily on Myanmar and in relation to the BDF, the impact of Indonesia’s democratisation on the promotion of political values in the context of East Asia regional cooperation was limited.
7 Democraatisation and conflict management: The Ambalat case

This chapter analyses how Indonesia’s democraatisation has influenced foreign policy relating to conflict management. It will examine the case of Indonesia’s dispute with Malaysia over the oil-rich Ambalat sea block which is located off the coast of the Indonesian province of East Kalimantan to the south-east of the Malaysian state of Sabah. Following Suharto’s fall, driven particularly by territorial disputes between the two countries, the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Malaysia were affected by increased nationalist sentiment. However, Indonesia did not adopt an aggressive policy in pursuit of nationalist claims, but rather sought to introduce new standards of cooperation and co-existence between the two states. The Ambalat dispute is the most important territorial conflict that Indonesia has had to deal with in its bilateral relations in recent years and a useful case study for demonstrating that Indonesia has not conformed to the expectations of some scholars on the relationship between democraisation and an aggressive foreign policy approach (see, for instance, Mansfield and Snyder 2002).

As this study shows, the democraisation process in Indonesia fostered a non-hostile attitude towards foreign relations, a result of the Indonesian leaders’ new commitment to democracy, the existence of strong foreign policy institutions, and a top-down approach to policy making.

The first section of this chapter will briefly discuss the history of Indonesia-Malaysia relations, followed by an overview of bilateral relations during the New Order era in Section Two. In Section Three, this chapter will examine how bilateral ties have evolved during the Reformasi period, highlighting key themes and flashpoints of the relationship. In this context, the chapter will also discuss the Ambalat dispute and the reactions toward it on different levels in Indonesia. Finally, this chapter will assess the relationship between democraisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy on the Ambalat issue. This section explains the underlying reasons for the absence of hostile policy behaviour in this context by referring to legal and ideational considerations and their links to the key role of leaders. This section also analyses the condition in which foreign policy could have been aggressive, influenced by nationalistic rhetoric, before making some concluding remarks.

7.1 Indonesia-Malaysia: a brief history of ‘kinship’-based relationship

Indonesia-Malaysia relations have been characterised as an ‘older and younger brother’ or ‘abang-adik’ relationship where Indonesia, traditionally, has been the ‘big brother’ (abang) due to its advanced science, size, political maturity and its economic growth. For instance, Indonesia’s current total population of around 240 million, over ten times that of Malaysia, with
a population of 23 million. Malaysia, on the other hand, has been the ‘younger brother’ \( (adik) \) as it generally looked up to Indonesia’s leadership role in Southeast Asia (Harun, 2006:50). Despite this metaphorical description of familiarity, bilateral tie have experienced what Baiq Wardhani (2008) described as a ‘love and hate’ relationship.

As neighbours, Indonesia and Malaysia share land and maritime boundaries, particularly across Kalimantan (Borneo), the Sulawesi Sea and along Sumatra Island with the Malacca Strait. Taking into consideration the geographical proximity and the similarity in languages, culture, and race, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur (KL) signed the Treaty of Friendship in KL in April 1959. The Treaty was supposed to restore blood and racial relations and help the two countries rediscover their common heritage, and was an attempt to emphasise avenues of kinship as a basis for bilateral relations (Liow, 2005:86). In other words, based on racial similarity, the two countries expected that they would understand each other better due this the common bond. However, this has not always been the case.

In 1963, the Indonesian President Sukarno declared what he called ‘konfrontasi’ against Malaysia, resisting the formation of the latter which he saw as a political neo-imperialistic move by the British ‘whose sole purpose was to perpetuate colonial economic and military interests in Southeast Asia’ (Wibisono, 2010:67; also see Liow 2005; Leifer 1983; Hindley 1964; Mackie 1975). In this case, Sukarno refused to recognise Malaysia, which he regarded as a ‘British puppet’ (Yazid 2007). For three years during the pursuit of Konfrontasi the slogan ‘ganyang Malaysia’ (crush Malaysia) served as a provocative catchcry for stirring Indonesian nationalism and hatred against the neighbouring country. Djiwandono (1996:47) argued that the victory in the West Irian confrontation against the Dutch in 1961, which resulted in Indonesian securing the province under its rule, greatly strengthened Sukarno’s domestic and international position, bolstering his confidence and emboldening him to pursue new foreign policy ventures and objectives based on nationalistic claims. This became the underlying justification for Konfrontasi.

Konfrontasi was a response to Malaysian PM Tunku Abdul Rahman’s proposal in 1961 to unite Malaya with Singapore, as well as with the former British territories in Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei, projected to become the Greater Federation of Malaysia (Leifer, 1983:75; see also Chua, 2001:8). Sukarno immediately challenged the Tunku’s proposal on two grounds. First, Malaya had not properly consulted with the Indonesian leaders (Liow, 2005:102), and second, the proposed Federation was regarded as an ‘unrepresentative alien-inspired polity designed to perpetuate colonial economic and military interests in the region’ (Leifer, 1983:75). The creation of Malaysia would put Indonesia’s regional role at risk (Liow 2005). At the time, Sukarno’s political legitimacy was underpinned by the PKI’s support and that the new
Federation of Malaysia could have eventually served as a ‘new concentration of colonial forces on the very frontiers of Indonesia’ (Leifer, 1983:77).

The PKI had already become a dominant political voice in Indonesia’s domestic political environment during before Konfrontasi (Leifer, 1983:77). Through his political ideology of Nasakom that combined nationalism, religion (read: Islam), and communism, and was designed to be the domestic pillar of Sukarno’s legitimacy, the PKI was accorded a substantial role during most of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. As communists, the PKI leaders were concerned that the formation of the Federation would allow Western interests to use KL as an anchor for their anti-communist agenda (Leifer, 1983:77). Indonesia’s rejection of the Federation was based upon, on the one hand, the influence of PKI leaders who feared that its establishment could pose a threat to their political power and activities and, on the other, Sukarno’s anti-colonial ideology. Sukarno’s policy of Konfrontasi was an expression of his staunch nationalism and world view, which in turn shaped his attitude towards international relations.

Sukarno’s policy of confrontation also served the political and economic interests of the domestic political elites (Hindley, 1964:905). If Malaysia continued its economic progress on the basis of private enterprise it could persuade affluent Indonesians dissatisfied with Sukarno’s chaotic ‘socialism’ to agitate for change, which in turn could manifest as domestic challenges to Sukarno’s political dominance (Hindley, 1964:907). In this case, the policy of Konfrontasi was also informed by Sukarno’s concern over his domestic political legitimacy and it was utilised as an ‘escape clause’ and a diversionary tactic to distract the public from Indonesia’s poor economic performance. Konfrontasi allowed for a ‘temporary’ dismissal of internal power struggles between the domestic political actors, consequently uniting them against a common external adversary (Chua, 2001:11). Overall, while Sukarno’s policy of Konfrontasi was an aggressive foreign policy adopted towards the end of his presidency, the rationale for it stemmed from Indonesia’s domestic politics (Mackie 1975).

The years of Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia ended after the change of power in Jakarta from Sukarno to Suharto, as the latter shifted away from revolutionary symbolism and redirected his internal policy to fervent anti-communism and the fostering of economic growth (Liow, 2005:109). In August 1966, marked by the agreement signed by Indonesia’s FM Adam Malik and Malaysia’s Tun Abdul Razak, Konfrontasi officially ended and bilateral ties were normalised.
7.2 **Indonesia-Malaysia relations during the New Order**

Built on the notion of ‘kinship’ (*saudara serumpun*), Indonesia-Malaysia diplomatic relations enjoyed a honeymoon period during the administrations of Suharto and PM Mahathir of Malaysia, particularly between the 1980s and 1990s. Under Suharto, Indonesian foreign policy sought to foster peace and stability in order to underpin economic growth. Mahathir also focused primarily on promoting Malaysia’s economic development, as illustrated by the pursuit of Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP), which demonstrated by industrialisation programmes designed to boost Malaysian prosperity (Beng, undated). In line with the NEP, an increased number of Indonesians went to Malaysia to work in industrial as well as non-formal sectors, such as domestic and construction workers. The pull factors were a high demand for Indonesian workers, who also served as a demographic buffer against the influx of Chinese and Indian labourers during the colonial economic policy (Liow, 2004).172 Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the push factors were, among others, the scarcity of employment opportunities and relatively low wage levels (*Detik Finance*, 15 February 2012).173 The pursuit of similar goals by the two leaders was a bonding factor that promoted regional cooperation and the maintenance of a stable relationship, which brought Suharto and Mahathir together. This relationship suppressed differences that could have endangered bilateral ties between the two countries, such as the dispute over the Sipadan and Ligitan islands.

The Sipadan and Ligitan islands are located in the Sulawesi strait between the border area of Malaysia’s Sabah and Indonesia’s East Kalimantan. The legal ownership of these islands was disputed by Indonesia and Malaysia in 1982. The dispute was a result of Malaysia’s *Peta Baru*, a new map unilaterally designed by KL in 1979, which included the Sipadan and Ligitan islands as Malaysian-claimed territory. Malaysia’s *Peta Baru* was problematic not only for Indonesia, but for all countries sharing borders with Malaysia such as Thailand, Brunei, Singapore, and the Philippines. The problem arose from Malaysia’s claims regarding its territorial waters, its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), and its continental shelf (Salleh, 2007:151).

Following the claim by the Malaysians over the Sipadan and Ligitan islands, Indonesian leaders were concerned because these sovereignty issues had not been included in the initial border negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia in September 1969 (Salleh et.al, 2009). The negotiations were intended to negotiate Malaysia’s border following its independence in 1957. In these meetings Indonesian delegates referred to the national map based on Law

172 In 2004, the Malaysian population was composed primarily of racial Malays (50.4%), Chinese (23.7%), Indians (7.1%), and others (7.8%). For details see, CIA World Factbook, “Malaysia”.

173 A recent report suggests that the average hourly wage in Indonesia was Rp.5,400.00 (US$ 0.6), one of the lowest in the region compared to Malaysia (US$2.88), Thailand (US$1.63), or even the Philippines (US$1.04).
No.4/1960, while the Malaysians referred to the 1954 British-initiated Continental Shelf Boundaries (CSB) Treaty, which did not include the Sipadan and Ligitan islands in their territory (Djalal 2010). The CSB Treaty declared that Malaysia’s continental shelf was based on a straight baseline connecting the eastern end of Sebatik Island to Sipadan and Ligitan (Salleh, 2007:151). However, the CSB Treaty was made prior to Malaysia’s independence, and therefore the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands were not accounted for. Consequently, as Hasjim Djalal, who was present at these negotiations, wrote: ‘both parties were confused on who is the actual owner of these islands’ (Djalal 2010).

Notwithstanding this confusion, Malaysia’s Peta Baru made claims over the islands and based on this, Malaysia begun to initiate tourism developments, such as cottages. Indonesia demanded Malaysia halt all kinds of activities in the islands as there were no existing agreements regarding the islands’ jurisdiction. In 1988, when PM Mahatir visited Jogjakarta, he agreed to Indonesia’s demands (Media Indonesia, 6 June 1991). According to Ali Alatas, this decision was a result of the agreement between Suharto and Mahathir to ‘solve the dispute with the brotherhood spirit’ (Merdeka, 3 November 1990). In 1991, both countries agreed to form a joint border commission (JBC) to negotiate territorial disputes, and to ‘handle the bilateral issues in the future’ (Suara Pembaruan, 3 June 1991; Suara Karya, 19 July 1991). Malaysia, however, irrespective of the ongoing bilateral negotiations, continued to develop resorts on the two islands and promoted them widely as tourism destinations (Suara Pembaruan, 3 June 1991), and in May 1991 also posted the Malaysian Forest Police on them (Kompas, 18 June 1991).

Several high level meetings were conducted between Suharto and Mahathir from 1992 to 1994, yet the result was unsatisfactory for both. In September 1994, Malaysian officials proposed bringing the dispute before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Meanwhile, cognisant of the fact that Indonesia and Malaysia were parties to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), Indonesia preferred to use the ASEAN framework of the High Council (AHC). Responding to Indonesia’s preferences, the Malaysian leaders objected to the idea of using AHC as a mechanism to settle the dispute as doing so might have negatively implicated other border issues that Malaysia has had with other Southeast Asian countries. In a statement, in 1996 Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi noted:

…this kind of issue, for Malaysia, is an issue related to other ASEAN countries. Malaysia has demarcation problems with Brunei, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia … (quoted in Luhulima, 2006: 115)

Malaysia’s reluctance to refer the matter to the AHC was based on primarily the fact that the AHC was supposed to consist of a representative at the ministerial level from each High
Contracting parties – the ASEAN members (see TAC, Article14.3). This would be a major disadvantage for Malaysia as its *Peta Baru* created border problems with nearly all ASEAN member states. Another reason for Malaysia’s reluctance was the nature of the decisions made by the AHC. While the ICJ verdict is binding and final (see ICJ Statute, Article 59), the AHC was not designed to be an adjudication body; it was instead a mediation procedure and thus it has no power in constituting judicial dispute settlement procedures. Therefore, from the Malaysian perspective, the AHC lacked the necessary enforcement mechanisms that would make its judgments binding (Salleh, 2007:158).

