

The London School of Economics and Political Science

**OIL AND WOMEN'S POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION:
A SUB-NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE
OF PROTESTS AND NGOS IN NIGERIA**

Sharon Shochat

A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. London, September 2014

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 83,460 words.

Abstract

The *resource curse* literature, which links natural resource abundance with negative political and economic outcomes, is largely based on large-N cross-national studies. This thesis examines the effects of oil production on women's political participation at the *sub-national* level, comparing the 36 states in the Nigerian federation, of which some are oil-producing. Shedding new light on the negative effects of oil production at the local and community level, and exploring the gender-related dimensions of the resource curse, I argue that the effect of oil varies across different forms of political activity: while oil production may have a negative impact on women's legislative participation, it can also have a positive impact on non-formal types of political participation, specifically protest and NGO activity. I further suggest that the underlying trigger for both of these effects is oil's impact on women's work, which is manifested differently at national and local levels. The analysis is based on a mixed-methods approach that combines quantitative and qualitative tools, including original datasets on oil production and legislative participation, women's protests, and women-led NGOs across Nigeria's states.

The combination of evidence offers a wide-ranging repertoire of the impact of oil on women. Drawing on historical evidence and women's testimonies, this thesis suggests that oil production has negatively affected women's labour force participation in Nigeria, while women's work in oil-producing *states* has been further diminished due to environmental degradation and regional militarisation. The extremely low levels of female legislative participation in Nigeria at both the national and state levels are linked with the negative impact of oil on women's work. Analysing a dataset of press reports and a directory of Nigerian NGOs to compare oil and non-oil producing states in the Nigerian federation, this thesis finds strong evidence for the impact of oil on women's *non-formal* political participation at the local level, in oil-producing states. Thus, evidence from Nigeria suggests that oil production may have a dual effect on women's political participation – undermining formal participation while increasing non-formal participation, a finding that adds to our understanding of the resource curse, women's political participation, and the link between the two.

Acknowledgements

This research project has benefited from the input of numerous individuals.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my extremely devoted, infinitely patient, and enormously supportive supervisors, Joachim Wehner and David Held. Like many other PhD theses, mine required a great deal of perseverance – not just on my part but also on the part of my supervisors, who remained faithful believers in the project (and me) through numerous deadlocks. Joachim’s extraordinary ability to motivate, critical eye for detail, and imaginative resourcefulness at times my ideas could not be matched by supportive data (or, at times I ran out of ideas), have made this thesis possible. David’s unwavering support along my lengthy and bumpy PhD road provided me with confidence, resilience and diligence. I am eternally grateful to both; any errors in the thesis remain my own. I would like to further acknowledge the generous funding received from my department at the LSE through annual research and teaching studentships, the LSE’s Ralph Miliband Award, the Bna’i Brith organisation, and several other donors who prefer to remain anonymous.

Throughout the course of this thesis, I came to meet many Nigerians, some of whom are the most charming, humble and hard-working individuals I have ever met. Special thanks go to activists Sokari Ekine, Safiya Ibn-Garba, and Caroline Usikpedo-Omoniye, as well as to the staff members of NNNGO, who facilitated my communication with hundreds of organisations across Nigeria.

I would also like to thank Peter Held for his wise advice, Dan Perry for commenting on some of the empirical work and my awkward prose in English, and my sisters – and sisters-in-arms – for their moral support. Finally, I thank my son Ethan. Although his birth in the middle of the writing stage did not facilitate timely submission – in fact, quite the opposite – his arrival brought learning of a different kind which has enriched my world and my work in countless ways.

List of Abbreviations

CAC – Corporate Affairs Commission
EWEI – Empowering Women for Excellence Initiative
FCT – Federal Capital Territory
FLFP – Female Labour Force Participation
FOWA – Federation of Ogoni Women’s Associations
HRW – Human Rights Watch
ILO – International Labour Organization
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IPU – Inter Parliamentary Union
LGAs – Local Government Areas
MENA – Middle East and North Africa
MEND – Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
NBS – National Bureau of Statistics
NDPVF – Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force
NDWJ – Niger Delta Women for Justice
NDWPD – Niger Delta Women for Peace and Development
NGOs – Non-Governmental Organisations
NNNGO – Nigeria Network of Non-Governmental Organisations
NNPC – Nigerian National Petroleum Company
SAP – Structural Adjustment Program
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
UNEP – United Nations Environmental Program
WB – World Bank

List of Tables

Table 2.1: Labour force participation rates and female parliamentary seats by region (%)	48
Table 3.1: Nigerian men and women in employment – 1952/53 Census (thousands)	70
Table 3.2: Commodity exports' share of total exports – 1960-1986 (%)	75
Table 3.3: Agricultural and oil production share of GDP, export and revenue –1960-2010	75
Table 3.4: Employment by industry, gender and region – 1960, 1964 (thousands)	79
Table 3.5: Urban labour force participation and unemployment rates – 1967-1983 (%)	80
Table 3.6: Post-oil boom employment in urban areas by industry and gender – 1983 (%)	81
Table 3.7: Indicators of women's work in oil and non-oil producing states, averages (%)	88
Table A3.1: Indicators of women's work in Nigeria by state (%)	102
Table 4.1: Women's share of seats in national and state assemblies, selected years	108
Table 4.2: Women elected to public office in Nigeria – 1999-2007	109
Table 4.3: Female representation in Sub-Saharan Africa's oil-producers – 2014	112
Table 4.4: Chronology of change to Nigeria's revenue sharing formula – 1958-2001	123
Table 4.5: <i>Oil Revenue Per Capita</i> and female seats – 2007	126
Table A4.1: Seats in Nigeria's National Assembly by state and gender – 1999-2007	128
Table A4.2: Seats in Nigeria's State Houses by state and gender – 1999-2007	129
Table A4.3: Chronology of Nigeria's division into sub-units – 1914-1996	130
Table A4.4: Oil Revenue Per Capita in Nigeria's oil-producing states – 3/2000-4/2007	130
Table 5.1: Reported protests in Nigeria – 1/2000-3/2007	149
Table A5.1: Government's share in major oil production facilities in Nigeria	168
Table A5.2: Women-led protests in the dataset – 1/2000-3/2007	168
Table 6.1: NGOs operating in Nigeria: level of operations and women-led status – 2013	192
Table 6.2: EWEI vs. NDWPD	206
Table A6.1: Local and regional women-led organisations in the dataset	208

List of Figures

Graph 3.1: Nigeria's labour force participation rate, male and female – 1990-2012 (%)	82
Graph 3.2: Female labour force participation rate by state – 2007 (%)	85
Graph 3.3: Share of female farmers by state – 2005-6 (%)	86
Graph 3.4: Female unemployment rate by state – 2007 (%)	87
Graph 3.5: Female-headed households by state – 2007 (%)	88
Graph 4.1: Female share of seats in Nigeria's National Assembly – 1999-2007	109
Graph 4.2: Female share of seats in legislatures by state, averages (%) – 1999-2007	114
Graph 4.3: Female share of seats, oil vs. non-oil states, averages (%) – 1999-2007	115
Graph 4.4: Oil Revenue Per Capita in Nigeria's oil-producing states – 3/2000-4/2007	124
Graph 5.1: Women-led protests in oil vs. non-oil states – 1/2000-3/2007	149
Graph 5.2: Number of protests in Nigeria by state – 2000-2007	150
Graph 5.3: Share of women-led protests in Nigeria by state – 2000-2007 (%)	150
Graph 6.1: Share of women-led NGOs in oil vs. non-oil states and regions (%)	192
Graph 6.2: Number of NGOs in Nigeria by state – 2013	193
Graph 6.3: Share of women-led NGOs in Nigeria by state – 2013 (%)	193

List of Maps

Map 1.1: The Nigerian federation of 36 states	32
Map 1.2: Nigeria's nine oil-producing states	32
Map 4.1: Nigeria's three federal regions – 1954	119
Map 4.2: Nigeria's division to 12 federal states – 1967	121
Map 5.1: Delta and Ogun states, Nigeria	156
Map 5.2: Urhoboland, Delta State	159
Map 6.1: Nigeria's six geo-political zones	189
Map 6.2: Delta and Kaduna states, Nigeria	196

Table of Contents

<i>Declaration</i>	<i>ii</i>
<i>Abstract</i>	<i>iii</i>
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	<i>iv</i>
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	<i>v</i>
<i>List of Tables</i>	<i>vi</i>
<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>vii</i>
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	2
<i>The thesis outline</i>	<i>5</i>
1.1 Rethinking the Resource Curse Theory	8
1.1.1 Oil's negative impact on economic and political outcomes	8
1.1.2 Integrating historical, local, and gender evidence	14
1.2 Rethinking the Study of Political Participation	17
1.2.1 Women's low formal political participation	18
1.2.2 Women's high non-formal political participation	20
1.3 Engendering the Resource Curse and Political Participation	24
1.3.1 Why focus on gender?	25
1.3.2 Oil impacts women's work	26
1.3.3 Oil impacts women's political participation	29
1.3.4 From cross-national to sub-national	30
1.3.5 Why Nigeria?	33
1.3.6 A mixed-methods strategy	35
Conclusion	38
CHAPTER 2: THE NEXUS BETWEEN OIL, WORK, POLITICS AND WOMEN	39
2.1 Women's Work and Political Empowerment	41
2.1.1 Labour force participation empowers women	42
2.1.2 Formal employment enhances formal political participation	45
2.1.3 How decreased work opportunities can also empower women	47
2.2 Oil's Effects on Women's Work and Political Participation	51
2.2.1 Decreasing women's work at the national level	52
2.2.2 Decreasing women's work at the local level	57
2.2.3 The dual effect of oil on women's political participation	61
Conclusion	63
<i>Appendix 2</i>	<i>64</i>
CHAPTER 3: MORE OIL, LESS WORK	67
3.1 Oil's Impact on Women's Work: the National Level	69
3.1.1 Women's high participation in the labour force <i>pre</i> oil	69
3.1.2 Oil, Dutch Disease and Nigeria's labour force	73
3.1.3 Women's low participation in the labour force <i>post</i> oil	78
3.2 Oil's Impact on Women's Work: the Local Level	83
3.2.1 Oil-producing states vs. non-oil producing states	83
3.2.2 Environmental degradation and women's work	90
3.2.3 Regional militarisation and women's work	96
Conclusion	101
<i>Appendix 3</i>	<i>102</i>

CHAPTER 4: OIL LIMITS LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION	104
4.1 Women in Legislatures Before and After Oil	105
4.1.1 Before 1999: from high to low formal participation	106
4.1.2 After 1999: the national level	108
4.1.3 After 1999: the state level	112
4.2 Measuring Oil Revenue Across Oil-Producing States	117
4.2.1 Nigeria's revenue sharing formula and federalism	118
4.2.2 The centralisation of oil revenue through state creation	120
4.2.3 <i>Oil Revenue Per Capita</i> and female legislative participation	123
Conclusion	127
<i>Appendix 4</i>	128
 CHAPTER 5: ENHANCED PROTEST ACTIVITY IN OIL COMMUNITIES	132
5.1 Women's Protests in Response to Colonialism and Oil	135
5.1.1 Protests before the oil era	135
5.1.2 Protests in the Muslim North	137
5.1.3 Protests during the oil era	139
5.1.4 Explaining men's absence from the protests	141
5.2 Press Analysis Across Nigeria's 36 States	144
5.2.1 Analysis outline	145
5.2.2 Results	147
5.2.3 Discussion	150
5.3 Case Studies of Oil and Non-Oil States	155
5.3.1 Delta State	156
5.3.2 Ogun State	162
5.3.3 Discussion	165
Conclusion	166
<i>Appendix 5</i>	168
 CHAPTER 6: OIL-INDUCED NGO ACTIVITY	173
6.1 Women's Associations in Response to Colonialism and Oil	176
6.1.1 Associations before the oil era	176
6.1.2 Organisations during the oil era	179
6.1.3 Men's alternative: militant organisations	181
6.2 NGO Analysis Across Nigeria's 36 States	185
6.2.1 Directory selection	186
6.2.2 Analysis outline	187
6.2.3 Results	190
6.2.4 Discussion	193
6.3 Case Studies of Oil and Non-Oil States	195
6.3.1 Empowering Women for Excellence Initiative, Kaduna State	196
6.3.2 Niger Delta Women for Peace and Development, Delta State	200
6.3.3 Discussion	204
Conclusion	206
<i>Appendix 6</i>	208

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS	210
7.1 Women participate differently in politics	212
7.2 Women mobilise over economic marginalisation	215
7.3 Oil may have a dual effect on women's political participation	218
7.4 Concluding remarks	221
Bibliography	222
Data Appendix	244
Chapter 4 – further regressions	244
Protests dataset – LexisNexis, 575 items	248
NGOs dataset – NNNGO, 363 items	270
Representation dataset – various sources	280
Chapter 4 – further regressions	

‘Ever since they discovered oil in our land,
They drill, dry and fry us with the fishes and farmlands all cooking in oil...
Do you smell the fishes roasting in their hot oil poured over the rivers?’
‘Yes! They’ve refined our oil into a curse!’
‘Where? Where else in the world does oil cease to anoint?’
‘Here, here, here!’
‘Plants, animals, children, men, women cooking in their oil.
Oil sapped from the very soil of our sagging land.
Ah! People of sufferland! Do you see yourself drowning?’
‘Yes!’
‘No more waiting!’

From What Mama Said: An Epic Drama
A play by Ms. Osonye Tess Onwueme, 2003

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

On a rainy afternoon in November 2002, a group of fifty women lay down naked on the wet grass in the middle of a field in Point Reyes Station, West Marin, California. The women were literally embodying the word ‘peace’ in protest of the planned US invasion of Iraq. The photo taken of the event spread like wildfire; in the weeks and months that followed, naked women protests took place in Florida, Washington, Hong Kong, Australia, France and the Antarctica, turning into a worldwide movement that saw marches of naked anti-war protestors (initially all-women, later joined by men) in countries on every continent. Though the protest movement was initiated largely in the West, it was inspired by women’s protests in one of Africa’s most remote hotspots – the Niger Delta. The anti-war movement’s founder, Donna Sheehan, stated that after pondering extensively a way ‘women can be heard on a very deep level’, the group formulated the idea following a protest in Nigeria in which ‘the [naked] Nigerian women shamed the men and won their cause’.¹ This particular ‘cause’ was pollution, economic devastation and militarisation brought to Nigeria’s oil-producing region by the oil industry.



Photo by Art Rogers, 2002

In at least 13 different all-women protests between July and August 2002, women of all ages and ethnic groups in the Niger Delta mobilised *en masse*, some with infants strapped to their backs, to demand clean water provision, electricity, employment and compensation for damages caused to farmlands and fishing ponds by reckless oil spillages, gas flaring and other oil operations. During one protest, 600 women took over ChevronTexaco’s oil export terminal in Escravos, preventing hundreds of members of staff from entering the site,

¹ Ivan 2002.

blocking the docks and the airstrip, and shutting down oil operations for ten days. In another protest, about a hundred women paddled a giant canoe five miles into the high seas of the Gulf of Guinea to take over ChevronTexaco's production platform in the port city of Warri. Women leaders in the region planned a coordinated protest at all major oil installations across the Niger Delta's six major oil-producing states, intending to 'completely paralyse oil... activities for one week'.² These protests inspired not only the anti-war women's movement, but also consumer boycott campaigns in Europe against ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil.

Women's protests in response to oil-related concerns are not unique to the Niger Delta, where they have been taking place unnoticed since the 1980s. Recent examples include a protest in Rio de Janeiro, where thousands of women wearing carnival costumes protested in 2010 against the Oil Royalties Bill on the division of oil royalties between Brazil's 26 states; in Wellington, New Zealand, where Maori women have been protesting since 2011 against oil exploration over their territory; in Cape Town, where women have been leading the battle against fracking, a controversial method of extracting oil or natural gas from underground layers of rock, carrying out all-women marches in the city in 2011; in Peru's Northern Amazon region, where indigenous women of the Achuar tribe protested against the state's oil company's plans to exploit oil reserves over the tribe's land; and in London, where six female Greenpeace activists from across Europe successfully reached the top of the Shard Building in July 2013 following a 17-hour climb in protest against Shell's plans to drill for oil in the Arctic.³ However, oil has not led to women's protests universally; across oil-producing countries in the Middle East, for example, there have been no reports of oil-related protest activity involving women.

If oil incites women's protests in some countries, but does not have a similar effect in others, this then raises questions about the effects of oil, or oil production, on women's political participation.⁴ By *women* I refer here not to women as individuals, but as members of a group that is systematically disadvantaged and discriminated against on the basis of gender. It could be argued that oil does not affect women in a systematic way, or that it affects women's political participation only under certain conditions, for example, when they

² Vanguard, August 3 2002.

³ Cryptome 2012; Suurmond 2011; Spath 2011; Hill 2013; Mound 2013, respectively.

⁴ Hereafter, I use the terms 'oil production', 'oil wealth', or simply 'oil' interchangeably, referring to both oil and natural gas.

are not subjected to political freedom restrictions placed by Islamic traditions. Another contention might be that women's protests against the oil industry should not be considered *political*, since women's protests do not intend, or do not have the capacity, to shape political outcomes, or because women are not typically motivated by political goals. This thesis aims to challenge these views by systematically examining the relationship between oil production and women's political participation, while extending the *political* to include both formal and non-formal types of activities.

The consideration of different modes of political activity intends to overcome gender-blindness; it presupposes that women's political participation is different from men's – differences ordained by gender, and suggests the incorporation of this understanding into the measurement of women's political participation and influence. Accordingly, I presume that oil production impacts men and women's political participation differently, in ways that have yet to be fully explored. Thus, the puzzle guiding this research project can be summarised as follows: in oil-rich countries, how does oil production affect women's political participation? For the purposes of this thesis, oil-rich countries refer to low-income oil exporters.⁵ I use *political participation* to refer to both formal political activities – institutionalised modes of political action that strictly concern the electoral process, such as voting, party membership, donating money to a political party, or running for elected office, and non-institutionalised modes of political action that do not (necessarily) concern the electoral process, such as protests.⁶

Addressing this puzzle requires attending to a host of related sub-questions on women's political engagement and the impact of oil production more generally. In what ways is women's political participation different to men's and what are the sources of this disparity? Which channels generate the political mobilisation of women in general, and the political mobilisation of women in oil-rich countries in particular? Do the effects of oil production differ along different forms of political participation? And if so, what are the implications of such findings for the way we should think about, and assess, women's political influence? And, can the effects of oil production vary within the same country

⁵ The resource curse largely affects low and middle-income countries.

⁶ This definition is based on Barns and Kaase's 1979 distinction between 'conventional' and 'unconventional' political participation. I use the terms 'formal' and 'non-formal' because the original distinction implies that non-formal activities are unusual when in fact, they are not, especially for women. I use the terms political 'participation', 'activity' and 'action' interchangeably.

between producing and non-producing sub-national units? I raise these questions in the context of Nigeria, a federation in which oil is produced only in states within the Niger Delta region, allowing for a sub-national comparison of oil and non-oil producing *states* in the same country. This within-country setting was chosen in order to provide an alternative framework for the analysis of the negative impact of oil on economic and political outcomes – a paradox known as the *resource curse* – which is typically studied *cross-nationally*.

By studying the effects of oil production on women's political participation in a sub-national setting, this thesis aims to offer new insights on gender-related aspects of the resource curse, as well as on the effects of oil production at the local, community level, while enriching our understanding of women as political actors. My examination of the impact of oil on some political outcomes provides evidence both for claims made in earlier studies and new claims raised here. In line with resource curse theory, I suggest that oil production has a systematic effect on women's political participation in oil-producing countries. However, this thesis further argues, and here may lie its greatest contribution, that under certain conditions the direction of this effect can be twofold: while oil production may decrease women's formal political participation, it can also *increase* women's non-formal political participation at the local level, in oil-producing communities. Exploring the nature of these conditions and tracing the process through which oil diminishes certain types of political engagement while inciting others are at the heart of this research project.

The thesis outline

The thesis consists of seven chapters, which are organised thematically. Following this introduction, the remainder of Chapter 1 critically examines key findings of two distinct bodies of literature – studies on the natural resource curse and scholarship on political participation – amplifying limitations that are shared by research in these two fields and addressed in this work. In particular, I stress the importance of three often-overlooked key issues – *historical* evidence, *local* particularities and *gender-based* differences – in explaining the effects of oil production, women's political participation and the relationship between the two. In the last part of this chapter, I outline theoretical and methodological aspects that are central to this research: the importance of focusing on gender differences, the application of a sub-national research design, Nigeria's selection as the primary source for

empirical evidence, and the utilisation of a mixed-methods approach in the thesis, while providing a broad overview of the argument.

In Chapter 2, I set out to delineate the theoretical framework motivating the thesis. The central role of this chapter is to sketch the causal mechanisms I suggest underlie the impact of oil on women's political participation. Although my theory draws on previous accounts of the link between oil and women's political influence, it has two unique features: the consideration of both formal and non-formal political activities, and the assessment of these at two different levels of analysis: national and local (state). The synthesis of these four elements results in a set of claims on the links between oil and women's formal political participation (in legislatures) at national and local levels, and oil and women's non-formal political participation (via protest and NGO activity) at the local level, which are articulated in a set of five hypotheses at the end of the chapter. At the national level, I draw on an established link between Dutch Disease symptoms and women's work to explain low female legislative participation in oil-producing countries, whereas at the local level, I suggest that the effects of pollution and militarisation on women's work in oil-producing states explains their increased protest and NGO activity in those states.

Chapters 3 to 6 contain the core empirical work of the thesis, organised to reflect the steps in my argument and inquiry. Across these chapters, I utilise a research approach that includes a combination of historical, quantitative and qualitative evidence (largely in that order within each chapter). Chapter 3 explores the effects of oil production in Nigeria on women's work from the 1960s to the 2000s at the national and local levels. At the national level, I examine female labour force participation in Nigeria before and after oil became a dominant sector, using labour force surveys and other economic data from the 1920s onwards, as well as assessing the appearance of Dutch Disease symptoms and the negative effect these had on the participation of women in the formal labour force. At the local level, I use data per *state* to measure women's labour participation across two groups of states – oil-producing and non-oil producing – finding differences between the two groups. I then use testimonies (secondary sources) collected from women in oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta to demonstrate the adverse impact of oil-related environmental degradation and militarisation on their work.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine the effects of oil on three types of political participation. In Chapter 4, I examine the link between oil and women's legislative participation in Nigeria

at national and sub-national levels. This test, which is largely statistical, follows two key assessments: first, an analysis of female representation in Nigeria before and after 1999 – when the transition to democracy took place – at national and state levels, measured by the number of female seats in both houses of Parliament and in State Houses of Assembly over three sets of elections (1999 to 2007). Second, an analysis of Nigeria's revenue sharing formula to identify the precise division of oil revenue since oil production began between two tiers of government – federal and state, and between oil and non-oil producing states, in order to develop a measure for oil revenue in Nigeria *per state* (oil revenue is used as a proxy for oil production per state). I then use multivariate regressions to analyse the links between oil production and women's legislative participation across Nigeria, following a similar test that was previously conducted *cross-nationally*.

Both Chapter 5 and 6 explore the effects of oil on women's non-formal political participation at the *sub-national* level. While structurally corresponding, the analysis in each of the two chapters is based on historical evidence, a unique dataset, and two case studies – oil and non-oil producing Nigerian states, following the principles of the Nested-Analysis research design (see Section 1.3.6). In both chapters, I suggest that women's choice of non-formal political activity had been prompted similarly under colonialism and the oil regime at times women were faced with economic marginalisation. In Chapter 5, which focuses on women's protest activity, I analyse a dataset of press reports obtained from the LexisNexis service on protests in Nigeria over a period of seven years. In Chapter 6, which focuses on women's NGO activity, I analyse a directory of NGOs compiled using the member-list of a local umbrella organisation of NGOs. Finding significant differences between oil and non-oil producing states, both chapters provide strong evidence for the link between oil and women's non-formal political participation at the state level, as well as support the idea that women's political activity is fundamentally different from men's.

In the final chapter, Chapter 7, I return to the four questions posed in the introduction to this thesis and provide answers to these questions, while summarising my key findings and reflecting on their theoretical and empirical implications. I further point out the strengths and weaknesses of my work, and offer some avenues for future research.

1.1 Rethinking the Resource Curse Theory

In 2008, the Oil, Gas and Mining Policy Division of the World Bank led community discussions in oil-producing communities in Peru, Poland, Tanzania and Papua New Guinea, to evaluate risks and benefits to communities in which extractive industries operate. The project revealed a striking insight into the negative impact of extractive industries specifically for women, identifying how benefits and risks of mining (oil, gas and coal) are unevenly distributed among different segments of the community: ‘men have most access to the benefits, which consist primarily of employment and income, while women... are more vulnerable to the risks created by extractive industries, which consist of mostly harmful social and environmental impacts’.⁷ Suggesting that men and women experience social and economic transformations differently is not novel; as early as 1985, the United Nations Third World Conference on Women called for *gender mainstreaming* – an assessment of different implications for men and women of planned policy action. However, research into the impact of natural resources on economic and political outcomes has remained – with a few notable exceptions – largely gender-blind. In this section, I outline key findings in the resource curse literature and review prominent weaknesses that are addressed in this work.

1.1.1 Oil’s negative impact on economic and political outcomes

The ‘resource curse hypothesis’ first referred to a negative association between natural resource-abundance and economic growth.⁸ It was based on findings in the early 1990s, the result of extensive research prompted by the economic collapse of many oil exporters in the early 1980s, that low and middle-income countries with an abundance of natural resources tended to have less economic growth compared with countries with little or no natural resources. This outcome was paradoxical since the extreme wealth bestowed on resource-rich countries should potentially improve, rather than hinder, their economic development. However, it substantiated concerns expressed already in the 1950s and 1960s by some economists that trade in natural resources would impact developing countries negatively (as well as a long-standing philosophers’ anxiety *vis-à-vis* the negative impact of great wealth of any source on societies).⁹

⁷ Eftimie, Heller, and Strongman 2009, 1.

⁸ The ‘resource curse hypothesis’ was first suggested by Auty (1993).

⁹ While some economists predicted that dependency on natural resources would run counter to growth (for example, Hirschman 1958; Seers 1964; Baldwin 1966), others envisioned a large flow of capital as crucial for

Since the early 1990s, numerous studies have confirmed in large-N cross-national settings that natural resource abundance, particularly oil abundance, runs counter to long-term growth.¹⁰ In a series of formative papers, economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner examined the growth rates of 97 countries over an 18-year period, linking natural resource-abundance with slower growth rates, even after controlling for a wide range of variables, leading them to conclude that ‘the curse of natural resources is a demonstrable empirical fact’.¹¹ Another study found that the GDP per capita of OPEC members decreased on average by 1.3 percent between 1965 and 1998, while in the rest of the developing world, per capita growth rate was 2.2 percent on average.¹² It was similarly found that in 2004, at least 34 developing countries relied on oil and natural gas for at least a third of their export revenues, while more than one third of these countries had annual per capita incomes below \$1500 (prescribing them as poor).¹³ Although these studies were criticised on various grounds, the evidence proved so convincing that the ‘natural resource curse’ was classified as one of the ten most robust relationships in economic growth literature.¹⁴

The term *resource curse* was then popularised and extended to refer to various pathologies prevalent in many oil-producing countries, particularly their tendency to evade democracy and become embroiled in civil war. The anti-democratic effect of oil was registered already in the ‘rentier state’ theory of the 1970s, which linked high governmental reliance on oil-derived economic rents with the depression of democratisation in the Middle East.¹⁵ Further work in the 1990s established links between oil and authoritarianism, a lack of government accountability and openness, rent seeking, corruption and weak public institutions.¹⁶ For example, a study of 113 countries concluded that between 1971 and 1997,

growth (for example, Viner 1952; Lewis 1955; Watkins 1963). French philosopher Jean Bodin famously asserted: ‘Men of a fat and fertile soil are most commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas contrariwise a barren country make men temperate by necessity and by consequence careful, vigilant, and industrious’ (1576).

¹⁰ See, for example, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003; Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006; Melhum, Moene, and Torvik 2006; Collier and Goderis 2009.

¹¹ Sachs and Warner 2001, 828. See also Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997a, b.

¹² Gylfason 2000. OPEC members include Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Venezuela.

¹³ Birdsall and Subramanian 2004.

¹⁴ Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin 2000.

¹⁵ Mahdavy 1970. The term *rent* refers to the revenue kept after subtracting costs to government. It is most frequently applied to oil producers since oil rent is exceptionally high, estimated at 95-97 percent of gross receipts (Yates 1996).

¹⁶ On oil’s anti-democratic effects, see Beblawi 1987; Chaudhary 1994; Van de Walle 1994; Karl 1997; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Ramsey 2006; Ross 2001, 2012. On oil and corruption, see Yates 1996; Isham et al.

‘oil and minerals [had] strong antidemocratic effects’.¹⁷ Similar conclusions were reached in a study of 156 countries between 1972 and 2002, which found that an increase of one percent in resource dependence led to nearly an eight percent increase in the probability of authoritarianism, and in various other studies.¹⁸ In a 2006 *Foreign Affairs* article, journalist Thomas Friedman proposed the ‘first law of petro-politics’, according to which ‘the price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions in oil-rich petrolist states’.¹⁹

Work on the links between natural resource abundance and civil war was pioneered by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, who associated natural resource abundance with civil war, armed conflict and violence.²⁰ Various studies confirmed that the probability of resource-rich countries to get involved in civil conflict was far higher than that of resource-poor countries (ranging from more than twice to over ten times higher).²¹ Further work found that in places where both sides of the conflict had access to natural resource financing (such as Angola, Senegal and Sudan), civil wars were longer than in places where fighting groups had no access to such resources (such as Nigeria and Mali).²² It was also suggested that conflicts are likely to make countries more dependent on natural resources, producing conflicts that are more difficult to resolve, and that in response to threats by non-state actors, tensions in producing regions, or other political unrest, resource wealth has tended to generate higher levels of military spending.²³ Oil in particular was linked to war: ‘petroleum is unique... it has more potential than any of the others [natural resources] to provoke major crisis and conflicts in the years ahead’.²⁴

Oil was further linked with social inequality, highly skewed income distribution, and low levels of human capital and school enrolment, while the *resource curse* became a catchphrase used commonly to refer to oil-producing countries’ various ailments.²⁵ Terry Karl, a

2003; Shaxson 2007. On oil and institutions see Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 2002. For a literature survey, see Rosser 2006.

¹⁷ Ross 2001, 341.

¹⁸ Wantchekon 2002. Aslaksen (2010) found that the levels of oil systematically predicted both levels and changes in democracy.

¹⁹ Friedman 2006.

²⁰ Collier and Hoeffler 2000, 2002, 2004.

²¹ See, for example, Soysa 2000; Le Billon 2001, 2005; Addison, Le Billon and Mansoob 2001; Ross 2003, 2004; Auty 2004; Fearon 2005.

²² Humphreys 2005.

²³ Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Humphreys 2005; Bannon and Collier 2003; respectively.

²⁴ Klare 2006, xiii. It was also suggested that oil could influence the conflict potential *between* countries, leading to further war and militarisation (Struver and Wegenast 2011).

²⁵ On oil and social inequality see Nankani 1979; Gelb 1988; Ross 2007a. On oil and human capital see Wood and Berge 1997. On oil and school enrolment see Gylfason 2001.

prominent scholar in the field, argued that the resource curse phenomenon is ‘not confined to the world’s hotspots such as Iraq, Indonesia, Sudan, Chad, the Niger Delta, and Colombia but also extends to more peaceful countries...’.²⁶ However, despite strong evidence to support the resource curse theory, there is little agreement among scholars on the precise mechanisms that underlie the negative effects of oil. Typically, accounts focus on one of the harms associated with the resource curse and the actions (or lack of action) by the governments of oil-producing countries that trigger that problem. For example, negative or slower-than-expected economic growth has been often explained by the mentality of governments, who – blinded by massive inflows of oil revenues – are led to short-sighted policies, careless economic planning, insufficient economic diversification, rent-seeking and corruption, all of which ultimately depress economic growth.²⁷

Similarly, the anti-democratic effects of oil have been attributed to governments’ avoidance of extracting income from non-oil sources, especially taxes. Avoiding taxation, which was identified as essential to the development of democracy through the facilitation of strong bureaucratic institutions, state-citizen relations, good governance and more egalitarian societies, frees the governments of oil-producing countries from the need to be accountable to their citizens, who on their part have little incentive to monitor the government and thus little or no control over its policies.²⁸ Governments’ establishment of generous welfare programmes, inflated public sectors, and wage increases to employees that are unrelated to productivity, have been shown to further discourage opposition to government and the creation of civil society, as citizenry consent is gained through patronage rather than through debate, deliberation and participation.²⁹ This, it is argued, prepares the ground for the proliferation of rent-seeking behaviour, which breeds corruption in government and business.³⁰ A non-democratic government funded by oil revenues also has the resources to pursue direct repression and violence against any opposition, facilitating civil war and militarisation, which further serve to keep autocrats in power and democracy at bay.

²⁶ Karl 2007, 257.

²⁷ Such arguments are made in Sachs and Warner 1995; Mikesell 1998; Ross 1999; Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004. See also Lane and Tornell (1996) on the relationship between natural resources and growth.

²⁸ On taxation and democracy, see Ross 2007b; Karl 2007.

²⁹ Patronage refers to ‘the way in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support’ (Weingrod 1968, 379).

³⁰ Shaxson 2007.

Another prominent set of explanations to account for the resource curse focuses on the distinct properties of oil revenues, which are ‘unusually large, do not come from taxes, fluctuate unpredictably, and can be easily hidden’.³¹ Oil industry nationalisation during the 1960s and 1970s by oil exporters in the developing world presented governments with unprecedented large windfalls, on which they became dependent, rendering their economies vulnerable to the high volatility of oil revenues.³² The petroleum industry’s tendency to operate as an enclave economy further explains poor economic performance, as weak linkages to other sectors fail to transmit growth to the rest of the economy.³³ Furthermore, oil industry operations can help explain the emergence of civil war: if local populations are subjected to forced migration, loss of lands and environmental damage, or if their incomes are smaller than expected, grievances can lead to political unrest and civil war, especially in regions that are ‘geographically peripheral, have little influence over the central government, and are populated by citizens with a distinct ethnic or religious identity’.³⁴ The large scale of revenue can also incite greed; civil wars can be prompted if local groups find attractive the idea of benefiting from resources independent of the state.³⁵ Resource control can also provide an opportunity to sustain conflict through natural resource exploitation.³⁶

Finally, the most popular account for the *economic* resource curse, the Dutch Disease, considers both government actions and the unusual properties of oil. The term was coined in 1977 by *The Economist* to describe the negative effects of natural gas extraction in Holland during the 1960s on the country’s manufacturing industry. According to the economic model that followed, Dutch Disease involves three key effects: (1) a rapid expansion of a booming extractive sector and a massive flow of revenue into the country, which increases government spending and leads to a rise in domestic demand for goods (the ‘spending effect’); (2) a consequent rise in the prices of non-tradable goods (construction and services), and a drop in the prices of traditional tradable goods (manufacturing and agriculture) (the ‘relative price effect’); and, (3) a flow of foreign currency into the country which leads to a currency appreciation, making imports more attractive than domestically

³¹ Ross 2012, 6. On the unique qualities of oil revenues, see also Karl 1997; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Dunning 2005; Morrison 2009.

³² The volatility of oil revenues is produced by changes in oil prices, changes in production rates, and the contracts between governments and oil companies (Ross 2012).

³³ This problem was first observed in Hirschman 1958.

³⁴ Ross 2007a, 245. See also Fearon and Laitin 2003; Englebert and Ron 2004.

³⁵ Collier and Hoeffler 2000, 2002, 2004.

³⁶ Humphreys 2005.

produced goods, and leading to a transfer of local resources – labour, materials and capital – from the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector (the ‘resource movement effect’).³⁷

The cumulative result is the expansion of the non-traded sector and the eventual shrinking of the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, which promote economic growth through their reliance on human labour, skill and productivity – well-established growth promoters. At the same time, there is no compensation from the booming natural resources sector, which as an enclave industry relies predominantly on capital and technology rather than human skill or labour. Developing countries have been particularly susceptible to Dutch Disease symptoms since natural resources are under the complete control of the state; when revenue accrues fundamentally to the state, as it has been since oil producers nationalised their oil sectors, the government has little incentive to invest in education, create a diversified and skilled workforce, and promote other sectors of the economy. Indeed, in Nigeria, the government’s neglect of the agriculture sector during the oil boom of the 1970s led to a sharp drop in the production volume of cocoa, palm oil and rubber, previously Nigeria’s three leading exports, and to the consequent shrinking of the agriculture sector (this is further discussed in Section 3.1.2).

Although the resource curse hypothesis, or the ‘paradox of plenty’ as it has also been termed, helps explain why natural resource-abundant countries are among ‘the most economically troubled, the most authoritarian, and the most conflict-ridden in the world’ – one might only need consider the Middle East’s authoritarian oil-producing countries, Africa’s poverty and war-stricken natural resource exporters, or Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, in which oil-producing countries consistently rank top – the resource curse is a contentious phenomenon and has been challenged on various grounds.³⁸ Of the many criticisms put forward against this theory, several are of particular relevance to this work.³⁹ These, and some new charges raised here, are discussed in the following section.

³⁷ Corden and Neary 1982.

³⁸ Karl 2005, 21.

³⁹ For sceptical views on the link between natural resources and democracy, see Herb 2005; Jones-Luong and Weinthal 2006; Dunning 2007; Haber and Menaldo 2007. Sceptics on the link between oil and civil war include Dashwood 2000.

1.1.2 Integrating historical, local and gender-aggregated evidence

One of the first critiques against the *economic* resource curse came from economic historians, who pointed out that only quite recently have resource-poor countries become systematically more productive than resource-rich countries.⁴⁰ In much of the early work that linked poor economic growth with natural resources, historical evidence was not used to provide an accurate account of the *long-term* effects of natural resource abundance, which played a critical role in the development of many countries. For example, during the 19th century, exports of primary commodities (farming, fishing, forestry and mining) were crucial in stimulating the development of the US, Canada, Australia and Norway. Similarly, England and Germany's industrial revolution materialised largely due to their vast deposits of ore and coal.⁴¹ The negative impact of oil on economic growth is a new phenomenon, largely triggered by unprecedented upheavals in global energy markets in the last quarter of the 20th century, in which the demand for oil multiplied exponentially while the prices of oil both soared to unprecedented levels and fluctuated intensely.⁴² As growth processes take place in the very long run, historical perspective matters. A recent study showed that oil has only had anti-democratic effects since the nationalisation of the industry in the 1970s.⁴³

The resource curse theory cannot account for the great degree of variation in outcomes not only over time, but also across countries within the last 40 years.⁴⁴ Several developing countries, including Botswana, Chile and Malaysia, have managed their natural resources successfully with no visible resource curse effects, serving as benchmarks for other natural resource-abundant countries.⁴⁵ Due to liability being typically attributed to the actions of governments, policy advice has focused on what governments should do (or avoid doing) in their management of natural resources. For example, *Escaping the Resource Curse* addresses 'the major decisions *a country must make* when faced with an abundance of a

⁴⁰ Wright and Czelusta 2007; Lederman and Maloney 2008. This point was also made in Auty 2001 and Ross 2012.

⁴¹ Habakkuk 1962; North 1963. Similarly, America's greater natural resource endowments helped explain its surpassing of England in the 19th century, while Mexico, Colombia and Brazil's Sao Paulo turned into successful industrialised centres thanks to their mining and coffee sectors.

⁴² Since 1970, the price of oil has changed by an average of 26.5 percent a year (Ross 2012, 51).

⁴³ Ross 2012.

⁴⁴ This critique is made in Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2003; Iimi 2006; Stevens 2006; Stevens and Dietsche 2008.

⁴⁵ There have also been propositions of the existence of a threshold beyond which oil revenue growth exerts a negative effect on economic growth (Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio 2001; Mehrara 2009).

natural resource’.⁴⁶ However, a one-fix-for-all, government-focused approach leaves a range of important factors unaddressed, particularly the unique developmental history of countries, their ethnic, religious, and cultural composition, and the role played (in past and present) by foreign powers and multinational oil companies; factors that can contribute to the appearance (or disappearance) of resource curse manifestations.

Country-specific characteristics are not taken into account partly because the literature is overwhelmingly based on large-N cross-national observational data and statistical regressions, tests which not only miss historical context, but are also vulnerable to bias from a variety of sources; omitted variables, reverse causation, sample selection bias or outlier cases can all drive results. For example, in a study that excluded countries with the highest natural resource ratios the economic resource curse disappeared (the removal of a single observation, Zambia, caused the effect to become insignificant).⁴⁷ Another study that employed historical data and time-series techniques found that resource dependency was not associated with authoritarianism.⁴⁸ Cross-country statistical comparisons also give little insight into the causation mechanisms underlying the examined associations, a weakness that is reflected in the multiplicity of competing explanations for the curse’s symptoms. As Stijns put it, ‘the story behind the effect of natural resources... is a complex one that typical growth regressions do not capture well’.⁴⁹ This is particularly true in the case of oil producers, where scholars are not in agreement on how to measure ‘oil production’.

Cross-national studies can capture change over time within countries and variation at the same point in time between countries with different natural resource endowments. However, by keeping the discussion at the national level, the theory says little about the effects of oil production at the local level; it leaves unattended within-country variations between oil-producing and non-oil producing sub-national units (regions, communities, or states).⁵⁰ When oil production is onshore, it is often concentrated in one region, such as Nigeria’s Niger Delta, the Congo’s Katanga, or Angola’s Cabinda region. Communities in

⁴⁶ Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz 2007, 3.

⁴⁷ Norrbin, Pipatchaipoom and Bors 2008.

⁴⁸ Haber and Menaldo 2011.

⁴⁹ Stijns 2000, 1.

⁵⁰ There are several recent exceptions: Michaels (2011) investigated the long-term effect of resource abundance on local economic development in the US South; Wilson (2012) examined the local effects of copper booms on risky sexual behavior in Zambia; Caselli and Michaels (2013) compared Brazilian municipalities to investigate the effects of resource windfalls on local government spending; and Aragon and Rud (2013) examined the local economic impact of a gold mine in Northern Peru on local communities.

oil-producing regions are subjected to the *direct* effects of the oil economy – deteriorating physical environment, land expropriations, forced migration, and others – while communities in non-oil producing regions are subjected to the *indirect* consequences of oil production deriving from the state of the national economy and political system. There is growing evidence to support this claim: a study in the US found that in states with greater oil revenues, governors were more likely to be re-elected and defeat their opponents by wider margins.⁵¹ A study of 900 Colombian municipalities found that oil-producing municipalities were more frequently subject to paramilitary violence, especially when oil prices rose.⁵²

Finally, men and women's different experience of oil production, or the gender dimension of the resource curse, has not been thoroughly investigated. Several studies examined the links between oil and women's economic and political status, but these focused exclusively on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.⁵³ Another study, which examined the link between labour market structure and Dutch Disease, found that 'labour mobility and differences in how gender is grouped across sectors play a role in how natural resource abundance impacts economic performance'.⁵⁴ Although the study adds a gender dimension to the Dutch Disease model, its focus is not gender differences but rather the reassessment of the mechanism underlying the link between natural resources and economic growth. In another seminal work – which greatly inspired the formation of this thesis – Michael Ross analysed oil production, female employment and female representation data for 169 countries, linking oil with low female labour participation and, consequently, low levels of women's political influence, and arguing that oil, not Islam, is behind women's political marginalisation in the Middle East.⁵⁵

However, the full extent of the impact of oil on women remains incomplete in this account too, which similarly to other studies in the resource curse literature is mostly based on cross-national observational data, neglecting within-country variation and a historical perspective.⁵⁶ The theory cannot fully explain the variation in women's presence in the workforce and political influence between different oil-producing countries across the

⁵¹ Goldberg, Wibbels, and Mvukiyehe 2008.

⁵² Dube and Vargas 2009.

⁵³ These include Moghadam 1993; Karshenas and Moghadam 2001; and Assaad 2004.

⁵⁴ Frederiksen 2006, 163.

⁵⁵ Ross 2008, 2012.

⁵⁶ Ross also follows his statistical analysis with a case study, comparing Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, to illustrate the causal mechanisms at work.

MENA region (and even more so, across the developing world), or the variation between different regions within the same oil-producing country. Similarly to other works, the theory applies most significantly to the MENA region, as Ross noted: ‘While the argument applies to all regions of the developing world, it is most salient to the Middle East and North Africa, where women have made less progress toward joining the labour force and gaining political office, than in any other region’.⁵⁷ Finally, and most crucially, women’s ‘political influence’ is measured in the study by only two variables – the number of female parliamentary seats and ministerial positions – variables that cannot fully capture women’s political influence as they measure *formal* participation alone. This claim, on which my thesis is centred, is further developed in the next section.

1.2 Rethinking the Study of Political Participation

‘It seems cruel to go on about it now that she has lost, but up until the very last moments of her campaign... Hillary Clinton seemed intent on doing all she could to cover up the fact she was indeed a woman running for the White House’.

(A commentator on the *Guardian*’s A Woman’s Place, July 2008)⁵⁸

The United States is not a developing country. Since it struck oil in 1847, the US has been both the world’s leading oil producer and its biggest oil consumer.⁵⁹ However, the country also boasts a highly diversified economy and an entrenched democracy, which provide women with better opportunities compared with oil-producing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Yet by 2013, only 44 women had ever served in the US Senate since its establishment in 1789, and the numbers only recently rose in the House of Representatives from three percent in 1965 to a record high of 17 percent in 2013.⁶⁰ While until 2008, no woman had ever run for the highest political office, during the democratic presidential nomination campaign the American public seemed perplexed by whether Hillary Clinton was too feminine to serve as President and Commander-in-Chief, or not feminine enough. The first woman frontrunner herself seemed ambivalent about the historic nature of her candidacy; while during the campaign she compared herself to the legendary male cinematic boxer Rocky, her defeat speech was full of references to feminist advances,

⁵⁷ Ross 2009, 576. For more critique of this work, see the exchange between Caraway, Charrad, Kang, Norris, and Ross in a special issue of *Politics and Gender*, 2009.

⁵⁸ Goldenberg 2008.

⁵⁹ For oil consumption and production data, see BP 2014.

⁶⁰ CAWP 2013.

including the famous 1848 women's rights convention in Seneca Falls, New York, and the 19th Amendment to the Constitution that gave American women the vote in 1920.⁶¹

The American public's dilemma merely reflected a prevailing public perception in many countries according to which women do not possess (and, by some accounts, *should* not) political acumen – skills, knowledge, and an interest in politics – as do men. I suggest this public perception is exacerbated by the obsessive focus of studies in the field of political participation on *formal* activities – institutionalised modes of political action that concern the electoral process, such as voting, membership in political parties, or running for elected office, as well as by the propensity of other studies to measure women's political *influence* by their representation in parliaments (although voting and running for elected office are different dimensions of political engagement which require different resources, the latter is viewed here as the uppermost expression of formal political activity).⁶² Since men dominate the formal political arena, studies that are based solely on measures of formal activities import a gender bias into their categories of analysis, maintaining the view that women are *less* politically active. This section briefly assesses some of the literature's findings, illuminating the need to consider both formal and non-formal activities if we are to accurately evaluate women's political participation and influence (and how it may be affected by oil).

1.2.1 Women's low formal political participation

Political participation is primarily understood as 'activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action either directly, by affecting the making or implementation of public policy, or indirectly, by influencing the selection of people who make those policies'.⁶³ One of the earliest findings that emerged in the study of political participation was a 'gender gap' in political activity, which was repeatedly confirmed over time and across countries.⁶⁴ For example, a 1972 study in the UK stated that 'one of the best researched findings in British politics is that women participate less and declare lower levels of interest in politics than do men', while a 2004 study confirmed that British men are

⁶¹ Clinton stated: 'when it comes to finishing the fight, Rocky and I have a lot in common' (BBC News 2008).

⁶² As Jane Leighley noted, 'political participation is typically equated with voter turnout' (1995, 181). See also Levitt 1967; Flora 1977; Rule 1987; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1999.

⁶³ Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001, 4.

⁶⁴ See, for example, Duverger 1955; Lane 1959; Campbell et al. 1960; Butler and Kavanagh 1980; Inglehart 1981; Conway 2001; Maeda 2005.

‘significantly more [politically] active than women’.⁶⁵ A 1978 seven-country study in the developing and developed world found that men’s greater political participation was prevalent in all cases, while the 1997 World Values Survey similarly established that men are more politically active than women in virtually every country of the world.⁶⁶ Although certain types of formal political participation, such as voting, have reversed between the sexes in many countries, it is still pervasively concluded that ‘men [are] more likely than women to take part in political life’, even when education, age, religion and ethnicity are controlled for.⁶⁷

Various accounts have been provided to explain the persistency of the gender gap in formal political participation. In the 1970s and 1980s, women’s lower political participation inside and outside the US was explained by sex-role socialisation, which encouraged girls to conform, be passive and engage in domestic activities, and boys to be aggressive, self-reliant and develop traits that are conducive to economic achievement and leadership, with obvious implications for their political participation as adults.⁶⁸ Indeed, studies confirm that women gain greater legislative representation in countries where more liberal attitudes in general, and liberal attitudes towards the role of women in politics in specific, prevail; the Scandinavians typically top the chart of the world’s highest number of female parliamentarians, while countries in the Middle East and North Africa tend to have much smaller proportions of their parliamentary seats held by women.⁶⁹ It has therefore been convincingly argued that in countries in which traditional doctrines play an important role in shaping attitudes, whether these are religions such as Islam, philosophies such as Confucianism, or tribal beliefs, it is more culturally acceptable to confine women to a subordinate role, limiting their political freedom and involvement.⁷⁰

Social norms are also emphasised as facilitators of gender-based discrimination, which can operate indirectly to keep women out of politics, by posing barriers to the acquisition of resources that could enable their political activity. Indeed, the disparity

⁶⁵ Dowse and Hughes 1972, 192; The UK Electoral Commission 2004, 1, respectively.

⁶⁶ Verba, Nie and Kim 1978 (the countries studied are Austria, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the US and Yugoslavia, based on data for 1966-1971); World Values Survey 1995-1997, respectively.

⁶⁷ Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001, 61. They found that in seven out of eight different political activities, women were less active than men (women and men participated equally in protest activity). See similar conclusions in Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Ward 2002.

⁶⁸ Tedin, Brady and Vedlitz 1977; Jennings 1983.

⁶⁹ See IPU 2013.

⁷⁰ Norris 1987. See also Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau 1978; Rule 1987, 1994; Moore and Shackman 1996; Norris 1997; Paxton 1997; Reynolds 1999.

between men and women's access to resources such as time, money, education, work experiences, and organisational affiliations features as a key explanation for the gender gap in political participation. In a seminal study of political participation in the US, Nancy Burns, Kay Schlozman and Sidney Verba found that the participation gap between American men and women largely results from the accumulative effect of several inequalities.⁷¹ First, men enjoy an advantage when it comes to 'the single most important source for political participation': formal education.⁷² Second, men are better placed in non-political institutions that foster the skills required for political participation, particularly the work place; women are less likely than men to be in the workforce and to hold the kinds of jobs that promote political participation.⁷³ Third, women's tendency to be less psychologically engaged with politics (that is, to be less politically interested, informed, and efficacious) contributes to fewer participatory activities.

The study concludes that 'it is men's advantage with respect to most of the factors that foster activity, not any distinctive capacity to use those factors, that is responsible for their higher level of political participation'.⁷⁴ However, whether a study's underlying assumption is that women are profoundly disadvantaged compared to men, or inherently apolitical by their overly feminine nature, their conclusion remains similar that in practice, women are less political than men. Evidence to the contrary, including important insights from feminist scholarship, remains peripheral in the narrative of the mainstream literature on political participation. The following section presents a glimpse of this evidence, suggesting that gender differences lie not only in men and women's experience, but also in their political response to this experience; in other words, men and women differ along *the type of political activity* they pursue.

1.2.2 Women's high non-formal political participation

The importance of a historical perspective in understanding the context-specific nature of political participation cannot be overstated. Historically, women have faced significant barriers to becoming politically active in the electoral process. While men in and outside

⁷¹ Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001.

⁷² Ibid, 8. The link between education and political participation has been documented in numerous studies. See, for example, Verba and Nie 1972; Welch 1977.

⁷³ Ibid, 9.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 273.

Western liberal democracies have been exercising their electoral rights – both electing *and* being elected – for many decades, women have been enfranchised only quite recently.⁷⁵ Evidence shows that early women's suffrage plays an important role in women's legislative participation; the longer women have had the right to vote, the larger the percentage of women parliamentarians.⁷⁶ This suggests deep links between voting and running for elected office, dimensions of political participation that are typically treated as entirely distinct (the former performed by the 'masses', the latter by 'political elites'). As women have been barred from formal political participation and access to the highest levels of political power, different forms of political action have emerged for women that are less formal, less institutional and less nationally centred.⁷⁷ These include protest activity, associational activity and grassroots community activity in which women in various countries have always taken part in, or indeed, led.

Historical examples abound: women were prominent in the food riots in Britain and France during the 17th to mid-19th centuries, frequently leading street and market disturbances and revealing 'political awareness and... a modicum of political skill'.⁷⁸ During the French Revolution, 7,000 working-class women marched to Versailles with cannons in protest against the bread shortage, while in Victorian Britain, women took an active part in the 1837 violent demonstrations against the Poor Law and initiated industrial action in response to poor working conditions during the Match-girls' Strike of 1888.⁷⁹ According to British historians, women were 'readily caught up in crowds which expressed popular fury against an institution' and constituted 'a determined force to be reckoned with'.⁸⁰ Other examples of industrial action initiated by women include Japan's 1918 Rice Riots, China's 1922 silk factories strike, and Peru's 1979 textile factory strike.⁸¹ In the US, women were active in local politics long before their 1920s enfranchisement, most notably in various movements for social reform but also in political parties.⁸²

In Russia, women acted as political leaders during the Red Revolution, while in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, they participated in peasant revolts and urban guerrilla

⁷⁵ 1972 in Switzerland, 1984 in Lichtenstein, 2005 in Kuwait, 2006 in Oman, and not yet in Saudi Arabia.

⁷⁶ Kenworthy and Malami 1999.

⁷⁷ This argument draws on Randall 1987, 50.

⁷⁸ Levy and Applewhite 1980, 10.

⁷⁹ Stacey and Price 1981; Rowbotham 1974, respectively.

⁸⁰ Thomis and Grimmett 1982, 48.

⁸¹ These examples are mentioned in Randall 1987.

⁸² Lebock 1990.

movements.⁸³ In Pinochet's Chile, women have been 'present on the three battlefronts, which the Resistance has set: underground, prison and exile'.⁸⁴ Women were prominent in the uprising against the Shah in Iran, where their 'well-organised... contingents became one of the distinguishing features of the street demonstrations'.⁸⁵ Further, women also participated in the national liberation movements of countries in Africa and Latin America, led and popularised the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, and were active in the terrorist wings of national movements such as the German Baader-Meinhof, the Irish Republican Army and various militant Palestinian organisations.⁸⁶ Women became political prisoners: in 1978, 60 percent of 'terrorists' sought by the police in the Federal German Republic were women, while one third of Spanish political prisoners in 1976 were female.⁸⁷

More recently, women have been at the forefront of the anti-war movement in the US and led environmental activism.⁸⁸ Other examples include the 1981 march of thousands of European women to Brussels in protest against the nuclear arms race, the 1982 women peace camp at Greenham against the installation of Cruise Missiles, and the 1997 Million Women March in Philadelphia in support of African-American communities.⁸⁹ During the Arab Spring, Muslim women participated in protests and cyber-activism that left millions inside and outside their countries astounded.⁹⁰ In January 2010, a random *Google News* search of 'women's protests' of all-women protests that took place that month alone around the world revealed protests in Mexico, in demand of an investigation into the killings of young women; in Nigeria, against poor services for pregnant women at a general hospital; in Bulgaria, against violence directed at female workers in local hospitals; in Zimbabwe, against the poor performance of the male-dominated new constitution commission; in Washington, for the right to mixed-gender prayers in Mosques; in Ukraine, against the results of the national elections; in India, against the rise in prices of essential commodities;

⁸³ Salaff and Merkle 1970; Jaquette 1973, respectively.

⁸⁴ Diaz 1985, 33.

⁸⁵ Tabari 1980, 19.

⁸⁶ Jacobs 1978; Thiercelin 1980, respectively as quoted in Randall 1987.

⁸⁷ Randall 1987.

⁸⁸ Krauss 1993.

⁸⁹ Henig and Henig 2001; Cortright 2008; Jones 1997, respectively.

⁹⁰ Isam 2011; Radsch 2012.

in Pakistan, against the celebration of St. Valentine's day in the country, and the list goes on.⁹¹

Several studies in the US have documented the *local* nature of women's political participation. Two studies that investigated women's participation in community organisations in Chicago found that the trigger to their political involvement was typically threats posed to their neighbourhoods by racial tension, declining school standards or industrial pollution.⁹² In another study, American women were slightly more likely than men to confine their political activity to sub-national politics (53 percent of women versus 49 percent of men), while men were more likely to report being interested in national politics.⁹³ The study also found no gender difference between American men and women in terms of being interested in local politics, watching news or paying attention to newspaper stories about local politics and community affairs. Similarly, men in the study were more likely to provide a correct answer for the names of public officials and show knowledge of the government, but women were more likely to know the name of the head of the local school system. This was explained by the early extension of a partial suffrage for women to participate in local elections, especially school elections.⁹⁴

These examples contrast sharply with the picture portrayed by the analysis of formal (or, as it is often termed, 'conventional') political participation, which by focusing on electoral politics provides a misleading view of women's political engagement. Although protest activity is reactive, spontaneous and anti-institutional, often focusing on local or communal concerns, it can lead nonetheless to changes in public policy; women-led food riots in Paris at the end of the 18th century contributed to the deregulation and liberalisation of grain trade in France.⁹⁵ Furthermore, a focus on formal activities pursued by individuals rather than a group, such as voting or donating money, is to a great extent a focus on white-male, Western, political activity. It not only ignores non-institutionalised forms of political participation and collective action that is external to the electoral process, but also assumes a free, fair and equal election process in which men and women equally participate, a practice foreign until recently to most countries. Finally, using legislative representation to measure

⁹¹ See Womensphere 2010; AllAfrica 2010; Wellsphere 2010; FreedomHouse 2010; Abigmessage 2010; Abcnews 2010; OneIndia 2010; Zamaan Online 2010, respectively.

⁹² McCourt 1977; Schoenberg 1980.

⁹³ Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001.

⁹⁴ Flexner 1975.

⁹⁵ Bouton 1993.

women's political influence greatly overlooks the issue of descriptive and substantive representation; high representation does not guarantee political influence.⁹⁶ Thus, in thinking about the gender gap in political participation, it is crucial to examine not only differences in *degree*, but also differences in *kind*.⁹⁷

Recognising the limitations of the conventional approach to capture important areas of political activity, several studies have incorporated non-formal political participation in their analysis. Several studies in the US and Europe found that women were as active as men in attending protests and more active than men in neighbourhood associations and community-action councils, as well as in consumer, humanitarian and social organisations.⁹⁸ A study in the UK found that while British women were significantly less likely than men to participate in campaign-oriented activities (contacting a politician or donating money to, working for, or being a member of a political party), they were more active than men in legal demonstrations, equally active in illegal protests, and more engaged in cause-oriented activism, particularly in signing petitions and engaging in consumer politics (the study found no gender gap in voter turnout).⁹⁹ A study in Mexico, which intentionally distinguished between formal and non-formal participation, found that men and women were equally active in various types of non-formal activities, including protests.¹⁰⁰ It is possible that the majority of studies focus on electoral activities since these lend themselves more easily to measurement – the source for most studies of citizen political participation in the US, for example, is the American National Election Study. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that this choice contributes to the misevaluation of women's political participation.

1.3 Engendering the Resource Curse and Political Participation

To present a comprehensive view of women's political engagement, this thesis defines political participation as 'all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system'.¹⁰¹ This broad definition encompasses activities at national and local levels, activities that are

⁹⁶ See Wangnerud 2009.

⁹⁷ As suggested in Randall 1987.

⁹⁸ Gittell and Shtob 1980; Hernes and Hanninen-Salmelin 1985, respectively.

⁹⁹ The UK Electoral Commission 2004, 7.

¹⁰⁰ Melkonian-Hoover 2008.

¹⁰¹ Barnes and Kasse 1979, 42. For an interesting theoretical discussion of the concept of political participation, see Conge 1988.

institutionalised and non-institutionalised in nature, and activities that are pursued either individually or within a group – the exercise undertaken here. To this end, and in an attempt to avoid the discussed limitations of the resource curse literature, I situated my study in a sub-national setting of one low-income oil-producing country, Nigeria. I utilised a mixed-methods approach which involved intense gathering of historical, quantitative and qualitative evidence, in order to trace changes to women's political participation in Nigeria between the *pre-oil* and the *post-oil* era, differences between oil and non-oil producing states, and the process that resulted in such differences ('pre' and 'post' oil are symbolically divided by the year 1958 when oil was first exported, though a time lag of a decade or more is taken into account to allow the effects of oil to have played out). This section explains how assessing the impact of oil production *and* women's political participation are integrated in this thesis, broadly outlining theoretical and methodological perspectives of the work and the core argument.

1.3.1 Why focus on gender?

Oil production can have a deep, broad and potentially negative impact on the social, economic and political circumstances of countries. Within countries, such impact can have very different implications for men and women, based on their socially constructed roles, responsibilities and relationships with their families and communities. Evidence suggests that a strong gender bias exists in the distribution of risks and benefits in oil-producing communities: while most benefits accrue to men, the costs fall most heavily on women.¹⁰² These differences cross multiple sectors: the oil economy creates a host of new jobs that go primarily to men, often at the expense of traditional sectors in which women work, mainly agriculture; where women are responsible for buying goods in the market or for gathering food, water and firewood, oil-related inflation forces them into a position of higher expenses, while decreased availability of these resources due to oil-related pollution leads to more time and energy-consuming tasks for women; decreases in subsistence agriculture products also reduces women's food supply and diminishes their economic independence; and, health risks associated with the oil industry also have a gender dimension: air and water pollution have severe implications for women's reproductive health, while oil has been associated with

¹⁰² Eftimie, Heller and Strongman 2009.

increased prostitution and rising rates of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases particularly amongst women.¹⁰³

Such risks have far-reaching implications not only for women, but also for gender dynamics and the wellbeing of communities; clearly, decreased job opportunities and access to resources for women negatively impact their families and the entire community. Since they often make up half of the productive labour force, women's oil-related economic marginalisation and compromised health are an impediment to development and economic growth; gender equality is a proven driver of economic growth, poverty reduction and sustainable development.¹⁰⁴ It has also been shown that when benefits are given to women, they have a higher developmental impact – women are more likely to use available income for food, shelter, health, education and savings for their families, whereas men are more prone to use income for personal consumption.¹⁰⁵ Thus, this thesis follows the notion that gender should be an important element of any upstream macro-social analysis.¹⁰⁶ A better understanding of the unique impact of oil production on women can also increase the effectiveness of policy advice to oil-producing countries; greater sensitivity to gender issues has the potential to mitigate some of the risks associated with oil production, and amplify the potential benefits to both men and women, leading to more sustainable development impacts. Furthermore, such understanding is essential for enhancing gender equality and the empowerment of women – an imperative objective in its own right.

