

Eleni Psarrou

'National Identity in the Era of Globalisation'

**Submitting for the award of PhD
at the London School of Economics
Government Department**

UMI Number: U615456

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI U615456

Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

THESES

F

8079

1025472

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is the realisation of the study and research made at the London School of Economics during October 1998 and March 2002. It was a long thought-for project whose realisation was made possible only after I secured my finances from the European Commission. The project has been wholly financed by the Commission's Training and Mobility for Researchers (TMR) program, or Marie Curie grant, which provides excellent opportunities for young researchers who aspire to acquire further specialisation in their academic field and the important experience of a multicultural environment.

The contribution of my supervisor, professor John Gray, had a decisive impact in the successful fulfillment of my project, and for that I wish to thank him from this position. Apart from his excellent scientific guidance and direct feedback on my work, he was also very supportive, encouraging, and understanding of the anxieties and needs of a young person. I believe I was very fortunate to have a supervisor whose presence was always evident and positive in every step of the way.

I also want to thank Dr Abigail Innes, who acted as my co-supervisor. She expressed a genuine interest in my work and, also, her critical comments always stimulated my mind and spirit. Her complementary guidance to my research was indispensable; this collaboration of Professor Gray and Doctor Innes resulted in a perfect supervision.

Last, I would like to thank professors David Held and Nikos Mouzelis for their time and interest on my work, and also for their useful comments and suggestions on the final draft of this thesis. Special thanks to my friend and political scientist Katia Gkikiza for her critical observations and ideas regarding the final draft as well. All the aforementioned have positively influenced my work, and their contribution should only be connected with the merits of this thesis.

ABSTRACT

The project *National Identity in the Era of Globalisation* is a research on the nature of national identity and its potentials in the era of globalisation. National identity is approached by psychoanalysis and by political analysis. Psychoanalysis offers us some insight on *identity* and the process of identification, a process that shapes the individual personality –and identities– since birth. Identification is essential for understanding how people identify themselves and how they are mobilised by other people, groups etc. It also reveals the role of the others (outgroups, foreigners, etc), who are also important to the extent that they act as reference points of identification, including negative identification; to a large extent their presence is essential for the coherence of the national group as the nation's aggressiveness is directed outwards, acting as a stabiliser for the cohesion of the group.

National identity occurs out of identification with the national group, so its peculiar characteristics are defined by the nation. Nationalism inevitably comes to the fore, not only as the force that has forged the nation-state, but also as a mass mobilising ideology that determines the aspirations of the 'nationals'. As it will be argued in this thesis, nationalism changes national identities to 'nationalistic identities', and signifies the nation with new characteristics. Most significantly, nationalism appeals strongly to the human unconscious, and accounts for the seemingly 'irrational' characteristics of national identity. Thus, national identity partly derives its strength, prevalence and ferocity from nationalism.

What are the prospects, then, of national identity in the era of globalisation? In order to answer this, we must define globalisation and examine the position and strength of the national state in the current globalising era. Also, the prevalence of nationalism as a political force and ideology that signifies the nation and national identity to a large extent must be explored in the era of globalisation. As globalisation seems to provoke national awakenings and enhance existing nationalisms, the potentials for national identities to be strengthened or rendered obsolete will be examined.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	page 1
PART ONE: Identification, and the Tool of Psychoanalysis	10
CHAPTER 1: Psychoanalysis and Identification	11
Basic Psychoanalytic Concepts	12
Basic Concepts	12
Identification	21
<i>First Identifications</i>	21
<i>Identification and Narcissism</i>	24
<i>The Super-ego</i>	28
<i>Later Identifications – Identity Formation</i>	30
The Freudian Tradition	33
Criticisms by Freudians	36
CHAPTER 2: Collective Identification and National Identity	41
The Individual Within a Group – Group Psychology	44
Psychoanalytic Interpretations	49
Libidinal Identifications	49
Common Identity: First and Later Identifications	53
Groups and Equality	56
Narcissism of the Groups	59
The Aggression Instinct and the Need to Have Enemies	61
Sameness or Difference?	65
Sublimation	69
Limitations to Psychoanalytic Approach?	72
PART TWO: National Identity and its Signification by Nationalism	75
CHAPTER 3: National Identity in the Era of Nationalism	76
Nationalism	77
Definition of Nationalism	78
A Dominant Ideology Within Modernity	85
National and ‘Nationalistic’ Identity	94
National Identity	95
‘Nationalistic’ Identity	97
Symbolic and Imaginary Identification	104
National Identity as a Distinctive Barrier	106
‘Return to the Womb’	109
Benign or Malign Nationalism	111
Civic and Ethnic Nationalism	112

<i>Billing's Banal Nationalism</i>	120
Patriotism and Nationalism	123
Collective Unconscious	131
Myths and National Identity	136
Selective Memory and Stereotypes	139
CHAPTER 4: The Emergence of Nationalism	143
Is Nationalism and National Identity New?	144
Nationalistic Attitudes Throughout History	144
When Does an Ethnic Groups Become Nation?	147
National and Ethnic Identity	155
<i>Education</i>	157
<i>Mass Communication Media</i>	163
<i>Elite and Mass Manipulation</i>	165
Why has Nationalism Appeared in Modernity?	168
When does Nationalism Actively Manifest Itself?	173
The Particular Circumstances	174
Particular Circumstances and the Particularity of Each Case	179
PART THREE: National Identity in the Era of Globalisation	188
CHAPTER 5: Defining Globalisation	189
The Globalisation Debate	190
Economic Approaches	191
Multidimensional Approaches	194
Definition of Globalisation	198
Economic Dimension	199
Civilian Dimension	205
CHAPTER 6: Globalisation, the National State and National Identity	211
The Modern National State in the Process of Globalisation	213
Economy	214
Warfare	219
Environment	221
Government and Sovereignty	222
Globalisation's Effects on Identification Mechanisms of the National State	226
Identification Mechanisms of the 'Globalised' National State	227
<i>New Communication Technologies</i>	233
Discursive Innovations and Nationalism	243
CHAPTER 7: National Identity in the Era of Globalisation	252
The Particular Circumstances of Globalisation	253
Inequality	255
Economic Insecurity	258
Cultural Threats	260
Environmental Risks	262

Global Awareness of Risks (Information Risks)	263
Reactions and Psychoanalytic Explanations	266
Globalisation as a Political Ideology	283
The Prospects of (National) Identity in the Era of Globalisation	287
National Identity as Primary Identity	289
Recall of Religious Identity?	291
CONCLUSION	296
BIBLIOGRAPHY	306

INTRODUCTION

The object of this thesis is national identity. The aim of this thesis is the deep comprehension of the nature of national identity, its mechanisms, its potency and potentials. While this object may seem general, it is quite precise: my object is national identity as such, and not a particular –in time and place- national identity. That is because, while the particular offers a deep insight on a case and an interpretation of its distinctive characteristic elements, my attempt is to identify the fundamentals of national identity, to grasp its common denominator in each particular case. So, I am not preoccupied with the elements that comprise a specific nation's national identity, be it religion, language or other, but my main concern is to identify the mechanisms that lead a person and a group to national identification. The methodology I use to approach my object is defined by the object itself. National identity is comprised by the *national* and the *identity* component; each of these elements have to be analysed separately before they can be explained in conjunction. Hence the need for a multidimensional approach.

Initially I turned to social psychology, as the science that defines as its object of analysis the 'frontier' where the social and individual meet. The relation between self and society appears to be a central one from the standpoint of social psychology, which focuses on their interaction, but it mostly stands at their borderline and does not touch analytically each component *separately*. The main standpoint of the classics of social psychology (Mead, Cooley, Jenkins and others) is that identity must be seen as the outcome of a continuous interaction between society and the self, which is a process rather than a stable, solid outcome. Yet, the details of this process are not explained, although some of its characteristics are identified¹. So, a deep insight into the issue of national identity requires the analysis and understanding of this process, the process of identification. Also, in order to understand better the interaction of the individual and societal components we must first have a clear insight of each of the components on their own account. Thus, I turned to the discipline that deals with the individual and the process of identification:

¹ Such as reciprocity of meaning, response to familiar attitudes and symbols, the distinction between 'self' and 'I', or the subjective and reflective self (Mead), the construction of identity through language and communicative life (Cooley), or the construction of identity through similarity and difference (Jenkins).

psychoanalysis. In the sequel, I placed the individual in its wider social, historical and political environment in order to explain the nature and potentials of national identification.

Psychoanalysis focuses on the process of identification and explains the attribution of identities in detail. In addition, it offers a full account of the inner self, the unconscious mechanisms and drives that dictate one's actions. However, psychoanalysis does not analyse the self in isolation to its social environment, be it the family or a larger group; it deals with individuals inside a group and their determinative relationship with the others too. Thus, psychoanalysis is an extremely useful tool in the socio-political analysis of national identity. National identity is a particular form of social identity that is acquired through interaction with other people (family, teachers, friends etc.) within a given social environment –the nation. Nevertheless national identity has become so pervasive and so powerful in mobilising people that it renders a necessity to search for the reasons of this pervasiveness. In this aim, psychoanalysis is an essential complementary approach to social and political analyses. National identity is a political identity too, as it is influenced by the political ideology of nationalism. As Schopflin remarks, nationalism persists even though dismissed as 'irrational'; so, it must "operate by rules of its own, rules that are rational in its own context" (1995:55). Those rules and that context are to be explained by psychoanalysis, which renders national identity and the phenomenon of nationalism much more comprehensible to the scholars in the field: it offers a deep insight into the forces and mechanisms operating within the self, those that provoke reactions and phenomena that appear to be irrational, but are clearly explainable and reasonable (thus "rational" in Schopflin terms) if analysed within their own context. It also offers a deep insight into the ways that the 'internal' and 'external' interact. Psychoanalysis tries to explain human behaviour and is, thus, a preferable tool in this analysis.

The applicability of Freud's theory to social and political phenomena is stressed by several scientists. Talcott Parsons, for example, in an article titled 'Social Structure and the Development of Personality: Freud's Contribution to the Integration of Psychology and Sociology' (1970) tried to show the relation of psychoanalysis and sociology. However, Freud himself has argued that, "what characterises psychoanalysis as a science is not the material which it handles but the

technique with which it works. It can be applied to the history of civilisation, to the science of religion...What it aims and achieves at is...what is unconscious in mental life" (1917c:436), individual or social. While in a group, the individual acts in a much more instinctual and unconscious way; for that reason, psychoanalysis, the science that introduced the unconscious and analysed its mechanisms, can be equally used in explaining social phenomena, meaning individual behaviours within society. So, we should see psychoanalysis as a method for explaining individual pathologies regardless of the context. Freud stressed this explicitly:

It is true that, individual psychology is concerned with the individual man and explores the paths by which he seeks to find satisfaction for his instinctual impulses; but only rarely and under certain exceptional conditions is individual psychology in a position to disregard the relations of this individual to others. In the individual's mental life someone else is invariably involved; and so from the very first individual psychology, in this extended but entirely justifiable sense of the words, is at the same time social psychology as well (1921:95).

Although psychoanalysis is appropriate to understand the internal mechanisms and the process of identification, by illuminating the interaction of the 'internal' and the 'external', it is not adequate to grasp the complexity of social and political phenomena. Those phenomena require political analysis, as many of the issues under consideration are political phenomena and ideologies that determine social activity and political structures. By political analysis I mean the critical study, explanation and evaluation of issues that are political, meaning that they involve the individual and its society but also the institutional constitution and regulation of society. In addition, the object of national identity involves an analysis of politics, of political ideologies and of the process of 'ideologisation' of certain political variables that determine social and political life. Multidisciplinarity is still significant, though, because of the complexity of the issue. Thus, political analysis necessarily requires the contribution of history and historical sociology. Historical sociology is particularly indispensable in regard to nationalism, the national state and national identity, because these are cultural and historical phenomena, and their course and development through history must be the basis of analysis: it is those and their history that we try to understand and can further illuminate our object, national identity.

Some scholars that have used psychoanalysis to approach political phenomena have used a specific name for their approach. Ross (1995) for example uses the term 'psychocultural interpretation', and Volkan (1995, 1998) and Lipowatz (1990) the term 'political psychology', by which they refer to the psychoanalytic explanation of society. Without considering these terms inappropriate, I will not use any of them because my attempt is not at explaining society psychoanalytically. Rather, my attempt is to explain social and political phenomena from the widest perspective possible. Psychoanalysis is one of the tools chosen for that, though a basic one; yet, it is not adequate alone to explain such complex sociopolitical phenomena. So, my attempt is not to psychoanalytically explain national identity, but rather to explain national identity in general, that is, to explain it through those approaches that can best and in conjunction provide the fullest analysis possible. To the extent that I emphasise on psychoanalysis during my study that is not due to a belief that it is the most important perspective compared to others; it is rather due to the fact that, although it is essential and indispensable for a complete analysis of (national) identity, it is neglected or underestimated as irrelevant by many scholars in the field. In overall, this is a multidisciplinary analysis.

This research on national identity has followed three main paths, three thematic units that have been considered as significant in the understanding of national identity. These are the three parts that this thesis is divided in and concern Identification, Nationalism, and Globalisation –the three components of the research on National Identity in the era of Globalisation, as the title itself indicates. The first part comprises the basis for the subsequent analysis, for it provides the basic understandings of the individual unconscious mental life, which is the prerequisite for the political analysis that will follow. Chapter 1 is basically introductory to psychoanalysis. As I am addressing an issue of the social and political sciences, I cannot but assume a lack of familiarity with psychoanalysis. So, the first chapter is an introduction to the basic concepts of psychoanalytic theory –such as the unconscious, the drives, the pleasure and the reality principles, as well as the process of identification, mainly first identification– and a short description of the Freudian tradition, the different schools and the criticisms to psychoanalytic theory. The second chapter is concerned mostly with secondary identifications and, in particular, group identifications and the mechanisms by which the same (national) identity is

attributed to a group of people. Here, psychoanalysis provides an explanation to group psychology and its pathologies as they relate to group identification in general and national identity in particular. Such pathologies are the 'need' to have enemies and its relation to aggression drive, or the construction of a group through similarity and difference.

These two psychoanalytic chapters provide the basic understandings on identity and the process of identification that is required in order to proceed in specifying the social and political characteristics of national identity. Thereafter, psychoanalysis leaves the foreground as the basic or sole approach to political analysis and historical sociology, but it nevertheless remains the complementary approach, as its explanations of the unconscious mental life will serve as our basic understanding of individual behaviour within a group. For example, it is this understanding that offers an explanation for the appeal of nationalism to individuals, or the potentials for political manipulation of the human drives. So, with these understandings in mind we then proceed to the second part, where we are mostly concerned with nationalism, and the national state, and the influence of nationalism on national identity. The second part/thematic unit on nationalism take up an equal space in the thesis as the unit on Globalisation, and for that reason its title could also be 'National Identity in the Era of Nationalism and Globalisation'. Yet, that title was not preferred in order to avoid the near-tautology of 'national identity and nationalism', as a theoretical analysis of national identity necessarily involves an analysis of nationalism.