The long-standing stalemate as a result of fourteen years of negotiation (1982-1996) made Suharto impatient. In October 1996 he gave the order for the case to be brought before the ICJ (Flores 2009). The Sipadan-Ligitan case was permanently resolved by the ICJ in December 2002, and based on the *effectivité* (effectiveness principle) – acts by a State relevant to a claim of title to territory by occupation or prescription, the factual elements that demonstrate the exercise of governmental authority in a territory – among others, its verdict states that the ‘sovereignty over these islands belong the Malaysia’ (ICJ Reports, 2002:625; see also Severino, 2011a: 61).

The decision to delay the Sipadan-Ligitan case from being formally adjudicated in principle was justified with regard to the brotherhood spirit in sustaining the stability of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Malaysia. The leaders maintained bilateral ties because they felt the two countries had developed friendly relations. In honouring the passing of Suharto in 2008, Mahathir said:

Malaysia is indebted to Suharto in ending the confrontation policy… We looked up to him as a great leader and as an international statesman. For me, it’s quite personal. I know him and I have worked with him for a very long time. I regarded him as a friend of Malaysia and a personal friend. He cherished good relations with Malaysia (Bernama, 27 January 2008).

While in Malaysia the ICJ’s judgment was cheered by the public, in Indonesia it was seen as a grave defeat. This situation stimulated nationalist responses in Indonesia whenever territorial disputes occurred between the two countries.

7.3 **Indonesia – Malaysia ties during the Reformasi period**

During the *Reformasi* era, bilateral ties between Indonesia and Malaysia entered a new chapter. Issues ranging from the stereotyping of people from each side, to treatment of Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia to unilateral claims on cultural heritage, and to border problems were all prominent. While the shared ‘similarity’ of culture could have strengthened the relationship of the two states, it was in fact often a cause of friction. For example, Indonesian
perceptions of kinship centred on the idea that the Malaysians overlooked the fact that Indonesia’s population consists of many ethnic groups that are not amalgamated in Indonesia as one Malay race, as is the case in Malaysia. As Alfitra Salamm, an Indonesian activist, notes in his interview (Koran Tempo, 6 September 2009: A10-11):

(as if) Indonesians are all Malay. Maybe they (the Malaysians) see it from a language perspective only… what they (Malaysia) know is the Javanese, Minang, and the Madurese. They don’t know Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, notwithstanding the Papuans and the Moluccas. They (Malaysia) did not know the Indonesians comprehensively.

As regard the treatment of Indonesian migrant workers, in recent times the presence of Indonesian labourers has been negatively viewed and blamed as a source of social problems in Malaysia (Liow 2004). As argued by a Malaysian blogger, Fazlee Rahman (Vivanews, 11 September 2009):

In Malaysia there are too many Indonesians searching for economic fortune…. However, the large flow of Indonesians has also contributed to the high rates of criminalities such as homicide and robbery.

Negative views about Malaysians also occurred in Indonesia. Indonesians publicly dubbed Malaysians as ‘arrogant’ and ‘thieving’ and in retaliation for ‘Indon’ – a derogatory term repeatedly used by the Malaysian media to describe Indonesians – referred to Malaysians as ‘Malingsia’, a word that derived from slang in the local dialect means ‘you thief’.174 These labels were triggered by the unilateral claims made by Malaysians, particularly those that led to the ‘loss’ of the Sipadan and Ligitan Island in 2002 to other perceived attempts to appropriate Indonesian traditional folklore – namely Rasa Sayange (traditional song of Maluku), tari Pendet (Pendet Dance) of Bali, and the Poco-poco dance of Manado175 - and the recent case of the claim over the Ambalat, Overall, since the removal of the two leaders, the bilateral ties have been in constant flux. In the words of former Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas, bilateral relations between the two countries ‘make a very long fence that in many places stands on soft grounds’ (quoted in Flores, 2009). Given the delicate nature of the bilateral ties, what did this mean for Indonesia’s foreign policy on the Ambalat dispute?

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174 For a useful discussion on the term ‘Indon’, see Nelly Martin, The Jakarta Post, 7 April 2012.
175 While other cultural disputes were widely published by the Indonesian and Malaysian news media, the last item that was claimed to be Malaysian, the Poco-poco dance, took place in a private dinner session hosted by the Malaysian government to honour the visit of Indonesian President SBY. It was known to the author that during the dinner, the Master of Ceremony (MC) called on the performance of the dance while announcing that its origin was Malaysian. This announcement, inevitably, shocked the Indonesian First Lady Ani Yudhoyono who spoke about this with the spouse of former foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda, Herawatie Wirajuda. In the event, the MC eventually amended the announcement and apologised to the Indonesian side.
7.3.1 The Ambalat case

Ambalat is a sea bloc located in the Sulawesi Sea near Indonesia’s East Kalimantan and Malaysia’s Sabah state. An oil-rich bloc with reserve capacity of around 30-40 thousand barrels per day, Ambalat first emerged as a bilateral issue in 2005, only one year after SBY was elected president. The conflicting claims to Ambalat related primarily to the East Ambalat, comprising Bulungan East Kalimantan, Nunukan East Kalimantan, Northwest of Natuna, Air Komering South Sumatera, Belida South Sumatera, East Sepayang and Sei Nangka-Senipah East Kalimantan (Efantino and Arifin 2009). The dispute was a result of the business contracts awarded on the one hand by Indonesia’s Pertamina national oil company to ENI (an Italian oil and gas company) and American-based Unocal in Ambalat and East Ambalat blocs in 2004 and – on the other hand – by Malaysia’s Petronas to Royal Dutch Shell in February 2005. The latter included the blocs ND6 and ND7, which are located in an area over which there are overlapping EEZ claims. In 1999, Indonesia had already awarded Shell an oil concession contract in the Ambalat bloc. This had expired in 2001, marked by the transfer of rights to ENI. However, speculation arose that Shell might have used the 1999 agreement with Indonesia as a basis for negotiation with Malaysia, which resulted in the granting of the aforementioned concession agreements in 2005. As noted by Iin Arifin Takhyan, then the Oil and Gas Director General at the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource, and reported in The Jakarta Post (15 March 2005): ‘the termination of the agreement in 2001 means that Shell must not use our (Indonesian) data to appraise the oil potential at the East Ambalat area during their negotiation[s] with Malaysia’. Due to these conflicting rights to explore the Ambalat blocs, while Indonesian authorities argued that Malaysia had ‘violated Indonesia’s sovereignty’, Malaysia’s former foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar, announced that Malaysia had the same views towards Indonesia (Arsana and Schofield, undated).

According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the territorial sea of a state exhibits the principle of sovereignty. However, in the EEZ and continental shelf, a sovereign right would apply, meaning that coastal states could exercise the ‘sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources’ (see UNCLOS, Article 56 and 77). Having said that Ambalat is a continental shelf zone within which overlapping claims in the EEZ existed. The Ambalat case is therefore ‘an issue of sovereign rights, not sovereignty and the dispute is all about resources’ (Sudarsono, interview with the author, 5

\[176\] Bilateral negotiations on the Ambalat case are still on-going. Accordingly, a senior Deplu official involved in the process advised the author that not all materials and processes could be revealed. Therefore, this thesis does not claim or aim to offer a comprehensive account of the Ambalat issue.

\[177\] For the complete provision of the EEZ (including its definition and breadth), see UNCLOS 1982 Part V, article 55-75, and of the continental shelf, see Part VI, article 76-85.
August 2011). In a more detailed comment, Hassan Wirajuda explained, as quoted by Antara (26 June 2009):

The Ambalat bloc is not included in the 12 nautical miles (nm) from the baseline, which would exemplify Indonesia’s sovereignty, but it is included in the area of Indonesia’s sovereign rights located outside the 12nm where Indonesia has the right to exploration.

Legally, Malaysia’s claim over Ambalat was based on its Peta Baru. In this case, Malaysia used the Sipadan and Ligitan islands, whose sovereignty was then still disputed, as the outer starting-points to claim their territorial boundaries around the Sulawesi Sea that encroached upon Indonesia’s territory (Arsana, 2010:50; Efantino and Arifin, 2009:163). As a result, its later boundaries of territorial waters, EEZ, and continental shelves greatly overlapped those of Indonesia’s Kalimantan (Salleh et.al, 2009:108). In response to the enactment of the Peta Baru, Indonesia sent a diplomatic note to Malaysia in 1980, protesting its content on the grounds that the map was designed without any consultation with Indonesia. In this regard, Malaysia had contradicted the principles of the UNCLOS 1982, to which Malaysia was also a signatory. Based on the UNCLOS, parties to the Convention are expected to resort to the provisions of UNCLOS 1982 in dealing with maritime issues.

Several provocative events in the Ambalat area between 2005 and 2009 intensified the dispute between the two countries. In January 2005, the Malaysian gunboat Sri Malaka went in pursuit of and reportedly fired on several Indonesian fishermen boats (KM Jaya Sakti, KM Wahyu, and KM Irwan) around East Kalimantan (Efantino and Arifin, 2009:164). Moreover, between 2007 and 2008 there were about ninety-nine intrusions by Malaysian gunboats into Indonesian territory (Pasaribu 2009). In addition to the public demonstrations against Malaysia’s provocative actions, the former Indonesian Chief of the Armed Forces (Panglima TNI), General Endriartono Sutarto, prepared three warships to patrol around the disputed zone, adding to the four units of F-16 jet fighters dispatched at Sepingan Airbase, East Kalimantan (Kompas, 3 March 2005; Liputan 6, 7 March 2005). However, the escalation did not reach a climax until the collision of the Indonesian patrol ship, KRI Tedong Naga, with the Malaysian warship Rencong on 8 April 2005 in Karang Unarang, close to Indonesia’s Sulawesi province (Koran Tempo, 11 April 2005). This incident took place only a few days prior to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Cebu, the Philippines. This heightened tension dissipated after Deplu filed a diplomatic note protesting about the incident to Malaysia a few days after the skirmish. Although the note ultimately remained unanswered by Malaysia, both countries were able to prevent an escalation of the conflict in the disputed zone by dispatching a balanced amount of military force in the Ambalat region (Koran Tempo, 24 April 2005).
On 30 May 2009, however, tension re-escalated when Malaysia’s gunboat, KD Baung-3509, a fast attack craft, illegally – from Indonesia’s perspective – entered Indonesian waters as far as 7.3 nautical miles (nm) towards the Karang Unarang lighthouse in Ambalat, sailing with a speed of 11 knots (Vivanews, 12 June 2009). During this event, the Indonesian side attempted to open radio contact with the Malaysian boat but was unsuccessful. As a result, an Indonesian vessel, the KRI Untung Surapati, became involved in a pursuit to drive out KD Baung from a range of less than 400 yards. This event was not the first of that month. A week before this event took place, as reported by Vivanews (12 June 2009), KD Baung joined with a Beechcraft airplane of Malaysia to intrude on the Ambalat area before KRI Hasanuddin 366 successfully expelled them.

This series of provocations created mixed reactions in Indonesia, which might have been influenced by the coming presidential election in July 2009, as well as by the discontent of the Indonesian public towards the Malaysians.

7.3.2 Indonesia’s reaction: preferences and interests at different levels

7.3.2.1 Indonesian leaders and the military

The increasing tensions in the Ambalat since January 2005 forced the Indonesian government to respond promptly. On Sunday, 6 March 2005, Indonesian President SBY summoned his cabinet-level political advisors and security and military leaders to the State Palace. Among those present was the Panglima TNI General Endriartono Sutarto,178 Navy Commander Admiral Slamet Subiyanto, Army Commander Lieutenant General Djoko Santoso, and Air Force Commander Air Marshal Djoko Suyanto. This meeting indicated that tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia were indeed serious, not only because it was unusual to hold a meeting on a Sunday, but also because a cabinet meeting attended by all ministers reportedly followed the initial meeting (Liputan 6, 7 March 2005). The outcome of this meeting was the decision to dispatch Indonesian warships to Ambalat and to prepare the military jets at the air force base nearest to the disputed zone, which was in Makassar, South Sulawesi.