1.3.2 Oil impacts women's work

This thesis follows up on two studies – Elisabeth Frederiksen's and Michael Ross's – which linked oil production with women's decreased labour force participation, and by implication, with women's participation in the public domain.¹⁰⁷ In both works, the link between oil and women's labour force participation was established based on the (previously gender-blind) Dutch Disease model: both studies demonstrate that since women in low and middle-income

¹⁰³ Other natural resources might not have such effect: a study of the local effects of copper booms on risky sexual behavior in Zambia found that copper booms substantially *reduced* transactional sex in copper-mining cities (Wilson 2012).

¹⁰⁴ Kabeer and Natali 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Eftimie, Heller and Strongman 2009.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 4.

¹⁰⁷ In another recent work, Kotsadam and Tolonen (2013) found that opening of mineral mines in Sub-Saharan Africa has created non-agricultural employment opportunities for women and *increased* their probability to earn cash income, as they switched from working in agriculture to services.

countries tend to be concentrated in sectors that shrink in oil economies (agriculture and manufacturing) due to Dutch Disease symptoms, and because they cannot freely move to work in other sectors due to entrenched gender-based occupational segregation, women depart from the labour force and ‘migrate’ to the household (or, do not join the labour force to begin with when household income is high enough). My theory, which is explained in greater detail in Chapter 2, builds on this account. However, I add new dimensions to the model on the effects of oil production on women’s work, which seems to have been largely designed to account for women’s low participation in public life in the MENA region.

Elisabeth Frederiksen explained the lower levels of economic growth observed in oil-rich economies by a movement of female labour into the household sector (thanks to high household incomes), a sector which does not contribute to overall economic growth.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, Michael Ross explained the low rates of female labour force participation in oil-producing countries by reduced financial incentives for women to work. While these accounts may apply to Middle Eastern countries, especially those with small populations that were able to ‘finance’ women’s subordination to the home thanks to high oil revenues, they do not apply universally. In many oil-producing countries in the developing world, particularly in Africa, oil wealth has not trickled down to the vast majority of the general populace as it has in the Middle East. Dutch Disease symptoms that involve the contraction of sectors in which women are concentrated can ‘squeeze women out of the labour force’, as suggested by Ross, if women are not free to migrate to work in other sectors *or* if their household income has simultaneously increased.¹⁰⁹ However, in oil-producing countries where household income has not increased and Dutch Disease symptoms have occurred, women would be forced to search for work elsewhere – largely in the informal sector – facing greater hardships than their counterparts in the Middle East.

Furthermore, Michael Ross excluded the agricultural sector from his measure of female labour force participation, a sector that employs the vast majority of women in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the MENA region, where women’s work in agriculture is typically an extension of their household duties rather than wage labour, and where agricultural work has not promoted economic and political advances for women, such exclusion might be justified. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, where female workers carry out almost the entirety of

¹⁰⁸ Frederiksen 2006, 166.

¹⁰⁹ Ross 2008, 109.

agricultural production (while others are largely absorbed in the informal sector), the exclusion of agricultural workers from the analysis altogether cannot capture the full extent of the impact of oil on women's work.¹¹⁰ Moreover, women in Sub-Saharan Africa were economically active in the agriculture sector *prior to* the oil era, giving them a different starting point compared to women in the Middle East. Agricultural work did not fail to promote financial independence and political power for women in Africa; historical evidence from Nigeria (brought in detail in Chapter 3) shows that women's economic and political status heavily relied on their work as farmers and traders of farm products.

Finally, the models offered by both Frederiksen and Ross capture changes to women's labour force participation at the national level, but neglect the impact of oil on women's work at the local level, as they do not differentiate between oil-producing and non-oil producing sub-national units within the same country. In the World Bank's study of oil-producing communities mentioned earlier, female farmers identified a range of risks they associate with extractive industries. These included the loss of ownership and use of fertile land, the pollution of water resources and depleted fish stocks, environmental degradation, deforestation, airborne and noise pollution, and the deterioration of safety and security due to the influx of construction workers to the area, all negatively impacting their livelihoods.¹¹¹ These aspects of oil production affect oil-producing regions, but not other regions within the same country that are remote to the area in which oil is produced. I suggest that to fully understand the effects of oil production on women's work, both the national and the local levels should be examined, as different forces come to play at each level to harm women's livelihoods.

At the local level, women's work participation in oil-producing communities could be diminished not only due to the contraction of sectors in which they work, but also by women's diminished capacity to *carry out* work. In oil communities that are subjected to the direct effects of the oil economy – land confiscations, oil leaks, soil degradation, gas flares, and the pollution of air and water sources – and where women constitute the majority of subsistence farmers and fishers, women would bear the brunt of the adverse effects of the oil economy, and suffer the most from pollution and the decline in agricultural products and fish stocks. Health hazards from toxic waste and the pollution of air and drinking water would

¹¹⁰ A similar point was made in Caraway 2009.

¹¹¹ Eftimie, Heller, and Strongman 2009.

particularly affect *women's* ability to work. Furthermore, oil-related high incidence of prostitution may lead to changes in women's work patterns as well as subject them to increased rates of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, further diminishing their long-term work prospects. Women may also be the key victims of harassment, repression and militarisation experienced by oil-producing communities, further reducing their ability to work. Women in these communities could suffer a *double marginalisation effect*: first as women in oil-producing *countries*, and second as women in oil-producing *communities*.

1.3.3 Oil impacts women's political participation

In Michael Ross's theory, differences in oil production explain the variation across countries in women's political influence through the impact of oil on women's labour force participation: 'the extraction of oil and gas tends to reduce the role of women in the work force, and the likelihood that they will accumulate political influence...'.¹¹² This claim is based on the established link between female labour force participation and women's political empowerment; if oil production negatively impacts women's work prospects, it can then indirectly affect their political empowerment and influence. Indeed, this claim is supported by the World Bank's study discussed earlier, in which women in oil-producing communities identified the 'lack of voice and representation in the *formal decision making process*' as a key risk they associated with extractive industries.¹¹³ However, as noted, Ross's study refers to women's *formal* political activities, as 'women's influence' is measured only by female legislative and ministerial representation. If we were to distinguish women's formal and *non-formal* participation, would oil production have a similarly negative impact on both?

I hypothesise that if women's political influence is to be measured not only by the number of women in the highest positions of political power, in which they are almost universally disadvantaged, but also by non-formal types of political participation such as protests, different effects of oil production on women's political action would surface, specifically in oil-producing communities in which women's work has been diminished by oil production without compensation in the form of rising household income. Indeed,

¹¹² Ross 2008, 120.

¹¹³ Eftimie, Heller, and Strongman 2009, 2.

evidence presented in this thesis suggests that oil production may exert a twofold impact on women's political participation: while oil may decrease (or perpetuate low levels of) formal political participation, including legislative participation, it can also lead to an increase in women's non-formal political participation at the local level, in oil-producing communities. To test this claim, I examine the link between oil production in Nigeria and three types of women's political activities: legislative participation (formal), protest participation, and Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) participation (non-formal); other formal political activities, such as voting or membership in political parties, could not be assessed due to the unavailability of objective data.¹¹⁴ How I define and operationalise each of these variables is discussed in detail throughout Chapters 3-6.

1.3.4 From cross-national to sub-national

To examine the links between oil production, women's work and women's political participation in a novel setting, this study is based on a sub-national comparative research design. As noted, the vast majority of studies in the resource curse literature use large-N, cross-national settings to explore the effects of oil production on economic and political outcomes. Following the suggestion that 'the most powerful test of any hypothesis is on a data set other than the one used in its original construction', I propose to test the connections between oil, women's work and women's political participation sub-nationally, using a new body of evidence collected from Nigeria.¹¹⁵ Both numerical data and qualitative evidence were collected in Nigeria *per state* to compare the 36 states in the Nigerian federation, of which only nine are oil-producing, or in other words to compare the group of 27 non-oil producing Nigerian states with the group of nine oil-producing Nigerian states (see Maps 1.1-1.2).¹¹⁶ Qualitative data were further collected at the local level in three states, one oil-producing and two non-oil producing, for a comparative case study-based analysis.

A sub-national empirical setting offers a number of methodological advantages. First, data on oil production, women's work and women's political participation can be consistently evaluated since the same set of rules governing data production applies across

¹¹⁴ There is no available data on voter registration, voter turnout, or party membership aggregated for men and women in Nigeria in any election (NDI 2011, 45). The World Values Survey has data on political participation in Nigeria for the period of 2010-2014, disaggregated at a regional level (six regions) but not at the state level.


¹¹⁵ Goldberg, Wibbels, and Mvukiyehe 2008, 480.

¹¹⁶ The Federal Capital Territory Abuja, which is not a state, is excluded from the analysis.

states within the same country. Second, in a sub-national setting many potential intervening variables are held constant; cultural or other differences between states are fewer and are mitigated by the states' necessity to adhere to the overarching national constitution. Third, this setting has a greater potential to ascertain the causal mechanisms behind the relationships tested; the limited understanding of the processes at work inherent to the cross-country setting can be improved with case studies from the same country. One insightful work in the literature compared the experience of the American states over a 73-year period to determine the occurrence of political and economic resource curse symptoms, finding considerable support for such symptoms in oil-producing American states.¹¹⁷ Thus, a federation in which some states produce oil and others do not offers a convenient setting to test some aspects of the resource curse.

¹¹⁷ Goldberg, Wibbels, and Mvukiyehe 2008.


Map 1.1: The Nigerian federation of 36 states



Source: Nigeria High Commission, London 2012.

* The Federal Capital Territory Abuja is excluded from the analysis.

Map 1.2: Nigeria's nine oil-producing states



Source: Nigeria High Commission, London 2012.

1.3.5 Why Nigeria?

‘If we hadn’t discovered oil, we would have been better off today. Once we had oil, our agriculture sector collapsed. Oil has made us lazy... we have become corrupted’.

(Nigeria’s Former Minister of Finance, Mrs. Nedadi Usman)¹¹⁸

According to the Forum of Federations, there are 27 federal states in the world, of which 11 can be considered large oil producers, exporting over 500,000 barrels of oil a day.¹¹⁹ These are Brazil, India, Iraq, Mexico, Russia, the US, Venezuela, Malaysia, Canada, the United Arab Emirates and Nigeria. Of these, Nigeria is the only low-income country according to the World Bank’s rating of countries by income.¹²⁰ Nigeria is one of the world’s top ten oil producers, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa’s first and top oil producer; oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1956 and first exported two years later. From 5,100 barrels a day (b/d), since 1974 oil production has consistently exceeded two million b/d. Since the mid-1970s, oil proceeds have formed the backbone of the Nigerian economy, accounting on average for 40-50 percent of GDP and over 90 percent of total exports and government revenue.¹²¹ A study by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that between 1965 and 2000, Nigeria’s governments have collected oil rents worth approximately \$350 billion dollars.¹²² However, these revenues do not seem to have improved the country’s development or the standard of living for the vast majority of the population. If the resource curse affects low-income countries most, then Nigeria is a prime example.

The acute disproportion between Nigeria’s oil revenues and its developmental outcomes is dumbfounding. Nigeria’s income per capita in 2007 was 25 percent lower than Sub-Saharan Africa’s average, while its GDP per capita rose from \$1 in 1960 to only \$1,084 in 2000, placing Nigeria among the 15 poorest countries in the world.¹²³ Poverty and income distribution have worsened since oil production began: between 1970 and 2000, the poverty rate – measured as the share of the population subsisting on less than a dollar a day – has nearly doubled from 36 to 70 percent (from 19 to 90 million people). While in 1970, the top two and the bottom 17 percent of the population earned the same total income, in 2000 the

¹¹⁸ Quoted in Power 2004.

¹¹⁹ For the list of federal countries, see ForumFed 2014. For oil production data, see BP 2014.

¹²⁰ World Bank 2012.

¹²¹ Ahmad-Khan 1994.

¹²² Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003.

¹²³ Shaxon and Murphy 2007; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003, respectively.

top two percent earned as much as the bottom 55 percent.¹²⁴ In a World Bank study, Nigeria was ranked the third most volatile economy in terms of trade volatility out of 90 countries, and the fourth in terms of real exchange rate volatility out of 84 countries.¹²⁵ Perhaps most paradoxical is Nigeria's relentless energy crisis, considering its oil output: large parts of the country suffer continuous power-cuts, while others are not connected to the grid. The collapse of Nigeria's agricultural sector about a decade after oil was first exported, the eruption of a brutal civil war partly due to resource control battles, consecutive repressive military governments, a plague of corruption, and the plundering of oil revenue to benefit the very few in power, attest that Nigeria has experienced every possible symptom designated by resource curse theory (these are further elaborated in consequent chapters).¹²⁶

While oil revenues intensely shaped the economic, social and political landscape of Nigeria as a whole, the country's oil-producing region – the Niger Delta – has been characterised by the worst underdevelopment in the country. According to the Niger Delta 2006 Human Development Report, only a third of children in the region attend primary school, compared with the national average of 75 percent.¹²⁷ In some areas, only 13 percent of households have electricity and 30 percent running water. The proportion of people living in poverty increased from 28 percent in 1980 to 66 in 1996 and in 2004, 70 percent of the Niger Delta's population was living in 'abject poverty' (less than a dollar a day), the highest rate in the country. Furthermore, per capita income in the Niger Delta region fell from \$800 in 1980 to \$300 by 2003, life expectancy dropped to about 50 years (from 62), and infant mortality increased to over 77 per 1000 births, exceeding the national average. HIV/AIDS rates in the Niger Delta are the highest in Nigeria.¹²⁸ Remarkably, within the Niger Delta, it was found that Local Government Areas (LGAs) without oil facilities fare better in the poverty index than those hosting oil facilities, while the pricing of goods is highest in remote oil communities.¹²⁹

Since the region has also been marked by civil war, intermittent conflicts between armed militias and government forces, blatant human rights abuses, devastation and havoc,

¹²⁴ Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003.

¹²⁵ Covering the period 1961-2000, World Bank 2003.

¹²⁶ Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) show a decline in the share of agriculture in GDP from 68 percent in 1965 to 35 percent in 1981. On Nigeria's resource curse, see also Gelb 1988; Gavin 1993; Bevan, Collier and Gunning 1999; and Shaxon and Murphy 2007.

¹²⁷ UNDP 2006.

¹²⁸ Kola-Olusanya and Trish 2012.

¹²⁹ UNDP 2006, 2; 35, respectively.

nowhere is the paradox of Nigeria's resource curse greater than in its oil-producing region.¹³⁰ The Niger Delta's Human Development Report clearly states: 'The human development situation in Nigeria as a whole, as measured by the Human Development Index, has declined, although the drop off appears to be steeper for the Niger Delta states than for the rest of the country'.¹³¹ The report repeatedly attributes the Niger Delta's devastation to oil production. For example, it states that 'there is no doubt that the incidence of conflicts may have been considerably less if there had been no oil and gas in the region'.¹³² The UN GDI (Gender-related Development Index) for the Niger Delta similarly shows that the region fares worse on gender equality and income comparatively to other states in Nigeria (particularly Akwa Ibom, Delta, and Imo – three major oil-producing states).¹³³

Nigeria's position as a low-income major oil producer, its well-documented resource curse symptoms, the concentration of oil production in nine of its 36 states, and unequivocal evidence from the Niger Delta on the local effects of oil make it an appealing (albeit, extremely challenging) setting for a sub-national test of the link between oil production, women's work and women's political participation. Notably, the country is also roughly divided between a Muslim-dominated North and a Christian-dominated South, where the nine oil-producing states are located. Although this was not the focus of my work, the religious divide within Nigeria allowed for some assessment of the impact on the results of Islam: nine Northern states which have implemented full *Sharia* law between 1999 and 2001 (not only in personal status issues but also in criminal law, superseding the Nigerian constitution) were coded as *strictly-Muslim* and their impact on the results was tested in every major analysis.

1.3.6 A mixed-methods strategy

The thesis follows a mixed-methods approach that combines quantitative and qualitative tools, including the statistical analysis of three original datasets, comparative case study analysis of three Nigerian states, and the examination of historical evidence. Each of the four

¹³⁰ On the Niger Delta's resource curse, see also International Crisis Group 2006; Omeje 2006; Watts 1997, 2007a,b.

¹³¹ UNDP 2006, 22.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

core chapters in the thesis draws upon a unique combination of these tools, as well as on interviews, secondary sources (testimonies collected by others), and press articles. By deploying a mixed-methods strategy and regarding quantitative and qualitative tools as complementary, the study aims to draw on the strengths of each approach and provide a more powerful account of the phenomena studied; while statistical analysis (largely cross-tabulations and t-tests) is used to generate a clear assessment of the strength of the relationships between variables and control for confounders (religion and ethnicity), case-study comparative analysis provides valuable information that could not have been otherwise obtained and allows establishing causality and revealing the underlying mechanisms at work.¹³⁴ As each tool brings a different type of data to the analysis, this integration of methods leads to greater confidence in the findings of the study and the generalisability of its results.

In two of the core chapters of the thesis (Chapters 5 and 6) the combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis is used also to gain a ‘synergistic value’, as different steps of the inquiry are used not only to complement but also to inform one another, following Evan Lieberman’s principles of Nested Analysis research design.¹³⁵ According to this approach, each step of the analysis provides direction for approaching the next: statistical analysis guides case selection strategies, while case study analysis is used to assess the plausibility of the observed statistical relationships between variables.¹³⁶ This involves an initial preliminary large-N statistical analysis to assess the strength of the relationships between variables and identify the range of variation on the dependent variable (‘hypothesis-testing’), which then motivates case-study selection of cases that are ‘on the line’ (cases that are well-predicted by the model), based on the widest degree of variation on the independent variable central to the model, within the pool of large-N cases. Here, out of the pool of 36 Nigerian states, three states were chosen to represent variation on the independent variable *oil production*.

Historical evidence is used throughout the thesis to identify and separate the earlier effects of colonialism and Nigeria’s 1960 independence from the impact of oil, as well as

¹³⁴ As Achen and Snidal point out, ‘case studies are an important complement to both theory-building and statistical investigations... they allow a close examination of historical sequences in the search for causal processes’ (1989, 168-9).

¹³⁵ Lieberman 2005.

¹³⁶ Ibid, 436.

detect the historical conditions that facilitate women's non-formal political participation. I follow Eric Hobsbawm's recognition in the importance of integrating historical evidence in social science research, which has 'pursued a model of scientism and technical manipulation which systematically... neglects human, and above all, historical experience... [an] a-historical or even anti-historical calculation [that] is often unaware of being blind'.¹³⁷ Time-series tests, which would have been ideal to observe change over time across and within states in Nigeria, were not feasible due to the unavailability of data at the state level (moreover, the number of states in Nigeria has continuously changed until it was finalised in 1996, complicating within-country analysis over time, as explained in Chapter 4). Historical evidence was therefore used to provide a 'pre-oil' account of women's work and political engagement that is often missing in cross-national studies. Historical evidence was particularly useful in revealing the strong roots of women's protest activity in Nigeria in response to their economic marginalisation, a link that is central to the theory.

Notably, Nigeria would have been immensely challenging to study based solely on quantitative data. While collecting the data it became clear that numbers alone would not deliver complete accounts of the effects of oil production in the country; numerical data are often available for only one point in time and are not entirely reliable. The state's official publications, as well as statistics published by international organisations (which are largely based on nationally-produced accounts), suffer systematically from missing or contradictory data and are notoriously untrustworthy. This could be due to theoretical definitions that are incompatible with what is measured on the ground, insufficient resources, unskilled personnel to accurately survey economic or political data, or political bias that interferes with the accuracy of the results.¹³⁸ For example, national censuses in Nigeria have been subject to controversy and difficulty for many decades; the precise number of the total population is still considered an estimate. Complementing quantitative data with qualitative evidence has allowed drawing on multiple sources to mitigate potential bias. The difficulty in data gathering can explain why Nigeria has not been the subject of other within-country studies.¹³⁹ Indeed, statistical findings in Chapters 3 and 4 are likely to have been influenced by the poor quality of numerical data.

¹³⁷ Hobsbawm 1998, 29.

¹³⁸ For an illuminating account of the quality of data in Nigeria (and Africa), see Jerven 2013.

¹³⁹ To the best of my knowledge at the time of writing.

Conclusion

This introductory chapter examined the findings of two separate bodies of literature – resource curse theory and the study of political participation. Both fields, I argued, could benefit from nuanced attention to gender differences, historical evidence and within-country variation. On the one hand, findings in the resource curse literature are largely based on large-N cross-national analyses, applicable mostly to the last quarter of the 20th century, and greatly overlook country-specific historical and cultural factors, as well as local differences between oil and non-oil producing sub-national units within the same oil-producing country. On the other hand, studies of political participation have been characterised by a prevailing focus on institutionalised activities related to the electoral process, ignoring both women's historical exclusion from the public domain and their strong political engagement through different channels of participation, such as protests. My proposal is to examine the impact of oil on women's political participation while attempting to avoid these pitfalls.

The Nigerian case, which is analysed in great detail throughout the thesis, effectively exemplifies both the extent to which oil production can impact political and economic outcomes at national and local levels, and the overlooked diversity of women's political activity. While oil dependency has dragged Nigeria through decades of developmental stagnation, impacting both its male and female citizenry, this thesis demonstrates that Nigerian women, especially in the oil-producing Niger Delta region, have borne the brunt of the negative effects of oil production, suffering greater economic and social marginalisation. Women in Nigeria were consequently disempowered in formal political institutions, but at the same time, women in the Niger Delta region mobilised to form the first line of regional opposition to policies and practices pursued by oil companies and the Nigerian government, thus presenting higher protest and NGO activity by women. Before evidence to support these claims can be presented, I turn to outline the theoretical framework of the thesis in the next Chapter.

Chapter 2

THE NEXUS BETWEEN OIL, WORK, POLITICS AND WOMEN

In the early 1990s, Bahrain, a small oil-dependent island country in the Persian Gulf, embraced a comprehensive economic liberalisation programme. Within a few years, the government implemented a series of reforms, successfully expanding the economy into banking, heavy industry, retail and tourism, turning Bahrain into the Gulf's financial and insurance hub. By the early 2000s, Bahrain launched a privatisation programme, signed a Free Trade Agreement with the US – the first Gulf state to do so – and embarked on an ambitious process of democratisation: the country was turned into a constitutional monarchy with elected legislature and independent judiciary, the *Emir* became king, and first parliamentary elections took place in October 2002. Political reforms guaranteed the freedom of expression and association, encouraged the formation of NGOs and community associations, and granted women full political rights, including the right to vote and run for office in municipal and parliamentary elections. In April 2005, Bahraini Alees Samaan became the first woman to chair a parliamentary session in the Arab world. When Bahrain was elected to head the UN General Assembly in 2006, it appointed a woman to serve on its behalf as the UN Assembly's President, the third woman in the history of the organisation to hold the position.

Bahrain is one of six countries that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council; the other members are Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Council was founded in 1981 on the basis of 'its members' common social, cultural, political and economic characteristics'.¹ Similarly to its neighbours, Bahrain's official religion is Islam, its principal source for legislation is *Sharia* law, and the citizen population is 99.8 percent Muslim. It has also been characterised, like its neighbours, by oil dependency, autocratic rule and female seclusion. What prompted Bahrain of all Muslim countries in the Gulf to embark on such transformative reforms over such a short period? Bahrain's adoption of economic liberalisation was dictated by an urgent need to diversify the economy away from oil. Unlike its Persian Gulf neighbours, by the early 1990s, Bahrain – the first Gulf country to have discovered oil in 1932 – had depleted almost entirely its oil reserves forcing

¹ GCC Charter 1981, Article 4.

the government to re-think economic policies and embrace liberalisation.² Since oil revenues could no longer finance generous welfare programmes and guarantee jobs in the public sector for the majority of nationals, diversification efforts included job creation and the training and education of citizens.

One important consequence of Bahrain's economic and political reforms has been women's gradual entrance into the labour force and politics during the past two decades. While in 1990, female labour force participation rate in Bahrain was 28 percent, in 2002 it rose to 35 percent, and in 2012 to nearly 40 percent (compared with male labour force participation rate of 88 percent).³ It was reported that women in Bahrain have been making strides into sectors such as finance, trade, law and entrepreneurship.⁴ According to a report by Bahrain's Economic Development Board, in 2010 alone the number of women joining the private sector had increased (from 2002) by 73.5 percent, while the average wage for Bahraini women grew by 44 percent between 2006 and 2011.⁵ A study by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) found that in the 2000s, nationals in Bahrain accounted for only 43 percent of the total workforce (dominated by expatriates), while nationals' unemployment stood at 14 percent – the highest rate in Bahrain's history.⁶ According to the study, high unemployment reflected 'not only the end of oil boom policies and rapid population growth but also more *women seeking work*'.⁷ At the political front, while women had no political rights including the right to vote until 2002, in the 2002 elections six women were appointed to the upper chamber of parliament, and in 2004-5 two were appointed as ministers. Since 2002, women's organisations in Bahrain have also been multiplying exponentially.⁸

Bahrain's example illustrates the causal mechanisms that underlie the impact of oil production on women's political participation, the focus of this chapter. My theory draws on findings from the resource curse literature, studies on the political participation and representation of women, economic models of female labour supply, feminist scholarship, and my own observations drawn from the Nigerian case. The theory has two key unique features: a transition from the cross-national to the sub-national level with *states* as the key

² Campbell 2013.

³ Percentage of female and male populations aged 15+, ILO LABORSTA 2012.

⁴ Gulf Daily News 2013.

⁵ From BD317 to BD457 (EDB 2012).

⁶ ILO 2011.

⁷ Ibid, 4.

⁸ UNDP 2005.

unit of analysis, in an attempt to capture the localised effects of oil on women's economic and political participation; and a clear distinction between formal and non-formal political activities. The chapter is organised in two parts, which together outline the theoretical model underpinning the thesis: from oil, through women's work, to women's political participation. In the first part, I examine findings relating to the links between women's labour force participation and women's political participation, explaining how different work-related mechanisms impact different types of activities. In the second part, I explain how oil can interfere with women's work and political activities on two different levels, national and local, and present the set of hypotheses tested in the thesis (the operationalisation of this conceptual framework is detailed throughout the empirical chapters).

2.1 Women's Work and Political Empowerment

Women's participation in the labour force has been identified in numerous studies as a driving force in reducing gender inequality and one of the main contributors to the political empowerment of women – the process of ‘enhancing the capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes’.⁹ It has been repeatedly established – inside and outside the West – that when women's employment rates rise, their political engagement also rises.¹⁰ My theory on the effects of oil production on women's political participation builds on this finding. However, to understand the nexus between oil, women's work and their political participation, I first re-examine the link between women, work and politics. First, I identify the *type* of work that is significant to women's political empowerment. I then assess whether such work is equally significant for formal and non-formal political activity. Finally, I suggest that negative changes to women's work can also empower women politically: when women's work is diminished due to reduced employment opportunities, this can increase women's *non-formal* political participation.

⁹ World Bank 2013c.

¹⁰ See, for example, Duverger 1955; Campbell et al. 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Christy 1974; Lansing 1974; Hansen, Franz and Metemeyer-Mays 1977; Farah and Jennings 1978; Lafferty 1978; Black and McGlen 1979; Beckwith 1986; Norris 1987; Oakes and Almquist 1993; Moore and Shakman 1996; and Matland 1998.

2.1.1 Labour force participation empowers women

'Gradually, without seeing it clearly for quite a while, I came to realize that something is very wrong with the way American women are trying to live their lives today. I sensed it first as a question mark in my own life, as a wife and mother... using my abilities and education in work that took me away from home'.

(Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique*, 1963)

From the American women's liberation movement of the 1960s to social theory, one of the most prominent paths advocated in the past century for women's social, economic and political emancipation has been work, specifically work outside the home. As early as 1884, Friedrich Engels theorised that the first condition for women's liberation is their introduction into formal-sector wage employment.¹¹ While conventional roles of women as housewives and mothers were viewed by Western feminists as dissatisfying and degrading for women, social scientists substantiated that non-employment has a strong debilitating effect on women's full participation in society as it isolates women in the home, where familial motivations, interests and dilemmas overshadow other concerns and opportunities. It was argued that unemployed women could become dependent on their husbands not only financially but also to relay information and to make decisions and judgements for them, with implications for their political interest and participation. In the US, it was observed that 'the unemployed woman... is almost always a housewife, a status that may provide a long-term set of behaviour and attitudinal patterns'.¹²

The 'feminisation' of the labour force around the world in the past three decades, on the other hand, particularly women's large-scale entry into the labour market in developing countries, has been associated with women's empowerment.¹³ Studies of female workers in the export garment industry in Bangladesh showed that women who migrated through work out of rural areas and away from the patriarchal control of kinship and community were more able to widen their social networks, postpone early marriage, renegotiate their relations with abusive partners, and challenge the practice of *dowry*.¹⁴ A study of female workers in export manufacturing jobs in the Philippines similarly found that these women were able to delay marriage and childbirth and enhance their sense of personal independence, leading to

¹¹ Engles 1884.

¹² Welch 1977, 727.

¹³ Dolan and Sorby 2003.

¹⁴ Kabeer 2005. A *dowry* is the transfer of parental property to a daughter as her inheritance at her marriage.

changes in their personal and household circumstances.¹⁵ Even paid work carried out in the home was shown to shift the balance of power within the family; a study of women engaged in industrial homework in Mexico City found that in households where women's economic contribution was critical to household survival, women were able to negotiate a greater degree of respect.¹⁶

The link between women's work and their *political* empowerment was first made in the US, based on the observation that following World War II, female labour force participation (FLFP) – the fraction of the formal labour force that is made up of female citizens – and female political participation, rose concurrently.¹⁷ This observation prompted extensive research in the US starting in the mid-1970s on the link between women's work and political participation.¹⁸ One of the first influential studies demonstrated that the traditional pattern of female socialisation in the US was transformed between 1952 and 1972 through women's entrance to the formal labour market; from 1960 onwards, employed women participated as frequently as men in political campaigns and surpassed them in 1972, while employed women's political efficacy scores were similar to those of men's and much greater than the scores of housewives.¹⁹ Another influential study examined three key explanations for the gender gap in political participation – political socialisation, non-employment and 'demographic' conditions (such as education and income), finding that once the latter two explanations were controlled for, there were no systematic differences in the levels of men and women's participation.²⁰

There is evidence from other countries to support these findings. In Japan, a study that examined the reasons for the low participation of Japanese women in politics by comparing full-time male workers, full-time female workers and female 'homemakers', concluded that 'the large number of female homemakers is responsible for the large gender gap in political participation'.²¹ A study in India attributed the limited presence of women in

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Beneria and Roldan 1987.

¹⁷ This definition of FLFP follows Ross 2008, 112. The World Bank defines FLFP alternatively as 'the proportion of the female population aged 15 and older that is economically active' (World Bank 2013a).

¹⁸ See Flora and Lynn 1974; Tedin, Brady and Vedlitz 1977; McDonagh 1982; McGlen 1980; Sapiro 1983; Jennings 1983; Andersen and Cook 1985; Beckwith 1986; Clark and Clark 1986.

¹⁹ Andersen 1975. Especially the increase in the number of women who are in professional occupations, young and highly educated. Anderson credited the feminist movement for mobilising women both into the labour force and into mainstream politics.

²⁰ Welch 1977.

²¹ Maeda 2005, 356.

legislative bodies at the national and state levels to the high share of women confined to the household.²² Analysing the World Values Survey, the study established a similar global pattern, concluding that women who have an identity outside the household, often through work, are more likely to be politically active. In Honduras, women working in *maquiladoras* (assembling manufactured goods for export) were more likely to have voted in elections and feel they were able to influence the government, as well as more likely to have worked for a political candidate in the last elections (compared with female candidates to work in *maquiladoras*).²³ The study found that these changes grew stronger over time and noted that female workers' increased participation was even more striking considering that employees had significantly less 'free time' and more health problems.

Within the formal labour force, variations in the type of employment are significant. High-skilled jobs were shown to have the greatest effect on women's political engagement: 'what matters is not only being in the work force but having a job that requires education and on-the-job training'.²⁴ Such jobs facilitate the cultivation of skills, resources and opportunities that are viewed as essential for political activity. For example, according to the Civic Voluntarism model, the process of becoming politically active entails three main components: the accumulation of resources (skills, time and money), location in networks of recruitment and psychological involvement in politics.²⁵ Workforce participation in high-skilled jobs provides women with the opportunities to enhance their experiences on all three fronts: accumulating financial resources necessary for political activities, exposing women to an environment that provokes psychological orientation towards politics (as they can share information, exchange opinions, develop social networks and become familiarised with working towards 'political goals'), and developing personal and professional skills that can be transferred to political settings. Thus, it is argued that women in high-level, professional jobs who work longer hours accrue these resources at a higher rate and are more politically involved.²⁶

²² Chhibber 2003.

²³ Ver Beek 2001.

²⁴ Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001, 211.

²⁵ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995.

²⁶ Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001. 2001. A negative work experience could in itself be a meaningful driver for action; studies in the US found that employed women who experienced gender discrimination were more politically motivated (Sapiro 1983).

2.1.2 Formal employment enhances formal political participation

The proposition that paid work leads to women's political empowerment is consistent with the assumption that women's political participation has been, prior to work, low, or at least lower than men's. This raises questions about the *type* of political activities that are examined and presumed to be enhanced by formal work experience. Arguably, skills, resources and opportunities that are obtainable in formal employment – managerial proficiencies, technical expertise, political knowledge and financial resources – are particularly relevant to *formal* political participation, especially running for elected office; signing petitions, joining protests or organising community meetings do not require such resources. Since the study of political participation had focused on formal activities, studies on the links between FLFP and women's political participation have, too, focused on activities related to the electoral process. For example, in *Working Women and Political Participation*, Kristi Andersen linked women's employment with women's participation in election campaigns.²⁷ Another study in the US showed that when women were in a stimulating environment, they scored higher than their male siblings across four areas of political expression, all linked to the electoral process.²⁸ Another study found that work outside the home 'produces a dramatic increase in female *voting* and [seven] other forms of activity', which were all formal: registering with a political party, influencing another person's vote, writing to an official, giving money, participating in political meetings, political party work and joining a political club.²⁹

Women's labour force participation has been similarly linked with female legislative representation, measured by the fraction of female seats in national parliaments.³⁰ A study of 19 democracies between 1970 and 1972 found that the percentage of women in the workforce and the level of women's unemployment explained fifty percent of the variance in the number of women in national legislatures (the other two factors were the number of women college graduates and the length of women's suffrage).³¹ Another study found that

²⁷ Andersen 1975.

²⁸ Political efficacy, political information, political interest, and political participation (Tedin, Brady and Vedlitz 1977).

²⁹ Welch 1977, 724. The study also included measures of 'spectator activities' indicating interest in politics.

³⁰ For the purposes of this thesis, I use the terms 'legislative representation', 'legislative participation', or simply 'representation' interchangeably, referring to the share of female seats in national or state legislatures.

³¹ Rule 1981.

high FLFP rate increases women's representation in Western parliaments.³² In a 1998 study that examined 146 countries, the share of women in professional occupations was positively linked to the share of female parliamentary seats.³³ In another study that examined 110 countries, it was found that 'high rates of FLFP decrease male predominance in national parliaments'.³⁴ Another study of 73 countries found that FLFP is a powerful predictor of women's 'political status', which was again measured by women's representation in national legislatures.³⁵ Orbin Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth proposed that low FLFP rates contribute to female under-representation by reinforcing traditional voter attitudes towards women, and by constraining the supply of women with professional experience and resources who are capable of mounting electoral campaigns.³⁶

Thus, the link between women's work and their political empowerment refers largely to *formal* political participation. Although non-formal political activities received less scholarly attention, there is evidence to suggest that women's work can affect these too, especially outside the US and Europe. In the study on the gender gap in political participation in Japan mentioned earlier, both formal and non-formal measures were used to explain the positive relationship between women's work and their political participation (out of 13 measures, three can be regarded non-formal: signing a petition, joining a demonstration, and holding a community meeting).³⁷ A study in Mexico, which deliberately distinguished political participation into two sets of formal and non-formal activities to test the effects of factory work on each, concluded that factory experience has had an 'egalitarian' effect on women, who translated acquired skills at work into non-formal political participation; female employees were more likely than male employees to engage in protests, be involved in school boards, engage in local efforts to address neighbourhood problems, or serve as a volunteer community organiser.³⁸ The global rise of women's organisations over the past two decades has, too, been associated with the mass entrance of women into the labour force in many developing countries around the world.³⁹

³² Rule 1997.

³³ Kenworthy and Malami 1999. The study links several other political and cultural factors to women's representation.

³⁴ Moore and Shackman 1996, 273.

³⁵ Oakes and Almquist 1993.

³⁶ Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008.

³⁷ Maeda 2005.

³⁸ Melkorian-Hoover 2008. Out of nine measures of political activity in the study, four were non-formal.

³⁹ Moghadam 1999.

2.1.3 *How decreased work opportunities can also empower women*

We can put the association between women's labour force participation and their formal political empowerment to the test by examining worldwide shifts in FLFP rates and female parliamentary seats by region over a two-decade time period (see Table 2.1). Between 1992 and 2012, male labour force participation rates *decreased* in all regions of the world by three percent on average, while FLFP rates *rose* in most regions of the world to varying degrees (excluding Central and South-Eastern Europe, South Asia, and East Asia, in which FLFP rates have dropped). In the three regions in which FLFP rates are the lowest – the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia – female parliamentary seats are the lowest in a corresponding order, supporting the theory. However, the proportion of female parliamentary seats has been continuously rising in *all* regions of the world, including the regions in which FLFP rates have dropped. It is possible that other factors that contribute to female representation – the structure of the electoral system, early female suffrage, the partisan composition of the legislature and the use of quotas, as well as cultural attitudes and social norms – can explain these results; labour force participation is not the only pathway to women's political empowerment. However, it is also plausible that the dynamic between women's work and their political empowerment is more complex than the current theory suggests, particularly if we distinguish formal and non-formal political activities.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Iversen and Rosenbluth (2008) found that electoral systems have a strong, systematic effect on the extent to which women's workforce participation boosts female political representation; women politicians do better in PR than in candidate-centred systems.

Table 2.1: Labour force participation rates and female parliamentary seats by region (%)

	Labour force participation rates						Female parliamentary seats*		
	Males			Females					
	1992	2002	2012	1992	2002	2012	1997**	2002	2012
World	80.2	78.1	77.1	52.4	52.1	51.1	11.3	15	20.4
Developed economies and European Union	71.8	69.4	67.5	50.3	51.7	52.8	13.2a	17.4a	23.2a
Central and South-Eastern Europe	74.1	68.0	70.7	52.6	49.1	50.2			
East Asia	84.2	81.4	79.4	71.4	69.1	66.4	9.7b	15.2b	17.9b
South Asia	84.8	83.3	81.3	36.1	35.8	31.8			
South-East Asia and the Pacific	82.6	82.8	81.8	58.4	58.4	58.8	12.7c	15.2c	15.3c
Latin America and the Caribbean	82.5	80.3	79.5	43.5	49.6	53.6	13.2d	16.5d	24.1d
Middle East	77.6	73.8	74.3	13.3	17.2	18.7	3.4e	5.7e	13.3e
North Africa	74.4	74.1	74.3	21.8	21.2	24.4			
Sub-Saharan Africa	79.0	76.5	76.3	60.3	63.5	64.6	11.0	13.6	20.8

Source: ILO 2012: Global Employment Trends for Women; Inter Parliamentary Union 2013.

*Female parliamentary seats were calculated from data compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and refer to the percentage of women in both houses of parliament in December of that year. Notably, the regions do not correspond entirely to those set by the International Labour Organization, as follows:

a. Europe (including Nordic countries), b. Asia, c. The Pacific, d. Americas, e. Arab states. Labour force participation rates for 2012 are projections.

**1997 is the earliest year the IPU holds data for.

We can examine the trends in one country in the South Asia region (in which FLFP rates have dropped) for more insights. In the region's largest country, India, FLFP fell from over 37 percent in 2004 to 29 percent in 2010, ranking India at the 11th place from the bottom out of 131 countries for which the ILO holds data. What explains this drop? An ILO study linked India's economic transition with a decline in employment opportunities for women and estimated this to be the key reason for the drop in FLFP rates.⁴¹ Gender-based occupational segregation in India is extremely high; women are largely grouped in basic agriculture, sales, elementary services and handcraft manufacturing, industries that have not seen employment growth during India's economic transition. While between 1999 and 2005, women accounted for nearly 40 percent of new manufacturing jobs created in the country, mostly in export-oriented sectors such as garment making, between 2004 and 2010 the manufacturing sector suffered a slowdown, resulting in the loss of 3.7 million jobs, of which eighty percent were women's. During the same six-year period, the number of women

⁴¹ ILO 2013.

engaged in the agriculture sector decreased by 19 million.⁴² Since women were unable to pursue jobs in other sectors due to occupational segregation, India's economic transition had a negative impact on their employment.

The significant decline in women's participation in the labour force in India did not translate into a drop in female seats in parliament. Parliamentary seats for women rose, albeit moderately, from 7.2 percent in the lower house in 1997, to 8.8 percent in 2002, and to 11 percent in 2012.⁴³ Moreover, recent events suggest that women's non-formal political participation in India may be on a dramatic rise. In December 2012, the Indian public was enraged by a brutal gang rape in New Delhi, in which a 23-year-old medical student died. For several weeks after the incident, hundreds of thousands of women across the country of all age groups, and from various castes and backgrounds, participated in and led mass protests, calling for changes to laws on violence against women. In New Delhi, for example, thousands of women marched through the streets, while female teachers and students from the state's oldest women's college, *Indraprastha*, submitted petitions to government authorities.⁴⁴ Since the Indian women's movement has been fragmented for many decades along lines of class, caste, tribe, language, religion and political affiliations, women's recent united mobilisation was described as an 'unprecedented moment in India's history'.⁴⁵

Although India's protests were incited over a particular incident and focused on sexual violence against women, they ignited a more general and unusually open public debate in India about the status of women in the country. Issues of gender inequality and the low impact the country's economic growth has had on women were raised: India remains one of the lowest countries in the world in male-female ratio with only 940 women per one thousand men; the 'missing women' are victims of sex-selective abortions, poor investment in health and education for girls, and traditional marriage practices which result in high maternal mortality.⁴⁶ I suggest that through protests against the New Delhi rape, female protestors in India were in fact mobilising over greater societal strains that have been placed on women in the country over the past decade, predominantly their diminished job opportunities and economic marginalisation. This was illustrated in demands protesters

⁴² Thomas 2013.

⁴³ IPU 2013.

⁴⁴ Bhowmick 2013.

⁴⁵ Kelly 2013.

⁴⁶ Desai 2012.

made from government, including safer working environments and job opportunities for women in the country, the unusual unified response of women from different backgrounds, and statements on placards: ‘united against patriarchy’; ‘I live in a country where a girl is neither safe inside the womb nor outside it’; ‘you can get raped but not protest against rape – world’s largest democracy’; and ‘this world belongs to women too’ (see the chapter’s Appendix for illustrative images).

If we take a step back in time, women’s protests in response to threats to their economic independence were documented 150 years ago in the US, long before American women could vote. The textile mills of Lowell, Massachusetts, attracted visitors from around the world thanks to their magnitude and workforce that was mostly comprised of female labourers; in 32 mills of massive scale and astonishing productivity worked some 8,000 women.⁴⁷ As the small town expanded and became America’s largest textile manufacturing centre, competition increased and profits declined, leading to reductions in wages and cutbacks of employees. Between 1834 and 1848, women workers responded with fierce protests: they went on strikes and mounted petition campaigns to protest wage and job cuts. In the first protest in 1834, some 800 women marched to several mills calling women to ‘discontinue their labours’, while in 1836, to coordinate strike activities, they formed a Factory Girls’ Association, through which strikers were able to halt production in the mills in order to win their demands. Their petition announced: ‘Resolved, that none of us will go back unless they receive us all as one’.⁴⁸ In an era in which women faced difficulties to working in mills and had no formal political rights, women mobilised to protect their economic interests by participating in a public protest (even if they had no political goals).

In October 2012, two months prior to New Delhi’s rape incident, women in the eastern Indian state of Nagaland carried out a rally protest in demand of a 33 percent reservation for women in the state parliament; India’s 108th Amendment Bill, introduced in 1996 to mandate this reservation for women in all legislative bodies, is the longest pending legislation in the Indian Parliament. In this protest, women’s placards read: ‘we want our rights and to be treated equally with men’; ‘court, give the final verdict on 33% women reservation’; and ‘we demand constitutional rights for women’.⁴⁹ In the first few months of 2013, India’s rape protests inspired thousands of women across South Asia in Nepal, Sri

⁴⁷ Dublin 1975.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Nagaland 2012.

Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh – countries in which women’s protests are uncommon – to mobilise against sexual violence.⁵⁰ While the region boasts the second sharpest *drop* in FLFP rates worldwide over the past twenty years, women are seen rising in protest for equal rights and demonstrating enhanced group consciousness to gender-based discrimination. I suggest this can be explained, at least partly, by women’s diminished employment opportunities and economic marginalisation across the region. When women suffer threats to their economic independence in the form of declined work opportunities despite their willingness (and necessity) to work, they tend to mobilise in protest. This claim will be further developed, and tested, in relation to oil production.

2.2 Oil’s Effects on Women’s Work and Political Participation

Economic models of female labour supply explain a drop in FLFP rates by three main factors: rising household incomes, large disparities between men and women’s wages, and a decline in employment opportunities for women.⁵¹ Compatibly, women are expected to enter the workforce when these conditions are reversed. However, women’s low employment rates in the MENA region, as well as women’s low status in the region more generally, are commonly attributed not to economic conditions but to the region’s Islamic traditions. In the following section, I argue that effects of the oil economy on women’s work can better explain women’s low status in and outside the region.⁵² In the first part of this section, I explain how oil production can ultimately diminish FLFP rates at the national level, impacting the entire female population of working age in the country. In the second part of this section, I demonstrate how oil operations can more directly affect women’s work at the local level, through two key channels: environmental degradation and militarisation, which take place in oil-producing communities. In the third section, I explain how the impact of oil on women’s work may affect their political participation and present my hypotheses.

⁵⁰ Burke 2013.

⁵¹ ILO 2013.

⁵² This suggestion follows Karshenas and Moghadam 2001, and Ross 2008, 2012.

2.2.1 Decreasing women's work at the national level

'Thousands of women go to work in [Iraq]... the complete emancipation of women from the ties which held them back in the past, during the ages of despotism and ignorance, is a basic aim... our society will remain backward and in chains unless its women are liberated...'

(Saddam Hussein, 1971)

One of the pronounced goals of the 1968 revolution in Iraq, according to Saddam Hussein's 'Women: one half of our society' speech, was to build a society in which women were equal members. The Ba'ath Party had an enduring interest in recruiting women to the labour force to alleviate the continuing labour shortage, particularly during the protracted Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, when men were sent to the front.⁵³ Despite government rhetoric, Iraq's FLFP rate in the non-agricultural sector remained low between the 1960s and the early 2000s, similarly to other countries in the Middle East region (as explained, non-agricultural activities are typically excluded since agricultural work for women in the region tends to take place as an extension of their household activities).⁵⁴ In 2003, only 17 percent of Iraqi women participated in the formal labour force, while 23 percent of them were unemployed.⁵⁵ In the Middle East region, FLFP rates in 2012 stood similarly at 18.7 percent, the lowest in the world, followed by North Africa's 24.4 percent. Low FLFP rates in the MENA region stand in contrast to the increasingly rising rates of FLFP observed in other regions, as well as to men's high labour force participation rates in the region (see Table 2.1).

The persistence of a strict patriarchal socioeconomic structure in the MENA region has been one of its most debated features.⁵⁶ Many observers attribute the status of women in the region to its Islamic traditions.⁵⁷ In *The True Clash of Civilizations*, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris argue that 'when it comes to attitudes toward gender equality... the cultural gap between Islam and the West widens into a chasm'.⁵⁸ Their argument draws on Samuel Huntington's controversial thesis, according to which the cultural divide between the Muslim world and the West over political values will be the new fault for conflict; the West advances values that support the birth of representative democracy, which are rejected by the

⁵³ Moghadam 2003.

⁵⁴ Kershana 2001.

⁵⁵ ILO 2010.

⁵⁶ By patriarchy I refer to social units (such as a family) in which members have clearly defined gender roles and within which women are economically dependent upon men.

⁵⁷ See Youssef 1978; Abu Nasr, Azzam and Khoury 1985; Sharabi 1988; Clark, Ramsbey and Adler 1991; Landes and Landes 2001; World Bank 2004.

⁵⁸ Inglehart and Norris 2003a, 67.

Muslim world.⁵⁹ Inglehart and Norris slightly modify this argument to suggest that the divide is over socio-cultural values regarding gender equality and sexual liberalisation. In their book *Rising Tide*, they analyse data from the World Values Survey to explain worldwide patterns of gender inequality, concluding that women made little progress in Middle Eastern countries due to Muslim culture: ‘an Islamic religious heritage is one of the most powerful barriers to the rising tide of gender equality’.⁶⁰

While religious traditions and cultural values undoubtedly impact women’s access to equal opportunities, gender-related socialisation and gender-based discrimination, there is strong evidence to suggest that cultural factors alone cannot account for the persistence of patriarchal structures in some countries while their alleviation is witnessed in others, as the earlier example of Bahrain demonstrates. Less than a century ago, patriarchy was prevailing in virtually all countries and endorsed by all religions.⁶¹ In Western Europe and the US, the emergence of double wage-earning families occurred only after World War II.⁶² Within the Muslim world itself, some countries boast much higher FLFP rates than others, while within Muslim countries, the removal of *purdah* – the practice of women’s seclusion – is reserved for the poor; women in poor households are *allowed to work*. Gender scholars in the Middle East, who analysed Islamic religious scriptures, have shown that Islamic doctrine does not in itself subordinate women, but rather its interpretation can be used to object to, or favour, women’s rights.⁶³ Scholars of Islam have argued that *Sharia* law has provided women with some rights they lacked under the pre-Islamic Arab world.⁶⁴ Others have noted that the link between cultural attitudes and women’s subordination can run in the opposite direction; attitudes not only shape, but can also be *shaped by*, the existing conditions of women in society.⁶⁵

This evidence suggests that mechanisms other than cultural barriers to women’s participation must be at work. Indeed, it was shown that women’s deteriorating economic condition in Muslim Indonesia in the 1990s was related to the Asian economic crisis rather than the rise of political Islam in the country, and that in post-revolutionary Iran, where an

⁵⁹ Huntington 1996.

⁶⁰ Inglehart and Norris 2003b, 71.

⁶¹ This argument follows Karshenas and Moghadam 2001; and Ross 2008, 2012.

⁶² Moghadam 2003.

⁶³ Ahmed 1992; Mernissi 1991.

⁶⁴ Khadduri 1977.

⁶⁵ Blaydes and Linzer 2008; Ross 2009.

Islamic regime has been in power for over three decades, women's formal employment rate increased in the 1990s far more than it did under Iran's previous, pro-Western secular regime, due to 'the forces of international political economy'.⁶⁶ From a Marxist theoretical framework, Valentine Moghadam examined social-change processes in the Middle East, arguing that women's status is shaped not only by Islam but also by the state, class, the world system, and economic development, pointing to limited employment opportunities for women in the capital-intensive industries that dominate the region.⁶⁷ Mounira Charrad further suggested that the historical prevalence of 'kin-based solidarities' in the political system, rather than the Middle East's Muslim heritage, is responsible for the development of patriarchal networks that perpetuate gender inequality in economic and political life.⁶⁸

While various factors have likely interacted to result in women's subjugation in the Middle East, this thesis follows the suggestion that patriarchal ideologies can be perpetuated only as long as certain economic conditions are met. To preserve women's absence from the labour force nationally, or in other words to suppress *female labour supply*, most households in the country ought to be able to afford it. In the MENA region, patriarchal norms regarding gender roles in the labour force, society and politics have persisted largely since oil-producing economies were in a position to finance high per capita incomes: during the 1960s and the 1970s, the region exhibited one of the fastest growth rates in the world economy, thanks to the simultaneous increase in the production levels and the price of oil.⁶⁹ Oil revenues allowed governments of oil-producing countries in the region to increase transfers to households in two ways: through higher male wages, and through extensive welfare programmes that included tax cuts and food and energy subsidies, giving women no economic incentive to join the labour force. As Massoud Karshenas noted,

'In societies with relatively high per capita incomes in the non-agricultural sector... those elements of traditional culture that restrict the role of women become prominent. In others, where due to relatively low incomes, one breadwinner families are not affordable, new cultural norms are forged, which allow greater female labour force participation'.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Bahramitash 2002, 2003, respectively.

⁶⁷ Moghadam 1993, 19.

⁶⁸ Charrad 2001, 2009. See a similar argument by Keddie 2007.

⁶⁹ Moghadam 2003.

⁷⁰ Karshenas 2001, 174.

This theory is strongly supported by economic models of female labour supply. According to these models, women enter the labour force when they have economic incentives to do so.⁷¹ First, when women's *unearned income* – the income that accrues to a woman's household but not earned directly by her, including her husband's earnings, inheritance, or state benefits – are high, women are less likely to join the labour force. Thus, high household incomes tend to be associated with low numbers of women in the workforce, while a decline in households' real earning tends to tie women more permanently to the workforce to compensate for missing income. Second, if women's unearned income is high, women's *reservation wage* – the wage at which women find it attractive to join the labour force – would also be high, and less likely to be met. Third, when women's work is not in high demand, resulting in a low *prevailing wage* for women, women are less likely to substitute work in the home with paid employment; the rate of FLFP has been strongly associated with women's earning power in both industrial and developing economies.⁷² Thus, in the oil-rich Middle East, women's low FLFP rates have been perpetuated due to women's high-unearned incomes, high reservation wage and low prevailing wage.

A comparison of oil-producing countries in the Middle East region with Indonesia, a predominantly Muslim country in Southeast Asia, illuminates the point. In (relatively) resource-poor Indonesia, the prevailing wages between the early 1960s and the 1990s were up to ten times smaller than the prevailing wages in the Middle East region, while over the same period, Indonesia's female labour force participation rate was at 44 percent, higher than any other Middle Eastern economy.⁷³ The female labour supply model also explains the observed rise in job-seeking women in some countries throughout the Middle East during the 2000s, when per capita incomes dropped due to oil's smaller contribution to the economy and households were no longer able to *afford* to keep women in seclusion. In an illuminating study that explored the different trajectories followed by Egypt and Morocco with regards to the feminisation of their labour forces, Ragui Assaad found that women's employment prospects were much higher in oil-poor Morocco since Egypt has relied on oil revenue as a major source of foreign exchange, while Morocco became more reliant on manufactured exports and tourism revenues, sectors in which women can be absorbed.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Mammen and Paxson 2000, quoted in Ross 2008.

⁷² See Polacheck 1979; Becker 1991; Karshenas and Moghadam 2001; Moghadam 2003; Ross 2008.

⁷³ Karshenas and Moghadam 2001.

⁷⁴ Assaad 2004.

Oil production can impact not only the *supply* of female workers, but also the *demand* for female labour. For women to enter the workforce, economic incentives need to be complemented by employment opportunities; in the absence of jobs, even the most willing female labourers will not be able to join. Job opportunities for women can shrink in oil-producing countries due to Dutch Disease.⁷⁵ As noted (in Section 1.1.1), Dutch Disease symptoms lead to the contraction of the traditional traded sectors – agriculture and manufacturing – in which women in developing countries are largely concentrated.⁷⁶ If women are free to mobilise within the labour force and take up jobs in the expanding non-traded sector (for example, in services), or in the booming extractive sector, Dutch Disease symptoms would not harm their employment rates; in Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico, Venezuela, Canada, New Zealand and Norway, FLFP rates were unaffected by oil revenues.⁷⁷ However, in developing countries in which labour markets are strongly divided due to gender-based occupational segregation, and where women are concentrated in the traded sector in manufacturing and agriculture, oil-induced shrinking of the traded sector will reduce the demand for female labour, diminishing their job opportunities and pushing women out of the formal labour force.

Oil's impact on the *demand* for female labour cannot be tested in the Middle East, where FLFP was low *prior* to oil production, and where oil wealth has served to perpetuate existing conditions of women's economic and political subordination. However, it can be tested in many other oil-producing countries outside the region, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where women's share of the labour force has been traditionally high, and where household incomes have not seen oil-related increases. In Africa's largest oil producers – Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea – the vast majority of men did not enjoy the fruits of the oil boom, neither through government transfers to households nor through high-paid jobs in the public sector or in the capital-intensive oil sector, which creates jobs for a very small minority of men. As the vast majority of the population continues to live in abject poverty despite enormous oil windfalls, women have enough economic incentives to stay in, or indeed join, the labour force. Unlike their counterparts in the Middle East, women in these countries who are pushed out of the formal labour force due to Dutch Disease symptoms will not move to the household but, rather, be forced to turn to the informal sector.

⁷⁵ This claim draws on the model developed by Frederiksen 2006, and Ross 2008, 2012.

⁷⁶ Anker 1998.

⁷⁷ Ross 2008.

Whether oil affects the supply of female labour, the demand for women's work, or both, the ultimate result is the reduction of women in the formal workforce. In Nigeria, if FLFP rates and occupational segregation were indeed high prior to oil production, and Dutch Disease symptoms have occurred, national FLFP rates would subsequently decline according to this theory. Such change should be noticed across the federation since oil revenue is collected by the federal government, thereby affecting the national economy. The change should appear after an appropriate time lag for oil to have had an effect; indeed, since Nigeria's emergence as an oil producer in the late 1950s coincided with its gaining of independence in 1960, and because oil did not constitute a large share of government revenue for at least a decade, it is only during and especially *after* the oil boom of the 1970s that changes to FLFP rates should be expected. At the local level, FLFP rates in Nigerian states that had larger agriculture or manufacturing sectors in which women were absorbed prior to oil production should be affected worse (regardless of whether the state is oil-producing). Other differences that could be observed between oil and non-oil producing sub-national units are explained in the next section.

2.2.2 Decreasing women's work at the local level

In oil-producing countries, the extractive industry can have *localised* effects on women's work if production is carried out onshore. About two-thirds of oil production worldwide takes place onshore and in many oil-producing countries, onshore production is concentrated in particular regions, such as Ecuador's Oriente region, Colombia's Eastern Plains and Nigeria's Niger Delta. When the production and transportation of oil takes place over populated areas, above the territories of *host communities* (or oil communities), these communities can be exposed to direct consequences of oil operations that non-oil communities are spared. These include forced out-migration, new in-migration, the loss of ownership over land due to land confiscation by the state for exploration purposes, the pollution of water sources and the contamination of soil due to oil spills and oil waste dumping, deforestation, airborne or noise pollution, depletion of vegetation and fish stocks, and deterioration of safety and security. Women's work in oil communities can be significantly diminished under such conditions, which have been identified in many oil

communities around the world.⁷⁸ In particular, I suggest that women's work can be negatively affected through two key channels: environmental degradation and militarisation.

Oil operations can wreak environmental havoc on surrounding wildlife, habitat, human life and public health, mainly in developing countries where oil companies operate under less scrutiny. For example, a recent study by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) in Ogoniland, Nigeria, found the pollution and destruction of soil, groundwater, vegetation and fish habitat so severe it would take up to 30 years to be cleaned.⁷⁹ Environmental degradation impacts women of working age and female children more than other community members.⁸⁰ In much of Asia and Africa, gender-based division of labour assigns women with work that demands constant interaction with their environment: gathering fuel, fodder and water from forests and rivers, cultivating and harvesting the land, and serving as primary economic providers for their families; 96 percent of rural women in Africa, and at least 70 percent of working women in South and Southeast Asia, are employed in agriculture.⁸¹ When women are dependent on the environment 'for drawing sustenance for themselves, their families, and their societies... the destruction of the environment becomes the destruction of women's sources for 'staying alive''.⁸² Moreover, despite their role as primary economic providers, women are systematically disadvantaged in the distribution of resources such as food and health care, and in access to agricultural land; ownership rights typically prevent women from owning land.

Women's limited rights, extensive obligations and disadvantaged position in labour markets render them particularly vulnerable to environmental degradation. As the main gatherers of domestic essentials, their already-long working day is extended with the depletion of forests, water and soil, exacerbating their workload and the burden on their time and energy.⁸³ Moreover, environmental degradation results in a direct loss of income when more time is spent in gathering essentials than in waged employment.⁸⁴ A study in Nepal found that substantial increase in firewood collection time due to deforestation has significantly reduced women's crop cultivation time, leading to a fall in the production of

⁷⁸ Eftimie, Heller, and Strongman 2009.

⁷⁹ UNEP 2011. The report is the most comprehensive study conducted to date on oil's environmental impact.

⁸⁰ Boserup 1970.

⁸¹ Jacobson 1992.

⁸² Shiva 1988, 39.

⁸³ Agarwal 1992; Haider 1994.

⁸⁴ Kaur 1991.

maize, wheat and mustard which are primarily dependent on female labour in the region.⁸⁵ Another study of three Indian villages in the Himalayas found that deforestation affected not only women's work burden – the time and energy needed to collect forest produce – but also the gendered division of labour in the village, negatively affecting women: to meet growing labour needs, female labour was used, while men shifted to non-farm occupations or enjoyed more leisure days.⁸⁶ Thus, oil-related environmental degradation in developing countries can be expected to burden women most heavily, due to an increase in their workload, a direct loss of income, and changes to the gender-based division of labour.

The impact of oil-related environmental degradation would be further exacerbated by the militarisation of oil-producing regions. Assisted by foreign governments and oil companies interested in safeguarding the smooth production of oil, oil-producing developing countries tend to build up large military apparatus to protect oil facilities and suppress local opposition (which typically rises in response to oil pollution); it was found that oil exporters spend between two to ten times more than non-oil exporters on their militaries.⁸⁷ Militarisation primarily affects oil-producing communities: in the Niger Delta, for example, oil facilities that are interwoven with local communities are protected by special police forces ('mobile police'), several army battalions, and a fleet of naval warships (some 'donated' by the US), as well as by private security companies.⁸⁸ When aggrieved local groups respond with mounting their own military campaigns, attacking oil facilities and carrying out insurgency (as seen in Nigeria, Colombia, Ecuador, Angola, Sudan and Chad), the battle of resource control takes place over the territories of oil-producing regions, which often come under the control of an army that utilises terror against the local population.

In Nigeria, a frequent response to protests against the oil industry has been the use of repressive security measures against local communities.⁸⁹ Protests were met by regular units of the army, navy and the police, as well as by special 'anti-protest' units, such as the locally notorious Rivers State Internal Security Task Force. In an illustrative secret memorandum, the task force's chairman was quoted stating following community protests: 'Shell operations [are] still impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for

⁸⁵ Kumar and Hotchkiss 1988.

⁸⁶ Mishra and Mishra 2012.

⁸⁷ See Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz 2007, 13.

⁸⁸ Ifeka 2004.