In chapter 3 I address the question, why is national, among all other social identities, so prevalent and appealing within modernity. The answer to this relies on the signification of national identity by the political ideology of nationalism, which renders it both a national and a 'nationalistic' identity. This chapter begins by defining nationalism and explaining its significance as an ideology, and analysing the attribution of a particular value and quality to the national state by it. It proceeds with the distinction between nationalism and patriotism and an evaluation of different types of nationalism and their common denominator. In the context of nationalism, (national) identity acquires peculiar characteristics, which I try to define towards the end of the chapter. Yet, my main concern is with the imaginary character of nationalism and the specific reasons for its strong psychological appeal. In chapter 4,

I am trying to locate this psychological appeal within time and identify the particular circumstances that facilitate the generation and spread of nationalistic feelings –be they political, social, historical and/or economic. Thus, since psychological predispositions are not confined in place and time, the following questions arise and search for an answer in chapter 4: is nationalism new and, also, why and when did it emerge? Is the national state an exclusively modern phenomenon? What is the relation between national and ethnic identities? What are the specific reasons that account for the emergence of exclusionary and actively aggressive forms of nationalism?

The first two parts on Identification and Nationalism provide a clear idea about national identity, its nature, its distinctive characteristics, and the circumstances under which it becomes stronger or remains latent. Thus, having acquired a deep knowledge on national identity I proceed to the third and last part on globalisation and its impact on national identity. The study of national identity in the era of globalisation is not only a study of national identity in a particular context but, also, its study in the contemporary environment. Globalisation is, in a sense, the contemporary era, the period that we currently live in. So, having analysed national identity as such, although keeping modernity as the particular reference, the next step is to examine its prospects in the light of most recent developments –in late-modernity, to use Beck's term.

Globalisation is said to produce new forms of social and political change both within and between nations, to produce new sources and forms of conflict as well, and to raise new issues about identity and culture, issues that can be interpreted and evaluated anew. Initially, we must examine the accuracy and extend of these claims. For example, on one hand, it is argued that economic globalisation, which weakens the nation-state, is backed up by a globalisation of culture, while the continuity of generations has begun to fray and teenagers are influenced by their counterparts in other societies. On the other hand, it is counterargued that, the more people communicate with each other, the more they find out what is peculiar about themselves and may tend to evaluate it as a distinctive barrier. So, globalisation and the debate about it raise questions about national identity, about its contemporary and future prospects. A number of questions arise: What are the prospects of national identity as –and if– the world becomes a 'small village'? Where are individual and

national identities rooted as local, regional and global cultures interact, and how are they re-shaped by increasing geographical and cultural mobility? A few more issues are raised regarding nationalism. The most important concern national awakenings, conflicts etc.: are they an outcome of globalisation, or rather of nationalism? Why have they become so apparent in the age of globalisation? What is the future of nationalism in the era of globalisation?

These are all important and inter-related questions, and they will be answered in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In chapter 5 I first provide a brief introduction to the debate and a working definition on globalisation; in that sense, chapter 5 is the introduction to our discussion on globalisation. Then, in chapter 6 we refer in detail to the arguments and counterarguments as to whether the national state is going to be rendered obsolete by the process of globalisation. As the national state is comprised by the *state* and the *national* component, this chapter will address the issue of the changes of states in the era of globalisation, and then it will examine whether globalisation has generated any changes thus far regarding the construction/ascription/acquisition of national identity. Thus, in chapter 6 we shall examine whether the state has been significantly undermined in the era of globalisation, and whether the mechanisms that operate within it and produce identification with it have undergone any alteration. My main concern is to identify the prevalent tendency as far as the direction of changes is concerned, and to give a reasonable estimation for the prospects of national identity in the context that globalisation delineates. This is also my main concern in the next and last chapter: chapter 7 will be preoccupied with the prospects of national-as-collective identification within globalisation. That is, the prospects of identification will not be analysed in sole reference to the national state and its changes (which is the aim of chapter 6), but in relation to globalisation in general. In that sense, we shall examine the perceptions and images of globalisation for individuals and groups, so as to identify possible trends in the development of collective identification in that context.

As indicated at the beginning, my attempt during this research has been to achieve the greatest comprehension possible on national identity. This attempt has led me to examine it within different contexts and to raise quite a few questions, questions that may initially seem distracting and diverting. However, the issues

involved and the questions raised have been to a large degree interrelated (ie, nationalism and globalisation), while they have been drawn in direct reference to the issue of national identity. Each of these different contexts (Psychoanalysis, Nationalism, Globalisation) constitute large debates on their own, with many sub-debates as well; so, each of these three thematic units can be separated in areas of specialised study. At the same time, though, each of them includes as an area of study the issue of national identity. So, the study of national identity through these diverse and yet interrelated thematic units would offer the opportunity of its most complete comprehension. Certainly, one runs the risk of losing sight of the objective of research, or getting lost in a vast and unending literature. Indeed, this was a major challenge during my research. Each of the thematic units opened up unending possibilities of research, aspects that I found equally interesting and stimulating. But, had I followed any of these specialised areas of research, I would have limited my research on a particular case of national identity, on a specific aspect of it. Not that this would be any less interesting, but it would divert me from my original aim, which is to understand national identity and to answer a common question posed by many scholars who specialise on issues of nationalism and nationality: why is it so prevalent among identities today, why does it, occasionally, show the ferocity that it shows, and what are its prospects in the contemporary 'globalised' era? Hence, I followed multidisciplinary as it is the key for understanding a large number of complex social and political phenomena.

Thus, comprehension of national identity required its analysis through the examination of individual identification, the development of nationalism, and the current prospects and reactions that the current era of globalisation poses. In order to handle the vast literature I focused on the 'classics', meaning that I concentrated my study of literature to the books and articles that are widely considered as indispensable readings, and I used particularised researches only when published in a reputable edition or journal. Fortunately, my background helped a lot, as my master's specialisation was on issues of nationalism and identity, while I had some moderate familiarisation with the way psychoanalysis can be connected to political and social phenomena. It was this initial knowledge and specialisation that I wished to broaden and make concrete with my doctorate research, which I anticipate to make a useful contribution to the debate on national identity. In a similar way, it is this further

doctorate specialisation that has already become the initiative for some additional research in the future. For the moment, I hope that I have succeeded in my present task: to elaborate a research that will answer the questions of nature, strength and potentials of national identity.

PART ONE

Identification, and the Tool of Psychoanalysis

In the first two chapters of this thesis our main attempt will be to understand individual psychology and the process by which individuals acquire their identities. For that reason, our methodological tool will be psychoanalysis. The first chapter will be an introduction to psychoanalysis, to the main psychoanalytic concepts as initiated by Freud and further developed by the Freudian school (mainly the orthodox Freudians), along with a brief reference to the development of the Freudian tradition. Particular attention will be paid on the analytical concept of identification, as it is the process by which individuals form their personal and collective identities. In chapter 2 we shall analyse collective identifications and group psychology, so as to understand the mechanisms that operate in the process of group formation and group identification. The nation will be the major example used as far as groups are concerned in this chapter, so that particular reference will be made to national identification.

CHAPTER 1: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND IDENTIFICATION

This chapter is an introduction to the basic concepts of psychoanalysis, with a particular focus on the process of identification. This analysis is based on the classical psychoanalytic tradition as it is founded by Freud. The Freudian theory entails the foundational elements of psychoanalysis and offers the tools for understanding the human psyche, or at least the mechanisms that determine the mental and sentimental life, tools and mechanisms that have initially been discovered through Freud's clinical research. Although there are certain points and concepts that he did not elaborate in detail, the 'father' of psychoanalysis has provided the explanatory tools for the approach of unconscious mental life. The interests of Freud's research, for example, were determined by the fact that he was at the beginning of new discoveries and, more significantly, his activities were determined by the period he lived in. So, his clinical research was initiated from and focused on hysteria, while today the interest of psychoanalysis has moved towards other issues, such as depression and psychosis. It is, thus, of great importance to apprehend the mechanisms and possess the tools for understanding the fundamentals of human behaviour; such knowledge can then be applied to the particular issues of our interest.

We shall first proceed with the analysis of the basic psychoanalytic concepts that will also give us an insight of the terminology that will be used in the sequel. Identification will be separately explained in more detail, while some psychoanalytic concepts will be analysed in direct reference to it. At the end of this chapter I will make a brief reference to the Freudian tradition and some basic criticisms that have been advanced against his theory; this reference is, I believe, essential to an introductory presentation of the theory that will be an essential explanatory tool for the rest of this thesis.

BASIC PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTS

In the Freudian tradition, the term usually employed is identification instead of identity. The use of this word has a particular meaning: that is to emphasise the continuity of the process that is going on throughout someone's life, particularly until late-adolescence. Identity has a more static connotation and, thus, it is not preferred. Identification is the mechanism, the whole process through which an identity is acquired, and offers us a clear idea of the very basis, the 'solid core' upon which every identity is formulated.

Before we proceed to an analysis of identification, it is necessary to explain some basic psychoanalytic terms. Not all of what is important in psychoanalysis can be explained at this point, because that would need much more than a chapter (more than a thesis indeed); a reference will be made solely to those concepts that are essential in psychoanalytic theory and, also, those that are necessary for the understanding of identification. So, some of these concepts will be analysed independently at first, while some will be further explained in direct reference to identification. Thus, this section will be divided in two parts: the first will be an description of some basic psychoanalytic ideas, and the second will deal with the concept of identification.

Basic Concepts

The central psychoanalytic concept is that of the *unconscious*. The unconscious is Freud's most important and innovative discovery –discovery in the sense of the first concrete elaboration and presentation of the unconscious as an analytical concept, and not just as a broad idea or speculation, as it was referred to until that time, particularly in philosophical circles. Hierarchically, therefore, it should be our point of departure. Nevertheless, it would be extremely confusing to refer to the unconscious without first having an insight into the *drives or instincts*¹, for it is –

¹ The German word translated in English as 'instinct' is 'Trieb', which means 'drive'. The word 'Instinkt' ('instinct' in English) is used by Freud only referring to animals: "...the instincts of animals", on Moses and Monotheism, p.346 (see also footnote 1 in Moses and Monotheism, p.346). Let us quote here an editorial footnote about the passage word 'Trieb' from the *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*: "Literary 'drive'. The German word is often so translated, but, for reasons of style and grammar and to avoid anachronistic misrepresentation of Freud's ideas, 'instinct' has been used throughout the Standard Edition" (1933b, footnote 1, p.129). Nevertheless, this mistranslation of the term is not without importance, because the two terms have

partly— through the drives, and their repression, that we come to know about the unconscious². So, for the sake of clarity, let us begin with the drives.

The drives are “the representatives of all the forces originating in the interior of the body and transmitted to the mental apparatus” (Freud, 1920:306)³. The use of the term, as introduced by Freud, has no relevant connotations to the traditionally used “animal instinct”. It is rather the psychical representative that originates from the organism, and, thus, stands at the borderline of the mental and the physical. The aim of the drives is satisfaction; they seek for pleasure in every instance, even when different paths to this aim may show intermediate aims. In reality, the drives serve the *pleasure principle*, meaning that they strive for pleasure/satisfaction (the pleasure principle shall be referred to in detail later on). Their objects are those things, and persons, through which they can achieve their aims, things that act as mediators in a sense. This act of selection of a person, object etc. as love-object is described by the term object-cathexis or object-choice. In certain cases there is a particularly close attachment to the object; when this happens, the object becomes more like an aim itself than a mediator. These cases are pathological, and the term *fixation* is used to describe this close attachment or obsession with an object.

Freud, in his later writings, classified the drives in two large categories: the life drives and the death drives, *Eros* and *Thanatos* or *Death*⁴. The death drives, or drives of destruction, or aggressive drives, seek to destroy and kill; they are “striving to bring men to ruin and reduce life to its original condition of inanimate matter”⁵: as inanimate things existed before living ones, to strive to return to that condition is to

different connotations. The drive is more an impulse, an urge to do something. The instinct is unavoidable in any case and cannot become the object of mental elaboration. It has a purely biological connotation, and it applies more appropriately when referring to the ‘instinct for nutrition’. The instincts cannot be social mediated, which is a significant characteristic of the drives and accounts for their sublimation. Here I shall use the accurate term ‘drive’ in general, except from quotations from original texts or references to authors who use this term, but always put in inverted commas, and when I refer to the ‘animal instinct’.

² The other way through which we know about the unconscious is through the study of the dreams.

³ In my quotations and references to Freud’s books, I will use the original date of publication of the book or article in question. I will do so exceptionally for Freud’s quotations for the sake of convenience in directly identifying his works, and because I want to keep the temporal development of his thinking in mind. Yet, in the *Bibliography* I mention the details of the publication I am using.

⁴ Here, I refer to his later categorisations, made in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920). In his earlier works he talked of two groups of primal drives: the ego or self-preservative drives and the sexual drives (in *Instincts and their Vicissitudes*, 1915, p.121). These two groups still hold in Freud’s theory, but in 1920 they became part of a broader categorisation, that of *Eros*. This may be connected, to some extent, with the fact that, in his earlier works, he laid much more emphasis on the sexual drive than he did later on.

⁵ Freud (1933) *Why War?*, p.357. The concept of the “compulsion to repeat” was first introduced in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, and is described as a general tendency of the unconscious, usually observed in hysterics, and not explicitly related to the Death drive.

strive for death. When it is directed outwards, to the external world, it seeks to destroy everything surrounding the individual, and is manifested with aggressiveness and hostility towards other people; when directed inwards, it leads to self-destruction. In his correspondence with Einstein⁶, Freud placed this drive at the core of his pessimistic view about a future without wars and conflicts, for he believed it was impossible for humans to get rid of their aggressive drives. He stressed, however, that this aggressiveness could be diverted, by civilisation and science, to such extent as to avoid wars (the process through which a drive can be diverted is called *sublimation* and we shall refer to it later on).

Most analysts, however, avoid referring to Thanatos or Death, even though they do not reject it as such. In reality, most psychoanalysts accept the aggression drives as basic within psychoanalytic theories. It is rather the concept of death directed aggression that has raised strong protest even among orthodox supporters. These protests, however, are mostly based on moral disapproval. The most reasonable criticism, as quoted by Brown, is Ferenczi's, who argued that "Freud had confused two entirely separate concepts: the first, that aggression is innate in man and its dynamics are as described, based as they are on clinical findings; the second, that because all men die and all behaviour is striving, they must also be striving for death"(Brown, 1961:28), which is a metapsychological view. In general, due to the moral oppositions and to absence of adequate clinical data connecting aggressiveness with death-striving behaviour, the dual schema of Life and Death is rarely referred to; however, their components –aggression, sexual, etc. drives– remain at the core of psychoanalytic theory. Freud himself, without rejecting it, did not elaborate it any further, and he did not even use it again; in his *New Introductory Lectures of Psychoanalysis*, he categorised the drives into sexual, or Eros (that is, the life drives), and aggressive ones (still aiming at destruction, either directed outwards or inwards) (Freud, 1933b:136). A characteristic of the drives that he did maintain, though, is the "compulsion to repeat" (Freud, 1933b:139-140), expressing a conservative nature of the drives, which reveals an effort to restore an earlier state of things and satisfy the

⁶ See *Why War?*, 1933.

pleasure principle⁷. In the present analysis we shall keep this analytically valid and broadly accepted categorisation into life and aggression drives.