While military leaders remained on high alert, Indonesian diplomats continued to negotiate with their Malaysian counterparts. The Indonesian diplomats believed that Ambalat and other border issues should be resolved through dialogue and negotiations as they are primarily legal matters. For this reason, the DG for International Law and Treaty at Deplu led the Indonesian delimitation team.179 Headed by Arif Havas Oegroseno in his capacity as the

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178 General Djoko Santoso replaced Sutarto in 2006.
179 The current negotiation team consists of fifteen officials from various institutions in Indonesia. It also includes a team of experts such as Hassan Wirajuda, Prof. Hasjim Djalal, former Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti, International law expert Prof. Hikmahanto Juwana, and maritime affairs expert Etty Agoes.
then Director for Political, Security, and Territorial Treaty at Deplu, Indonesian negotiators met their Malaysian counterparts no less than thirteen times between 2005 and 2008.\textsuperscript{180} According to Rachmat Budiman, Oegroseno’s successor, Indonesian officials met with Malaysian representatives four times in a year and it has reached its nineteenth meetings by August 2011 (Budiman, interview with the author, 16 August 2011).\textsuperscript{181} For Indonesia, the negotiations were aimed not only at Ambalat, but also other territorial disputes with Malaysia, namely the EEZ in the northern part of the Malacca Strait; the EEZ in the South China Sea; the territorial sea in the Malacca Strait; the territorial sea in the Singapore Strait; and the EEZ, territorial sea, and continental shelf in the Sulawesi Sea which includes Ambalat (Budiman, interview, 16 August 2011).

The Ambalat dispute re-emerged as a public issue between late-2008 and mid-2009, coinciding with Indonesia’s general election. During this period, Indonesian elites took a stronger stance towards these issues than in 2005. This stance was taken to appease politicians who resorted to nationalistic rhetoric in the attempt to attract votes. The Ambalat case provided this opportunity.

SBY, who was set to re-contest the presidency in 2009, continued to emphasise the importance of a peaceful settlement by reinforcing bilateral negotiations and avoiding military confrontation at sea. On Tuesday, 9 June 2009, it was reported that SBY had telephoned Malaysia’s PM Najib Tun Abdul Razak to bring Malaysia back to the table after bilateral dialogue was postponed due to changes in the team of KL negotiators (The Jakarta Post, 9 June 2009). Six days earlier, reassured by the legal advice over the position of Ambalat, SBY made a public statement emphasising Indonesia’s sovereignty over Ambalat as final (Kompas, 3 June 2009). In this case, SBY’s public stance offers an interesting perspective. He opted to use ‘sovereignty’ when speaking to the press and the public in stressing the possession of Ambalat, when the dispute clearly only concerned sovereign rights, not sovereignty. Addressing the press, SBY stated:

[because] Indonesia believes that Ambalat belongs to Indonesia … And I’m telling you that even for a piece of land or sea, if it is within our sovereignty, we have to keep it. No compromise, no tolerance. This is final! (Kompas, 3 June 2009).\textsuperscript{182}

Although SBY had frequently portrayed Ambalat as an issue of sovereignty, he would still maintain his position that negotiation was the best course to take, as he was quoted saying:

\textsuperscript{180} In 2008 Oegroseno became the DG for International Law and Treaty, and in 2010, he was appointed Indonesian Ambassador to the Belgium and the European Union.

\textsuperscript{181} Until December 2013, the Indonesian and Malaysian negotiators have met no less than 28 times in this regard.

\textsuperscript{182} The original quote is ‘Sebab, Indonesia yakini Ambalat adalah wilayah Indonesia … dan saya katakan, sejengkal tanahpun atau laut, kalau itu keduulatan kita, harus kita perlakukan. Tidak ada kompromi, tidak ada toleransi. Itu harga mati.’
We (Indonesia and Malaysia) are both members of ASEAN. There is the ASEAN Charter, there is diplomacy, and there is peaceful resolution. So, don’t be rhetorical only to be seen as a tough and brave leader, (and then) waging war everywhere. War should be the last resort. We (Indonesia and Malaysia) prioritise on dignified efforts and on not creating any additional problems to the country’s development (Kompas, 3 June 2009).  

During the election period, not wanting to rely solely on the power of negotiation and alarmed by the intensity of Malaysia’s intrusions—which reportedly had reached its thirteenth encroachment since January 2009—SBY decided to maintain the presence of the Indonesian naval force, by increasing the number of warships in the disputed area from three to six (Kompas, 7 June 2009a). SBY’s methods of combining negotiations and a display of force (gelar pasukan) had an impact on the Malaysian leaders. It was reported that Malaysia’s Navy Commander Admiral Abdul Aziz Jafar apologised for what he called: ‘the misbehaviour of the Malaysian Navy’ (Detik, 10 June 2009) to the Indonesian Parliament delegates, headed by Yusron Ihza Mahendra of Komisi I, during the latter’s visit to KL on 10 June 2009. This was the second apologetic note originating from the Malaysian authorities, after Malaysian Defence Minister Zainal Abidin bin Zin informally apologised to Indonesian Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono at the ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting in Bali 24 March 2008 for the skirmish in Ambalat (see Efantino and Arifin, 2009:168). While his words were portrayed as an ‘apology’ by the Indonesian media, they were originally framed as ‘regret’. It was Juwono who toned-up his counterpart’s statement. As Juwono admitted: ‘I twisted it to be an ‘apology’ when asked by the media as it was necessary for the domestic consumption in Indonesia to calm the people at home’ (Sudarsono, interview, 5 August 2011).

While SBY took an approach that combined ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, his VP Jusuf Kalla urged a rather different approach, one contradictory to SBY. According to Bandoro (2009), Kalla wanted Indonesia to have a stronger position over the Ambalat issue and was prepared to wage war over the competing claims. Kalla, who was at the time campaigning with Wiranto as his running-mate, also wished to double the defence budget from Rp.33 trillion to Rp.74 trillion if he was elected (The Jakarta Post, 6 June 2009). He further stated that ‘we must take firm action on Ambalat. As a country, when intruded upon we can wage war with anyone’ (Waspada Online, 3 June 2009). With Bugis ethnic heritage, Kalla was known for his outspokenness. He therefore pursued an approach of what he called ‘diplomasi ala Bugis’, as a way to convey his unrestricted views openly, rather than with diplomacy itself. As testified by Kalla when he met Najib in Kuala Lumpur,  

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183 The original quote is ‘Kita sama-sama negara ASEAN. Ada Piagam ASEAN, ada diplomasi, dan ada penyelesaian secara damai. Jadi, jangan beretorika agar dinilai sebagai pemimpin yang berani dan gagah, terus mengobarkan perang dimana-mana. Ingat, perang itu jalan terakhir. Kita utamakan jalan lain yang lebih bermartabat dan tidak mendatangkan masalah bagi negara yang sedang membungun.’
[Najib], Ambalat is a sensitive issue. It could lead us to war. If we were engaged in a war, it is uncertain who would win. But there’s one thing you need to remember, in Malaysia there are one million Indonesians and if only I taught a thousand of them to make bombs and they blow these buildings in Malaysia, you’re finished! (Kalla, Kompas 4 August 2009).

To Kalla’s comment, Najib replied: ‘Pak Jusuf, you can’t do that’, to which Kalla responded by saying: ‘let’s negotiate then. And don’t you send any more of your troops to Ambalat, otherwise we may engage in war’ (Kalla, Kompas 4 August 2009). To further stress Kalla’s dissatisfaction over Malaysia’s behaviour in Ambalat, he refused to stay in Kuala Lumpur that evening and opted for the Bugis Village in Johor (Kalla, Kompas 4 August 2009). The different approach to the dispute portrayed by SBY and Kalla, according to political analyst Wisnu Adiputra, showed that Ambalat had become ‘an attractive field for the presidential hopefuls to gain public support’ (see Waspada Online, 3 June 2009).

At the bureaucratic level, preferences were also diverse and the contradiction between SBY and Kalla, who were still then the Indonesian president and vice president, confused the decision-makers, no less than the ministers. Wirajuda, for example, stated that Indonesia was prioritising a settlement through negotiations, while adding that: ‘I would not complain should the Indonesian Navy strengthen (the deployment of) their personnel therein so that Malaysia could restrain itself before the negotiation is concluded’ (Antara, 26 June 2009). However, Deplu’s general position on this issue, as reflected by Rachmat Budiman, was consistent with pursuing negotiations even at the risk of prolonging the issue, which may not have been in accordance with public preferences, yet ‘Indonesia wants to conclude it as soon as possible’ (Budiman, interview with Forum Keadilan, 12 July 2009).

On the defence-security front, the TNI, though sworn to obey the political decisions of the President, also had its own preference. The TNI doctrine, according to Panglima TNI Djoko Santoso, has always been: ‘if we want peace, we must be ready for war’ (Kompas, 7 June 2009a). Meanwhile the Navy, as assured by the Navy Deputy Commander Admiral Moekhlas Sidik, is: ‘always at the forefront to safeguard Indonesia’s sovereignty and will launch fire if ordered to’ (Kompas, 6 June 2009). At the lower levels, however, as admitted by a number of middle rank officers to the author, the Ambalat case served as a test for Indonesia’s military readiness and also for their patience with Malaysia’s manoeuvres. The expressions ‘I would shoot if permitted’ or ‘we have been training for, and were trained to go to war, so just let us go’ were common phrases among the soldiers themselves and also privately expressed to the author in several personal communications with them.

In response to the desire of the soldiers, former Defence Minister Sudarsono (interview, 5 August 2011) held that Indonesia was in no position to wage war and that Jakarta should not
act beyond mere rhetorical nationalist-flavoured statements because of a number of factors, including insufficient warships and Indonesia’s low military budget. By 2009, for instance, fewer than twenty per cent of Indonesia’s warships were operable (Isgindarsyah 2011). He also added: ‘even for its logistical needs the TNI is still indebted to Pertamina’ (Sudarsono, interview, 5 August 2011). In general, with only a rate of about 35 per cent in terms of military armaments readiness by 2009 (see Tempo, 15 September 2009), questions arose as to whether Indonesia could acquire sufficient military capabilities should war would become an option. Indonesia, despite its status and size, is clearly not the greatest spender on military expenditure in the region. The defence budget, as admitted by Sudarsono, had to yield to the Kesejahteraan Rakyat, or Kesra (people’s prosperity sector) budget, which comprised 40 percent of the national budget, given that the Politik, Hukum, dan Keamanan, Polhukam (Politics, Law, and Security) sector only held 20% of the whole budget (Sudarsono, interview, 5 August 2011). The Defence Department falls under the latter sector. In 2009 alone, Indonesia only allocated Rp.33.6 trillion (around US$ 2.8 billion) to Defence, far from the desired figure of Rp.127 trillion (around US$ 11 billion) (Depkeu, 30 September 2009).

In terms of manpower strength, however, the TNI was superior to the Malaysian Armed Forces. As an illustration: in 2002, Malaysia had around 196,042 personnel across all services while Indonesia had 250,000 (Susilo, 2009:66-68). More surprisingly, in order to deter the so-called ‘maritime-based threat’, the Indonesian Navy had begun to recruit fishermen as informants and to prepare them for duties as military reservists (Radar Lampung, 22 April 2010). This decision would only have exposed the lack of Indonesia’s human intelligence capacity. It also raised questions about the function of naval intelligence. It showed that, strategically, Indonesia lacked threat-based defence planning, relying instead on integrated forces (Sukma 2005a). Indonesia’s inability to integrate its forces, as Sukma argues, caused Malaysia to ignore Jakarta’s deterrent forces (Sukma 2005a). Indonesia’s limited military capacity, however, did not prevent Sudarsono from conveying a strong message to Malaysia, as he admitted telling his Malaysian counterpart on one occasion that: ‘should there be an open war, the first ship to sink, I can assure you, will be Malaysian’ (Sudarsono, interview, 5 August 2011).

In short, the preferences of the political actors within the executive were diverged: there were those formally in-charge for foreign policy, namely the president and the foreign minister,

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184 Pertamina is Indonesia’s national oil company.
185 As reported by Tempo, the readiness of Indonesia’s military assets is as follows: the Army’s infrastructure sits at 61.81%, the Navy’s warship preparedness is 16,55%, and the Air Force’s jetfighter readiness revolves around 30,88%. See Tempo, 15 September 2009.
186 For authoritative figures on Indonesia’s annual military spending and Southeast Asia’s in general, see The International Institute for Strategic Studies Report, “Military Balance”.
who preferred a diplomatic solutions to the dispute, while those without formal authorisation to make foreign policy, in this case the military, favoured an aggressive approach.

7.3.2.2 The Parliament

In the DPR the Ambalat issue prompted anger and led parliamentarians to yield to nationalistic fervour, contending that ‘NKRI harga mati! (The united Indonesia is final!)’. Among them were Yusron Ilza Mahendra, Ali Moctar Ngabalin of the PBB, Andreas Parera and Permadi of the PDIP, Effendy Choirie of the PKB, Djoko Susilo of the PAN, and Theo Sambuaga of Golkar (who was also chairman of Komisi I). Being politicians, these parliamentarians were well aware of the repercussions of resorting to nationalism. They did so, above all, to attract more popular votes by shifting the emphasis from Ambalat being an issue of sovereign rights to an issue of sovereignty, as the run-up to the 2009 election demonstrated. In this regard, the parliament had opted for a rather different approach when the issue initially arose in 2005. Extracted from an unpublished document, in meetings between Komisi I and the foreign minister that took place in 2005, the former recommended a subtle approach to the Ambalat dispute by urging the foreign minister to ‘immediately plan and propose a draft law on Indonesian Territorial Borders’, and for the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) to conduct ‘sharper geopolitical analysis on the position and the interest of the involved countries’ (Report of Activities of the First Commission Hearing Session II-IV, 2004-2005).