⁸⁹ Frynas 2001.

smooth economic activities to commence'.⁹⁰ Oil companies have supported repression measures by providing equipment to be used in protests; Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that ChevronTexaco supplied helicopters and boats in attacks on anti-oil protestors in Nigeria in 1998-9, as well as documented extensive human rights abuses including regular harassment of the local population, intimidation and beatings during military crackdowns in Nigeria's oil communities.⁹¹ Following one devastating military attack in Ogoniland in 1994-5, HRW reported that soldiers committed 'extrajudicial executions, indiscriminate shooting, arbitrary arrests and detention, floggings, rapes, looting, and extortion'.⁹² Prominent anti-oil activists in Nigeria have been executed; most famous is the 1995 execution of the Ogoni writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, along with eight Ogoni leaders, following community protests against Shell.

The militarisation of oil-producing regions carries profound social consequences for local communities, to which women are most vulnerable. As recognised in the Beijing Platform for Action, 'those affected most negatively by conflict and excessive military spending are women living in poverty, particularly rural women...'.⁹³ Militarisation has been linked in various studies to increased gender inequality, physical and psychological violence towards women, sexual abuse, the use of rape as a weapon of intimidation and war, forced displacement, institutionalised prostitution and changes to women's work patterns. For example, a study of 61 countries found militarisation to have had a 'significant enhancing effect on violence against women and a highly diminishing effect on women's socio-economic empowerment'.⁹⁴ A study in the Philippines found that 'militarisation compounds the economic, social and cultural exclusion of women, making it harder for them to fulfil meaningful productive and reproductive roles in their daily lives'.⁹⁵ As Chapter 3 shows, when oil-related militarisation involves the use of violence and rape, the destruction of agricultural land and water supplies, the loss of homes, the displacement of communities, and increased poverty and insecurity – conditions that are spared from non-oil producing communities in the same country – these are certain to lead to the loss of employment opportunities for women in oil communities, as well as negatively affect their capacity to

⁹⁰ Quoted in Frynas 2001, 50.

⁹¹ HRW 1999, 151.

⁹² HRW 1995.

⁹³ UN 1995.

⁹⁴ Asadi 2010.

⁹⁵ Ocasiones 2009, 21.

carry out work.

2.2.3 The dual effect of oil on women's political participation

If we accept that women's formal employment is linked to their political empowerment, and that oil production can negatively impact women's formal employment through its effects at the national level, the local level, or both, we can infer that oil production will indirectly affect women's political participation through oil's direct impact on women's work. However, in which direction will this effect take place? While women's labour force participation can be politically empowering – predominantly increasing *formal* political activities that are related to the electoral process but also *non-formal* activities, I have suggested that women's exclusion from labour markets due to fewer job opportunities can, too, serve as an impetus for enhancing their political participation through *non-formal* activities such as protests. Thus, if oil production in developing countries reduces the number of women in the formal labour force due to Dutch Disease symptoms (the contraction of sectors in which women are employed), there is no compensation in the form of enhanced household incomes, and environmental degradation and militarisation occur in oil-producing regions, we can expect to see two distinct effects on women's political participation: a *decrease* in formal political activities (or, the perpetuation of low levels of formal political activities if these were initially low), and an *increase* in non-formal political activities.

The first effect would be witnessed at the national level, since Dutch Disease symptoms affect the national economy, thereby affecting the entire population of women of working age. It could also be witnessed at the local level, in sub-national units (oil or non-oil producing) in which traded sectors are more prominent, or in oil-producing sub-national units that are subjected to environmental degradation and militarisation, further diminishing women's work. The second effect – enhanced *non-formal* political participation – should be witnessed specifically in oil-producing sub-national units, since women who are subjected to the localised effects of oil production can more directly link the oil industry to the loss of employment opportunities, and mobilise against it (as well as being subjected to harsher conditions and less employment opportunities). Thus oil could have a dual effect on women's political participation: decreasing formal political activity and increasing non-formal political activity, both through oil's impact on women's work. This set of claims is

articulated in the following five hypotheses, the first two on the link between oil production and women's work, and the last three on the link between oil production and women's political activities:

H1: A rise in the value of oil production will reduce female labour force participation in an oil-producing country, assuming that it experienced Dutch Disease symptoms and that gender-based occupational segregation (women concentrated in the traded sector) is high.

H2: Higher levels of oil production in sub-national units within the same oil-producing country will reduce female labour force participation in these units compared with other units, assuming that environmental degradation and militarisation are more prominent in these units.

H3: A rise in the value of oil production will reduce women's formal political participation in an oil-producing country, assuming that female labour force participation has decreased.

H4: Higher levels of oil production in sub-national units within the same oil-producing country will reduce formal political participation in these units compared with other sub-national units, assuming that female labour force participation in these states has decreased further due to environmental degradation and militarisation.

H5: Higher levels of oil production in sub-national units within the same oil-producing country will enhance women's non-formal political participation in these units compared with other units, assuming that household incomes have not risen and that women's work in these states has declined due to environmental degradation and militarisation.

Of the five hypotheses, two relate to the national level (*H1* and *H3*), and three to the sub-national level (*H2*, *H4*, and *H5*). Although the theory implies a time dimension at both national and sub-national levels – that is, that a *rise* in the volume of oil production will result in changes to women's work and political participation at national and state levels – the unavailability of data at the state level in Nigeria did not allow for a comparison of states across time. Since the statistical tests I conduct at the state level are cross-sectional due to

data limitations, the sub-national hypotheses are limited accordingly to a test across different units at one point in time (i.e. ‘higher levels of oil production’). However, at both the national and local levels, I use historical data to provide some evidence for change over time. The hypotheses are tested throughout the four empirical chapters as follows: *H1* and *H2* in Chapter 3; *H3* and *H4* in Chapter 4; and *H5* in Chapters 5 and 6.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have laid out the theoretical foundation for a sub-national analysis of the impact of oil on women’s work and women’s political participation in Nigeria. My theory draws on several associations that have been previously established by other scholars; primarily the link between women’s labour force participation and their political empowerment, and the link between Dutch Disease symptoms in oil-producing developing countries and women’s reduced labour force participation and political influence. By re-examining these links, I have suggested that while labour force participation can be politically empowering for women, it facilitates particularly formal types of political activities that require financial resources and professional expertise, such as running for elected office. Non-formal political activities do not require such resources and have therefore been characteristic of women’s political engagement across time and space. I further made a new claim, according to which negative changes to women’s work – whether oil or non-oil induced – can also be politically empowering for women: reduced employment opportunities and the consequent economic marginalisation of women can increase their *non-formal* political activity.

Thus, fundamental to my theory is a clear distinction between formal and non-formal political activities, based on the assumption that the latter distinguishes women’s political engagement from men’s and thus must be included in any analysis of political participation. The second feature central to the theory is the attention to sub-national units – in this thesis, states – as key units of analysis. Distinct attention to both the national and local levels in oil-producing countries promotes a more nuanced appreciation of the impact of oil on economic and political outcomes, compared with the cross-national setting. As we will see, it helps reveal the localised effects of oil production in oil-producing communities, particularly the effects of environmental degradation and militarisation, as well as the unique political response of women in these communities. Since the impact of oil on women’s political

participation is mediated according to the theory through oil's impact on women's work at national and local levels, the thesis' primary analysis begins with an assessment of the link between oil and women's work in Nigeria in the next chapter.

Appendix 2

Women's protests in India, December 2012

Chapter 3

MORE OIL, LESS WORK

In early 2013, *CNN* identified a remote town in North Dakota as ‘America’s biggest growing boomtown’.¹ Williston, a sleepy farm town until the mid-2000s, is located on top of the Bakken shale, a massive rock formation that holds an estimated 18 billion barrels of crude oil. This deposit was found in the 1950s but was inaccessible until 2008, when the invention of a new drilling technology, hydraulic fracturing or ‘fracking’, has made it possible to remove oil from deep layers of the earth. Since oil production began, labour seekers have been flooding to the area to join the ‘oil bonanza’, a migration wave so great it was compared to the 1850s Californian Gold Rush.² The town’s population has almost tripled, with the majority of the newcomers being young, single males; it was reported that the ratio of men to women has become 3:1 or higher. Labour force composition has also changed: between 2010 and 2012, the town has produced 14,000 new jobs in sectors that attract largely male labour, such as construction, while some women were reported to have ‘opted out of the job market’ because ‘their husbands make enough money in the oil business to sustain the family’.³

The scenario in Williston is characteristic of oil booming towns; the discovery of oil in Pennsylvania in 1859 is renowned for setting off an ‘oil rush’ of workers to the region, stimulating urbanisation and industrialisation with drastic implications for the local labour force.⁴ On a larger scale, increased oil production in the Persian Gulf during the 1970s attracted workers from across the Middle East, making female labour unnecessary thanks to high household incomes.⁵ However, oil booms that generate economic transformation can result in negative changes to women’s work, if household income has not increased and if female workers are concentrated in sectors that decline as a result of the oil economy, while they cannot freely move to work in other sectors. Furthermore, the local effects of oil operations in oil-producing communities – rural-to-urban migration, pollution, environmental degradation and regional militarisation – can cause further losses to women’s

¹ CNN 2013.

² Ibid.

³ Klimasinska 2013.

⁴ Williamson et al. 1963.

⁵ On oil-related migration within the Middle East, see Baldwin-Edwards 2005.

livelihoods in these communities, as well as changes to the traditional division of labour, exacerbating women's poverty and insecurity.

Testing *H1* and *H2*, this chapter explores the relationship between oil production and women's work in Nigeria at the national and local levels, assessing the impact Nigeria's transformation to an oil giant had on its labour force, particularly female workers. It is organised accordingly in two sections. In the first section, I assess whether oil-related Dutch Disease symptoms that involved the expansion of the oil sector at the expense of traditional sectors, particularly agriculture, have resulted in a decrease in FLFP rates across Nigeria. To this end, I examine historical evidence on women's work in Nigeria before independence, including population censuses from the 1920s onwards, to provide a pre-oil account of women's work and rule out other explanations for a drop in FLFP rates. For a post-oil account, I focus specifically on the period preceding and following the 1970s oil boom, which had been the most transformative due to the massive inflow of oil revenue and simultaneous rise in oil prices.

In the second part of this chapter, I carry out a sub-national analysis of women's labour participation in Nigeria, to examine whether women's work in Nigeria's oil-producing states has been affected *worse* than women's work in non-oil producing states. Women's work is measured by the rates of FLFP, female unemployment, female farmers and female-headed households per state. Following this quantitative evaluation, I analyse testimonies (secondary sources) collected from women in oil communities to provide 'on-the-ground' evidence of the effects of environmental degradation and militarisation on their livelihoods.⁶ Analysing women's testimonies allowed exploring mechanisms that underlie differences between oil and non-oil states, and to overcome potential bias that could be the result of poor data on women's work per state, as well as the unavailability of data within states over time (originally, I intended to examine change within oil and non-oil producing states over time, but the available data allowed only for a cross-sectional analysis). The testimonies not only highlight the impact of oil-related pollution and militarisation on the livelihoods of women in oil communities, but also provide a vivid account of the effect of oil at the local level, illuminating some of the local manifestations of the resource curse.

⁶ Unless otherwise stated, testimonies were obtained from the Niger Delta Women for Justice – an NGO that operated in the Niger Delta from 1998 to 2005 and collected testimonies from women in 13 communities over four states (Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta and Ondo) during a three-week period in March 2000 (see Ekine 2001).

3.1 Oil's Impact on Women's Work: the National Level

To assess the impact of Nigeria's transformation to an oil-based economy on women's work, FLFP rates would have ideally been compared *before* and *after* this process took place. However, inconsistent methods of surveying the labour force, Nigeria's independence in 1960 which coincided with the beginning of oil exportation in 1958, and its adoption of the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986 which was recognised as harmful to female farmers, suggest that changes to FLFP rates could be the result of a number of factors.⁷ Since the influence of these factors cannot be fully separated from the effects of oil production, and because caution should be exercised with official Nigerian figures, the account of women's work in Nigeria begins with evidence on men and women's traditional work patterns in the country's three historical regions – North, East and West, providing an important historical context for Nigerian women's work (Nigeria's division to sub-units is portrayed in Section 4.2.2). In the second part of this section, I examine the effects of oil on the Nigerian economy to determine whether Dutch Disease symptoms have occurred. Lastly, I examine changes to women's work during the 'oil period', specifically before and after the 1970s oil boom, in which oil revenue's infiltration of the economy has been the fastest and the most transformative.

3.1.1 Women's high participation in the labour force pre oil

Historical evidence reveals that, in contrast to women in Western countries in the early 1900s, Nigerian women (like elsewhere in West Africa) have been at the forefront of productive and economic activities.⁸ Women's occupations consisted mainly of agricultural work; in pre-colonial Nigeria, women carried up to 80 percent of the planting, weeding and harvesting and all of the processing of agricultural goods, particularly food crops.⁹ In addition to farming, household duties and childbearing responsibilities, Nigerian women engaged in crafts, dying, weaving and spinning, petty trading and home-based informal activities.¹⁰ During the colonial period, FLFP rates remained exceptionally high; in the 1921 and 1931 population censuses conducted by the British administration, men and women

⁷ On SAP's effects on female farmers, see FAO 1995.

⁸ I gathered data on FLFP rates from annual national censuses between 1920 and 2007 (source: the Federal Office of Statistics, Nigeria).

⁹ Awoyemi and Adeoti 2006.

¹⁰ Fashoyin 1991.

were reported to be *equally productive*.¹¹ British Africanist Margery Perham found striking the ‘distribution of work between the sexes’, and commented in her 1933 analysis of the 1931 census that, ‘the Kanuri, though good Moslems, send 87 percent of their women to the fields’.¹² In the 1952 Population Census, women represented 44 percent of the national workforce (see Table 3.1). In Nigeria’s Western and Eastern regions, women were more active than men in agriculture and trade – the only two categories assigned for women’s work, while in the Muslim North, the number of women in trade was *over five times higher* than the number of male traders.

Table 3.1: Nigerian men and women in employment – 1952/53 census (thousands)

Region	Men						Women			Both
	Agric.	Craft	Traders	Gov.	Other	Total	Agric.	Traders	Total	
Lagos	4	11	21	16	32	84	3	33	36	120
West	1,154	119	145	54	125	1,597	1,187	420	1,607	3,204
North	3,876	291	151	104	245	4,667	2,069	836	2,905	7,572
East	1,306	75	148	50	142	1,721	1,737	144	1,881	3,602
Total	6,340	496	465	224	544	8,069	4,996	1,433	6,429	14,498

Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics 1964, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos. Table 2.3, p. 13.

Agric.=Agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting; Craft=Craftsmen, skilled and semi-skilled workers; Traders=Traders and employees engaged in commerce; Gov.=Government, local government and professional workers

Although regional differences between Nigeria’s three main regions existed, they were similarly characterised by a traditional gender-based division of labour, which assigned men and women with distinct roles and responsibilities. Generally, men would tend to felling trees, bush clearing and making bridges, while women were responsible for the planting of seeds, harvesting, processing and selling of farm products.¹³ In the Eastern region, dominated by the Igbo ethnic group, women’s occupations involved agricultural cultivation, food processing, manufacturing (pottery, cloth weaving and mat making), trade and marketing.¹⁴ Igbo women did all the planting and weeding but there was a clear distinction in harvesting between *male* crops (yam, plantain, kola and oil palm) and *female* crops

¹¹ The 1921 Census was based on anthropological accounts of Southern and Northern Nigeria, while the 1931 Census was a more detailed exercise, issued in six volumes (see Perham 1933).

¹² Perham 1933, 423.

¹³ Martin 1984.

¹⁴ Chuku 1995.

(cocoyam, pumpkin, and okra).¹⁵ Igbo women also dominated the local markets and were renowned for their trading skills. It was noted that, 'on market days... the whole female population moves to the market place', and that 'marketing, together with the preparation of food constitutes the chief occupation of the women'.¹⁶ Trading is still considered an important part of women's work among the Igbo: 'a woman who does not know how to trade... in our town is a senseless woman. She is not a woman at all'.¹⁷

In the Western region, dominated by the Yoruba ethnic group, women's major occupation was regional and long-distance trade, selling their farm products and other goods in the markets.¹⁸ B.W. Hodder traced the domination of long-distance trade by Yoruba women to the 19th century, when due to 'conditions of internal insecurity... it was unsafe for men to move away from their farms, while women enjoyed relative immunity from attacks'.¹⁹ Yoruba women also engaged in farming and manufacturing of a variety of goods (oil, dye, ceramics and textiles). In the latter part of the 19th century, they started to accumulate considerable wealth from the growing trade in palm kernels, a *female* crop.²⁰ Their economic power was such that wealthy women traders could enter into marriage contracts with one or several young girls – a practice known as the 'female-husband marriage' – to benefit from their productive resources.²¹ At marriage age (18), the young woman would move from her father's home to the female-husband's farm, where she worked and was sent on trading operations. After being introduced to a male, the children she bore were claimed by the female-husband to work on the farm.

In Northern Nigeria, a major West-African textile manufacturing centre during the 19th century, women were active in a variety of capacities as spinners, weavers, dyers and managers.²² Similarly to men, women were highly skilled workers, formally trained in apprenticeships for as long as six years. Women labourers, many of whom were slaves, were the backbone of the industry; the growing and harvesting of locally produced indigo dye was conducted on plantations worked by male and female slaves. Two separate textile production systems coexisted: in the 'Northern system', based in the Muslim states dominated by the

¹⁵ Martin 1984.

¹⁶ Basden 1982, 89.

¹⁷ Chuku 1999, 2.

¹⁸ Fadipe 1970; Falola 1995.

¹⁹ Hodder 1962, 110.

²⁰ Lynne 1990, 339.

²¹ Kriger 1993. The practice was prevalent amongst tribes in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.

²² Ibid.

Hausa ethnic group, women were spinners and men were weavers, dyers, tailors and embroiderers; in the 'Southern system', based in the city of Benin and some Yoruba states, women also worked as weavers and dyers. The greater differentiation of labour in the Northern system diminished during the 20th century, when women began engaging in weaving and dying. Since their workplaces were usually located in inaccessible private compounds due to their seclusion, women's economic activities in the North were rarely noted in the journals of Europeans and the role they played as workers in the textile industry has not been acknowledged.²³ Indeed, it was noted that the economic activities of Northern Hausa women 'place them in the same category as the highly visible female traders of Southern Nigeria', even though they were not as visible.²⁴

British colonialism (officially, between 1900-1960) introduced a new economic and social order in Nigeria. Due to Victorian ideologies held by the British regarding women's subordinate role, new practices that were enacted by the administration such as paid jobs and formal education, discriminated against women; women were barred from waged employment and boys-only missionary schools. Moreover, their traditional occupation as traders was resented by the colonial administrators, while their economic independence and status were ignored at all levels of government.²⁵ Women also suffered direct losses to their traditional sources of income due to the inflow of mass-produced cheaper crafts from Europe and the lowering in prices of farm products and raw materials. With the establishment of townships and the gradual advance of industrialisation, men migrated to urban centres leaving women behind with extra farm workloads.²⁶ In the latter years of colonial rule, however, women's economic position slightly improved; they were allowed in small numbers into waged employment and formal education, greater professional differentiation took place and women professionals – teachers, nurses, doctors, accountants and lawyers – began to emerge, as well as cooperative societies and guilds for women workers.²⁷

Thus, historical evidence regarding men and women's economic roles in pre-independent Nigeria – as documented by labour force participation statistics and anthropological accounts (which cannot be brought here in further detail) – clearly

²³ Hill 1969. See also Pittin 1984.

²⁴ Hill 1969, 393.

²⁵ Uchendu 1993.

²⁶ Osiruemo 2004.

²⁷ The first cooperative society was registered in 1942; by 1950 there were 69 cooperative societies exclusively for women in Nigeria's Eastern region (Uchendu 1993).

establishes that in all parts of the country, including the Muslim North, women were fully active economic actors. Although women suffered losses to their traditional economic power during the colonial period, they remained active in the labour force, owned their property, and kept separate accounts from their husbands, maintaining full financial independence.²⁸ As one scholar put it, the concepts of housewifery and unemployment simply did not exist in pre-independent Nigeria; work was ‘carried irrespective of gender as a means to avoid starvation and poverty’ and was as important to women’s social status as marriage.²⁹ In the predominantly rural Southern Niger Delta region, where oil explorations had begun in the early 1930s, the major source of livelihood for women of various ethnic groups was subsistence farming, fishing and trading; women comprised 60 to 80 percent of the agricultural labour force and accounted for 90 percent of family food supply in the region.³⁰

3.1.2 Oil, Dutch Disease and Nigeria’s labour force

‘Agriculture is still a substantial sector of the Nigerian economy – if it stagnates it is bound to reduce the overall rate of growth of the economy. It is the booming petroleum industry which seems now to make Nigerians oblivious of the important role of agriculture in the nation’s development’.

(A. Olufemi Lewis, 1977, 70
Nigeria’s Third National Development Plan)

Although oil has featured in the Nigerian economy as early as 1958 when export commenced, the Nigerian economy remained fully agrarian until the early 1970s, producing palm oil, palm kernel, cocoa, rubber, cotton, groundnut and subsistence food products.³¹ Nigeria was ranked the world’s leading exporter of palm produce, the second largest exporter of cocoa, and among the top ten in the production and export of timber, cotton, rubber, groundnut, hides and skin, tin and zinc. The strong agricultural sector provided significant foreign exchange through exports as well as domestic food and industrial raw material needs, keeping Nigeria almost entirely self-sufficient. Compatibly, following independence the Nigerian labour force remained highly productive: in the early 1970s, out of 28.5 million people in the labour force, 27.3 million were employed and of these, 18

²⁸ Falola 1995.

²⁹ Uchendu 1993, 23.

³⁰ Ololade 2009. Farming activities by women in the Niger Delta include predominantly the cultivation of yam (food crop) and the production of oil palm.

³¹ Damachi and Seibel 1973.

million (63 percent) were employed in the agriculture sector.³² Within this sector, over 94 percent were self-employed in small-scale family farming enterprises. It was estimated that the agriculture sector provided means of livelihood for over 70 percent of the population, while the sectorial share of agriculture in GDP was roughly 64 percent.³³

Oil became a significant contributor to GDP, exports and government revenue in the early 1970s, thanks to the nationalisation of the oil sector in 1967 and a massive increase in the level of oil production and the price of oil.³⁴ From 5,100 barrels a day (b/d) in 1958, oil production increased to over one million b/d in 1970 and to two million b/d by 1974. As production levels and world oil prices simultaneously increased, the country's agricultural orientation was gradually abandoned in favour of the oil sector. This is demonstrated clearly in the steep decline in the share of agricultural exports out of total exports: while oil exports rose from 2.6 percent of total exports in 1960 to 96 percent in 1980, agricultural exports declined over this period from 81 percent of total exports to 2.4 percent (see Table 3.2).³⁵ Similarly, the agriculture sectorial share of GDP dropped in 1970 to 41.3 percent (from 64 percent), and by 1980 to about 20 percent (see Table 3.3). The oil sector's share of GDP, on the other hand, grew from 0.2 percent in 1960 to over 11.5 percent in 1970, further increasing to almost half of GDP by 2000.³⁶ By the mid-1980s, Nigeria had lost both its lead in agricultural exports and its self-sufficiency; it now had to rely on food imports for about 58 percent of its food and 72 percent of its industrial raw material.³⁷

³² Ezeala-Harrison 1993.

³³ Damachi and Seibel 1973.

³⁴ Lubeck 1977.

³⁵ This was also connected to the civil war between 1966-70, as agricultural products mainly came from the war-affected Eastern region (Ezeala Harrison 1993). However, in 1986, despite the crash in oil prices, oil exports still accounted for 92.5 percent of total exports.

³⁶ In 1980 oil's share of GDP fell to 29 percent, and further to 11 percent in 1986 as a result of the global drop in oil prices (Ezeala-Harrison 1993).

³⁷ Oshikoya 1990.

Table 3.2: Commodity exports' share of total exports – 1960-1986 (%)

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1986
Agriculture	80.9	58.0	30.0	7.2	2.4	4.5
Palm produce	23.6	15.0	2.7	0.6	0.1	0.1
Cocoa	21.7	15.9	15	4.2	2.2	4.1
Groundnut	16.6	17.8	7.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Rubber	8.4	4.1	2	0.3	0.1	0.3
Timber	4.1	2.3	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.0
Cotton	3.7	1.2	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hides/skin	2.5	1.7	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.0
Oil	2.6	25.4	57.6	92.7	96.1	92.5
Other exports	16.8	16.6	12.4	1.9	1.5	3

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletins, various years.

Table 3.3: Agricultural and oil production share of GDP, export and revenue – 1960-2010

Year	Agricultural production			Oil production		
	% GDP	% Total export	% Total revenue	% GDP	% Total export	% Total revenue
1960	63.9	97.3	89.6	0.2	2.7	-
1970	41.3	33.1	73.7	11.5	58.2	26.3
1980	20.6	2.1	35.8	21.4	96.1	64.2
1990	32.7	1.3	26.7	37.5	97.1	73.3
2000	33.8	1.3	16.5	47.7	98.7	83.5
2010	35.2	3.6	26.1	33.4	96.4	73.9

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletins, various years.

The oil windfalls presented the Nigerian government with immense opportunities for development; one figure places Nigeria's gains in oil revenue between 1971 and 2005 at \$390 billion.³⁸ However, government actions encouraged the transformation of the economy from agriculture-based to becoming heavily oil-dependent. In response to the mid-1970s oil boom, the government increased spending, relying on optimistic estimates of oil prices. According to Nigeria's Economic and Financial Review, between the boom years of 1972 and 1981, annual expenditure was far higher than receipts from total oil revenue.³⁹ Resources were spent on the consumption of imported foreign consumer goods and the

³⁸ Budina and van Wijnbergen 2007.

³⁹ Nigeria's Economic and Financial Review 1988.

establishment of projects that had no productive value.⁴⁰ At the same time, the influx of foreign exchange from booming oil exports created a surplus of foreign currency, driving down the Naira price of foreign exchange, and resulting in a sharp increase in imports and a drop in non-oil exports. Accompanied by the migration of workers from rural to urban centres for jobs in infrastructure and construction mega-projects, these developments gradually led to falling productivity and stagnating output in the rural agricultural sector.

Indeed, one study found that the main contributing factor to the rise in import demand in Nigeria during the mid-1970s was the boom-induced shrinking in agricultural output (other factors included the expansion of the public sector, higher incomes of public sector employees, and a government policy of using imports to offset domestic shortages which created greater demand for goods and services).⁴¹ Furthermore, a rising demand during the oil boom for non-tradable goods such as transport and construction led to increases in the prices of these goods and high inflation due to limited supply. Combined with high demand for agricultural imports, high government spending and the appreciation of the real exchange rate, these factors made the economy highly vulnerable to Dutch Disease; while between 1970 and 1980 Nigeria's economic growth has doubled compared to the previous decade thanks to oil exports (6.2 percent growth annually compared with 3.1 percent), following the collapse in oil prices in the early 1980s economic growth was negative, decreasing 4.8 percent annually from 1980 to 1987.⁴² In 1989 this led to Nigeria's classification by the World Bank as a low-income country, declaring it poor enough to be eligible (along with resource-poor Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Mali) for concessional aid.⁴³

Nigeria's dependence on a volatile source of income produced macroeconomic instability and left it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles in world's oil prices. In 1977, incidentally when *The Economist* coined the term 'Dutch Disease', the impact of government neglect of the agriculture sector was already recognised in Nigeria, as the quote at the beginning of this section demonstrates. These early warnings were insufficient to prevent Dutch Disease symptoms. As the entire oil windfall was squandered on

⁴⁰ A large part was also used to finance government recurrent budget deficits, or put in foreign personal bank accounts of government officials (Budina and van Wijnbergen 2007).

⁴¹ Nyatepe-Coo 1994, 328. In another study, Chukwuka et al. found that a one percent increase in oil export depressed agricultural export by 16 percent, determining that 'the more Nigeria produces and exports oil, the lower the output and less competitive the traditional traded sector becomes' (2013, 1).

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid. Concessional aid was from the World Bank's affiliate International Development Association.

consumption, when oil prices dropped, the economy collapsed. The government's launch of the 'Green Revolution' programme in the early 1980s to try and restore the agriculture sector's lead was insufficient; Nigeria was left to borrow heavily in international debt markets, extending its external debt from \$567 million in 1970 to \$24.5 billion by 1986.⁴⁴ In 1986, Nigeria had no choice but to adopt the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Program of economic reforms, a programme aimed at restoring economic stability, diversifying the productive base to reduce dependence on the oil sector and imports, stabilising the exchange rate, and enlarging the employment base of the labour force.⁴⁵ In other words, a programme aimed at fixing distortions created by oil dependency to 'cure' Dutch Disease symptoms.⁴⁶

The changes undergone by the Nigerian economy had dramatic implications for the country's labour force. The wave of rural-to-urban migration was exacerbated, not only by new jobs in the expanding non-traded sector, but also by a growing gap in rural-urban incomes and rising poverty in rural areas as a result of the shrinking agricultural sector, creating a *push factor* for increased urbanisation.⁴⁷ In 1975, urban-oriented sectors exceeded agriculture in per capita earnings.⁴⁸ While in 1967 agriculture had a share of 71.7 percent of total employment, in 1975 the share of agriculture declined by 7.7 percentage points to 64 percent, and the sector continued to suffer manpower losses in the early 1980s.⁴⁹ It was noted that the sector's continued neglect signalled to the population that only the oil-based, urban sector could provide viable employment opportunities.⁵⁰ However, the agriculture sector remained the main employer and source of livelihood for the majority of Nigeria's population. In 2003, about 70 percent of the labour force was still employed in agricultural production at a subsistence level.⁵¹ This implies that while the oil sector expanded during the 1970s to become the backbone of the Nigerian economy, it provided no long-term employment opportunities for the vast majority of the population. Moreover, the non-

⁴⁴ Bienen 1988.

⁴⁵ Nwabugo 2011.

⁴⁶ As Ezeala-Harrison noted, 'Nigeria had come from a strong domestic-food producing and primary-product exporting economy with a viable industrial potential, to a heavily indebted food-importing economy struggling to rediscover its agrarian comparative advantage' (1993, 193).

⁴⁷ Lewis 1977.

⁴⁸ Umo 1975. The sectional distribution of per capita income was (%): commerce 69, manufacturing 26, construction 23, services 21, transport 15.5, utilities 15, agriculture and forestry 9, non-oil mining 3.

⁴⁹ In 1967, agriculture was followed by commerce (12.9 percent) and manufacturing (9.6 percent). By 1976, the manufacturing sector had increased its share in employment from 9.6 to 16.8 percent.

⁵⁰ Ezeale-Harrison 1993, 196.

⁵¹ ICFTU 2005.

sustainable expansion of the non-traded sector (i.e. construction) at the expense of the traded sector (i.e. agriculture) affected predominantly women, as the next section suggests.

3.1.3 Women's low participation in the labour force post oil

The high rates of FLFP documented by the British (as discussed in Section 3.1.1) are not reflected in Nigeria's post-independence population surveys. In surveys from 1960 and 1964, the proportion of women in the workforce appears insignificant: men are reported to constitute *95 percent of the labour force* (see Table 3.4). The discrepancy between reports from immediately before and immediately after 1960's independence is most likely the result of measurement distortions and not a sudden drastic decline in women's work participation: Nigeria's surveys in the 1960s did not permit the inclusion of more than one type of work, resulting in the exclusion of female farmers who were also wives or mothers from the labour force, as 'homemaker' was considered their primary occupation. The problem of women's dual work was already identified in the 1952 census: a government statistician noted that 'enumerators had great difficulty in deciding whether the duties of housewife were or were not the primary occupation'.⁵² Moreover, what constitutes the 'labour force' is not clearly defined in early surveys, and the categories utilised seem to have been designed for the male occupational structure; for example, trade – women's second most important occupation in the 1952 census – was not considered an industry in 1960 (see Table 3.4).

⁵² Federal Office of Statistics 1964, 9.

Table 3.4: Employment by industry, gender and region – 1960, 1964 (thousands)

Industry	Government		Non-government		Total	
	1960	1964	1960	1964	1960	1964
Breakdown by sector						
Agriculture	16,390	17,876	23,723	17,240	40,113	35,116
Mining & quarrying	135	216	42,970	50,819	43,105	51,035
Manufacturing	4,073	3,716	28,748	58,148	32,821	61,864
Construction	53,470	28,006	59,249	50,014	112,719	78,020
Electricity	2,494	4,614	5,846	10,325	8,340	14,939
Commerce	1,300	855	38,674	44,310	39,974	45,165
Transport & communi.	11,894	17,851	27,378	40,217	39,272	58,068
Services	122,901	147,308	60,703	70,019	183,604	217,327
Breakdown by region						
Lagos	26,393	42,144	68,134	105,669	94,527	147,813
North	70,802	69,005	73,379	91,750	144,181	160,755
West	62,492	40,900	70,521	56,370	133,013	97,270
East	52,970	47,892	75,257	67,464	128,227	115,356
Breakdown by gender						
Total employment	212,657	220,442	287,291	341,092	499,948	561,534
Of which males	202,712	207,190	271,814	322,001	474,526	529,191
Of which females	9,945	13,252	15,477	19,091	25,422	32,343

Source: 1960: Annual Abstract of Statistics (1963), Lagos: Federal Office of Statistics, Table 159, p. 187; 1964: Annual Abstract of Statistics (1966), Lagos: Federal Office of Statistics, Table 3.1, p. 22.

Data gathered by Nigeria's National Manpower Board seem more indicative of changes to women's work, beginning in the early 1960s. First, *female participation in urban wage employment* increased from 2.1 percent in 1956 to 5.1 percent in 1960, 7.2 percent in 1965 and to 13.3 percent in 1981.⁵³ This could be attributed to the expansion in educational opportunities for women from 1960 onwards, the establishment of a public sector in independent Nigeria in which women were absorbed, and urbanisation, which attracted female migration to urban areas.⁵⁴ Second, despite the rise in women's participation in urban wage employment, *FLFP* rates in urban areas between 1967 and 1976 – a decade in which the oil industry expanded exponentially – *decreased* from 60.4 percent to 48.8 percent, and further down to 41.9 percent in 1983. Over the same period, men's urban labour force participation remained at the same high level of 87.2 percent (see Table 3.5). The decrease in the urban FLFP rate could indicate a decline in the demand for female labour or a decline in the supply of job-seeking women (or both). The third noticeable trend – an increase in the rate of *female unemployment* in urban areas between 1976 and 1983 – implies it was the former rather than the latter.

⁵³ Fashoyin 1991. 'Urban wage employment' is loosely defined as employment in medium and large establishments of ten or more employees.

⁵⁴ Osiruemo 2004. The Nigerian civil war, between 1967 and 1970, might have had an additional impact on the rising level of women in wage employment, with most men out in the battlefield (Uchendu 1993).

Table 3.5: Urban labour force participation and unemployment rates – 1967-1983 (%)

Year	Labour force participation			Unemployment rate		
	Male	Female	Both	Male	Female	Both
1967	87.2	60.4	73.8	10.4	4.3	8.3
1976	87.2	48.8	68.0	4.7	3.5	4.3
1983	75.4	41.9	58.9	5.8	10.6	7.3

Source: National Manpower Board, labour force sample survey. Lagos, November 1984, p. 26.

These data suggest that the neglect of the agriculture sector in Nigeria during the 1970s resulted in migration of *both* men and women to urban centres, which were reported to have witnessed population explosions.⁵⁵ If during the colonial period men were the key migrants to urban areas, during the 1970s' oil boom women joined – a key difference between the two periods. However, while men were absorbed in the rapidly growing non-traded sector – mining, electricity, construction and transport – due to prevailing occupational segregation and different skills-set for men and women entrenched by the British, women were concentrated in unskilled and low level jobs in trade and community services sectors; data from 1983 shows that these two sectors represented over 80 percent of female urban employment (see Table 3.6). When oil prices crashed in the early 1980s, male labour force participation fell by nearly 12 percentage points, while that of women dropped slightly less by 7 percentage points (see Table 3.5). Although unemployment was lower among women before the oil boom, this trend began to change during the boom, and reversed after the oil crash: in 1983, women's urban unemployment rate rose to 10.6 percent, nearly twice the rate for men (female unemployment rates in Nigeria during the 1980s were undoubtedly far higher than these figures suggest).⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Uchendu 1993.

⁵⁶ Fashoyin (1991) noted that in the 1980s, women experienced greater unemployment rates than men due to the shrinking of the public sector and because a large number of women in the shrinking traded sector were casual workers.

Table 3.6: Post-oil boom employment in urban areas by industry and gender – 1983 (%)

Sector	Male	Female	Both
Agriculture	13.1	11.6	12.5
Mining/quarrying	0.4	0.0	0.2
Manufacturing	4.1	1.4	3.2
Electricity, Gas & water	4.5	0.0	2.9
Construction	5.7	0.2	3.8
Trade, restaurant and hotels	17.1	51.3	29.2
Transport & Communications	9.5	0.4	6.3
Financial institutions	2.6	1.2	2.1
Community, social & personal services	41.0	29.5	36.9
Miscellaneous	2.0	4.4	2.9
All sectors	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: National Manpower Board, labour force sample survey. Lagos, November 1984, p. 26.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, during further oil *boom and bust* cycles, women faced higher redundancies and unemployment rates than men.⁵⁷ While a large proportion of Nigeria's population was absorbed by then in cities through rural-to-urban migration, women's official FLFP rates have continued to be low; in the 1991 census, FLFP was at 25 percent.⁵⁸ One study in Nigeria found that 82 percent of women in non-agricultural employment in urban areas in 1990 were self-employed.⁵⁹ In another study from 1997, women represented 12.5 percent of full-time employees in the federal civil service, 33 percent of university teachers, 19.5 percent of legal practitioners, 17.3 percent of full-time medical practitioners and 4.3 percent of registered architects – low shares of professional employment.⁶⁰ In 2005, less than 40,000 women were employed as federal civil servants, compared with 227,000 men.⁶¹ These findings demonstrate both the low participation of women and the strong occupational segregation in the formal Nigerian labour force. When FLFP is defined as 'the percentage of the female population aged 15 and older that is

⁵⁷ Largely, as a result of the Structural Adjustment Programme. The programme dictated the relocation of resources from subsistence production to the production of export crops, disadvantaging those who were concentrated in the subsistence sector and whose ability to move into export crops was limited- i.e., women (Eboiyehi, Bankole, and Eromonsele 2006).

⁵⁸ National Bureau of Statistics 2000.


⁵⁹ Okojie 1991.

⁶⁰ Okeke 1997.

⁶¹ National Bureau of Statistics 2008.

economically active' (rather than the fraction of the formal labour force that is made up of female citizens), the gender gap is narrower but still considerably large (see Graph 3.1).

Graph 3.1: Nigeria's labour force participation rate, male and female – 1990-2012 (%)*



Source: ILO LABORSTA 2013.

*FLFP is defined here as the percentage of the female population aged 15 and older that is economically active.

These data tentatively suggest that women's formal employment in Nigeria has been diminished due to oil-related transformations, consistently with *H3*. While women who migrated to urban areas faced fierce gender-based occupational segregation and little employment opportunities, women left behind in rural areas were confronted with a stagnating agricultural sector. FLFP rates were not diminished due to increased household income in the vast majority of households, as in the Middle East; GDP per capita in Nigeria *decreased* between 1970 and 2000, from \$1,113 to \$1,084, while poverty and income distribution have deteriorated sharply (placing Nigeria amongst the 15 poorest countries in the world).⁶² The prevailing wage for women in the formal labour force has most likely declined as women's labour was not in high demand, but no official data can support this claim. Importantly, low FLFP rates do not suggest Nigerian women have stopped working. Rather, the vast majority of women were absorbed in the informal sector; one study found that 77 percent of women surveyed in Osun, a (non-oil producing) state in central Nigeria, had joined an informal trading network as a resort to 'household survival'.⁶³ To provide further evidence on the effects of oil on women's work in Nigeria, as well as explore

⁶² Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003, 4.

⁶³ Ologunde 2005.

whether women's economic marginalisation was worse in oil-producing Nigerian states, I turn to a sub-national analysis of the impact of oil on women's work.

3.2 Oil's Impact on Women's Work: the Local Level

The analysis in this section begins with a comparison of two groups of Nigerian states – oil-producing and non-oil producing – to identify differences between states that could be the result of the localised impact of oil.⁶⁴ Ideally, I would have been able to assess change over time within states; the four variables of women's work I examine per state were available for a single point in time, providing only a cross-sectional glimpse into differences between states (as explained in Chapter 4, the frequent change in the number of states in the Nigerian federation would in any case have complicated the assessment of change over time within states). In the second and third parts of this section, I use testimonies of women from oil communities (secondary sources) to complement the numerical data and illustrate how women's experience in these communities has been fundamentally different from women's experience in non-oil communities, with detrimental effects to their work. The testimonies, obtained from the local NGO *Niger Delta Women for Justice* (unless otherwise stated), were originally collected to highlight the plight of women in the Niger Delta. Following my analysis of the testimonies, I use only selected excerpts to specifically elucidate the impact of oil on women's work.⁶⁵

3.2.1 Oil-producing states vs. non-oil producing states

I examine four variables of women's work at the state level: (1) *FLFP* rate per state – defined by Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) as 'the share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector'.⁶⁶ This measure corresponds to the definition of FLFP used in the thesis, except for its exclusion of the agriculture sector; (2) The *share of female farmers* per state – the proportion of female farmers out of all farmers in the state.⁶⁷ This measure is used to gain some insight on the impact of oil on the agriculture sector in

⁶⁴ The data were gathered from Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics.

⁶⁵ For the full testimonies, see Ekine 2001.

⁶⁶ NBS 2009, 29. This measure is similar to the World Bank's FLFP indicator used in cross-national studies of women's work, except for the exclusion of agricultural workers; the World Bank's indicator is defined as 'the fraction of the formal labour force that is made up of female citizens', including the agriculture sector.

⁶⁷ This is defined by Nigeria's NBS as 'employment in crop farming by sex and category of workers', referring to both paid and unpaid family employees (NBS 2009, 30).

which Nigerian women are largely concentrated; (3) *Female unemployment rate* per state – defined by the NBS as the share of unemployed women in the labour force.⁶⁸ Since a substantial amount of Nigerian women are employed in the informal sector which is not reflected in formal labour force surveys, I use this measure to gain a better understanding of women's work per state under the assumption that higher unemployment rates indicate less demand for female labour despite women's willingness to work, as well as high rates of informal sector employment; (4) Female-headed households – the share of households in the state headed by a female. This measure can illustrate shifts in households that are the result of oil-related male migration to urban areas.

If the national trend has been repeated at the local, state level, *FLFP* rates would be lower in oil-producing states compared with non-oil producing states, while *female unemployment* rates would be higher in oil-producing states (assuming that prior to oil production, *FLFP* and *female unemployment* rates were roughly even across Nigeria). The share of *female farmers* could be lower in oil states due to the loss of agricultural land and pollution, but this effect could be countered by the greater expansion of the non-traded sector and a departure of men from agriculture (and stagnating rural areas) to take up jobs in this sector in urban areas, raising the share of female farmers in oil states. If this indeed occurred, the share of female-headed households would also be higher in oil states. Notably, agricultural work has not been historically even across Nigerian states; agriculture has been more predominant in Southern states, of which some are also oil-producing (see Section 3.1.1). Thus, I draw insights from comparing oil and non-oil producing states specifically *in the South*, of which nine (of 17 states) are oil-producing.⁶⁹ I also examine changes to the results when the nine *strictly-Muslim* Northern states are excluded from the group of (27) non-oil states.


FLFP. The results show that the average of *FLFP* in the group of oil-producing states is higher than the average of *FLFP* in the group of non-oil states (Graph 3.2). *FLFP* rates across Nigeria vary considerably from a high of 59.5 percent (in oil-producing Akwa Ibom State) to a low of 3.7 percent (in non-oil producing, *strictly-Muslim* Zamfara State). While

⁶⁸ NBS 2009, 28.

⁶⁹ This means excluding the 12 Northern states – Zamfara, Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, Bauchi, Borno, Jigawa, Kebbi, Yobe, Kaduna, Niger, and Gombe; as well as the seven 'Middle Belt' states of Kwara, Kogi, Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa, Taraba, and Adamawa, leaving 17 Southern states, of which nine are oil-producing.

the national average in 2007 was 32.5 percent, oil-producing states' average was 39.9 percent, compared with an average of 27.6 percent for non-oil producing states. However, oil-producing states' average is pulled up by three states that are ranked top, while four other oil-producing states are below the national average, with oil-producing Delta State featuring the lowest rate in the group with 19.9 percent (this finding promoted Delta State as primary candidate for case-study analysis in Chapters 5 and 6). Notably, 11 of 12 states ranked top (of which five are oil-producing) are all Southern. When the nine Northern *strictly-Muslim* states are excluded from the group of non-oil states, the group's average is raised to 34.0 percent (from 27.6 percent). Indeed, eight of the ten states with the lowest *FLFP* rates are *strictly-Muslim*. A two-tailed t-test confirms the strong impact played by these states: the difference between *FLFP* rates in the two groups of states is statistically significant at the 5% level when all states are included ($p=0.047$), but becomes insignificant when *strictly-Muslim* states are removed ($p=0.316$).

Graph 3.2: Female labour force participation rate by state – 2007 (%)*




Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2009, p. 29, Table 5.5.

*=*Strictly-Muslim* states. Oil states are marked black. Non-oil Southern states are circled red.

Female farmers. The results show that the average share of female farmers in the group of oil-producing states is higher than their average share in non-oil states (Graph 3.3). The shares of female farmers vary from a high of 59.2 percent (again, in oil-producing Akwa Ibom State) to a low of 10.5 percent (in non-oil producing, *strictly-Muslim* Katsina State).

Here, the difference between the two groups of states is more acute in favour of oil states. While the national average for the *share of female farmers* was 38.4 percent in 2005-6, oil-producing states' average was 49.3 percent, compared with an average of 34.7 percent for non-oil producing states. Five oil-producing states are ranked top while the other four are also above the national average (interestingly, despite Delta State's low *FLFP* rate, its *share of female farmers* is high at 43 percent). The distribution of non-oil Southern states is largely even. When the nine Northern *strictly-Muslim* states are excluded from the group of non-oil producing states, the group's average is again raised appreciably to 40.3 percent (from 34.7 percent); seven out of eight states at the bottom of the graph are *strictly-Muslim*. However, the difference between the *share of female farmers* in the two groups of states is statistically significant in a two-tailed t-test both when all states are included ($p=0.001$) and when *strictly-Muslim* states are removed ($p=0.018$).

Graph 3.3: Share of female farmers by state – 2005-6 (%)*




Source: calculations based on National Bureau of Statistics, 2009, p. 30, Table 5.6.

*=Strictly-Muslim states. Oil states are marked black. Non-oil Southern states are circled red.

Female unemployment. The results show that the average share of female unemployment in the group of oil-producing states is higher than that of non-oil states (Graph 3.4). Female unemployment rates across Nigeria vary from a high of 14.4 percent (in non-oil-producing Nassarawa State) to a low of 0.3 percent (in non-oil producing, *strictly-Muslim* Zamfara State, which is also the lowest in *FLFP*). While the national average of *female unemployment* in 2007 was 4.4 percent, oil-producing states' average was 6.0 percent,

compared with an average of 3.9 percent for non-oil producing states. While seven out of nine oil-producing states are far above the national average, two oil-producing states (Ondo and Cross River) are pulling the group's average *down*; excluding them raises the group's average to 7.0 percent. The distribution of non-oil Southern states is largely even. When the nine *strictly-Muslim* states are excluded from the group of non-oil producing states, the group's average is raised to 5.0 percent, still under that of oil states; seven out of ten states from the bottom are *strictly-Muslim*. The difference between *female unemployment* in the two groups of states is statistically significant in a two-tailed t-test at the 10% level when all states are included ($p=0.087$), but not when *strictly-Muslim* states are removed ($p=0.463$).

Graph 3.4: Female unemployment rate by state – 2007 (%)*




Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2009, p. 34, Table 5.8.

*=*Strictly-Muslim* states. Oil states are marked black. Non-oil Southern states are circled red.

Female-headed households. The results show that the average share of *female-headed households* in oil-producing states is about 2.5 times higher than their average share in non-oil states (Graph 3.5). Female-headed households' rates across Nigeria vary from a high of 32.3 percent (in oil-producing Abia State) to a low of 0.7 percent (in non-oil producing, *strictly-Muslim* Sokoto State). While the national average of *female-headed households* in 2007 was 15.2 percent, oil-producing states' average was 27.8 percent, compared with an average of 11.0 percent for non-oil producing states. All nine oil-producing states were far above the national average. While Southern states presented on average higher shares of female-headed households, oil states were higher than their Southern counterparts. When the nine *strictly-Muslim* states are excluded from the group of non-oil producing states, the

group's average is raised to 15.1 percent, still far under that of oil states; seven out of ten states from the bottom are *strictly-Muslim*. The difference between the shares of *female-headed households* in the two groups of states is statistically significant in a two-tailed t-test, both when all states are included ($p=0.001$) and when *strictly-Muslim* states are removed ($p=0.01$).

Graph 3.5: Female-headed households by state – 2007 (%)*



Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2009, p. 7, Table 2.2.

*=Strictly-Muslim states. Oil states are marked black. Southern states are circled red.

Table 3.7 summarises these results (for figures per state, see Table A3.1 in the Appendix).

Table 3.7: Indicators of women's work in oil and non-oil producing states, averages (%)*

	National	Oil states	Non-oil states	Non-oil states excluding <i>strictly-Muslim</i> states
FLFP	32.5	39.9	27.6	34.0
Share of female farmers	38.4	49.3	34.7	40.3
Female unemployment	4.4	6.0	3.9	5.0
Female-headed households	15.2	27.8	11.0	15.1

Source: Calculations based on Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics, 2009.

* Averages for 2007, except for share of female farmers (2005-6).

These findings provide evidence for differences between oil and non-oil states; across all four indicators, oil states' averages were higher than those of the group of oil-producing states. Examining the distribution of Southern states clarifies the importance of the oil factor.

As noted, since the Southern region has been historically responsible for the majority of agricultural production in Nigeria, Southern states – whether oil or non-oil producing – had a higher starting point in terms of the sector’s productivity. Thus, we should witness higher shares of *female farmers* across all Southern states, both oil and non-oil producing. However, oil states scored higher on average than their Southern counterparts on *female farmers*, a difference that can be attributed to oil. Higher shares of *female farmers* in oil-producing states can be explained by male migration from the agriculture sector to oil-related booming sectors and local women’s necessity to compensate for missing farm labourers (this phenomenon was indeed documented to have taken place in the Niger Delta, see the following section). The strong finding on female-headed households, which are far more prevalent in oil states compared with all other Nigerian states, including those in the South, further supports this claim.

Southern states are not evenly distributed when it comes to *FLFP*; here, both oil and non-oil Southern states are ranked high. This suggests that the oil factor might not be responsible for the high rates of *FLFP* witnessed in oil states, as there are generally higher *FLFP* rates *overall* in the South. Moreover, on average female unemployment is higher in oil states compared with other Southern states. The analysis further suggests that Islam plays an important role shaping women’s work in Nigeria; excluding *strictly-Muslim* states from the analysis had a significant impact on the results. However, there is good reason to question the accuracy of these findings. Historical evidence earlier in the chapter showed that prior to Nigeria’s independence, Nigerian women engaged in work across the country *including the Muslim North* to a similar extent to men. Moreover, it was observed that census information in the North is provided (and collected) by men, grossly skewing data concerning women since men’s priorities, privacy, the threat of women’s autonomy, the need to present responsibility for the domestic unit, and fear of taxation, lead them to minimise women’s economic activities: ‘as secluded women in particular are not ‘seen’ to be working, it is especially easy to fail to mention their economic activities and thereby maintain the myth of their total economic dependence on their husbands’.⁷⁰

Since these results offer only a cross-sectional snapshot of women’s work in oil and non-oil producing states in one point in time, rather than a depiction of change over time, we cannot assess whether *FLFP* rates in oil states have declined *further* than they have in non-

⁷⁰ Hill 1975, 482.

oil states, even though it is possible that this process has taken place. Despite this limitation, the results provide unique evidence from Nigeria on differences between oil and non-oil states at the sub-national level. On average, oil-producing states boast higher levels of *FLFP*, *female farmers*, and *female-headed households*, as well as significantly higher levels of *female unemployment*. This suggests that while women in oil states might appear to be more likely to work than their counterparts in non-oil states, they are also more likely to be *out of work*. In the Niger Delta, where poverty is indisputably acute, this can only be explained by decreased work opportunities for women and reduced demand for women's work. However, variables that could be linked with *FLFP* and oil are not held constant in cross-sectional analysis, making it difficult to distinguish the effects of oil from the effects of urbanisation, industrialisation, the spread of education, and the variance of these in different parts of Nigeria. Certainty that oil production is the cause to the observed differences between the two groups of states can be achieved through qualitative evidence, the task of the following two sections.

3.2.2 Environmental degradation and women's work

'The opportunity to dry our farm produce by this fire is the only benefit we derive from having oil in our land'.

(Ms Reivu Umuokoro, 38-year-old Niger Delta farmer)⁷¹

The Niger Delta, extending over about 70,000 square kilometres and making up 7.5 percent of Nigeria's landmass, has been subjected to intense environmental abuse as a result of oil operations, which began with a revolution in land ownership. In 1977, all land in Nigeria not privately owned was appropriated by the federal government through the 1977-78 Land Use Decree, allowing the takeover of communal farmland for the purpose of leasing or selling it to oil companies.⁷² Consequently, extensive areas in the Niger Delta were swallowed up by oil operations – exploration, production and the construction of mega oil processing facilities, including refineries and petrochemical plants, placing agriculture and fishing communities under great pressure.⁷³

As early as 1981, it was noted in Nigeria's Fourth National Development Plan that 'oil spillages... have begun to constitute a very serious danger to the... inhabitants of oil-

⁷¹ Quoted in Anugwom 2008.

⁷² Perchonock 1985.

⁷³ Turner and Oshare 1993.

producing areas'.⁷⁴ Two years later, a report by Greenpeace International pointed to the harmful consequences of the oil industry for the Niger Delta environment: 'We witnessed the slow poisoning of the waters... the destruction of vegetation and agricultural land by oil spills, which occur during petroleum operations'.⁷⁵ Since then, numerous reports have documented the environmental catastrophe caused by oil operations in the Niger Delta, some declaring it the most oil-devastated region on earth.⁷⁶ Despite urgent calls for action, there has been no real or effective effort by the government and the oil companies to control or alleviate damages caused by the industry; rather, oil operations have continued with complete disregard to the environment and the local population. In 2006, the region boasted 7,000 kilometres of pipelines, 5,284 onshore and offshore wells, 275 flow stations, ten gas plants, ten export terminals, four refineries, and three gas liquefaction plants, facilities that are interwoven with local communities – their homes, farmlands, fishing ponds and water sources.⁷⁷

The two key sources for oil-related pollution in the Niger Delta have been oil spills and gas flaring – the burning of natural gas associated with crude oil. Oil spills occur in the Niger Delta daily; according to one estimate, between 1976 and 1996 2.4 million barrels of oil have been spilled in 4,835 incidents.⁷⁸ Nigeria was also declared in a World Bank study as the world's biggest gas flarer: approximately 2.5 billion cubic feet of associated gas are flared in Nigeria daily, contributing more greenhouse gas emissions than all of Sub-Saharan Africa's countries combined.⁷⁹ In spite of the frequency of oil spills in Nigeria, oil companies largely have not been sanctioned or prosecuted for negligence by an environment regulatory agency. Moreover, although flaring has been illegal in Nigeria since 1984, in 2004 about 75 percent of associated gas was still flared.⁸⁰ Both oil spills and gas flaring impact the ecosystem into which they are released, spreading out over wide areas, destroying crops through the contamination of groundwater and soil, killing fish and aquatic animals, and reducing agricultural productivity. Gas flaring further causes the thermal pollution of air, land and water, destruction of vegetation and wildlife, damage to homes, soil and crops from

⁷⁴ Federal Republic of Nigeria 1981, 129.

⁷⁵ Greenpeace 1983.

⁷⁶ See, for example, UNDP 2005; Friends of the Earth Nigeria 2005; UNEP 2011.

⁷⁷ Figures are taken from Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz 2007.

⁷⁸ Okoko 1999.

⁷⁹ Friends of the Earth Nigeria 2005, 4.

⁸⁰ World Bank 2013b. The anti-flaring law is not systematically enforced and non-compliers receive fines that are so low that flaring is both more practically convenient and more economically attractive.

heat and acid rain, and health damage to those who breathe the fumes; the flares contain a cocktail of toxins that have been linked with premature deaths, child respiratory illnesses, asthma and cancer.⁸¹ Women further risk their health by using the heat generated by the flares to dry farm products (see the section's opening quote).

The environmental damage of oil operations takes years or even decades to be cleared. An extensive scientific study by the UNEP in Ogoniland, an oil community in Rivers State, carried out almost a decade after Shell ceased operating in the area, found that 'oil contamination... is widespread and severely impacting many components of the environment... oil spills continue to occur with alarming regularity. The Ogoni people live with this pollution every day'.⁸² Hydrocarbons were found in the soil at depths of over five metres as well as in groundwater; in one site, an eight-centimetre layer of refined oil was observed floating on the groundwater that serves the community wells.⁸³ In another site, wells were contaminated with benzene at levels over *900 times above* the World Health Organisation's guidelines. The report clearly states: 'any crops in areas directly impacted by oil spills will be damaged, and root crops... will become unusable. When farming recommences, plants generally show signs of stress and yields are reportedly lower... fish farms... have been ruined by an ever-present layer of floating oil'.⁸⁴

Despite land alienation and oil pollution, the majority of the indigenous population continued to depend on farming and fishing for its subsistence. As women constitute the majority of farmers and fishers in the region, oil-based industrialisation affected them most, as they could not easily migrate to work in urban areas due to poor skill-sets, family obligations, gender-based occupational segregation and the unavailability of jobs. In the previous section, I documented exceptionally high levels of female-headed households in oil states. Indeed, an illuminating study of the oil community Ibeno in Akwa Ibom State found that reduced farming and fishing yields due to oil pollution led to male out-migration (termed 'environmental migrants') and a high frequency of female-headed households in the community, a phenomenon which characterises the Niger Delta but no other rural area in Nigeria.⁸⁵ Female interviewees in the study attributed reduced agricultural productivity in

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² UNEP 2011, 2.

⁸³ Ibid, 3.

⁸⁴ UNEP 2011, 5.

⁸⁵ Okoko 1999, 377.

the area directly to oil pollution. The study found that poor crop yields and ‘missing husbands’ have prompted the women to rely on increased forest use for survival, through the collection of a wide range of forest products such as firewood, bush-food, fruits, leaves, herbs, roots, seeds, fibres, fodder and raw materials for local crafts. It was also found that male out-migration has increased reliance on the labour of children, especially girls.

Changes to the local labour market were also documented by UNEP in Ogoniland. The report states: ‘UNEP is fully aware that unemployment and the absence of new job opportunities in the region may drive some of the local community members to take up oil bunkering despite high risk of self-harm’.⁸⁶ Although the report connects unemployment with oil bunkering – the risky hacking into pipelines to steal crude oil and sell it locally or abroad – it only implicitly links unemployment with oil-related pollution. This connection is made unambiguously in testimonies of local village women, in which women directly link the oil industry’s practices not only with unemployment, but also with a rise in poverty, disease, prostitution and crime in the Niger Delta region. Based on the analysis of over 60 testimonies, I distinguish the effects of oil-related environmental degradation on women’s work into two categories: effects that result in *direct* losses to women’s livelihoods, for example through oil’s impact on the productivity of agricultural land, and effects that result in *indirect* losses to women’s livelihoods through oil’s impact on their (and their children’s) health and their capacity to work. I use only selected excerpts to illustrate these effects.

Direct losses. In testimonies, women made a direct link between the onset of oil production and consequent oil-related pollution, which negatively affected their livelihoods. In Egiland, a community of 17 villages in Rivers State in which Elf has been operating since 1962, women reported that the assumption of oil operations resulted in instant dwindling in agriculture and fish stocks and identified malpractices by the oil company: ‘Elf came here... since then the farming has got worse. Farms are not good, yam cassava even palm fruit doesn't yield anymore. There is no oil in the palm fruit again... no fish in the pond because chemicals from Elf fill up our swamp’;⁸⁷ ‘The oil they are drilling has made our farmland not to yield anything... the only thing we eat now is stock fish... in those good days our yam product in the farm was yielding fine, cassava and cocoa yam was doing fine, but today there

⁸⁶ UNEP, 104. Oil bunkering reduces up to a fifth of Nigeria’s daily oil output.

⁸⁷ Elderly woman, Egiland, March 22 2000.

is no good product',⁸⁸ 'Each time when Elf people wash their pipe - you know their pipe is filled with oil, when they wash they turn the water down to the swamp, this crude then kills all the aquatic life leaving us with nothing to eat and survive with'.⁸⁹

In Imiringi Town, an Ijaw community in Bayelsa State which hosts numerous oil wells, miles of pipelines and a flow station operated by Shell, women connected the year-round practice of gas flaring with soil degradation and losses of livelihoods: 'Since 1982 [when Shell started operating in the area] the soil has changed and crops do not grow well. It is not because of overuse because we know how to use our lands... It is because of the flares... before a small child can turn the soil but now it is too hard...';⁹⁰ 'The villagers are mainly farmers and fisher women. Oil exploration has resulted in a loss of crops and fishing stock. Gas flares affect the land and sometimes we have had earth tremors. This is something new... We have informed Shell and the government about the tremors but nothing has been done';⁹¹ 'We have no help from Shell. They have brought pollution and no development'.⁹² A female farmer blamed gas flaring and the emptying of chemicals into rivers for the disappearance of a local crop, cocoyam, and fish from the river, reporting: 'our people no longer engage in fishing activities here'.⁹³

In Umuechem, a village in the farming community Etche in Rivers State, where Shell has been operating since 1957 with 32 oil wells and several flow stations, women reported: 'Often there are oil spills... cassava vegetables are destroyed from the pollution and gas flares... all that happens is the contractors come and move it somewhere else... Shell does not compensate for the spilling which affects some of the crops'.⁹⁴ In a community submission into the inquiry of the Umuechem massacre (a deadly military raid on the community in 1990 following community protests against pollution), residents wrote: 'Shell's drilling operations have had serious adverse effects on the Umuechem people who are predominantly farmers... Their farmlands are covered by oil spillage/ blow-out and rendered unsuitable for farming'.⁹⁵

⁸⁸ Group discussion, Egiland, March 22 2000.

⁸⁹ Mrs Odua, Leader, Egi Women's Council, March 22 2000.

⁹⁰ Young female, Imiringi Town, March 11 2000.

⁹¹ Women leader, Imiringi Town, March 11 2000.

⁹² A young female, Imiringi Town, March 11 2000.

⁹³ Mrs Joy Sample, quoted in Friends of the Earth Nigeria 2011.

⁹⁴ Three women using interpreters, Umuechem, Etche, March 18 2000.

⁹⁵ HRW 1999.