The life drives –Eros– are those that bind people and bring them together in common living. The most significant among them are the *ego*, or *self-preservation*⁸ drives, and the *sexual* drives. The self-preservation drives are associated with bodily functions necessary for the individual's living (hunger is a usual example of those). These drives also provoke social attachments: since human beings are not independent and autonomous when they are born, they need a protective surrounding for their self preservation –the smallest being the family. These drives, however, are much more egoistic in nature than the others⁹. The sexual drives, on the other hand, are those aiming for the satisfaction of a bodily organ –‘organ pleasure’. But, they are more than that: they also include whatever comprises under the word “love”, as for example love relationships, emotional ties etc. It is the love drive, which has sexual love at its nucleus, that stands at the core of any group-formation. In love relationships between two people the sexual drive has a directly sexual aim; in groups, however, the drive is diverted (inhibited would be the Freudian term) in its aim, and the libidinal¹⁰ ties between people maintain their original energy, which creates a group attachment instead of a sexual relationship. The internal need for communication, that Cooley (1902) has identified, exists in people indeed, and its energy is derived by the love or sexual drive.

In the beginning, Freud used the word “sex” in its everyday use, but later on he gave it the “much wider connotation to apply to any pleasurable sensation relating to the body functions, and also, through the concept of sublimation [a process by which the aim of a drive is diverted to another one], to such feelings as tenderness, pleasure in work, and friendship. In other words, he used the word to refer to what would originally be described as ‘desire’” (Brown, 1961:20). *Desire* is a very significant concept that stands at the core of every drive; it is the wish that requires its

⁷ The pleasure principle is one of the two governing principles of mental functioning (the other being the reality principle), and it strives at obtaining pleasure and satisfaction. We shall refer to the two principles in more detail in the sequel.

⁸ In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud interrogated whether the self-preservation drives actually belong to the death or life drives, but he abandoned this question as a mere speculation, having no clinical support.

⁹ We can also speculate that it is because of the drives that aim at self-preservation that the aggression drives are usually directed outwards than inwards.

¹⁰ *Libido* is the name of the force by which a drive manifests itself, the energy behind a drive (see Freud, 1917c:355). It is usually associated with the sexual drive. The notion of *libido*, though a basic one, is quite perplexing and complicated; for that reason, it is better not to include it in the current analysis.

fulfillment, the initiative for the drives to strive for their satisfaction. This is also why drives can be socially mediated; because, desire can be both constructed and mediated by the surrounding social environment. “According to Freud, unconscious desire is the organising principle of all human thought, action, and social relations”, Elliot argues (1999:15).

According to Elliott, moreover, desire arises out of the relation with an other – usually the mother. In the beginning, it emerges out of the biological need for nutrition: the infant’s sucking at its mother’s breast for nutrition provokes the desire for pleasure derived from sucking. The striving to obtain pleasure independently of nourishment is to be termed ‘sexual’. Sexuality is thus born as a new libidinal relation with the other arises. This is how the unconscious desire is born. It is Lacan’s contribution to psychoanalysis that “desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need” (Elliott, 1999:119). The presence of the other, as well as of speech, is essential for the expression of desire (language functions as a vehicle for desire). Desire goes beyond the objects that satisfy it; it stands at the core of every drive and is never ending. What is particularly interesting about desire is that, as Szpilka (1999) argues, it is directed primarily “not towards a given positive object, but towards another wish”, as for example the wish to be loved and acknowledged; in that sense, “human history is thus ultimately the history of wished-for wishes” (p.1176).

The drives are sometimes difficult to be discerned because they often undergo certain vicissitudes. The vicissitudes a drive may undergo are: a) reversal into the opposite, b) turning around upon the subjects own self, c) repression¹¹, and d) sublimation. *Reversal into the opposite* may be a change from activity to passivity (i.e. sadism and masochism), or reversal of its content (love-hate). The meaning of *turning around the subject’s own self* is that there is a change of object, while the aim remains the same. *Repression* and *sublimation* are very important concepts for psychoanalysis and, therefore, will be explained in more detail. Repression is the operation that “attempts to repel, or confine, to the unconscious representations (thoughts, images, memories) which are bound to a drive. Repression occurs when the satisfaction of a drive –though likely to be pleasurable in itself– would incur the

¹¹ The English word ‘repression’ has a double meaning: it means coercion, oppression on the one hand, and suppression, inhibition, exclusion from conscious awareness, on the other hand. The term is used in psychoanalysis with its second meaning.

risk of provoking unpleasure because of other requirements” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973:390), such as social. Repression is a defense mechanism, which denies certain *psychical representatives of the drives*¹² to access consciousness. When a drive is repressed, it usually remains attached to the representative in question (fixation). The force that institutes and maintains repression is *resistance*, which emanates from the ego¹³. When the repressed tries to come to the conscious and manages to overcome resistance somehow, it has to pass through the censorship of the latter; if it manages to come to the fore, it is usually distorted. So, where there is unsuccessful repression, distortion takes place and transforms the repressed representations into symptoms, so as to make them unidentifiable. Dreams, slips of the tongue, jokes etc. are everyday examples of repressed drives that come to consciousness distorted; their true meaning can only be found through psychoanalytic treatment. Also, “the amount of repression that human beings are able to sustain depends on many factors, such as the subject’s inner world, psychic creativity and...their place within the structure of social and economic relationships” (Elliot, 1999:19). This means that some people are more vulnerable to repressions, and are most likely to become frustrated or even psychically ill than others who are able to sustain a larger amount of psychical pressure.

Sublimation is the process by which the aim or the object of a drive is diverted to another one. Let us stress an example: if a youngster is prohibited from having sexual relationships, a large amount of libidinal energy would stay trapped inside him, seeking to be set free. In order to avoid frustration, among other possible symptoms, his libido can be directed towards other activities, such as sports, studying etc. In such case, we say that the sexual drive is inhibited in its aim, though it still holds its libidinal energy. So, sublimation helps the subject to divert his libido in such way as to avoid frustration and anxiety, and, more significantly at this point, to avoid socially destructive impulses. Freud believed that sublimation could be mostly achieved, for the sake of civilisation, through the arts, literature and science. The process of sublimation is extremely important for the maintenance of social order and peaceful coexistence. As will be shown in the following chapters, it is important

¹² The drives cannot become conscious as such, but only through certain representative ideas, as for example the instinct for nutrition reveals itself to the conscious through the sentiment of hunger. They also come to the fore through representative words.

¹³ This is, perhaps, where the other meaning of the English word ‘repression, that is coercion, can be seen as applicable.

for the conflict resolution process for it has the potentials to direct the drives for aggression to non-socially destructive aims.

Having examined the drives, we can now proceed to the analysis of the unconscious¹⁴. But, why was not that possible before? The reason is that, as Freud tells us, “we obtain our concept of the unconscious from the theory of repression...The repressed is the prototype of the unconscious for us” (Freud, 1923:353). So, before having an insight on the drives (repression is, as we have seen, a vicissitude of them), we would not be able to understand the contents of the unconscious. Everything repressed is unconscious, but the unconscious is more than that. The unconscious comprises of *latent* acts and *repressed* ones. The drives are always unconscious, and can have access to the conscious through representative ideas. Freud made another classification, that of the preconscious, which is the system that contains whatever is “capable of becoming conscious” (Freud, 1915d:175). This, however, applies only to the representative ideas, because, as it has already been mentioned, the drives themselves are always unconscious. The preconscious representations are unconscious, for they have not reached consciousness yet (and they may never do), but are the only ones that could or might become conscious: they are in a state of latency. We must not get confused, however, as Rieff warns, by Freud’s imprecise use of the term ‘unconscious’ as both noun and adjective, for “the word properly denotes a quality of, not a place inside the mind” (Rieff, 1960:22).

While a psychological act passes through the systems it has to pass a kind of testing, a censorship, so that what finally becomes conscious may be strongly distorted. In fact, most of the mental activity is unconscious, and only certain portions are conscious. The popular hypothesis that the latent, unconscious ideas are weak, and become stronger as they grow conscious is not correct. Clinical research and experience has proved that, not only unconscious ideas are stronger, but, also, they occupy a much greater space of our mental activity. This is perfectly illustrated in the shape of the pyramid. In a schematic representation, we can imagine the mental apparatus as a pyramid, whose basis is the unconscious, further up there is the preconscious, and on the top there is the, relatively smallest part, of the conscious.

¹⁴ Unconscious is the appropriate Freudian term, and not the usually uttered ‘subconscious’. The latter implies that there is some mental activity lying ‘under’ consciousness, occupying lesser space and significance, while the former shows the existence of a mental activity that is not conscious.

The unconscious is not a wastebasket of unimportant memories and ideas, but a vivid pot containing all the energy and motivation for what appears as a conscious action. It is indicative that, even the ego is partly unconscious (Freud, 1923:355-6).

The unconscious has certain particular characteristics that channel the way people act. Hence, in order to understand human behaviour, it is important to identify and comprehend these characteristics. A first characteristic of the unconscious is *negation* and *exemption from mutual contradiction*. For example, the unconscious denies death, cannot separate falsehood from truth, and it accommodates ambivalent feelings at the same time (typical example is the coexistence of love and hate for the same object). The myths of the living dead (the ‘zombies’ for example), the characterisation of certain –dead– heroes as immortal originates here. Another basic trait of the unconscious, closely connected to that of negation, is the *replacement of external by psychical reality*. The unconscious may deny external reality, either social or natural, if it is unpleasant, and it is solely oriented towards pleasure and enjoyment. As a consequence, it does not acknowledge any lack, but lives in an illusion of wholeness and completeness. *Timelessness* is another characteristic of the unconscious: it does have its own history, but it does not acknowledge any temporal, or even logical, order in it. An important consequence of that is *regression*, that is the return of the psychical apparatus to an earlier point of its development. A usual example is the pathological regression to a libidinal fixation, or the regression to infantile identifications. In addition, the unconscious is characterised by a continuous *mobility* and *mutability* of the drives¹⁵.

The above characteristic introduces us to the important distinction between the *pleasure principle* and the *reality principle*, the two principles that govern the whole of mental functioning¹⁶. As it was indicated earlier, the pleasure principle is the governing purpose of the unconscious, the aim of the drives, and it represents the internal, psychical ‘reality’ that strive towards obtaining pleasure and/or avoiding unpleasure. The reality principle, on the other hand, is the representative of the external, social and natural reality, of what is real and usually not agreeable. The pleasure principle is more prevalent and more often satisfied until the end of infantile period, that is, until the child achieves complete physical detachment from his

¹⁵ These characteristics are described in Freud, 1915d, p.191-192; see also Lipowatz, 1990:59-60

¹⁶ See on the matter Freud’s *Formulations on the Two Principles of the Mental Functioning* (1911), and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920); also, Lipowatz, 1990:154-156.

parents. Then, when the child starts its own social contacts away from the parenting persons, the reality principle mediates individuals' activities to a larger extent.

The two principles are not isolated from each other; on the contrary, they communicate, while being completely autonomous. It is the reality principle, though, that, while striving for what is useful, acts also as a safeguard of the pleasure principle. A momentous pleasure, for instance, may be given up for an assured later one. According to Freud, this is the basis of the religious doctrine of reward in the after-life, which makes every-day sacrifices worthwhile. In any case, the individual is always divided between the two, and the transition from one to the other is always problematic. Repression, for instance, is the flight from something that produces unpleasure. The 'surrender' of the pleasure to the reality principle, however, is a kind of decoy: individual desires remain always in a search for fulfilment as repressed wishes will always strive to come to consciousness (and they usually manage to do so through distorted 'messages', dreams, etc).

The statement made a few paragraphs above –that the ego is partly unconscious¹⁷– needs some clarification. Freud discerned three regions of the mental apparatus: the ego, the super-ego, and the id. The id is the “inaccessible part of the personality” (Freud, 1933b:105), the one containing all the drives and libidinal energy; it strives to bring satisfaction to the drives under the surveillance of the pleasure principle, and is wholly unconscious. The ego is the portion of the id that has been modified by the proximity of the external world: it has been separated from the id by taking on the task to represent to it the external world. “The ego stands for reason and good sense while the id stands for the untamed passions” (Freud, 1933b:109). A large part of the ego is unconscious as well, as for example are ego's defence mechanisms. Last, the super-ego, which is mostly unconscious, emerges out of separation from the ego. Its task is to observe the ego so as to conform to the demands of external reality, and resist the demands of the id. So, the ego, driven by the id and confined by the super-ego, tries to bring about harmony among the forces working in and upon it¹⁸.

Thus far, we have examined the three more important concepts in psychoanalysis, the unconscious –Freud's most influential discovery–, the drives,

¹⁷ See below, p.11.

¹⁸ See on the ego, superego and the id, Freud, 1933b:110-111.

and the reality and pleasure principle. Some more will emerge while analysing the concept of identification, and will be dealt with when they emerge and in direct connection to identification. We should now proceed to the core psychoanalytic concept relating to this thesis, namely identification.

Identification

As it was indicated above, in groups we are concerned with love drives that have been diverted from their original, sexual aim. Other mechanisms, apart from object-cathexis, that create emotional ties are *identifications*. Identification is “a psychological process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attitude of the other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides. It is by means of a series of identifications that the personality is constituted and specified” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973:205). Also, as Elliot argues, a unified ego is not present at birth, but is only developed through the process of identification (1999:113). The most important feature we should keep from this definition is the word ‘process’, for identification is exactly that: a process that constantly enriches one’s identity. In addition, all identifications in a subject’s life correspond to the model of the first identifications of the infant¹⁹, and so it is important to focus on first identifications.

First Identifications

It is most common in psychoanalytic literature to begin with the *Oedipus complex* when referring to identification. The Oedipus complex involves the expression of hostile and affectionate feelings towards one’s parents, and it is usually evolved between the ages of three to five years. It is described as follows – for the sake of the argument, we can use here the example of a little boy. The boy’s sexual drive during the Oedipal phase is oriented towards his mother, whom he loves and sees as his sexual object. He realises, though, that his father stands in his way with his mother and, so, the boy expresses hostility towards him. But, at the same time, he loves his father and admires him for all the qualities he has that make the mother

¹⁹ By first identifications I refer to identifications that occur in the first 4-5 years of life.

love him. That provokes ambivalence in his feelings. The boy's internal conflict due to this ambivalence is overcome by identification: he identifies with the father, that is, he identifies with *what he would like to be*. In that way, he overcomes his hostility towards the father that is provoked by his wish to keep his mother as a sexual object. Nevertheless, at the same time the mother is usually given up as a sexual object and the boy finds other substitutes for her. A similar process applies in inverse proportion to the girl.