Towards the 2009 election, however, there was a shift in attitude within the DPR regarding the Ambalat case. Triggered by the Malaysian intrusions into the perceived Indonesia’s territory, Komisi I had recommended the Panglima TNI to ‘intensify the force parade of the TNI in the sea and land border territory, particularly in Ambalat’ (Report of Activities of the First Commission Hearing Session III, 2006-2007). About a month before the presidential election, which was scheduled for July 2009, a number of Komisi I members went to Kuala Lumpur to ‘warn Malaysia’ of its recent provocative activities in the Ambalat area (Kompas, 7 June 2009b). This decision was made in addition to the call made by Komisi I to Panglima TNI to intensify the securitisation over the area as a strategy of anticipation and containment against Malaysia’s provocative manoeuvre to assert its claim over Ambalat (Report of Activities of the First Commission Hearing Session I, 2008-2009).

On 6 June 2009, on the brink of the presidential election, SBY met members of Komisi I in a consultation meeting. Held at the Presidential Palace, SBY was accompanied by the cabinet’s political-security establishments while Komisi I was represented by its chairman Theo Sambuaga, Yusron Ilza Mahendra, Sidki Wahab, Andreas Parera, Djoko Susilo, and Happy

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187 Yusron Mahendra was appointed the Indonesian Ambassador to Japan in 2014.
Bone Zulkarnaen. This meeting was held one day prior to the departure of the Komisi I members to Malaysia. In this meeting, SBY asked for the Komisi I to channel to Malaysia his discontent regarding Malaysia’s provocative manoeuvres and to urge Malaysia to respect the continuing negotiations (Kompas, 7 June 2009b). As stated by Mahendra after the meeting: ‘[Malaysia] should not undertake manoeuvres while concurrently negotiating’ (Kompas, 7 June 2009b). In this meeting, the notion of kedaulatan (sovereignty) was emphasised by SBY as the underpinning factor in Indonesia’s firm position on Ambalat.

In Kuala Lumpur, on the same day that the rapat konsultasi was held in Jakarta, three members of Komisi I, Effendi Chorrie, Ade Daud Nasution, and Ali Mochtar Ngabalin, informally met with the Malaysian Defence Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi. In a rather emotional approach, Ngabalin threatened Malaysia:

I am urging the Malaysian Navy warships not to provoke us with any military patrol that would trespass Indonesia’s sovereignty borderlines. We (Indonesia) may get impatient and sink the Malaysian ships (Kompas, 8 June 2009).

In response to Ngabalin’s statement, Malaysia re-stated its position that it would never be involved in a war with Indonesia. According to Hamidi: ‘the Malaysian armed forces are wearing the uniform made by Sritex (a large Indonesian textile company), how can we be at war?’ (Kompas, 7 June 2009c).

Another member of Komisi I, Permadi, of the PDIP, also illustrated the DPR’s emotional response to the case. In his attempt to demonstrate his outrage, he joined the street demonstration outside the premises of the Malaysian Embassy in Jakarta. Permadi’s populist attitude had been his preferred approach to cases related to Malaysia since 2005. He usually attended demonstrations whenever a case related to Malaysia occurred. In 2005, Permadi stated:

[that] Malaysia has violated our sovereignty and has become a new imperialist. All Malaysian jets and ships should be forcefully repelled. Just warn them three times, and shoot if they disobey. Diplomacy is not needed. If they insist that Ambalat is their territory, [then they] should be crushed (Detik, 8 March 2005).

His consistent stance on this issue by ‘whipping up’ nationalistic sentiment was witnessed once again in 2009. In an interview with Metro TV, Permadi stated even more strongly:

Malaysians are aware that Indonesia will not do anything to them. The Indonesian government is too weak to react! This is exactly why we should demonstrate (outside) the Malaysian Embassy, to show that Sukarno’s slogan of ganyang Malaysia is still relevant.

In sum, the Komisi I, as an organic body within the parliament’s structure had opted for a stronger approach to the Ambalat case. While Indonesian diplomats believed that negotiation was the only way to solve the issue, Yusron Ihza of Komisi I, for instance, believed otherwise.
As he noted: ‘the Ambalat is ours, therefore no negotiation is needed. If we negotiate, that means we are giving up’ (Kompas, 6 June 2009). On this issue, Oegroseno of Deplu rebuked Yusron’s view by firmly suggesting that ‘territorial border lines are made through negotiation, not by war. If there is any border that exists not as a result of negotiation, show me!’ (Kompas, 6 June 2009). These different opinions between the Indonesian diplomats and the politicians in DPR, as well as the activities of some of the members of DPR in meeting Malaysian authorities demonstrated the increasing participation of the DPR in Indonesian foreign affairs. They also confirmed the arguments developed in Chapter One and Two on matters related to the issue of sovereignty as a topic the parliament is interested in.

7.3.2.3 Elite opinion

Indeed, as Chapter One notes, issues related to sovereignty became more salient following Indonesia’s democratisation (see, e.g. Dosch 2006). Taking into account that Indonesians were on the brink of election when the Ambalat issue re-emerged in 2009, assessing elite opinion – including those running for political positions – served as an important part in explaining when an appeal to nationalistic sentiment and foreign policy adjustment by leaders were pronounced.

The Indonesian elite opinion to the Ambalat case was mixed. Hikmahanto Juwana, an expert on international law at Universitas Indonesia, for instance, suggested that Indonesia should firmly warn Malaysia that the latter’s repeated provocations could violate the principle of respect towards other countries’ sovereignty, as highlighted in the ASEAN Charter (The Jakarta Post, 8 June 2009). He went further by criticising the Indonesian government for merely sending a diplomatic note —by which time there had been thirty-six unanswered notes—and thus, supporting the Indonesian legislators’ decision to depart for Malaysia to settle the dispute. The defeat in the adjudication process in the ICJ on the case of Sipadan-Ligitan islands against Malaysia created a certain degree of trauma, which the Ambalat case seemed likely to reinforce. For instance, analyst Ikrar Nusa Bakti held that Indonesia’s decision to dispatch its warship was acceptable because the Indonesian government should not ‘underestimate the Ambalat issue’ and the dispute ‘should not be brought to the ICJ’ (The Jakarta Post, 8 June 2009).

Similarly, the Pemuda Muhammadiyah, a youth organisation of the Muhammadiyah, emphasised that Indonesia should not be deceived after Malaysia defeated Indonesia at the ICJ over the Sipadan-Ligitan islands. The organisation’s chairman Nadjamudin Ramli rejected the involvement of the ICJ in the Ambalat case as, according to him: ‘Petronas cooperates with Shell, a Dutch company based in the same country as the ICJ, therefore Shell will apply pressure (akan menekan) to the Court’ (Tempo, 8 March 2005). The NU, on the other hand, saw the Ambalat problem from a different perspective. Its former chairman, Hasyim Muzadi, using the
spirit of Muslim brotherhood, was quoted as saying that: ‘war between Indonesia and Malaysia would only benefit Shell and would be to the detriment of Islam, the OIC, and ASEAN because it would be war between Muslims’ (NU online, 21 March 2005). Strangely, however, Muzadi also supported the firm action by the TNI which, in essence, could motivate an armed clash, if not war (NU online, 21 March 2005).

Presidential hopefuls for the 2009 election, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Prabowo Subianto, patrons of Indonesia’s nationalist political parties PDIP and Gerindra respectively, echoed the nationalist sentiment when referring to the Ambalat dispute. Subianto, former commander of the Indonesian Army Special Forces (Kopassus) and the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), known for his strong character, publicised his readiness to lead the Indonesian troops to retain the country’s sovereignty over Ambalat. At the most intense period of the presidential campaign, Prabowo, who was then paired with Megawati as her VP candidate, suggested:

I don’t know whether Malaysia mocks or challenges us … (And) I am ready to be a soldier again. The rank does not have to be high; even the rank of a group leader would be enough (Okezone, 4 June 2009).

Responding to this flaring spirit, Jakarta-based ethnic group Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR), announced its preparation to be deployed as war volunteers (Kilas Berita, 9 June 2009). FBR became yet more hostile when it urged the government to cut diplomatic ties with Malaysia, to expel the Malaysian Ambassador in Jakarta, and to ban Petronas from Indonesia (Kilas Berita, 9 June 2009).

Megawati’s reaction to the Ambalat case, however, was unexpectedly low-key. Her reaction contradicted her party’s nationalist credentials and her father’s high-profile foreign policy campaigns. Emphasising Indonesia’s limited military capabilities, she feared the possibility that Malaysia’s military allies would besiege Indonesia should the former enforce its will regarding Ambalat (Bandoro 2009). The small defence budget allocation was seen as a useful campaign tool against the incumbent SBY. In one of her public appearances, Megawati compared it to Sukarno’s glorious time when the Indonesia defence budget was raised to 29% of the overall national budget as opposed to 4% under President SBY (Sihaloho 2009). When making the comparison, Megawati did not mention the fact that in 2002 when she was president, the defence budget only amounted to 1% of the national budget, which made it significantly less than SBY’s (see Suryohadiprojo 2005), and less than 3.5% in the subsequent years until her resignation, as reported by the Defence Intelligence Organisation of the Australian

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188 Prabowo Subianto was one of the contestants in the 2014 Indonesia’s presidential election.
Department of Defence (2010:15-16). This figure, according to the report, was much less than Malaysia’s defence budget, which consistently exceeded 7% per annum during the same period.

Overall, the sentiment of nationalism and, in turn, the national pride, compounded the Indonesians’ views over the Sipadan-Ligitan case, and influenced the general reaction of the Indonesian public against Malaysia in the Ambalat case. As Chapter Four highlights, it is not surprising that the Indonesian public generally drew upon nationalistic pride given Indonesia’s struggle for independence was a product of ‘self-styled revolution and armed struggle’ (Vatikiotis, 1995:221).

7.4 Democratisation and foreign policy: managing territorial dispute

As Chapter One notes, the scholarly literature suggests that democratisation leads to hostile foreign policy is the result a weakening of the institutions with the erosion of the old ones (see among others, Mansfield and Snyder 1997, 2002; Keck 2006). This situation leads political actors to appeal to nationalist sentiment in order to gain support for their actions. Territorial disputes become instruments of influence for these actors and therefore, the foreign policy preferences they opt for are likely to be hostile (Mansfield and Snyder 1997). This, however, has not held true for Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Malaysia in the Ambalat case was not resolved using hostile actions for four key reasons.

First, Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution underscored the aspirational goals of the Indonesians in, among other goals, participating in the creation of world peace. This objective was illustrated in the cardinal principle of the bebas-aktif foreign policy (see Chapter Four: 95). Any military conflict with Malaysia would have destabilised the Southeast Asia and this would have undermined Indonesia’s foreign policy aspirations to create regional stability (see Chapter Five). An unstable region, in turn, would negatively impact on Indonesia’s effort to consolidate its economy. In a more general context, Indonesia and Malaysia are parties to the ASEAN Charter. This Charter, in essence, advocates that disputes between ASEAN members should be settled through dialogue and other peaceful means. Similarly, the UNCLOS 1982, to which Indonesia is a signatory, calls on states to settle border issues through bilateral negotiation.

Second, scholars have argued that democratisation tends to lead foreign policy makers to focus on domestic needs in order to strengthen democratic consolidation (see Chapter One). Since the fall of Sukarno, Indonesian decision-makers have primarily focused on internal security problems such as separatism and communal conflict rather than foreign threats (Anwar 1998). This was even more prominent following Indonesia’s democratisation (see Indonesia’s Defence White Paper 2003). Therefore, it was unlikely that Indonesian leaders would pursue hostile foreign policy approaches or enter into armed conflict with other states. In addition,
Indonesia’s foreign policy goal during the Reformasi era was aimed at utilising resources available in the international environment for the interest of political and economic consolidation within the country (Sukma, 2005b:87). A hostile approach would potentially undermine the ability of political leaders to consolidate Indonesia’s democracy at home.