Indirect losses. In addition to the direct damages to agricultural land, water sources and fishing ponds, women linked oil operations with the deterioration in their health and the health of their children. In Imiringi, where gas has been flared for over 40 years, women testified: ‘the gas flare has... been the cause of irritation and rashes on our skin, especially children... [who] come down with cough and catarrh soon after drinking [polluted] rainwater’;⁹⁶ ‘My mother was wounded by a pipeline burst when she was passing in the farm... I have not seen any repairs to the [exposed] pipelines by Shell. Women are complaining of eyesight problems and also breathing problems’.⁹⁷ In Egiland, women reported that children have ‘cough, sight problems, skin rashes...’.⁹⁸ In Umuechem women reported occupational hazards due to rusty pipes and barbed wire: ‘There have been so many injuries because of the [unburied] pipelines... they are obstacles and people fall over them and wound themselves, whilst carrying their farm produce’.⁹⁹ In Ogoniland, UNEP reported that families live in close proximity to oil facilities, some within meters of unfenced oil wells, flow stations and operational pipelines in houses that are made of readily combustible materials. Oil facilities no longer in operation have been abandoned by Shell without being removed or maintained, risking ‘blowouts’ in oil wells.¹⁰⁰

Women in oil communities have also linked the reduction in agricultural production with a sharp rise in poverty, theft and prostitution in the region. In Egi, women explained the rise in theft and prostitution as follows: ‘many of our children cannot go to school due to poverty...’¹⁰¹; ‘our children don’t know what to do after that [primary school]... no employment, nothing. The only thing left is for some of them to go and thief... the girls... prostitute around because they don’t know where to attach themselves’.¹⁰² Indeed, in 2002 it was reported that 95 percent of 15,000 Nigerian women and girls who were trafficked to Italy to engage in prostitution were from the Niger Delta.¹⁰³ The 2006 Niger Delta Human Development Report similarly stated: ‘A social problem generating serious concern is the

⁹⁶ A young female, Imiringi Town, March 11 2000.

⁹⁷ Women leader, Imiringi Town, March 11 2000.

⁹⁸ Elderly woman, Egiland, March 22 2000.

⁹⁹ Three women using interpreters, Umuechem, Etche, March 18 2000.

¹⁰⁰ UNEP 2011, 96. A blow-out is an uncontrolled release into the environment of hydrocarbons (crude oil, produced water and associated gas) that typically leads to oil spills and fires.

¹⁰¹ Elderly woman, Egiland, March 22 2000.

¹⁰² Group discussion, Egiland, March 22 2000.

¹⁰³ JDP/Caritas Nigeria 2008.

prevalence of commercial sex workers patronised by oil company workers'.¹⁰⁴ The following testimony, given by a member of the Egi Women's Council, is particularly illuminating on the connection between the presence of oil industry's foreign workers and prostitution:

'So many girls go into prostitution – they are local girls, and they do it because of money. As soon as you say you are working for Elf they [women] will follow you well. But if you say you are working for government they know that there is not enough money. You see so many girls hunting for men because on their way back after sleeping with them they will give them 5000 Naira whereas civil servants will not give them more than 100 Naira. It means that there are a lot of women who would have married from the village but who are now prostituting around... It causes breaking up of homes... Some women are leaving their husbands because of poor living and change their lives rather than staying under their husbands... There are young girls in this village that have babies - some with white men'.¹⁰⁵

In a group discussion in Egiland, women demonstrated their economic plight by pleading their interviewers: 'If you people can help so that we can get something doing – to help us occupy ourselves with something, some kind of handiwork that will give us some money, we will be happy'.¹⁰⁶

3.2.3 Regional militarisation and women's work

Oil's impact on women's livelihoods in the Niger Delta has also been mediated through regional militarisation, which has been intrinsically linked with oil pollution. From the inception of oil production in the region, abusive army and police units were deployed in the Niger Delta to protect oil facilities and the smooth production of oil. When in the late 1980s and 1990s local communities began demanding compensation for damages caused by oil operations through protests and the rise of local organisations (these will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6), military oppression was exacerbated and included blatant human rights violations.¹⁰⁷ For example, in Ogoniland, a community protest of about 300,000 people in 1993 against oil pollution and the establishment of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People resulted in 'scores of death' according to a report by HRW.¹⁰⁸ A special unit designed to deal specifically with protests – the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force,

¹⁰⁴ UNDP 2006, 102.

¹⁰⁵ Rose Nwaomah, member of Egi Women's Council, March 22 2000.

¹⁰⁶ Group discussion, Egiland, March 22 2000.

¹⁰⁷ Frynas 2001.

¹⁰⁸ HRW 1999.

subjected Ogoni villages to a 'series of punitive raids... characterised by flagrant human rights abuses, including extrajudicial executions, indiscriminate shooting, arbitrary arrests and detention, floggings, rapes, looting and extortion'.¹⁰⁹ In 1995, nine of the community's leaders, including the writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, were executed following protests against Shell.

In women's testimonies, a clear link emerges between the oil industry, militarisation, and women's loss of livelihoods, as well as the loss of possessions, homes, farmland, family members and their dignity. Although terrorising military actions were directed at the entire community, women in oil communities were further subjected to rape, which according to rape victims, witnesses and soldiers, was frequently used in the Niger Delta as a weapon of repression, punishment and torture; testimonies reveal that soldiers raped young and old women alike in the course of military raids on oil communities.¹¹⁰ In Ogoniland, HRW documented soldiers recounting they witnessed many simultaneous rapes of Ogoni women by soldiers off duty, as well as by a Lieutenant Colonel.¹¹¹ According to HRW, the participation of chief officers in the rape of women in oil communities in the Niger Delta suggests that 'soldiers committed rape with consent or acquiescence. The rapes were both punitive and discriminatory because they occurred in the course of organised raids on Ogoni villages alone'.¹¹² Below are excerpts from three testimonies of Ogoni rape victims, after omitting gruesome details.

(1) 'The soldiers pursued us and pushed me down. They kicked me and hit my junior sister's mouth with a wooden stick. They... tore my dress. One soldier held each of my legs. Then each of the four soldiers took turns. I was lying in a pool of blood when they left, unconscious. My small sister was there crying... Since then... I have severe pains in my lower abdomen. At times I can't move'.¹¹³

(2) 'The soldiers... beat me with the butts of their guns, pushed me onto the ground, kicked me. They tore off my wrapper, then my underwear... Each of them took turns... While one soldier raped me, another would beat me. I tried to scream, but

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ HRW 1995.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² For the full testimonies, see HRW 1995.

¹¹³ R., a teenage orphan, attacked during morning in June 1994 on her way back with her sister from a well near their house, quoted in HRW 1995.

they held my mouth. They said if I made too much noise, they would kill me. By the time they left, I was in so much pain I couldn't move'.¹¹⁴

(3) 'First, they beat me on my back with the butts of their guns. One kicked me in the lower abdomen. Then they raped me... They covered my mouth, but I still tried to scream... I was screaming until I couldn't scream anymore. The breath finished from inside me.... They said if I wanted to die, I could die there... I was unconscious when they left... The pain is so much sometimes that I can't cry... my husband accused me of inviting it because he doesn't see emotion on my face'.¹¹⁵

The rape of women in oil communities was in direct response to anti-oil protest activity, as the following testimony of a rape victim in Ogoniland indicates:

'On this day we women were demonstrating... Singing near the main road we met face to face with the army... They asked us to lie down on the road...After using their koboko [whip] on us they started kicking us... They dragged some of the women into the bush... our dresses were torn... They tore our pants and began raping us in the bush. The raping wasn't secret .. They are raping you there in front of your own sister. They are raping your sister too in front of your mother. It was just like a market... the captain slapped me in the face. He then told his boys to pack me in a room somewhere to wait for him...'.¹¹⁶

In Kaiama, a small oil community in Bayelsa State that was invaded by the army following community protests, women clearly linked protest activity with the invasion, the use of rape, and loss of work capacity. The army's invasion followed the publishing in December 1998 of the Kaiama Declaration, a document that articulated the community's requests for environmental justice and called for the withdrawal within a month of Shell and ChevronTexaco from the land.¹¹⁷ The community pledged to 'struggle peacefully for freedom, self-determination and ecological justice', while thousands of young men and women protested peacefully in song and dance in Bayelsa State's capital Yenagoa, threatening to take over oil facilities and bring oil production to a halt. The protesters were met with live fire and in early January, Kaiama and several nearby villages were invaded and occupied by the military for over a month, during which hundreds were killed, wounded and tortured, and women beaten and raped. Following the invasion, women from Kaiama

¹¹⁴ K., a woman in her late thirties, Bera village, attacked during morning on May 1994 on her way back from provisions. Her ten-year old son was locked in another room in the house, quoted in HRW 1995.

¹¹⁵ G., Bera village, attacked by a group of soldiers in the bush, May 1994, quoted in HRW 1995.

¹¹⁶ Kawayorko, Housewife, Ogoniland, Rivers State, March 25 2000.

¹¹⁷ The 'Kaiama Declaration' was issued by representatives from over 40 Ijaw clans. The Ijaw is the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria and the largest group in the Niger Delta (United Ijaw 1998).

testified: ‘I am not able to do my trading because of fear to travel’;¹¹⁸ ‘When I hear gun sound I am always afraid. I am no longer happy to go to the farm’;¹¹⁹ ‘Now I have no money, I can only collect firewood to sell and some small farming’;¹²⁰ ‘Before I used to farm but I no fit farm now, I am weak’;¹²¹ ‘I cannot farm now – I have blood pressure’ (for the full testimonies, see the chapter’s Appendix).¹²²

Odi Town is another Ijaw community in Bayelsa State that was invaded in the context of the on-going conflict in the state and following the killing of 12 Nigerian policemen by an armed gang near the town in November 1999. The military used heavy artillery and proceeded to burn houses and indiscriminately shoot at civilians in what was termed the ‘Odi massacre’. Within three days, the town was reduced to rubble; every building except the bank, a church, and the health centre, was burnt to the ground.¹²³ The death toll was estimated at over one thousand people, with 20,000 left homeless. Nigeria’s Minister of Defence, General Theophilus Danjuma, stated bluntly following the event that ‘this operation... was initiated with the mandate of protecting lives and property, particularly oil platforms, flow stations, operating rig terminals and pipeline refineries and power installations in the Niger Delta’.¹²⁴ In 2013, the Nigerian court ordered the federal government to pay 37 billion Naira to Odi surviving residents. During the trial, an advocate for the Odi people stated: ‘It was only old men, women and children who could not run, that were massacred in that military operation’.¹²⁵

In testimonies, women from Odi connected the massacre directly with oil production. A schoolteacher commented: ‘I think it is this oil thing that has made them to come to fight like this. They wanted to eliminate everyone in the community in this Bayelsa, in this Niger Delta, because of this oil... they want to finish us... they have bias against us because of the oil’.¹²⁶ In another testimony, a woman observed: ‘Our boys were writing some letters that the oil belongs to us... so for that they came to finish us up’.¹²⁷ A press statement by the Odi community following the event declared: ‘we strongly feel that the Odi [massacre occurred]

¹¹⁸ Blessing, Kaiama, March 7 2000.

¹¹⁹ Ekpoeneikamio, elderly married woman, Kaiama, March 7 2000.

¹²⁰ Helen, widow, Kaiama, March 7 2000.

¹²¹ Elderly mother, Kaiama, March 7 2000.

¹²² Rhoda, widow, Kaiama, March 7 2000.

¹²³ For statements on the Odi massacre, see AfricaFocus 2012.

¹²⁴ Quoted in Ekine 2001, 22.

¹²⁵ Ibekwe 2013.

¹²⁶ Amasin, School Teacher, Odi, March 1 2000.

¹²⁷ Claris Tokoni Gagariga, market woman, Odi, March 20 2000.

to carry out a wider agenda i.e. terrorise the people of the Niger Delta, break their spirit and finally occupy their territory for easy access to their... wealth – oil and gas'.¹²⁸ Women testified that following their town's destruction by the army, obtaining a livelihood became impossible: 'I cannot farm because of the pain in my leg... no tools to use... nowhere to sleep, no clothes to wear... there is hunger everywhere';¹²⁹ 'we can't even go to the farm and farm because so many canoes lost, we have no knife no hoes... then next year starvation will come'.¹³⁰ In a UNDP study, it was stated that two years after the Odi massacre, the community was 'filled with fatherless babies'.¹³¹

Testimonies from numerous oil communities across Nigeria's oil-producing Niger Delta region tell a similar story: oil operations are accompanied by environmental degradation and militarisation, which are followed by protest and further militarisation, facilitating women's loss of livelihoods and increasing poverty, crime, prostitution and the incidence of rape. In 2013, the Niger Delta was described as 'the rape capital of Nigeria'; a survey by the CLEEN Foundation found that one in every ten women in the region was either raped or the victim of attempted rape in 2012, double than the national average.¹³² Nigeria's transition to democracy in 1999 has not alleviated these problems; rather, the 2000s have brought brutal military crackdowns to the Niger Delta, the rise of armed groups and the multiplicity of intense conflicts, as well as the uninterrupted continuation of oil spills and gas flaring, further damaging women's economic stability.¹³³ In its 2006 report, the UNDP stated that prostitution is 'very rampant in [oil-producing] communities'.¹³⁴ The report concluded: 'unfortunately, the pollution and destruction of agricultural land and waterways, including through oil spills, has imposed serious hardships on women... [who] need to learn new ways to avoid the danger of displacement and marginalisation'.¹³⁵

¹²⁸ Friends of the Earth Nigeria 2002, 60.

¹²⁹ Elderly lady, Odi, March 11 2000.

¹³⁰ Claris Tokoni Gagariga, market woman, Odi, March 20 2000.

¹³¹ UNDP 2006, 125.

¹³² Mohammed 2013.

¹³³ Climate & Capitalism 2012.

¹³⁴ UNDP 2006, 102.

¹³⁵ Ibid, 131-132.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the effects of oil production on women's work in Nigeria at the national and state levels, finding tentative support for *H1* and *H2*, as allowed by the available data. While in previous studies on women's work in Nigeria, the wide gap between male and female labour force participation was explained by the 'enduring custom of Islamic religion, particularly in some Northern states which discourage women's work', and by 'the pervasive socio-cultural beliefs and assumptions in Nigeria that women are traditionally homemakers', this chapter has attempted to demonstrate that oil production has also played a role in shaping Nigerian women's labour force participation.¹³⁶ At the national level, Dutch Disease symptoms combined with strong gender-based occupational segregation have reduced women's participation in the female labour force, as women across Nigeria were affected by the decline in the agriculture sector in which they are concentrated, as well as by their inability to move to other expanding sectors in urban areas. At the state level, in the nine oil-producing states, women's work was further diminished by extreme oil pollution and militarisation that affected the region directly.

The dissection of Nigeria into two groups of states illuminates a key difference between women in oil and non-oil communities in the Nigerian federation. Women's testimonies reveal that oil communities were more profoundly unsettled by the oil industry (compared with both their Northern and non-oil Southern counterparts) and were faced with more severe economic dislocation and crisis. While in these communities women were able to make a direct and immediate link between oil and their economic plight due to the visible effects of oil operations and women's first-hand experience of pollution, violation and abuse, elsewhere in Nigeria women were less able (and probably, less likely) to make such a clear connection between oil and their employability prospects, even if those were negatively affected by oil-related Dutch Disease symptoms. In other words, although the resource curse affected Nigeria as a whole, women in oil communities were 'better positioned' to pinpoint the underlying root of their suffering and relate it directly to the oil industry, as the testimonies reveal (as well as being subjected to harsher conditions). It is therefore not surprising that anti-oil protests and NGO activity, particularly by women, would rise and flourish in these very communities. However, before I examine women's non-formal

¹³⁶ Fashoyin 1991, 32.

political participation in Nigeria, I first turn to assess the impact of oil on women's legislative participation in the next chapter.

Appendix 3

Table A3.1: Indicators of women's work in Nigeria by state (%)

	Share in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector (FLFP); 2007	Share of female farmers out of all farmers; 2005-6	Female unemployment rate; 2007	Share of female-headed households; 2007
OIL-PRODUCING STATES				
Akwa-Ibom	59.5	59.2	8.3	26.3
Ondo	56.5	37.9	3	27.9
Imo	53.1	54.9	5.1	27.4
Abia	47.9	55	5	32.3
Cross River	38.5	41.5	1.7	26.9
Bayelsa	30.4	54.7	6.2	31.2
Edo	26.9	43	7.4	28.1
Rivers	26.5	54.8	11.5	24
Delta	19.9	43	5.8	26
NON OIL-PRODUCING STATES				
Anambra	52.7	52.1	6.9	27.2
Ebonyi	49.5	53.5	2.1	19.4
Kwara	47.6	37.2	4.4	23.1
Enugu	46.5	52.1	8.8	27.1
Osun	42.8	37.3	1.5	31.2
Oyo	39.3	37.4	2.2	16.3
Ekiti	39	38.1	3.6	24.7
Gombe	35.2	22.5	8.1	3.4
Kebbi*	33.8	21.3	1.1	1.6
Kogi	32.9	37.2	6.6	15.4
Ogun	31.5	26.2	3.1	23.9
Adamawa	29.2	43.9	4.7	7.3
Benue	29.1	50.8	3.2	13.9
Lagos	28.9	33.3	11.1	16.9
Nassarawa	27.5	50.9	14.4	3
Taraba	26.7	44	2.6	3.3
Plateau	25.2	50.8	3.2	9.9
Kaduna	25	26.9	2.9	3.3
Bauchi*	22.9	22.5	4.7	3.5
Yobe*	18.6	43.4	2.2	2.3
Sokoto*	15.2	21.2	1.4	0.7
Borno*	13.5	43.4	1.1	6.8
Katsina*	12.3	10.5	1.9	1.8
Kano*	8.1	10.7	0.9	2.9
Niger	4.5	31.4	1.3	2.9
Jigawa*	4.3	18	0.3	3.2
Zamfara*	3.7	21.3	0.3	1.8

Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2009. FLFP - p. 29, Table 5.5; female farmers - p. 30, Table 5.6; female unemployment - p. 34, Table 5.8; female-headed households - p. 7, Table 2.2.

*=*Strictly-Muslim* states.

Women's testimonies from Kaiama, March 2000:

(1) 'I wake up for morning and come see the army everywhere. Fear drive me go outside then I ran into soldiers who started to beat me. I ran from them back to my compound... and come and see the army break the door. I fear again but think that since I am a woman they [army] will leave me but they came back and drove me from my house... many woman get rape but for me they [army] cannot f*** me. Shame will not let them speak. One woman who is married, MOPO [mobile police] come and rape in her husband's presence then her husband came and drove her out. Soldiers come and f*** woman anyhow at anytime. Everyday they worry any girl they see. They come force girl to "befriend them" and when the girl refuse they say we will beat you and rape you. Because I stubborn and no have any fear they no fit befriend me, I will not agree to be with them... Many girls fear too much so they agree to go with the soldier for peace sake... *Me, I am not able to do my trading because of fear to travel.* Every time there is checkpoint... you don't know who be your enemy and who be your friend'.¹³⁷

(2) 'I was in Kaiama on the day the soldiers came. I stay at my farm till late by which time when I reach town army is everywhere. I hear soldier kill people by the bridge but I cannot run because my children dey for house. When I reach my house we lock the door and hide... The soldiers came and wounded me when they push open the door and I beg them please, I be old woman they should leave me. They hold their gun on my body and tell me to bring water. They beat my husband and by that time I cannot even know what the soldiers are doing. I try to help my husband. Anywhere there are soldiers if you don't look out you are in trouble. When I hear gun sound I am always afraid. *I am no longer happy to go to the farm but I have to go to feed my family*'.¹³⁸

(3) 'On the day the soldiers came I ran with my three children to the bush. At that time I was pregnant. My husband lock the house then follow me run. I think that he is at my back but I am hearing gun shot. After I come and see my husband is shot by the soldier when he is running. They steal all my property and break everything. *Now I have no money, I can only collect firewood to sell and some small farming...* Now my heart is cut'.¹³⁹

(4) 'They took my son [chief of Kaiama] and I have not seen him since... *before I used to farm but I no fit farm now*, I am weak. I no feel to do anything I just wait make I die'.¹⁴⁰

(5) 'The soldiers came and arrested my husband... he was beaten and tortured... my husband died from the wounds. I have four children... [they] do not go to school now. I have small money only from a fish pond but I cannot go there all the time... *I cannot farm now – I have blood pressure*'.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Blessing, Kaiama, March 7 2000.

¹³⁸ Ekpoeneikamio, elderly married woman, Kaiama, March 7 2000.

¹³⁹ Helen, widow, Kaiama, March 7 2000.

¹⁴⁰ Elderly mother, Kaiama, March 7 2000.

¹⁴¹ Rhoda, widow, Kaiama, March 7 2000.

Chapter 4

OIL LIMITS LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION

One major feature of the political landscape of independent oil-producing Nigeria has been the low participation of women in the formal political process. The National Gender Policy, an affirmative action plan initiated in 2007 by the federal government to guarantee 30 percent female representation in government and public institutions, has not yet been implemented.¹ In the 2011 elections, the fourth general elections since the transition to civilian government in 1999, women represented only 8.3 percent of candidates for the 360-member House of Representatives and 11.1 percent for the 109-member Senate.² The number of women elected to the National Assembly dropped in 2011 from the previous elections; only 12 women were elected to the House of Representatives and seven to the Senate (down from 26 and nine, respectively).³ It was reported that the one female presidential candidate who contested for her party's (the People's Democratic Party) presidential nomination received one vote – the one she cast for herself.⁴ Indeed, a report in 2011 by the National Democratic Institute stated that 'women continue to face numerous barriers [to] participating in the election process as electoral officials, candidates, campaigners, party agents, observers and voters'.⁵

The poor record of female legislative participation in Nigeria, as well as formal political participation more generally, stands in sharp contrast to the salient political leadership roles women held in traditional Nigerian society. While this discrepancy is commonly attributed to social and cultural factors, I suggest that women's marginalisation in the formal political process in Nigeria has been underpinned by the oil-related economic disempowerment of women. Testing *H3* and *H4*, this chapter examines the relationship between oil and women's legislative participation in Nigeria at national and state levels (as no gender-disaggregated data is available on voter registration, voting, or party membership in Nigeria per state, the analysis of women's formal participation focuses on women's legislative participation).⁶ To this end, I assembled a dataset on Nigeria's 36 states which includes data *per state* on female seats in national and state parliaments over three sets of elections (1999-2007), demographic

¹ Ministry of Women's Affairs 2013.

² In the House of Representatives 200 of 2400 candidates were female, while in the Senate 80 of 720 candidates were female (Ibid).

³ NDI 2011.

⁴ Okoronkwo-Chukwu 2011.

⁵ NDI 2011, 45.

⁶ In 2011, Nigeria's electoral commission announced that registration data would be gender-disaggregated, but this information was not released (see NDI 2011, 46).

data on the ethnic and religious composition of states, and data on income and oil production per state.

The chapter is organised in two distinct parts. The first section examines women's formal political participation in Nigeria before and after 1999, when a transition to civilian government took place through democratic elections. At the national level, I draw on historical evidence and the results of elections that took place in independent Nigeria before and after 1999. At the state level, I examine female share of seats in Nigeria's three main legislative bodies following the elections of 1999, 2003 and 2007, to map the distribution of female seats across oil and non-oil producing states (the results of the 2011 elections were unavailable at the *state* level at the time of writing). In the second part of this chapter, I turn to examine changes to the revenue sharing formula in Nigeria from 1958 to 2007, in order to pinpoint the precise distribution of oil revenue between two tiers of government – federal and state – and between oil and non-oil producing states, thereby measuring oil *production* per state. As changes to Nigeria's revenue sharing formula and its federal system were intertwined, both are portrayed in this section. I then proceed to assess the link between oil and female legislative participation at the sub-national level using regression analysis. With the available data, the chapter finds only tentative evidence for *H3* and *H4*.

4.1 Women in Legislatures Before and After Oil

Between independence in 1960 and the transition to democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria experienced three short periods of civilian rule (1960-1966, 1979-1983 and 1989-1993), separated by long periods of military rule. While elections for presidency, the bicameral National Assembly, and State Houses of Assembly, which are held simultaneously, took place in 1979, 1983, 1992 and 1998, women's representation in government before 1999 was negligible; political positions were reserved for men under military and civilian governments alike.⁷ The year 1999 marked the beginning of a new era: in the four elections that followed, the government was formed through a democratic (if often corrupt) electoral process. I therefore regard 1999 as a turning point for assessing oil's impact on female legislative participation in Nigeria (as Section 4.2 shows, the continuous change in the number of states in any case complicates sub-national analysis before 1996, when the last division of states took place). This section begins by briefly examining women's legislative participation in Nigeria before 1999. I then assess female

⁷ For data on female representation before 1999, see Vogt 1996.

legislative participation at the national level during 1999-2007, the oil period in which democratic elections were held. In the third part of this section, I examine differences in women's legislative participation between the groups of oil and non-oil producing states.

4.1.1 Before 1999: from high to low formal participation

Historical evidence shows that women exercised considerable political power and held distinct political roles in traditional Nigerian society, much like elsewhere in West Africa.⁸ Although patriarchy was a dominant feature of social organisation, a dual-sex political system was in place across Nigeria's different ethnic groups, assigning both men and women with political functions. For example, in East Nigeria, Igbo villages and rural towns were ruled jointly by the 'unrelated and equally powerful' King (*Obi*) and Queen (*Omu*), each with its own cabinet responsible for handling the public affairs of its respective constituency.⁹ In the West region, the Yoruba's female leader (*Iyalode*) commanded considerable respect and authority and supervised trade in the market.¹⁰ In the pre-Islamic North (prior to the 1804 *Jihad*), women held public offices, including the highest positions of power; Queen Amina of Zaria was known for her widespread conquests in the 16th century.¹¹ Across Nigeria, the decisions of villages' general assemblies were subjected to the approval of the entire community, while both men and women could acquire political titles that enhanced their social position and prestige (these were often dependent on their economic status and wealth).¹²

When Nigeria came under colonial rule, the British – led by a discriminatory Victorian ideology – found foreign the idea of including women in the political process. The administration dismissed the dual-sex political system and replaced it with a single-sex system; local female rulers were deposed and (male) Warrant Chiefs were appointed to oversee the affairs of the entire community.¹³ The administration's refusal to recognise traditional titles of female rulers effectively terminated their position. For example, the Yoruba's *Iyalode* was dropped from membership in local government and the council of elders and dismissed as supervisor of the market.¹⁴ Women's political power was further diminished by the deterioration of their economic position due to discriminatory practices in the labour market (see Section 3.1.1), the spread of Western education in

⁸ Uchendu 1993. See also Northcote 1913; Leith-Ross 1939; Green 1964.

⁹ Okonjo 1975.

¹⁰ Johnson 1921.

¹¹ Uchendu 1993.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Okonjo 1976.

boys-only missionary schools, urbanisation and the introduction of monogamy.¹⁵ Thus, the colonial period witnessed the disappearance of many female political titles, as their functions became obsolete under the new system.

Following independence, women's traditional political titles were gradually restored, women were granted suffrage (in the East and West regions in the late 1950s and in the North in 1976), and the three main political parties formed women's wings.¹⁶ However, evidence shows that under civilian and military governments alike, only a handful of women were elected (or appointed) to office and the political arena at both the national and local levels remained almost exclusively male-dominated. In the First Republic (1960-1966), only two women sat in the Houses of Assembly in the West and East regions.¹⁷ In the 1979 elections, three women were elected to the Federal House of Representatives (representing 0.7 percent of the House) and only one to the Senate, while in the 1983 elections, women represented 1.7 percent of the House of Representatives (notably, one of the eight representatives was from the Muslim North).¹⁸ By the late 1980s, women members sat in most states' Executive Councils, but only a handful of women contested for a seat in the Senate, House or Representatives, State Houses of Assembly and Local Government Councils, and *none* were appointed to ministerial positions in the federal government, the Armed Forces Ruling Council, or as State Governor (see Table 4.1).

¹⁵ Uchendu 1993.

¹⁶ These parties were The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) and the Action Group (AG) (Okonjo 1976).

¹⁷ These were Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti and Margarte Ekpo, respectively (Osinulu and Mba 1996).

¹⁸ Uchendu 1993. From Kano State.

Table 4.1: Women's share of seats in national and state assemblies, selected years

	Women	Men	Women's share %
1979 Elections (2 nd Republic)			
Senate	1	56	1.8
House of Representatives	3	442	0.7
1990 (Military Rule)			
Senate	1	90	1.0
House of Representatives	14	575	2.4
States' Houses of Assembly	27	1145	2.3
Local Government Chairs	3	588	0.5
1993 (Military Rule)			
Senate	9	100	8.2
House of Representatives	20	340	5.5
1999 (Transition)			
Senate	3	106	2.7
House of Representatives	12	348	3.3
Local Government Chairs	9	765	1.2

Source: CEDAW Accountability to Gender Equality in Nigeria, a Shadow Report, 2008, p. 29.

4.1.2 After 1999: the national level

The return to democracy in 1999 has not altered women's legislative participation in Nigeria dramatically; although female share of seats has seen an increase between 1999 and 2007, on average it remained under six percent. In the 1999 elections, following a year of transition to civilian rule, only 631 women contested for a total of 11,117 electable positions (5.6 percent), and of these only 180 won, filling 1.6 percent of positions.¹⁹ While before 1999, women's representation in the bicameral National Assembly averaged four percent, in the 1999 elections women represented 2.8 percent of Senate seats and 3.3 percent of seats in the House of Representatives.²⁰ The first handover from one civilian government to another in 2003 showed only a slight improvement: women now represented 3.7 percent of Senate seats and 6.1 percent of seats in the House of Representatives, rising to 8.3 percent and 7.2 percent in the 2007 elections, respectively (see Table 4.2 and Graph 4.1). In all three elections, no woman was elected for State Governor in any of the 36 states, although the number of female deputy governors rose from none in 1999 to two in 2003 and to six in 2007. Notably, none of the three female Senators of 2003 has returned to office in 2007, indicating the difficulties women face in developing a career as politicians in Nigeria.

¹⁹ NBS 2009.


²⁰ Ibid.

Table 4.2: Women elected to public office in Nigeria – 1999-2007

	No. of seats	1999		2003		2007	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
National							
Senate	109	3	2.8	4	3.7	9	8.3
House of Representatives	360	12	3.3	22	6.1	26	7.2
State							
Governor	36	0		0		0	
State Houses of Assembly	960-990	21	2.2	34	3.5	53	5.5
Committee Chairpersons	829-887	18	2.2	32	3.6	52	5.9
Local							
Local Government Chairs	710-774	13	1.8	15	1.9	27	3.6
Councillors	6368	69	1.1	267	4.2	235	3.7

Source: NBS 2009, Men and women in Nigeria report, p.71-73, Tables 6.1a-6.3a.

Graph 4.1: Female share of seats in Nigeria's National Assembly –1999-2007



Source: calculations based on NBS 2009, Men and women in Nigeria report, p.71-73, Tables 6.1a-6.3a.

The poor record of female representation in Nigeria has been attributed to various factors – the legacy of the single-sex political system inherited from colonial rule, the male-dominated culture of military rule, the violent and corrupt nature of elections in the country, and strong prejudices against female politicians that can dissuade women from running.²¹ Indeed, following the 2007 elections, female candidates reported they were either ‘schemed out’ by their male counterparts or openly threatened to remove their candidacy.²² Another contributing factor to women’s low representation may have been the failure of the democratic process itself; between 1960 and 1999, attempts for

²¹ See Okonjo 1976; Ogwu 1996; Arowolo and Aluko 2010.

²² WACOL 2008, 56.

democratic rule lasted a total period of nine years, discouraging the gradual development of mechanisms for elections in which women would be given equal political opportunities. Although these factors have undoubtedly contributed to women's inability (and, possibly, reluctance) to run for office, oil has arguably *facilitated* the perpetuation of the above conditions. Moreover, oil's negative impact on women's participation in the labour force has undermined their ability to run political campaigns, as their access to well-remunerated employment, financial independence, and the skill-set that goes with labour force experience, have all been diminished.

This suggestion was reflected in the results of a survey conducted by the Nigerian NGO Women's Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative following the 2003 elections, where *90 percent* of female candidates reported the lack of finances as a 'major constraint in their campaigns' which gave their male opponents an advantage.²³ Women contestants reported they did not possess enough resources to set up and run campaigns, offices and logistics, or to secure votes by paying off voters and officials in the ballots, a common practice in Nigeria ('even delegates to the party primaries had to be paid off').²⁴ The report states: 'the capital required to run a campaign in Nigeria side-lines the majority of the economically powerless citizens, and women top that list' (indeed, according to Nigeria's 2006 Human Development Report, while 70 percent of Nigerians are poor, 70 percent of the poor are women).²⁵ In the 2007 elections, several political parties announced exemptions for female candidates from paying registration fees to the party in recognition of women's disadvantaged economic position, but female candidates argued that the waiver was insignificant compared to other expenses.²⁶ Following the 2011 elections, a report by the National Democratic Institute noted that, 'even those [women] who ran were less likely to win because they... were unable to run effective campaigns due to lack of funding...'.²⁷

Although evidence shows that women's legislative participation in Nigeria has been persistently low, oil production persistently high, and women's position in the labour force diminished due to oil-related Dutch Disease symptoms (as shown in Chapter 3), the link between oil and low female legislative participation at the national level in Nigeria should remain tentative. Since 1999, when we can begin to measure representation continuously, there has been little variation both in Nigeria's oil

²³ WRAPA 2003, 4.

²⁴ Ibid, 4.

²⁵ Ibid, 4; UNDP 2006.

²⁶ Nigeriaonline 2009.

²⁷ NDI 2011, 70.

production and in female legislative participation.²⁸ The short timeframe available for analysis does not allow fully separating, with high certainty, the effects of oil on women's public participation from the effects of other factors, particularly the effect of military rule. Military governments in Nigeria had bluntly unleashed anti-women rampages by soldiers, along with official measures to 'discipline' and limit women. For example, Head of State General Buhari's 'War against indiscipline' in the 1980s targeted specifically women with various charges.²⁹ In the North, unmarried women living in rented accommodation were thrown out of their rooms, while in the South soldiers pulled women wearing trousers off buses and stripped them off their 'Western clothing'. Women were often barred from forming unions; the Nigerian Labour Congress halted an initiative by women to establish their own network within the union.³⁰

The atmosphere of women's subjugation during the prolonged military rule in Nigeria, for which there is bounteous evidence, could not have disappeared overnight with the handover to civilian government in 1999. As one Nigerian woman commented: 'they call it democracy now but it's the same Nigeria. The soldiers are still in government... the soldiers are the same soldiers'.³¹ Although it is difficult to distinguish the effects of oil from the effects of military rule – until 1999, the two coincided – military rule is arguably in itself positively linked with Nigeria's oil production. To gain more insight on the link between oil and women's legislative participation in Nigeria, we can compare Nigeria *cross*-nationally to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, or compare *sub*-nationally within Nigeria oil and non-oil producing states. Cross-nationally, Nigeria's female representation rate ranks fourth from the bottom out of 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (for which the Inter Parliamentary Union holds data), followed in 2014 only by Swaziland, the Comoros and Yemen.³² Compared specifically with other oil-producing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, female representation in Nigeria is by far the lowest (see Table 4.3). However, oil's effects in these countries could be mitigated by various factors. For example, in Angola, political parties keep 30 percent quotas for female candidates, which resulted in a sharp rise in women's representation in the National Assembly from 9.5 percent in the 1992 elections to 36 percent in 2014.³³

²⁸ Excluding periods during the 2000s in which oil production dropped significantly due to oil bunkering.

²⁹ Turner and Badru 1985; Mba 1989. These charges included over-spending in the household, failure to supervise children, neglect of farming, and inadequate service to husbands (!).

³⁰ Turner and Oshare 1993.

³¹ Conversation with Joy Adebayo, Abuja, July 10 2009.

³² IPU 2013. This refers to the lower house of parliament, for the 46 countries in the region on which the IPU holds data.

³³ Quotaproject 2014.

Investigating this proposition further is beyond the scope of this work, but I now turn to assess differences between Nigerian states at the sub-national level, in an attempt to gain more insight on the link between oil and women's legislative participation.

Table 4.3: Female representation in Sub-Saharan Africa's oil-producers – 2014*

Country	Oil production (Thousands barrels daily)	Female representation share (%) (Lower or single house)
Nigeria	2322	6.7
Angola	1801	36.8
Equatorial Guinea	311	24.0
Gabon	237	15.0
Sudan	122	24.3
South Sudan	99	26.5
Chad	94	14.9

Source: IPU 2013; BP Statistical Review 2013.

*The IPU does not hold data for the Republic of the Congo – Sub-Saharan Africa's eight oil-producing country, which produces 281 thousands barrels of oil daily.

4.1.3 After 1999: the state level

Aggregated national figures on women's legislative participation could hide important sub-national variation at the state level, which could in turn be related to sub-national variation in oil production. To assess whether such variation exists, this section examines the relationship between oil production and legislative participation at the state level. I measure women's legislative participation using three variables: (1) *Female Seats in Senate by state* – the fraction of seats held by women in the Senate from each of the 36 states, following the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections; (2) *Female Seats in the House of Representatives by state* – the fraction of seats held by women in the House of Representatives from each of the 36 states following the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections; and (3) *Female Seats in State Houses of Assembly* – the fraction of seats held by women in each State House of Assembly – following the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections.³⁴ The three indicators are complementary; the difficulties women face contesting for public office in Nigeria at the national level might be mitigated by state-specific conditions.

Aggregating the total number of seats held by women in each state following the three elections and distinguishing the two groups of oil and non-oil producing states produced the following results. In the 109-member Senate, where states are given equal representation of three seats each irrespective of size, women represented 7.4 percent of


³⁴ Data was collected from NBS 2009 'Men and women in Nigeria' report.

the 81 seats held by oil states, compared with 3.7 percent of the 243 seats held by the group of non-oil states.³⁵ In the 360-member House of Representatives, where seats are allocated on the basis of proportional representation according to the state's population, the average share of female representation in the group of oil states was 5.0 percent, compared with an average share of 6.3 percent in the group of non-oil states (notably, the averages of both groups are pulled up by outliers: the relatively large share of female seats from oil-producing Delta State and non-oil producing Ekiti and Kwara States, respectively). In State Houses of Assembly, where the number of seats ranges from 24 to 40, the average share of female representation for the group of oil-states was 5.1 percent, while that of the group of non-oil states was 3.2 percent. However, an outlier, Delta State, pulls up the average of oil states. Graph 4.2 illustrates these results (for the total numbers of seats per state, see Tables A4.1-A4.2 in the chapter's Appendix).


³⁵ The Federal Capital Territory, which holds one seat in the Senate but does not have a state status, was excluded.

Graph 4.2: Female share of seats in legislatures by state, averages (%) – 1999-2007*


a. Senate



b. House of Representatives



c. State Houses of Assembly




Source: calculations based on NBS, 2009, 'Men and women' in Nigeria report, p.71-73, Tables 6.1a-6.3a.

*=*Strictly-Muslim* states. Oil states are marked black.

The results do not show a consistent difference between oil and non-oil states; while women's representation in the House of Representatives over the three elections was on average lower in the group of oil states (supporting the hypothesis), women's representation in the Senate and States' Houses of Assembly was on average higher in that group (against the hypothesis). Two-tailed t-tests confirm that the differences are not statistically significant at the Senate and House of Representatives ($p=0.13$; $p=0.61$, respectively). However, a two-tailed t-test shows that the difference between the two groups of states is statistically significant in State Houses of Assembly ($p=0.02$). Overall, fewer states have sent women to Senate (12) and to the House of Representatives (23) compared with State Houses of Assembly (30). Interestingly, excluding the nine *strictly-Muslim* states from the group of non-oil states does not change the direction of the results (see Graph 4.3). In the House of Representatives, non-oil states' group average remains higher than that of oil states even when the nine *strictly-Muslim* states are *included* in that group (although the group's average declines). In the Senate, the exclusion of *strictly-Muslim* states from the group of non-oil states raises the group's average to 5.5 percent (from 3.7 percent), still lower than oil states' average (of 7.4 percent). In State Houses of Assembly, excluding *strictly-Muslim* states raises the group's average to 4.5 percent (from 3.2 percent), still under the 5.1 percent average share of oil-states.

Graph 4.3: Female share of seats, oil vs. non-oil states, averages (%) – 1999-2007



Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2009, Men and Women in Nigeria report, p.71-73, Tables 6.1a-6.3a.

Although the average share of female seats was higher in the group of oil states in two out of the three legislative bodies examined, these results show no consistent differences in women's share of seats between the two groups of states over the three elections. While this finding does not support H_4 , it is not surprising: the very low share of female representation in Nigeria *overall* makes differences between oil and non-oil states substantively small. As the variation on the dependent variable (female seats) is negligible, the independent variable (oil production) has little to explain. However, historical evidence showed that women in the South, which includes the nine oil-producing states, had a better starting point compared with women in the North prior to oil production; the South adapted Western education and Christianity while the North rejected it, arguably contributing to a more liberal and educated population. More importantly, I documented (in Chapter 3) higher women's labour force participation rates in Southern states, both oil and non-oil producing. These differences should have resulted in *much higher levels of female representation* in Southern states, including the nine oil-producing states, rather than only slightly and inconsistently higher levels.

It is possible that Nigeria's oil revenues have 'evened out' female representation across the country. That removing the nine *strictly-Muslim* states from the analysis did not dramatically change the results supports this assumption. Without oil, we might have seen far greater differences between Southern and Northern (Muslim) states. Thus, the results could in fact attest to some effect of oil production at the state level, one that cannot be fully captured within the short timeframe in which the link is examined (1999-2007), and because variation in representation over this period has been acutely low. Possibly, the full effect of oil at the state level will be observable in two or three decades' time. What can be further examined at this stage, however, is whether variation on the *independent* variable, oil production, *within the group of oil-producing states* can shed further light on the link between oil and female representation, the task of the next section.

4.2 Measuring Oil Revenue Across Oil-Producing States

So far in the analysis, I used a bivariate measure to distinguish oil-producing states (1) from non-oil producing states (0). However, within that group, significant variation exists in the levels of oil production; several oil states produce the bulk of Nigeria's oil, while others contribute a smaller amount. Since variation in oil production could have implications for the dependent variable (here, female legislative participation), I sought to measure oil production across the group of oil-producing states. Yet, data on oil production or oil exports are published for Nigeria as a whole and not *per state*; Nigeria's Department of Petroleum Resources' Service Division, the state agency responsible for the collection of petroleum data, bases its information on records of activities reported by oil companies that operate in Nigeria.³⁶ Thus, the data are recorded on company rather than state basis and then aggregated for Nigeria as a whole. A report by the NBS states: 'the NBS will in most cases store aggregated data for the whole country. Only in a few cases such as consumption of petroleum products and share of each producing company in production and export of petroleum products will the NBS store data on state or company basis'.³⁷ Technical data, such as the number of oil wells, oil fields, oil flow stations, or the number of barrels produced per day, which can be indicative of oil production, are also recorded per company, oil field or crude type, and not per state.

As attempts to retrieve the data from government agencies in Nigeria have been futile, I turned to examine whether oil *revenue* data can serve as a proxy for oil *production*. In oil-producing federations, revenue is often shared between the federal government and the producing states according to a predetermined formula.³⁸ In the US, for example, oil-producing states such as Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alaska share 50 percent of revenues generated from onshore oil and natural gas production with the federal government.³⁹ In Nigeria's case, political instability and the federal government's efforts to maximise its control of oil revenue resulted in frequent changes to the revenue sharing formula since it was launched in 1958. To measure the distribution of oil revenue between the federal and state tiers of government and *across* the nine oil-producing states, while assessing whether Nigeria's oil-producing states received a *greater* share of oil revenue than non-oil producing states, I first trace the historical origins of Nigeria's revenue sharing formula and federal system, which were greatly intertwined. I then

³⁶ NBS 2010, 6.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ For an assessment of countries' policy options to assign oil revenue to sub-national governments, see Ahmad and Mottu 2002.

³⁹ CEA 2010.

examine changes to the revenue sharing formula and the number of states between 1960 and 2007. Finally, I use data collected from Nigeria's Ministry of Finance on oil revenue received by the oil-producing states to measure oil production per state within that group.

4.2.1 Nigeria's revenue sharing formula and federalism

Both the principle of revenue sharing and Nigeria's federal political structure were introduced by the British colonial administration. The British Empire's influence in the historical territories of Nigeria stretches back to 1885, but only in 1900 did the territories come officially under the direct control of the British government. Then, together with the Niger Coast Protectorate already under imperial control, they were formed into the two protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria, which were amalgamated in 1914 by the British Governor-General into a single unity – the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria.⁴⁰ According to historical accounts, amalgamation was initiated for economic reasons: while the resource-poor Northern Protectorate had budget deficits, the resource-rich Southern Protectorate had surpluses (thanks to its agricultural resources); uniting the two budgets eliminated the need for financial remittances from the British treasury.⁴¹ But despite the establishment of central institutions to facilitate the development of a unified political entity, the imposition of revenue sharing created severe tensions between the Christian-dominated South and the Muslim-dominated North.

To strengthen Nigeria's integrated structure and in response to the geo-ethnic configuration of the country's population, a federal system was instituted in 1954 and the country was divided into three regions – North, East and West – which formed largely around the three largest ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo, and the Yoruba, respectively (see Map 4.1).⁴² However, Nigeria's internal divisions were also drawn along cultural, political and economic differences that complicated unification and resource sharing efforts.⁴³ While the North's economy was largely rural, based on cattle raising, cotton cultivation and textile production, the South's population (both East and West) engaged in agriculture and trade; the Yoruba-dominated region produced cocoa and food crops, whereas the Igbo-dominated region became a major producer of palm oil and palm products. While the North's Muslim population, historically governed by powerful emirs, resisted Western education and rebelled against the colonial rule, the

⁴⁰ Danjuma 1994.


⁴¹ Suberu 2004.

⁴² None of these groups constituted more than 65 percent of the population of the region in which it was dominant; Nigeria consists of over 250 ethnic groups.

⁴³ Suberu 2004.

South embraced both Western education and Christianity, and its governance was organised in small kingdoms and chieftaincies.

Map 4.1: Nigeria's three federal regions –1954



Source: Wilberforce Conference on Nigerian Federalism, 1997.

The 1954 British partition plan established the three regions as semi-autonomous political entities within a federal framework, while a parliamentary form of government based on the Westminster model was instituted at both the regional and federal levels.⁴⁴ This political structure created a need for a revenue sharing arrangement between the federal and regional levels of government, which would also consider the persisting tension between North and South – the latter demanding a larger share of the revenue produced over its territory, the former requiring adequate resources. The solution was the implementation of a distributive scheme that included derivation and revenue sharing principles: while a fraction of the revenue accrues to the producing region (derivation), the remaining part is to be shared between the central government and the three regions according to a revenue sharing formula.⁴⁵ However, the weights attached to the derivation and revenue sharing principles were not initially clear or agreed upon. In the decade prior to independence, each of the three regions was attempting to tilt this system in its favour.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Danjuma 1994.

⁴⁵ Ehtisham and Singh 2003.

⁴⁶ Danjuma 1994.

The British granted internal self-government to the East and West regions in 1957, and to the North region in 1959.⁴⁷ When Nigeria gained its independence in October 1960, two years after it began exporting oil, it consisted of a federation of three independent political entities, each with its own revenue base.⁴⁸ The regions maintained a high degree of control over their revenues: according to the recommendations of the 1958 Fiscal Commission, 50 percent of mining, mineral rents and royalties were retained by the region of origin ('derivation'), 30 percent were allocated to the distributable pool account shared by the three regions, and 20 percent were allocated to the weak federal government.⁴⁹ During the first decade of independence, the government extended exploration rights in onshore and offshore areas adjacent to the Niger Delta, formerly exclusive to the British, to foreign companies, facilitating the discovery of several major oil fields and turning the agrarian Niger Delta – located over the Southern parts of the East and West regions – into an oil-producing region.⁵⁰ However, oil was relatively insignificant to the economy; the role of Government in the industry was primarily regulatory, limited to the collection of royalties from the international oil companies.⁵¹

4.2.2 The Centralisation of oil revenue through state creation

As oil production began expanding in the South in the early 1960s, each party in the federal government strove to maximise its region's share of revenues. This led to disagreement over the figures of the 1962/63-population census and to the federal government's division in 1963 of the Western region, whose party was in opposition, into two regions, creating the Mid-West region for non-Yoruba minorities.⁵² When political tensions escalated into outbreaks of violence around the country and military intervention, Nigeria's first experiment as a democracy ended in 1966 with a coup led by a Northern-dominated military faction. Fearing the loss of control over its oil resources, the East region attempted to secede and create an independent state (Biafra), leading to a gruesome three-year civil war.⁵³ To strengthen its control of the oil industry and share of revenues, as well as weaken both the East region's demands for independence and local bases of power in the West and North regions, the military government initiated a series

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ The federal government was headed by a coalition of the North and East dominant parties, with the West region's leading party in opposition.

⁴⁹ Rupley 1981.

⁵⁰ NNPC 2010.

⁵¹ NBS 2010


⁵² This was also in response to the mass killing of Igbo people in the North (Danjuma 1994).

⁵³ Rupley 1981.

of measures that would drastically alter both the distribution of oil revenue and the nature of Nigeria's federal system.

In the 1967 constitution, the military government declared that all minerals, oil and gas in the country belong to the federal government, while under the guise of extending political rights to the country's numerous ethnic minorities, it divided the four regions into 12 states in 1967, and further to 19 states in 1976 (see Map 4.2). To further weaken the states, the government also established in 1976 a system of 300 Local Government Areas (the number later grew to the present 774 LGAs) and centralised the fiscal system, transferring tax resources that were previously vested in the regional governments to the federal government. Most significantly, it reduced the proportion of revenue retained by oil-producing states according to the derivation principle from 50 to only 10 percent.⁵⁴ Oil revenue, collected by the federal government and consolidated in a centrally managed pool – the Federation Account – was allocated according to a new formula that awarded the federal government with 75 percent, all state governments with 22 percent and local governments with three percent.⁵⁵ However, evidence suggests that the derivation principle was in practice ignored; all states retained similar revenues.⁵⁶

Map 4.2: Nigeria's division to 12 federal states – 1967



Source: Wilberforce Conference on Nigerian Federalism, 1997.

⁵⁴ Ehtisham and Singh 2003.

⁵⁵ Suberu 2004.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

In 1979, following 13 years of military rule, the military handed power back to a civilian government. A new constitution replaced the parliamentary system with a US-modelled presidential structure and attempted to ensure equitable sharing of power and revenue. The second civilian government shifted revenue back to the states and to LGAs: the 1982 Revenue Allocation Act reduced the allocation to the federal government from 75 to 55 percent, increased states' allocation to 32.5 percent (from 22), and allocated LGAs with 10 percent of revenue.⁵⁷ However, the established balance of power between the federal government and oil-producing states remained intact; the states were now entirely dependent on the federal government for their revenues and the derivation principle continued to be ignored (an insignificant 1.5 percent was reportedly allocated to oil-producing states).⁵⁸ When the civilian government failed to manage the economy, a publically-supported military regime returned to power in 1984, seeing four successive Northern-dominated military administrations in the next 15 years and the intensification of oil revenue centralisation strategies.⁵⁹

State division continued in order to weaken demands by oil-producing states for greater control over their resources: the number of states rose from 19 to 21 in 1987, 31 in 1991, and 36 in 1996 (Table A4.3 in the Appendix summarises the chronology of Nigeria's division to sub-units). The revenue sharing formula was modified again, with state allocation of the Federation Account reduced to 24 percent and the share of LGAs raised from 10 to 15 percent in the 1980s and then to 20 percent in the 1990s, while the federal government retained 48.5 percent (further 7.5 percent was assigned to special federal projects).⁶⁰ During the democratic elections held in 1993, contestants promised to shift power back to states, but the elected civilian government lasted only three months in power. In 1994, the military administration agreed to re-instate the derivation principle; oil-producing states were now to finally retain 13 percent of all oil revenues obtained from oil produced onshore (on the land areas of each oil-producing state).⁶¹ This decision, however, was not implemented until after the handover to the new civilian government in March 2000, following Nigeria's transition to democracy in June 1999.

⁵⁷ Danjuma 1994.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ This period saw four Northern presidents: General M. Buhari (1984-85), General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93), General Sami Abacha (1993-98), and General Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-99).

⁶⁰ Danjuma 1994.

⁶¹ The 13 percent derivation weight has been heavily disputed; oil-producing states are battling for an increase of this share and have appealed to the Nigerian Supreme Court demanding the inclusion under the derivation principle of revenue collected also from *offshore* oil production (Punch 2012).

Thus, while all 36 Nigerian states have been receiving revenue allocations based on the revenue sharing formula between the three tiers of government (allocations are largely made on the basis of equality [an equal share] and population size), only since the year 2000 have the nine oil-producing states been retaining a *greater share* of oil revenue – an extra 13 percent equal to the percentage of oil produced by each state (applying the derivation principle implies that oil production data per state do exist, but are not made public). This finding is important for measuring oil production based on oil revenue *per state* in Nigeria across the nine oil-producing states. Table 4.4 summarises the changes to the revenue sharing formula in Nigeria since 1958.

Table 4.4: Chronology of change to Nigeria's revenue sharing formula – 1958-2001

Year	Allocation of the Federation Account (%)				Derivation principle (%)
	Federal Government	States*	Local Government Areas	Special funds	
1958	40	60	0	0	50
1968	80	20	0	0	10
1977	75	22	3	0	10
1982	55	32.5	10	2.5	10
1989	50	24	15	11	10
1995**	48.5	24	20	7.5	13
2001	41.5	31	16	11.5	13

Source: based on Danjuma 1994 and Suberu 2004.

* Revenue allocation to all 36 states in Nigeria is determined by equality (equal share for all states of 40 percent), population (30 percent), social development (10 percent), land mass (5 percent), terrain (5 percent), and internal effort at generating own revenue (10 percent).

** Since 1995, a portion is also devoted to 'first charges' to insure Nigeria meets its debt repayment schedule and other international obligations.


4.2.3 Oil Revenue Per Capita and female legislative participation

As noted, since March 2000, 13 percent of Nigeria's oil revenue has been paid monthly into a special account – the Derivation Account, for distribution to the oil-producing states (while 87 percent has been retained by the federal government for distribution to all tiers of government according to the revenue sharing formula). Revenues of the Derivation Account are distributed to the nine oil-producing states on a proportional basis equal to the share of oil produced by each state. The Ministry of Finance publishes the payments made to oil states according to the derivation principle monthly, in special reports (see example in the Appendix). The data, obtained from the Ministry, were aggregated for each state from March 2000, when the derivation principle was enacted, to April 2007, when the third democratic elections were held in Nigeria. The aggregated

sum of oil revenue was then divided for each state by its population in 2006, resulting in the *Oil Revenue Per Capita* variable.⁶² This variable captures oil revenue collected by oil states' governments *beyond* the revenue that is equally received by each of the 36 states.

The results of this analysis, illustrated in Graph 4.4, show that four of the nine oil-producing states produce the majority of Nigeria's oil, while the other five states are smaller oil producers (for the full figures, see Table A4.4 in the Appendix). The effect of this variation on women's legislative participation is tested next.

Graph 4.4: Oil Revenue Per Capita in Nigeria's oil-producing states – 3/2000-4/2007



Source: calculations based on Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Finance monthly reports and National Population Commission of Nigeria 2007, p.6.

To test the link between *Oil Revenue Per Capita* and female legislative participation at the sub-national level further, I turn to multiple regression analysis. This allows controlling for three variables – religion, ethnicity, and income – which vary considerably between states in Nigeria and play a dominant role in states' socio-cultural landscape, economic organisation and local governance. While controlling for potential confounders, this analysis also assesses whether findings made previously on the relationship between oil and women's 'political influence' at the cross-national level can be validated at the sub-national level using similar analytical tools.⁶³ I run two regressions for each of the three dependent variables of female legislative participation.

⁶² There were several irregularities with data, including: 1. Data is missing for October 2001, May 2002, and September 2002; figures for these months are a mean of the previous and subsequent months. 2. Between March 2002 and January 2003, Akwa Ibom and Ondo states received what seems like fixed rates: 600,000,000 and 210,000,000 Naira, respectively. The reason for this is unknown. 3. Cross River did not receive revenue after March 2000, implying it stopped producing oil. 4. Figures do not include disputed funds.

⁶³ See Ross 2008, 2012. Ross examines the relationship between oil, female labour force participation, and female 'political influence' (measured by parliamentary seats and ministerial positions) in 169 countries.

The first is a simple regression, where I regress each measure onto *Oil Revenue Per Capita*, while the second includes the full set of control variables discussed below (I run OLS regressions with robust standard errors).

Variables. The independent variable is *Oil Revenue Per Capita*, the aggregated sum of oil revenue divided for each of the nine oil-producing states by its population in 2006.⁶⁴ The other 27 states, which receive no oil revenue by derivation, are assumed to have zero *Oil Revenue Per Capita* (although they receive a share of oil revenue according to the revenue sharing formula, I measure only the share received by states according to the derivation principle).

There are three dependent variables: (1) *Female seats in Senate* – the fraction of seats held by women from each state in the Senate following the 2007 elections; (2) *Female seats in the House of Representatives* – the fraction of seats held by women from each state in the Federal House of Representatives; and (3) *Female seats in State Houses of Assembly* – the fraction of seats held by women from each state in the State House of Assembly following the 2007 elections. The results of the 2007 elections were chosen for two reasons. First, data on oil revenue is available only from March 2000, after the 1999 elections. Second, assessing the 2007 election results allows for some time lag; by 2007, oil-producing states have been receiving 13 percent of oil revenue for seven years, a time period that could be sufficient for oil revenue to have played out its effects.

There are three control variables: *Income* – the log of GDP per capita in 2007 (in Naira); *Islam* – a dummy variable that denotes the nine states that are fully governed by *Sharia* law (rather than Christian or mixed-states, which constitute the reference category); and *Ethnic origin* – three dummy variables denoting the three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria: *Igbo*, *Hausa-Fulani*, and *Yoruba*.

⁶⁴ The *Oil Revenue Per Capita* variable attempts to replicate, to the extent possible, the variable used by Ross (2008) in his cross-national study. The measure used by Ross – *Oil Rents Per Capita* – the total annual rents from oil and gas production, divided by a country's population, could be employed sub-nationally if production data per state were available. Ross claims this variable is a more precise measure of the value of oil production than *Oil Exports by GDP* which is used frequently in the 'resource curse' literature, since it subtracts production costs, leaves out oil that is imported and subsequently re-exported, and includes oil that is produced and consumed domestically. Moreover, it avoids endogeneity problems that come from using GDP to normalise oil wealth; oil wealth is normalised by using each country's population.⁶⁴ I use the term *Oil Revenue Per Capita*, and not *Oil Rents Per Capita*, since 'rents' implies (amongst other things) the collection of oil revenue by national governments; in the case of sub-national units, revenue is being *handed down* by the federal government. Ross calculates *Oil Rents Per Capita* by subtracting country-specific extraction costs (which vary between countries) from the total value of each country's annual oil and natural gas production. Since data on oil production per state were unavailable, and because extraction costs are in any case similar in the Nigerian case, the *Oil Revenue Per Capita* measure can be thought of as a proxy of *Oil Rents Per Capita*.

The results, presented in Table 4.6, do not show statistical evidence for a relationship between oil and female seats in the Senate following the 2007 elections (column 1). When control variables are included, the sign is as expected (negative) but the coefficient is very small and far from significant at conventional levels (column 2). Similarly, the results do not show statistical evidence for a relationship between oil and female seats in the House of Representatives; although the sign here is also as expected (negative), the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels (column 3). When the controls are included the coefficient is even closer to zero (column 4). However, the results show evidence of an association between female seats and Igbo ethnic origin. In State Houses of Assembly, the results show statistical evidence for a positive link between oil and female seats (column 5, as demonstrated earlier using a t-test). However, with the inclusion of control variables this relationship disappears, while the sign changes to negative, suggesting it is a spurious correlation (column 6). There is also statistical evidence for a link between ethnic origin Igbo and female seats, as well as for a link between Islam and female seats; indeed, Islam appears to have a substantively large negative effect on female seats in State Houses of Assembly (further tests the data were subjected to, which resulted in similar findings, are portrayed in the Data Appendix).

Table 4.5: Oil Revenue Per Capita and female seats – 2007

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable: Female seat share (%)	Senate	Senate	House	House	State House	State House
Oil revenue per capita (plus 1, log)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.339 (0.343)	-0.111 (0.688)	0.380** (0.165)	-0.156 (0.170)
Islam		-0.084 (0.061)		-7.314 (4.350)		-4.342*** (1.423)
Igbo		0.080 (0.087)		8.253*** (2.859)		5.577** (2.066)
Hausa-Fulani		0.006 (0.019)		0.504 (4.679)		1.617 (1.050)
Yoruba		0.002 (0.072)		12.819 (8.349)		-1.097 (2.049)
GDP per capita (log)		0.067 (0.198)		-15.427 (19.233)		8.673 (5.491)
Constant	0.073*** (0.026)	-0.121 (0.644)	9.074*** (2.358)	56.848 (61.812)	4.409*** (0.959)	-22.257 (17.799)
Observations	36	36	36	36	36	36
Adjusted R-squared	-0.019	-0.024	-0.011	0.176	0.088	0.501

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Discussion. The results are based on a small dataset covering only a short period of time and should be interpreted with caution, as they provide a snapshot view of the association between the variables rather than a long-term study of causal relationships. As suggested earlier, the overall low levels of female legislative participation leave little

to be explained, while one or two data points can pull the relationship in a particular direction. Nonetheless, these results reveal two interesting patterns. First, the association between *Oil Revenue Per Capita* and *Female seats in State Houses of Assembly* is not statistically significant once control variables are included. This can be interpreted as consistent with the idea that the effects of oil have ‘evened out’ female legislative participation across Nigeria. Second, the regressions suggest that Islam and ethnic origin may play a role in shaping the relationships between the variables across Nigerian states, justifying the assessment of the impact of *strictly-Muslim* states in tests throughout the thesis.

Conclusion

In 2003, Nigeria’s President Olusegun Obasanjo addressed a group of women in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, announcing that in accordance with the Beijing Declaration, 30 percent of public offices will be reserved for women.⁶⁵ However, when women’s groups protested in the Presidential Compound in 2007 against the elimination of women in primary elections through undemocratic means, the President’s response was that ‘the socio-cultural context of Nigeria was not supportive of women’s participation in governance’, advising women’s groups to work towards a constitutional amendment to facilitate 15 percent female representation, as the 30 percent international benchmark was ‘too ambitious’.⁶⁶ This chapter, which examined the link between women’s legislative participation and oil at national and sub-national levels in Nigeria, proposed that oil has served to perpetuate socio-cultural conditions that inhibit women’s formal political participation in the country. The results of the analysis provided only tentative evidence for this claim. However, since oil revenue had only reached the state level in oil-producing states in March 2000, when the 13 percent derivation principle was enacted, and due to the overall low levels of female representation, it is possible that the impact of oil at the sub-national level will be evident only in years to come. I now turn to assess the link between oil and non-formal types of political participation.

⁶⁵ Best 2008.

⁶⁶ Iloh and Ikenna 2009.