This, however, is a simplistic presentation of the Oedipus dilemmas. The case is not as easy as that, for if it were, then we might be able to develop a 'rule' in psychoanalysis saying that, the boy identifies with the father and the girl with the mother. Such a rule, for better or worse, does not exist, and the issue of first identifications is much more complicated. Firstly, the process described above is the simplest form, but not the only one. The boy (keeping the same example) could express a feminine attitude and take up the father as the sexual object and identify with the mother. That would not be strange or abnormal because infants are not in a position to understand sex differences yet and, also, they do not acknowledge *any* difference or contradiction, as they are still dominated by the pleasure principle (unconscious). As a result, they often express homosexual attachments. Secondly, identification, according to Freud, may be of another kind, meaning with *what he would like to have* (Freud, 1921:134). In that case, the child identifies with the love-object, and the boy with his mother.

In connection to this second kind of identification (identification with what he would like to have) is the following. The Oedipus phase is generally placed between three and five years, but the process of identification has already occurred during the course of the child's three years life. These identifications basically involve the mother (the symbolic mother, the mothering person), as the first person that generates satisfaction to the infant. The mother becomes the first love-object and the earliest identification occurs because of the emotional ties developed with that object. So, at the very beginning (oral phase), identification and object-cathexis (or object-choice) are indistinguishable from each other. It is often the case that, a sexual object is 'given up' by identifying with it, as if this introjection –meaning, unconscious incorporation– of the object into the ego makes it easier to be given up. Yet, one acquires/internalises a number of characteristics of the object of

identification. It should be remarked that introjection and identification are often mixed up and even equated. Freud has occasionally used the terms interchangeably, and Melanie Klein has defined identification as “a sequel to introjection” (1988:141). To be more accurate, though, we should view introjection as a process through which identification occurs.

Klein’s influential research has shown that, during the earliest months of life, the child makes no distinction between the self and the surrounding world: it experiences the external world (mainly the mother) as part of itself. At the same time, at this stage of primary narcissism, the child is unable to bear tension –with a small change of situation it converts a pleasant stimulus to an unpleasant one. “As the young child experiences the frustrating reality of the external world’s less than perfect response to his needs, he begins to differentiate himself from it” (Post, 1986:678), meaning that it begins to separate the ‘me’ from the ‘not me’. Because a child attributes the emotional responses called out by external objects to the objects themselves and experiences those objects as part of itself, it feels surrounded with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ objects. It solves this problem with the defence mechanism of splitting. Thus, it integrates all the good aspects and externalises all the bad ones, and maintains in this way its ideal narcissistic self. Furthermore, its loved objects – mainly the mother– are cathected, that is infused, with narcissistic libido/energy and internalised through identification. The processes of taking in and giving out, that is introjection and projection, are of dominant importance here.

Klein and object relations theory distinguish between *introjective* and *projective* identification. The former is a process whereby an external object captures over the subject’s ego and enriches it with its properties. The latter describes identification with other people because one has attributed/projected qualities or attitudes of his own to them. Moreover, projection is particularly significant, because it is through projection that the child gets rid of the ‘bad’ –self and object– images. This process describes negative identification, where it is our ‘bad’ properties and wishes that we project on to the other. So, initially, identification occurs as a defence mechanism in the service of narcissism: it emerges as a means for the child to maintain the ideal image of itself. Idealisation of the parent, as part of the self, occurs symptomatically, but proves to be of particular importance in latter life and future identifications.

First identification, thus, arises as a defense in connection to narcissism. Nevertheless, it is also a defense mechanism that facilitates the subject to deal with the external world and the frustration that it may provoke. The child usually develops aggressiveness and hostile feelings against the authority that prevents it from having its first satisfactions. Then, by means of identification, it takes the unattackable authority into itself and enters into possession of all the aggressiveness that it would like to exercise against this external authority (Freud, 1930:322). Thus, for instance, the little boy comes into possession of his hostility against the father by identifying with him and manages to control and tolerate it. We can see identification as a defense in many more instances; the two subsequent examples are usually stressed. First, usually children are afraid of the dentist and try to avoid any visit to him. This, however, is above their power, since they have to do what their parents tell them to. A common way they use in order to control their fear of the dentist is the play: they play the dentist between them. So, by (temporarily) identifying with him, they possess his qualities in a symbolic way that helps them deal with their fear. A second example is that of those primitive tribes who, being afraid of the 'bad spirits', dress up like them in certain rituals, as a way of exorcising them.

The function of identification as a defense mechanism and its close connection to *narcissism* is a primary source of identification. As Freud argued in *Totem and Taboo*, the initial "narcissistic organisation is never wholly abandoned. A human being remains to some extent narcissistic, even after he has found external objects for his libido" (Freud, 1913:147). In that sense, 'Oedipus' modelled early love-cathexes and defence identifications are substantially connected to and derived from narcissism. This will be further explained.

Identification and Narcissism

Freud defines narcissism as "the attitude of a person who treats his own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily treated" (Freud, 1914:65); in other words, it is "love directed towards the image of oneself" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973:255). In narcissism, libido withdraws from the external world and directs towards the ego. "Narcissism is our first erotic disposition", argues Rieff, as "libido is directed originally toward the self"; so, in a way, "satisfaction

from an object is but a devious means of self-love” (Rieff, 1960:157-8). Narcissistic identifications, however, are not merely identifications made according to the ego-model, but more than that. In infancy and early childhood the subject lives in ‘narcissistic perfection’, meaning a state where the narcissistically perfect image of one’s own self prevails. The admonitions of others and the awakening of his critical judgement destroy this perfection. In order to retain perfection, the subject identifies with those others, or uses as his ideal a substitute, on which he projects his narcissistic ideal. It is also in that context that Klein’s introjective and projective identifications function as a defence of the perfectly narcissistic image of the self.

In the early years of life, the object of identification is usually the love-object. Regarding the object-choice, Freud distinguished between two types: the ‘*anaclitic*’ or *attachment* type, and the *narcissistic* type of object-choice²⁰. According to the first type, a person may love either the person who feeds him (i.e. the mother), or the person who protects him (i.e. the father). According to the second type, a person may love: first, what he himself is, second, what he himself was, third, what he would like to be, and fourth, what was once part of himself. We can see, however, that even the anaclitic object-choice can fall under the narcissistic one. Let us examine that closely.

Identification with the person that feeds the infant, to begin with, is usually the mother²¹, who happens to be the first love-object in most cases. According to H. Hart, “one of the first acts of identification would seem to be the sucking of the thumb following breast feeding”, an act observed in almost every infant. What is revealed by this act is the “unwillingness of the infantile self to accept a need for something or someone outside of the self” (Hart, 1947:275), and thus supply it by itself. The infant’s narcissistic perfection is hurt by the idea that it is dependent on the mother and misses her breasts after she stops providing them for feeding; so, he masters those feelings by identifying her (her breasts) with the thumb. In that way it retains the illusion of self-sufficiency, for she becomes a part of its own self and it is no longer dependent upon her.

In the same manner, by identifying with the person who protects it, the infant retains the perfection of its own self. As Balint argues, children usually wish to do

²⁰ On these two types, see Freud, 1914, p. 84.

²¹ By ‘mother’ we should also understand any ‘mothering person’.

the opposite from what they are told to; that is because their narcissism is incapable of tolerating a command. So, by identifying with the adults, they become prepared *to will*, rather than obey, what their parents require them to do. By internalising commands and prohibitions, making them part of themselves, “obedience takes place not through understanding but through identification” (Balint, 1945:329). If identification would not take place frustration might emerge, thus provoking aggression. We can say that, identification as a defense mechanism is in reality a defense of narcissism. In Balint’s words, “identification always operates in the interest of narcissism and does what it can to defend narcissism...” (1945:332)²².

Thus, we can see that, while the ‘anaclitic’ type of object-choice of identification is derived by the love drives and attachment felt towards the parenting persons, it is also largely related to narcissism and the narcissistic type of object-choice. The two are not in contradiction anyway; on the contrary, they are both related to the first two types of identification that Freud defined, which is identification with what one would like to be and identification with what one would like to have. In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921) Freud clarified further these two types of identification and added a third one. He argued that: “first, identification is the original and earliest form of emotional tie with an object; secondly, in a regressive way it becomes substitute for a libidinal object-tie...; and thirdly, it may arise with a new perception of a common quality shared with some other person who is not the object of the sexual instinct” (1921:137).

The third type of identification that Freud referred to arises with a new perception of common quality shared with some other person who is not a sexual object, and it is “based upon an important emotional common quality” (Freud, 1921:137); identification with the leader, and also with members of a group (with people that have something in common), comes under this type. We can see that this third type of identification is closely connected to the narcissistic type of object choice too, for it is identification with someone ‘similar’ to the self or with someone ideal to the self. But, it also serves another need: the *sense of belonging*. We should regard the sense of belonging as, firstly, a direct derivative of the love-drive in its

²² The same applies, more or less, to the Oedipus complex. Identification emerges as a protective mechanism against the aggression that the child feels against the parent who stands in its way, against the ambivalent feelings it has for this parent, and against frustration and sadness it may feel because of his prohibited sexual object.

inhibited form, which is responsible for the communal ties of people, and secondly, a need to be protected by familiar faces, images etc., against an unfamiliar and, thus, frightening reality. Within that context, the sense of belonging serves the need to avoid unpleasure and protect the self from unfamiliarity (thus it serves the pleasure principle). So, I would suggest that this third type of identification is a process that serves the sense of belonging. Family and group identifications fall under this type. According to Bar-Tal, the sense of belonging is the basis upon which social identity is constructed, and identification with a social group serves this as well. As he argues, “identification with a social group is a psychological state very different from merely being designated as falling into one social category or another”; for example, “patriotic beliefs do not only strengthen the sense of belonging, but also support the definition of an individual’s social identity” (1993:55).

It is important to remark at this point the close connection of identification with the concept of familiarity. As Balint explains, a small child can only identify with what it is familiar with. She interpreted this finding by stating that, familiarity as a prerequisite to discover the unknown, the external world, means that the latter has to be akin to the ego: “in the last resort, a child wishes to meet only his beloved self” (Balint, 1945:320). This finding clearly supports the close connection of narcissism and identification. Moreover, she argues that “identificatory thinking is employed for the purpose of avoiding what is unpleasurable and obtaining what is pleasurable, and it aims at transforming a strange and consequently frightening external world into one that is familiar and enjoyable” (1945:318). Indeed, children love their parents, for example, because they bring them pleasure and gratification, and they identify with them as being the powerful representatives of the frustrating external world²³.

Several authors have distinguished between two types of identification, without proposing the same distinction, though. Moscovici (1985) distinguishes between *restricted* and *general* identification²⁴. Restricted refers to first identifications that occur within the family, in the model of *what one would like to be* or *what one would like to have*, to which we have already referred. General identification, he argues, is free of all ties to the libido and “instinctual drives” (p.256), and is expressed in the act of imitating and the feeling of attachment. A feeling of attachment, however,

²³ We can infer that, identification is regulated by the pleasure principle.

²⁴ See his reference to types of identification in Moscovici, 1985:257-265

cannot be separated from the 'instinctual drive' behind it²⁵. His idea about general identifications is close to that of social identifications that we make later on in our lives, which are nevertheless modeled according to first identifications that he calls restricted. Scheidlinger talks of *primary* and *secondary* identification, a distinction made quite often (Scheidlinger, 1971:19-23). The former refers to the unconscious desire *to be like* another person, which we have already mentioned. The latter refers to the replacement of a discarded object-cathexis with another object, which is set up within the ego. But, since libidinal impulses are characterised by mobility, certain transformations of the libidinal cathexis occur in any case. Moreover, in the case that secondary identifications occur as a way for the ego to deal with a loss of an object, or regression from an unsatisfactory object-tie, as Scheidlinger describes, then identification comes as a defense mechanism. Last, but not least, Winnicott (1971, particularly chapter 10) and Klein (1988) have, among others, distinguished between *projective* and *introjective* identification, as referred above. The identificatory mechanisms they describe, however, are based on the defence mechanisms of the unconscious and the preservation of 'narcissistic perfection'. In general, we should keep in mind that the unconscious mechanisms are directed by the pleasure principle, which dominates mental life during the process of first identifications²⁶.

The Super-Ego

We should lastly refer to the *super-ego*, which is another basic concept and particularly significant for the understanding of group identifications. The super-ego is in a sense an outcome of the identification process. It is one of the agencies of the personality (the other two being the ego and the id), it is separated from the ego and it acts as an internal 'judge' or censor for the ego. Among its functions are conscience, self-observation and formation of ideals (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973:435).

²⁵ It is most likely that, Moscovici connected libidinal ties with sexual-objects, and remised the fact that the sexual drive can also be inhibited in its aim.

²⁶ Whatever the partial classifications may be, we must not forget that, as Elliott argues, Freud had, throughout his life, "isolated the mechanisms of narcissism and identification as fundamental to ego formation" (1999:28). This is very important in understanding later identifications and group formation. Although the reality principle moderates the predominance of the pleasure principle soon after the infancy, first identifications remain the model of every identification in later life.

According to the classical Freudian conception, the super-ego arises out of the child's first identifications; Freud considered it as the heir of the Oedipus complex. As soon as the child realises that its Oedipal wishes cannot be fulfilled, it identifies with the parent(s). That means that it also internalises their prohibitions, morals, values, commands, etc. All these compose the super-ego, which is now an *internal* agent controlling and mastering the ego. The super-ego is, in reality, the part of the ego that has been introjected with these properties and then detached from it. One part of the ego is thus set against the other, producing a conflict. This conflict is, also, the origin of the sense of guilt, which arises out of the tension between the demands of conscience and the desires of the id. The super-ego is, in this sense, the most severe agent, because it is internal and the ego cannot hide from it.