Third, the authoritative role of the president and the foreign minister, including Deplu as the state’s formal institution for foreign policy-making, contributed to Indonesia’s pursuit of a peaceful foreign policy approach in relation to the Ambalat dispute. In this case, Deplu remained the primary institution deciding foreign policy in Indonesia and this was not eroded by the impact of democratisation. In fact, as Chapter Three notes, democratisation strengthened rather than weakened, the role of Deplu in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Consequently, the arguments underscoring hostile foreign policy behaviour as a result of weak state’s institution following democratisation do not hold true for Indonesia’s case regarding the Ambalat dispute. As this chapter argues, the foreign policy leaders in Indonesia continued to see negotiations as the standard for cooperation and coexistence between the two countries.

Fourth, Indonesian leaders’ commitment to democracy and peaceful dispute settlement. As the preceding chapters noted, following democratisation democracy has been an important value guiding the practice of Indonesian foreign policy in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia more generally. This was tied to Indonesia’s new democratic identity, which Indonesian leaders then sought to reflect in their foreign policy decisions. Therefore, resolving territorial disputes through negotiations were favourable for the Indonesian foreign policy leaders. To this extent, and notwithstanding the decision to deploy military vessels into the disputed area, which had troubled Sudarsono given Indonesia’s limited military capacity (Sudarsono, interview, 5 August 2011), the utilisation of military force was never an option for Indonesia. As explained by Wirajuda (interview, 12 January 2012):

There was no talk about using force in the Cabinet meeting. Military deployment was a mere symbolic approach over substance and a means to convey Indonesia’s collective determination in opposing any territorial claims by Malaysia…Ambalat is an extension of a problem emanating from Malaysia’s 1979 Peta Baru [new map]. In fact this took place during the Suharto period when Indonesia’s military was seen as strong among ASEAN members yet we did not engage in any armed conflict.

The preferences submitted by different actors in Indonesia demonstrate the complexity in Indonesia’s stances toward the Ambalat dispute, and in bilateral relations with Malaysia more generally. In Chapter Two, this study noted that even in a complex decision-making situation where a number of ideas exist, the influence of leaders in foreign policy is likely to prevail because they occupy the highest positions in a state, thereby hold a great deal of influence (Domhoff 1990:19; Higley 2010:163). To this extent, President SBY and foreign minister
Wirajuda continued the non-aggressive foreign policy preferences toward Malaysia by resorting to negotiation, a practice that began in the New Order regarding the settlement of border issues. Despite the changing atmosphere of bilateral relations, Indonesia attempted to maintain its democratic image by continuing this policy. Another reason for the continuity was also the top-down foreign policy-making process in Indonesia, which emphasised the prominence of foreign policy-makers in the executive in determining the policy content. Therefore, if the Indonesian foreign policy leaders were to follow the preferences of other actors, most notably the military, the parliament, and the public, Indonesia may have adopted irrational foreign policy preferences given the limited TNI’s military capacity to engage in a maritime war. The non-authoritative role of the DPR in making state foreign policy also contributed to the inability of this institution to pursue the nationalist ambitions maintained by its members. Nevertheless, why did Indonesian political leaders engage in nationalist rhetoric when submitting their views on the Ambalat conflict in 2009, and also in 2005, when the issue first emerged, albeit less starkly then? And if SBY opted for negotiations instead of other foreign policy instruments, why was the order to gelar pasukan in Ambalat made?

In 2009 Indonesia was on the brink of its general elections. Although foreign affairs were not considered as an election issue in Indonesia, sovereignty remained an attractive topic for most politicians in Indonesia. The Ambalat case provided leeway for politicians to evoke nationalism to gain more votes. This included SBY who was re-contesting the presidency. SBY adjusted his foreign policy preferences by resorting to both accommodation and mobilisation strategy. To reiterate, as Hagan (1995:128-131) notes:

\[\text{...accommodation emphasises a situation where decision-makers respond to domestic political pressures by allowing bargaining among players, hence, foreign policy compromise. Meanwhile, mobilisation focuses on manipulation of foreign policy issues by the regime in an effort to retain power and could involve the leaders’ appeals to nationalist sentiment.}\]

Indeed, by doubling the presence of the Indonesian Navy in Ambalat (an attempt to accommodate the view that Indonesia needed to respond firmly to the dispute) and by publicly stating that Ambalat was a case of sovereignty instead of sovereign rights (a manifestation of foreign policy manipulation as a means to mobilise political support), SBY readjusted his foreign policy options. This placated domestic pressure during a time when ignoring these pressures could have been politically costly for him. Resorting to these strategies was also a way to attract public votes as he wished to preserve his presidential position. Pursuing such

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189 The top three election agendas were the issues of economic sustainability (34.5%), the primary daily needs (sembako) (10.2%), and the problem of unemployment (9.8%). For details, see Lembaga Survey Indonesia (4 June 2009).
strategies are not unusual for politicians especially during the election periods (see Hagan 1995; Welch 2005). The decision to avoid hostile foreign policy preferences with regards to the Ambalat case also confirms that although nationalism has been a value underpinning the bebas-aktif foreign policy, in practice Indonesia’s foreign policy was not transformed into hostile behaviour driven by the spirit of nationalism.

In sum, democratisation has affected Indonesia’s foreign policy in relation to managing conflict with another country by allowing different preferences to emerge. These preferences came from various perceptions about Indonesia’s identity. On the one hand, those who wished for Indonesia to take firm actions against Malaysia were influenced by the notion of Indonesia being a country with strong nationalist principles whose independence was gained by struggle, and by the sense of superiority in terms of the kinship status between the two countries, where Indonesia was considered as the big brother (abang) of Malaysia. On the other hand, there were those who maintained the importance of negotiations in managing conflicts, informed by Indonesia’s democratic identity. Foreign policy leaders were key in this competition of preferences as they made and decided the final policy action. To this extent, notwithstanding the changes in the dynamics of the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Malaysia, Indonesian foreign policy leaders continued pursuing a peaceful approach even when they were involved in territorial disputes with another country.

**Conclusion**

This chapter shows the impact of democratisation on the way Indonesia handled potential conflict with its neighbours, using the Ambalat dispute with Malaysia as a case study as the most important conflict Indonesia has had to deal with bilaterally in recent years.

The analysis of Indonesia’s response to the Ambalat dispute challenges the notion that democratisation leads to a more aggressive foreign policy and that a rise in nationalism translates into support for military solutions to foreign policy problems. This was primarily the result of the president and the foreign minister, who were both authoritative foreign policy-makers in Indonesia, opting for negotiations, thereby disregarding the more hostile approach preferred by a number of Indonesian parliamentarians as well as certain groups amongst the public. While the decisions made by these authoritative actors were related to Indonesia’s democratic credentials, which they wished to maintain, Indonesia’s top-down foreign policy-making process also contributed in this regard.

Overall, the methods of Indonesia’s foreign policy with respect to managing potential territorial conflict with Malaysia indicated continuity with the previous regime. In this context, the role of Indonesian foreign policy leaders was more salient than that of the DPR and elite
opinion in shaping and making Indonesia's foreign policy decision on Ambalat. Therefore, the salience of leaders and their commitment to democracy more generally is a key consideration for a democratising country in the pursuit of peaceful, instead of aggressive, foreign policy behaviour towards other states in responding to territorial disputes.
8 Conclusion

This study has sought to answer the following questions: how has democratisation affected Indonesia’s foreign policy decision-making and what has been the impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy in relation to particular issues and areas? This thesis investigated three aspects of Indonesia’s foreign policy during the Reformasi period, namely its decision-making process, its basic doctrine, and the foreign policy related to regional cooperation, promotion of political values, and conflict management. To highlight these aspects, three cases were examined: Indonesia’s foreign policy in relation to political cooperation in ASEAN; foreign policy toward Myanmar and on East Asia regional arrangement; and the Ambalat territorial dispute. These case studies allow this thesis to demonstrate that the impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy has been at best differential. These cases were selected because they were active points of Indonesia’s diplomacy in recent years and thus, useful to examine the changes and continuities in foreign policy in the context of Indonesia’s democratic transition.

This research argues that democratisation has impacted foreign policy in a mixed and limited way. While Indonesia’s democratisation has shaped ideas that have influenced foreign policy, some traditional foreign policy aspects have continued to be relevant. Hence, while in some areas the impact of democratisation is obvious, in others it has been less visible. In order to understand the impact of democratisation on foreign policy, an integrative conceptual framework was used. This framework emphasised on the role of leaders, the importance of institutions, and the relationship between identity, ideas, and foreign policy. These variables are ultimately account for the change and continuity within Indonesia’s foreign policy.

The following sections will review the key findings of the thesis. This review will be followed by a summary of specific findings in relation to the case studies. Overall, these findings highlight the differential impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy. The third section reviews the variables that make for this differential impact and the general lessons from the relationship between Indonesia’s democratisation and foreign policy.

8.1 Main findings

The first main finding is that democratisation provided an opportunity for new political actors, in addition to traditional actors such as the foreign minister and president or prime minister, to participate in the policy-making process. These new actors included the parliament, and, to some extent, certain individuals (mainly those with expertise on foreign affairs) who gained access to the decision-making environment either by occupying specific positions within the
foreign policy-making structure or by nurturing policy networks involving decision-makers in the executive. The issues at hand also determined the involvement of these new foreign policy actors. In this regard, issues related to, for instance, maintaining territorial sovereignty and protection of citizens abroad increased the likelihood for new foreign policy actors to influence foreign policy-making process. Further, the role of parliament was found to be particularly high when ratification of international treaty is concerned. Notwithstanding this development, as the second main finding offers, traditional foreign policy actors remained crucial in making state’s foreign policy. This study also found that democratising countries tend to be inward-looking due to the salience of domestic problems arising from the democratic transition. Therefore, pursuing active foreign relations was unlikely unless the leaders of the democratising countries saw domestic imperatives for doing so, which would usually involve a boost in the political legitimacy to the leadership, both at home and abroad.

This thesis also argued that Indonesia experienced the stages of democratisation outlined by Huntington, including (i) ending a non-democratic regime, (ii) the inauguration of a democratic regime, and (iii) democratic consolidation process. To this extent, the fall of Suharto in 1998, which was followed by the instalment of the transitional Habibie regime and the subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections, brought Indonesia closer towards democracy. Furthermore, there was a presidential decision to establish national laws that respected the citizen’s rights, to develop political institutions in order to tackle the problems of the past, and to ensure the withdrawal of the military from politics, which underscored Indonesia’s progress towards democratic consolidation. In relation to Indonesia’s foreign affairs, the thesis found that democratic transitions allow for an increase in the number of actors involved in the policy-making, and for specific political ideas and values, notably democracy and human rights, to emerge.

The second main finding is related to the conceptual framework to approach the research question and to examine the case studies. Specifically, this framework focused on the role of leaders and institutions as well as the influence of identity and ideas in foreign policy in order to understand the impact of democratisation. This framework was built upon theoretical literature on democratisation, foreign policy decision-making processes, and the nexus between identity, ideas, and foreign policy.

Indeed, theories about democratisation permitted this thesis to analyse the stages of Indonesia’s democratic transitions. In this regard, Huntington’s theory on stages of democratisation was particularly useful to support the argument that Indonesia has indeed democratised. Meanwhile, theories about foreign policy decision-making underlined the key roles of leaders in the making of state’s foreign policy (Peterson 1994; Wright 1978; Williams
2004; Alden and Aran 2012). Consequently, these theories helped the author point out the limited role of parliament in foreign policy decision-making processes (see Milner 1997; Mitchell 2005; Jones 2009). Therefore, the arguments advanced by theories of foreign policy decision-making contradicted the assumptions maintained by democratisation theories with regard to the increasing role of parliament in foreign policy-making. Since foreign policy continues to be the product of individuals in leadership positions, top-down foreign policy-making process should be anticipated, even in democracies. Therefore, foreign policy decisions are likely to reflect ideas/values held by foreign policy leaders, which, occasionally, can be linked to their identification of the state’s identity and their interpretation of national interests. In this context, delving into theories about the role of identity and ideas in foreign policy (see Ashizawa 2008, 2013; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Ekengren 2011; Checkel 1993) helped this thesis to understand which foreign policy ideas matter and how ideas about democracy shape leaders’ foreign policy preferences.

However, the studies on identity, ideas, and foreign policy did not explain the stages and conditions that would support the influence of ideas in foreign policy. For this reason, this thesis referred to theories on internalisation to understand which and how ideas mattered in foreign policy (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Cortell and Davis 2000). This is because, essentially, different ideas emerged during the foreign policy making-process. Internalisation was argued to have involved three stages, namely the emergence of ideas, the acceptance of these ideas by the policy-makers, and lastly, the conformance by these policy-makers to the accepted ideas. A number of conditions were argued to indicate that ideas have been internalised, including their appearance in the domestic political discourse that could serve as justifications for policy, regulation, and institutional changes. Indeed, the examination of these theories suggests that only when ideas are internalised and shared by foreign policy leaders could they shape foreign policy decisions.