Appendix 4

Table A4.1: Seats in Nigeria's National Assembly by state and gender – 1999-2007

		Senate							House of Representatives									
		1999		2003		2007		F%**	1999		2003		2007		No. seats	F%**		
S/N	States	M	F	M	F	M	F		M	F	M	F	M	F				
	OIL PRODUCERS																	
1	Abia	3	0	3	0	2	1	11.1	8	0	7	1	7	1	8	8.3		
2	Akwa Ibo	3	0	3	0	2	1	11.1	9	1	9	1	10	0	10	6.7		
3	Bayelsa	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	5	0	5	0	5	0	5	0		
4	C/River	2	1	3	0	3	0	11.1	8	0	8	0	8	0	8	0		
5	Delta	2	1	3	0	3	0	11.1	8	2	8	2	8	2	10	20		
6	Edo	3	0	2	1	3	0	11.1	9	0	9	0	9	0	9	0		
7	Imo	3	0	3	0	2	1	11.1	10	0	10	0	9	1	10	3.3		
8	Ondo	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	8	1	9	0	9	0	9	3.7		
9	Rivers	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	13	0	13	0	12	1	13	2.6		
	NON OIL PRODUCERS																	
10	Adamawa	3	0	3	0	2	1	11.1	7	0	8	0	7	1	8	4.3		
11	Anambra	3	0	2	1	2	1	22.2	10	1	10	1	9	2	11	12.1		
12	Bauchi*	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	12	0	11	0	12	0	12	0		
13	Benue	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	11	0	10	1	10	1	11	6.1		
14	Borno*	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	10	0	9	1	10	0	10	3.3		
15	Ebonyi	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	5	1	5	1	5	1	6	16.7		
16	Ekiti	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	6	0	4	2	3	3	6	27.8		
17	Enugu	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	8	0	8	0	7	1	8	4.2		
18	Gombe	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	6	0	6	0	6	0	6	0		
19	Jigawa*	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	11	0	11	0	11	0	11	0		
20	Kaduna	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	14	2	13	3	15	1	16	12.5		
21	Kano*	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	24	0	23	1	24	0	24	1.4		
22	Katsina*	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	15	0	15	0	15	0	15	0		
23	Kebbi*	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	9	0	9	0	8	1	9	3.7		
24	Kogi	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	9	0	9	0	9	0	9	0		
25	Kwara	3	0	2	1	2	1	22.2	5	1	5	1	4	2	6	22.2		
26	Lagos	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	22	2	21	3	22	2	24	9.7		
27	Nassarawa	3	0	3	0	2	1	11.1	5	0	4	1	5	0	5	6.7		
28	Niger	3	0	3	0	2	1	11.1	10	0	10	0	10	0	10	0		
29	Ogun	3	0	2	1	2	1	22.2	9	0	9	0	9	0	9	0		
30	Osun	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	8	1	7	2	8	1	9	14.8		
31	Oyo	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	14	0	14	0	11	2	14	4.9		
32	Plateau	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	8	0	8	0	6	2	8	8.3		
33	Sokoto*	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	11	0	11	0	11	0	11	0		
34	Taraba	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	6	0	6	0	6	0	6	0		
35	Yobe*	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	6	0	5	1	5	1	6	11.1		
36	Zamfara*	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	7	0	7	0	7	0	7	0		
	FCT***	0	1	1	0	1	0	-	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	-		
Total		106	3	105	4	100	9		348	12	338	22	334	26	360			

Source: NBS, 2009, Men and women in Nigeria report.

* Strictly-Muslim states.

** The share of women over the three elections combined for each state.

*** The FCT is not included in the analysis.

Table A4.2: Seats in Nigeria's States' Houses by state and gender – 1999-2007

		State Houses of Assembly							
		1999		2003		2007		No. seats	F%**
S/N	States	M	F	M	F	M	F		
OIL PRODUCERS									
1	Abia	23	1	22	2	22	2	24	6.9
2	Akwa Ibom	26	0	24	2	24	2	26	5.1
3	Bayelsa	23	1	24	0	23	1	24	2.8
4	C/River	25	0	25	0	22	3	25	4.0
5	Delta	28	1	26	3	26	3	29	8.0
6	Edo	22	2	23	1	23	1	24	5.5
7	Imo	27	0	26	1	25	2	27	3.7
8	Ondo	25	1	25	1	25	1	26	3.8
9	Rivers	32	0	31	1	27	5	32	6.2
NON OIL PRODUCERS									
10	Adamawa	22	3	25	0	24	1	25	5.3
11	Anambra	29	1	28	2	26	4	30	7.8
12	Bauchi*	30	1	30	1	30	1	31	3.2
13	Benue	27	2	26	3	28	1	29	6.9
14	Borno*	28	0	27	1	28	0	28	1.2
15	Ebonyi	24	0	23	1	22	2	24	4.2
16	Ekiti	26	0	25	1	26	0	26	1.3
17	Enugu	24	0	23	1	20	4	24	6.9
18	Gombe	23	1	23	1	22	2	24	5.5
19	Jigawa*	30	0	30	0	30	0	30	0
20	Kaduna	34	0	34	0	32	2	34	2.0
21	Kano*	40	0	40	0	40	0	40	0
22	Katsina*	34	0	34	0	34	0	34	0
23	Kebbi*	24	0	24	0	24	0	24	0
24	Kogi	25	0	24	1	25	0	25	1.3
25	Kwara	23	1	23	1	21	3	24	6.9
26	Lagos	39	1	39	1	35	5	40	5.8
27	Nassarawa	24	0	24	0	23	1	24	1.4
28	Niger	25	2	25	2	26	1	27	6.2
29	Ogun	26	0	25	1	24	2	26	3.8
30	Osun	25	1	25	1	25	1	26	3.8
31	Oyo	32	0	30	2	31	1	32	3.1
32	Plateau	22	2	23	1	22	2	24	6.9
33	Sokoto*	30	0	30	1	30	0	30	1.1
34	Taraba	24	0	23	1	24	0	24	1.4
35	Yobe*	24	0	24	0	24	0	24	0
36	Zamfara*	24	0	24	0	24	0	24	0
	FCT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	939	21	933	34	913	53		

Source: NBS, 2009, Men and women in Nigeria report.

* *Strictly-Muslim* states.

** The share of women over the three elections combined for each state.

*** The FCT is not included in the analysis.

Table A4.3: Chronology of Nigeria's division into sub-units – 1914-1996

Provinces	Regions	States					
1914	1954	1967	1976	1987	1991	1996	
Southern Province	Eastern (Igbo dominated)	Cross River		Akwa Ibom Cross River			
		East Central	Imo		Abia Imo		
			Anambra		Anambra		
					Enugu	Enugu Ebonyi*	
		Rivers				Bayelsa Rivers	
		Mid-Western (1963)	Mid-Western	Bendel		Delta Edo	
	Western (Yoruba dominated)	Lagos					
		Western	Ogun				
			Ondo			Ekiti Ondo	
			Oyo		Osun Oyo		
	Northern Province	Northern (Hausa-Fulani dominated)	Benue-Plateau	Benue			Nasarawa Plateau
Plateau							
Kano			Jigawa Kano				
Kwara			Kwara Kogi**				
North Central			Kaduna		Kaduna Katsina		
North Western			Niger				
			Sokoto		Kebbi		
					Sokoto	Sokoto Zamfara	
North Eastern			Bauchi			Bauchi Gombe	
			Borno		Borno Yobe		
			Gongola		Adamawa Taraba		

* Also includes part of old Abia State. ** Also includes part of Benue State.

Table A4.4: Oil Revenue Per Capita in Nigeria's oil-producing states – 3/2000-4/2007

	State	Year created	Oil revenues (Naira)	Population*	Oil Revenue Per Capita
1	Bayelsa	1996	287,335,547,491	1,704,515	168,573
2	Delta	1991	294,112,526,502	4,112,445	71,518
3	Rivers	1967	335,324,724,162	5,198,716	64,501
4	Akwa Ibom	1987	229,913,291,487	3,902,051	58,921
5	Ondo	1976	59,455,554,299	3,460,877	17,179
6	Cross River	1967	19,612,806,772	2,892,988	6,779
7	Abia	1991	18,991,003,121	2,845,380	6,674
8	Imo	1976	23,716,963,040	3,927,563	6,039
9	Edo	1991	12,178,005,726	3,233,366	3,766

Source: Calculations based on Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Finance monthly reports

*2006 Population Census, National Population Commission of Nigeria 2007, p.6.

Federal Ministry of Finance
Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation, Abuja

Table III

Distribution of Revenue Allocation to State Governments by Federation Account Allocation Committee for the month of April, 2000 shared in May, 2000

1	2	3	4	5	6=4+5	7	8	9	10=6+(7+8+9)	11	12	13=6+11+12	14=10+11+12	
Sn	Beneficiaries	No. of LGCs	Gross Statutory Allocation	13% Share of Derivation	Gross Total	Deductions			Net Statutory Allocation	Crude Oil Excess Proceeds/Other Additional Allocation	VAT Allocation	Total Gross Amount	Total Net Amount	Sn
						External Debt	Contractual Obligation (ISPO)	Other Deductions (see Note)						
			=N=	=N=	=N=	=N=	=N=	=N=	=N=	=N=	=N=	=N=	=N=	
1	ABIA	17	345,286,921.84	58,104,335.29	403,391,257.13	0.00	-	20,947,002.38	382,444,254.75	205,214,848.09	57,247,466.94	665,853,573.16	644,306,570.78	1
2	ADAMAWA	21	416,419,702.73	-	416,419,702.73	0.00	-	27,567,613.68	388,852,089.05	206,694,720.99	46,164,627.28	669,279,051.00	641,711,437.32	2
3	AKWA IBOM	31	414,700,825.23	914,278,558.85	1,328,979,384.07	0.00	-	11,798,719.93	1,317,180,664.14	738,124,444.26	48,139,415.50	2,115,243,243.83	2,103,444,523.90	3
4	ANAMBRA	21	406,013,606.34	-	406,013,606.34	0.00	20,000,000.00	14,490,359.05	371,523,247.29	201,529,535.06	55,476,053.64	663,019,195.04	628,528,835.99	4
5	BAUCHI	20	434,204,395.23	-	434,204,395.23	0.00	-	17,823,573.07	416,380,822.16	215,522,358.18	51,752,768.03	701,479,521.45	683,655,948.38	5
6	BAYELSA	8	320,417,100.11	754,597,394.17	1,075,014,494.28	0.00	64,375,936.99	8,587,748.37	1,002,050,808.92	598,361,014.66	37,682,125.69	1,711,057,634.63	1,638,093,949.27	6
7	BENUE	23	475,313,716.44	-	475,313,716.44	0.00	53,643,366.12	16,082,163.83	405,608,186.49	235,927,443.78	49,809,927.04	761,007,627.26	691,344,557.31	7
8	BORNO	27	487,690,233.38	-	487,690,233.38	0.00	-	10,079,165.48	477,611,067.90	242,070,670.67	49,620,495.27	779,381,399.32	769,302,233.84	8
9	CROSS RIVER	18	404,216,870.28	95,388.99	404,312,259.26	0.00	5,000,000.00	18,554,128.55	380,758,130.71	200,693,238.81	45,373,275.56	650,378,774.04	626,824,845.49	9
10	DELTA	25	421,967,125.34	1,244,482,053.98	1,666,449,179.32	0.00	-	13,925,997.43	1,652,523,181.89	933,971,994.41	67,801,977.31	2,668,223,151.04	2,654,297,153.61	10
11	EBONYI	13	318,416,733.96	-	318,416,733.96	0.00	25,373,820.40	10,192,800.45	282,850,113.11	158,049,817.41	41,016,532.39	517,483,083.76	481,916,462.91	11
12	EDO	18	405,908,796.74	24,058,761.53	429,967,558.27	0.00	8,750,000.00	15,906,150.39	405,311,407.88	215,484,257.60	50,034,782.76	695,486,598.63	670,804,448.24	12
13	EKITI	16	331,413,124.84	-	331,413,124.84	0.00	-	7,698,211.79	323,714,913.05	164,500,725.88	40,466,696.15	536,680,546.88	529,162,305.99	13
14	ENUGU	17	353,599,820.71	-	353,599,820.71	0.00	-	22,460,843.29	331,138,977.42	175,513,348.20	47,880,770.19	576,983,939.11	554,533,095.82	14
15	GOMBE	11	326,129,223.53	-	326,129,223.53	0.00	-	4,466,838.48	321,662,385.05	161,878,000.54	45,330,811.87	533,338,035.93	528,871,197.45	15
16	IMO	27	381,324,955.50	104,533,888.00	485,858,843.50	0.00	-	12,655,203.51	473,203,639.99	250,133,516.90	49,854,035.20	785,846,395.60	773,191,192.09	16
17	JIGAWA	27	432,825,400.30	-	432,825,400.30	0.00	-	7,243,742.47	425,581,657.83	214,837,878.15	48,894,718.76	696,557,997.21	689,314,254.74	17
18	KADUNA	23	531,292,525.89	-	531,292,525.89	0.00	-	20,790,027.22	510,502,498.67	263,713,171.31	96,498,834.19	891,555,531.39	870,765,504.17	18
19	KANO	44	600,902,572.96	-	600,902,572.96	0.00	-	23,055,187.77	577,847,385.19	288,264,920.81	81,665,889.87	980,833,183.65	957,777,995.88	19
20	KATSINA	34	515,970,859.08	-	515,970,859.08	0.00	-	23,088,129.02	492,882,730.06	256,108,085.32	57,803,917.68	829,882,862.08	806,794,733.06	20
21	KEBBI	21	392,922,886.81	-	392,922,886.81	0.00	-	6,212,238.03	386,710,588.78	195,031,805.48	44,344,725.41	632,299,417.70	620,187,119.67	21
22	KOGI	21	399,257,878.73	-	399,257,878.73	0.00	-	12,468,969.43	386,788,908.30	198,176,251.76	45,209,042.93	642,643,173.43	630,174,204.00	22
23	KWARA	16	385,193,927.17	-	385,193,927.17	0.00	-	11,114,602.13	374,079,325.04	191,195,447.24	42,551,040.27	618,940,414.68	607,825,812.55	23
24	LAGOS	20	598,554,837.83	-	598,554,837.83	0.00	-	20,266,538.96	578,288,298.87	297,099,595.41	240,094,638.18	1,135,749,071.43	1,115,482,532.47	24
25	NASSARAWA	13	335,542,623.24	-	335,542,623.24	0.00	-	7,796,086.54	327,746,536.70	166,550,450.03	39,576,067.09	541,669,140.35	533,873,053.81	25
26	NIGER	25	475,472,428.13	-	475,472,428.13	0.00	-	12,712,418.61	462,760,009.52	236,006,222.15	49,428,804.68	760,907,454.96	748,195,036.35	26
27	OJUN	20	429,752,981.63	-	429,752,981.63	0.00	-	20,372,303.88	409,380,677.75	213,312,847.71	55,443,787.54	698,509,616.88	678,137,313.00	27
28	ONDO	18	379,922,004.09	292,599,497.41	672,521,501.50	0.00	-	24,919,327.82	647,602,173.68	358,926,872.40	46,731,912.39	1,078,180,286.30	1,053,260,958.48	28
29	OSUN	30	397,974,709.72	-	397,974,709.72	0.00	-	15,405,897.04	382,568,812.68	197,539,336.03	45,268,296.69	640,782,342.45	625,376,445.41	29
30	OYO	33	489,286,333.92	-	489,286,333.92	0.00	-	38,416,149.57	450,870,184.35	242,862,913.57	64,290,099.86	796,438,347.36	758,023,197.79	30
31	PLATEAU	17	387,025,100.67	-	387,025,100.67	0.00	-	11,063,320.17	375,961,780.50	192,104,371.32	46,958,657.58	626,088,129.58	615,024,809.41	31
32	RIVERS	23	432,501,987.81	754,597,394.17	1,187,099,381.98	0.00	193,000,000.00	22,331,712.80	971,767,669.18	653,995,641.07	95,248,835.27	1,936,343,658.31	1,721,012,145.51	32
33	SOKOTO	23	408,484,118.43	-	408,484,118.43	0.00	-	7,635,527.14	400,848,591.29	202,755,802.22	51,755,999.03	662,985,919.69	655,360,392.55	33
34	TARABA	16	393,741,899.01	-	393,741,899.01	0.00	27,433,333.34	6,714,848.87	359,593,716.80	195,438,331.62	39,641,565.28	629,066,965.23	594,938,783.02	34
35	YOBE	17	379,492,284.71	-	379,492,284.71	0.00	-	8,168,854.08	371,323,430.63	188,365,371.27	39,641,565.28	607,499,221.26	599,330,367.18	35
36	ZAMFARA	14	363,660,045.40	-	363,660,045.40	0.00	-	10,944,172.35	352,715,873.05	180,506,856.73	42,894,581.69	587,061,483.82	576,117,311.47	36
38	Delta/Ono Disputed Funds		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38
Total (States/LGCs)			14,972,800,557.75	4,147,347,272.37	19,120,147,830.13	-	397,576,456.85	543,936,633.58	18,178,634,739.70	9,846,462,108.06	2,058,389,710.24	31,024,999,648.42	30,083,486,557.99	

Note:

* Other Deductions cover: National Water Rehabilitation Projects, National Agricultural Technology Support Programme, Multi State Roads Projects, Multi State Water Projects, Community Development Programme, State Health & Population Project, Federal Urban Mass Transit Agency (FUMTA), Repayment of Loan granted to States, Urban Development Bank, Recovery of Loan for Nigeria 99, State Water Supply Project, State Agricultural Project, National Fadama Project, UNDP Assisted Project, UNICEF/World Bank Assisted Essential Drug Project, Recovery of Payment to JDP Construction and Contribution towards Funding of Primary Education

Chapter 5

ENHANCED PROTEST ACTIVITY IN OIL COMMUNITIES

In the summer of 2002, the struggle in the Niger Delta caught the attention of the international community, when images of hundreds of Nigerian women occupying oil facilities, some with infants strapped to their backs, reached the front pages of newspapers and magazines worldwide. Although news articles declared that ‘Nigerians had never before seen a protest quite like this one’, and ‘Naked ploy is latest threat in oil wars’, women’s protests against the oil industry – oil companies and the Nigerian government – have been taking place in the Niger Delta as early as the 1980s.¹ In some of the protests, the entire female population of oil communities stormed and besieged oil companies’ offices and oil facilities, in song and dance or armed with cooking pots, refusing to leave without tangible results. In many protests, women threatened to use or used a weapon of last resort – the *curse of nakedness* – a deeply rooted and enormously symbolic cultural practice, which signals women’s willingness to sacrifice themselves for their cause, die or lead to the death of male offenders.² On several occasions, women’s protests brought oil production to a halt and forced oil companies to concede, if temporarily, to their demands.

While women’s protests in the Niger Delta have been prompted by oil-related pollution and economic devastation, women’s recourse to protest activity in Nigeria as means to express political grievances preceded the oil era; historical evidence suggests that women’s collective action was prevalent already under colonial rule and more prominent than men’s, emerging particularly at times when women were confronted with threats to their economic independence. I suggest that women’s response to oil-related damages and discriminatory colonial policies was fundamentally similar: in both cases, it was triggered by financial losses suffered specifically by women, taking the form of non-formal grassroots political activity through protests and women’s organisations, since women were barred from formal political channels. Both colonial policies and the oil industry introduced a new social order in Nigeria that affected men and women differently, resulting in the emergence of a gendered response to these regimes. While the majority of men either cooperated with the state or resorted to militant activity, women’s non-formal political activity has been a continuous feature of women’s political

¹ Titles taken from Sealey 2002; News24 2002, respectively.

² Turner and Brownhill 2002. The curse is rooted in the culture of several African societies as the ultimate weapon at women’s disposal to shame men, extending to both local and foreign men.

participation in Nigeria before and during the oil era, crossing ethnic, class and age-group affiliations.

This argument is at the core of the next two chapters, which together test *H5* on the relationship between oil and women's non-formal political participation. The two chapters combined offer an extensive examination of women's political activities in Nigeria, as well as a unique narration of the *resource curse* at the local level. In both, I follow a mixed-methods strategy that utilises quantitative analysis and case study evidence. Focusing on women's protest activity, this chapter is organised in three parts (mirrored in the following chapter). In the first section, I draw on historical evidence to examine the roots of women's protest activity in Nigeria, placing recent anti-oil protests in a historical context and exploring the sources for the disparity between men and women's different responses. In the second section, I analyse a unique dataset of press reports on protests that took place in Nigeria between 2000 and 2007, to assess whether women-led protests have been more frequent in oil states than in non-oil states. In the third section, I use qualitative analysis – drawing on geological surveys, oil companies' reports, press reports, and interviews – to compare two Nigerian states, oil and non-oil producing, and unveil the mechanisms that underlie the link between oil and women's protests. Following Eric Hobsbawm's definition of protest as 'some physical action – marching, chanting slogans, singing – through which the merger of the individual in the mass... finds expression' (i.e., street protests), the chapter presents strong evidence in support of *H5*.³

³ Hobsbawm 2003, 73.



Photo: International Museum of Women, 2012

'It was women at the forefront of the struggle. If you look at who was killed, who was raped, who was violated in the Niger Delta... it was the women. When they rape and force prostitution, that is a strategy that is extremely gendered. Why? Women were being attacked because they were the ones to take the initiative to protest'.

(Sokari Ekine, Niger Delta activist and writer
Personal interview, December 15 2012)

5.1 Women's Protests in Response to Colonialism and Oil

Examining women's protests in Nigeria from the early twentieth century to the 2000s reveals that women's protest activity formed under colonialism and the oil regime alike in response to economic deprivation experienced by women, and when other channels of political participation had been blocked to them. While discriminatory colonial policies excluded women from decision-making processes, stripped them off their political responsibilities, and led to their economic marginalisation, oil production led to the impoverishment of women in oil-producing communities and perpetuated their exclusion from the formal political process under (oil-funded) successive military governments. In both periods, women's response to the deterioration in their economic and political status took the form of furious protest activity, demonstrating group consciousness and solidarity based on their mutual economic interests and political grievances. In the first two parts of this section, I provide historical evidence on women's protest activity prior to the oil era. I then examine women's protests during the oil era. Finally, I assess the sources for the disparity between men and women's different political response.

5.1.1 Protests before the oil era

'For the first time in our imperial history we were faced with, and insulted by, mobs of irate women who marched up and down the country, decrying our rule and pulling down local institutions of our authority'.

(Cited in Ross 1965, 97)

Historical evidence shows that prior to the advent of British colonialism, Nigeria's traditional societies had structures for female political participation; although patriarchy was a dominant feature of social organisation, women exercised considerable political power and held distinct political roles in traditional Nigerian society (see Section 4.2.1). When the colonial administration imposed discriminatory policies in the mid-1920s, women's protests broke out spontaneously in Nigeria's Southeast region. In April 1925, women in Calabar province (today's Cross River State) opposed the introduction of new taxes on women and refused to pay them, arguing they had not been consulted.⁴ During a protest that broke in the market, women assaulted European men and the local police, closed the market and warned women traders to not sell food to Europeans or face fines. In November that year, women of the Nwabiola ethnic group at Bonny province (today's Rivers State) went from town to town demanding a strict regulation of prostitution, a ban

⁴ Mba 1982.

on the use of European coins and a general return to the 'old customs'.⁵ In 1928, women of the Ezzi ethnic group in Ogoja province (today's Rivers State) protested against the persecution, extortion and corruption among Native Court members who imposed oppressive fines on women. Women also protested against the decrease in prices of farm produces and the high prices of imported goods.⁶

Though women expressed concerns across a range of issues, protests emerged specifically when women's economic interests were at stake. This was demonstrated in the most renowned women's protest under colonial rule, the 'Aba Women's Riot' (popularly known as the 'Women's War'), which was instigated in November 1929 by Igbo women following a rumour that a recently introduced taxation of men was to be extended to women.⁷ This happened at a time when the price of palm-produce, in which women were trading, was falling due to imports brought in by the British. Women traders were particularly affected by the economic crisis and viewed taxation as 'an infringement on their economic competitive patterns'.⁸ Igbo women also resented the British imposition on the community of male Warrant Chiefs, who pursued abusive and extortionist actions such as seizures of property, and felt deprived of their traditional involvement in the public domain. However, it was the fear of taxation and loss of income that instigated protest, as illustrated in interviews conducted by British Africanist Margery Perham in 1937, in which one protester commented: 'we women... held a large meeting at which we decided to wait until we heard definitely... that women were *to be taxed*, in which case we would make trouble, as we did not mind to be killed for doing so'.⁹

During the protests, which lasted for nearly three months, thousands of women of all ages marched along key trade and market routes and into major towns in the Owerri, Calabar and Ogoja provinces, chanting demands and statements in defiance of the colonial administration.¹⁰ Perham reported: 'here... converged some ten thousand women scantily clothed, girded with green leaves, carrying sticks, singing angry songs against the chiefs and court messengers...'.¹¹ According to Perham's report, groups of women also stormed and looted European trading stores and Barclay's Bank, broke into a prison to release prisoners, and burned Native Courts in 16 administrative centres; in

⁵ Gaily 1970.

⁶ Ukeje 2004.

⁷ Adeyemo 1987.

⁸ Lynne 1990, 339.

⁹ Perham 1937, 208.

¹⁰ Ukeje 2004.

¹¹ Perham 1937, 208.

clashes with the local police, at least 50 women were killed. Although not all of the women's demands were met, the protests had instant political results: the British administration was forced to review its taxation policy towards women in Nigeria and other African colonies and subsequently adapted reform; the Warrant Chief system, to which women opposed, eventually collapsed.¹² Notably, a year prior to the 'Women's War' protests, men in Southeast Nigeria had succumbed to the repressive taxation regime without protest.

Another wave of women's protests occurred between 1939 and 1947 and was led by new women's organisations. In 1939, the Lagos Market Women's Association led anti-tax revolts to challenge the 1939 Income Tax Ordinance.¹³ The legislation, enacted by the colonial administration to raise revenue for WWII expenditure, proposed to tax women earning over £50 a year. The organisation also protested the Pullen Price Control Scheme enacted in 1941, when the administration sought to control the pricing and selling of food, negatively affecting women traders. During the mid-1940s, women staged further demonstrations against the colonial exploitation of their lands, heavy taxation, market closures and commodity delays, culminating in the kidnapping of colonial officials and local male rulers who cooperated with the regime.¹⁴ In 1958, new taxes and school fees sparked a women's uprising in Yenagoa (today's Bayelsa State); women of Epie and Atissa origin organised across 29 villages with each sending 15 women to join a demonstration, in which about 70 of them were killed.¹⁵ Women were also active in the anticolonial movement that was sweeping through Nigeria in the 1950s and in rallies that called for independence.¹⁶ These examples demonstrate that women's protest activity has been a dominant feature of their political participation in pre-independent Nigeria.

5.1.2 Protests in the Muslim North

Protests against colonial policies took place predominantly in the Christian-dominated South. In Northern Nigeria, where the vast majority of the Hausa-Fulani population is Muslim (and where no oil is produced), the practice of wife seclusion (*kulle*) was almost universally subscribed to by the start of colonialism, affecting all women of childbearing age, from marriage at 12 to about 50. As noted in earlier chapters, though confined to the

¹² Okonjo 1976; Uchendu 1993.

¹³ Johnson 1982.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Turner et al. 2001.

¹⁶ Johnson 1982.

home, Northern women worked to maintain their financial autonomy similarly to women in the South, mostly in the preparation of food that was sold in the streets by brokers (often their children).¹⁷ They took part in farm work in the early and late periods of their lives, or – in poor households – after acquiring their husband's permission. Thus women's work was performed either in solitude or in 'loose cooperative units without any formal or enduring groupings'.¹⁸ Northern women's seclusion from the public domain clearly militated against female collective action; there is no sign of women's protests against the infringement by the colonial administration of their traditional rights, which in any case converged with cultural attitudes towards women in their communities.

Against this background, it is interesting to note a strike by Hausa Muslim women that took place in 1977 in Kano State. In 1971, the young Nigerian government initiated the establishment of the Kano River Project, an irrigation scheme that aimed at increasing agricultural production to meet the growing national demand for food. The economic growth stimulated by the project increased female seclusion and withdrawal from farm work as a result of higher household incomes (as predicted by the model of female labour supply).¹⁹ Yet an international, Brussels-based company operating in the area employed a few hundred women no longer in seclusion to work in groups on small-scale wheat farms and harvest beans, alongside men. Women worked for six hours a day, picking 20 to 24 kilos of beans, for which they earned 30 to 36 Nigerian Kobo per day, while the daily rate for men was 2.2 Naira, more than 6 times higher.²⁰ When a private contractor attempted to recruit women offering higher wages, the female workers on the bean farm announced a strike, demanding better wages. Initially, the company refused to give in and resorted to recruiting other women from a nearby village. However, the strike's organisers convinced the newcomers to refuse to work, forcing the company to meet their demands; their pay was raised to 50 to 60 Kobo a day.

Although the strike had no political goals, it illustrates how women's work outside the home alongside other women – even farm work – enhanced their consciousness to their exploitation and their ability to mobilise as a group, militating against the influence of religious ideology and cultural norms that prescribe them subordinate and subjugated positions. As Jackson noted:

¹⁷ Jackson 1978.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁹ Jackson 1978.

²⁰ 100Kobo equals 1Naira.

‘The stereotypical image of Hausa women as totally submissive, obedient, lacking in power and oppressed by an Islamic ideology which specifically devalues women is somewhat at odds with the way in which these women organized their strike, refused to give way to either the threats of losing their jobs or the vision of truckloads of women, apparently willing to work for the wage they had rejected’.²¹

Although the striking women were no longer in seclusion (over 50), they had no formal public power; in Hausa society, women are considered legal minors throughout their entire lives.²² However, cultural norms that bar women from the public domain and from assuming collective action did not prevent them from striking once seclusion was removed and economic incentives were presented, paving the way for their mobilisation.

5.1.3 Protests during the oil era

There are no records of women’s protests during the first two decades of Nigeria’s independence, which were marked by political instability and uncertainty regarding the Nigerian national project. In the early 1980s, women’s grassroots protest activity began emerging in Nigeria’s oil-producing region, in response to land grabs by the state and oil pollution. These early protests occurred spontaneously before political mobilisation had reached a regional level and were initiated by local women’s groups (*women’s councils*) in oil communities that suffered direct losses or damages to their farmland from oil operations. The first documented protest took place in June 1984 in Ogharefe, a rural community in Delta State, where the community’s entire womenfolk, totalling several thousand women, sieged the production station of Pan Ocean, the oil company operating on their land. The protesters refused to negotiate and eventually stripped naked, demanding compensation for land loss and pollution damages (this protest is further discussed in Section 5.3.1). Their demands were met instantly, inspiring women of neighbouring communities and youth groups to follow their lead.

In another protest in Delta State in March 1986, several hundred residents of Bonny Island, led by the community’s women, invaded and shut down the Shell-operated oil terminal. During the protest, over a hundred women sat on the Shell helipad and prevented helicopters from landing, holding placards that read: ‘Shell’s 28 years in Finima is a curse to us’; ‘Our means of livelihood has been destroyed by Shell’; and ‘No

²¹ Jackson 1978, 24.

²² As Smith (1955, 13) noted: ‘politically and legally, [northern] women are an internally undifferentiated collection of individuals, none of whom are full social persons’.

light, no water for us after 28 years of Shell'.²³ In another protest in the state in August 1986, over 10,000 women from the Uvwie community besieged several major oil facilities at Ekpan, Warri, carrying placards against the oil industry, chanting war songs, and eventually breaking into the petrochemicals plant, bringing the region's entire oil production to a halt.²⁴ During negotiations with the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), which operated the site, the women insisted that no men from their community attend and demanded the hiring of locals by the company, compensation for grabbed farmlands, provision of water pipes and electricity, and education scholarships for their children. A second negotiation meeting, which was taken over by a delegation of men, did not achieve the women's objectives and included a condemnation of their tactics.

During the 1990s, women-led protests (and women's participation in community protests) against the oil industry intensified and spread across the Niger Delta. In January 1993, Ogoni women in Rivers State participated in possibly the largest-ever community protest against the oil industry, with about 300,000 participants (over half of the Ogoni population).²⁵ Another two examples include the February 1995 seizure by women of the Shell-operated Odidi oil well in Delta State, in protest against the destruction of crops following a ten-day oil spill from the site, and the September 1998 Egi women's protest, where several thousand women from the Egi community in Rivers State demonstrated at Elf's Obite gas plant, the largest in West Africa, demanding the release of an environmental assessment of the project and calling for social investment in the community; the women were prevented from entering the site by anti-riot mobile police, leaving them protesting in song and dance at the facility's gate.²⁶ The use of mobile police and special military units to disperse women's protests, as well as the use of harassment, assault and rape to deter women from protesting, contributed to the emergence in the late 1990s of a regional women's movement, which took over the struggle, crossing ethnic and tribal affiliations (see Chapter 6).²⁷

Despite their frequent occurrence, women's protests in the Niger Delta have gone largely unnoticed until July 2002, when several major protests attracted international media coverage (further detailed in Section 5.3.1). During these protests, women's demands were no longer limited to compensation for lost farmlands and pollution.

²³ Turner and Oshare 1993.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ HRW 1999.

²⁶ Ukeje 2002; HRW 1999 and Ukeje 2004, respectively.

²⁷ Sokari Ekine, personal interview, December 15 2012.

Rather, women were demanding the termination of oil operations over their land and direct compensation *for women* for suffering damages due to oil operations. For example, during a protest in 2002 in Escravos, Delta State, women negotiated 26 demands with the management, including the company's departure from the land.²⁸ The deputy chairperson of the Escravos Women Coalition, Queen Uwara, was quoted stating: 'Chevron brought soldiers and police to threaten us... but we are not afraid... all we want is for Chevron to leave our land'.²⁹ In another protest over the same facility, women refused to leave until their ten communities were paid two million Naira each, 'as compensation for *the women* who abandoned their various trades to occupy the flow stations'.³⁰ They also demanded the establishment of a micro-credit loans scheme for their communities worth 20 million Naira, to enable *women* to embark on small and medium-scale enterprises. Women's demands for direct compensation illustrate not only their financial needs due to loss of income, but also the lack of trust in the community's male leadership to appropriately manage compensation awards.

5.1.4 Explaining men's absence from the protests

How can the all-women nature of women's protests in Nigeria be explained? Under colonialism, Nigerian men and women's experience of the new political system was fundamentally different, leading to the emergence of a gendered response.³¹ Due to notions held by the British of gender-appropriate roles, men continued to enjoy access to formal channels of participation through which they could vent political grievances – male rulers were consulted and hailed by the administration – while traditional female rulers were dismissed from their duties. Moreover, men benefited greatly from the new system: they were able to migrate to urban centres for waged jobs and education, while women were subjected to discrimination. Men in positions of power had no incentive to take action against a system they benefited from, while women's action took the form of the only political channel available to them – protest. From a feminist perspective, Judith Van Allen saw the 1929 Women's War as a traditional protest where women reacted as they customarily did against male infringement of their rights; women mobilised not only against British colonialism, but also against indigenous men who collaborated with the regime against their interests.³²

²⁸ Associated Press, July 22 2002.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ukeje 2004, 612.

³¹ A similar claim on women under the colonial regime is made in Drew, 1995.

³² Van Allen 1972.

An illustrative example of men and women's different responses to colonial policies is found in the introduction of new technologies into the farming sector in the 1940s and 1950s.³³ While male chiefs welcomed the mechanisation of the oil palm industry, women viewed it as a threat to their livelihoods and the traditional division of labour, leading to women's violent protests across the Southeast between 1946 and 1953. The first wave of protests followed the introduction of hand presses for the extraction of palm oil.³⁴ Due to their high costs, only rich male traders and public servants could afford to buy them. Women protested, claiming that 'men who owned [the presses] kept the palm kernels for themselves', depriving them of their source of income as men came to dominate not only the production but also the marketing of palm oil.³⁵ Another wave of protests was in response to plans to build pioneer oil mills. In a mass meeting with the District Officer of Ndiya, Uyo in 1946, where a mill was planned to be built, women stated: 'What shall we do, insofar as we know that if the mill is owned and run by men we will be thrown out of a job?'³⁶ Unable to reach a compromise, the mill was eventually not set up and efforts to build mills in the Southeast faced similar setbacks.

To forestall further women's protests, the British administration instructed its governors to ensure that women were consulted before any installation of mills. An illuminating circular sent out by the Secretary of the Eastern Provinces in February 7, 1948 stated:

'It has always been recognised that women of Ibo country might view the introduction of [an] oil mill with alarm as a measure which might deprive them of their customary profits they derived from the sale of palm kernels. Direct your administrative officers that particular attention should be paid in the future to the possibilities of unfavourable reactions on the part of the women and that women in addition to the Native authorities and men should be consulted'.³⁷

These instructions demonstrate the political significance of women's protests and their capacity to influence the administration's policies. Notably, women did not object to the introduction of new technologies or progress; their concern was primarily with the economic and social consequences of mechanisation for *women*. With ownership open only to men who had the resources to purchase them, the new technologies would have undermined the traditional gender-based division of labour, deprived women of income accruing from trading in palm produce, and distorted the balance of political power in

³³ Orijj 2000.

³⁴ Mba 1982.

³⁵ Ibid, 106.

³⁶ Ibid, 107.

³⁷ Quoted in Mba 1982, 110.

their communities.³⁸ Protests ensued since women's economic position was at stake, and because they had no formal channels to express their concerns. That very mechanism would facilitate women's protests against the oil industry half a century later.

Although oil-related pollution affected male and female farmers in the Niger Delta alike, men had better access to education and the waged-job sector and were able to migrate to urban centres to seek alternative employment. The oil industry itself is an all-male preserve; the few jobs it offers, as well as the upsurge in jobs it creates in the non-traded sector (construction or transport), are open mostly to men. Moreover, it was suggested that women in oil communities were motivated to act *because* they considered the male leadership inefficient and unreliable in communicating the community's grievances, particularly chiefs who reportedly sold communal land for their own benefit while profiting from jobs, contracts and pay-offs supplied by oil companies.³⁹ It is not surprising that women's protests against the oil industry in the Niger Delta faced the objection of the traditional male leadership in their communities, while often gaining the support of male youth organisations (who, similarly to women, faced unemployment).⁴⁰ If men benefited from the oil industry, these benefits did not extend to women in their communities; women remained economically marginalised, which served as impetus for protest. The next two testimonies illustrate the disparity that rose between men and women in oil communities:

(1) 'That time the women saw the neglect so we decided to go on demonstration, peaceful demonstration. We figured out the things that were being neglected and how they are treating women... Our Egi Women's Council wrote Obasanjo [Nigeria's President] that he is the figure head that we want reply from... women have been neglected right from the day they start the operations... Some of our demands were women should have direct contact with the oil company, that they should employ women... that they should confirm those who have jobs'.⁴¹

(2) 'It is divide and rule. Men are presently being encouraged to support Shell but we women will never agree... Shell is now using our men, our brothers, to fight us again... we cannot tolerate it'.⁴²

Thus, in the oil era as much as under colonialism, women were confronting the government as well as indigenous men in positions of power who aligned with the government. Women's response under both regimes marked the division that rose

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Oshare 1986; Ukeje 2004.

⁴⁰ Turner and Oshare 1993.

⁴¹ Mrs Odua, Leader, Egi Women's Council, March 22 2000.

⁴² Alice Douglas, Ogoniland, March 25 2000.

between Nigerian men and women in regards to a new social order, which carried a distinctive impact for each group.

5.2 Press Analysis across Nigeria's 36 States

Although there is ample anecdotal evidence on women's protests against the oil industry in the Niger Delta, quantitative data were required to determine whether women's protest activity in oil-producing states *exceeded* women's protest activity in non-oil producing states. Unlike parliamentary seats, however, protest activity does not lend itself to a straightforward quantitative assessment, particularly in Nigeria where citizens habitually take to the streets and where local police or state governments do not keep organised records of protest activity.⁴³ Since local newspapers report on protests, I based my analysis of protest activity on press reports obtained from LexisNexis, the largest and most trusted electronic database for news worldwide. Using LexisNexis, which is fed by various local and foreign media outlets reporting from Nigeria, overcomes risks of media bias – prejudice in the selection of events that are reported and how they are covered – that are typically associated with the analysis of items produced by one media source alone (indeed, local newspapers in Nigeria are typically affiliated with regional interests or a political party; for example, the Daily Times is Southern-based while the New Nigerian is associated with the North).⁴⁴

The search for and collection of press items resulted in a unique dataset on news reports published in Nigeria between January 1 2000 and March 31 2007 (corresponding to the examined period of oil production and women's legislative participation), which were systematically analysed to assess the relationship between oil, gender and protest activity across Nigeria's 36 states. Although the dataset is comprehensive, it is not considered an exhaustive list of protests that took place in Nigeria over the examined period; many protests are likely to have gone unreported. Rather, it is an inventory of *reported protests* that appeared in news articles coming out of Nigeria, which is treated as a sample of the actual (unknown) incidence of protests that took place in Nigeria over the examined period.

⁴³ Efforts to gather protest data from the Nigerian police, NGOs, the archives of national newspapers and several government agencies failed.

⁴⁴ It was noted that, 'when a national issue enters the public domain for debate, the Nigerian media often... takes a North-versus-South position on it' (Jibo 2003, 183).

5.2.1 Analysis outline

A simple search using the terms ‘Nigeria’ and ‘protest’, to appear in the headline of all English language news (including newswires, excluding non-business news) between January 1 2000 and March 31 2007, yielded 1,665 results. The vast majority of these news items were fed from Nigerian national daily newspapers, such as the Vanguard Daily, This Day, Daily Champion, P.M. News and Daily Trust, while a small minority of items were reported by foreign news agencies operating in Nigeria such as *Agence France Presse*, Associated Press, and Pan African News Agency.

These news reports were screened for irrelevant items of four types: (1) repetitions of the same protest across several news items; (2) reports on protests that would take place in the future or planned protests that have been aborted (protest is often used in Nigeria as a threat to exert political pressure); (3) reports on protests that do not include physical action, such as protest letters or petitions;⁴⁵ and, (4) reports on industrial action or sit-in strikes that did not have clear political objectives. To be included, a protest had to abide by my definition of *political activity* – motivated by an intention to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system. For example, a report on a protest by Nigeria Airline passengers over the absence of their luggage upon their arrival to Nigeria was coded as *non-political*, while traders’ storming of the State House of Assembly in Anambra State in protest ‘over the killing of a trader by a policeman’ was coded as *political*.⁴⁶

Notably, anti-oil protests were regarded categorically as *political*. Anti-oil protest activity in Nigeria is directed against, and should be understood as targeting, both the multinational oil companies and the Nigerian government simultaneously. This is due to the nature of the oil industry in Nigeria, which operates through Joint Ventures between oil companies and the government-owned NNPC.⁴⁷ Typically, NNPC holds 55 to 60 percent interest in oil production projects, making the government a *de facto* partner in the oil industry (see Table A5.1 in the Appendix for the government’s share in major oil operations). Thus, the Nigerian army routinely provides security to oil companies and tackles anti-oil protest activity. Moreover, foreign oil company officials often obtain Nigerian citizenship and become Nigerian bureaucrats, while Nigerian politicians often

⁴⁵ There was only one item that reported a protest letter by women: the NGO Women in Peace Building Network protested discrimination against women in the sitting arrangement of buses (Vanguard, July 19 2005).

⁴⁶ This Day, December 2 2002; Vanguard, September 25 2003, respectively.

⁴⁷ The NNPC was established in 1977 and replaced the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) that was established in 1971.

become the employees of oil companies, blurring the distinction between the state and oil companies.⁴⁸ Although some anti-oil protests were directed explicitly against a particular oil company and others at the local or federal government, Nigerians perceive their government and the oil companies as *partners in crime*. For example, when asked ‘who are they [the women] blaming for their hardship, the government or the oil companies?’, a female leader in the Niger Delta responded: ‘It is the oil company and the federal government that is causing our neglect not only one cause’.⁴⁹

The exclusion of irrelevant reports generated a dataset of 575 items, representing the number of reported protests with political objectives in Nigeria over the examined period (see the Data Appendix for the full dataset). I then analysed these items to extract information on their precise physical location, motivation and key participants. Under *location*, I categorised protests as either having taken place in the territory of an *oil state* (one of the nine oil-producing states), a *non-oil state* (one of the 27 non-oil producing states), the *Federal Capital Territory* Abuja (FCT, which is not a state), or *nationally* (for protests that erupted simultaneously in several locations, including oil and non-oil states). For example, a report on protests in March 2001, in which ‘thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of Nigeria’s large cities to protest prospective petrol rises’, was coded as *national*, while a protest in July 2001 by members of the Ogoni ethnic group from Delta State against Shell at the National Assembly in Abuja was coded as *FCT*, even though the protesters reportedly arrived from Delta State (raising the bar for testing the hypothesis).⁵⁰ The location of protests (either the name of the LGA, community or state in which they took place) was clearly stated in the text in all items.

Under *motivation*, I categorised protests as either *oil-related* – where clear grievances related to oil production, oil facilities, or oil revenue sharing were expressed, or *non-oil related* for all other motivations for protest. For example, a protest in September 2000 by youth from the Ijaw ethnic group in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, ‘in support for the struggle of the control of their resources as proclaimed by governors and legislators of the South-south zone’ was coded as *oil-related*.⁵¹ As noted, where oil-related protests did not take the form of a street protest by a group of individuals, but were rather expressed by state governments through official statements or performed through sit-ins, such items were removed from the analysis. For example, Ondo State’s

⁴⁸ Frynas 2001.

⁴⁹ Mrs Odua, Leader, Egi Women's Council, March 22 2000.

⁵⁰ *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, March 21 2001; *Vanguard*, July 26 2001, respectively.

⁵¹ *Post Express*, September 16 2000.

protest in August 2000 against the ‘unconstitutional deduction of five percent from 13 percent derivation payable to oil producing states’ was coded as an irrelevant item. Since such protests were frequent in oil communities, these criteria significantly raised the bar for testing the hypothesis. Motivations were typically identified in the text, or determined by demands made by protesters, statements on placards, or quotes of protest speakers.

Under *key participants*, protests were categorised as either *women-led* or *non-women led*. To be coded as *women-led* strictly required both the organisation of, and participation in, the protest to be solely or predominantly by women. Typically, these would be all-women protests clearly stated as such in the report’s title, such as ‘Unmarried women protest against monogamists in Zamfara’ or ‘Women protest as crisis rocks Benin Museum’, or otherwise stated as ‘a women’s protest’ in the text.⁵² All other items, including items in which women were mentioned as participants but were not clearly identified in organisational roles or as the majority of participants, were coded as *non-women led*. For example, the report mentioned above on the protest in Bayelsa State in September 2000 stated that ‘all activities in the state capital were grounded to a halt as everybody *including market women*... came out en masse to give their support to the youths’.⁵³ Although women took part in this protest, the item was coded as *non-women led*, as women were not described to be in organisational roles or as the majority of participants.

5.2.2 Results

Location. Of the 575 reported protests in Nigeria over the examined period, 331 took place in non-oil states (57.6 percent), 181 took place in oil states (31.5 percent), 37 took place in the FCT (6.4 percent) and 26 took place nationally (4.5 percent). Within the group of non-oil states, Lagos State – Nigeria’s commercial capital and the most populated state – is a major outlier, with 121 protests, over a third of protests in the group of non-oil states. When Lagos is excluded, the difference in the share of protests between the groups of oil and non-oil states is smaller (36.5 vs. 31.5 percent, respectively). Within the group of non-oil states, 45 protests (13.6 percent of protests in this group) were carried out in one of the nine *strictly-Muslim* states.

Motivation. Of the 575 reported protests in Nigeria over the examined period, 6.8 percent were identified as motivated directly by oil grievances. The majority of protests

⁵² Weekly Trust, November 12 2000; Daily Champion, February 21 2007, respectively.

⁵³ Post Express, September 16 2000.

in Nigeria (60 percent) were against legislation, decisions, actions or a lack of action by the state or the federal government, such as increases in fuel prices, taxation or levies; the poor state of roads in the country; corruption; increases in school fees; the demolition of houses; arbitrary arrests or extortion by the police; unemployment; the imposition of traditional rulers by state authorities; and, poor hospital facilities, among others. Other common motivations for protest included the non-payment of salaries, pensions, benefits or scholarships by the government (18.4 percent of protests), the killing of citizens by the police or an arbitrary shooting (6.8 percent of protests); and religion-related contentions, such as the implementation of *Sharia* law in mixed states which was followed by violent deadly protests (5 percent of protests). Notably, all but one oil-related protest took place in oil-producing states. Within the category of women-led protests in oil states, over a third of protests were motivated by oil-related grievances.

Key participants. Of the 575 reported protests in Nigeria over the examined period, 52 were coded as women-led (9.0 percent of all protests). Of these, 33 women-led protests took place in oil states, 17 in non-oil states, and two in the FCT (no national protest was identified as women-led), translating to a share of 18.2 percent of women-led protests out of all protests in oil states, versus a share of 5.1 percent of women-led protests out of all protests in non-oil states. Within the group of non-oil states, seven women-led protests took place in Lagos State. When Lagos is excluded from this group, the share of women's protests out of all protests in non-oil states drops to 4.8 percent. Notably, within the group of non-oil states, four out of ten women-led protests took place in *strictly-Muslim* states, representing 7.7 percent of all women-led protests and 23.5 percent of women-led protests in the group of non-oil states (40 percent of women-led protests in the group of non-oil states excluding Lagos). A two-tailed t-test confirms that the difference between the shares of women-led protests in the two groups of states is statistically significant at the 5% level ($p=0.022$).


Table 5.1 summarises these results, which are illustrated in Graphs 5.1-5.3.

Table 5.1: Reported protests in Nigeria, 1/2000-3/2007

	No. of protests	Share of all protests	No. of women-led protests	Share of women-led protests in the group
Oil states	181	31.5%	33	18.2%
Non-oil states	331	57.6%	17	5.1%
[Non-oil states excluding Lagos]	210	36.5%	10	4.8%
National	26	4.5%	0	0
FCT	37	6.4%	2	5.4%
Total	575	100%	52	-

Source: calculations based on an analysis of LexisNexis news reports published in Nigeria, 2013.

Graph 5.1: Women-led protests in oil vs. non-oil states – 1/2000-3/2007




Graph 5.2: Number of protests in Nigeria by state – 2000-2007*



Source: calculations based on an analysis of LexisNexis news reports published in Nigeria, 2013.

*Strictly-Muslim states. Oil states are marked black.

Graph 5.3: Share of women-led protests in Nigeria by state – 2000-2007 (%)*



Source: see Graph 5.2

5.2.3 Discussion

The press analysis reveals a higher number of women-led protests in the group of nine oil-producing states than in the group of 27 non-oil producing states (33 vs. 17), as well as a higher *share* of women-led protests in that group (18.2 vs. 4.7 percent, excluding Lagos), supporting the hypothesis. A bias in the selection of news reports, which could

have affected the *total* number of women-led protests in a state (for example, a newspaper's inclination to focus its reports on the South or a particular federal state), should not have affected the *share* of women-led protests in that state; if a state is over-reported, men and women's protests should be equally over-reported (or underreported). The exclusion of Lagos from the group of non-oil states is significant since all national Nigerian newspapers are located in Lagos, with an inevitable Lagos bias (21 percent of the news items reported on Lagos). When both Lagos and the FCT – Nigeria's commercial and official capitals – are excluded, oil states were responsible for producing 77 percent of women-led protests reported in Nigeria, a striking finding considering the small number of states in this group (Table A5.2 in the Appendix provides detailed information on the 52 women-led protests in the analysis).

Oil states' significant share of protests in Nigeria – nearly a third of all protests – suggests that Niger Delta men (overwhelmingly portrayed as 'youth') are also more prone to protest than their counterparts in non-oil states. Can this general propensity to protest in the Niger Delta be explained by unique regional characteristics, such as ethnic, tribal or religious affiliations? Neither religion nor ethnicity can account for the difference between oil and non-oil states: while protests in the Niger Delta have emerged from many of the region's 40-plus different ethnic groups, Christianity is practiced in *all* Southern states, both oil and non-oil producing.⁵⁴ Within the group of non-oil producing states, the share of women's protests in non *strictly-Muslim* states was not higher than their share in *strictly-Muslim* states; in fact, forty percent of women-led protests in the group of non-oil states (excluding Lagos) took place in *strictly-Muslim* states. Remarkably, Nigeria's Muslim women, too, took to the streets to express grievances related to economic deprivation. For example, in March 2005, over 400 wives of railway workers protested in Bauchi State the non-payment of their husbands' salaries, marching to the State Governor's office and urging the government to intervene.⁵⁵

Within the group of oil states, women-led protests took place across the majority of states (seven out of nine), with the share of women-led protests in each state ranging from 12 percent to 26 percent. Over a third of women-led protests (12 out of 33) were motivated directly by oil-related grievances, either in response to a specific incident or to the general negative impact of the oil industry in the region. For example, in August 2000, Ogoni women from Sakpenwa, a farming district in Rivers State, protested against an 'alleged plot by prominent Ogoni people to bring back Shell to Ogoniland "through

⁵⁴ The region boasts a much larger number of sub-tribes who speak about 250 different dialects.

⁵⁵ Vanguard, March 2 2005.

the back door”'.⁵⁶ In August 2002, ‘scores of half-naked, middle aged women’ from the Ilaje community in Ondo State arrived in 15 boats at ChevronTexacos’s Ewan oilfield, carrying ‘samples of damaged fishing nets and polluted waters, [and] accusing the oil company of ruining their livelihoods and polluting their environment’.⁵⁷ In November 2005, Ijaw women demonstrated outside ChevronTexaco’s office in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, in protest against the environmental and social impact of the company’s operations in the region, stating ‘it had brought no benefit to the area and destroyed livelihoods by polluting fishing waters’.⁵⁸

Press reports on women-led protests in the Niger Delta also reveal the emergence of a regional female frontline movement against the oil industry and women’s capacity for mobilisation and coordinated political activity at the regional level. For example, in August 2002, Vanguard reported ‘widespread consultations amongst the various women leaders in the area and [an] agreement that they should stage a week-long coordinated protest on all oil installations in the six major oil producing states of the Niger Delta’.⁵⁹ The objective of the protest was to ‘completely paralyse oil exploration activities for one week’. The report further states that ‘the leaders of the planned protest are still making contacts with the various women leaders in communities of the oil rich Niger Delta with a view to mobilising them for the showdown’. A woman leader was quoted stating under anonymity that ‘the federal government left the matter entirely to Chevron Nigeria as if it is their problem alone. Maybe, if we [women] paralyse oil exploration activities in the Niger Delta region for one full week, they will know we are serious’.⁶⁰

Thus ethnicity, religion or an outlier explanation cannot account for the differences found between oil and non-oil producing states in women’s propensity to protest; oil production is the only consistent feature that unites the group of oil-producing states, distinguishing it from the rest of Nigeria. Although only 36 percent of women-led protests in the Niger Delta were explicitly oil-related, it is likely that protests that were not explicitly oil-related (or coded here as such) were *also* motivated by sentiments of marginalisation, exploitation and injustice fuelled by oil production in the region. For example, in August 2005, women carried out a peaceful march in Port Harcourt, the capital of Rivers State, in protest of indecent dressing by girls in the city and its

⁵⁶ Vanguard, August 18 2000.

⁵⁷ UN Networks, August 16 2002.

⁵⁸ Vanguard, November 2 2005.

⁵⁹ Vanguard, August 3 2002.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

surroundings.⁶¹ Although this protest was not coded here as oil-related, the link between indecent dressing of young, impoverished girls and the presence of numerous foreign oil workers in the city is obvious (as noted, the Niger Delta boasts the highest rate of prostitution and HIV/AIDS rates in Nigeria). Similarly, a women's protest in Abia State in March 2002 against the appropriation of a stream by the local government, a common practice in the Niger Delta to facilitate oil explorations, was not coded as oil-related but is most likely to have been entirely oil-related.⁶²

The link between oil and protests in general, and between oil and women-led protests in particular, is likely to be even stronger in Nigeria than my findings suggest. The strict definition employed here for *women-led* protests has excluded numerous community protests in the Niger Delta in which women participated. For example, in January 2003, residents of Ochigba community in Rivers State, both men and women, protested in Port Harcourt against Shell's 'nonchalant attitude to an oil spillage in their area' and the contamination of their farmlands and only source of drinking water, asking for a clean-up and compensation.⁶³ In another protest in Delta State in May 2005, 13 host communities of Shell protested the abandonment of a road project by the company arguing they have been impoverished by Shell's presence on their land.⁶⁴ The news report notes that the protesters, including 'the chiefs, elders, *women groups* and youths... are mobilizing for a showdown with SPDC if the company fails to commence work on the project'. Employing a wider definition such as 'women mentioned as participants' would have pushed women's protest activity in oil states to far higher levels.

Finally, during the press analysis I observed that reports on oil-related protests in the Niger Delta were fed by foreign news agencies, unlike the majority of the news items, which were fed by local newspapers. Interestingly, the focus of some of these reports was not the protest itself, which was only indirectly mentioned, but an announcement by an oil company that it would not be able to fulfil its oil production obligations due to interruptions caused by a protest. For example, Bloomberg News published in August 2005 an announcement by Shell that 'oil production remains cut for a fourth day from a flow station in Rivers State after community groups surrounded its facilities' to protest the company's lack of compensation for an oil spill which occurred two years earlier.⁶⁵ Or, *Agence France Presse* reported Shell's announcement in January

⁶¹ Daily Trust, August 9 2005.

⁶² Vanguard, March 1 2002.

⁶³ This Day, January 28 2003.

⁶⁴ ThisDay, May 25 2005.

⁶⁵ Bloomberg News, August 20 2005.

2005 that is was ‘forced to close two flow-stations and a gas plant, shutting in about 35,000 barrels per day of crude’, due to a community protest in Abia State.⁶⁶ It is likely that many protests that have not caused interruptions to oil production have gone unreported.

The lack of local reporting on protests in the Niger Delta was explained to me by D’Arcy Doran, one of only five foreign journalists stationed in Nigeria in the early 2000s since the end of military rule in 1999 (under which foreign journalists were barred from entering the country). According to Doran, who was reporting from Nigeria on behalf of the Associated Press news agency, local journalists had ‘different ideas of news standards; since they were often unpaid for months or even years, they made a living by writing news stories they were paid to write, or not write’.⁶⁷ During Doran’s stay in Nigeria, it was found that a major oil company had been paying local journalists to cover or bury news items.⁶⁸ Doran himself witnessed a large payment being made to a local news editor by a businessman to ‘make a story go away’.⁶⁹ In July 2002, Doran noticed ‘an unusual and very small’ story at the back pages of one of the local newspapers on women’s takeover of a helicopter pad in an oil facility in the Niger Delta. Following this lead, Doran was the first foreign journalist to travel to the Niger Delta and report on a women’s protest against the oil industry.⁷⁰

Traveling from Lagos to the Niger Delta in 2002 was ‘expensive, difficult and dangerous’, explaining why local journalists refrained from accessing the region.⁷¹ The trip included a drive from Lagos to Warri, where a boat with a local driver was hired to sail through the mangrove swamps of the Niger Delta to the remote ChevronTexaco’s oil facility of Escravos, where the protest took place. As the boat approached the facility, fenced almost at the waterline to prevent people from the nearby Itsekiry village going in, Doran saw ‘women, only women, marching back and forth with signs and chanting... communicating through walkie talkies with the guys [their drivers] in the boats...’.⁷² Covering the protest for over two weeks, Doran witnessed the negotiations between women leaders and ChevronTexaco’s top executives. To his New York editor’s bewildered inquiry regarding the soldiers’ inaction towards the women, who paralysed

⁶⁶ Agence France Presse, January 25 2005.

⁶⁷ Personal interview, October 25 2013.

⁶⁸ The details of this incident were provided off the record (Personal interview, October 25 2013).

⁶⁹ Personal interview, October 25 2013.

⁷⁰ Doran has speculated that ‘it might have been a local chief who pulled the money together to get the story out’ (Personal interview, October 25 2013).

⁷¹ Personal interview, October 25 2013.

⁷² Ibid.

oil production in one of Nigeria's largest oil facilities for ten days, he responded that 'their power was in their ability to inflict terror on the oil company, who feared a PR disaster in the form of dead village women over their facility'. A local political analyst similarly commented that, 'The government... was only too aware of the political consequences of attacking unarmed women with the whole world watching'.⁷³

The 'very small' story Doran followed consequently featured on the front pages of the Independent, the Guardian, the Washington Post, and numerous newspapers and magazines worldwide, drawing global attention to women's protests in the Niger Delta (images of the protest are in the chapter's Appendix).


5.3 Case Studies of Oil and Non-Oil States

To further explore the chain of causation that underlies the link between oil and women's protests, I complement the quantitative analysis presented above with a case study investigation of two Southern Nigerian states: oil-producing Delta State and non-oil producing Ogun State (see Map 5.1). Juxtaposing two states that share important characteristics – geographical proximity, rich agricultural resources that provide livelihoods for the rural population, and a populace that largely follows Christianity – but differ on the independent variable (oil production), allowed tracing the process that is hypothesised to lead women in oil states to protest.⁷⁴ Both states are also ethnically diverse: Ogun State consists of sub-groups of the Yoruba ethnic group, while Delta State consists mainly of the Anioma, Urhobo, Isoko, Ijaw and Itsekiri ethnic groups and sub-groups (notably, no two Nigerian states that differ on the independent variable share a similar ethnic composition). Through the examination of geological surveys, oil companies' reports, press articles, and women's testimonies, this section reveals the differences between oil and non-oil communities, which have facilitated women's protests.

⁷³ Isioma 2002.

⁷⁴ Case studies were chosen according to principles set in Gerring 2004 and Lieberman 2005.

Map 5.1: Delta and Ogun states, Nigeria



Source: Nigeria's High Commission, London 2012.

5.3.1 Delta State

Created in 1991 out of the former Bendel State (historically an integral part of Nigeria's Western region), Delta State was ranked second from top on the *Oil Revenue Per Capita* variable (see Section 4.1.3). The government's website reports that the state supplies about 35 percent of Nigeria's crude oil and a considerable amount of natural gas (other mineral deposits include industrial clay, silica, lignite, kaolin, tar sand and limestone).⁷⁵ Located in the Southwest of the Niger Delta, the state's main port city, Warri, is one of Africa's largest oil export terminals, hosting major oil facilities including Nigeria's largest refinery and a petrochemical plant. The state is also rich in agricultural resources, which have provided livelihoods for the vast majority of the state's rural population before oil production commenced, producing food crops such as rice, yam, cassava, fruits and vegetables, as well as industrial crops such as rubber (the state's leading export crop), oil palm and palm kernel.⁷⁶ Despite these vast resources, women's work in Delta State was exceptionally low within the group of oil-producing states (see Section 3.2.1): *FLFP* rate in the state was 19.9 percent in 2007 (compared to the group's average of 39.9 percent), its *share of female farmers* was lower than the group's average (43 percent, compared with 49.3 percent), and its *female unemployment* rate was 5.8 percent (close to the group's average of six percent).