It is not yet agreed at which stage the super-ego was first introduced. The Kleinians, for example, place its first formulation at the first introjections of 'good' and 'bad' objects, during the early oral stage (first two years of life). Nevertheless, as Laplanche and Pontalis argue, "if we consider the different forms of identification, it is difficult to decide which specific ones play the most part in the formation of the super-ego..." (1973:437). Since it is clearly formulated through identification, though, its formation starts during the first years of life, perhaps even before the Oedipus phase²⁷. We should mention that, the ego ideal is often used interchangeably with the super-ego. Freud argued that the super-ego is "the vehicle of the ego ideal...whose demand for greater perfection it strives to fulfil" (1933b:96), thus almost identifying the two. However, some authors refer to the ego ideal as the more conscious, better-integrated aspect of the super-ego, usually placed after adolescence. Some other distinguish between ego ideal/super-ego, the punitive and demanding agency, and ideal ego, which is the ideal in the subject's aspirations and desires for narcissistic perfection²⁸. At present, we shall use the terms as synonymous, following Loewald's argument that, the ideal ego, ego ideal, and super-ego are "successive stages in the development toward super-ego structure" (1962:265), which is also consistent with the way Freud developed the concept. Behind the origin of the ego ideal, argues Freud, lies the most important identification, that with the father, and so

²⁷ As Hart argues, "a considerable part of our early and unconscious identification forms the super-ego and ego-ideal", 1947:287.

²⁸ See also on this matter the three articles under the same title 'The Super Ego and the Ego Ideal', By Rosenfeld, Loewald, and Weigert, in *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol.43, 1962.

it serves as the idealised image of the parents (1923:370). Before that, in *On Narcissism* (1914), Freud related it to a substitution of our lost narcissism in which we were our own ideal.

The formation of the super-ego comes from the first introduction of the child into the social order. The role of the father (the symbolic father, which can be any person that plays the role of the father) is very important as intervening in the child-mother dyad. His intervention severs the child from the imaginary plenitude of the maternal body, as his presence is “this parental prohibition...which at one stroke constitutes repressed desire and the social order” (Elliott, 1999:34). The symbolic father, thus, introduces the Law (the concept of a prohibiting and regulating rule), as the child, because of fear of punishment, represses its desire²⁹; the Law is founded on the repressed desire and the realisation on behalf of the child that there are things it is not allowed to do, things prohibited. This is the moment when all subjects become socialised. This is, according to Elliott, the founding moment of psychical differentiation and individuation. Nevertheless, we should not confuse the super-ego with some kind of moral agent. As Jones points out, “the superego is not moral, for it may dictate an act of murder. It is an ‘oughtness’, a categorical imperative, not morally dictated in its earlier stages” (1948:43). Morality is guarded by conscience, which is only a part of the super-ego.

The super-ego is not static and unchangeable, but it is enriched throughout life, along with the continuous identifications. “As the child grows up, the role of the father is carried on by teachers and others in authority; their instructions and prohibitions remain powerful in the ego ideal and continue, in the form of conscience, to exercise the moral censorship” (Freud, 1923:376). This is a crucial linkage between ego ideal and group psychology, because of its social side; the ego ideal is “also the common ideal of a family, a class, or a nation” (Freud, 1914:96).

Later Identifications –Identity Formation

Thus far we have been preoccupied with first identifications, their nature and derivatives. It is particularly important to fully understand this process, for the simple

²⁹ This, in boys, is expressed as a ‘fear of castration’.

reason that it constitutes the model after which later identifications occur. The meaning of this is twofold. First, that the mechanism is the same: every identification, first or later ones, occur after the same mechanism that operates internally. Second, and even more important, the first identifications themselves (not as a process) constitute the model for the later ones. Parental identifications, as the basis of the metamorphosis of the parental relations into the super-ego, are the first ones, and are long lasting, in the sense that they remain the prototype for the later ones. In that sense, internalisation of a good or bad object, or identification with a despotic father, and so on, will have a direct and lasting impact on the person's choices as a grown up and on his or her identifications with other people, groups, etc. The effects of childhood identifications are general and lasting and affect the attitudes and personality of the adults (Freud, 1923:370). For instance, in a survey made by Brunswik and Sanford (1947) on 'anti-Semitic personality' it was found that girls who were highly influenced by anti-Semitic ideas showed an uncritical devotion to their parents. At the same time, devotion and obedience was not only manifested toward parents, but toward authority in general (Brunswik and Sanford, 1947:249-254).

Later identifications include social contacts with larger groups than the family, like peer-groups, classes, nations etc. A person's group identity becomes more crystallised in adolescence, after spending his/her childhood in a given culture and acquiring its ways and attitudes. Volkan argues that "the concrete character that develops when the child passes through early and mid-adolescence is not the sum total of childhood character traits but the end result of the amalgamation of modified, weakened, or strengthened traits to which new traits have been added as a result of new identifications of important others in this phase of life" (1988:37). Identity is the outcome of multiple group identifications and it is very important, not only because it answers the individual's interrogation 'Who am I?', but also regulates the individual's social relations and satisfies his/her belonging to a group while answering the question 'Where do I belong to?'. So, identity formation is in a way the consequence of the setting of an agency within the self, like a controlling super-ego: as in earlier identifications, so in later ones, the subject takes into his/her super-ego the values, prohibitions etc. of the group(s). These are the roots of conformity; people behave in the 'proper' way, as the social environment demands, so as to

secure their belonging to a group, and because these are now their own ‘demands’ too.

Not every group identification becomes important, or equally important, in someone’s life: the less important it is, the less traits it will leave in someone’s character and identity formation. In addition, we must bear in mind that, new identifications occur constantly in adults’ life, for this is an endless process. However, their significance depends on the duration and intensity of the presence in a group and identification with it. So, by ‘crystallisation’ of identity we do not mean one stable and solid identity, but only an identity that its most solid and important parts have been introduced, although the process continues. According to Erikson (1968), identity is achieved in late adolescence as a result of exploration and experimentation, which leads to a decision. Alternatively, he argues, they absorb ethnic, religious and other attitudes from their parents. Indeed, this is the period when such explorations are made, but we should not overestimate the capacity of the adolescents to make such decisions. The individuals are not *tabula rasa* at this time of their lives and, even though they seek for their own identity, the previous, unconscious registrations cannot be deleted. Ethnic or religious identities, for example, are more a matter of long standing internalisations than choice: these are groups that people (learn to) participate to since their infancy. Erikson also developed an ‘identity-health’³⁰ model, in the sense that identity was considered as essential for a healthy personality. This is rejected by psychoanalysis, for identity is a prerequisite for any personality: everybody has an identity, but identity does not provide with inner stability by definition, for identifications vary significantly.

Freud made very few references to adolescence. He rather focused on the relationship with parents which, as the first social integration tie, provides the first sense of identity. Nevertheless, as Leao argues, the central task of adolescence is “the search for identity, which corresponds to the search for cohesion, integration and continuity of the self” (1986:67). In her article ‘Identification and its Vicissitudes as Observed in Adolescence’, Leao summarises the essential contributions in the theory of adolescence as follows. Adolescence, with the reactivation of the Oedipus complex, is a recapitulation of the vicissitudes of childhood development and its disturbances; there is a prevalence of action over verbalisation; an increase of

³⁰ A term Sharon Macdonald uses (1993:7).

narcissistic libido; detachment of the libido from the parents and cathexis to new objects; “peer group formation is of utmost importance during this libidinal detachment and re-cathexis of objects” (1986:70); reorganisation of personality, involving detachment of archaic object ties and old identifications in favor of new identifications with new objects or ideals; an increase of narcissism and its vicissitudes. These appear, according to Leao, to be the central tasks of adolescence.

There would be a lot more to say about the issue of later identifications, which interests us more as it involves social and group identifications. Nevertheless, we shall leave this discussion for the next chapter, where it will be explained and analysed in particular reference to the issue of ethnic and national identifications. In the meantime, it will be helpful to take a brief look on the elaborations and deviations from Freud’s theory, not only to acquire an insight on the psychoanalytic perspective, but, also, to identify those psychoanalytic concepts that are most broadly articulated.

THE FREUDIAN TRADITION

The first secessions from Freud’s circle took place in the early 1910’s, with A. Adler and C.G. Jung. The former found that factors other than sexual can also lead to internal conflict, such as aggression, and tried to explain human behaviour in terms of a struggle for power in order to overcome feelings of inferiority. Jung was also opposed to Freud’s emphasis on sex, and elaborated a different aspect of the unconscious, based more on philosophy and metapsychology. Neither of the two maintained a broad influence after their death. What is very interesting to know, however, is that Freud had already started to pay attention to the ego and to non-sexual factors at that time, which led him to re-elaborate his theory after new investigation and clinical research. During the 1920’s some more disciples broke away or just disagreed, including O. Rank and S. Ferenczi, who both implemented a psychotherapeutic treatment that was shorter and more affectionate towards the patient. Freud disapproved of this ‘showing affection to the patient’ attitude, which proved to be less successful in the end. In addition, Rank broke up with Freud because of the ‘birth trauma’ (the separation of the baby from the mother at birth and

the anxiety it produces) and the importance he attributed to it. Ironically enough, Freud was himself ready to acknowledge the importance of it at the time, as similarly happened with Adler and Jung and their controversy with Freud over the importance of sexual drives.

After Freud's death, and after the Second World War, the centres of psychoanalysis moved from Vienna, Budapest and Berlin, and were divided between Britain and the United States. Two main schools were formed, respectively: the *Orthodox Freudians* and the *Neo-Freudians*. This is not to say, however, that there were not any disagreements within these schools; within the Orthodox there were different points of interest, while, for example, there were a number of analysts in Britain who utilised Freudian concepts, but did not accept the theory as a whole (known as 'the eclectics', including the famous psychoanalyst I.D. Suttie). Nevertheless, those two schools were the two main ones formed at the time. In general, "in post-Freudian psychoanalytic emphasis was shifted from conflicts within a fully formed self to disruptions in the very development of the self – from...Oedipal conflicts... to attachment, separation, and individuation with mothers...(earliest months and years)" (Caspary, 1993:417). This major theoretical revision opened up significant new possibilities for explaining 'irrational' causes of conflict and war, as Caspary has pointed out.

The Orthodox Freudians (E. Jones, W. Stekel, Anna Freud, and M. Klein being the most prominent among them) followed the core of Freud's theory and accepted the majority of his findings. Nevertheless, or exactly because of this 'loyalty', some of them have offered to psychoanalysis very stimulating and broadly accepted theories. Anna Freud, for example, focused her analysis on the ego (instead of the 'id' that was her father's focus), and she stressed the need for attaching relatively greater significance to the ego and its defense mechanisms; one of those defense mechanisms, identification with the aggressor, has been equally influential with other Freudian concepts. On the top of the orthodox Freudians, though, one would not hesitate to put Melanie Klein –perhaps the most important psychoanalyst after Freud– and object relations theory. In general, she thought aggressive drives as more important than sexual ones, she examined very young children (i.e., through play), and attached more significance to biological than environmental factors. She traced

the super-ego back to the earliest months of life, and put introjection and projection at the core of her theory.

The Neo-Freudian school developed in the US, mainly by analysts who emigrated there after the Second World War, and had at their ranks scholars such as A. Kardiner, K. Horney, E. Fromm, and H.S. Sullivan. Though differing in detail, they generally believed in the following: that sociocultural, rather than biological, factors are basic; that the drive, libido and Oedipus theories are not universal, and are modified by cultural factors; that interpersonal relationships form the character, anxieties and neurosis; and that character determines sexual behaviour and not the other way round. These issues certainly provoke a long and stimulating debate that is not relevant at the moment. However, in relation to the two aforementioned schools Brown remarks that, "by far the greatest number of analysts in the US remain more or less orthodox Freudians" (1961:201), while the impact of the Neo-Freudians in Europe is nil.

A third school of thought that became very influential after the 1960s in France (initially and mainly) was the Lacanians. Lacan has been a famous and very controversial scholar. His initiative was to elaborate Freud's writings further and another school of thought emerged out of his effort. In Lacan's triadic thinking we find the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real, which were not mental forces but orders that serve to position the individual into a continuity; the unconscious does not exist before language (the unconscious is structured like language, is his famous postulate) and the instantiation of the symbolic order. Two of his most valuable contributions to psychoanalysis are his concepts about desire as constituting element of the self, as well as his concepts about the importance of language as the vehicle of desire that facilitates the mediation of the imaginary through the symbolic. Also, his triadic thinking provided the ground for further elaborations on the Imaginary and the Symbolic.

There are much more stilted approaches, mainly rising out of the merging of psychoanalysis with other disciplines, such as anthropology, biology, genetics and others. My psychoanalytic approach follows Freud's writings and the orthodox school, and is based on the basic psychoanalytic concepts as described above. However, the contribution of other theorists will be taken under consideration,

particularly when they advance points of interest relevant to this research and can contribute to our understanding of national identity.

Criticisms by Freudians

Much of the criticism directed against the Freudian theory is concerned with the 'self' as opposed to society, an issue addressed by other related disciplines (i.e. social psychology). In this matter, it has been largely an opposition of the neo-Freudians and the orthodox Freudian school. The main point of view of the Neo-Freudians is that personality is structured by society. The modern Neo-Freudian schools, although acknowledging the fact that neurotic and normal human behaviour differ in degree rather than kind, they raise the question of cultural influences in determining what is to be regarded as normal or abnormal, arguing that the sources of internal conflict are not necessarily universal. They argue that cultural and environmental factors largely determine biological phenomena, and that different ways of living in each society tend to produce different personality types. One way by which they sustain this view is by the use of anthropological findings that demonstrate the flexibility of human nature when observed in different cultural backgrounds.

In addition, the conclusion that personality appears to change throughout life has led Neo-Freudians to disagreement with the two Freudian postulates of biological orientation and libido theory. They tend to deny the biological basis of the drives and their crucial determining the development of personality for the first five years of life. They rather argue that personality is a cultural product which, although uses biological energy, is not determined by it. They more intensely oppose the biological foundation of aggression, mostly because of the pessimism it implies. On this, they diverge a lot from Freudian theory. J.F. Brown criticises Freud and his use of "biological instincts theory...since there are no basic instincts in man which lead to definite behaviour independent of the existing environment. Most psychologists today...are quite prepared to accept the facts of erotic and aggressive behaviour, but they attribute these behaviours to a combination of biological and cultural differences. This is a matter of some importance for, if aggression is innate, war is

presumably inevitable, and if it is not innate but due rather to the frustration of constructive impulses, then there is still hope”³¹.

Freud had been severely criticised initially on the grounds of a deliberate abstention from moral judgments when he first introduced the sexual drive and talked about infantile sexuality. Equally based on moral grounds is the criticism against the aggressive drive. Nevertheless, these findings cannot be rejected based on ‘moral’ criteria. Unwillingness to accept an unpleasant fact or moral objections cannot constitute an argument; let alone that such an argument would classify those who adhere to psychoanalysis as pro-warfare personalities. The wish to see a world without wars and conflicts may be present and widespread, but self-delusion is not the way. Rieff, in his book on Freud and psychoanalysis after him, has argued, referring to the Neo-Freudian school, that “the liberal revisers of Freud, in their efforts to avoid the pessimistic implications of his genetic reasoning, tend to let the idea of the individual be absorbed into the social, or at best to permit it a vague and harried existence” (1960:33). It is true that Freud himself had reservations at first to confirm the existence of such a destructive impulse within humans. It was only after his clinical findings verified his first hypotheses that he incorporated it into his theory. It was these findings, moreover, that made him the pessimist he was in his latter years of life.