Integrating key arguments from theories of democratisation, foreign policy-making, and the role of ideas in foreign policy helps shed light on the limited impact of democratisation on Indonesian foreign policy. The framework has pointed out the need to bring back an analysis focusing on the salience of leaders in assessing Indonesian foreign policy during Reformasi in ASEAN and in broader Asia while not entirely discounting the roles of what this thesis refers to as non-authoritative actors, i.e. DPR, the military, and policy entrepreneurs. For example, Sukma’s role in shaping Indonesia’s APSC initiative and the preferences of, and actions conducted by, members of the Indonesian Parliament with regard to Indonesia’s policy on Myanmar, and the final policy decisions taken by Jakarta in these areas help explain the limited influence of actors beyond key traditional foreign policy-makers in Indonesia. In light of this
study, it is important to discuss the roles of these new actors because democratisation has allowed them to gain more influence in foreign policy decision-making processes in Indonesia by using the availability of more open political networks and access to the top. Overall, in this study, the framework was employed to approach the research questions by assessing the roles of different actors involved in Indonesia’s foreign policy-making to examine the extent to which foreign policy decision-making has been affected by democratisation and to further assess the salience of these actors in policy-making in the selected case studies.

Indeed, Indonesia’s democratisation affects the way foreign policy is made by allowing for various actors to emerge and participate in the decision-making process. The Indonesian Parliament and, to some extent, individuals who possess expertise on foreign affairs or policy/ideas entrepreneurs, were the most notable new foreign policy actors in this regard. The increasing role of these actors could have encouraged Indonesia’s foreign policy-making to become a more bottom-up process, since leaders were more likely to follow the preferences of the parliament and the public. However, traditional foreign policy leaders were still dominant in determining the content of Indonesia’s foreign policy. This was supported by contentions in Chapter Two, that emphasised three considerations in the role of new actors: First, the inability of the parliament to make foreign policy given that it is a heterogenic body embedded with different perceptions of and varying interests towards foreign policy issues (see Putnam 1988; and Milner, 1997: Chapter 3 and 4); second, the fact that the general public were considered inattentive and poorly informed on foreign policy issues (Baviera 2012; Risse-Kappen 1991; and Sørensen 1998); and third, the idea that leaders have the formal authority to make and execute foreign policy since they occupied positions that enabled them to identify foreign policy issues, make judgements about them, and act upon them (see Alden and Aran 2012). As far as the link between identity, ideas, and foreign policy is concerned, the framework developed in this study noted that democratisation allowed Indonesian foreign policy leaders to redefine the state’s identity, as being a democratic country (see also Chapter One). A change in Indonesia’s political identity and the salience of key foreign policy-makers in Indonesia allowed for modification in Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions. In this context, this study found that ideas about democracy mediated the relationship between Indonesia’s democratic identity and a change in foreign policy.

8.2 Specific findings

8.2.1 Democritisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy-making

In Chapter Three, a categorisation of Indonesian foreign policy actors was made, consisting of authoritative and non-authoritative actors. Authoritative actors included traditional foreign
policy-makers (the president, foreign minister, and Deplu) and they held formal authority to make, decide, and execute Indonesia’s foreign policy. Meanwhile, non-authoritative actors covered DPR, policy entrepreneurs, Presidential Special Staff on International Relations, and Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs as well as the TNI. These actors could not formally make state’s foreign policy. However, the non-authoritative actors could influence foreign policy by making use of their positions in the policy-making structure and their access to the key foreign policy decision-makers in the executive.

In Indonesia, authoritative foreign policy actors, particularly the foreign minister, have been instrumental in determining the content of foreign policy during the Reformasi period. This was evident particularly throughout the Megawati’s presidency and, to some extent, SBY’s first term (2004-09). During Megawati’s term (2001-04), foreign minister Wirajuda was vital in setting the tone of Indonesia’s foreign policy highlighted by, inter alia, Indonesia’s proposal on the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) initiative during the 2003 ASEAN Summit in Bali. However, this did not mean that the president’s role was diminished. Megawati’s decision to let Wirajuda take charge of Indonesia’s foreign affairs essentially demonstrated that the president’s authoritative role in foreign policy had been delegated to the foreign minister. Apart from the substance of foreign policy, this study also found that Wirajuda was crucial in transforming Indonesia’s foreign policy by making some adjustments on the structure of Deplu. Wirajuda’s decision with regard to Deplu’s bureaucratic reform was linked to changes in domestic politics following democratisation. In this case, he aspired to change Indonesia’s foreign policy by making it reflect the values of Reformasi, namely democracy, good governance, and civilian supremacy over the military. Wirajuda replaced the military officers seconded to Deplu with civilians. This indicates a significant difference from the New Order’s policy where, under the dwi-fungsi doctrine, military officers were placed in civilian departments.

While the foreign minister was influential, the president remained the key maker of Indonesia’s major foreign policy decisions. During SBY’s period, foreign policy became an important aspect of his presidency. He created two foreign policy bodies attached to the presidential palace, namely the office of the Special Staff on International Relations (SKHI) and the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. The establishment of these bodies did not alter the formal authority of the foreign minister and the president in making state foreign policy decisions. Their presence served merely to provide advice to the president. Although they were non-authoritative, those involved were at times able to shape foreign policy by using their direct and unrestricted access to, as well as their personal relationship with, President SBY. This was demonstrated by the case of Dino Djalal who, given his unrestricted access to the president,
successfully inserted new foreign policy doctrines through President SBY speeches (see Chapter Four).

This study found that democratisation also led to an increasing role of the DPR. The involvement of the DPR in foreign policy-making in Indonesia was particularly observable in treaty ratification and cases related to the issue of sovereignty. Indeed, the DPR made foreign policy-making in democratic Indonesia more consultative and complex than it had been during most of the Suharto era. This was illustrated in Chapter Five and Seven, which elaborate on how Indonesian foreign policy-makers in the executive had to engage intensively with DPR members in the process of the ASEAN Charter ratification and to adjust foreign policy preferences in response to nationalistic sentiments voiced by the DPR in relation to the Ambalat case. The increased role of the DPR in foreign policy indicated a change in policy-making mechanisms during the Reformasi era as it became more than a rubber-stamp body. Further, democratisation also made it possible for ideas entrepreneurs to gain access to the decision-making process because of more open policy-making mechanisms. In the DPR, this was marked by the existence of numerous public consultations. Ideas entrepreneurs also relied on direct access and networking with the Indonesian foreign policy leaders in the executive. This was evidenced by Sukma’s role in conceptualising Indonesia’s ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) initiative (see Chapter Five). Although the increasing involvement of DPR and ideas entrepreneurs in foreign policy was observable, in practice their roles were issue-dependent thus, very limited. Being politicians, DPR members needed to capture salient issues that would allow them to nurture domestic political support. As they were likely to seek re-election, commenting on issues related to sovereignty, among other issues, could become an effective tool for boosting their popular support.

Notwithstanding the proliferation of foreign policy actors, this study found that, in general, Indonesia’s foreign policy-making remained a top-down process because no alterations took place in the delegation of formal authority to foreign policy decision-makers in the executive. Indeed, while the constitutional amendments between 1999 and 2002 and the Law regarding Indonesia’s Foreign Relations allowed the DPR to have a bigger role in foreign affairs, such a role was limited to specific foreign policy matters, such as ambassadorial appointments and the ratification of international agreements. Instead of altering the authority of the Indonesian foreign policy leaders, these regulations reinforced their control over foreign affairs. Therefore, the principal authority to make Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions remained in the hands of a limited number of traditional foreign policy actors in the executive. Overall, democratisation did not change the pattern of foreign policy-making in Indonesia. However, developments in foreign policy decision-making, as it became a more consultative
process, highlighted the differential impact of democratisation on the way foreign policy is made in Indonesia.

8.2.2 Democritisation and the Bebas-Aktif doctrine

Indonesia’s democratic transition has changed neither the basic tenets of its foreign policy, bebas-aktif, nor its underlying values. In Chapter Four, this thesis considered bebas-aktif as the main doctrine of Indonesia’s foreign policy and the values that underpinned it. The doctrine was essentially an amalgamation between Mohammad Hatta’s identification about Indonesia as a fragile state following its independence and his view on the appropriate foreign policy stance in the context of Indonesia’s ‘hostile external environment’ (see Hatta, 1953; Weinstein 1976). Therefore, the doctrine was underpinned by political values central to Indonesia’s existence as a newly independent country, namely Indonesia’s Constitution, national interests, non-alignment, Pancasila, and national unity and sovereignty. In this regard, the initial existence of bebas-aktif confirms the argument held by Ashizawa (2008:581), where ‘a conception of state identity provides policy-makers with a particular value hence, defines the leaders’ preference of state’s foreign policy’. This thesis found that the doctrine and its core values survived the political change of 1998. There have been no foreign policy cases since Reformasi in which the government has publicly announced the removal of the bebas-aktif principle. The reason for the survival of bebas-aktif included its acceptance as Indonesia’s chief foreign policy principle by Indonesian key foreign policy-makers because it reinforced values that reflected Indonesia’s identity.

Indeed, a conception of state identity allowed foreign policy-makers to introduce certain values or ideas, which would define their foreign policy preferences. Therefore, it is likely for new foreign policy preferences to emerge as a result of a new state identity (see Saideman 2002). In this case, a change in the state identity, combined with unrestricted and direct access to the top, obtained by individuals with specific foreign policy expertise, permitted Dino Djalal, as the president’s speechwriter, to raise new ideas about how to most appropriately describe Indonesia’s foreign policy principles in the context of Indonesia’s democratic identity. This description was manifested in the ideas of an ‘all-directions’ foreign policy approach and a ‘million friends, zero enemies’ slogan, coined by Djalal. At this stage, Hatta’s ideas about bebas-aktif and Djalal’s ideas about loose foreign policy principles demonstrated that in Indonesia, individuals have been the key transmitters for ideas in foreign policy (see Goldstein and Keohane 1993). These individuals’ conceptualisation of Indonesia’s most appropriate foreign policy doctrine informed the relevance of institutions (Deplu during Hatta’s period as foreign minister, and Office of the SKHI under Djalal’s tenure) in Indonesia’s foreign policy.
Therefore, the importance of these institutions in the practice of Indonesian foreign policy during their own terms was essentially reducible to the prominence of ideas held by Hatta and Djalal, respectively. This confirms Blyth’s argument (1997) on the key role of individuals as ideas transmitters.

In practice, however, this thesis found that practitioners and observers were sceptical of the relevance of these ideas to practical diplomacy and considered them to be mere slogans. In other words, Djalal’s ideas were not viewed as an adaptation of Indonesia’s main foreign policy doctrine, nor did the country’s authoritative foreign policy makers, especially the foreign minister, endorse them. As a result, Djalal’s ideas were unable to change bebas-aktif. Nevertheless, the fact that Djalal was able to incorporate ideas into the president’s speeches demonstrated that non-authoritative actors, benefitting from policy networks they built and direct access to the top, could impact foreign policy. This situation confirms Mintrom’s argument (1997) about the need for policy entrepreneurs to have strong networking in policy circles for them to channel their ideas and shape foreign policy.

This thesis also found that Islamic values were prominent voices in Indonesia’s politics following democratisation. In this regard, a more Islamised foreign policy, i.e. a policy based on Islamic considerations and closer ties with Islamic countries, would have been anticipated. However, an Islamised foreign did not emerge. Almost similar to the case of Djalal’s ideas, Indonesian foreign policy leaders did not embark upon Islamic-heavy foreign policy decisions as they did not consider Islam (or religion in general) as a value significant to the practice of Indonesian foreign policy. Had foreign policy been ‘Islamised’, aggressive foreign policy actions toward Myanmar in response to the Rohingya issue would have been likely (see Chapter Six).

Indeed, the adherence by Indonesian diplomats, in general, and the foreign minister, in particular, to bebas-aktif indicated that this doctrine has been deeply internalised to the point that conformance to it has been almost automatic. This is not unusual because ideas matter in foreign policy as they are internalised thereby giving them a role in the practical reasoning for action (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Brennan et.al 2013). In this context, the key role of foreign minister in Indonesia in setting the tone and deciding the direction of foreign policy explained why Djalal’s ideas and Islamic values that emerged during the Reformasi period did not redefine or replace bebas-aktif as Indonesia’s principal foreign policy doctrine. Another reason for the continuity of bebas-aktif in Indonesia was the ambiguous nature of its definition, which was primarily based on pragmatism. It has survived every political succession in Indonesia, as every leader has essentially had to be pragmatic in diplomacy in order to pursue an effective foreign policy.
8.2.3 Democrtatisation and Indonesia’s regional cooperation in ASEAN

In examining the impact of democratisation on foreign policy in the area of regional cooperation, this thesis used the case of Indonesia’s foreign policy in ASEAN, particularly in the area of political cooperation. This study found that democratisation contextualised the change in Indonesia’s foreign policy initiatives, which were marked by decisions to promote democracy and human rights, as manifested in the creation of the APSC and ASEAN Charter as well as AICHR. Indonesia’s foreign policy during most of Suharto’s period was characterised by the projection of the ‘national resilience’ concept into the region. The Indonesian foreign policy leaders after Suharto continued the tradition of projecting domestic values to the region by focusing on democratic values and human rights. The change in the projected domestic values was linked to a number of factors, including the development in Indonesia’s domestic political realm as well as the desire by Indonesian foreign policy leaders to substantiate the country’s regional leadership status, particularly during Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2003. With regard to the development of the domestic realm, as indicated in Chapter Three, foreign minister Wirajuda aspired to incorporate values derived from Reformasi as part of his ideas of transforming Indonesia’s foreign policy. The acceptance of democracy and human rights as domestic political values, indicated by, inter alia, a number of regulations that promote human rights (see Chapter One), the conformity to democratic principles of nearly most Indonesians (see Chapter Five: 134), and the internalisation of Indonesia’s democratic identity by Indonesian foreign policy-makers, motivated Indonesian foreign policy leaders to assert democracy and human rights as their foreign policy preferences.