In the earlier press analysis, Delta State was responsible for producing 36 percent of women-led protests in the Niger Delta (12 out of 33) during the examined period, of which 67 percent (eight protests) were coded as motivated by oil grievances. Notably, thirteen of the 25 Local Government Areas in the state are oil-producing, while the port

⁷⁵ DTIDP 2013.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

city of Warri is connected to major oil fields across the Niger Delta. Considering that oil pollution travels for miles from its point of origin and the army's pervasive presence around oil facilities, it can be assumed the entire state has been affected by oil production. Indeed, the first documented anti-oil women's protest in the Niger Delta took place in Delta State in 1984. Since then, women-led protests in the state have been common, specifically against pollution and militarisation; in October 2013, for example, about a hundred women from the Kokori ethnic group, one of the many groups and sub-groups that inhabit the state, marched half-naked to protest the army's takeover of their town following the arrest of a local militant.⁷⁷ In what follows, I analyse the backdrop of the 1984 protest in detail, and then examine the wave of protests in the state during the early 2000s.

The 1984 Ogharefe protest. Ogharefe is a small rural community of several thousand people, located northeast of the port city of Warri.⁷⁸ A search in the archive of the Oil and Gas Journal revealed that in the early 1970s, when oil-related development in the Niger Delta was accelerating, the federal government transferred a territory of 250,000 acres that spread between Warri and Benin City (to the North) to several oil companies through concessions – oil prospecting licenses and oil mining leases – for the exploration and production of oil.⁷⁹ The Ogharefe oil field, which covers a small terrain of approximately 8.1 square kilometres, lies within this territory.⁸⁰ Since 1973, when oil exploration in the field began, over 47 oil wells have been drilled in the small field at depths of between 9000 and 12,000 feet.⁸¹ Crude oil production in the Ogharefe field commenced in 1976 and an oil flow station was constructed, adjacent to the homes and running over the farmland of the Ogharefe community. Given this evidence, it can be established that allegations by the Ogharefe community that its lands 'have been swallowed up by oil operations' are thoroughly accurate.⁸²

The Ogharefe field is operated by Pan Ocean Oil Corporation, a small company previously owned by an American group and currently under Nigerian ownership, in Joint Venture with the government's NNPC (the latter owns 60 percent of shares).⁸³ On

⁷⁷ Thewill 2013.

⁷⁸ In Ethiope West LGA of the former Bendel State.

⁷⁹ OGJ 1991.

⁸⁰ Journal of Petroleum Technology 1984.

⁸¹ OGJ 1991.

⁸² UrhoboNation 2012.

⁸³ In 1998 the company came under Nigerian management, which became owner following a shares transfer. It is the only Nigerian company to work alongside the NNPC in a JV (This Day, May 3 2004).

the company's website, it is stated that crude oil production in the field soared from 4,000 b/d in 1976 to 42,000 b/d in 2012 and that Pan Ocean has 'persistently continued its drilling campaign in the Niger Delta'.⁸⁴ This drilling campaign has included the alienation of land for exploration and production purposes and the installation of hundreds of miles of pipelines through farmland and homes to connect the Ogharefe flow station with the oil refinery in nearby Ekpan and with the Warri port. In a report commissioned in 2005 by Pan Ocean, it is bluntly stated that for 24 years, between 1976 and 2010, virtually *all gas* associated to crude oil in the Ogharefe field has been flared (see Section 3.2.2 on the devastating effects of flaring on host communities). In 2010, the Pan Ocean Gas Utilization Project was established to process associated gas in the field and 'avoid the emission of 26.3 million tonnes of CO₂ into the atmosphere'.⁸⁵

The Ogharefe village is the headquarters of the Oghara Kingdom, one of the 22 clans of the Urhobo tribe – the fifth largest ethnic group in Nigeria and the largest ethnic group in Delta State (see Map 5.2). In the tribe's traditional system, community members are categorised into age grades, with important implications for their social position and labour allocation.⁸⁶ Men are categorised into four grades: *Ekpako*, *Ivwragha*, *Otuorere* and *Imitete*, according to their age, life achievements and contributions to the community. Women are categorised into three age grades: *Ekwokweya*, *Evweya*, and *Emete*, based on childbearing status. The elderly men and women (*Ekpako* and *Ekwokweya*) assist in the day-to-day administration of the clan and serve as custodians of the Urhobo culture. The children (*Imitete* and *Emete*) clean and sweep the streets, run errands and perform domestic duties. Men of working age (*Otuorere*) perform heavy duties such as bush clearing, the building of shrines, construction and burial works, while the *Ivwragha* men are warriors. Women of working age (*Evweya*) are farmers and traders, responsible for the production of food crops for consumption and trade.

⁸⁴ PO 2012.

⁸⁵ DNV 2005, 5. Ovade-Ogharefe gas capturing and processing plant started operating in October 2010 (Daily Trust, October 27 2010).

⁸⁶ UrhoboNation 2012. The Oghara Kingdom is made up of two sub-clans, the Oghareki and the Ogharefe, who are traditionally ruled jointly on a rotational basis by an *Ovie* (king), who is assisted by a council of chiefs and titled officers.

Map 5.2: Urhoboland, Delta State



Source: Urhobo Historical Society, 2012.

This gender-based labour allocation confirms that agriculture production in Ogharefe (as in other parts of the Niger Delta) has been carried out predominantly by the community's women. During the colonial period, the production of palm oil and palm kernel from oil palm trees, which are native to the land, as well as rubber and cocoa, was encouraged by the administration and pursued by local women.⁸⁷ Women have been cultivating food crops such as cassava, the community's primary food, yam, sweet potato, plantain, banana and cocoyam, and exchanging surpluses of food crops for money and other products in local markets. When oil operations began over their lands in the early 1970s, women farmers and traders were placed under tremendous pressure.⁸⁸ The loss of farmland by the community affected women the most, as the fields on which they farmed were either confiscated or polluted by gas flaring and oil spills, without compensation. Furthermore, heavy oil-related industrialisation was taking place in nearby Warri and its surroundings, including the construction of mega complexes in the late 1970s such as the Delta Steel Company at Ovwian-Aladja and the refinery and petrochemicals plant at Ekpan, occupying large tracts of land and attracting male labour.

Indeed, men responded to intensifying industrialisation and urbanisation of the Warri area by migrating *en masse* to urban centres to take up construction jobs, leaving

⁸⁷ Ohwobetehe 2012.

⁸⁸ Turner and Oshare 1993

women behind with extra responsibilities.⁸⁹ Non-indigenous men were also migrating to Warri for work, leading to a rapid male urban population growth. Young women who migrated to Warri or other urban centres in the Niger Delta (such as Benin City or Port Harcourt) hoping to find employment during the 1980s and 1990s were largely forced to turn to the informal sector. Thus, the delicate traditional division of labour in local communities surrounding Warri has been destroyed and the livelihoods and economic independence of women greatly diminished. Across the Urhobo tribe, entire families migrated to urban areas or other rural areas of Urhobo villages in Western Nigeria in which no oil was produced, where as experienced farmers they formed the backbone of agriculture production.⁹⁰ Thousands of others migrated to North America, where they formed the largest expat community of Urhobo origin.⁹¹ However, before migration took place, Ogharefe women rose in protest as early as 1984.

In June that year, the entire womenfolk of Ogharefe, including several thousand women of all ages, laid siege to Pan Ocean's production station in a highly organised operation.⁹² They arrived at the production station at dawn and blocked all access roads, preventing the morning shift workers from entering the site and holding hostage the night shift workers, bringing oil production to a standstill. The women demanded compensation for land appropriation, pollution damage, and the provision of clean water and electricity to the community. When the company's Managing Director and his team offered to arrive at the production station from their offices in Warri and Lagos to negotiate, the women threatened to remove their clothes if their demands were not instantly met. They executed their threat when the management team arrived at the scene: the entire crowd of women stripped naked to inflict the *curse of nakedness* on company workers and other male spectators. Women's demands were then met promptly: compensation was paid to the community for lost farmland, water and electricity were promised to be provided, and small amounts of unknown figures were paid for pollution damages.

The process that preceded the Ogharefe women's protest – land alienation, pollution, and the loss of livelihoods caused by oil operations – was repeated in numerous communities across Delta State (and the Niger Delta) during the rest of the 1980s and 1990s. By 2002, oil-producing communities had been hosting oil facilities for

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ UrhoboNation 2012.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Turner and Oshare 1993.

nearly half a century, with environmental degradation, poverty and devastation so acute as to shatter hopes for change. However, women's protest activity continued in full vigour: in the summer of 2002, several major protests by women of various ethnic groups took place in Delta State. While women's protests in the 1980s and 1990s went unreported, Nigeria's transition to democracy in 1999 facilitated foreign news coverage of the 2002 wave of women's protests in Delta State and their gaining of international attention. This was, perhaps, the key difference between earlier protests which took place under military rule and more recent protests; democracy did not alter either the circumstances that led women to protest or their resort to non-formal political activity.

The 2000s protests. The wave of protests in 2002 began in June that year, when women from several Itsekiri communities sent a protest letter to ChevronTexaco demanding better living conditions and employment for their youth.⁹³ Infuriated by the lack of response, about 150 women from six communities marched on July 6, armed with cooking pots, to take over the company's export facility Escravos, one of the largest in Nigeria. After seizing a boat at the terminal used to shuttle staff to and from the island, they divided into groups to occupy the airstrip, helicopter pad, oil storage area and the docks, freezing movement and trapping more than 700 Nigerian and expatriate employees in the facility. The women's motivation was stated during the protest by a spokeswoman: 'Before Chevron came to this land many years ago, we... used to kill fish and crayfish...in the creeks. Today, many children are useless in the town because we have no money to educate them'.⁹⁴ At the end of an 11-day occupation, in which oil production was severely disrupted, the women reached an agreement with ChevronTexaco's top executive, according to which 25 *women* were to be offered jobs and their communities provided with schools, clean water and electricity.⁹⁵

This protest was followed by two other major protests in July 2002. The first was a copycat protest, staged by over 2,000 Ijaw women over the same facility in Escravos (a day after its evacuation) as well as four other ChevronTexaco-operated flow stations for ten days.⁹⁶ The women turned away a company's delegation whose members were not 'high-ranking' enough, trapped hundreds of Nigerian and expatriate workers, and briefly held two men hostage after company officials met without their consent with the

⁹³ Vanguard, June 27 2002.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 18 2002.

⁹⁶ Vanguard, June 27 2002.

community's male traditional leaders, in what the protesters believed to be an 'attempt to bypass them'.⁹⁷ In an agreement signed by five women representatives, the company promised the resuscitation of oil-ruined fish and poultry farms and jobs for community members. The second protest in July took place soon after in Ekpan, near Warri, where over a thousand women marched in heavy rains to seal up ChevronTexaco's operational base, barricading the gates, in demand of jobs. This protest followed an ultimatum the women issued a week earlier, threatening to storm the base if the company failed to meet a set of demands, including the provision of jobs to community members.⁹⁸

In August that year, another protest took place in front of the administrative headquarters of Shell in Warri, which began peacefully but deteriorated into violence when anti-riot police were called in to disperse the women using teargas and clubs, causing injuries which led a group of 4,000 women to hand a ten-day ultimatum to Shell to pay their hospital bills.⁹⁹ Unlike previous protests, which were initiated by rural women of various ethnic origins, this protest also drew from the ranks of urban women and cut across ethnic groups (women drew largely from the Ijaws, Itsekiris, and Urhobos ethnic groups). While in earlier protests, women demanded the provision of basic amenities such as portable water and electricity, the rehabilitation of community land and fishponds, as well as employment opportunities lost due to oil operations on their land, in the 2000s women expressed far greater despair and pleaded for oil operations to be terminated. For example, a local woman leader provided the following response to an interviewer's question regarding women's motivations to protest:

'Most women in the Niger Delta are now prostitute. Their means of subsistence have been destroyed by the oil spillage. Our men are now armed robbers. We cannot have a sound sleep as ever before. Arms and ammunition are proliferated in this area. The evil of neglect on the part of government and oil companies is staring us in face. Raping of old and young women by the soldiers that were sent on peace keeping has become a common phenomenon'.¹⁰⁰

5.3.2 Ogun State

Created in 1976, Ogun State borders oil-producing Ondo State to the East, non-oil producing Lagos State to the South, and non-oil producing states Oyo and Osun to the North. Although the state does not produce oil, it is rich in other minerals, such as limestone, phosphate, granite stone, bauxite, bitumen and glass sand.¹⁰¹ Ogun is both a

⁹⁷ AP, July 22 2002.

⁹⁸ This Day, July 31 2002.

⁹⁹ Turner and Brownhill 2003.

¹⁰⁰ Quoted in Olankunle 2010, 145.

¹⁰¹ Ogunstate 2013.

religious centre, with various Christian churches having their seats in the state, and an education centre, with nine registered universities, the highest number of universities in any one Nigerian state.¹⁰² This, as well as the absence of oil operations in the state, might be linked to women's higher labour force participation in the state compared with Delta State: Ogun's *FLFP* rate in 2007 was just under the national average at 31.5 percent (compared with Delta State's 19.9 percent), its *share of female farmers* was relatively low at 26.2 percent (compared with Delta State's 43 percent), and its unemployment rate was 3.3 percent (compared with Delta State's 5.8 percent). Ogun State's rates are similar to those of other non-oil producing states in the South (see Section 3.2.1).

Women-led protest activity in Ogun State, as well as protest activity in the state in general, has been quantitatively and qualitatively different from protest activity in Delta State (and the rest of the Niger Delta). First, it was far less frequent and consisted of a smaller share of protests: in the earlier press analysis (Section 5.2), two out of 11 protests that took place in the state between 2000 and 2007 (18 percent of all protests in the state) were coded as women-led (in Delta, 12 out of 54 protests were coded as women-led). Second, protests in the state were motivated by different reasons: in both women-led protests in the state, women attempted to influence formal political processes that had no connection to the oil industry. In August 2005, women of the Egba ethnic group protested the selection of a traditional leader, a retired army colonel, by their kingmakers, marching through major streets in the state's capital Abeokuta, calling the state government to organise another selection exercise and distributing leaflets which stated that 'the people of Egbaland should wake up'.¹⁰³ In March 2007, women protested in the state capital the disqualification of Nigeria's Vice President, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, from contesting in the presidential elections by the Independent National Electoral Commission, carrying placards that read 'Nigerians say no to autocracy, dictatorship, abuse of law' and calling for the President to put in place democratic institutions.¹⁰⁴

In August 2013, another women-led protest took place in Ogun State in an attempt to influence formal political processes: hundreds of women protested in the state capital against the early marriage of girls, following a rumour that the Senate was to introduce an early marriage bill. The women, who drew from various women's groups, religious groups, and civil society groups across the state, staged a coordinated protest at

¹⁰² Olatokun and Ayanbode 2008.

¹⁰³ This Day, August 9 2005.

¹⁰⁴ This Day, March 22 2007.

the secretariat of the Nigerian Union of Journalists, carrying placards with the following inscriptions: ‘Give us education, not marriage’; ‘Child marriage is barbaric, no to it’; ‘Woe to husbands of underage, they are evil’; and ‘Ogun children, reject child marriage’.¹⁰⁵ Addressing journalists, the *Ayadole* (traditional female leader), Chief Alaba Lawson, condemned the bill and wondered why the lawmakers were not ‘focusing their attention on the alleviation of poverty in the country’. She also called on Nigerians to ‘vote wisely during the next elections and shun their N500’ (referring to corruption). Another woman leader stated: ‘If you allow those [female] children to be married at age of 13, what will be the gain of the women?’¹⁰⁶ In this protest, too, neither oil nor the issue of women’s livelihoods were brought to the fore.

Indeed, none of the other nine protests in the database, which were not coded as *women-led* but reportedly included women participants in some of the protests, was related to oil agitations or the loss of livelihoods by community members, men or women. These included the following protests: a civil servants’ protest against the non-payment of salaries in October 2000; a students’ protest following the death of a colleague in December 2002; a protest by aspirants during the People’s Democratic Party primaries in July 2002; a protest by youth against the killing of a young man, setting a palace on fire in March 2003 (most likely, an all-male protest); a students’ protest following a three-month blackout in their town in October 2004; a protest by locals following the physical assault of a female State Senator by a fellow (male) politician in October 2004; a protest by Igbo traders following their alleged harassment by ‘area boys’ (organised gangs) in August 2005; a residents’ protest following a power outage in May 2006; and, a protest against the appointment of a traditional leader in April 2006. While oil did not motivate any of these protests, in Delta State ten out of 42 *non* women-led protests were coded as motivated by and directed against the oil industry.

If we turn to look at legislative participation, Ogun’s women were also ranked *behind* their Delta State counterparts. Between 1999 and 2007, the state sent two women to Senate (22.2 percent of seats) and *no* women to the House of Representatives, while Delta State sent one woman to Senate (11.1 percent of seats) and six women to the House of Representatives (20 percent of seats). In the State House of Assembly, women occupied 3.8 percent of seats in Ogun State (three women) compared with eight percent of seats in Delta State (seven women). Although the difference is not great, it is consistent across the three sets of elections (between 1999 and 2007) as well as with the

¹⁰⁵ Olatunji 2013a.

¹⁰⁶ Olatunji 2013b.

general finding regarding differences between oil and non-oil producing states in the Nigerian federation (see Section 4.2.3). Combined with the data on women's protests, this portrays an overall picture of greater political activity by women in Delta State than in Ogun State. The difference is not only numerical; while a great number of women-led (and other) protests in Delta State have focused on oil-related grievances and the loss of livelihoods, women in Ogun State had no such motivations.

5.3.3 Discussion

The difference in women's political participation between the two states cannot be explained by Islamic ideology: the vast majority of the population in both states (over 90 percent of their populations) follows Christianity. It can neither be explained by ethnic origin: while Delta State is composed of various ethnic groups from which women-led protests have arisen, the Yoruba ethnic group, which dominates Ogun State, consists of numerous sub-groups (who speak over 60 different dialects of the Yoruba language). Women of the Yoruba tribe have been traditionally respected as rulers under the dual-sex political system and have remained active in the traditional political system, which operates in Nigeria alongside the formal political system. The Yoruba's traditional female leader or chief, the *Iyalode*, commands considerable authority in her community and remains the supervisor of trade in local markets.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, Ogun State is an education centre, which arguably should contribute to more liberal attitudes in the state. Thus, the difference that consistently accounts for women's different degrees of political engagement, particularly protest activity, is oil operations. In Delta State, women were motivated to protest against the oil industry since they had been subjected to its direct negative impact, while in Ogun State, they were not.

In a 2012 study of women's (formal) political participation in Ogun and Lagos, in which 346 women were surveyed, respondents were asked to rank 15 factors that inhibit their political participation. The factors ranked highest by women were, from top to bottom: lack of adequate education, lack of financial resources, and patriarchal culture. The three factors ranked lowest were the military legacy of women's alienation from governance, the colonial legacy of women's alienation from governance, and women's natural lack of interest in politics – which was ranked *last out of 15 factors*.¹⁰⁸ Undoubtedly, women's exclusion from the formal political process in Ogun State, like elsewhere in Nigeria, derives largely from the lack of educational and financial resources

¹⁰⁷ Uchendu 1993.

¹⁰⁸ Samuel and Segun 2012.

at their disposal (a finding that is consistent with the theoretical assertion made in Chapter 2, which links resources with formal political activity). However, while patriarchal culture is likely to be similar across the two South Nigerian states, Ogun's women enjoy a higher labour force participation rate and higher access to education. These factors should have contributed to the accumulation of resources, resulting in *higher*, not lower, rates of political participation (both formal and non-formal). That it did not achieve this result further strengthens the findings made in the previous section: oil production exacerbates women's protest activity in oil-producing communities.

Conclusion

This chapter presented evidence for significant sub-national differences in women's protest activity between oil-producing and non-oil producing states in Nigeria, supporting *H5*. Both the number and the share of women-led protests were significantly higher in oil-producing states over the examined period. The chapter also provided support for my theory on the link between women's jeopardised financial independence and their non-formal political reaction; both in the 1920s under colonialism, and half a century later under the oil regime, Nigerian women responded to infringements on their economic status and financial resources in a similar manner – through protest. Women's protests in both periods demonstrated capacity for coordinated political action when women's financial autonomy was compromised. Indeed, in a book from 1937, C.K. Meek commented that the 1929 Women's War was 'a manifestation of sex solidarity and political power which women can exercise when they chose to do so', an observation which holds true regarding women's anti-oil protest activity.¹⁰⁹

Women's protests did not achieve all of their objectives or a real change on the ground; in February 2005, a group of 200 women and youth from the Ugborodo community in Warri, Delta State, invaded ChevronTexaco's Escravos oil terminal again, following the breakdown of negotiations between community leaders and the oil company over community development and employment issues.¹¹⁰ The unarmed protesters where this time met with live fire from a Joint Military Task Force that killed about ten people (their gender unknown). A spokesperson for the community explained that the reason for the protest was the company's refusal to implement the agreement reached with the community's women following the 2002 protest.¹¹¹ However, the

¹⁰⁹ Meek 1937, 201.

¹¹⁰ World Market Research Centre, February 7 2005.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

success of women's protests should not be gauged by the achievement of their immediate goals, but by their capacity to provide local women with a political channel through which they were able to express grievances, attracting massive international attention both to women's plight in the Niger Delta and to the devastatingly harmful impact of oil operations on host communities. To further test *H5*, I turn to examine the impact of oil production on another non-formal political activity in the next chapter.

Appendix 5**Table A5.1: Government's share in major oil production facilities in Nigeria**

Production fields	Operator	Other partners	NNPC	Production (b/d estimated 2003)
Bonny/Eastern Division: Nembe, Cawthorn Channel, Ekulama, Imo River, Kolo Creek, Adibawa & Etelebou Forcados/Western Division: Forcados Yorki, Jones Creek, Olomoro, Otumara, Sapele, Egwa & Odidi	Shell (30%)	TotalFinaElf (10%) Agip (5%)	55%	950,000
Edop, Ubit, Oso, Unam& Asasa	ExxonMobil (40%)	None	60%	500,000
Meren, Okan, Benin River, Delta/Delta South, Inda, Meji & Robertkiri Funiwa, Middleton, North Apoi, Pennington & Sengana	ChevronTexaco (40%)	None	60%	485,000
Obama, Obiafu, M'Bede, Abgara&Oshi	Agip (20%)	Phillips (20%)	60%	150,000
Obagi, Aghigo, Okpoko, Upomami, Afia & Obodo-Jatumi	TotalFinaElf (40%)	None	60%	150,000

Source: US Energy Information Administration, 2003.

Table A5.2: Women-led protests in the dataset – 1/2000-3/2007

No.	State	Motivation for protest	Source	Date of report
OIL STATES				
1	Rivers	Ogoni women protest alleged plot to bring back Shell to Ogoniland 'through the back door'	Vanguard	2000 Aug 18
2	Abia	Women (and some youth) protest the abduction of a member of the State House of Assembly	This Day	2001 Oct 26
3	Ondo	Hundreds of mothers ('mostly') protest prolonged closure of Ondo College of Education	The Guardian	2001 Jul 26
4	Edo	Thousands of women protest deplorable state of roads in Akoko-Edo, storming LG secretariat	This Day	2001 Jul 13
5	Ondo	Scores of half-naked, middle-aged women from the Ilaje community take over ChevronTexaco's Ewan oil field, accusing the company of ruining their livelihoods and polluting their environment	UN Integrated Regional Information Networks	2002 Aug 16
6	Delta	Over a thousand Ekpan women take over ChevronTexaco's operational base near Warri, demanding jobs and assistance to community	This Day	2002 Jul 31
7	Delta	2,000 Women protest the results of the People's Democratic Party council primaries in the state	This Day	2002 Jul 25
8	Delta	Ugborodo women take over ChevronTexaco's Escravos (between 8-16 July) in protest against oil operations, demanding jobs and compensation	Deutsche Presse-Agentur	2002 Jul 18
9	Delta	Hundreds of Ijaw women take over ChevronTexaco's Escravos oil terminal, in protest of the oil industry's neglect of host communities	Associated Press	2002 Jul 22
10	Abia	Hundreds of women protest the appropriation of stream, their only water supply, by the LG	Vanguard	2002 Mar 1
11	Delta	Ijaw women aged 10-70 protest federal government's neglect of area, block river to prevent naval boats passing through	This Day	2003 Jan 24
12	Imo	3000 Obinze women protest the detention of a traditional leader by the police	Vanguard	2003 Jan 8
13	Abia	Female nurses dressed in black protest over poor	This Day	2004 Oct 29

		hospital facilities, storm State House of Assembly		
14	Delta	Women protest the displacement of a community due to military operations	This Day	2004 Jun 17
15	Edo	Women traders stormed the HQ of LGA in protest of chairman's plan to destabilise market	Daily Champion	2004 Jun 17
16	Edo	Market women (and some students) protest deplorable condition of the Ugbowo-Lagos road	Vanguard	2005 Dec 5
17	Bayelsa	Hundreds of women from all LGs in the state protest against corrupt State Governor's return	BBC Monitoring	2005 Nov 30
18	Bayelsa	Ijaw women protest outside Chevron's office in Yenagoa against environmental and social impact of oil operations in the region	World Market Research Centre	2005 Nov 2
19	Abia	Women traders protest demolition of market stalls that have been bought by the police	Vanguard	2005 Sep 13
20	Rivers	50 Christian women protest indecent dressing by girls in Port Harcourt, campaigning against nudity	Daily Trust	2005 Aug 9
21	Delta	Urhobo women (and some youth) protest the North's refusal to support the South-south's demand for 50% derivation	Vanguard	2005 Jul 7
22	Bayelsa	2,000 Ijaw women protest their exclusion from the nominees list for the 24 new local government councils in the state	This Day	2005 Jun 8
23	Edo	Female students protest rape of eight students by armed men at College for Health Education	Vanguard	2005 Mar 3
24	Delta	Ughorodo women (and some youth) invaded (on Feb 4) Escravos following the breakdown of negotiations between community leaders and the oil company over development and jobs	World Market Research Centre	2005 Feb 7
25	Rivers	Village women (& children) from Kula community shut down Shell's oil flow stations protesting no local benefits and jobs	Platts Oilgram Price Report	2005 Jan 13
26	Abia	Hundreds of women storm State House of Assembly protesting the poor state of roads	This Day	2005 Jan 3
27	Delta	Women Organisation for Gender Issues protest non-passage of widows rights bill by State HoA	This Day	2006 Sep 10
28	Delta	Women (and some youth) protest non-execution of development projects by the state government	Vanguard	2006 Jul 5
29	Delta	Women residents protest government's demand for payment to repair power transformer	Vanguard	2006 Apr 12
30	Delta	Thousands of Ughelli women protest nude the arrest of members of the Ughelli Vigilance Group	Vanguard	2006 Feb 7
31	Imo	Women loyal to Action Congress party protest in support for 'the rule of law' in the country	Vanguard	2007 Mar 20
32	Edo	Hundreds of women protest over victimisation of women at the Benin Museum	Daily Champion	2007 Feb 21
33	Edo	Market women in Owan East LG protest against the suspension of LG chairman by State HoA	Daily Champion	2007 Jan 16
NON-OIL STATES				
1	Zamfara	Divorcees & widows in Bungudu LGA protest against the rising trend of monogamy in the state	Weekly Trust	2000 Nov 12
2	Zamfara	Divorcees & widows in Gusau protest 'harassment by Islamic law enforcement agents'	Agence France Presse	2000 Nov 5
3	Lagos	Women protest the removal of (the only) female councillor, barricading the Apapa LG secretariat	This Day	2000 Jul 25
4	Lagos	Christian women groups in the state march in protest against legalisation of abortion	Vanguard	2001 Feb 13
5	Kano	Muslim women (and youth) protest Israel's hostility to Palestinians and take over a Mosque	This Day	2001 Jan 13
6	Lagos	'Mothers in Nigeria' protest killings of children by the police; stormed the State Governor's office	P.M News	2002 Jul 4

7	Lagos	Women storm the House of Assembly protesting the exclusion of a woman from the cabinet's list	P.M News	2003 Jun
8	Anambra	3,000 women protest presidential election results and conduct of the Electoral Commission	This Day	2003 Apr 23
9	Lagos	Naked women (and youth) protest a mechanic's killing by a policeman, besieging police station	Daily Trust	2003 Jan 20
10	Lagos	'Concerned mothers of Nigeria' protest against bad governance in the country, tear-gassed	BBC Monitoring	2005 Dec 18
11	Ogun	Egba women protest selection of traditional leader (retired army colonel) by the kingmakers	This Day	2005 Aug 9
12	Ebonyi	Thousands of women protest maltreatment of widows in the state, march to State HoA	This Day	2005 Jun 5
13	Bauchi	Distressed wives of railway workers protest non-payment of salaries for husbands	Vanguard	2005 Mar 2
14	Lagos	PDP women leaders protest in warning to not impose a party leader on them	This Day	2006 Dec 13
15	Anambra	Hundreds of women from Oyi LG protest detention of community leaders, storm court	Vanguard	2006 Aug 9
16	Anambra	Hundreds of women protest nude for 'choosing their leaders for them' by the state government	This Day	2006 Jan 14
17	Ogun	'Women's Forum' protest disqualification of vice president from presidency	This Day	2007 Mar 22
FCT				
1	FCT	Hundreds of women demand the release of 162 women detained on their way to carry a protest	Daily Champion	2005 Oct 20
2	FCT	International Federation of Women Lawyers protest-march against rape in the country	Vanguard	2006 Nov 22

Source: LexisNexis 2013.

Women's protest in Escravos, Delta State, Nigeria, July 2002

Chapter 6

OIL-INDUCED NGO ACTIVITY

In 2006, Shell lost its license to operate in Ogoniland, a 404 square-mile territory in Rivers State. On Shell's website, it is stated that 'SPDC withdrew from Ogoniland in 1993 to protect its staff' and that 'no oil has been produced in the area since then'.¹ Shell's unusual evacuation from an oil-rich territory was facilitated by a mass demonstration in January 1993 of about 300,000 Ogoni people, who protested four decades of devastation of their land by oil operations; oil was first struck in Ogoniland in 1958, and in 2011 the UNEP declared it one of the world's most oil-polluted lands.² It was reported that between 1976 and 1991, oil spills in Ogoniland alone accounted for about 40 percent of Shell's total oil spills *worldwide*.³ But Shell's recklessness in Ogoniland extended beyond environmental degradation; in 2009, Shell was taken to court in New York for its alleged complicity in the 1995 execution of Ogoni activist Ken Saro Wiwa and eight Ogoni leaders, resulting in a \$15.5 million settlement paid to the Ogoni population.⁴ Shell's departure from Ogoniland in 1993 was accompanied by raids of special military units on Ogoni communities, characterised by 'extrajudicial executions, indiscriminate shooting, arbitrary arrests and detention, floggings, rapes, looting, and extortion'.⁵ Ogoni villages were razed to the ground, thousands were killed or displaced, and rape was used as a tool of punishment and intimidation.

Following these events, the Federation of Ogoni Women's Associations (FOWA) was founded in 1995 along with eight other groups that together make up the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People. FOWA's objectives and activities are intrinsically linked to the oil-related events that facilitated its establishment: the organisation aims for 'cultural survival and environmental justice', and its activities focus on protest, assistance to refugees, rebuilding destroyed homes and villages, providing moral support, and educating women.⁶ In April 1997, the organisation published the following declaration: 'It is resolved that Shell cannot and must not be allowed in Ogoni. We say no to Shell as it remains *persona non grata* in Ogoni'.⁷ This statement and five other similar resolutions were signed or thumb printed by over 300 women leaders. Since its

¹ Shell 2013. Shell lost its licence due to absence of activity in the area for over a decade.

² UNEP 2011.

³ Cayford 1996.

⁴ Shell 2013.

⁵ HRW 1995.

⁶ Personal correspondence with Legborsi Saro Pyagbara, MOSOP President, April 30 2013.


⁷ HRW 1995.

inception, FOWA has grown to include 126 branches – one in every Ogoni village, and has international offices in the US and Canada. It is the strongest Ogoni organisation and has been recognised as one of the most effective women's groups in Africa.⁸ It was noted that FOWA's success in keeping Shell out of Ogoniland 'was not only rooted in its commitment to organising the protests against oil exploitation, but [also] in its commitment to strengthening cultural practices and increasing *the political role of Ogoni women at the village level*'.⁹

FOWA is one of many women's organisations in the Niger Delta that emerged in response to oil production. Although women's groups in the region preceded the oil era, I suggest oil has led to the proliferation of these groups and significantly altered the patterns and goals of existing local women's groups. Testing *H5* on the relationship between oil and women's non-formal political participation, this chapter assesses whether women's NGO activity in oil states has been higher than women's NGO activity in non-oil states, and explores the mechanisms that underlie this relationship. Mirroring Chapter 5, this chapter is based on a mixed-methods approach and is structured in three parts. The first section provides a historical overview of women's associational activity in Nigeria under colonialism and in response to oil, and explores the disparity between men and women's NGO activity. In the second section, I analyse a unique dataset of Nigerian NGOs, mapping their membership and distribution across Nigeria. I then investigate two women's organisations that operate in oil-producing Delta State and non-oil producing Kaduna State. Following a broad definition of NGOs as non-profit organisations within the larger body of civil society, formed by ordinary citizens and acting outside the realm of government or political institutions, the chapter presents strong evidence in support of *H5*.

⁸ Barikor-Wiwa 1997.

⁹ Ibid.



'...The cause of justice has given birth to the Niger Delta Women's Movement for Peace and Development... The women's meeting started at a friend's backyard in Ajegunle, Lagos and at the close of meeting, there was a heavy down pour, and the flood was much, dirty dark looking water flowing with dustbins. We managed to get out by holding our shoes in our hands and deepening our legs on the dirty water... then we all said we are set for the emancipation of women in the Niger Delta!'...

(Caroline Usikpedo-Omoniye, founder of NDWPD
Personal correspondence, March 25 2013)

6.1 Women's Organisations in Response to Colonialism and Oil

Historical and contemporary evidence shows that Nigerian women have actively participated in the political organisation of their communities through formal and non-formal women's associations, consistently with the West-African tradition of communal-based activism. Although the types of activities differ from one region to another and across ethnic groups, women's organisations have been a resilient feature of public life across Nigeria, facilitating women's collective action and functioning effectively as political pressure groups. In this section, I suggest that both colonialism and oil production have brought about a new social order, in which women could no longer protect their economic interests as traders and farmers through traditional associations alone. Women have responded to both these regimes similarly by re-organising and improving their traditional associational techniques, enhancing not only the numbers of organisations but also their capacity and scope. The section is organised in three parts, examining women's collective efforts in response to colonial policies, women's associational activities in response to the oil industry, and men's associational response to oil-related grievances.

6.1.1 Associations before the oil era

In pre-colonial Nigeria, women's associations were prevalent in every village and central to the dual-sex political system, performing a major role in women's self rule.¹⁰ For example, among the Igbo, it was noted that women's base of political power 'lay in their own gatherings' and their political institutions – women's 'meetings', market networks, kinship groups, and these institutions' ability to use strikes and boycotts to enforce their decisions.¹¹ At women's 'meetings' (*Mikiri*), age-related gatherings of all married women in the village, women performed ritual functions, assisted with settling communal disputes, and discussed their particular interests as traders, farmers, wives, and mothers – interests that were often opposed to those of men. Market trade, one of women's chief economic activities, was regulated in these meetings: prices were set, rules established regarding market attendance, and fines fixed for violators, men or women. Women could launch a boycott or a strike to force men offenders to cooperate, or in extreme cases, they 'sat on a man' for violating their market rules or decisions, a

¹⁰ See Leith-Ross 1939; Paulme 1963; Van Allen 1972; Uchendu 1993.

¹¹ Van Allen 1972, 169.

practice that involved barricading his house and performing humiliating song and dance.¹²

Using their solidarity, women acted upon the understanding that while ‘individually [they] could not compete with men, collectively they could often hold their own’.¹³ The Igbo’s associations of married daughters (*Umuada*) and married women (*Alutaradi*) were politically powerful: the former was considered the guardian of the village’s traditions and intervened to impose sanctions if local traditions were violated, while the later was responsible for bringing to trial women who were charged with committing adultery or other socially forbidden acts such as stealing.¹⁴ The association’s leader was also accepted as the community’s female leader. Among the Yoruba ethnic group, the *Egbe Iyalode*, a member-organisation of crafts women and traders, was ‘a force in the political administration of the society’ with one operating in every Yoruba village or town.¹⁵ The organisation’s president, the *Iyalode*, constituted an influential political figure locally and regionally. Similar women’s associations prevailed among other ethnic groups in Southern Nigeria (in the Muslim North, there are no historical records of official women’s associations following the 1804 *Jihad*, when full implementation of *Purdah* – seclusion – came into effect).

When Southern Nigeria became a British protectorate in 1900, it was divided into Native Court Areas, violating the traditional autonomy of villages by grouping unrelated communities into one court area under the rule of a (male) Warrant Chief.¹⁶ This system eliminated the power held by women’s meetings and associations, as policy discussions no longer included different sections of the village but only (male) members of the native courts. As women lost their ability to exert pressure on men, who had direct contact with the British administration, their interests were ignored. The British had also declared all jural institutions except the Native Courts illegitimate – stripping women’s ‘meetings’ off their judicial responsibilities, as well as outlawed individual use of force – making *sitting on a man* an illegal practice, and depriving women of key political channels. As Van Allen noted: ‘By interfering with the traditional balance of power, the British effectively eliminated the women’s ability to protect their own interests and made them

¹² ‘Sitting on a man’ involved gathering at his compound, sometimes late at night, dancing, singing songs which detailed the women’s grievances against him and often called his manhood into question, and even demolishing his hut or plastering it with mud (Van Allen 1972).

¹³ Van Allen 1972, 170.

¹⁴ Nelson 1972; Uchendu 1993; Ikelegbe 2005.

¹⁵ Uchendu 1993, 28.

¹⁶ Van Allen 1972.

dependent upon men for protection against men'.¹⁷ Women responded by re-organising and up-scaling their traditional associational activities and by forming new organisations.

In the 1920s, the Lagos Market Women's Association was established, bringing women's associations to the state level.¹⁸ The association included thousands of market women and female traders from 84 markets across Lagos, under the leadership of Alimotu Pelewura, an illiterate fish trader of Yoruba origin. The organisation grew so powerful as to send a representative to sit in the Lagos government and ensure women's concerns were considered. When taxes were to be introduced to women traders through the Tax Ordinance in 1939, the organisation's members coordinated mass protests and drafted petitions to challenge the law, closed markets, and marched to the Governor's House where Palewura debated the governor facing a crowd of 7000 women, stating: 'votes for women... no taxation without representation'.¹⁹ The law was consequently changed to not affect the vast majority of women traders. In 1944, the association organised resistance to the Price Controls Scheme that was enacted in Nigeria during WWII and negatively affected market women; women unanimously refused to abide by the government's price controls.²⁰ The association also supported the general strike in 1945, which called for Nigerianisation and self-governance.

Another notable organisation established during the colonial period was the Abeokuta Women's Union. Formed in 1942 by the UK-educated Funmilayo Anikulapo-Kuti, it aimed to organise charity work and literacy classes for market women. The organisation operated under the motto 'unity, cooperation, selfless service, and democracy', with the objective of 'uniting women in order to defend, protect, preserve and promote their social, economic and political rights'.²¹ Although it was established by elite women, its membership expanded to also include female traders from various ethnic origins across several Nigerian states. By 1948, the organisation consisted of 20,000 female members and commanded the support of over 100,000 women, carrying successful campaigns against the system of government, women's taxation, and in support of women's representation. One campaign, which demanded the government pays salaries to female market supervisors, was followed by mass demonstrations and a collective refusal to pay taxes. In another, the organisation succeeded in ousting a

¹⁷ Ibid, 178.

¹⁸ Johnson 1982.

¹⁹ Ibid, 140.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid, 149.

traditional ruler of one of the Western Region's most important cities. The organisation did not enjoy the support of men in the community.

The establishment of these and similar organisations and their effectiveness in influencing government decisions demonstrates that women were acutely aware and highly responsive to the threat posed by colonial policies to their economic and political interests.²² When traditional bases of women's political power were diminished through external forces, women acted collectively to regain their political leverage and protect their interests by transforming traditional associational activity into powerful organisations at the state level. As Johnson noted, women's organisations in Nigeria during this period 'represented a reformulation and expansion of the traditional type of women's organisation, an important step in Nigerian women's attempt to preserve their prerogatives under the changing conditions of the colonial system'.²³ Women's capacity to mobilise across different ethnic groups as well as different class affiliations, united primarily by their solidarity as women, will be demonstrated again half a century later in the Niger Delta in response to changes brought by the oil industry.

6.1.2 Organisations during the oil era

Following independence, the young Nigerian government encouraged self-help development initiatives, promoting the formation of women's groups, cultural associations and cooperatives.²⁴ A second proliferation in the number of women's organisations took place in the mid-1980s, following the oil bust-related economic collapse and the controversial adaptation of the International Monetary Fund's Structural Adjustment Programme, which negatively affected female farmers.²⁵ From the early 1990s, in tune with the global growth of interest in and sensitivity to gender issues and the increased presence of international development agencies in Nigeria, women's NGOs became a prominent feature of Nigeria's vibrant civil society. These include traditional community women's groups, women's religious and cultural associations, professional groupings, advocacy networks, and women's rights associations, which operate at the local, regional or national level.²⁶ In the Niger Delta, where unmet promises for compensation by oil companies led to anger and frustration, a general flowering of associational life in response to the oil economy included numerous new women's

²² See also the Nwabiola Women's Movement and Southern Ngwa Women's Association (Mba 1982).

²³ Johnson 1982, 143.

²⁴ Ikelegbe 2005, 249.

²⁵ Mama 1999.

²⁶ Ikelegbe 2005.

groups and brought changes to the focus, pattern and goals of traditional local associations.²⁷

Early mobilisation was facilitated through women's traditional associations in local communities (which typically encompass the majority of the community's women). Having borne the brunt of the adverse effects of the oil economy, their concerns were with issues that affected them and their communities directly – poverty, neglect, unemployment and economic disempowerment – and with communicating demands for compensation to oil companies, the government, and local male leaders.²⁸ Their strategies included drafting petitions, contacting oil companies' community liaison officers to articulate their grievances, and employing their traditional technique of protest; women's community associations carried protests and occupied oil facilities in the Niger Delta long before male militancy took over.²⁹ Other local women's groups – self-help associations or 'meetings' – focused on micro-credit support initiatives, mutual support and the welfare of women, serving as agents of development interventions from the state and oil companies in the region. It was noted that these groups have operated not only to improve women's conditions, but also as 'the harbingers of community-wide development projects ranging from electricity installation to town hall buildings and maintenance of village markets and schools'.³⁰

While women's local associations engaged in front-line battle, changing the focus of their activities, two other types of women's organisations emerged in the Niger Delta directly in response to oil-related grievances; in a study of women's organisations in the Niger Delta, all 26 new women's organisations studied related to the oil economy as 'key object of agitation'.³¹ During the 1990s, ethnically-affiliated women's organisations above the village level began emerging as part of a regional agitation that included resource control demands by local ethnic groups and conflicts between groups over compensation awards from oil companies.³² Organisations such as Ekunuga Women's Association, FOWA, and the Warri Women Consultative Assembly (the first two in Rivers State and the latter in Delta State), focused on intervening in oil-based inter-communal conflicts, carrying non-formal peacekeeping missions, conflict resolution, and mediation activities in conflict-torn areas of the Niger Delta. These groups have also

²⁷ A similar suggestion is made in Ikelegbe 2005. For a thorough examination of civil society in the Niger Delta, see Abutudu 1995; Olukoshi 1996; and Ikelegbe 2001b.

²⁸ Ikelegbe 2005.

²⁹ Anugwom 2002.

³⁰ Anugwom and Anugwom 2009, 338.

³¹ Anugwom 2008, 339.

³² Oruwari, Owei and Jev 2003.

resisted to corrupt traditional leaders, initiated protests and supported protests that were initiated by local women's groups.³³

The second type of new women's organisations emerged in the Niger Delta in the late 1990s, when the struggle became one of regional resistance, paving the way for solidarity, linkages and coordination between women of various ethnic origins. These regional women's associations include the Niger Delta Women Forum for Peace, Voice of Niger Delta Women, Gender and Development Action, the Niger Delta Women for Peace and Development, and numerous other groups.³⁴ Regional women's groups reacted more broadly to region-wide neglect, abuse and state repression, playing a key role in transforming the Niger Delta's struggle from the local, communal and ethnic level to a regional level.³⁵ For example, the Niger Delta Women for Justice, which operated in the Niger Delta from 1998 to 2004, carried out women's protests in various parts of the Niger Delta and collected testimonies from local women across the region on oil's impact on their lives (some of which are used in this thesis). International publicity and recognition in the struggle of women in the Niger Delta, as well as attention to the effects of oil on women in general, can be attributed to the work done by these organisations.

6.1.3 Men's alternative: militant organisations

Similarly to women's organisations, militant youth groups in the Niger Delta emerged specifically in response to continuous state repression following peaceful community protests, and the failure of oil companies to honour agreements reached with host communities. In the late 1990s, angry youth across the region began taking violent action including pipeline vandalism, illegal oil bunkering, and hostage taking.³⁶ While in 1993, seven cases of pipeline vandalism were officially recorded in the region, in 1996 the number grew to 33, in 1999 to 497, and in the following year to over 600 instances.³⁷ By 2004, Nigeria was losing as much as 200,000 barrels of crude oil p/d, nearly ten percent of its output (since 2006, the number picked at certain times to as much as 600,000 barrels p/d, about a third of Nigeria's capacity output). It was noted that the trade in stolen oil 'undermine[s] security in the Gulf of Guinea and add[s] to instability on world

³³ Ikelegbe 2005.

³⁴ Ikelegbe 2001b.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Oil bunkering involves tapping into an oil pipeline, filling cans with crude oil and taking the oil away in speedboats. The trade in stolen oil ('blood oil') has become a multi-billion business in the Niger Delta, enabled by a complex set of local and foreign accomplices (Asuni 2009).

³⁷ Ghazvinian 2007.

energy markets'.³⁸ It is therefore not surprising that the Niger Delta's narrative has focused almost exclusively on youth organisations and militias, which by the mid-2000s have transformed the Niger Delta into a region bursting with militancy and insurgency directed against the oil industry.

In September 2004, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), one of the largest armed groups in the Niger Delta, was formed with the explicit goal of acquiring control of regional oil resources, declaring an 'all-out war' on the Nigerian state and oil companies.³⁹ In Operation Locust Feast, the organisation's leader, the former president of the Ijaw Youth Council Mujahid Dokubo Asari, demanded that oil companies evacuate their personnel or prepare to engage in full-fledged armed combat. The threat to shut down Nigeria's crude oil production led to a spike in global oil prices and to the capitulation of the former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, into a meeting with Asari outside the capital Abuja, in which he offered the members of the organisation amnesty and cash in return to surrendering their arms.⁴⁰ The truce was temporary; the cash received from the government allowed the group to rearm and Asari was arrested in 2005 on charges of treason, leading to the formation of another key militant group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

MEND established its presence in 2006 by kidnapping four foreign oil workers and storming a Shell flow station, killing 17 people. In an email statement, the group introduced its demands from oil companies: 'It must be clear that the Nigerian government cannot protect your workers or assets. Leave our land while you can or die in it. Our aim is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil'.⁴¹ Since 2006, the organisation has evolved into a conglomeration of distinct militant groups operating across the Niger Delta, carrying deadly operations, including the blowing of pipelines and the kidnapping of numerous oil workers. It was observed that MEND employs sophisticated techniques of guerrilla warfare, using speedboats, high-level combat training, and IT systems to systematically choose targets for effective shutdown of oil production.⁴² One of its leaders told a BBC correspondent that MEND was fighting for 'total control of the Niger Delta's oil wealth' since 'local people had not gained from the riches under the ground...'.⁴³ Other organisations that operate under

³⁸ Asuni 2009.

³⁹ Ghazvinian 2007.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Howden 2006.

⁴² Ghazvinian 2007.

⁴³ BBC 2009.

similar impetus include the Niger Delta Revolutionary Militia, the Martyrs Brigade, the Niger Delta Vigilante, the Niger Delta People's Liberation Front, and the Niger Delta Youth. According to one estimate, over a hundred militias were operating in the Niger Delta in 2009.⁴⁴

Militant youth groups share several characteristics with women's organisations. First, they emerged in response to oil operations and the failure by oil companies and the government to compensate host communities.⁴⁵ Following decades of underdevelopment, impoverishment and deprivation, their creation was almost inevitable: 'Local boys with no jobs, no access to schools, and almost certainly no real future ahead of them have been rounded up and organized into gangs and militias that inevitably clash with authorities and with one another'.⁴⁶ Second, similarly to women's organisations, these groups have emerged from traditional, established local youth groups, which changed their focus and proliferated in response to the oil economy. The NDPVF, for example, grew out of the politically mainstream Ijaw Youth Council. As Michael Watts put it, 'youth organisations [in the Niger Delta] have multiplied and metastasized: they often refigure cultural traditional institutions'.⁴⁷ Another shared similarity to women's organisations is the gender-specific membership of these groups: militia groups in the Niger Delta are an all-male preserve. One study of youth militancy in the Niger Delta found that out of 183 respondents, 'all were coincidentally of the male gender'.⁴⁸ Another study of the Egbesu Militia found it was '100 percent male Ijaw'.⁴⁹

However, men's groups in the Niger Delta are crucially different from women's organisations. While women's activities have been characterised by peaceful 'passive resistance' – protest through physical presence and insistence on reaching agreements – youth groups have transformed from engaging in community protests to 'hit-and-run' militancy and the use of arms.⁵⁰ According to one youth leader, 'violence is the only language Shell understands and the youth of this community are bent on shutting down every Shell flow station...'.⁵¹ Another key difference is the importance of ethnicity in men's groups: while many women's groups in the Niger Delta have risen above ethnic rivalries in the name of regional and female solidarity, male youth organisations seem to

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ukiwo 2007.

⁴⁶ Oluwaniyi 2010, 312.

⁴⁷ Watts 2007b, 640.

⁴⁸ Oluwaniyi 2010, 313.

⁴⁹ Ikelegbe 2006, 94.

⁵⁰ Oluwaniyi 2010, 309.

⁵¹ Quoted in Oluwaniyi 2010, 320.

be driven not only by direct oil-related grievances, but also by ethnic competition over resource control. Militant groups' members typically draw from a single ethnic group and frame their rhetoric in terms of ethnic self-determination (for example, NDPVF, MEND and the Niger Delta Vigilante are all-Ijaw affiliations). Indeed, in a study of militias in the Niger Delta, 50 percent of focus group discussants attributed their militant activities to 'ethnic marginalisation' (16 percent attributed it to political exclusion, 13 to unemployment, nine to oil companies' attitude, six to poverty, and six percent to state repression).⁵²

Moreover, while women's organisations have been motivated by clear political grievances, militant groups have often been blamed for criminal activity under the pretence of political grievances. MEND has been described by *The Economist* as a group that 'portrays itself as [a] political organisation that wants a greater share of Nigeria's oil revenues... [While] in fact, it is more of an umbrella organisation for several armed groups'.⁵³ The distinction between grievance and greed has been made more complex since the groups began funding their operations through criminal activity; the founder of the NDPVF admitted to funding the group through the sale of stolen oil, claiming he is 'taking back what has been stolen from the Ijaw people'.⁵⁴ Genuine militancy by community youth has also been exacerbated by individuals who capitalised on the 'restive youth problem'; local wealthy elites and corrupt traditional rulers are known to have encouraged, as well as funded, militant youth groups, including purchasing weapons for them, blurring the distinction between state and non-state actors in the Niger Delta (both the NDPVF and the Niger Delta Vigilante were financially supported by Peter Odili, the Governor of Delta State).⁵⁵ As one scholar pointed out, 'The militia phenomenon is to some extent a creation of political, ethnic and community leaders, who encourage, sponsor and control the militia groups for political and personal objectives'.⁵⁶

Finally, although male militancy enjoys widespread popular support in the Niger Delta, the activities of youth militant groups have mostly exacerbated suffering and havoc in the region, unlike the achievements of women's organisations. Cash received in two amnesties during 2006 and 2009 has not trickled down to local communities to alleviate poverty, but rather served groups to re-arm.⁵⁷ The rivalry between groups of

⁵² Ikelegbe 2006.

⁵³ *The Economist* 2008.

⁵⁴ Malina 2012.

⁵⁵ HRW 2005.

⁵⁶ Ikelegbe 2006, 95.

⁵⁷ HRW 2005.

different ethnic origins (particularly the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo) had precipitated several conflicts and violent acts against local populations, claiming the lives of thousands and causing widespread property destruction. The state's military campaign against militant groups has turned the already-militarised Niger Delta into a zone practically under military occupation since 1999; it was noted that the Nigerian army used insurgency as an excuse to raid homes, blaming civilians for cooperation, destroying property and reducing to rubble in air raids villages that were believed to house militia fighters.⁵⁸ Since 2012, militant groups have also terrorised the sea with a large spike in piracy; in early 2013 Nigeria became the second most pirated country in Africa.⁵⁹ MEND is thought to be behind most of these attacks, hijacking ships, kidnapping sailors and killing oil workers. Thus, although oil has served as impetus for the emergence of both men and women's organisations in the region, women's organisations have been fundamentally different in kind and the activity of their members can be more accurately considered grassroots political participation.

6.2 NGO Analysis Across Nigeria's 36 States

In order to assess whether women's NGO activity has been more prominent in Nigeria's oil-producing states than in non-oil producing states, it was essential to obtain quantitative data on NGOs operating in Nigeria *per state* – a challenging task. As noted, since the 1990s, and especially since the return to civilian rule in 1999, NGOs operating in Nigeria have multiplied. Yet, widespread corruption led to a proliferation of organisations that under the guise of non-for-profit set up business enterprises to attract donor funds.⁶⁰ According to a local report, over 46,000 organisations were registered in Nigeria in 2009.⁶¹ The term NGO in itself is not used or understood consistently in Nigeria; many organisations fund their operations through selling their products and services to government and corporate clients, blurring the distinction between state, business and the third sector. Local human rights and other organisations have been blamed for tribalism, manipulation, unaccountability and lack of transparency.⁶² As no credible data on organisations could be retrieved from official sources – the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), the federal government body charged with regulating the

⁵⁸ Ikelegbe 2001a.

⁵⁹ Ghazvinian 2007.

⁶⁰ Ikelegbe 2001a.

⁶¹ ThisDay 2009.

⁶² See Kukah 1997; Jega 1997. For example, the Federation of Nigerian Women Societies, the National Council of Women Societies, and Women in Nigeria, have been criticised for being state-sponsored (Mama 1999).

formation of companies and the registration of NGOs, does not produce such listing – I turned to analyse the members’ list of a local umbrella organisation of NGOs.⁶³ I explain the selection of this source before outlining the process of analysis, presenting and discussing the results.

6.2.1 Directory selection

Producing a directory of NGOs operating in Nigeria was a project taken up by several local and international agencies. In June 2013, these included the 2002 UNICEF Directory of NGOs and Civil Society Organisations in Nigeria, which listed 648 organisations; the ‘live’ NGOs database of the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, which listed 216 organisations; the West Africa Civil Society Institute’s Directory, which listed 146 organisations, and several local business directories that have separate listings for NGOs.⁶⁴ None of these directories offer a complete inventory of NGOs in Nigeria, whose number is most likely in the thousands. UNICEF’s 2002 directory, which has been used in a few studies, is out-dated as many organisations have either ceased to exist since 2002 or changed their names (a common practice in Nigeria), while new organisations have been established. The UN’s database not only lists too small a number of organisations but is also compiled by means of self-registration rather than external evaluation, and it is not clear which criteria is used, if any, to verify organisations’ genuineness.

I therefore assembled a unique dataset of NGOs using the members’ list of the local umbrella organisation Nigeria Network of Non-Governmental Organisations (NNNGO), which is updated regularly and published online.⁶⁵ NNNGO was recognised in 1992 by Nigeria’s National Planning Commission as the coordinating body for local NGOs and by 2012, grew from 60 to 1,078 member-organisations and 3,000 affiliated institutions. Member-organisations include international organisations that operate in Nigeria (such as Amnesty and Transparency International), national organisations, and local organisations that operate at the state or community level. The majority of member-organisations – over 60 percent – are grassroots organisations that operate at the state/community level.⁶⁶ Member-organisations adhere to strict eligibility criteria to join the network, which operates a *Code of Conduct* to ensure members abide by principles of

⁶³ Many NGOs operate in Nigeria without being registered since the registration process is ‘tedious, resource consuming and difficult’ (personal interview, Safiya Ibn-Garba, March 15 2013).

⁶⁴ UNICEF 2002; OSAA 2013; EACS 2013; see also Nigeria Galeria 2013.

⁶⁵ See NNNGO 2013.

⁶⁶ Personal interview with the Director of the organisation, Oyebisi Oluseyi, January 12 2013.

ethical operation and accountability (members are also required to make a contribution to NNNGO's mission by paying an annual membership fee based on their category of membership).⁶⁷ The network is further funded by grants from international agencies such as the UN Millennium Campaign, DFID and Civicus.⁶⁸ Although the database created based on the network's member-organisations is not an exhaustive list of NGOs operating in Nigeria, it offers a plausibly representative sample of NGOs that operated in Nigeria in late 2012.

6.2.2 Analysis outline

NNNGO's member-organisations totalled in December 2012 1,078 NGOs. To assess the genuineness of each of these organisations, I examined their online presence; an existing website had to declare the organisation is non-governmental and non-for-profit. Realising that many legitimate organisations struggle to maintain a website and opt for registration with local online directories, I used the network's monthly e-newsletter in February 2013 to directly approach member-organisations, requesting them to provide information on their operations (see the chapter's Appendix for the request). Establishing direct contact with the organisations intended to gather information that was not readily available on their websites (if such existed), enhance the confidence in the accuracy of that information, and give organisations without websites the opportunity to present their credentials. This process, which involved numerous email exchanges and phone conversations with hundreds of organisations over the first six months of 2013, eliminated over two thirds of the organisations on the list; those whose presence and activities were not satisfactorily verified either online or through direct contact (or both) were removed from the analysis (for the list of 363 NGOs in my dataset, see the Data Appendix).

Organisations whose genuineness has been confirmed were then classified to one of four categories according to their *level of operations*: (1) *International* – organisations that operate worldwide with branches in Nigeria; (2) *National* – organisations that operate across Nigeria's 36 states (typically with offices in the capital Abuja or the commercial capital Lagos); (3) *Regional* – organisations that operate in one of Nigeria's six geopolitical zones (see Map 6.1); and, (4) *Local* – grassroots organisations that

⁶⁷ Ranging from a symbolic 5,000 Naira annually to two million Naira for sponsor organisations (Ibid).

⁶⁸ The organisation's financial statements are published online.


operate in one of the 36 states.⁶⁹ Importantly, organisations were not classified according to their physical site, which was not always indicative of where they operate. Many *national* organisations are based in one of Nigeria's 36 states (or in the capital Abuja) while operating across Nigeria. Similarly, many organisations that are based in Abuja or Lagos operate *locally* in another state, or *regionally*, in several neighbouring states. In the Niger Delta, a difficult terrain and generally rural area, several organisations keep their offices in Port Harcourt, the regional capital and the capital of Rivers State, while operating *across* the region. Thus, to determine their *level of operations*, organisations were specifically asked to state where they operate. When applying for an NGO license from the CAC, this is information NGOs are required to submit.⁷⁰

Following this classification, I excluded from the analysis NGOs that were categorised as international; only Nigerian organisations were relevant for a *sub-national* analysis. I then identified regional and local NGOs as operating in either an *oil state* – one of the nine oil-producing states of the Niger Delta; a *non-oil state* – one of the remaining 27 states which do not produce oil; across the *oil region* – the South-south geo-political zone which is made up of six oil-producing states; or across a *non-oil region* – one of the five other geo-political zones in Nigeria. Although the South-west zone hosts one oil-producing state (Ondo) and the South-east zone hosts two oil-producing states (Abia and Imo), in both regions oil states are a minority (in the South-west the ratio is 1:5, in the South-east 2:3); organisations that operate regionally in these two regions were thus classified as *non-oil regions*, raising the bar for testing the hypothesis in making it harder to detect differences between oil and non-oil regions (assuming regional organisations are indeed similar to those operating across states). Organisations that operate across the Niger Delta were classified under the South-south zone, since six of the nine Niger Delta states are located in that zone. Organisations that operate in several states across several regions were classified as *national*.

⁶⁹ African or West African NGOs that operate in a number of African countries including Nigeria, such as Oil Watch Africa, were categorised as 'International'. Branches of the same organisation in different locations in Nigeria were removed from the analysis.

⁷⁰ Personal interview, Safiya Ibn-Garba, March 15 2013.

Map 6.1: Nigeria's six geo-political zones



Source: Nigeria's High Commission, London 2012.

The final stage of the analysis involved identifying women-led NGOs. Typically, the word *women* or its equivalents (sisters, daughters, mothers, wives, etc.) appearing in the organisation's name would suggest it is a women's organisation, while many organisations that are concerned with *women's issues* (i.e. gender equality or women's empowerment) would be women-led. However, not all organisations abide by these rules; *women* in the organisation's name can indicate the organisation's agenda rather than its founding members and membership, while a large number of women-led organisations focus on sustainable development, community and environmental issues, rather than *women's issues*. Thus, a narrow definition of *women-led NGOs* was required and strictly adhered to, referring to non-governmental, non-for-profit organisations that have been *both founded and run* by a majority of women. 'Founding' requires the organisation's founder to be a woman or a majority of women amongst founding

members, while ‘running’ requires the current Executive Director or President of the organisation to be a woman. Often, the founder and the Executive Director of local grassroots organisations are the same person. In all cases I examined, the *leadership* of the organisation was indicative of its membership.

As a robustness check, I examined whether the results still hold when I employ a wider definition for *women-led NGOs*. Nigeria is highly patriarchal; there could be cases in which the founding members were women but a man serves as the Executive Director while women run the organisation behind the scenes, or cases in which an organisation was co-founded by a man and a woman. I therefore explored the impact on the pattern of results using two alternative definitions of *women-led NGOs*: 1) organisations that were founded by a majority of women in which the Executive Director is a man; and, 2) organisations that were co-founded by an equal number of men and women, whose Executive Director is a woman. Organisations that were founded by a man but are run by a female Executive Director, or co-founded by a man and a woman and are run by a male Executive Director, were not considered *women-led NGOs* under any definition; both my narrow and broad definitions required a majority of women amongst the *leadership* of the organisation.

6.2.3 Results

Level of operations. Of 1,078 member-organisations, 363 were confirmed as genuine and entered the dataset. Of these, 77 organisations (21.2 percent) were categorised as international, 192 as national (52.9 percent), 29 as regional (8.0 percent) and 65 as local (17.9 percent). Of 29 regional NGOs, 16 operated in the oil region (55.2 percent) and 13 in one of the other five geopolitical zones (44.8 percent). Of 65 local organisations, 32 operated in oil states (49.2 percent) and 33 in non-oil states (50.8 percent).

Women-led status. Of 192 national organisations, 43 were established as *women-led*, representing 22.4 percent of the total number of NGOs in the dataset. In the oil region (the South-south), eight NGOs were established as *women-led*, representing half of NGOs operating in the region, and just under a quarter of the total number of regional NGOs operating in Nigeria. In the group of non-oil regions, four NGOs were established as *women-led*, representing 30.8 percent of the total number of NGOs in that group, and 13.8 percent of regional NGOs operating in Nigeria (these NGOs were spread over four

regions⁷¹). In oil states, 15 organisations were established as women-led, representing 46.9 percent of organisations in the group. In non-oil states, eight organisations were established as women-led, representing 24.2 percent of organisations in the group.