Anthropological findings have been important in the examination of human behaviour. Melford Spiro (1990), for example, has published in his article ‘Culture and Human Nature’ the findings of two fieldworks related to the issue of aggressiveness. The first one was conducted in Ifaluk, Micronesia, where Spiro found no manifest incidence of aggression. Since Ifaluk had –among other things– a cooperative system and an ethos stressing the value of non-aggression, it seemed to follow that, aggression is culturally determined and not an attribute of human nature. Nevertheless, further observations indicated that, the absence of aggression (a behavioral, observable variable) did not infer absence of hostility (motivation and affective variables, such as anger, rage, etc.). Spiro noticed that, every morning custom required that babies being bathed in the chilly waters of a lagoon. After that, he directed his research to children, and he found out that they had indeed other frustrating, even traumatic experiences. But, hostile feelings were not manifested in

³¹ Quoted in Brown (1961), p.175.

observable social aggression. So, why was hostility not expressed in aggressiveness? Spiro made two hypotheses providing for an answer. First, the Ifaluk religion believed in a class of spirits who were purely evil and their sole aim was to produce human suffering; these spirits were “isomorphic with those of the parents of their childhood” (p.27). So, he inferred that, hostility of the Ifaluk was both projected and displaced on these spirits. Moreover, since they had rituals to drive away the evil spirits, their hostility was discharged through these aggressive rituals. So, through this projective system, “Ifaluk seemed to afford one avenue for the expression of hostility” (1990:27). The second hypothesis is related to the institution of hereditary chieftainship. In Ifaluk, the chiefs were moral mentors who exhorted people to behave well, in accordance to the ethos of non-aggression, and periodically monitored their behaviour. They were called the ‘fathers’ of the people, and they were “in the people’s eyes, benevolent parental figures, whose approval was of vital importance for their self-esteem and positive self-image. Desire for the approval of chiefs, and fear of their disapproval, seemed to be the most important social determinant of the Ifaluk adherence to the ethos of non-aggression” (1990:28).

The second fieldwork took place in Israel, in a Kibbutz reservation (communal farming settlement). Kibbutz children, according to Spiro, were raised in a totally communal, cooperative, non-competitive system and socialisation techniques were mild, loving and permissive. Nevertheless, children did not wish to share scarce goods. As Spiro reports, they “view as rivals those with whom they are obliged to share, and they aggress against those who frustrate their desires to monopolise (or at least to maximise) these scarce goods...Although they learn to view aggression as wrong, when they are frustrated they become angry, and their anger –when not controlled– leads to overtly aggressive behaviour” (1990:30).

Other anthropological findings have presented data indicating that aggression may not be innate in humans. Such an example are the findings of Margaret Mead³², whose research in the Arapesh tribe in New Guinea appear to indicate the existence of no aggression –the Arapesh showed no aggression at all, and were particularly gentle towards their children. This optimistic interpretation, however, is not enough, because gentleness within a group can be sustained by diffusion of aggressiveness to the outsiders, for example towards other neighboring tribes. So, anthropological

³² In Brown, 1961, p.121.

fieldwork can most accurately answer the question of aggressiveness, for example, when adequately searching for possible alternative outlets beyond the apparent behaviour.

The Neo-Freudians tend to omit the space and time between birth and social interaction. They thus show a misunderstanding of the drives, which are biologically determined but socially mediated at the same time (in contrast to animal instincts). Freud did see moving elements in character, as 'conflict' or their 'dynamic' character implies. From the duality of drives, ambivalence, and their being convertible into the opposite, "characters of opposite kind may arise out of the same instinct or organ fixation" (Rieff, 1960:53). Also, the drives are influenced by social pressures under the course of upbringing. So, the drives are biologically grounded and socially mediated. This misunderstanding could also be a matter of terminological confusion. For example, Klein and Anna Freud, both belonging to the orthodox tradition, were in opposition because the former believed that environmental factors are less important, while the latter believed that that they are equally important with the drives. Nevertheless, A. Freud termed environmental factors the parents' attitudes toward the child and the course of upbringing; Klein was preoccupied with the (earlier) relations of the infant to the parents, especially the mother, thus focusing on the interrelation of infants with their mothers. In that respect, their opposition was

^{mc}The universality of Freud's findings is another peculiar matter. Certainly,

The universality of Freud's findings is another peculiar matter. Certainly, there are huge differences among the diverse parts of the world, culturally, socially, economically, etc. Nevertheless, there are certain similarities that concern all humans, and these similarities have to do with biological determinants of the human species, determinants that affect their upbringing to a large extent. The most basic determinant is the helplessness of the newborns and their dependency on the parents, or the parenting persons. Fenichel (an orthodox Freudian) argues in favour of the Oedipus complex, its biological foundation and, therefore, its universality, by saying: "the human infant is biologically more helpless than other mammalian offspring and therefore needs prolonged care and love; ...he will always ask for love from the nursing and protecting adults around him, and develop hate and jealousy of persons who take this love away from him. If this is called Oedipus complex, ...the Oedipus complex is undoubtedly a product of family influence. If the institution of

the family were to change, the pattern of the Oedipus complex would necessarily change too”³³. The form that the Oedipus complex takes varies from one culture to the other, but it does not disappear; similarly, the expression of the drives will not be the same everywhere, but they will follow the existing outlets.

It all boils down to the old problem: ‘does the hen come from the egg or the egg from the hen?’ The argument supported thus far is that biological and social determinants are not in opposition to each other, while certainly social relationships are very crucial. However, by social, we do not mean ‘societal’ relationships, that is relations with(in) society. We rather mean relations where there is some interaction with at least one person. In that sense, relationships with the parents are included in social relationships, and they are the most determinative as well. Let us finish this discussion with Brown’s remark: “practically speaking, there is no difference between the proposition that hostility is innate and the proposition that it is not but that it is a natural response to frustration... Frustration is and always will be universal, so hostility whether innate or not is also universal, and since the individual man only becomes a human being within society the antithesis between the two is unreal” (1961:16). ✓

³³ In Brown (1961), p.185.

CHAPTER 2: COLLECTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

As it was argued in the previous chapter, identification is not just an individual process but involves a certain interaction with the social (and political) surroundings. Individual psychology is at the same time social psychology, because someone else is always involved with the individual's mental life, whose relations to other people (parents, loved ones, etc.) are social phenomena too, in a broad sense. In addition, individuals, apart from forming an identity through social interaction, 'participate' in certain social identities, meaning that they participate in several social groups –class, religious etc.– and identify with them and their members to a larger or lesser extent, thus acquiring particular social identities. National identity is one of those social identities and comes out of identification with one's national group, the nation. The nation includes numerous other groups (from families to churches) and, to a large extent, national identities embrace the respective identities of these groups (i.e. religious, class and other).

Identity is pervasive and ubiquitous in politics. As Hoover argues, "what formal political systems do is to institutionalise procedures and policies that shape and manage identities so as to serve some concept of common good" (1997:6). He also argues that, "people create whole nation-states just to make the point about who they are and how they are different from the people on the other side of the border" (1997:3). It is quite obvious, though, that even if it is not people (the popular masses) who 'create' nation-states, as he says, and if nation building is a good way of seizing power too, the latter clearly satisfy people's need to identify with a group and delineate 'us' from 'them'. So, we could say that national identity is also a political identity or a social one that is politically manageable and usually exploited so as to mobilise people towards certain political ends.

National identity is a social identity that is collectively attributed to individuals through organised means and procedures that will be analysed in the next chapter. At present, we have to understand *why* most individuals, if not all, acquire the national identity attributed to them. So, we shall refer to the mechanisms of collective identification, with particular reference to the national group. We shall begin with the

description of the individual when entering a group and the changes of his/her behaviour. This field of interest is often referred to as group psychology, for it refers to the psychology of a group, or rather to psychology within a group as it is the individual that can have a psychology, although somewhat altered when forming and participating in a group. That is because, while individual psychology is concerned with an individual and its pathology, group psychology is still concerned with the individual, though this time as a member of a social group, nation etc (Freud, 1921:95-98). It is not the psychology of a 'group mind', because such a thing does not exist. It is rather the psychology of the individual mind when entering a group, and the explanations of the alterations that their behaviour undergo when entering a group. In that sense, that individual psychology is not different from group or social psychology.

Before proceeding in this analysis we should explain the statement that 'a group mind does not exist'. Masses are not a mere collection of individuals, for individuals behave in a somewhat different way when isolated, than in a group. In the later case, their attitudes are more uniform and even predictable, while reason and logic seems to withdraw. "Individuals have to be convinced, masses have to be swayed" argues Moscovici (1985:33), who believes that their sharing a high belief and identity, turns a collection of individuals into a collective individual. Nevertheless, we should not confuse this collective individual with any perception of collective mind. The phrase 'collective individual' should be perceived as a metaphor indicating the uniformity and identification of individuals when in a group, which results in their acting as one individual. It also makes clear that, a deep knowledge of the group psychology cannot start but from the individual itself.

To be accurate, Freud has used the term 'collective unconscious'. This term refers to traces of archaic heritage and important past events that may survive and influence people today. The collective unconscious is apparent in fixed symbolism, mythology, fairy tails, religion, history etc. Freud's belief, as Brown argues, is that "during the course of development of civilisation it became necessary to repress primitive drives and wishes which nevertheless continued to press upwards towards satisfaction and fulfilment. These wishes –aggressive, sexual, and incestuous– had to be disguised according to the degree of civilisation attained at any particular period, and in their disguised form are to be found in mythology" (Brown, 1961:114).

description of the individual when entering a group and the changes of his/her behaviour. This field of interest is often referred to as group psychology, for it refers to the psychology of a group, or rather to psychology within a group as it is the individual that can have a psychology, although somewhat altered when forming and participating in a group. That is because, while individual psychology is concerned with an individual and its pathology, group psychology is still concerned with the individual, though this time as a member of a social group, nation etc (Freud, 1921:95-98). It is not the psychology of a 'group mind', because such a thing does not exist. It is rather the psychology of the individual mind when entering a group, and the explanations of the alterations that their behaviour undergo when entering a group. In that sense, that individual psychology is not different from group or social psychology.

Before proceeding in this analysis we should explain the statement that 'a group mind does not exist'. Masses are not a mere collection of individuals, for individuals behave in a somewhat different way when isolated, than in a group. In the later case, their attitudes are more uniform and even predictable, while reason and logic seems to withdraw. "Individuals have to be convinced, masses have to be swayed" argues Moscovici (1985:33), who believes that their sharing a high belief and identity, turns a collection of individuals into a collective individual. Nevertheless, we should not confuse this collective individual with any perception of collective mind. The phrase 'collective individual' should be perceived as a metaphor indicating the uniformity and identification of individuals when in a group, which results in their acting as one individual. It also makes clear that, a deep knowledge of the group psychology cannot start but from the individual itself.

To be accurate, Freud has used the term 'collective unconscious'. This term refers to traces of archaic heritage and important past events that may survive and influence people today. The collective unconscious is apparent in fixed symbolism, mythology, fairy tails, religion, history etc. Freud's belief, as Brown argues, is that "during the course of development of civilisation it became necessary to repress primitive drives and wishes which nevertheless continued to press upwards towards satisfaction and fulfilment. These wishes –aggressive, sexual, and incestuous– had to be disguised according to the degree of civilisation attained at any particular period, and in their disguised form are to be found in mythology" (Brown, 1961:114).

Freud's collective unconscious is different from a perception of a 'group mind' in that it is a *historically determined* concept, and it lacks any meta-psychological connotations. Freud's idea was that a group, like individuals, may retain "an impression of the past in unconscious memory traces"; in addition, he defined *tradition* as the "prototypal content of the mass unconscious"¹. So, the 'collective unconscious' of a nation contains elements of its traditions, its history etc., elements that may be selectively 'chosen' and attributed to each person through the process of social upbringing (which includes a continuous transmission of images through rituals, myths, education, etc); it contains elements of the history and development of the collectivity in question, elements that each person learns and internalises. So, the term 'collective unconscious' should not be taken literally, connoting one collective mind².

We shall begin this analysis with the description of the changes that individual behaviour undergo when entering a group. That will serve two purposes: first, it will specify the unconscious dynamics that operate while in a group, and second, it will throw light on the problem of nationalism –which is not the object of this chapter, but certain aspects of it will be indirectly illuminated now, and will be directly explained in the following chapter. Then, we will provide the explanations for these changes in individual behaviour, and in the sequel we will refer to the role of enemies in group's cohesion and the perceived difference with them as opposed to the perceived sameness with the members of the group. These are essential for the understanding of group, and particularly national, identification, but also for the explanation of inter-group aggressiveness and intra-group discrimination.

¹ In Rieff, 1960:200.

THE INDIVIDUAL WITHIN A GROUP – GROUP PSYCHOLOGY

It is of great importance to understand the changes that individuals undergo when entering a group. This will provide a more clear understanding of their identification with a nation and, also, of the unconscious mechanisms that are in operation when someone (re)acts in reference to his/her own nation or ethnic group. The most influential contribution to group psychology was probably made by Gustav Le Bon and his *Psychologie des Foules* (originally published in 1895); also, very important is Mc Dougall's *The Group Mind* (1920). The presentation that will follow in this section will be based on Freud (1921), Moscovici (1985), and Lipowatz (1990), their readings on the aforementioned writers, and their further elaborations on group psychology.

To begin with, we should specify our working definition of the word 'group'. Group is a number of people held together by something in common. This, however, is a necessary and constituent but not sufficient condition, because whoever has something in common (i.e. professional groups) would be considered a group, which is not the case. Groups must also have a degree of organisation, which offers the group a certain degree of stability; a random gathering of individuals cannot be called 'group'. The members of a group must not be indifferent to each other. There must be something that unites them, something in common that is also sustained by collective will and/or organisation, and some preconditions of continuity for a group to be formed. The common thing is the reference point that makes individuals have a mutual influence, an interaction, but also a sentimental attachment. The reference point in groups that Freud was concerned about is usually the leader, but it can also be a leading idea as a point of rallying; more emphasis is given, though, on the existence of a leader. Lipowatz explains this by arguing that it is important that there is one (or more) leading person(s), apart from an idea, because an identity cannot be formulated but only by idealisation and identification with another person (1990:84). Groups also offer their members a sense of belonging and a sense of identity. Individuals become sentimentally attached to their groups, as the latter are essential reference points for their personal identity. So, groups must have a consistency and

² We shall return to this issue in chapter 3.

continuity as well. In addition, the larger the group, the more intense its characteristics and manifestations are. For that reason, the description and analysis of group psychology made by Freud has taken as prior examples the Army and the Church: that is, groups with a large degree of organisation, coherency and continuity, and a leader and/or leading idea³. It is to such groups that the subsequent analysis will mostly apply, as it is those that interest us in this research (on national groups), but also accumulate most of the characteristics that group psychology specifies.