This change in Indonesia’s foreign policy impacted on how Indonesia dealt with the principle of non-interference in ASEAN. This thesis found that as regards human rights issues Indonesia has, without hesitation, applied a more relaxed position on the non-interference principle. Although within limits of Indonesia’s position at the UN, Indonesia’s bilateral foreign policy on Myanmar, as Chapter Seven asserted, was an example of this. However, Indonesian foreign policy leaders certainly did not attempt to eliminate the non-interference principle from the core of norms that are to inform inter-state relations in ASEAN. This was primarily because the Indonesian government has also been taking advantage of this principle, as illustrated in the haze pollution case mentioned in Chapter Five.

Indonesia’s foreign policy in promoting political development in ASEAN was to some extent the result of ideas entrepreneurs successfully influencing foreign policy decision-making in Indonesia. This was demonstrated by Deplu building on Sukma’s ideas in relation to the creation of an ASEAN political and security community. Indonesia’s chairmanship in ASEAN in 2003 opened a window of opportunity for Sukma to channel his ideas into the policy-making.
process. However, it is important to emphasise that Sukma’s ideas were not all adopted uncritically. Indeed, some were not included in the government’s final APSC concept paper. This suggests that the role of leaders remains crucial.

As far as the role of institutions is concerned, this study has found that the Indonesian Parliament, whose role was significantly strengthened in the post-Suharto period, is influential in the context of Indonesia’s ratification of the ASEAN Charter. To this extent, the DPR scrutinized the proposals made by the executive as evidenced by the various public consultations it organised. A measure of influence is that the DPR was reluctant to ratify the Charter before sanction mechanisms therein were resolved. The role of the DPR in foreign policy-making was also observable in the selection of Indonesia’s representative at the AICHR. Nonetheless, while the DPR had preferred Marzuki Darusman as Indonesia’s representative, foreign minister Wirajuda opted for Rafendi Djamin. These two cases demonstrate that while the DPR’s role in foreign policy has increased since 1998, its actual influence remains limited and in practice it has even been subject to preferences of the authoritative foreign policy leaders.

8.2.4 Democritisation and Indonesia’s promotion of political values beyond ASEAN

This study found that democratisation has impacted foreign policy by allowing new ideas, democracy and human rights, to feature in Indonesia’s foreign policy at two different levels: bilateral and regional. In the former, Indonesia’s foreign policy on promotion of political values was salient in the Myanmar case, as being a country that was continuously under international scrutiny in Southeast Asia as regard human rights protection, while in the latter, the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) initiative became the hallmark for the promotion of democracy in Asia. Notwithstanding this development, this thesis found a number of limitations as regard promotion of democracy and human rights.

First, while Indonesia has been actively promoting democracy in the wider Asia through the BDF mechanism, it was not accompanied by a far-reaching or sustained focus on human rights promotion. This was evidenced, for instance, by the absence of initiatives to create a human rights mechanism in Asia. To this extent, Indonesia’s experience in supporting the creation of AICHR in ASEAN could have informed Indonesian foreign policy leaders with regard to pursuing a similar policy approach in Asia. This study also found that the concrete outcomes of the BDF were unclear as there was no evidence of countries democratising because they attended this forum.

Second, the dearth of initiatives to promote democracy and human rights was observable in Indonesia’s policy in the framework of East Asia regional cooperation – where Indonesia has no leadership status. To this extent, Indonesia’s foreign policy was influenced by security
considerations, i.e. Indonesia has hoped to maintain a balanced presence of influence through the ‘balanced and inclusive’ approach in order to contain China from becoming the only dominant power in the region. To this end, Indonesia’s conceptualisation as a vulnerable country operating in a hostile external environment was more salient than Indonesia’s democratic identity in influencing the preferences of foreign policy leaders with regard to cooperation in East Asia context. Nonetheless, this thesis found that this policy approach indicates a continuity of Suharto’s foreign policy in relation to regional cooperation beyond Southeast Asia, as it appeared in the ARF. Such a foreign policy continuity highlighted important considerations in maintaining Indonesia’s relevance vis-à-vis major countries in regional cooperation arrangements outside ASEAN.

Third, Indonesia’s promotion of democracy in Myanmar has not been fully accompanied by a promotion of human rights. The lack of Indonesia’s human rights promotion abroad was tied to primarily domestic situations where a number of events linked to human rights abuses, such as oppressions against minorities, occurred and have led the Indonesian government being scrutinised in international forum, such as the UN. Therefore, it was unsurprising to see Indonesia’s relatively inactive response to the oppression of the Rohingya and the conflicts between Muslim and Buddhists community in Myanmar, which resulted in a public outcry, particularly on the side of Indonesia’s Islamist groups as manifested in some extreme behaviour toward symbols of Buddhism in Indonesia. But even with this public outcry in Indonesia, Indonesian leaders have not demonstrated a significant change in their policy to promote human rights in Myanmar. Specifically in this regard, Indonesia’s top-down policy-making and the fact that Islam has not been an influential consideration in Indonesia’s foreign policy explained the absence of a hostile foreign policy towards Myanmar.

Nevertheless, this thesis found that democratisation has affected Indonesia’s foreign policy on Myanmar by way of installing political freedom and allowing for human rights considerations to matter in Indonesia’s domestic political context. This has then led to the emergence of different policy preferences at different levels. To this extent, while Indonesian foreign policy leaders in the executive primarily based their policy preferences on the lack of democracy in Myanmar, the (members of) DPR used Myanmar’s poor human rights situation as the ground for their preferences. In practice, this was observable in the policy actions taken by these different actors in Indonesia. For the Indonesian government, a respect for Myanmar’s sovereignty and non-interference principle remained the key in guiding its formal diplomatic action. The same cannot be said for the Indonesian Parliament who supported, if not organised, a number of events in Jakarta that have been perceived by the Indonesian leaders as disrespecting the legitimate Myanmar government, such as a meeting involving the Myanmar’s
government in-exile. However, being non-authoritative actors, the DPR could only engage in non-formal activities since it did not have the authority to determine the state’s foreign policy. In this regard, the salience of Indonesian leaders confirms the argument held in Chapter Two about the role of parliament, and even in democracies the role of parliament can be a distant second to that of decision-makers in the executive. Overall, Indonesia’s policy on Myanmar indicates a change from being accommodative during the Suharto’s period – as Indonesia’s support for Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN demonstrates – to being critical and, to some extent, assertive, during the Reformasi period.

The findings presented in this section consequently contend the existing study of democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy where human rights was argued to have been a key feature in Indonesia’s foreign policy following democratic transitions (see, e.g., Dosch 2007; Sukma 2011). Instead of far-reaching in Indonesian foreign policy in general, human rights was only significant in Indonesia’s foreign policy in ASEAN and less so in other areas of cooperation. Further, authors have yet to clearly identify the considerations that make for the absence of promotion of democracy and human rights beyond issues of BDF and Myanmar (see Currie 2010). The arguments on security factors in East Asia and maintenance of Indonesia’s position in this context, and on domestic considerations of human rights promotion in Indonesia are essential in this regard. The findings also contribute to the wider literature on democracy promotion. This literature argued that a mature democratic political system is an essential prerequisite for a country to promote democracy abroad (see, Nau 2000; Gershman 2004). That Indonesia has been promoting democracy primarily since 2003 – a period where Indonesia’s democracy was still young and not fully consolidated – as a way for Indonesia to substantiate the once questioned leadership status in the region, indicates that being a mature and liberal democracy may not always be the prerequisite for a country to promote democracy abroad. Ultimately, it depends on the interpretation of national interests by the leaders.

In short, Indonesia’s democracy identity mattered as far as Indonesia’s foreign policy in ASEAN, in BDF, and on Myanmar, are concerned and less so substantively in East Asia regional cooperation. This, in turn, has made for the differential impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s promotion of democracy and human rights in general.

8.2.5 Democratisation and Indonesia’s foreign policy on Ambalat

To assess the impact of democratisation on conflict management, this thesis used the Ambalat dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. In this context, this research found that democratisation in Indonesia fostered a non-hostile attitude, a result of the country’s new commitment to democracy, the existence of strong foreign policy institutions, and top-down
policy-making process. This finding did not confirm Mansfield and Snyder’s arguments (see Chapter One) on the likelihood of democratising countries pursuing hostile foreign policy vis-à-vis other countries whenever territorial disputes are concerned. In relation to this, the authoritative role of the Indonesian foreign policy leaders as well as Deplu contributed to Indonesia’s pursuit of a peaceful foreign policy. Deplu remained the primary institution in setting foreign policy in Indonesia and this was not eroded by democratisation. In fact, as Chapter Three notes, democratisation strengthened the role of Deplu in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Therefore, arguments that suggest a high probability of hostile foreign policy behaviour, resulting from a weak state’s institution following democratisation, do not apply to the Indonesia’s way of managing (territorial) conflict, at least at sea.

The peaceful foreign policy approach adopted in the Ambalat case was also a result of top-down foreign policy-making. The president chose to ignore the nationalist rhetoric and views articulated by the military, parliament members, and, to some extent, the elite opinion in relation to the Ambalat issue. Indeed, he stuck to inter-state cooperation and diplomacy. This suggests that with Indonesia’s democratisation voices (re-) emerged that propounded the nationalist cause. Those who wished Indonesia to take firm actions against Malaysia were also influenced by a sense of superiority, where Indonesia was considered as the ‘big brother’ of Malaysia. However, because of the president those who preferred negotiations to manage conflicts prevailed.

Indonesia’s peaceful foreign policy action, however, did not mean that the assertive approach was not considered. This thesis found that during the two occasions when the Ambalat issue came to the attention of the public (in 2005 and in 2009), the same Indonesian foreign policy leader, namely President SBY, acted differently. This study found that in 2005, Indonesian leaders did not intensively engage in nationalistic sentiments, at least publicly, notwithstanding the preparation of Indonesian forces in military bases close to the disputed areas. When the Ambalat issue reoccurred in 2009, President SBY openly dispatched Indonesia’s maritime forces to the disputed area and public statements referring to nationalistic sentiment were exposed almost intensively by the Indonesian leaders. SBY’s decision in this regard was linked to Indonesia’s election in 2009, as he sought re-election, thus some foreign policy adjustments were made.

SBY’s decision was not unusual as leaders who seek to secure their political position are likely to resort to strategies of, inter alia, ‘accommodation’ and ‘mobilisation’ (Hagan 1995). On the one hand, SBY accommodated the view that Indonesia needed to respond firmly to the Ambalat dispute by doubling the presence of the Indonesian Navy in the affected areas. On the other, he mobilised political support by manipulating the Ambalat issue, publicly stating
that it was a case of sovereignty instead of sovereign rights. Pursuing these strategies placated domestic pressure at a time when ignoring these pressures could have been politically costly for SBY. This being said, although Indonesia remained committed to peaceful foreign policy approach, political leaders used nationalism to manipulate foreign policy issues during elections period to achieve their goal: maintaining office.

Indeed, this analysis leads to two crucial conclusions. First, Indonesia has not been adopting aggressive foreign policy behaviour in pursuit of the nationalist claim to bilateral territorial disputes it has had to deal with. This was largely due to the role played by the president and foreign minister and their commitment to democracy, hence opting for peaceful foreign policy approach to reflect Indonesia’s new democratic identity. The top-down foreign policy-making processes in Indonesia and the fact that democratisation did not weaken Deplu as Indonesia’s key foreign policy institution contributed to the limited impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour as regard the Ambalat issue. This finding contributes to the existing literature on the relationship between democratisation and foreign policy (see Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002; Clare 2007) by highlighting the salience of leaders and arguing that instead of making state’s institutions weak, democratic transitions strengthened them, thus limiting the possibility for a pursuit of hostile policy approach. This finding, therefore, adds to the existing works on the ‘positive’ impact of democratisation on foreign policy in Asia (e.g. Acharya 2010; Park 2008). Second, nationalistic rhetoric only mattered and became more crucial during election period. This was tied to the interests of political actors in securing votes to maintain office. In this regard, leaders were likely to make some adjustments in their foreign policy in order to accommodate nationalist sentiments. Overall, the salience of leaders can be a key consideration in explaining the limited impact of democratisation on countries facing territorial disputes with other countries.