Robustness check. A change in the definition of *women-led* organisations did not alter the results; in all cases examined, both the founder and the Executive Director/ President of women-led organisations were women. A two-tailed t-test shows that the difference between the shares of women-led NGOs in the two groups of states, as well as between the two groups of regions (South-south versus the other five), is highly significant ($p=0.001$ for states, and $p=0.006$ for regions). There were no women-led organisations in the dataset operating in *strictly-Muslim* states.

Table 6.1 summarises these results, which are illustrated in Graphs 6.1-6.3 (for an inventory of the 34 women-led organisations operating locally and regionally in Nigeria, including specific information on their leadership, see Table A6.1 in the chapter's Appendix).

⁷¹ The South-east, South-west, North-central and North-west.

Table 6.1: NGOs operating in Nigeria: level of operations and women-led status – 2013


	NNNGO database	My dataset	International	National	Regional		Local	
No. of NGOs	1,078	363	77	192	29		65	
Oil/ Non-oil					Oil*	Non-oil	Oil**	Non-oil
					16	13	32	33
No. of women-led NGOs				43	8	4	15	8
Share of women-led NGOs				22.4%	50.0%	30.8%	46.9%	24.2%

Source: calculations based on an analysis of NNNGO's member-organisations, 2013.

*The South-south oil region vs. five non-oil regions.


**The nine oil-producing states vs. 27 non-oil producing states.

Graph 6.1: Share of women-led NGOs in oil vs. non-oil states and regions (%)



Source: see Table 6.1.


Graph 6.2: Number of NGOs in Nigeria by state – 2013



Source: calculations based on an analysis of NNNGO's member-organisations, 2013.

*=*Strictly-Muslim* states. Oil states marked black.

Graph 6.3: Share of women-led NGOs in Nigeria by state – 2013 (%)



Source: see Graph 6.2.

6.2.4 Discussion

Both the total number and the share of women-led organisations are significantly higher in oil states than in non-oil states, supporting *H5*. If the number of NGOs in the dataset had been affected by an unknown bias (for example, a propensity for organisations in particular states to join NNNGO), such bias should not affect the *share* of women-led NGOs per state.⁷² The results translate to an average of 1.6 women-led NGO in each oil

⁷² Examining the *share* of women-led NGOs also adjusts for size effect (larger states may have more women-led NGOs).

state compared with an average of 0.3 women-led NGO in each non-oil state. Strikingly, the pattern is repeated at the regional level, with the South-south boasting nearly double the share of women-led NGOs compared with the other five regions *combined*. Notably, women are also involved in the work of organisations that were not coded as *women-led* according to my definitions; in the majority of *non* women-led NGOs I examined, women served in prominent positions as members of Board of Trustees and as management and staff members of organisations. The large number of women-led NGOs documented at the grassroots level – both local and regional – supports an important part of my theory: that *non*-formal political participation is popular means for women to get politically involved, particularly at the local level. The share of local women-led NGOs of all local (state) organisations across Nigeria is over a third (23 out of 65 NGOs), while 38 percent of all regional organisations are women-led (11 out of 29 NGOs). Compared with the very low share of female seats in national and state legislatures in Nigeria, the results demonstrate that when measured differently, the political participation of women is, in fact, pervasive.

Does variation on the independent variable (oil production) within the group of oil states affect the share of women-led NGOs? In other words, does the quantity of oil produced in a state matter, or is it oil's mere presence that encourages the establishment of women-led NGOs? The results using the *Oil Revenues Per Capita* variable show no consistent pattern of *decrease* in the number of organisations the smaller the amount of oil. However, three of the four largest oil-producing states – Rivers, Delta and Akwa Ibom, all located in the South-south zone – host together the majority of women-led NGOs, 10 out of 15, while five women-led NGOs operate across the five smaller oil-producing states (see Graph 6.2). This means that the average number of women-led NGOs in oil states is actually pulled *down* by small oil-producing states, reinforcing my findings.

Finally, the large number of women-led NGOs in the South-south zone (eight) compared with the small number of women-led NGOs in the South-west zone (one) and in the South-east zone (one), which host one and two oil-producing states, respectively, further strengthens these findings. The three zones in the Southern part of Nigeria are similarly overwhelmingly Christian. If Islam accounts for the relatively small number of women-led NGOs in the North, it cannot account for the smaller number of women-led NGOs in these two Southern regions. The high concentration of oil-producing states in the South-south – indeed, the high concentration of oil production – is the only factor

that can account for the occurrence of women-led NGOs in that region. Notably, across non-oil states I found a random distribution of women-led NGOs with no concentration in any particular state. Thus, in Nigeria, the nearer to oil one travels, the greater the number of women-led NGOs one finds.

6.3 Case Studies of Oil and Non-Oil States

The quantitative analysis of the distribution of NGOs across Nigeria suggests that oil production is linked with a higher incidence of women-led NGOs, yet it cannot ascertain causality or the reasons underlying this link. To explore the causal mechanisms that connect oil to women's NGO activity, I examine two prominent women-led NGOs that operate in two Nigerian states with different oil endowments: the Niger Delta Women's Movement for Peace and Development (NDWPD), which is based in oil-producing Delta State, and Empowering Women for Excellence Initiative (EWEI), which is based in the Northern Kaduna State, where no oil is produced. Although the focus of the analysis is the two organisations, the unit of analysis remains *the state in which they operate*, which sets the background to their operations (data on the state is interwoven in the analysis). The analysis is based on internal documents and reports obtained from the organisations, press items, and interviews with founding members and staff. It focuses on two key dimensions – the motivation for establishing the organisation and the focus of its activities – to establish the link between cause and effect. Both organisations were contacted in early 2013 and gave their consent to serve as case study organisations.


Several features made Delta State and Kaduna State agreeably comparable. First, although Kaduna State is located in the North, its population is a mixture of Christians and Muslims. The state has been described as a 'Christian enclave' in the Muslim North and as a 'melting pot of Nigerian politics and a mini Nigeria';⁷³ Kaduna is the only state out of seven in the North-west zone that has not implemented full *Sharia* law, the only state in the region that had a Christian governor, and a regional centre for several key churches that have their seats in the state.⁷⁴ It is also one of Nigeria's largest centres of higher education, hosting 14 national colleges, two universities and the National Defence Academy. Second, similarly to Delta State, Kaduna's population is ethnically diverse, with five key ethnic groups – the Kamuku, Gwari, Kadara, Hausa and Kurama – and over twenty other minorities. Third, Kaduna State is largely rural and

⁷³ Aruwan 2011.

⁷⁴ The Roman Catholic Diocese of Zaria, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Kaduna, and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Kafanchan.

livelihoods are predominantly based on agricultural activities including the production of food crops and animal husbandry, similarly to the South.⁷⁵ Finally, the two organisations studied share several important features: both are grassroots organisations that use intervention techniques in local communities to achieve their respective goals; both were founded by a local woman who remained the organisation's leader; and both were established in the post-1999 period, after Nigeria came under democratic rule.

Map 6.2: Delta and Kaduna states, Nigeria



Source: Nigeria High Commission, London 2012.

6.3.1 Empowering Women for Excellence Initiative, Kaduna State

EWEI is one of five NGOs in my dataset that operate locally in Kaduna State and the only one of these five to be women-led (two other NGOs operate regionally in the North-west geopolitical zone in which the state is located, of which one is women-led). Founded in April 2008, EWEI's key mission is 'to empower girls and women in local communities'.⁷⁶ Its activities include a number of intervention programmes and capacity building workshops aimed at inspiring and educating girls and women and encouraging them to 'harness their abilities and take more active roles in decision-making and policy formation [to] ensure that their voices are heard and are taken seriously'.⁷⁷ Although the organisation advocates gender-sensitive legislation at the National Assembly and the implementation of laws and policies regarding women's rights at the national level, its programmes and activities are limited to Kaduna State.⁷⁸ It is registered with the CAC and with the Kaduna State Government's Ministry of NGOs, Youth, Sports, Education

⁷⁵ Kaduna State 2013.

⁷⁶ EWEI 2012.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Personal interview, organisation officer Mavis Dooshima.

and Women Affairs, while its programmes are sponsored by several international funds (including Generations for Peace Amman, UNICEF, the British Council, the World Bank Institute, Open Meadows Foundation NY, and DFID). The organisation's offices are based in the North LGA (an area with a majority of a Muslim population), but programmes take place in communities across the state regardless of their religious affiliation.

The organisation's staff composition is predominantly female; apart from the founder, who serves as the organisation's Programme Director, two of three full-time officers are women, one of two pro-bono technical advisors is a woman, and three of the five-member Advisory Board are women.⁷⁹ The organisation's thirty volunteers, who work on an on-demand basis, are both male and female. Having a majority of women employees is mandated by the organisation's *Code of Conduct and Policy Statement*, which outlines guidelines for staff on ethical and professional conduct and articulates the organisation's hiring policy as follows:

‘EWEI is an equal opportunity employer which means [it] does not discriminate on the basis of sex, age, culture, religion or disability in its recruitment process. However, being a female gender focused organization and in keeping with the aims and objective of EWEI, policy states that at any point in time... EWEI's workforce should consist of 60% female and 40% male’.⁸⁰

The policy was explained in the document as a step ‘to help improve upon and develop the capacity of girls and women in developmental work’.⁸¹

The organisation's founder, Kaduna-born Safiya Ibn Garba, attributed the establishment of the organisation to ‘personal motivations’: ‘I understand what women go through because of the experience I had’.⁸² This experience included the out-casting of her Southern-born, Christian mother following the death of her Northern-born, Muslim father due to her mother's refusal to re-marry and wed her three daughters, as culturally expected. Accordingly, the organisation's stated objectives include the empowerment of girls and women through the following mechanisms: informing girls and women on health, reproductive, political, economic and social issues; encouraging girl-child education; inspiring girls and women to aim for excellence; encouraging girls to pursue various fields of study, including sciences and information technology; contributing to the political participation of girls and women; making information

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ EWEI 2013, 3.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Personal interview, Safiya Ibn Garba, March 15 2013.

accessible to girls and women at no cost; advocating for progressive budgeting practices, gender mainstreaming and good governance initiatives; and contributing to both the political and legislative processes through capacity building, civic education and advocacy.⁸³

The initiative to found an organisation for ‘women’s empowerment’ was further motivated, according to the founder, by sectarian violence surrounding the Miss World beauty competition, which was to be hosted in Nigeria in December 2002 and triggered a wave of deadly clashes between Christians and Muslims in several states, including Kaduna. The riots began after an article was published in November that year in a national newspaper, *ThisDay*, defending Nigeria’s hosting of the competition against the objection of its Muslim population and stating that Prophet Muhammad ‘would have been happy to marry one of the contestants’.⁸⁴ The article was followed by raging Muslim youth’s looting of shops, lighting bonfires at major highways and burning down two hotels and the local office of the newspaper in which the article was published.⁸⁵ At least 105 people have been killed in Kaduna during the riots.⁸⁶ Ibn Garba noted: ‘when churches are burned and the Young Christian Association building was burnt down, it affected everyone, all of a sudden it was a question of us and them. I know people who were personally affected... this has contributed to my decision to establish EWEI’.⁸⁷

Indeed, understanding the particular population makeup and internal divisions of Kaduna State is essential to understanding a crucial factor that could have given rise to the establishment of other local NGOs, particularly by women who have been carrying the anti-sectarianism flag in Nigeria (in the Niger Delta, women’s groups strongly promote mediation between rival ethnic groups). The religious divide in Kaduna turned the state into one of Nigeria’s most brutal scenes of sectarian violence; three serious outbreaks of inter-communal violence took place in Kaduna in 1987, 1992 and 2000, with the latest described as the worst in Nigeria’s history since the civil war.⁸⁸ The riots in 2000 erupted following the state governor’s proposal to introduce *Sharia* law in the state, despite Christians’ slight majority. This proposal was followed by a public protest by the Kaduna branch of the Nigerian Christian Association, in which fighting between Christians and Muslims spiralled out of control for several weeks, with over 5,000

⁸³ EWEI 2012.

⁸⁴ Cowell 2002.

⁸⁵ Reuters 2002.

⁸⁶ Cowell 2002.

⁸⁷ Personal interview, Safiya Ibn Garba, March 15 2013.

⁸⁸ HRW 2003.

casualties.⁸⁹ The state government consequently instituted Sharia law only in the Northern parts of the state in which there are large concentrations of Muslims and it is applicable only to Muslims within these regions.⁹⁰

To tackle sectarian reconciliation, EWEI's flagship project, *Let Her Play*, aims at increasing the participation of girls and women in sports in Northern Nigeria and 'help bridge the gender, ethnic, religious and political divides in our local communities'.⁹¹ The project has been implemented since 2009 in partnership with the international organisation Generations for Peace Amman, and includes the organisation of various sports events, including football, basketball, table tennis and softball matches, in numerous schools and community centres, drawing both boys and girls participants, with equipment improvised for some of the games.⁹² The project has reached over 4,200 children, youth, and youth leaders and inspired other organisations in North-west Nigeria. Although other programmes carried out by the organisation do not directly address sectarianism or Muslim-Christian reconciliation, EWEI directs its programmes at members of both communities in the hope that 'bringing them together would assist in settling differences and bridging gaps created by sectarianism'.⁹³ Interestingly, such differences are not understood by Ibn Garba to derive from religious ideologies: 'The North-South divide is largely thought to be about religion but aside from religion, it is politics, it is tribal and it is about power relations'.⁹⁴

Other programmes which aim at reaching wider community circles are run by the organisation in partnership with international organisations: *Getting Involved* aims at raising awareness about the Millennium Development Goals and the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy among youth, empowering young people (both male and female) to become change agents within their communities, for example through the distribution of insecticide treated mosquito nets; *Know and Say No* aims at raising awareness to gender-based violence and strengthening institutional capacity to address violence against women, providing 'a platform for effective actions towards the protection of minority rights and a voice for vulnerable groups';⁹⁵ and *Civic Education and Participation for Women Project*, a programme supported by Open Meadows Foundation NY that aims at addressing women's political under-representation, giving a

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Personal interview, Safiya Ibn Garba, March 15 2013.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Personal interview, Safiya Ibn Garba, March 28 2013.

⁹⁵ EWEI 2012. Thirteen social welfare workers from Kaduna North LGA participated in the programme.

voice to citizens' concerns and encouraging participatory governance through lectures, interactive panel discussions, town hall meetings and pressure group activities by participants and politicians, government officials, legal practitioners and others.⁹⁶

Other activities by the organisation include monthly sports programmes, quarterly newsletters that offer free resources for women on various issues, and providing information through the organisation's website, which is designed to encourage IT literacy among girls and women. Between 2008 and 2013, 17,794 women and girls and numerous other indirect beneficiaries in Kaduna State benefited from the programmes provided by the organisation.⁹⁷ In none of the organisation's programmes, publications, annual reports and online pages I examined, as well as in none of my communications with the organisation's founder and staff members, was oil production, the oil industry, or oil-related grievances mentioned as a factor that has motivated the organisation's foundation or activities. When asked directly whether oil production in Nigeria has informed her motivations, mission, vision, or the organisation's activities in any way, the founder offered the following response:

‘Indirectly perhaps, but certainly not directly. When you talk about the issue of resources, how it affected communities – violence, corruption and underdevelopment – in which women are most vulnerable, these are the effects of oil production in Nigeria. It is felt all over the country, but in the South, they feel it differently, more directly... Women in the oil-producing states have suffered more losses to their livelihoods than women in the North due to factors like insecurity, environmental degradation and ironically underdevelopment. In that sense, in the South there is more to struggle for, the South is not as developed... normal people in the North are not richer, but they are just not affected by oil directly’.⁹⁸

6.3.2 Niger Delta Women for Peace and Development, Delta State

NDWPD is one of two NGOs in the database that operate in Delta State (eight other women-led organisations operate regionally in the South-south zone). Previously called the Niger Delta Women's Movement for Peace and Hope, the organisation was founded in 2005 with a vision of ‘a world for women to live in where there is social and environmental justice, gender equality and respect for women's rights, and a society free of gender-based violence’.⁹⁹ Although the organisation is based in Ughelli, a small town in Delta State, and carries intervention programmes within the state, its advocacy work

⁹⁶ Ibid. Over 2,400 local citizens have participated in this programme.

⁹⁷ EWEI 2013 Annual Report.

⁹⁸ Personal interview, Safiya Ibn Garba, March 15 2013.

⁹⁹ Personal interview, Caroline Usikpedo-Omoniye, March 22 2013.

aims at reaching and inspiring communities across the Niger Delta as well as nationally and internationally. The programmes are varied and focus on women's rights and political mobilisation, women's livelihoods and economic empowerment, peace building, security and mediation, HIV/AIDS prevention, climate change and the environment, women and girls' education, and caring for orphans and vulnerable children.¹⁰⁰ The organisation is funded predominantly by membership fees with no external financial support. Although it does not maintain a website due to lack of funding, the organisation's activities are widely reported in several civil society and women's rights websites.¹⁰¹ The organisation is registered with the Ministry of Youth and Sports Development, Delta State, and has a special consultative status with the UN's Economic and Social Council.

Similarly to EWEI, the organisation's staff composition is predominantly female. Although there is no official hiring policy, the founder, Caroline Usikpedo-Omoniye, pointed out that 'we strongly encourage women to work with us'; apart from the founder who serves as the organisation's President, the six-member Board of Trustees includes four women and is headed by a woman chair, all ten full-time officers are women, and over one thousand women volunteers reportedly support the organisation's activities.¹⁰² The founder also serves as an Ambassador of Goodwill for women empowerment at the International Human Rights Commission, a co-Chair for the Women Major Group at the UNEP, the African representative of Feminist Task Force, the African coordinator for Ways Women Lead, and a member of the Delta State Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women. She has attributed the organisation's establishment, similarly to her Northern counterpart, to 'personal experiences' as well as to 'wanting to give a voice and empower women and girls in the Niger Delta, the most vulnerable people in Nigeria'.¹⁰³ However, the founder articulated a sense of grievance and referred to women's regional solidarity in much stronger terms, as the chapter's opening quote demonstrates.

This sense of grievance and women's solidarity are clearly articulated in the organisation's objectives, which also demonstrate the level of destitution in the Niger Delta region: to promote enduring peace and cooperation in the Niger Delta and to alleviate the hardship of children, their families, rural communities and schools; to

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Gueneheux 2013.

¹⁰² Personal interview, Caroline Usikpedo-Omoniye, March 22 2013.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

‘harness the wisdom of women to eliminate any form of violence and create justice among all’ by providing communities with skills and vocations; to promote women’s empowerment and encourage women to get actively involved in decision-making processes at all levels; to support ‘human right ecology imperatives and sustainable development’ and cooperate with local and international organisations to provide technical knowledge and skills for women; to foster educational, economic and the social advancement of women and improve the conditions of vulnerable girls and women in rural communities by creating jobs for them; to identify the problems and progress of women and ‘the most vulnerable’ in the Niger Delta; and to provide children in orphanages and destitute homes with food, clothes, vaccinations and medical care, books and uniforms, education scholarships and household equipment.¹⁰⁴

Corresponding to the founder’s mission, the majority of the organisation’s activities have focused on advocacy work related to environmental degradation in the Niger Delta involving primarily gas flaring, oil spills, and other oil-related catastrophes with an emphasis on women’s perspective, aiming to influence decision-making at the national and international levels. In 2009, NDWPD conducted the Women’s Tribunals on Gender and Climate Justice as part of a project by Feminist Task Force titled *Strengthening Voices: Search for Solutions* and in partnership with Greenpeace International. The project involved collecting testimonies from women in Odi Town, Bayelsa State, which was burned to the ground in 1999 by the Nigerian army in response to community protests with thousands of casualties (see testimonies from Odi in Chapter 3). The Justice Tribunals were held again in 2011 in the community of Jesse, Delta State, where women stood in line outside the tribunal’s complex to submit their testimonies (Jesse sustained in 1998 one of the biggest and most deadly pipeline explosions in Nigeria, with over one thousand casualties and thousands of burns injuries).

The testimonies collected focused on the hardships of women in oil-devastated communities and reveal women’s key concerns: oil spillage pollution and related scarcity in food, clean water, and work opportunities. In Odi, women made the following statements: ‘there are no fish in our rivers anymore’; ‘the riverbanks have been eroded’; ‘landslides consumed our houses’; ‘I cannot feed my family now’; ‘we struggle to feed our children’; and ‘we want to see political action’. In Jesse, women stated: ‘we are victims of Western oil companies’; ‘the oil fire of 1998 ruined our land’; ‘we want our

¹⁰⁴ Personal correspondence, Caroline Usikpedo-Omoniye, March 25 2013.

land back as it was'; 'this is our turn to speak out'; and 'time is running out'.¹⁰⁵ According to the founder, the hearings intended to 'bring the voices of those most affected – women and excluded groups – to influence negotiations and plans of action on climate change at the national and international levels'.¹⁰⁶ The testimonies were presented to the Nigerian government ahead of the UN environment summit in Copenhagen in December 2009, at the 2009 Klima Forum in Copenhagen, at the Global Call for Action against Poverty mobilisation weekend in 2011, at the UN COP 17 convention at Durban in December 2011, and at the Rio+20 Summit in Brazil in June 2012.

The organisation has also carried out several peace-building and conflict prevention programmes that are linked to oil-driven insecurity in the Niger Delta. According to the founder, 'NDWPD took the elusive role of mainstreaming women into an early-warning network for conflict prevention. By providing time to prepare, analyse, and plan our response, this method has been very effective in the region and has reduced the rate of conflict. Early-warning information is used to forestall a resurgence of conflict and violence'.¹⁰⁷ The programme was shaped by a broader vision of security that redefines local, national and global security to focus on human dimensions. This vision has 'inspired NDWPD to mainstream gender issues into the peace enlightenment campaign in the region'.¹⁰⁸ The organisation has also worked against corruption in Delta State. In October 2012, it organised the Anti-Corruption Internet Data Base Forum, where representatives of the Nigerian Police, the federal Road Transport Works, and community leaders discussed anti-corruption advocacy and the processes for obtaining national passports and driver's licenses in Delta State.¹⁰⁹

The organisation's mission and activities demonstrate that oil production and oil-related grievances are at the core of its *raison d'être*. The following statement, made by the organisation's founder in an address at a UN event – *Leaders Forum on the Future Women Want* – in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012, clearly clarifies the link between her political activity and oil production:

'Women in the Niger Delta have been victims of gender-based discriminatory practices and the economic crisis. They are underrepresented in the strategic heights of politics, government, economic, educational institutions and employed labour, particularly in the oil industry... poverty and economic hardship is real in

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ NDWPD 2012.

these communities of the Niger Delta, and the hardest hits is the women and children. Immediate steps need to be taken to address the issues of climate change and oil pollution that has exacerbated this phenomenon’.

In response to a judgement by the Economic Community of West African States’ Court of Justice in December 2012, which found the Nigerian government responsible for abuses by oil companies and stated it had ‘failed to protect the Niger Delta’s people rights for food, social life, and opportunities to earn a living by destroying their environment’, the organisation issued the following statement:

‘The Niger Delta Women and Communities welcome this juridical action after decades of environmental maltreatment. The Niger Delta... people have suffered maltreatment through political and economic marginalisation, violence and environmental degradation. The denial of basic rights of Niger Delta communities and violence against them worsened as oil became the dominant income earner for the country... The underdevelopment of the Niger Delta and what we believe to be criminal neglect over decades by successive Nigerian governments and oil exploitation has made the zone a graveyard for economic, environmental, social and cultural rights. Especially the rights to health, water, food, and sustainable livelihood are not being respected. The activities of the oil companies operating in the Niger Delta... are affecting the integrity and wellbeing of most individuals in the Niger Delta. The gas flaring has caused life diseases and unimaginable environmental hazards – affecting basic human rights. The triple legacy of gas flaring, oil spills and effluent discharges by oil companies has make life in many parts of the Delta, where people live, impossible...’¹¹⁰

In response to the same question asked of her Northern counterpart on the impact of oil production on her motivations, mission, vision, or the organisation’s activities, the founder offered the following unequivocal response:

‘We fight for environmental justice, because oil has impacted the Niger Delta’s women and livelihoods negatively. Environmental degradation and pollution due to oil spills has made land not to yield, crops not to grow, fishes are no more in the river, and women rely on farming and fishing as a means of livelihood so with these problems... they are impoverished’.¹¹¹

6.3.3 Discussion

The two organisations studied share several key similarities: both are the product of local women’s initiatives, both were established by a single woman founder, and both operate at the grassroots level *by women for women* with an overarching ‘women empowerment’ vision, against the backdrop of a patriarchal, chauvinistic society (see Table 6.2). The key difference between the two organisations is in the incentive that prompted their establishment, which is reflected in their activities, objectives, and tools of intervention.

¹¹⁰ Usikpedo-Omoniye 2013.

¹¹¹ Personal interview, April 22 2013.

Sectarian violence is predominant in both Kaduna and Delta states, between Christians and Muslims, and between members of different ethnic groups, respectively. Yet while EWEI's programmes that concern inter-community conflict have no relation to oil production, NDWPD's programmes on conflict prevention and peace building are linked to oil operations. NDWPD is also more directly concerned in its programmes with women's economic deprivation, poverty, underdevelopment, prostitution and STDs, issues that are most pertinent in the Niger Delta *because* of the oil industry. This difference elucidates the underlying mechanism that connects oil to women's NGO political activity.

NDWPD's motivations echo in the mission statements and activities of other Niger Delta-based women-led organisations. For example, the mission statement of Niger Delta Women's Forum declares: 'Oil is wealth, but in the Niger Delta... it seems to be the opposite. We believe the crisis in the area cannot be solved by militancy. We recognise... that the problems of the Niger Delta region... are a commutation of the effect of a long period of neglect and deprivation of the area and the people'.¹¹² FOWA's key activities since its establishment in 1993 have focused on keeping Shell out of Ogoniland and seeking environmental justice and compensation for the devastation of the Ogoni land. In an interview, the founder of Delta Women, an NGO in Delta State, replied to the question 'What were your motivations in setting up Delta Women?' as follows: 'Once you have stared poverty in the face, your life never remains the same... having witnessed the suffering [in the region] of many people, has been my motivation and passion'.¹¹³ The organisation focuses on 'addressing the critical challenge of employment and occupational dislocation faced by the women of Delta State'.¹¹⁴ The Niger Delta Women for Justice focused on documenting testimonies of women from oil-devastated communities. One of its four co-founders, Sokari Ekine, explained the motivation for establishing the organisation in 1998 as follows:

'It was women coming out and asserting themselves for a Pan-Delta women organisation... to bring women together to cross ethnic boundaries. It was the time when all the national self-determination [by communities in the Niger Delta] were coming out. The Niger Delta Women for Justice was not ethnically based... but it did have to do with oil and resource control. It had the same impetus like all the other declarations [of national self determination], but we were talking about oil from a gendered perspective. The idea was to get women's testimonies at a

¹¹² NDWF 2013.

¹¹³ Quoted in Johnson 2013.

¹¹⁴ DW 2013.

time when the conversation was all male-dominated... to bring women's voices into the narrative and the discussion...'.¹¹⁵

The few women-led NGOs found in other regions in Nigeria are not driven by similar motivations.

Table 6.2: EWEI vs. NDWPD

	EWEI / Kaduna, North-west	NDWPD/ Delta, South-south
Level of operations	Local	Local
Number of founders	1, woman	1, woman
Number of Directors	Same	Same
Staff composition	60/40% female/ male	100% female
Key focus	Women and girls education	Environmental justice, conflict resolution, job creation for women
Tools of intervention	Seminars, programmes	Tribunals, advocacy
Key motivation	Sectarian violence	Oil-related pollution and poverty

Conclusion

Women's associations have historically been a part of the social and political organisation in Nigeria. These women-only forums were based not only around cultural activities but also provided women with spaces to organise collectively and protect women's economic survival through their political leverage. The presence and endurance of these associations has helped provide a strong power base from which women's movements have evolved and multiplied at times of social change, first under colonialism, and later following the development and entrenchment of the oil economy and in response to its devastations. Although women's resistance in the Niger Delta can be traced back to the pre-oil era, the recent magnitude and spread of women's associations in the region can be attributed predominantly to oil; the results of the NGOs analysis in this chapter suggest a significantly higher share of women's NGOs in oil states and the oil-producing South-south geopolitical zone compared with any other region in Nigeria. Measured by the degree of women-led NGOs, the political participation of women in oil communities is significantly higher than that of their counterparts in non-oil communities, both in the North and South. Case study analysis clearly connected the effects of the oil economy with women's inclination to engage in associational activity. In the past decade, women's organisations in the Niger Delta initiated numerous protests, occupational sieges and rallies against the oil industry. Their success should be gauged solely in terms of their immediate impact on the presence of oil

¹¹⁵ Personal interview, Sokari Ekine, December 15 2012.

companies, but by their ability to mobilise women to become political agents of change in their communities.

Appendix 6

Table A6.1: Local and regional women-led organisations in the dataset

No.	Name	Location	Founder	Executive Director	Website / E-mail
OIL REGION/ STATES					
1	Action for Community Development	South-south	Jacklyn Amiegbe-Obob	Sam Ajufoh	http://actforced.blogspot.co.il/ + actionforced@yahoo.com
2	Association for Women Improvement in the South-South	South-south	Roseline Okobiah	same	awiss20@yahoo.com
3	Centre for Development Support Initiatives (CEDSI)	South-south	Mina M. Ogbanga	same	www.cedsi-nigeria.org + cedsi2000@yahoo.com
4	Centre for Information and Development (CFID)	South-south	Belema Ogbuigwe	same	http://cfidev.wordpress.com/
5	Girls Power Initiative (GP)	South-south	Bene Madunagu	Grace Osakuet	http://www.gpinigeria.org
6	Niger Delta Peace Network Initiative	South-south	Queen Ehirim	same	http://www.glopin.org
7	Niger Delta Women's Forum	South-south	Dr. Esther Uduch	same	http://www.nigerdeltawomenforum.org/activities.html
8	Niger Delta Women's Movement for Peace and Development	South-south	Amb. Caroline Usikpedo-Omoniye	same	nigerdeltawomen@gmail.com
9	Association for Child Health (ACH)	Edo	Bella Akhagba	same	Bella@yahoo.com
10	United Women Front	Edo	Elizabeth Ativie	Same	http://www.unitedwomenfront.org/
11	Country Women Association of Nigeria (COWAN)	Ondo	Chief Bisi Ogunleye	same	http://www.lamf.org/projects/projects_cowan.php
12	Multiview Advocacy Network (MANET)	Ondo	Jewel Bolade	same	jewelbolade@yahoo.co.uk
13	Delta Women	Delta	Elsie Ijorogu-Reed	same	http://www.deltawomen.org + ereed@deltawomen.org
14	Dreamboat Development Theatre Foundation	Cross River	Rose Adanna	same	Contacted by phone.
15	Dynamic Youth Development Organisation (Dydo)	Akwa Ibom	Florence Patrick	same	Florencepatrick@yahoo.com
16	Federation of Akwa Ibom Women Associations (FAIWA)	Akwa Ibom	Ekaette Unoma Akpabio	same	Contacted by phone.
17	Women and Community Livelihood Foundation	Akwa Ibom	Uduak Itohowo Umoh	same	http://www.woclif.org
18	Women United for Economic Empowerment	Akwa Ibom	Mrs. Aniema A. Udofa	Iniobong E. Frank	http://wuee.org/
19	Women's Health & Economic Development Association	Akwa Ibom	Fidela Ebuk	same	wheda@skannet.com

20	Women's Initiative for Self-Actualization	Akwa Ibom	Mrs. Iniobong E. Frank	Felicia Robert	Contacted by phone.
21	Federation of Ogoni women Association	Rivers	Legborsi Saro Pyagbara	same	infomosop@ymail.com
22	Gender and Development Action (GADA)	Rivers	Amb. Nkoyo Toyo	Ada Agina-Ude	http://www.gadanigeria.org/
23	Tessy Mother and Child Development	Rivers	Theresa Itonyo Jaja	same	tessymotherandchild@yahoo.com
NON OIL REGIONS/ STATES					
1	Adolescent Health and Information Projects (AHIP)	North-west	Mairo V. Bello (Hajiya)	same	youngpeople@ahipnig.org
2	Community Empowerment International	South-west	Bunmi Tejumola	same	www.cepinig.org
3	Global Health and Awareness Research Foundation (GHARF)	South-east	Prof. Obioma C. Nwaorgu (President)	same	http://www.gharf-nigeria.org gharf_enugu@yahoo.com
4	Lift Up Care Foundation (LUCAF)	North-central	Lami Angela Ahmed	same	www.liftupcare.org
5	Change a Life Nigeria	Lagos	Funmi Iyand	Jumoke Giwa	http://changealifenigeria.org/
6	Youths Mentoring	Lagos	Taiwo Tosin	same	Contacted by phone.
7	Empowering Women for Excellence Initiative	Kaduna	Safiya Ibn Garba	same	http://www.eweing.org/sateig@icloud.com
8	Women's Initiative for Sustainable Environment (WISE)	Kaduna	Olanike Olubunmi Olugboji	same	http://www.wisenigeria.org/pages/about.html
9	FE Women and Youth in Development	Plateau	Rifkatu Ezekiel Kaze	same	rifkatu_kaze@yahoo.com
10	Mashiah Foundation	Plateau	Mary Beth and Bayo Oyebade	same	http://mashiahfoundation.org/
11	Progressive Women Forum	Ogun	Kolebaje Adetutu Makanjuola	same	http://progressivewomenforum.org
12	Widows Development Organisation	Enugu	Dr. Eleanor Nwadinobi	same	http://www.widoafrica.org/

Source: analysis based on the members-list of NNNGO, 2013.

Request sent to member-organisations of NNNGO, February 2013:

Dear friends,

I hope this message finds you well.

I am conducting a research on NGOs operating in Nigeria, with the assistance of NNNGO and its member-organisations.

Since not all organisations operate a website, I would be grateful if you respond to me directly, confirming:

1. Whether you have a website and its URL.
2. Where your organisation operates (i.e. in which state/ states/ region/ regions).
3. Name and gender of founder/s and Executive Director/ President.

Any further information you can provide on your organisation will be most helpful.

Please send your response to me directly at s.shochat@lse.ac.uk.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSIONS

Puzzled by the intensity of women's protest activity in response to oil production in the Niger Delta and other parts of the world, this thesis has been motivated by two key interests: exploring the effects of the 'natural resource curse' using a gender prism to increase our understanding of the impact of oil on women, and investigating women's political participation using a different conceptual framework and analytical tools to those typically used in the field of political participation. Thus, the thesis has assessed and brought together two different sub-fields within political science – the resource curse on one hand, and female political participation on the other. This combination was building on a previous account, which asserted that a country's oil endowment can explain variations in the economic and political empowerment of its female citizenry: developing countries whose economies are dominated by oil exports tend to exhibit exceptionally low levels of female labour force participation (FLFP), and small numbers of women in public office.¹ This tendency was linked to the Dutch Disease, which can lead to the contraction of sectors in which women are employed, thereby diminishing women's economic independence by pushing them out of the labour force, as well as affecting women's political influence – which is partly a function of their economic independence.

While this thesis accepted the outlines of this argument, it criticised several of the theoretical and methodological principles on which it was constructed. First, similarly to other studies in the resource curse literature, the account is based on an analysis of broad, cross-national datasets that largely fail to identify sub-national variations within oil-producing countries, and pinpoint with certainty the channels through which oil can undermine political institutions and political development. Second, it has been mostly employed to explain the lack of female empowerment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and is less applicable to other parts of the developing world, particularly oil-producing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. And third, it is based on a narrow definition of female political participation that focuses on formal representation, corresponding to the excessive emphasis on formal political activities prevalent in the general literature on political participation. This thesis has attempted to ameliorate these shortcomings by assessing whether the theory can explain sub-national differences

¹ Ross 2008, 2012.

within one oil-producing country outside the Middle East region, Nigeria, while modifying the conceptualisation and measurement of ‘political participation’ to include both formal and non-formal political channels.

The integration of these two key aims resulted in a fusion of several theoretical approaches and methodological tools utilised in the thesis, which attempted to provide a comprehensive answer to the thesis’ main question on the impact of oil on women’s political participation. The Nigerian case study, although trying due to the unavailability of long-term reliable data, served as a useful framework for the analysis of the effects of oil on women: Nigeria’s federal political arrangement provided a real possibility to analyse the link between oil and women sub-nationally in a systematic manner, while addressing factors that are typically overlooked in the cross-national setting, particularly the unique developmental history of the country, its ethnic, religious and social composition, and local and historical evidence. Moreover, the sub-national setting has offered the opportunity to study within-country variations between oil and non-oil producing sub-national units (states), identifying some effects of the resource curse at the local, community level. By considering sub-national variations and the effects of oil on women’s economic and political participation, the thesis has shed some new light on the impact of oil, female political participation, and the relationship between the two.

In the introduction to the thesis, I raised four sub-questions for which the thesis sought answers: (1) In what ways is women’s political participation different from men’s and what are the sources of this disparity? (2) Which channels generate the political mobilisation of women in general, and the political mobilisation of women in oil-rich countries in particular? (3) Do the effects of oil production differ along different forms of political participation? And if so, what are the implications of such finding for the way we should think about and assess women’s ‘political influence’? And, (4) can the effects of oil production vary within the same country between producing and non-producing sub-units? To conclude this research project, this chapter is structured along these four sub-questions. Each section provides a brief substantive answer to the question raised, reiterating the main arguments and summarising the key findings made throughout the empirical chapters in relation to that question and the thesis’ hypotheses. Within each section, I also reflect on my findings, point out their strengths, limitations and theoretical implications for the debates on the oil curse and political participation, raise questions that remain open and propose avenues for future research.

7.1 Women participate differently in politics

A key premise that underlies the thesis is that men and women's political participation takes different forms, largely due to women's historical exclusion from the public domain and the formal political arena. This suggestion is not novel in itself; feminist writers have long argued against the persistent focus on electoral processes in studies of political participation, pointing out that differences between men and women's participation lie not only in degree, but also in kind. The uniqueness of this thesis was in providing a new context within which this premise could be examined; the sub-national setting of oil and non-oil states offered the opportunity to assess diverse forms of participation at national and local levels, explore the sources for the disparity between men and women's political activities, and associate women's participation with their economic marginalisation based on the evaluation of women's political involvement in Nigeria across time. Based on the proposition that women do not participate less, but rather participate differently, I hypothesised that if women's political influence is to be measured not only by the number of women in the highest positions of political power, in which they are almost universally disadvantaged, but also by non-formal types of political participation, different results regarding women's political action would surface.

The findings in this thesis strongly reaffirm this notion. Evidence presented in Chapter 4 shows that women's legislative participation in Nigeria has been exceptionally low since 1960's independence, with no dramatic increase in female representatives in both national and state legislatures since the return to democratic rule in 1999: female seats averaged about five percent before and after 1999. Indeed, under military and civilian governments alike, women's participation in the formal political process remained extremely low across Nigeria. Measured solely by legislative participation, we may have concluded that women's political engagement in Nigeria has been marginal, ignoring both historical evidence on women's salient political leadership roles in traditional Nigerian society and evidence on different forms of participation. When these are taken into account, a different picture emerges; the analysis of protest and NGO activity presented in Chapters 5 and 6 illuminated the pervasiveness of women's grassroots political activity: all-women protests represented nine percent of all protests in Nigeria, while women-led NGOs represented 21.5 percent of all NGOs (these figures exclude women's participation in protests and NGOs that were not coded as 'women-led'). The *gender gap* in political participation, which is largely understood to refer to men's dominance in the political arena, acquires new meanings in light of this evidence;

women's vibrant engagement in non-formal activities alongside their negligible representation in legislatures suggests there is no consistent gender gap across all types of political behaviour.

Juxtaposing women's formal and non-formal political activities in Nigeria at the national and local levels provided evidence for another proposition made regarding the nature of women's political participation: that women are more likely to get involved in *local*, rather than national, political enterprises – both formal and non-formal. Assessing legislative participation, I found that fewer Nigerian states have sent women representatives to national houses of parliament over the three elections since the return to democracy, compared with the number of women holding public office in state legislatures: 12 states have sent women to Senate over the three elections and 23 to the House of Representatives, compared with 30 State Houses of Assembly that boasted female seats. Assessing protest and NGO activity, I found strong evidence for women's involvement in grassroots political activity at the local level: out of 52 women-led protests in the dataset, 50 took place locally in one state (and two at the FCT), while women-led NGOs represented 22 percent of all national NGOs, 41 percent of all regional NGOs, and 35 percent of all local NGOs. These findings demonstrate women's preference for, and most likely easier access to, local political institutions, reinforcing earlier findings on women's inclination to engage in local political initiatives involving issues that concern them and their communities directly.

Broadening the scope of participation to include protest and NGO activity, and the findings made regarding women's participation via these channels, challenge the widely accepted view that Nigerian women have become disengaged in, and disillusioned with, politics. As excerpts from press reports, women's testimonies and interviews with female activists throughout the thesis show, women-led anti-oil grassroots activity in Nigeria aimed at influencing choices at different levels of the political system, assigning their activity as 'political'. Furthermore, it suggested that men and women's experience of new social orders could be fundamentally different, leading to the emergence of a gendered response. Contrasting men and women's experience in Nigeria under colonialism and under oil-supported military governments suggested that, in both periods, while men continued to enjoy access to formal channels of participation through which they were able to vent political grievances, women's action took the form of the only political channel available to them – grassroots political activity. Men in positions of power had little incentive to take action against a system they benefited from

and aligned with the government, while disenfranchised men (particularly, youth) turned to militancy funded by criminal activity, whose political goals are questionable.

These results highlight the need to move more powerfully within the study of political participation towards a view of men and women as engaging in different types of political activities. This view should be reflected in the conceptualisation and measurement of political participation to include various types of activities; narrowly focusing on electoral activities – voting, political party membership, or legislative participation – activities that lend themselves more easily to measurement, not only perpetuates the misevaluation of women as political actors, but also risks importing a gender bias into our categories of analysis. Indeed, this thesis proposes more attention should be paid to gender in any macro-social analysis. Although feminist scholars have challenged the category of women as a unit of analysis on the grounds that it ignores the diversity of women's existence and neglects the high degree of differentiation amongst women, this thesis promotes the idea that gender cuts across other areas of social stratification. Despite women's diverse experiences and the important differences between them based on class, race, ethnicity and education, women's common denominator remains a socially imposed gender-based segregation, supported by ideologies that justify their social differentiation from men.

While the distinction between formal and non-formal political participation made in the thesis allowed investigating various forms of female political activity, important areas of formal participation remained unexplored due to the unavailability of gender-disaggregated data in Nigeria; data on formal activities such as voting, party membership, and political campaigning at national and state levels could have shed more light on the effects of oil on women's formal political participation, as well as on the links between various forms of participation. Indeed, the findings in the thesis raise important questions on the relationship between formal and non-formal political activities. If different traditions of participation emerge as a result of different opportunities, as the thesis suggests, would oil (or other social-economic transformations) affect other disenfranchised groups similarly? Moreover, is non-formal participation necessarily a *substitute* for formal channels? In other words, if men and women were given equal access to participation in the formal economy and political system, would non-formal types of political participation be replaced by formal ones or remain complemented by them? Finally, are formal and non-formal types of participation

equally important, or indeed equally useful, as political channels? These questions remain open for future research.

7.2 Women mobilise over economic marginalisation

Another important building block in the theoretical framework of this thesis is the link between women's labour force participation and their political mobilisation. Although work is not the only path to female political empowerment, a substantial fraction of the gender gap in political activity has been explained in the literature by gender differences in workplace experience; work outside the home has consequences for the accumulation of resources, connections and orientations that foster the skills required for political participation (largely, I observed, *formal* participation but also non-formal). Building on this link, the thesis has argued that oil production can negatively affect women's work, with implications for their political participation (to which I turn in the next section). If household incomes in oil-producing countries are kept high thanks to male wages and government subsidies, female labour supply would be low as women lack economic incentives to join the labour force, as seen across the MENA region. Moreover, oil-related Dutch Disease symptoms can lead to the shrinking of sectors in which women are employed (agriculture and manufacturing), reducing the demand for female workers and pushing women out of the labour force. As the latter effect is more prominent in Nigeria, *H1* asserted that oil will reduce FLFP, assuming the economy has experienced Dutch Disease and that gender-based occupational segregation is high.

To the well-established link between women's labour force participation and political empowerment, this thesis added a unique element suggesting that decreased job opportunities and the economic marginalisation of women can also lead to their political mobilisation via *non-formal* types of participation, particularly protest activity. Historical evidence brought in Chapters 2 and 3 attests to the importance of this mechanism in oil and non-oil contexts: when women's traditional or existing work patterns suffer due to the emergence of a new social order that effects them directly, women tend to respond by mounting protest campaigns. I further theorised that in oil-producing sub-national units, women's economic marginalisation would be more acute than in non-oil units within the same country due to environmental degradation and militarisation. Since in oil-producing units, women can more directly link the oil industry with their loss of employment opportunities (as well as being subjected to harsher physical conditions), they would be more prone to mobilise against it. Thus, *H2* asserted that in oil-producing sub-national

units, FLFP will decrease further compared to non-oil units, assuming that environmental degradation and militarisation are more prominent in these units.

Evidence presented in Chapter 3 on the effects of oil on women's FLFP at the national level is tentatively consistent with *H1*. It showed that following the mid-1970s' oil boom, the Nigerian economy suffered severe Dutch Disease symptoms, which by the late 1970s led to the contraction of the agriculture sector, where the vast majority of female workers in Nigeria are concentrated. Furthermore, official data suggested that the expansion of the non-traded sector at the expense of the traded sector during the oil boom affected mainly women: while men were absorbed in the growing non-traded sector, women who migrated to urban areas faced fierce gender-based occupational segregation and little employment opportunities, largely in unskilled and low-level jobs. Following the oil boom, FLFP in urban areas in Nigeria declined (while that of men remained at the same level) and female urban unemployment rate increased (at a higher rate than men's). Women who were left behind in rural areas faced a stagnating agricultural sector, as well as extra workload at the absence of men who migrated to urban areas in search of jobs. Notably, while official figures show a clear decline in FLFP rates following the assumption of oil production in Nigeria, consistently with the hypothesis, the changes observed could be the cumulative result of a number of factors that cannot be fully separated from oil in the Nigerian case; Nigeria's independence, the commencement of oil export, and military rule have coincided.

Data gathered on women's work in Nigeria at the sub-national level to compare the nine oil and 27 non-oil producing states provided inconsistent evidence for *H2*. Across four indicators used to measure women's work per state – FLFP, the share of female farmers, female unemployment and female-headed households – the average of the group of oil states exceeded that of non-oil states (most significantly, female-headed households were 2.5 times higher in oil states). While higher FLFP and female farmers rates in oil states go against the hypothesis, this finding should be interpreted with caution; data were available for only a cross-sectional analysis, and there is evidence to suggest that FLFP rates in Northern Muslim states are underreported. Moreover, a comparison of oil and non-oil states specifically in the Christian-dominated South showed that oil states scored higher on average compared to their Southern counterparts on the share of female farmers. Since women across the South have been similarly active as farmers prior to the commencement of oil production, high shares of female farmers should be witnessed across all Southern states, both oil and non-oil producing. The

difference can be attributed to the migration of male farmers away from rural oil-producing areas, resulting in higher shares of female farmers in these areas, which is confirmed by the exceptionally high levels of female-headed households in the Niger Delta.

Although numerical data at the sub-national level did not substantiate that women's work in oil states suffered worse compared to women's work in non-oil states – indeed, the lack of data for time series tests leaves findings inconclusive – the analysis of over 60 testimonies of village women from across the Niger Delta provided significant evidence on the local effects of oil on women's work in oil communities. In testimonies, women directly linked the oil industry's practices and operations with the lack of employment opportunities in the region, as well as with a rise in poverty, prostitution, insecurity and crime. In particular, women affirmed they had suffered losses to their livelihoods due to oil-related environmental degradation – the pollution of farmland, fishing ponds and rivers by oil spills and gas flaring – and regional militarisation, which was accompanied by brutal acts of terror and intimidation against local populations, including rape. The combination of historical, statistical and testimonial evidence suggested that while Dutch Disease symptoms in Nigeria may have affected the country's FLFP as a whole, Niger Delta women have borne the brunt of the negative effects of oil production, suffering greater economic and social marginalisation.

These findings add to our understanding of both the effects of the resource curse at the local level and its particular impact on women, with wider theoretical implications for the literature on women's political participation. Following the long-standing emphasis on women's *enhanced* workforce participation as a path to their political empowerment, the proposition that women's *decreased* workforce participation can also mobilise women may be generalised beyond the context of oil to other settings in which women's job opportunities or financial autonomy have declined, for example countries in which economic growth has not been conducive to women's economic empowerment (such as India). Do threats from other sources to women's livelihoods generate protest, or is oil unique in facilitating this chain of causation? Further research could examine whether women's political activity has been triggered by other sources of negative impact to their economic position, shedding more light on this link. Evidently, women's participation in the labour force should be prevalent *prior to* the appearance of any economic change. This scope condition is essential: if FLFP is initially low, as it has been in the MENA region prior to the oil era, women would have little to lose, and thus

little to mobilise against. As I have stressed throughout the thesis, historical evidence on women's work would be key for interpreting contemporary political activity. Indeed, historical evidence was crucial in my analysis to revealing the strong roots of women's protest activity in response to their economic marginalisation.

7.3 Oil may have a dual effect on women's political participation

Since oil production can negatively affect women's work, and based on the proposition that both increases and decreases in FLFP can contribute to women's political empowerment – increased workforce participation can empower women to participate in formal types of activities, while diminished workforce participation can empower them to mobilise through non-formal activities – I hypothesised that oil may have a dual effect on women's political participation: decreasing formal and increasing non-formal participation, both through oil's impact on women's work. The first effect would be witnessed at the national level, since Dutch Disease symptoms impact the national economy, thereby affecting the entire population of women of working age in the country. It could also be witnessed at the local level, in sub-national units (oil or non-oil producing) in which traded sectors are more prominent, or in oil-producing units that are subjected to environmental degradation and militarisation, which could further diminish women's work. The second effect – enhanced non-formal political participation – should be witnessed specifically in oil-producing sub-national units, since women who are subjected to the localised effects of oil production can more directly link the oil industry to their loss of work opportunities, and mobilise against it.

This set of propositions was articulated in three hypotheses: *H3* suggested that oil production will reduce women's formal political participation, assuming national FLFP has decreased; *H4* suggested that oil production in sub-national units will reduce women's formal political participation *further* compared with non-oil sub-national units; and *H5* suggested that oil production in sub-national units will enhance women's non-formal political participation in those units compared with non oil-producing units, assuming the conditions specified above occurred. Evidence from the Nigerian case indicated that another condition might be necessary for *H5* to materialise: a historical engagement of women in non-formal activity may be underlying their propensity to become politically active in response to oil production (or other sources of economic marginalisation). Thus, the thesis set out to examine women's formal and non-formal political participation across Nigeria. Formal participation was evaluated by the only

indicator for which data were available per state – female legislative participation in National and State Houses of Assembly. Obtaining data on non-formal participation in Nigeria was far more challenging; focusing on women-led protest and NGO activity, I utilised the LexisNexis service for data on protests in Nigeria, and the members-list of a local umbrella organisation of NGOs for data on women-led organisations, culminating in the creation of two original datasets.

Evidence presented in Chapter 4 on the effects of oil on women's legislative participation in Nigeria provided tentative support for *H3*. Although female representation in the Senate, House of Representatives and State Houses of Assembly gradually increased between the elections that followed the return to democratic rule, the average across the three elections remained similar to the average during military rule. While various factors may have contributed to this poor record – the legacy of single-sex political system inherited from the colonial period, the male-dominated culture of military rule, the violent and corrupt nature of elections in Nigeria, strong prejudices against female politicians, and the failure of the democratic process itself – oil has arguably *enabled* the perpetuation of these conditions. Furthermore, evidence suggested that oil's impact on women's labour force participation has undermined their ability to run for elected office; female candidates reported the lack of financial resources as their most significant constraint. However, while women's formal political participation in Nigeria has been low, oil production high, and women's labour force participation demonstrably diminished due to Dutch Disease symptoms, the short timeframe available for analysis (1999-2007) did not allow to fully separate, with high certainty, the effects of oil from the effects of other factors.

Evidence on the effects of oil on women's legislative participation at the sub-national level was inconsistent with *H4*. Assessing the number of female seats in the three legislatures following the three elections (1999-2007) revealed that oil states had higher averages in the Senate and State Houses of Assembly and only a slightly lower average in the House of Representatives. Excluding the nine *strictly-Muslim* states from the group of non-oil states did not change the direction of the results, although the group's average declined. T-tests and further regression analysis, which controlled for Islam and ethnic origin, confirmed that the differences between the two groups of states were not statistically significant. While these findings do not support *H4*, they are not surprising: the small number of states in the analysis (36) and the very low shares of female representation in Nigeria overall (averaging 5 percent) makes differences between

oil and non-oil states substantively small. Moreover, since women in the oil-producing South have been historically active politically, we should expect to see much higher levels of female representation in the South (both oil and non-oil states). The findings suggest Nigeria's oil revenues might have 'evened out' female representation across the country.

Evidence in Chapters 5 and 6 on women's protest and NGO activity, on the other hand, provided ample support for *H5*. The press analysis of 575 news items reporting on protests with political objectives in Nigeria (between 2000 and 2007) demonstrated that the share of women-led protests in oil states overwhelmingly exceeded that of non-oil states – an 18.2 percent versus a 4.7 percent share (excluding Lagos). When both Lagos and the FCT (Nigeria's commercial and official capitals) were excluded, oil states were responsible for producing 77 percent of women-led protests reported in Nigeria, a striking finding considering the small number of states in the group. The analysis of 363 member-organisations of the local umbrella network NNNGO provided further confirmation for oil's effects on women's non-formal political activity in oil-producing states: women-led organisations represented a 48 percent share in oil-producing localities, compared with a 26 percent share elsewhere in Nigeria. The results translated to an average of 1.6 women-led NGO in each oil state compared to an average of 0.3 women-led NGO in each non-oil state. Case study analysis of three states, one oil and two non-oil producing, across the two chapters unveiled through process tracing the chain of causation from oil to women's non-formal political activity.

Thus, in Nigeria, the resource curse enhanced women's political participation by encouraging non-formal mobilization in response to the damaging effects of oil production at the local level; the accumulation of evidence in the thesis suggests that women's economic marginalisation, women-led protests, and women's NGO activity in the Niger Delta can be attributed to the effects of oil development. Based on the Nigerian case, scope conditions may be identified, under which the mechanism would apply (either in oil-producing national or sub-national units): women should be economically active prior to the assumption of oil production in sectors that suffer due to oil-related transformations, such as agriculture or manufacturing; women's unearned income should not increase through oil-funded higher household incomes or government subsidies, offsetting their own economic marginalisation; strong gender-based occupational segregation should be in place, to prevent women from migrating to other sectors of the economy; and there should be pre-existing historical foundations for women's non-

formal political activity, as seen in Nigeria. Examining whether these conditions are observable in other countries or unique to the Nigerian case remains open to future research. Further work can also examine whether the theory holds when other revenue-inducing economic transitions – foreign aid, economic growth, or the export of other natural resources – result in negative changes to women's work.

7.4 Concluding remarks

The links between oil production, women's work, and women's political participation were examined in the thesis in a sub-national comparative research design. This was based on the assumption that aggregated national figures could hide important sub-national variations, which could in turn be related to variations in oil production between states in the Nigerian federation. While the sub-national investigation in Nigeria was trying – objective data at the state level were difficult to obtain – it encouraged creativity and resourcefulness through the search for valuable sources of information, as well as a bottom-up approach to the process of data collection. The results of the analysis demonstrate the importance of such exercise; the thesis provided strong evidence on differences between oil and non-oil states in regards to women's work (albeit, against the hypothesis), and women-led non-formal political activity (supporting the hypothesis). The sub-national research design has also shed new light on the local impact of the resource curse, adding to our knowledge and understanding of both the effects of oil on political action and female political mobilisation.

The findings in the thesis have broader theoretical implications about the nature and the study of political action: if oil is individually disempowering of women's political activity through its impact on their economic resources, yet women's non-formal group participation increases, then this suggests that oil promotes the collective empowerment of women. This finding indicates that both the resource curse, and political participation, have a deeply social dimension that political science research often fails to capture, and reflects the individualistic methodological bias prevalent in the field. It further suggests there are deep links between political participation and collective action, which are typically studied in isolation, and that the dismissal of collective action as non-political, as it typically takes place outside formal political institutions, is largely unwarranted. To better understand the links between the two, it is important to recognise both the intrinsic and instrumental value of women's political participation and the wide variety of expressions it can take.

Bibliography

- Abigmessage, 2010. Washington D.C. Mosque – Muslim Women Demand End to Sex Segregation Again. *Abigmessage*, January 2 2010. Available at: <http://www.abigmessage.com/washington-dc-mosque-muslim-women-demand-end-to-sex-segregation-again.html> [Accessed January 30 2010].
- Abu Nasr J., Azzam H. & Khoury N., eds., 1985. *Women and Development in the Arab World*. Leiden: Mouton.
- Acemoglu D., Johnson S. & Robinson J.A., 2003. An African Success Story: Botswana. In: Rodrik D., ed. *Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives on Economic Growth*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Chapter 3.
- Achen C.H. & Snidal D., 1989. Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies. *World Politics*, 41 (2), 143-169.
- Addison T., Le Billon P. & Mansoob M.S., 2001. Conflict in Africa: The Cost of Peaceful Behaviour. WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2001/51, Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research of the UN University.
- Adeyemo S., 1987. Women in Politics: A Move Away from Tokenism. *The Nigerian Interpreter*, 1 (3), December, 21.
- AfricaFocus, 2012. Odi Massacre Statements. Available at: <http://www.africafocus.org/docs99/odi9912.php> [Accessed July 20 2012].
- Ahmad-Khan S., 1994. *Nigeria: the Political Economy of Oil*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Ahmed L., 1992. *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- AllAfrica, 2010. Nigeria: Pregnant Osun Women's Protest. *AllAfrica*, January 19 2010. Available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201001191002.html> [Accessed January 27 2010].
- Abcnews, 2010. Ukrainian Female Group Femen Protests Topless. *Abcnews*, January 14 2010. Available at: <http://abcnews.go.com/International/photos/ukrainian-female-group-femen-protest-topless-15468165?page=8/image-15468330> [Accessed January 27 2010].
- Agarwal B., 1992. The Gender and Environment Debate: Lessons from India. *Feminist Studies*, 18 (1), 119-158.
- Almond G. & Verba S., 1963. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Andersen K., 1975. Working Women and Political Participation, 1952-1972. *American Journal of Political Science*, 19 (3), August, 439-453.
- Andersen K. & Cook E.A., 1985. Women, Work and Political Attitudes. *American Journal of political Science*, 29 (3), 606-625.
- Anker R., 1998. *Gender and Jobs: Sex Segregation of Occupations in the World*. Geneva: International Labour Office.
- Anugwom E.E., 2002. Voluntary Associations and Development in South-eastern Nigeria. Research Report prepared for the Centre for Research and Documentation (CRD), Kano, Nigeria.
- Anugwom E.E. & Anugwom K.N., 2009. The Other Side of Civil Society Story: Women, Oil and the Niger Delta Environment Struggle in Nigeria. *GeoJournal*, 74, 333-346.
- Aragon F.M. & Rud J.P., 2013. Natural Resources and Local Communities: Evidence from a Peruvian Gold Mine. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 5 (2), 1-25.

- Arowolo D. & Aluko F.S., 2010. Women and Political Participation in Nigeria. *European Journal of Social Sciences*, 14 (4), 581-593.
- Aruwan S., 2011. Nigeria: Kaduna State – 11 Years After the Shariah Crisis. *AllAfrica*, February 22 2011. Available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201102230098.html> [Accessed March 23 2013].
- Asadi M., 2010. Militarization and Gender: Pathways to a Violence-Based Patriarchy. *Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict*, 2010-2012, 100-121.
- Aslaksen S., 2010. Oil and Democracy: More Than a Cross-Country Correlation? *Journal of Peace Research*, 47 (4), 421-431.
- Assaad R., 2004. *Why Did Economic Liberalization Lead to Demonization of the Labor Force in Morocco and De-feminization in Egypt?* University of Minnesota.
- Asuni J.B., 2009. *Blood Oil in the Niger Delta*. United States Institute of Peace. Available at: http://www.usip.org/files/blood_oil_nigerdelta.pdf [Accessed January 20 2011].
- Auty R.M., 1993. *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis*. Routledge: London and New York.
- 2001. *Resource Abundance and Economic Development*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- 2004. Natural Resources and Civil Strife: A Two-Stage Process. *Geopolitics*, 9 (1), 29-49.
- Awoyemi T.T. & Adeoti A.I., 2006. Gender Inequalities and Economic Efficiency: New Evidence from Cassava-based Farm Holdings in Rural South-Western Nigeria. *African Development Review*, 18 (3), 428-443.
- Bahramitash R., 2002. Islamic Fundamentalism and Women's Employment in Indonesia. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 16 (2), 255-272.
- 2003. Islamic Fundamentalism and Women's Economic Role: the Case of Iran. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 16 (4), 551-568.
- Baldwin R.E., 1966. *Economic Development and Export Growth: A Study of Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Baldwin-Edwards M., 2005. *Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean*. University Research Institute for Urban Environment and Human Resources, Panteion University, Greece.
- Bannon I. & Collier P., 2003. *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Barikor-Wiwa D., 1997. The Role of Women in the Struggle for Environmental Justice in Ogoni. *Cultural Survival*, Fall 1997. Available at: <http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/nigeria/role-women-struggle-environmental-justice-ogoni> [Accessed April 18 2012].
- Barnes S.H. & Kasse M., 1979. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Basden G.T., 1982. *Among the Ibos of Nigeria*. Ibadan, Reprint Edition.
- BBC News, 2010. Clinton will fight 'like Rocky'. *BBC News*, April 2 2008. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7325342.stm> [Accessed October 28 2011].
- Beblawi H., 1987. The Rentier State in the Arab World. In: Beblawi H. & Luciani G., eds. *The Rentier State*. New York: Croom Helm. Chapter 2.
- Becker G.S., 1991. *A Treatise on the Family*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

- Beckwith K., 1986. *American Women and Political Participation: the impacts of Work, Generation and Feminism*. Greenwood Press, New York.
- Beneria L. & Roldan M., 1987. *The Crossroads of Class & Gender: Industrial Homework, Subcontracting, and Household Dynamics in Mexico City*. Women in Culture and Society. University of Chicago Press.
- Bevan D., Collier P. & Gunning J.W., 1999. *The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: Nigeria and Indonesia*. Oxford University Press.
- Bhowmick N., 2013. The Real Shame: India's Patriarchy Roars Back After Delhi Gang Rape. *Time*, January 18 2013. Available at: <http://world.time.com/2013/01/18/the-real-shame-indias-patriarchy-roars-back-after-delhi-gang-rape/> [Accessed: February 2 2013].
- Bienen H., 1988. Nigeria: From Windfall Gains to Welfare Losses? In: Gelb A. (ed.) *Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse?* New York: Oxford UP, 227-260.
- Birdsall N. & Subramanian A., 2004. Saving Iraq From Its Oil. *Foreign Affairs*, 83, 4.
- Black J. & McGlen N., 1979. Male-Female Political Involvement Differentials in Canada, 1965-1974. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 12 (3), September, 471-497.
- Blaydes L. & Linzer D.A., 2008. The Political Economy of Women's Support for Fundamentalist Islam. *World Politics*, 60 (4), 576-609.
- Bodin J., 1576. *Six Books of a Commonwealth*. Tooley M.J., ed. and trans. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967.
- Boserup E., 1970. *Women's Role in Economic Development*. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.
- Bouton C.A., 1993. *The Flour War: Gender, Class, and Community in Late Ancien Régime French Society*. University Park, Pa.
- BP, 2014. BP Statistical Review of World Energy. London: British Petroleum.
- Bravo-Ortega C. & De Gregorio J., 2001. *The Relative Richness of the Poor? Natural Resources, Human Capital, and Economic Growth*. Mimeo, University of California, Berkeley.
- Budina N., Pang G. & Wijnbergen S., 2007. *Nigeria's Growth Record: Dutch Disease or Debt Overhang?* World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4256, June.
- Burke J., 2013. Rape Protests Spread Beyond India. *The Guardian*, January 4 2013. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/04/rape-protests-spread-beyond-india> [Accessed February 2 2013].
- Burns N., Schlozman K.L. & Verba S., 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.
- Butler D. & Kavanagh D., 1980. *The British General Election of 1979*. London: Macmillan.
- Campbell A., Converse P., Miller W., & Stokes D., 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960, 483-493.
- Campbell C.J., 2013. The Oil Age in Perspective: Energy Exploration and Exploitation. Volume 31 (2). Available at: http://aspo.ch/wp-content/uploads/studies/5B11%5D%20Campbell_Oil%20Age%20in%20Perspectives_2013.pdf [Accessed January 14 2014].
- Caraway T.L., 2009. Comparative Political Economy, Gender, and Labor Markets. *Politics and Gender* 5 (4), 568-575.
- Caselli F. & Michaels G., 2013. Do Oil Windfalls Improve Living Standards? Evidence from Brazil. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5 (1), 208-238.