When individuals are placed within their group they start acting in a somewhat different way. They often express certain ideas and feelings that would not express alone –with actions– but only when in a group. Freud describes some basic characteristics of the groups as follows. “A group is extraordinarily credulous and open to influence, it has no critical faculty, and the improbable does not exist for it” (Freud, 1921:104). The notion of impossibility does not exist for the individuals in a group, who feel omnipotent, and have no doubt or uncertainty. Their feelings are very simple and exaggerated, and can go directly towards the extremes. So, a simple rumour can be instantly changed into an unquestioned certainty, and sympathy or antipathy can be transformed into love or hatred.

If someone wanted to influence a group, they should produce an excessive stimulus, appeal to the sentiments and morals of individuals, exaggerate and repeat again and again. Groups can easily lose their critical faculty, for they are highly suggestible; simple words/messages and visions can be projected to them. According to Le Bon, they are “subject to the truly magical power of words...Reason and arguments are incapable of combating certain words and formulas”⁴. As Moscovici argues, masses are better awakened by memories than by reason. We can notice here that these are also the methods of propaganda, while nationalistic discourse uses the same tools too: nations are mobilised through simple words that become slogans by repetition, by visual symbols (the flag being at the top of the list), by simplified images, like monasteries, statues etc., and by collective memories, shared myths etc.

Groups do not necessarily strive for the truth and often prefer illusions, group psychology postulates. They perceive these illusions, however, as the truth, for they

³ Such groups are usually quite numerous; perhaps it is for that reason that organisation, continuity and, most importantly, a leadership is indispensable for their existence.

⁴ Freud, 1921:107, quoting from the English translation of Le Bon, G. (1920): *The Crowd: a Study of the Popular Mind*, London, p.117.

are more pleasant and reassuring for the group's integrity. Freud argues that, the "predominance of the life of fantasy and of the illusion born out of an unfulfilled wish is the ruling factor in the psychology of neurosis" (1921:107). In that way, he draws the parallels between this group characteristic and the behaviour of neurotic patients. This could shed some light on the use of myths and tales that are often part of the nationalistic rhetoric. Their origin and liability is never questioned; they are perceived as solid parts of national identity. Groups accept what they perceive to be true, and not necessarily what is true.

According to Moscovici, there are three basic traits of the groups: indifference to their own contradictions, vividness, and repetitiveness (1985:97-101). The first point, that groups do not understand their own contradictions has as a consequence the coexistence of contradictory ideas without provoking any logical conflict, as for example in the rhetoric coexistence of socialism and nationalism or of ethnic cleansing and democracy. Second, vividness, or liveliness makes it possible to select the decisive idea among a mass of possible ones that calls up familiar memories and creates enthusiasm. This idea is, thirdly, changed by repetition into an ideational image and is reduced to a simplistic formula that captures imagination and provokes mobilisation. We should bear in mind that, following the Freudian theory, all three traits are fundamental characteristics of the unconscious⁵.

As far as the morals of the group are concerned, they are characterised by extremes too. On the one hand, individual inhibitions tend to fall away, and brutal and destructive instincts are stirred up. In that respect, individuals in a group are capable of the most disdainful and condemning actions, actions that they would not perform alone. But, on the other hand, groups are also capable of high achievements under suggestion. While the usual motive for individual action is personal interest, this is rarely the case with groups that are unselfish and easily devote to an ideal. When the ideal is a 'good' one only acts of merit will occur; if not, they can provoke disaster. Groups are in either case devoted to their ideal, and intend to serve it with all their means because they always perceive it as good. Of course, when we talk about nations, politics are involved: then a 'good' or 'bad' ideal can be a matter of time, space and other circumstances. For example, when in 1821 the Greeks revolted

⁵ These unconscious' characteristics are, *exemption from mutual contradiction, mobility and mutability, and timelessness* (Freud, 1915d:191-2), along with the *compulsion to repeat* that characterises the drives (Freud, 1933b:139-140). These have been described in chapter 1, pp.13-14, 19.

against the Ottoman Empire and claimed for their own state, that was a good ideal, the ideal of self-determination, which was also the norm in Western Europe at the time which supported them. A century later, however, the ideal of a 'Great Greece', seeking to expand 'Hellenism' towards the north and the east, was against the odds, since the political circumstances were very different and international contingencies did not favour the development of this idea. In either case, however, the Greeks were equally committed to their ideal. Finally, critical judgment and evaluation can easily wither away or fall under suggestion in a group. In Freud's words, "whereas the intellectual capacity of a group is always far below that of the individual, its ethical conduct may rise as high above his as it may sink deep below it" (1921:106).

These characteristics of groups can find expression in diverse manifestations, either peaceful and benign, or disastrous and malign. Nevertheless, someone might interrogate whether certain group characteristics –such as groups have no critical faculty, do not strive for the truth, are highly suggestible, etc.– account for group manifestations such as pro-democratic manifestations in the former Soviet Union, or peaceful protest against the Vietnam War in the US in the sixties. The answer to this would be twofold. First, the above are not examples of groups in the sense specified above, but rather mass-gatherings. They concern individuals who gather for *a particular reason*, who have something in common, like groups have, but only for a limited time, that is for the purpose of the manifestations. In addition, they lack any further organisation, coherency and continuity, in many cases leadership, and also those sentimental ties that would glue them together beyond the particular demonstration and serve as a basis for *identity* and, also, self-evaluation⁶. Thus, since identification does not take place in these cases, their solidarity lasts for as long as they demonstrate for the particular cause they believe in. Certainly, a certain amount of the analysis of group psychology can be applied to a number of mass gatherings as well. However, not every mass gathering can be considered a group, as in that case the term would lose its specificity and could possibly be applied to every gathering of numerous individuals: from protesters to football fans and gig audiences. Second, as it has been mentioned, groups are no less capable of high achievements. Group psychology stresses the capability of individuals for the most extreme and contradictory actions, either good or bad, and their higher potential to do so when

their ‘fellows’ surround them. The content of their actions is socially and politically determined. Analysis of group psychology rather explains why, to follow our example, the anti-regime protests in the former Soviet Union occurred so massively and in every country of the Union simultaneously, than why the content was democratic and the manifestations peaceful. A full explanation of the particular demonstrations would have to be done in a complementary way: it would require political analysis of the particular circumstances in conjunction to psychoanalytic explanations.

Le Bon, and Mc Dougall have offered significant contributions to group psychology, in the direction of description though. We should still have in mind, however, the historical framework of the time these works were written, a time of general disappointment on ‘the masses’ and democracy, originated to a large extent to the French Commune⁷. In that context, and mostly Le Bon, interpreted this description of the characteristics of groups in such a way as to regard groups as largely barbaric, in opposition to individual capacities. This is not correct, to the extent that groups are only individuals gathered together and their barbaric propensities “derive from the literally hypnotic stimulus of the emotional environment, with its protective anonymity, upon the uncritical/suggestible part of each individual” (Rieff, 1960:232). So, although the description is quite accurate, it leads to a misunderstanding and a sharp distinction of the groups and the individuals that compose them. For that reason, the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of group behaviour, as described above, still need an explanation; this is the contribution of Freudian analysis. Freud tried to understand and explain the reasons for such behaviours: for that reason, his, and subsequent, analyses (i.e. by Moscovici and Lipowatz) are clear from moral interpretations of these findings. So, with Freudian psychoanalysis we search for certain explanations as to why individuals can behave in the way described when they are in a group instead of adhering to interpretations that characterise groups as barbaric or else. As Adorno has written referring to *Group Psychology and*

⁶ This is not to say that there are no feelings derived by the fact that they demonstrate for the same cause, but that these feelings are much looser and temporal than feelings derived from identification.

⁷ Moscovici mentions that Le Bon’s book was addressed to politicians, in the same way that Machiavelli was addressed to Kings and Monarchs, and had actually influenced many military circles and its principles were put into practice by Mussolini and Hitler (1985:53-63). If that is correct, and considering the destructive influence and suggestive power of Hitler upon the German national group, it is imperative to understand the individual/group psychology and the reasons for this influence.

the Analysis of the Ego, “the method of Freud’s book is that of a dynamic interpretation of Le Bon’s description of the mass mind”⁸.

Psychoanalytic Interpretations

Libidinal Identifications

Group psychology is merely descriptive and, thus, raises the question ‘Why?’ This is where psychoanalysis must come to the fore. Freud’s fundamental book on this subject is *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*; the title itself indicates that, it is through the ego, through understanding individual psychology, that we can acquire a deeper knowledge of group psychology. The individual is still in focus. So, psychoanalysis will offer an insight into the deeper reasons for the vicissitudes of individuals’ behaviour and, also, will help us understand the way individuals acquire the same identity and –occasionally– behave uniformly.

We will start with Freud’s criticisms on the explanations provided by Le Bon. Le Bon’s view is that, individuals in a group display new characteristics due to three factors: anonymity, contagion, and suggestibility. Firstly, the group is anonymous and thus acquires a sense of invisible power. So, the individual feels free to yield to instincts which, had he/she been alone, would have been restrained. Secondly, in a group every sentiment and act is contagious to such a degree that the individual readily sacrifices his/her personal interests to the collective ones. Thirdly, in suggestion, like in hypnosis, the individual is no longer conscious of his acts and obeys all the suggestions made to him. According to Freud, the above are not the explanations for this phenomenon but only its expressions: certain conditions are met in a group that facilitate the expression of these characteristics, conditions that “allow him [the individual] to throw off the repression of his unconscious instinctual impulses” (1921:101). It seems, however, that the above is not in contradiction with the spirit of Le Bon’s writing since he has argued that what is conscious in mental life is of small importance in comparison to the unconscious life, although he had no concrete knowledge of the mechanisms that operate and explain such phenomena. As

⁸ In Moscovici, 1985:57, quoting from Adorno (1972), VIII, p. 411.

far as suggestibility is concerned, Freud believed that, not only it could not provide an explanation, but also it needed to be explained itself. The analytical concept Freud used to explain group psychology is libido.

Libido is “the energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude (though not actually measurable), of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word love” (Freud, 1921:119)⁹. The nucleus of love is sexual love, and love drives are called sexual drives. The essence of the group, argues Freud, is love relationships –love in its wider sense– and emotional ties. An individual will give up his/her distinctiveness in a group because he/she wants to be in harmony with them –for the love of them. Initially, it is emotional ties that bring a group together; they are soon replaced by identifications, which hold them together and maintain the coherence of the group.

This whole process of libidinal identifications was explained in detail in the previous chapter, so we can now proceed with two illustrations of the existence of love attachments with the examples of the Church and the Army, the two basic examples used by Freud (1921). In both Church and Army, he argues, everything depends on the illusion of a head (Christ, Commander-in-Chief) who loves all members with an equal love. The head is the image of the father, who loves every member of the family and justifies with his love his commands (prohibitions, commands etc. help maintain the integrity of the family). Groups are modelled after the family. In that sense, believers are like brothers, as their love for Christ unites them. Christ’s love for them is of more importance, it may be suggested, than their love for him: it is the greatest taboo, the biggest sin, to ever question his love, for this would question the foundations of the Church, the very libidinal ties that glue them together. In the same way, soldiers are comrades, who are united under love, not for the Commander-in-Chief, as Freud thought, but for the nation (the Commander is a mediator, who also identifies with the leading idea of the nation).

Let us examine another example, the example of panic, which best illustrates that the essence of a group lies in the libidinal ties¹⁰. Panic arises if a group disintegrates or it comes under threat. When in panic, individuals act on their own

⁹ In the previous chapter (footnote 10) we used Freud’s definition of libido as the name of the force by which instincts manifest themselves (Freud, 1917c:355), in which Freud referred to libido as *usually* connected to the sexual instinct. We can see at the definition given now that libido is defined as related to this instinct exclusively.

¹⁰ On panic see Freud, 1921:125-126.

account, without consideration for the rest. That is because the libidinal ties that bound them together cease to exist as soon as the group disintegrates or self-preservation becomes imperative. A senseless fear is set free because of panic, and not the other way round. Panic is not necessarily related to danger: it can emerge independently of the presence of a danger. If we take panic in the sense of collective fear, argues Freud, we can establish a very interesting and far-reaching analogy. In individuals, fear can be provoked either by increasing danger or by cessation of emotional ties. In the latter case, we talk about neurotic fear or anxiety. In the same analogy, panic comes to the fore either by increase of common danger, or by disappearance –or fear of disappearance– of the emotional ties that hold the group together. The latter case is analogous to neurotic anxiety. But, why would the loss of libidinal ties provoke a panic reaction? Because, as the libidinal ties are the nucleus out of which identification with the group occurs, disintegration of the group would provoke an identity crisis. That is to be translated to loss of security, certainty and sense of belonging. The disintegration of the group can be experienced, in that sense, as a bad development or even a disaster for individuals.

Following that, we can throw some light on the importance of national identity for people, and the obsession with it that is apparent to most nationalistic and, usually, extreme right political circles (an obsession expressed in their constant fear that the nation is under threat). Anxiety can be provoked by the constant fear of danger or by fear of disappearance of emotional ties, as previously mentioned. In group psychology that would mean the fear of disintegration of the group, meaning fear for the loss of their national identity. Nationalists always see their nation as being in constant danger, surrounded by enemies who are all-evil and have designs on it. Their greatest fear is the loss of territory, which equals for them to a personal loss, to castration. This is to be traced back to the castration complex during the Oedipal phase, a castration feared as a punishment for the erotic and aggressive feelings the children had for each of their parents. Not every one becomes a nationalist, though, and national identity is not of equal importance for everyone –at least not in peaceful, tranquil periods. The above would apply more intensely to those individuals who have not managed to reach of individuation and, also, their first identifications paved the way for more problematic later ones. Education and diversity make the individuals less prone to mass influences. Nevertheless, as

Lipowatz (1990:84-87) argues, human beings are quite fragile: a period of weakness and instability can make them regress and become subject to the nationalistic discourse.

We must bear in mind that it is easier, and much more pleasurable, for an individual to inhibit his/her judgement and follow his/her instincts than be reasonable and contained. In that sense, there is a *potential* nationalist, racist etc. in every one of us who can react in the same manner within a group, under certain circumstances. The particular acquirments of individuals can become obliterated in a group; “the mental infrastructure, the development of which in individuals shows such dissimilarities, is removed, and the unconscious foundations, which are similar to everyone, stand exposed to view” (Freud, 1921:100). This characteristic explains how a peaceful and democratic nation can become, under certain circumstances and for a specific time, aggressive, racists etc. The fact that individuals within a group react towards a –perceived or real– external danger in an excessive and irrational way has to do with the fact that, they react like children. Any excessive reaction is absolutely normal for children, for their actions are largely dictated by the unconscious. Someone might argue that, if the danger is real and not perceived, then the reaction described above (a nationalist, xenophobic etc. reaction) is not an irrational one. However, not every reaction to a threat can claim to be a rational one on the basis of just being ‘a reaction’ of defence. Responses to threats vary significantly, thus rendering important to distinguish between extreme and reactionary, and mild and rationalised reactions. So, an extreme reaction can be explained and understood, but not justified and excused.