8.3 **The leaders’ factor and the differential impact of democratisation on foreign policy**

This thesis approached the main research question raised in Chapter One by employing a framework developed from theoretical arguments on democratisation, foreign policy decision-making, and the role of identity and ideas in foreign policy. This framework was used to understand the main foreign policy actors in Indonesia’s foreign policy, the influence of Indonesia’s democratic identity in foreign policy, the salience of ideas about democracy and human rights, and about the *bebas-aktif* doctrine in Indonesian foreign policy. This thesis analyses the key roles of leaders in foreign policy by looking at their speeches, statements, and interviews with state officials. This targeted and multi-method approach allowed this thesis to
understand the underlying ideas about foreign policy decisions and to examine the impact of
democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions in specific areas and issues. This study
found that the president and foreign minister remain the key foreign policy actors with the
formal authority to create official state foreign policy. As a result, their ideas about Indonesia’s
identity were paramount, and in this context Indonesia’s democratic identity often served as the
context for certain ideas or values that, in turn, informed leaders’ foreign policy decisions. For
this matter, democratic identity was salient in foreign policy issues that linked Indonesia’s
promotion of political values. In foreign policy cases where Indonesia has no leadership status,
for instance in the case of East Asia cooperation, Indonesia’s foreign policy was instead based
on security rather than the considerations of Indonesia’s democratic identity and ideas about
democracy.

Drawing upon the conceptual framework and the literature review, this thesis argues
that while democratic transition changed Indonesia’s domestic politics by allowing for political
freedom to exist, hence proliferation of foreign policy actors, and certain political values to
feature in the government’s policies, foreign policy decision-making remained top-down
although it has become more consultative and complex. In this case, the role of key foreign
policy actors in the executive (authoritative actors) was not altered by the presence of new
actors as foreign policy decisions were still made based on the authoritative actors’
terpretation of national interests and ideas. Therefore, in analysing Indonesia’s foreign policy
during the Reformasi era, one must focus on the individuals in leadership position in the
government. The role of leaders was also salient in continuing the prominence of bebas-aktif
as Indonesia’s fundamental foreign policy doctrine and in the way Indonesia handled potential
conflict with Malaysia and in Indonesia’s preferences towards regional cooperation in East
Asia. While some foreign policy continuities existed, a number of changes were also visible
during the Reformasi period. They were demonstrated by Indonesia’s foreign policy in ASEAN,
in the BDF, and on Myanmar.

In summary, the overall conclusion of, and the lessons that can be learned from,
Indonesia’s democratisation and its impact on foreign policy are threefold. First,
democratisation, being a political process, cannot solely explain foreign policy decisions. Its
impact on foreign policy could only go as far as providing a context for foreign policy actions.
In assessing these actions, one must delve primarily into the role of leaders and their ideas about
democracy. To this extent, assessing foreign policy decisions that include or reflect the ideas of
democracy can be a yardstick to understand the extent to which foreign policy has been
influenced by democratisation. Second, democratisation is not always resulted in foreign policy
change. The practice of Indonesian foreign policy demonstrates that notwithstanding
democratic transitions, Indonesia’s principal foreign policy doctrine and top-down policy-making processes continued to be relevant. This claim defies the expectations generated by the literature on democratisation and foreign policy decision-making, where the former was believed to affect the latter by making it bottom-up. Third, leaders matter in any political system. In this light, the crucial role of leaders is not limited to authoritarian systems because even in democracies, foreign policy is made and decided by leaders. To this extent, the practice of Indonesian foreign policy suggests that Indonesian Presidents and Foreign Ministers mattered during Reformasi as much as they did during the New Order period. Therefore, examining the role of leaders is useful to understand the extent to which foreign policy change and continuity took place in the context of democratisation.

Ultimately, the limited and differential impact of democratisation on Indonesia’s foreign policy is attributable to the preferences held by Indonesian foreign policy leaders sitting primarily in the executive. They were the variables that explained the change and continuity in Indonesia’s foreign policy during Reformasi, whereas democratisation, as a political process, only served as the context for these developments to come into being. More generally, being a political process, democratisation is not non-reversible as democratic elections in Indonesia could lead to the emergence of anti-democracy leaders. Therefore, the current progresses in Indonesia’s democracy do not necessarily serve as indicators for the sustainability of Indonesia’s democratic system because in the long run the quality of Indonesia’s democracy is, eventually, subject to the commitment of Indonesian leaders to democracy.
Appendices

Appendix 1. The structure of Deplu prior to the bureaucratic reform
Appendix 2. The structure of Deplu in 2005 (bureaucratic reform 2)

Source for Appendix 1 and 2: The Bureau for Personnel, Deplu.
References

Interviews

A former staff member of SKHI, interview, 14 May 2010. The person was interviewed in her capacity as a former member of staff at the Office of the Special Staff to the President for International Relations. She is currently working as a diplomat. For ethical purposes, she prefers to remain anonymous. The interview was conducted in Jakarta.

Abdul Mu’ti, interview, 11 August 2011. Abdul Mu’ti serves as the Secretary of Muhimmadiyah as well as the Executive Director of the Centre for Dialogue and Cooperation amongst Civilisations (CDCC), a non-profit organisation founded and managed by Muhimmadiyah. The interview was conducted at Muhimmadiyah office, Jakarta.

Agus Widojo, interview, 16 December 2009. Agus is a retired Lieutenant General of the Indonesian Army. He was a member of the Parliament, a Deputy Speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). In the military, he served as the Chief of Territorial Affairs of the Indonesian Military (TNI). The interview was conducted at Hotel Grand Hyatt, Jakarta.

Alfitra Salam, interview with Koran Tempo (an Indonesian newspaper), published on 6 September 2009. Alfitra is an academic and researcher at the Indonesian Scientific Agency (LIPI). His interview entitled “Malaysia krisis identitas [Malaysia is having an identity crisis]”.

Ali Alatas, interview with Sinar Harapan (an Indonesian newspaper), 19 February 2007. Ali Alatas was a former Indonesian Foreign Minister (1988-1998). At the time this interview was conducted, he was a member of the Presidential Advisory Council (Wantimpres) for International Affairs. The interview entitled “RI tak Usulkan Opsi Timtim Merdeka [RI did not Suggested the Option for the Independence of East Timor]”, and full text of his interview is available at http://209.85.229.132/search?q=cache:F9MycrY188kJ:www.sinarharapan.co.id/berita/0702/19/sh02.html+opsi+timor+timur&cd=29&hl=id&ct=clnk&client=firefox-a, accessed on the 21st April 2009.

Andrew MacIntyre, interview, 28 July 2011. Andrew MacIntyre was interviewed in his capacity as an observer for Indonesian affairs. He currently serves as the Dean for the School of Asia Pacific, the Australian National University (ANU). The interview was conducted at the ANU, Canberra.

Ann Marie Murphy, interview with the National Bureau of Asian Research, 17 November 2011. Ann Marie Murphy is a US academics at the Seton Hall University. Her focus has been primarily on Indonesia and the US-Indonesia bilateral relationship. The interview was regarding the US accession to the East Asian Summit and the implication it may have on regional cooperation. The full link to her interview is available at <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=183>, accessed on 21 June 2012.

Arthauli Tobing, interview, 28 December 2011. Arthauli is a senior diplomat and former Ambassador to Vietnam. She was interviewed in her capacity as the former Head of Research and Development Body at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. The interview was conducted in her office in Jakarta.

Azyumardi Azra, interview, 2nd March 2009. Professor Azra was a Rector of Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN). He was interviewed in his capacity as an Islamic scholar and a political scientist. The interview took place at the official residence of the Indonesian Deputy Ambassador in London.
Burhanuddin Muhtadi, interview, 22 August 2011. Burhanuddin serves as a researcher at the Indonesian Survey Agency (LSI). He was interviewed in his capacity as a surveyor as well as a political observer. The interview was conducted at Hotel Nikko, Jakarta.

Dewi Fortuna Anwar, interview, 23 August 2011. Dewi was interviewed in her capacity as a scholar on foreign policy. She currently serves as the Deputy to the Secretary of the Indonesian Vice President for Political Affairs. The interview was conducted in Jakarta.

Dino Patti Djalal, interview, 2 June 2010. Dino is a career diplomat and currently serving as the Indonesian Ambassador to the United States of America. He was interviewed in his capacity as the former Special Staff to the President for International Relations. The interview was conducted at Hotel Kempinski, Jakarta.

Douglas Ramage, interview, 9 August 2011. Douglas was interviewed in his capacity as a political scientist and an expert on Indonesian affairs. The interview was conducted in his office in Jakarta.

Eva Kusuma Sundari, interview, 18 May 2012. Eva is an Indonesian member of parliament of the PDIP. She was interviewed in her capacity as the President of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar (AIPMC). The interview was held in London, during her work visit with other Indonesian parliament members.

Hamzah Thayeb, interview, 25 August 2011. Hamzah is a senior Indonesian diplomat and serves as the Indonesian Ambassador to the United Kingdom. He was interviewed in his capacity as the former Director General for Asia Pacific and African Affairs at the Foreign Ministry. The interview was conducted in his office in Jakarta.

Hassan Wirajuda, audience, 7 March 2009. The audience took place during his trip to Zurich, Switzerland.

Hassan Wirajuda, interview, 12 January 2012. Hassan was Indonesian Foreign Minister since 2001-2009. He is currently a member of the Presidential Advisory Council (WANTIMPRES) for International Affairs (2009-2014). The interview was conducted at the Centre for Education and Training of the Foreign Ministry, Jakarta.

Hassan Wirajuda, personal communication, 9 October 2010, Jakarta

I Ketut Erawan, interview, 16 September 2011. Ketut is a scholar at Universitas Udayana. He was interviewed in his capacity as the Director of the Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD). Apart from formal interview, Ketut and I have also engaged in a number of personal communication, particularly throughout 2011. The interview was conducted in Bali.

Juwono Sudarsono, interview, 5 August 2011. Professor Sudarsono was interviewed in his capacity as a former Minister of Defence. The interview was conducted in Hotel Sultan, Jakarta.

Khin Ohmar, interview, 17 May 2012. Khin is a Burmese pro-democracy activist and currently runs a non-governmental organisation called Burma Partnership. The interview was conducted via exchange of emails.

Leonard Sebastian, interview, 5 December 2011. Professor Sebastian is a researcher and serves as the Head of Indonesian Programme at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyang Technology University (NTU), Singapore. The interview was conducted in his office in Singapore.

Leonard Sebastian, speaking at Universitas Paramadina in a seminar on Indonesia’s foreign policy, 8 June 2010.

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Rafendi Djamin, interview, 8 August 2011. Rafendi is a human rights activist and a chair of Human Rights Watch. He was interviewed in his capacity as the Indonesian Representative to the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). The interview was conducted in his office in Jakarta.

Renne Kawilarang, personal communication, 2011. Renne is an Indonesian journalist covering news primarily on foreign affairs and diplomacy. He was stationed at the Foreign Ministry. The communication was conducted in a café in Jakarta.

Rizal Sukma, interview, 3 October 2010. Rizal is the Director of CSIS, Indonesia and known as a prominent Indonesian scholar on foreign affairs. He was interviewed in his capacity as the previously mentioned position. The interview was conducted at the CSIS temporary office, Jakarta.

Theo Sambuaga, interview, 30 March 2010. Theo is a senior politician and a chair of Golkar party. He was interviewed in his capacity as a former Chairman of the Komisi I of the Indonesian People’s Representative Council (DPR). The interview was conducted at his residence in Jakarta.

Usman Hamid, interview, 10 August 2011. Usman is a prominent Indonesian human rights activist. He was interviewed in his capacity as a former Coordinator of the Commission for Missing Persons and Violence Victims (KONTRAS), a human rights non-governmental organisation. The interview was conducted in his office in Jakarta.

Wisbury Loes, interview, 5 August 2011. Wisber is a retired diplomat and a former Indonesian Ambassador to Japan. He was interviewed in his capacity as a senior diplomat who served the most part of the Suharto’s administration. The interview was conducted at his residence in Jakarta.

Yuri Thamrin, interview, 16 July 2007. Yuri is a senior Indonesian diplomat. He served as the Indonesian Ambassador to the United Kingdom and currently is the Director General for Asia Pacific and African Affairs at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. He was interviewed in his capacity as a former Director for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. The interview was conducted via exchange of emails during the completion of the author’s Masters Dissertation in Birmingham. Only relevant materials arise from this interview is included in this Doctoral Thesis.

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