- CAWP (The Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University), 2012. Women in the U.S. Senate 1922-2014. Available at: http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/levels_of_office/documents/senate.pdf [Accessed March 25 2014].
- Cayford S., 1996. The Ogoni Uprising: Oil, Human Rights, and a Democratic Alternative in Nigeria. *Africa Today*, 43 (2), 183-198.
- Charrad M.M., 2001. *States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 2009. Kinship, Islam, or Oil: Culprits of Gender Inequality? *Politics and Gender*, 5 (4), 546-553.
- Chaudhary K.A., 1994. Economic Liberalisation and the Lineages of the Rentier State. *Comparative Politics*, 27 (1), 1-25.
- Chhibber P., 2003. Why Are Some Women Politically Active? The Household, Public Space, and Political Participation in India. In: R. Inglehart, ed. *Islam, Gender, Culture, and Democracy*, ON: de Sitter.
- Christy, C., 1974. *The Political Participation of Women in Mass Industrial Societies*. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Chicago, August.
- Chuku G.I., 1995. Women in the Economy of Igboland, 1900 to 1970: a Survey. *African Economic History*, 23, 37-50.
- 1999. From Petty Traders to International Merchants: A Historical Account of Three IGBO Women of Nigeria in Trade and Commerce, 1886 to 1970. *African Economic History*, 27, 1-22.
- Chukwuka O.I et al., 2013. Oil Exploitation and Agricultural Commodity Export in Nigeria: An Empirical Evaluation of the Extent and Impact of the Dutch Disease. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 14 (1), 1-9.
- Clark C. & Clark J., 1986. *Models of Gender and Political Participation: The Impacts of Work, Generation, and Feminism*. New York: Greenwood Press
- Clark R., Ramsbey T.W. & Adler E.S., 1991. Culture, Gender, and Labor Force Participation: A Cross-National Study. *Gender and Society*, 5 (1), 47-66.
- Climate & Capitalism, 2012. Shell versus Human Rights in the Niger Delta. *Climate & Capitalism*, November 14 2011. Available at: <http://climateandcapitalism.com/2011/11/14/oil-companies-versus-human-rights-in-the-niger-delta/> [Accessed June 20 2013].
- CNN, 2013. Fastest Growing Boomtowns. *CNN Money*, March 19 2013. Available at: http://money.cnn.com/gallery/pf/2013/03/19/oil-boomtowns/index.html?iid=SF_PF_Lead [Accessed July 26 2013].
- Collier P. & Goderis B., 2009. Structural Policies for Shock-Prone Developing Countries. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 61 (4), 703-726.
- Collier P. & Hoeffler A., 2000. Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars. *Working Paper WPS 2000-18*, World Bank, Washington D.C.
- 2002. Greed and Grievance in African Civil Wars. Mimeo, World Bank, Washington D.C.
- 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56 (4), 563-595.
- Conge P.J., 1988. The Concept of Political Participation: Toward a Definition. *Comparative Politics*, 20 (2), 241-249.
- Conway M., 2001. Women and Political Participation. *Political Science and Politics*, 34 (2), 231-233.

- Corden W.B. & Neary J. P., 1982. Booming Sector and De-Industrialization in a Small Open Economy. *The Economist Journal*, 92 (368), 825-848.
- Cortright D., 2008. *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas*. Cambridge University Press, p. 147.
- Cowell A., 2002. Violence in Nigeria Drives Out Miss World Event. *New York Times*, November 23 2002. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/23/world/religious-violence-in-nigeria-drives-out-miss-world-event.html> [Accessed July 28 2012].
- Cryptome, 2012. Women's Protests Worldwide. Available at: <http://cryptome.org/info/women-protest5/women-protest5.htm> [Accessed: March 22 2013].
- Damachi U.G. & Seibel H.D., 1973. *Social Change and Economic Development in Nigeria*. Praeger Publishers: New York, Washington, London.
- Danjuma T., 1994. Revenue Sharing and the Political Economy of Nigerian Federalism. *Nigerian Journal of Federalism*, 1, 43-68.
- Dashwood H.S., 2000. *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transformation*. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
- Desai R.M., 2012. India's Protests as a Social 'Stress Test'. *Brookings*, December 28 2012. Available at: <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/12/28-india-gate-protests-desai> [Accessed: July 27 2013].
- Diaz G., 1985. Roles and Contradictions of Chilean women in the Resistance and Exile. In M. Davies, ed. *Third World: Second Sex*. London: Zed Books.
- DNV (Det Norske Veritas), 2005. Validation Report: Pan Ocean Gas Utilization Project in Nigeria. Report Nu. 2005-1593, Revision Nu. 01.
- Dolan C.S & Sorby K., 2003. Gender and Employment in High-Value Agriculture Industries. *Agriculture and Rural Development*, Working Paper 7, The World Bank.
- Doppelhofer G., Miller R. & Sala-i-Martin X., 2000. Determinants of Long-Term Growth: a Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach. *NBER Working Paper No. 7750*, June.
- Dowse R. & Hughes J., 1972. *Political Sociology*. London and New York: John Wiley.
- Drew A., 1995. Female Consciousness and Feminism in Africa. *Theory and Society*, 24 (1), February, 1-33.
- Dube O. & Vargas J., 2009. Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia. Working Paper, New York University and Universidad del Rosario.
- Dublin T., 1975. Women, Work, and Protest in the Early Lowell Mills. *Labor History*, 16, 99-116.
- Dunning T., 2007. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*. Department of Political Science, Yale University.
- 2005. Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49 (4), 451-482.
- Duverger M., 1955. *The Political Role of Women*. Paris: UNESCO.
- DW (Delta Women), 2013. Delta Women: Our Projects. Available at: <http://www.deltawomen.org/projects.html> [Accessed July 25 2013].
- Eboiyehi F.A., Bankole A.O. & Eromonsele O.A, 2006. Work, Women Employment and Feminization of Poverty in Nigeria. *Gender and behaviour*, 4 (1), 642-658.
- EDB (Economic Development Board), 2012. EDB Issues White Paper on Women's Role in Bahrain's Economy. Available at: <http://enewsletter.bahrainedb.com/en/default.asp?action=article&id=156> [Accessed January 20 2013].

- Eftimie A., Heller K. & Strongman J., 2009. Gender Dimensions of the Extractive Industries: Mining for Equity. The World Bank, August 2009, Extractive Industries and Development Series no. 8.
- Ehtisham A. & Singh R., 2003. *Political Economy of Oil-Revenue Sharing in a Developing Country: Illustrations from Nigeria*. IMF Working Paper WP/03/1.
- Ekine S., 2001. *Blood and Oil: Testimonies of Violence from Women of the Niger Delta*. Niger Delta Women for Justice.
- Personal interview [via Skype]. December 15 2012.
- Engels, F. 1978 (1884). The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. In *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. R. C. Tucker. New York: Norton.
- Englebert P. & Ron J., 2004. Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville's Ambivalent Resource Curse. *Comparative Politics*, 37 (1), 61-81.
- EWEI (Empowering Women for Excellence Initiative), 2012. Annual Report. Kaduna, December 2012.
- 2013. Annual Report. Kaduna, December 2013.
- Ezeala-Harrison F., 1993. Structural Re-Adjustment in Nigeria: Diagnosis of a Severe Dutch Disease Syndrome. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 52 (2), 193-208.
- Fadipe N.A., 1970. The Yoruba. In: *The Sociology of the Yoruba*. Okediji F.O. & O.O. Okediji, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. Chapter 5.
- Falola T., 1995. Gender, Business, and Space Control: Yoruba Market Women and Power. *African Market Women and Economic Power: The Role of Women in African Economic Development*. Los Angeles, Greenwood Press.
- FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), 1995. *Women, Agriculture and Rural Development: A Synthesis Report of the Africa Region*. Economic and Social Development Department.
- Farah B. & Jennings M., 1978. *Ideology, Gender, and Political Action: A Cross-National Survey*. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. New York, August.
- Fearon J., 2005. Primary Commodities Exports and Civil War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49 (4), 483-507.
- Fearon J. & Laitin D., 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review*, 97 (1), 75-91.
- Flexner E., 1975. *Century of Struggle: the Women's Rights Movement in the United States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 179-180.
- Flora C.B & Lynn N.B., 1974. Women and Political Socialization: Considerations of the Impact of Motherhood. In: *Women in Politics*, ed. Jaquette J.S., New York: John Wiley and Sons, 37-53.
- Flora, C.B., 1977. Working-Class Women's Political Participation: its Potential in Developed Countries. In: M. Githens & J. Prestage, eds., *A Portrait of Marginality: The Political Behavior of American Women*, New York: McKay, pp. 75-95.
- ForumFed (Forum of Federations). List of Federal States. Available at: <http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/federalismbycountry.php> [Accessed August 27 2014].
- Frederiksen E.H., 2006. Labor Mobility, Household Production, and the Dutch Disease. Working paper, University of Copenhagen.
- Freedom House, 2010. Zimbabwe: Overview. Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/zimbabwe#.U_mjwkg09Z0 [Accessed January 30 2010].

- Friedan B., 1963. *The Feminine Mystique*. Penguin Modern Classics.
- Friedman T.L., 2006. The First Law of Petropolitics. *Foreign Policy*. May/June.
- Friends of the Earth Nigeria, 2002. A Blanket of Silence: Images of the Odi Genocide. 60. Available at: <http://www.eration.org/publications/silence.pdf> [Accessed July 25 2013].
- 2005. Gas Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, Environmental and Economic Monstrosity.
- Frynas J.G., 2001. Corporate and State Responses to Anti-Oil Protests in the Niger Delta. *African Affairs*, 100, 27-54.
- Gavin M., 1993. Adjusting to a Terms of Trade Shock: Nigeria, 1972-88. In: Dornbusch R. ed. *Policymaking in the Open Economy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Chapter 2.
- GCC Charter, 1981. Article 4. Available at: <http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/indexfc7a.html> [Accessed: June 10 2012].
- Gaily H.A., 1970. *The Road to Abe: A study of British Administrative Policy in Eastern Nigeria*. New York: New York University Press.
- Gelb A.H., 1988. *Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse?* Oxford University Press, New York.
- Gerring J., 2004. What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? *The American Political Science Review*, 98 (2), 341-354.
- Ghazvinian J., 2007. The Curse of Oil. *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Winter 2007. Available at: <http://www.vqronline.org/vqr-portfolio/curse-oil> [Accessed June 24 2012].
- Gittell M. & Shtob T., 1980. Changing Women's Roles in Political Volunteerism and Reform of the City. *Signs*, 5 (3), S67-S78.
- Goldberg E., Wibbels E. & Mvukiyeh E., 2008. Lessons from Strange Cases: Democracy, Development, and the Resource Curse in the U.S. States. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41 (4-5), 477-514.
- Goldenberg S., 2008. What Hillary Has Done for Women in Politics. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/08/hillaryclinton.usa> [Accessed 24 February 2010].
- GREEN M.M., 1964. *Igbo Village Affairs*. London: Frank Cass & Co., New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
- Gueneheux D., 2013. Niger Delta's Women Movement for Peace and Development Should Be Heard. *CIVICUS*, June 28 2013. Available at: <http://blogs.civikus.org/civikus/2013/06/28/niger-delta-womens-movement-for-peace-and-development-should-to-be-heard/> [Accessed 28 2013].
- Gulf Daily News, 2013. Women playing vital role in Bahrain's economy. June 18 2013. Available at: <http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=355567> [Accessed January 20 2013].
- Gylfason T., 2000. Resources, Agriculture and Economic Growth in Economies in Transition. *Kyklos*, 53 (4), 545-580.
- 2001. Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development. *European Economic Review*, 45 (4-6), 847-859.
- Habakkuk H.J., 1962. *American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century: the Search for Labour-Saving Inventions*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Haber S. & Menaldo V., 2007. Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse. Stanford Center for International Development, Working Paper No. 351, Stanford University.

- Haider R., 1994. Women, Poverty and the Environment. In: Rahman A. Atiq. et al, eds, *Environment and Development in Bangladesh*. Vol. 1, Dhaka: University Press Limited (UPL).
- Hansen S., Franz L. & Metemeyer-Mays M., 1977. Women's Political Participation and Policy Preferences. *Social Science Quarterly*, 56 (4), 576-590.
- Henig R.B. & Henig S., 2001. *Women and Political Power: Europe since 1945*. Routledge London.
- Herb M., 2005. No Representation Without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy. *Comparative Politics*, 37 (3), 297-316.
- Hernes H.M. & Hanninen-Salmelin E., 1985. Women in the Corporate System. In: E. Haavio-Mannila et al., eds. *Unfinished Democracy: Women in Nordic Politics*. New York and Oxford: Pergamon, 106-133.
- Hill D., 2013. Indigenous Peruvians protest state oil company taking over their land. *The Guardian*, May 9 2013. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/andes-to-the-amazon/2013/jun/07/peruvians-protest-oil-company-land-petroperu> [Accessed: March 22 2013].
- Hill P., 1969. Hidden Trade in Hausaland. *Man* (London), 4 (3), 392-409.
- 1975. The West African Farming Household. In: Goody J. (ed.): *Changing Social Structure in Ghana*. London, International African Institute. 119-136.
- Hirschman A.O., 1958. *The Strategy of Economic Development*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
- Hobsbawm E., 1998. *On History*. London: Abacus.
- 2003. *Interesting Times: A Twentieth-Century Life*. Random House Digital, 73.
- Hodder B.W., 1962. The Yoruba Market. In: *Markets in Africa*. Bohannon P. & G. Dalton, eds. Evanston, III: Northwestern University Press.
- Howden D., 2006. Nigeria: Shell May Pull Out of Niger Delta After 17 Die in Boat Raid. *The Independent*, January 17 2006. Available at: <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=13121> [Accessed January 28 2012].
- HRW (Human Rights Watch), 1995. The Ogoni Crisis: A Case-Study of Military Repression in Southeastern Nigeria. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/07/01/ogoni-crisis> [Accessed February 20 2010].
- 1999. *The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities*. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/> [Accessed January 11 2010].
- 2005. Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria's Rivers State. February 2005. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/nigeria0205/index.htm> [Accessed July 16 2013].
- Humphreys M., 2005. Natural Resources, Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49 (4), 508-537.
- Humphreys M., Sachs J. & Stiglitz J.E., 2007. *Escaping the Resource Curse*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Huntington S.P., 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Hussein S., 1971. *Women – One Half of Our Society*. Speech delivered at the Third Conference of the General Federation of Iraqi Women on April 17 1971. Available at: http://www.al-moharer.net/iraqi_files/saddam_hussein_women_in_iraq.htm [Accessed February 18 2010].

- Ibekwe N., 2013. Odi Massacre: Court Orders Nigerian Government to Pay N37bn Damages to Residents. *Premium Times*, February 20 2013. <http://premiumtimesng.com/news/121196-odi-massacre-court-orders-nigerian-government-to-pay-n37bn-damages-to-residents.html> [Accessed July 26 2013].
- ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions), 2005. *Internationally Recognised Core Labour Standards in Nigeria*. Geneva, May.
- Ifeka C., 2004. Violence, Market Forces & Militarisation in the Niger Delta. *Review of African Political Economy*, 31 (99), 144-150.
- Imi A., 2006. Did Botswana Escape the Resource Curse? IMF Working Paper 05/138, June.
- Ikelegbe A., 2001(a). The Perverse Manifestation of Civil Society: Evidence from Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39 (1), 1–24.
- 2001(b). Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Ramifications of Civil Society for a Regional Resource Struggle. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39 (3), 437-469.
- 2005. Engendering Civil Society: Oil, Women Groups and Resource Conflicts in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43 (2), 241-270.
- 2006. Beyond the Threshold of Civil Struggle: Youth Militancy and the Militia-ization of the Resource Conflicts in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. *African Study Monographs*, 27 (3), 87-122.
- Iversen T. & Rosenbluth F., 2008. Work and Power: the Connection Between Female Labor Force Participation and Female Political Representation. *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, 479-495.
- ILO (International Labor Organisation), 2010. LABORSTA Database. Available at: <http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest> [Accessed February 17 2010].
- 2011. Decent Work Pilot Programme. Country Brief: Bahrain. Available at: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dwpp/download/bahrain/countrybriefbah.pdf> [Accessed May 20 2012].
- LABORSTA, 2012. Global Employment Trends for Women. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_195447.pdf [Accessed September 14 2011].
- 2013. *India: Why is Women's Labor Force Participation Dropping?* Available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/comment-analysis/WCMS_204762/lang--en/index.htm [Accessed March 20 2013].
- Inglehart M.L., 1981. Political Interest in West European Women. *Comparative Political Studies*, 14, 299-326.
- Inglehart, R. & Norris, P., 2003a. The True Clash of Civilizations. *Foreign Policy*, 135, 62-70.
- 2003b. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge University Press.
- International Crisis Group, 2006. Fueling the Niger Delta Crisis. *International Crisis Group*, 28 September 2006. Africa Report No. 118. Available at: [www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/Fuelling%20the%20Niger%20Delta%20Crisis.pdf) [Accessed June 28 2010].
- IPU (Inter Parliamentary Union) 2013. Women in National Parliaments. Available at: <http://www.ipu.org/> [Accessed: August 2013].
- Isam S., 2011. Women and the Arab Spring: Expectations and Concerns. *Nebula* 8 (1), 283-295. Available at: <http://www.nobleworld.biz/images/Shihada7.pdf> [Accessed August 20 2013].
- Isioma D., 2002. Protests in the Nigerian Delta: Women's Tactics Stymie Oil Grant. *MsMagazine*, Winter 2002. Available at: <http://www.msmagazine.com/dec02/daniels.asp>

[Accessed February 15 2012].

Ivan G., 2002. West Marin Women Strip For Peace. *Free Republic*, November 14 2002. Available at: <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/chat/791196/posts> [Accessed August 24 2013].

Isham L. et al., 2003. The Varieties of the Resource Experience: How Natural Resource Export Structures Affect the Political Economy of Economic Growth. Mimeo, World Bank, Washington D.C.

Jackson S., 1978. Hausa Women on Strike. *Review of African Political Economy*, 13, Nigeria, September-December, 21-36.

Jacobs M., 1978. Civil Rights and Women's Rights in the Federal Republic of Germany Today, *New German Critique*, no. 13.

Jacobson J.L., 1992. *Gender Bias: Roadblock to Sustainable Development*. Worldwatch Institute USA, No. 110.

Jaquette, J., 1973. Women in Revolutionary Movements in Latin America. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 35 (2), 344-354.

Jega A.M., 1997. Organising for Popular Democratic Change in Nigeria: Options and Strategies. *Report of Proceedings of Strategic Planning Workshop on Democratic Development in Nigeria*, London: Centre for Democracy and Development.

Jennings M.K., 1983. Gender Roles and Inequalities in Political Participation: Results from an Eight-Nation Study. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 36 (3), 364-385.

Jensen N. & Wantchekon L., 2004. Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37 (7), 816-841.

Jerven M., 2013. *Poor Numbers: How we are misled by African Development Statistics and what to do about it*. Cornell.

Jibo M., 2003. The Nigerian Media: An Assessment of Its Role in Achieving Transparent and Accountable Government in the Fourth Republic. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 12 (2), 180-195.

Johnson C., 1982. Grass Roots Organizing: Women in Anticolonial Activity in Southwestern Nigeria. *African Studies Review*, 25 (2/3), 137-157.

Johnson L., 2013. Tackling Pollution, Poverty and patriarchy in the Niger Delta. *Safe World for Women*, August 2012. Available at: <http://www.asafeworldforwomen.org/rights-defenders/rd-africa/3002-delta-women.html> [Accessed July 25 2013].

Johnson S., 1921. *The History of the Yorubas: from earliest times to the beginning of the British protectorate*. London, Routledge & Keegan Paul Ltd, 65-66.

Jones A., 1997. Million Women March, 1997. *Blackpast*. Available at: <http://www.blackpast.org/aah/million-woman-march-1997> [Accessed May 24 2012].

Jones-Luong P. & Weinthal E., 2006. Rethinking the Resource Curse: Ownership Structure, Institutional Capacity, and Domestic Constraints. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9, 241-263.

Kabeer N., 2005. Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: A Critical Analysis of the Third Millennium Development Goal 1. *Gender and Development*, 13 (1), 13-24.

Kabeer N. & Natali L., 2013. Gender Equality and Economic Growth: Is There a Win-Win? IDS Working Paper 417. Available at: <http://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/gender-equality-and-economic-growth-is-there-a-win-win> [Accessed March 28 2010].

Kaduna State, 2013. Kaduna State Government, Nigeria. Available at: <http://www.kadunastate.gov.ng/> [Accessed July 28 2013].

- Kang A., 2009. Studying Oil, Islam, and Women as if Political Institutions Mattered. *Politics and Gender*, 5 (4), 560-568.
- Karl T.L., 1997. *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 2005. *Understanding the Resource Curse, Covering Oil: A Reporter's Guide to Energy and Development*. Open Society Institute.
- 2007. Ensuring Fairness: the Case for a Transparent Fiscal Social Contract. In: Humphreys M., Sachs J.D. & Stiglitz J.E., eds. *Escaping the Resource Curse*. Columbia University Press, NY. Chapter 10.
- Karshenas M., 2001. Economic Liberalization, Competitiveness, and Women's Employment in the Middle East and North Africa. In: D. Salehi-Ishfahani, ed., *Labor and Human Capital in the Middle East*. Ithaca Press, 147-192.
- Karshenas M. & Moghadam V.M., 2001. Female Labor Force Participation and Economic Adjustment in the MENA Region. *The Economics of Women and Work in the Middle East and North Africa*. Research in Middle East Economics, Volume 4. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 51-74.
- Kaur R., 1991. Women in Forestry in India. *Policy Research and External Affairs*. Working paper: Women In development: Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Keddie, N., 2007. *Women in the Middle East: Past and Present*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kelly A., 2013. Delhi Gang-Rape Could Prove a Catalyst for Change for Women. *The Guardian*, January 4 2013. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/jan/04/gang-rape-delhi-catalyst-change-women> [Accessed: January 5 2013].
- Kenworthy L. & Malami M., 1999. Gender inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis. *Social Forces*, 78 (1), 235-268.
- [Khadduri M.](#), 1977. Marriage in Islamic Law: The Modernist Viewpoints. *American Journal of Comparative Law*, 26 (2), 213-218.
- Klare M., 2001. *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- 2006. *Blood and Oil*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Klimasinska K., 2013. Women Cash in on Dakota Oil Service Needs to Sustain Boom. *Bloomberg*, April 19 2013. Available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-19/women-cash-in-on-dakota-oil-service-needs-to-sustain-boom.html> [Accessed July 26 2013].
- Kola-Olusanya and Trish, 2012. Role of Niger Delta Women in Ecological Justice Struggles. Working paper. Availabe at: http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/9/7/9/pages319794/p319794-1.php [Accessed May 15 2012].
- Kotsadam A. & Tolonen A., 2013. Mineral Mining and Female Employment. Oxcarre Research Paper 114. Department of Economics, University of Oxford. Available at: <http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/files/OxCarreRP2013114.pdf> [Accessed June 22 2012].
- Krauss C., 1993. Women and Toxic Waste Protests: Race, Class, and Gender as Resources of Resistance. *Qualitative Sociology*, 16 (3), 247-262.
- Kruger C., 1993. Textile Production and Gender in the Sokoto Caliphate. *The Journal of African History*, 34 (3), 361-401.
- Kukah H.M., 1997. State of Current Actors: An Overview of Human Rights and Democratic Development in Nigeria. *Report of Proceedings of Strategic Planning Workshop on Democratic Development in Nigeria*. London: Centre for Democracy and Development.

- Kumar S. & Hotchkiss D., 1988. Consequences of Deforestation for Women's Time Allocation, Agricultural Production, and Nutrition in Hill areas of Nepal. *International food policy research institute*, Research report 69, Washington, D.C.
- Lafferty W.M., 1978. Social Development and Political Participation: Class, Organizations and Sex. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 1 (4), 233-254.
- Landes, D.S. & Landes R.A., 2001. Girl Power: Do Fundamentalists Fear Our Women? *New Republic*, October 8: 20-23.
- Lane R.E., 1959. *Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Lane P. & Tornell A., 1996. Power, Growth and the Voracity Effect. *Journal of Economic growth*, 1 (2), 213-241.
- Lansing M., 1974. The American Woman: Voter and Activist. In: J. Jacquette, ed., *Women in Politics*. New York: John Wiley, 5-24.
- Le Billon P., 2001. The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts. *Political Geography*, 20 (5), 561-584.
- 2005. Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict. Adelphi Paper No. 343. London: Routledge.
- Lebsock S., 1990. Women and American Politics. In: Tilly L.A. and Gurin P., ed. *Women, Politics and Change*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Chapter 2.
- Lederman D. & Maloney W.F., 2008. In Search of the Missing Resource Curse. *Economia*, 9 (1), 1-39.
- Leighley J., 1995. Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation. *Political Research Quarterly*, 48 (1), 181-209.
- Leith-Ross S., 1939. *African Women: A Study of the Ibo of Nigeria*. Faber and Faber limited.
- Levitt M., 1967. The Political Role of American Women. *Journal of Human Relations*, 15, 23-35.
- Levy D.G. & Applewhite H.B., 1980. Women of the Popular Classes in Revolutionary Paris, 1789-1795. In: C.R. Berkin & C. Lovett, eds. *Women, War and Revolution*. New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 9-36.
- Lewis A., 1955. *The Theory of Economic Growth*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Lewis A.O., 1977. Nigeria's Third National Development Plan, 1975-80: An Appraisal of Objectives and Policy Frame. *The Developing Economies*, 15 (1), 60-79.
- Lieberman E.S., 2005. Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research. *The American Political Science Review*, 99 (3), 435-452.
- Lipset S.M., 1963. *Political Man*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books.
- Lovenduski J. & Norris P., 1993. *Gender and Party Politics*. Thousand Oaks, Sage.
- Lubeck P., 1977. Nigeria: A Political Economy. *AfricaNews*, 9 (20), November.
- Lubeck P.M., Watts M.J. & Lipschutz R.D., 2007. *Convergent Interests: US Energy Security and the 'Securing' of Nigerian Democracy*. Washington DC: Center for International Policy.
- Lynne H.J., 1990. Dance, Protest and Women's 'Wars': Cases from Nigeria and the United States. In: G. West & R.L. Blumberg (eds.), *Women and Social Protest*. New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Maeda Y., 2005. External Constraints on Female Political Participation. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 6 (3), 345-373.

- Mahdavy H., 1970. The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development. In: Cook M.A., ed. *Rentier States: the Case of Iran. Studies of Economic History of the Middle East*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Malina T., 2012. Militancy in the Niger Delta. *University of Pittsburgh*. Available at: <http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/RidgwayResearch/Issues/InternationalPeaceSecurity/BackgroundersIPS/tabid/552/smId/1686/ArticleID/646/reftab/497/t/Militancy-in-the-Niger-Delta/Default.aspx> [Accessed October 22 2012].
- Mama A., 1999. Dissenting Daughters? Gender Politics and Civil Society in a Militarized State. *Dakar: CODESRIA Bulletin* 3&4.
- Mammen K. & Paxson C., 2000. Women's Work and Economic Development. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 14 (Autumn), 141-164.
- Martin S., 1984. Gender and Innovation: Farming, Cooking and Palm Processing in the Ngwa region, South-eastern Nigeria, 1900–1930. *The Journal of African History*, 25 (4), 411-427.
- Matland R.E., 1998. Women's Representation in National Legislatures: Developed and Developing Countries. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 23 (1), 109-125.
- Mba N.E., 1982. *Nigerian Women Mobilized: Women's Political Activity in Southern Nigeria, 1900-1965*. Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley.
- McCourt K., 1977. *Working-Class Women and Grass-Roots Politics*. Indiana University Press.
- McDonagh E., 1982. To Work or Not to Work: the Differential Impact of Achieved and Derived Status upon the Political Participation of Women, 1956-76. *American Journal of Political Science*, 26 (2), 280-297.
- McGlen N.E., 1980. The Impact of Parenthood on Political Participation. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 33 (3), 297-313.
- Meek, C.K., 1937. *Law and authority in a Nigerian tribe*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Mehrara M., 2009. Reconsidering the Resource Curse in Oil-Exporting Countries. *Energy Policy*, 37 (3), 1165-1169.
- Melhum H., Moene K. & Torvik R., 2006. Institutions and the Resource Curse. *The Economic Journal*, 116 (508), 1-20.
- Melkonian-Hoover R., 2008. Gendered Pathways to the Political: the Political Participation of Women Factory Workers in Mexico. *Social Science Quarterly*, 89 (2), 351-371.
- Mernissi F., 1991. *The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Michaels G., 2011. The Long Term Consequences of Resource-Based Specialisation. *The Economic Journal*, 121 (551), 31–57.
- Mikesell F.M., 1998. Explaining the Resource Curse, with Special Reference to Mineral-Exporting Countries. *Resources Policy*, 23 (4), 191-199.
- Mishra A. & Mishra D.K., 2012. Deforestation and Women's Work Burden in the Eastern Himalayas, India: Insights from a Field Survey Gender. *Technology and Development*, 16 (3), 299-328.
- Moghadam V.M., 1993. *Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- 1999. Gender and Globalization: Female Labor and Women's Movements. *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 5, Summer, 367–88.

- 2003. *Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East*. 2ND Edition. Lynne Rienner: Boulder London
- Mohammed A., 2013. Niger Delta, Rape Capital of Nigeria – Survey. *Premium Times*, October 25 2013. Available at: <http://premiumtimesng.com/news/147281-niger-delta-rape-capital-nigeria-survey.html> [Accessed June 25 2013].
- Moore G. & Shackman G., 1996. Gender and Authority: A Cross-National Study. *Social Science Quarterly*, 77 (2), 273-288.
- Morrison K.M., 2009. Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributive Foundations of Regime Stability. *International Organization*, 63 (1), 107-138.
- Mossuz-Lavau J. & Sineau M., 1978. Sex, Social Environment, and Left-Wing Attitudes. *International Journal of Sociology*, 8 (3), 38-55.
- Mound W., 2013. Greenpeace Arctic Protest: 6 Women Activists Climb London Shard. *Greenpeace*, July 11 2013. Available at: <http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/groups/bristol-greenpeace-group/blog/greenpeace-arctic-protest-6-women-activists-climb-london-shard> [Accessed: July 22 2013].
- Nagaland, 2012. Protest in Demand for the 33% Women's Reservation Bill. *Demotix*, October 1 2012. Available at: <http://www.demotix.com/news/1491407/protest-demand-33-womens-reservation-bill#media-1491384> [Accessed March 28 2013].
- Nankani G. T., 1979. Development Problems of Mineral Exporting Countries. World Bank Staff Working Paper, 354, World Bank, Washington D.C.
- NBS (National Bureau of Statistics), 2009. *Men & Women in Nigeria*. Available at: <http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng> [Accessed June 20 2010].
- NDI (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs), 2011. Final Report on the 2011 Nigerian General Elections, Nigeria.
- NDWF (Niger Delta Women Forum), 2013. Available at: <http://www.nigerdeltawomenforum.org/about.html> [Accessed July 15 2013].
- NDWPD (Niger Delta Women for Peace and Development), 2012. Meeting with Stakeholders at Ughelli, Delta State. Available at: http://www.antigraft.org/sites/default/files/news/uploads/acid-niger-delta-women-report_0.pdf [Accessed July 27 2013].
- Nelson H.D., 1972. *Nigeria, a Country Study (Area Handbook Series)*. Washington: DA PAM 550-157, Government Printing Office.
- News24, 2002. Nigerian Women Show their Power. *News24*, July 19 2002. Available at: <http://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Nigerian-women-show-their-power-20020719> [Accessed 31 January 2012].
- NNNGO (Nigeria Network of NGOs), 2013. Members' Directory. Available at: <http://www.nnngo.org/ngo-list/> [Accessed January 2 2013].
- Norrbin S.C, Pipatchaipoom O. & Bors L., 2008. How Robust is the Natural Resource Curse? *International Economic Journal*, 22 (2), 187-200.
- Norris P., 1987. *Politics and Sexual Equality: The Comparative Position of Women in Western Democracies*. Rienner Boulder, CO.
- 1997. Conclusions: Comparing Passages to Power. In: P. Norris, ed., *Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies*. Cambridge University Press, 209-31.
- 2009. Petroleum Patriarchy? A Response to Ross. *Politics and Gender* 5 (4), 553-560.

- North D.C., 1963. Aspects of Economic Growth in the United States, 1815-1860. In: B.E. Supple, ed. *Experiences of Economic Growth*. Random House, New York.
- Northcote T.W., 1913. *Anthropological Report on the Ibo-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria*. Harrison.
- Nwabugo N.E., 2011. The Story of Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria from the Perspective of the Organized Labour. *Australian Journal of Business and Management Research*, 1(7), 30-41.
- Nyatepe-Coo A.A., 1994. Dutch Disease, Government Policy and Import Demand in Nigeria. *Applied Economics*, 26, 327-336.
- Oakes A. & Almquist E., 1993. Women in National Legislatures: A Cross-National Test of Macrostructural Gender Theories. *Population Research Policy and Review*, 12 (1), 71-81.
- Ocasiones L.G., 2009. The Lives of Women in Militarized Zones. *Philippine Social Sciences Review*, 58 (1), 21-50.
- Ogunstate, 2013. Ogun State Government, Nigeria. Available at <http://ogunstate.gov.ng> [Accessed March 20 2013].
- Ogwu U.J., 1996. Perspectives on the Critical Impediments to Women in the Decision-Making Process. In: *Nigerian Women in Politics, 1986-1993*. Osinulu C. & Mba N. (ed.). Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos, Nigeria. Chapter 3.
- Ohwobetehe A., 2012. Oghara Traditional Council Unveils Ovie-Elect. *ThePointer*, September 26 2014. Available at: <http://thepointernewsonline.com/?p=9590> [Accessed 28 July 2013].
- Okeke P.E., 1997. Female Wage Earners and Separate Resource Structures in Post Oil Boom Nigeria. *Dialectical Anthropology*, 22, 373-387.
- Okojie C.E.E., 1991. The Absorption of Labour in the Urban Informal Sector: the Position of Women in Nigeria. *Nigerian Journal of economic and social studies*, 32 (3), 247-268.
- Okoko E., 1999. Women and Environmental Change. *Gender, Place & Culture*, 373-378.
- Okonjo K., 1975. The Role of Women in Development of Culture in Nigeria. In: R.R.Leavit (ed.) *Women Cross-Culturally: Change and Challenge*. Paris, Mouton Publisher.
- 1976. The Dual-Sex Political System in Operation: Igbo Women and Community Politics in Midwestern Nigeria. In: N.J. Hafkin & E.G. Bay (eds.) *Women in Africa: Studies in Social and Economical Change*. Stanford University Press, 56.
- Olankunle M.F., 2010. Women's Response to the Question of Development in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology*. 1(1), 133-149.
- Olatokun W.M. & Ayanbode O.F., 2008. Use of Indigenous Knowledge by Rural Women in the Development of Ogun State. *African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems*, 7(1), 47-63.
- Ologunde O. & Ako-Nai R.I., 2005. Household Survival and Economic Empowerment of Women in Osun State of Nigeria. *Journal of Social Sciences*, 11 (2), 151-155.
- Ololade O., 2009. Women of the Delta: Their Lives as Victims. *The Nation*, Vol. 04, No. 01219, November 21, 29.
- Olatunji D., 2013a. Ogun Women Protest Early Marriage. *Vanguard*, August 15 2013. Available at: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/ogun-women-protest-early-marriage/> [Accessed October 28 2013].
- Olatunji S., 2013b. Ogun Women Protest Senate Resolution on Child Marriage. *Punch*, August 15 2013. Available at <http://www.punchng.com/metro/ogun-women-protest-senate-resolution-on-child-marriage/> [Accessed October 28 2013].

- Oluwaniyi O.O., 2010. Oil and Youth Militancy in Nigeria's Niger Delta Region. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 45 (3), 309-325.
- Omeje K., 2006. Petrobusiness and Security Threats in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Current Sociology*, 54 (3), 477-499.
- Oneindia, 2010. RJD Women Protest Price Rise in Patna. *OneIndia*, January 26 2010. Available at: <http://news.oneindia.in/2010/01/26/rjdwomen-protest-price-rise-inpatna.html> [Accessed January 30 2010].
- Onwueme O.T., 2003. What Mama Said: An Epic Drama. Wayne State University Press.
- Orijji J., 2000. Igbo Women, Technological Change and Protests (1946-1953). A paper presented during the Annual Conference of the African Studies Association at Nashville, Tennessee, November. 17.
- Oruwari Y., Owei O. & Jev M., 2003. Gender, Ethnicity and Violence and their Effects on Livelihoods in the Niger Delta Region, Nigeria: The Case of Keegbara-Dere (Ogoni) and Bolo (Okrika) in Rivers State. Research Report as part of The Program on Global Security and Cooperation submitted to the Social Science Research Council, New York.
- Oshare M.O., 1986. The Ekpan Women's Uprising of August 1986. University of Jos, Sociology Department, mimeo, 1986.
- Oshikoya T.W., 1990. The Nigerian Economy: A Macroeconometric and input-output model. New York: Praeger, 2-33.
- Osinulu C. & Mba N. (ed.). Nigerian Women in Politics 1986-1993, 1996. Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos, Nigeria.
- PO (Pan Ocean), 2012. Available at: <http://panoceanoilnigeria.com/> [Accessed January 29 2013].
- Papayrakis E. & Gerlagh R., 2004. The Resource Curse Hypothesis and its Transmission Channels. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 32 (1), 181-193.
- Paulme D.P., 1963. *Women of Tropical Africa*. Los Angeles, University Printing Press.
- Paxton P., 1997. Women in National Legislatures: A Cross-National Analysis. *Social Science Research*, 26 (4), 442-464.
- Perchonock N., 1985. Double Oppression: Women and Land Matters in Kaduna State. *Women in Nigeria Today*, S. Bappa, et al. (eds.). London, Zed.
- Perham M., 1933. The Census of Nigeria, 1931. *Journal of the International African Institute*, 6 (4), 415-430.
- 1937. Native Administration in Nigeria. London.
- Pittin E., 1984. Documentation and Analysis of the Invisible Work of Invisible Women: A Nigerian Case-Study. *International Labour Review*, 123 (4), July-August, 473-490.
- Polacheck S.W., 1979. Occupational Segregation Among Women: Theory, Evidence and a Prognosis. *Women in the Labor Market*, 137-157.
- Power J., 2004. The gift that corrupts: Nigeria struggles against the curse of oil. *The New York Times*, January 8 2004. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/08/opinion/08iht-edpower_ed3_.html [Accessed June 20 2012].
- Radsch C., 2012. Women, Cyber-activism, and the Arab Spring. *Muftah*, December 10 2012. Available at: <http://muftah.org/women-cyberactivism-the-arab-spring/#.U2Tax8c09Z0> [Accessed August 18 2012].
- Ramsey K., 2006. *The Price of Oil and Democracy*. Mimeo: Princeton University.

- Randall V., 1987. *Women and Politics: An International Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Reynolds A., 1999. Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling. *World Politics*, 51 (4), 547-572.
- Reuters, 2002. Nigerian Muslims Riot Against Miss World Pageant. *Reuters*, November 21 2002. Available at: <http://wwwn.org/articles/5488/?&place=africa§ion=sectarian-violence> [Accessed June 26 2013].
- Robinson J.A., Torvik R. & Verdier T., 2006. Political Foundations of the Resource Curse. *Journal of Development Economics*, 79 (2), 447-468.
- Ross M.L., 1999. The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. *World Politics*, 51 (2), 297-322.
- 2001. Does Oil Hinder Democracy? *World Politics*, 53 (3), 325-361.
- 2003. Oil, Drugs and Diamonds: How Do Natural Resources Vary in their Impact on Civil War? In: K. Ballantine & J. Sherman, eds. *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*. New York: International Peace Academy.
- 2004. What do we know about Natural Resources and Civil War? *Journal of Peace Research*, 41 (3), 337-356.
- 2007a. How Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality. In: Humphreys M., Sachs J.D. & Stiglitz J.E., eds. *Escaping the Resource Curse*. Columbia University Press, NY. Chapter 9.
- 2007b. Does Taxation Lead to Representation? *British Journal of Political Science*, 34 (2), 229-249.
- 2008. Oil, Islam, and Women. *American Political Science Review*, 102 (1), 107-123.
- 2009. Does oil wealth hurt women? A reply to Caraway, Charrad, Kang, and Norris. *Politics and Gender*, 5 (4), 575-582.
- 2012. *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations*. Princeton University Press.
- Ross S., 1965. *African Women: A study of the Igbo of Nigeria*. New York: Frederick Praeger Publishers, 97.
- Rosser A., 2006. The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. A Literature Survey. Working Paper 268, Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Centre for the Future State.
- Rowbotham S., 1974. *Hidden from History: Rediscovering Women in History from the 17th Century to the Present*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Rule W., 1981. Why Women Don't Run: the Critical Contextual Factors in Women's Legislative Recruitment. *Western Political Quarterly*, 34 (1), 60-77.
- 1987. Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in twenty-three Democracies. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 40 (3), 477-498.
- 1994. Parliaments of, by, and for the people: except for women? In: W. Rule & J.F. Zimmerman, eds. *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities*. Greenwood Press, 15-30.
- Rupley, L.A., 1981. Revenue Sharing in the Nigerian Federation. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 19 (2), June, 257-277.

- Sachs J.D. & Warner A.M., 1995. Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth. NBER Working Paper No. 5398. Cambridge, MA.
- 1997a. Fundamental Sources of Long-run Growth. *The American Review*, 87 (2), pp. 184-188.
- 1997b. Sources of Slow Growth for African Economies. *Journal of African Economies*, 6 (3), 335-76.
- 2001. The Curse of Natural Resources. *European Economic Review*, 45 (4-6), 827-838.
- Sala-i-Martin X. & Subramanian A., 2003. Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria. IMF Working Paper WP/03/139.
- Salaff J.W. & Merkle J., 1970. Women in Revolution: The Lessons of the Soviet Union and China. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 15, 166-191.
- Samuel O. & Segun J., 2012. Gender Relations in Nigeria's Democratic Governance, *Journal of Politics and Governance*, 1 (2-3), 4-15.
- Sapiro V., 1983. *The Political Integration of Women*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Sarraf M. & Jiwanji M., 2001. Beating the Resource Curse: the Case of Botswana. Paper No. 83, World Bank Environmental Department, Environmental Economics Series.
- Schlozman K.L., Burns N. & Verba S., 1999. What Happened at Work Today?: A Multistage Model of Gender, Employment, and Political Participation. *The Journal of Politics*, 61 (1), 29-53.
- Schoenberg S.P., 1980. Some Trends in the Community Participation of Women in their Neighborhoods. *Signs*, 5 (3), S261-S268.
- Sealey G., 2002. Naked Ploy is Latest Threat in Oil Wars. *ABCNews*, July 31 2002. Available at: <http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=79895&page=1#.UNLqNbZhN0s> [Accessed 31 January 2012].
- Seers D., 1964. The Mechanism of an Open Petroleum Economy. *Social and Economic Studies*, 13, 233-242.
- Sharabi H., 1988. *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shaxon N., 2007. Oil, Corruption and the Resource Curse. *International Affairs*, 83 (6), 1123-1140.
- Shaxon N. & Murphy R., 2007. African Graft is a Global Responsibility. *Financial Times*. June 1 2007. Available at: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/edd9b506-0c74-11dc-a4dc-000b5df10621.html#axzz3BJGdTs00> [Accessed 28 June 2010].
- Shell, 2013. Nigeria: Potential, Growth and Challenges. *Shell*. Available at: <http://www.shell.com/global/environment-society/society/nigeria/ogoni-land.html> [Accessed April 14 2013].
- Shiva V., 1988. *Staying Alive: Women, Ecology, and Survival*. London: Zed books, 1988.
- Smith M.G., 1955. *The Economy of Hausa Communities in Zaria*. Colonial Research Studies No. 16, H.M.S.O, London.
- Snyder R. & Bhavnani R., 2005. Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49 (4), 563-597.
- Soysa I.D., 2000. The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity? In: M. Berdal & D.M. Malone, eds. *Greed and Grievance: Economic agendas in Civil Wars*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Chapter 6.

- Spath A., 2011. South African Women Protest Against Fracking. *Care2*, August 11 2011. Available at: <http://www.care2.com/causes/south-african-women-protest-against-fracking.html> [Accessed March 22 2013].
- Stacey M. & Price M., 1981. *Women, Power and Politics*. London and New York: Tavistock.
- Stevens P., 2006. Resource curse and how to avoid it. *The Journal of Energy and Development*, 31 (1).
- Stevens P. & Dietsche E., 2008. Resource Curse: An Analysis of Causes, Experiences and Possible Ways Forward. *Energy Policy*, 36 (1), 56-65.
- Stijns J.F., 2000. Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth Revisited. University of California, Department of Economics paper, November.
- Struver G. & Wegenast T., 2011. Ex oleo bellare? The impact of oil on the outbreak of militarized interstate disputes. GIGA Research Programme: Violence and Security. Working paper No. 162.
- Suberu R.T., 2004. Democratizing Nigeria's Federal Experiment. In: R.I. Rotberg (ed.) *Crafting the New Nigeria*. Boulder London. Chapter 4.
- Suurmond C., 2011. Protest Against Oil Exploration in New Zealand – Wellington. *Demotix*, 20 April 2011. Available at: <http://www.demotix.com/news/664558/protest-against-oil-exploration-new-zealand-wellington#media-664139> [Accessed: March 22 2013].
- Tabari A., 1980. The Enigma of Veiled Iranian women. *Feminist Review*, 5 (1), 19-31.
- Tedin K.L, Brady D.W. & Vedlitz A., 1977. Sex Differences in Political Attitudes and Behavior: the Case for Situational Factors. *The Journal of Politics*, 39 (2), 448-456.
- The Economist, 1977. The Dutch Disease. *The Economist*, November 26 1977, 82-83.
- 2008. Nigeria: Risky Toughness. *The Economist*, September 18 2008. Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/12267373?story_id=12267373 [Accessed February 22 2012].
- The UK Electoral Commission, 2004. Research Report, April. Gender and Political Participation in the UK.
- TheUnnecesarian 2010. Women Protest Violence Against Laboring Women in Bulgarian Hospitals. January 22 2010. Available at: <http://theunnecesarian.com/blog/2010/1/22/women-protest-violence-against-laboring-women-in-bulgarian-h.html#sthash.SXzqweBb.dpbs> [Accessed January 30 2010].
- TheWill, 2013. Kokori Women Embark on Naked Protest Over Army Siege on Community. *TheWill*, October 7 2013. <http://thewillnigeria.com/news/kokori-women-embark-on-naked-protest-over-army-siege-on-community/> [Accessed November 28 2013].
- ThisDay, 2009. Nigeria: Over 46,000 NGOs Registered in Nigeria. *ThisDay*, September 23 2009. Available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200909240191.html> [Accessed March 22 2013].
- Thiercelin R., 1980, Les Femmes Espagnoles et la Politique, as quoted in Randall V., 1987. *Women and Politics: An International Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Thomas J.J., 2013. A Woman-Shaped Gap in the Indian Workforce. *TheHindu*, January 9 2013. Available at: <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a-womanshaped-gap-in-the-indian-workforce/article4287620.ece> [Accessed February 27 2013].
- Thomis M.I. & Grimmett J., 1982. *Women in Protest, 1800-1850*. Croom Helm.
- Turner T.E. & Oshare M.O., 1993. Women's Uprising Against the Nigerian Oil Industry in the 1980s. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, 14 (3), 329-357.

- Turner T.E. et al., 2001. Fightback from the Commons: Petroleum Industry and Environmental Racism. United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Durban, South Africa, August 31-September 7.
- Uchendu P.K., 1993. The Role of Nigerian Women in Politics: Past and Present. Fourth Dimension Publishing Co Ltd, Nigeria.
- Ukeje C., 2004. From Aba to Ugborodo: Gender Identity and Alternative Discourse of Social Protest among Women in the Oil Delta of Nigeria. *Oxford Development Studies*, 32 (4), 605-617.
- Ukiwo U., 2007. From 'Pirates' to 'Militants': A Historical Perspective on Anti-State and Anti-Oil Company Mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta. *African Affairs*, 106 (425), 587-610.
- Umo J.U., 1975. Some Aspects of Urbanization and Implications Development in Nigeria. *African Urban Notes*, 1 (3). Lansing: African Studies Center, Michigan State University.
- UN, 1995. Fourth World Conference on women. Beijing, China 4-15 September 1995. Available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/gopher-data/conf/fwcw/off/a--20.en> [Accessed July 21 2013].
- UNDP, 2005. Arab Human Development Report: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World. Available at: <http://www.undp.org/content/ahdr/en/home/resources/regional-ahdr/gender/ahdr-2005.html> Accessed July 20 2011.
- 2006. Niger Delta Human Development Report 2006. Available at: http://web.ng.undp.org/reports/nigeria_hdr_report.pdf [Accessed May 15 2012].
- UNEP, 2011. Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland report. UN: New York.
- United Ijaw 1998. The Kaiama Declaration. *United Ijaw*. Available at: <http://www.unitedijaw.com/kaiama.htm> [Accessed June 9 2013].
- Usikpedo-Omoniye C., 2013. Presentation of the Niger Delta Women's Movement for Peace and Development. 14th Global Major Groups and Stakeholders Forum, February 16-17 2013, Nairobi, Kenya. Available at: http://www.unep.org/civil-society/Portals/24105/documents/GMGsf/GMGsf%2014/presentations/17_Feb_2013/morning/CAROLINE_OMONIYE_Human%20Right%20and%20Environment_Niger_Delta.pdf [Accessed March 25 2013].
- 2013a. Personal interview [via Skype]. April 22 2013.
- 2013b. Personal interview [via Skype]. April 25 2013.
- Van Allen, J., 1972. Sitting on a Man: Colonialism and the Lost Political Institutions of Igbo Women. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 6 (2), 165-181.
- Van de Walle N., 1994. Neopatrimonialism and Democracy in Africa. In: Widner, J., ed. *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Vanguard, August 3 2002.
- Verba S. & Nie N.H., 1972. *Participation in America*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Verba S., Nie N. & Kim J., 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ver Beek K.A., 2001. Maquiladoras: Exploitation or Emancipation? An Overview of the Situation of Maquiladora Workers in Honduras. *World Development* 29 (9), 1553-1567.
- Verba S., Scholzman K.L. & Brady H.E., 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- Viner J., 1952. *International Trade and Economic Development*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Vogt M., 1996. The Military and Women in Politics. In: *Nigerian Women in Politics, 1986-1993* (eds.). Osinulu C. & Mba N. Malthouse Press Limited. Chapter 4.
- WACOL (WomenAid Collective), 2008. *CEDAW and Accountability to Gender Equality in Nigeria, A Shadow Report*. Lagos, Nigeria.
- Wangnerud L., 2009. Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12, 51–69.
- Wantchekon L., 2002. Why Do Resource Dependent Countries have Authoritarian Governments? *Journal of African Finance and Economic Development*, 5 (2), 57-77.
- Ward R., 2002. Invisible Women: The Political Roles of Unionist and Loyalist Women in Contemporary Northern Ireland. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 55, 167–178.
- Watkins M.H., 1963. A Staple Theory of Economic Growth. *Canadian Journal of economics and Political Science*, 29 (2), 142-158.
- Watts M., 1997. Black Gold, White Heat. In: S. Pile & M. Keith, eds. *Geographies of Resistance*. New York: Routledge. 33-67.
- 2007a. Anatomy of An Oil Insurgency: Violence and Militants in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. In: K. Omeje, ed. *Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the Global South: Multi-Regional Perspectives on Rentier Politics*. London: Ashgate. 51-74.
- 2007b. Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict & violence in the Niger Delta. *Review of African Political Economy*, 114, 637-660.
- Weingrod A., 1968. Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 10, 377-400.
- Welch S., 1977. Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences. *American Journal of Political Science* 21, 711-730.
- Wellsphere, 2010. Women Protest Violence Against Laboring Women. *WellSphere*. Available at: <http://www.wellsphere.com/pregnancy-fertility-article/women-protest-violence-against-laboring-women-in-bulgarian-hospitals/956806> [Accessed December 27 2010].
- Williamson H.F. et al., 1963. *The American Petroleum Industry, 1899-1959: the Age of Energy*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 16.
- Wilson N., 2012. Economic Booms and Risky Sexual Behavior: Evidence from Zambian Copper Mining Cities. *Journal of Health Economics*, 31 (6), 797–812.
- Womensphere, 2010. Women Protest Killings in Mexican Border City. *WomenSphere*. Available at: <http://womensphere.wordpress.com/2009/12/07/women-protest-killings-in-mexican-border-city/> [Accessed December 27 2010].
- Wood A. & Berge K., 1997. Exporting Manufacturers: Human Resources, Natural Resources and Trade Policy. *Journal of Development Studies*, 34 (1), 35-59.
- World Bank 2003. Nigeria: Policy Options for Growth and Stability, PREM3, Africa Region, Report No. 26215-NGA.
- 2004. *Gender and Development in the Middle East and North Africa*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

- 2012. Country and Lending Groups Dataset. Available at:
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#Low_income
[Accessed April 26 2012].
- 2013a. Labor Force Participation Rate, Female – Data. Available at:
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS> [Accessed July 25 2012]
- 2013b. Global Gas Flaring Reduction: Nigeria. Available at:
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/EXTGGFR/0,,contentMDK:21102949~isCURL:Y~menuPK:2912252~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:578069,00.html>
[Accessed June 14 2013].
- 2013c. Empowerment. Available at:
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTEMPowerment/0,,contentMDK:20245753~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:486411,00.html> [Accessed March 29 2014].
- World Values Survey, 1995-1997. *ICPSR 2790*. Ann Arbor, MI: ISR, University of Michigan.
- WRAPA (Women's Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative), 2003. Women's Representation in the Elections. Available at: <http://wrapanigeria.org/?cat=6> [Accessed June 15 2012].
- Wright G. & Czelusta J., 2007. Resource-based Growth: Past and Present. In: Lederman, D. & Maloney W.F., eds. *Natural Resources: Neither Curse nor Destiny*. World Bank, Stanford University Press.
- Yates D.A., 1996. *The Rentier State in Africa*. Africa World Press, Trenton, NJ.
- Youssef, N. 1978. The Status and Fertility Patterns of Muslim Women. In: L. Beck & N.R. Keddie, eds. *Women in the Muslim World*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 69-99.
- Zamaan Online, 2010. Pakistani Women Protest Against the Celebration of St. Valentine Day. Available at: <http://zamaanonline.com/pakistani-women-protest-against-the-celebration-of-st-valentine-day-2801> [Accessed: March 30 2012].

Data Appendix

Chapter 4 – further regressions

To further test my hypothesis, I averaged the available data for the time period covered (2000-2007), constructing a cross-sectional dataset for the 36 states on oil revenue, women's legislative participation, and women's work. In *Oil, Islam and Women*, Ross examined the relationship between the three variables cross-nationally for 169 countries. To conduct a similar inquiry at the *sub*-national level, I used the data I collected on oil revenue, female legislative participation and women's work *per state*, as well as data on religion, ethnicity and income per state. The three key aims of this analysis were to assess the relationship between all variables in the study while controlling for rival explanations, assess Ross's findings sub-nationally using similar analytical tools, and examine the link between women's work and women's representation in Nigeria, which is mandated by the theory. For each of the examined variables, I used mean value to assess whether *Oil Revenue per Capita* explains both differences in women's work and political representation. The model can be written as

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where i is the state (1,...,36), x is a series of explanatory variables, ε_i is a noise term, and α and β are parameters to be estimated.

Notably, applying a time-series model to associate change over time of oil revenue and female legislative participation was not feasible; the small changes between the three elections and the unavailability of long-term data (only three points in time for each state) rendered this model ineffective. Moreover, data on women's work per state were available only for 2007 at the time of writing, while data for oil revenue by derivation per state were available only from March 2000 when the derivation principle was applied – leaving the results of the 1999 elections un-assessable. Thus, using oil revenue to explain *changes* in female legislative participation is possible only for the single difference between the results of the 2003 and 2007 elections (as noted, the frequent changes in the number of Nigerian states would have in any case complicated assessing change over time within states before 1996, when the final change in the number of states took place).

Variables. The independent variable used in the regressions (*Oil Revenue per Capita*) and the control variables (*Income*, *Islam*, and *Ethnicity*) were described in Section 4.2.3. The dependent variable women's legislative participation was measured

here by (1) *Federal Female Seats* – the fraction of seats held by women from each state in the Federal House of Representatives following the 2007 elections; and (2) *State Female Seats* – the fraction of seats held by women in each state House of Assembly following the 2007 elections.¹ The 2007 elections were chosen for three reasons: data on oil revenue is available only from March 2000, leaving the 1999 elections un-assessable; using the 2007 elections data for the main model allowed carrying robustness test for the model using the 2003 elections data; and, assessing the 2007 election results allows for some time lag; by 2007, oil-producing states have been receiving oil revenue by derivation for seven years. The additional dependent variable, women's work, was measured by (1) *FLFP* – the share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector in 2007 per state; and (2) *Female Farmers* – the share of female farmers out of the total number of farmers in 2005-6 per state.²

Robustness. I tested the robustness of the model in two ways. First, to test whether the model is over-sensitive to the levels of oil revenue of 'influential' states, I reran the regression model after replacing the *Oil Revenue per Capita* variable with a simple dummy variable for *oil-producing states*. Considering the relatively small number of oil-producing states in the analysis (nine), using a dummy variable is more suitable than dropping outliers.³ Second, to verify that the regression results on female representation were not specific to the year covered (2007), I reran the model using the same political indicators collected for 2003, with oil revenues calculated only for the period between March 2000 and March 2003.

Results.

Oil revenue and women's work.

In a linear regression model controlling for income, Islam and ethnicity, there is no statistical evidence for an association between *Oil Revenue per Capita* and *FLFP*. However, when using a dummy variable for oil revenue, oil becomes positively linked with *higher FLFP* (coefficient=0.34, p=0.09). The regressions highlighted the importance of Islam and ethnicity: *Islam* is negatively correlated with *FLFP* at the 5% level (coefficient=-0.6; p=0.002), while ethnic origins

¹ Data published by the NBS 2010.

² Based on data collected by the NBS from national labour surveys, the only available data on women's labour force participation *per state*; based on data collected by the NBS 2009.

³ This way of simplifying the oil production measure increases even further the risk of over-fitting the model to some arbitrary differences between the nine oil-producing states and non-oil producing states.

Igbo and *Yoruba* are both positively correlated with *FLFP* at the 5% level (coefficient=0.367; $p=0.02$; coefficient=0.36; $p=0.02$, respectively).

In a second regression in which women's work is measured as *the share of female farmers*, controlling for income shows no evidence for an association between the two variables. However, when additionally adjusting for Islam and ethnic origin, a link between the two variables appears (coefficient=0.23, $p=0.07$). While Islamic states have significantly lower shares of *female farmers* than non-Islamic states (the negative association is highly significant at the 1% level), '*Igbo* states' are positively linked with the share of *female farmers*, whereas '*Hausa-Fulani* states' are negatively linked with the share of *female farmers*. When all demographic variables are included, only the positive impact of *Igbo* ethnic origin is significant at the 10% level. Using a dummy variable for oil-producing states supports these findings: both oil revenue and *Igbo* ethnic origin are positively linked with the share of *female farmers*.

Women's work and women's political representation. There is mixed evidence for an association between the two variables, depending on the legislative body measured. Although states with very low *female seats* in State Houses of Assembly appear to be relatively low on *FLFP*, the link is not repeated in the House of Representatives and is not confirmed in the regression model. However, when women's work is measured as *female farmers*, a clear positive link appears between *female farmers* and *female seats* in State Houses of Assembly, but again this link is not repeated in the House of Representatives. A regression model turns these results around, showing statistical evidence for a link between a high share of *female farmers* and *female seats* in the Federal House of Representatives but not with female seats in State Houses of Assembly.

Oil and female political representation. The regression model shows no association between *Oil Revenue per Capita* and *female seats* in the federal House of Representatives when income, *Islam* and *ethnic group* are controlled for. However, *Islam* is negatively associated with *female seats* at the 5% level, although the inclusion of additional variables reduces this significance, while ethnic origin *Yoruba* is positively linked with *female seats*. When *female seats* are measured for 2003, these links are not re-established significantly. When a dummy variable is used for oil revenue, the only significant impacts on *female seats* remain the links with *Yoruba* and *female farmers*.

When female political representation is measured as *female seats* in State Houses of Assembly, there is similarly no association between the two variables when only income, *Islam* and *ethnic group* are controlled for. However, *Islam* is again negatively linked with *female seats* at the 5% level, while this significance is again lost when ethnic origin is included in the model. There is also evidence for a positive link between *Igbo* ethnic origin and *female seats*. When the model is repeated for the year 2003, there is no evidence for any significant links between the variables that might have been missed in the 2007 results.⁴ Using a dummy variable for oil revenue leaves only the impact of the *Igbo* variable on *female seats* statistically significant.

⁴ However, the p-values in this regression are very high for all variables, suggesting that the evidence for a link between *Igbo* and *female seats* might have been spurious due to over-fitting.