The initial interpretation through libido led us to identifications and to a common identity. But, we have not directly addressed the question of the formation of a common identity, even though national identity has been briefly referred to. This will be our concern in the next paragraphs.

Common Identity: First and Secondary identifications¹¹

How do people who merely have a common point of reference acquire a common identity? First, individuals identify themselves with the leader, who “offers an answer to their questions and gives a name to their anonymity”¹². Groups, Moscovici argues, have a spontaneous tendency towards despotism: they need a strong leader, who expresses no weaknesses and appears to be omnipotent. It is indicative that charismatic leaders, who usually make an appeal to emotions rather than to reason, gain the public support and sympathy, usually along with the vote of the electorate. This tendency towards despotism can be explained through the model of first identifications. Masses need a leader, like a family needs a father (a head, a leading person). The father¹³ is the unquestionable authority of the family, someone whom the children love, admire and respect, but also fear and see as omnipotent. So, too, the masses identify with the leader, who is both the model and the ideal, and perceive a feeling of omnipotence too.

In explaining the spontaneous tendency of the groups towards despotism, towards authority to be more accurate, we should not forget that latter identifications are qualitatively similar to the first ones. Identification first occurs with the authority of the parental image. This results initially because of the child’s dependence upon the parents, since it is born long before it can survive alone (without a caring person), and because of its affectionate feelings towards them. Identification is the mechanism of all implicit authority and is derived by the model submission to the parents. Rieff argues that the foundations for individual’s tendency to fixate upon the first relation to authority lay in “the earliest and original form of emotional tie, preceding sexual feeling” (1960:160). Sexuality, though, arises as a mode of

¹¹ This distinction does not relate to the distinction made in the previous chapter between first and later identifications (which was a temporal distinction). The context here is later identifications, as it involves group identifications that take place within a social environment. The distinction refers to first identification of each individual with the leader or leading idea, and to secondary identification among those individuals that have identified with the same leading object. So, secondary identifications emerge as a result of first identifications, as it will be analytically explained in this section.

¹² Moscovici, 1985:38. About the importance of naming, see later on this chapter.

¹³ I would like to lay emphasis on an important issue, that of the father as the authority of the family. One cannot ignore the surrounding social and political circumstances, those that determine the sociopolitical environment within which it tries to offer an analysis. This is why I refer to the father as the parental authority. It could be any other as head of a family, but, since the father is the general example of parental authority, we refer to him as such. The same is applicable to politics, where we usually refer to the leaders because they are the most usual case, even in contemporary societies of respect and equality. However, the dominance of the examples as the ‘heads’ of sociopolitical structures is not a coincidence, as it is the family model is the central and determining one.

liberation from parental authority: originally, “love is authoritarian; sexuality –like liberty– is a latter achievement, always in danger of being overwhelmed by our deeper inclinations toward submissiveness and domination” (Rieff, 1960:159). So, according to Rieff, order and rebelliousness are present in every culture, because the dualistic form of the Oedipus complex carries them within it. Society, thus, has more options than being authoritarian, but it has always a latent tendency to be so. But, also, society can be sustained by the authority of Law and respect for it, as the Lacanian tradition has emphasised.

In politics, the authority that mostly resembles and, to some extent, reproduces the initial parental authority is the leader. The leader must exhibit “a precise and commanding way of speaking, simplicity of judgment and quickness in making decisions”, argues Moscovici (1985:132), particularly so in peculiar circumstances, such as warfare or other threatening conditions where he has to exhibit strength as people rely on him. Not every politician can become a successful leader, though: it is important that he has *charisma* or *prestige*¹⁴. If this charisma is questioned, it is no longer charisma; this is why some dead leaders remain influential, for they keep their charisma intact. This is not to say that leaders who are not charismatic cannot be successful, but they are more likely to be questioned: this is what happens with contemporary democratic leaders. But, then, why is not the world dominated by charismatic leaderships, as one might logically conclude from the above? Also, how can we explain the very existence of democratic leaderships, whether charismatic or not, and the will for democracy (when it is expressed) since individuals are prone to authority? Certainly, an authority does not necessarily need to be despotic or totalitarian by definition; a democratic authority does not cease to be an authority because of its democratic ruling, as it still sets the rules that must be respected in the given democratic environment. In addition, groups’ wish to be ruled does not mean that they want a despotic ruling, in the same way that –to keep the analogy in mind– children want a father but not a punitive and coercing one. On the one hand, “authority is experienced and introjected largely in unconscious ways” but, on the other hand, “Freud’s work is [also] concerned...with the unconscious processes that work *against* domination and social power” (Elliott, 1999:38,43), such as the

¹⁴ Moscovici defines charisma as “a kind of spell based on admiration and respect that paralysed the critical faculties” (1985:129), and it is a quality that cannot be acquired (it is a gift).

ambivalence of affect that is due to hatred against paternal authority. That is because, to the extent that leaders resemble and reproduce parental authority, they also reproduce certain feelings associated with the relation of children with their parents. This extends to the ambivalence felt towards parental authority too: on the one hand, there is affection and appeal, but on the other hand there is the wish to repudiate it, to get rid of it.

Charismatic leaders have existed within democracies, and usually have much higher influence towards groups. Yet, their presence in the political scene and their success in it is also a matter of politics and contingencies. This does not imply that un-charismatic leaderships are not successful or not inspiring. In contemporary national states, for instance, leaders are influenced by and are committed to serve an ideal: the national idea, and ideal. This ideal is internalised by all co-nationals, including people and leaderships, who share the same ideal –that is to say that the same properties have captured their super-ego. In a (national) group everybody is identified with the same object (the nation) and, secondarily, with each other. In Freud's words, a group "is a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego" (1921:147). Thus, identification with a leader in this case resembles secondary identification as it occurs because of both the leader's and the individuals' first identification with their nation. In that sense, leaders are influencing and appealing only for as long as they (are perceived to) serve the national interests and the common national idea(l).

Both leaders and leading ideas use a symbol which extracts intense sentimental reactions. In nations, the leading idea is at the core of national identifications, an idea that constitutes the *ideal* for every leader of the nation, who inspires individuals under his leadership as long as he serves the nation. This is also partly why, political leaderships often adduce serious national matters in order to rally their party and, even, the nation. The number one symbol of a nation is its flag, the most respected and sentimentally loaded object of attachment. The burning of a flag, for example, is a symbolic action of enmity and/or repudiation; that happens because the flag constitutes a symbolic object of national unity and national identity. So, a common identity is acquired by, first individually identifying with the leader, or a leading idea(l), and then forming secondary identifications with each other.

A significant remark is that the more people share a symbol the more intense the feeling is (Lipowatz, 1990:83). This is what Mc Dougall calls the ‘exaltation or intensification of emotion’ or ‘emotional contagion’¹⁵, which means that mutual interaction intensifies the affective charge of the individuals. This mutual interaction must be related to Freud’s finding that, “the unconscious of one human being can react upon that of another, without passing through the conscious” (Freud, 1915d:198). Emotional contagion is the impartation of emotions through direct or indirect contact of a person or a group with someone else. It is also referred to the infants’ reception of their parents’ feelings, even though not verbally expressed. It usually results in similarity of feelings and/or attitudes within a group. Imitation and ritualisation can result because of emotional contagion: they have been observed in children as simple, even primitive, mechanisms of adaptation, through which the ego can adapt using much less energy than defence mechanisms do (which demand much energy to free the ego from the demands of the drives) (Parin, 1988:104). We should not neglect, however, the role of fear and conformism in producing emotional contagion and being produced by it, in a vicious-circle like process. Let us stress an example that Moscovici uses in order to illustrate this argument. Usually people in a public space look for familiar faces, same age-groups etc. That is for two reasons. First, to protect themselves against others’ hostility, or even their own hostility towards the others. Second, because that way they economise on effort: they can conform much more easily to the familiar group’s attitude than any strange or new one. This is why, he argues, foreigners (not within their group) tend to assimilate and even exaggerate some characteristics of the group they enter –being more royalist than the king. This attitude corresponds to a need for defence (Moscovici, 1985:258-9).

Groups and Equality

An interesting characteristic of the groups is equality of their members – equality that can be real or apparent. The nature of the groups is based on equality, argues Moscovici (1985:42). Equality of the individuals within a group is originated into the libidinal ties that brought them together in the first place. Individuals are

¹⁵ In Freud, 1921:112-113, quoted from Mc Dougall (1920): *The Group Mind*, Cambridge, p.22.

united through the libidinal love for the leader (leading idea), who loves them all and favours no one. The very basis and explanation for this is to be found in family. All individuals wish to be loved; children in particular, because of their 'narcissistic perfection', want to be the only ones to be loved. When a 'rival' arrives – a brother or sister – they feel hostility and jealousy towards the newcomer that claims their parents' love as well. Since this (mutual) hostility cannot be expressed and, moreover, damages the self, it declines and gives place to coalition and, later on, to mutual identification. Nevertheless, this is accompanied by the claim for equal amount of love from their parents.

This is another reason why identification occurs out of this jealousy. When children realise that their parents love their rival, they want to become like him/her so as to claim for an equal amount of love; for, if they are different, they may be loved less. Children cannot realise that parents will love them anyway, but think that they love them because of certain qualities they may have. The appropriation of the same qualities as the 'rival' would guarantee them an equal distribution of parental love. So, identification occurs out of the claim for equal love. This also explains why children address their aggressiveness to the brother or sister who is favoured by any of the parents.

In the same way, the group spirit is partly derived by what was originally envy. If one cannot be favoured, no one else should. This is the origin of the demand for justice and equal treatment for all, Freud argues (1921:151-2). The demand for equality applies only to the members and not to the leader/leadership. The leader is the person who unites all the rest by loving them equally; it is for his love that individuals identify with each other. In a democracy, particularly when the leader (president) is not a charismatic person, there is an intense demand for justice for all in front of the state and its apparatuses. The uniting bond is love for the country. All the above, however, apply only to the members of the group, as opposed to the non-members. The non-members, the outsiders, become the receivers of the aggression that is 'trapped' in the individuals because they cannot externalise it within the group. Freud gives a very tangible example, with religion. Religion, he says, is a religion of love *only* to its members: it can be very hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it. The strengthening of group-ties increases intolerance towards the outsiders; wars of religion are such an example. In that sense, non-believers and

people indifferent are much better off psychologically in the matter of cruelty and intolerance than the believers of another religious system, in the sense that they receive less hostility (Freud, 1921:128). This example is so tangible exactly because religions are (supposed to be) professing the un-reciprocated love.

We will stress another example, that of national states and minorities. Most national states declare, even in their constitution, that they strive for democracy, equality and freedom. That should mean for all, otherwise it is pointless. Nevertheless, the whole discussion about the minorities' rights, their integration into and acceptance from the majority group implies that in reality this is not the case. Minorities are 'different' and, consequently, their presence is a threat for the cohesion of the nation's identity, an identity built on (the perceived) similarity of the group. If minorities claim for equal love (in political terms that means equal treatment and lack of any discrimination) while being different, then, in the eyes of the/some members of the nation the nation runs the risk of being dissolved. We should not forget that they are united together under the equal love of the 'Mother-Country'. This is why a nation's identity is felt to be in danger when immigrants enter the country: they actually enter their 'family'. In addition, we should not underestimate the fact that minorities and immigrants are perceived to be so different by definition, without even questioning whether they are really so different from the group. That happens because, in questioning that, individuals might realise that, either the immigrants are not so different from the others, or that the members of the nation are not so similar after all, or both. This would put their national identity at risk too.

There is, however, inequality even within the members of a group as well as certain hierarchies. There are different classes, for example, within a society, and some of them are less favoured than the others. As it will be explained right below, their belonging to a nation compensates for that because it satisfies their narcissism; equality itself as a characteristic of the masses is based on narcissism too. The following section will shed some light on those issues.

Narcissism of the Groups

Identifications and attachments that unconsciously structure a group have a narcissistic dimension; as Ulman and Abse argue, “the group’s conscious and unconscious images of itself often coalesce in a grandiose and exhibitionistic group self”(1983:645). The claim for equality is, to some extent, a narcissistic one too¹⁶. Individuals find unbearable the possibility of someone else been favoured instead of them, and this is the reason that makes them ‘compromise’ with equal love. Their identification with other people in a group is a defence mechanism derived from self-love. Individuals within groups acquire an identity through ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ identifications. They identify with the ideal image of the leader, or an idea, by projecting on him all their good properties or by internalising those qualities they would like to have. In that way, he (and it) becomes an extension of their self: loving him is a kind of self-love. At the same time, they repudiate the image of the Other, the stranger, to whom they project their own bad properties. The presence of the Other destroys the perfect image of the group, because he is an outsider. His presence is absolutely necessary, though, for the cohesion of the group, because he becomes the receiver of the individual’s aggression. In the same sense, the leader or leading idea can be negative: hatred can be unifying too (Freud, 1921:129).

So, in narcissism the individual wants to keep his/her libido for him/herself, and identification is a way to do so. By extension, “this exaltation of the subject of his own ego and his own body developed into an exclusive love over a wider area, such as that of the inhabitants of a town for their place of residence, ...that of the citizens for their country...”, as Moscovici argues (1985:247). The fellow feelings often expressed toward other persons of the same national group is a narcissistic attachment for ourselves, since we have identified with them (through secondary identifications), and love for our country is love for what is ours. “The combination of fellow-feeling for ‘us’ and antipathy for ‘them’ had the corollary of a feeling that ‘we’ are superior”. Xenophobia, racism and nationalism are, thus, “the poisonous fruits of narcissism” (Moscovici, 1985:247). Identification as a defence mechanism is therefore a derivative of narcissism and can be quite pathological. The loss of an identified object is experienced as a loss of a part of the self, as an ego loss. In the

¹⁶ Not always, though, because equality is also an Idea and an Ideal: it entails a moral Law. The claim for equality is narcissistic when it is involved in the process of identification.

case of national identity, where the identifying object is the nation (including its past), both past losses and present threats upon its integrity are being experienced as ego losses and threats upon ego integrity, respectively; this is why they provoke such intense feelings of exaltation.

Freud's argument about cultural groups, such as ethnic groups and nations, is that they always strive towards an ideal, or claim to serve a superior goal or purpose; these ideals give to the participants of the groups a satisfaction of narcissistic nature, that is pride of what has been achieved. To complete their satisfaction, they compare with other cultures that have aimed toward different achievements. "On the strength of these differences every culture claims the right to look down on the rest. In this way, cultural ideals become a source of enmity between different cultural units, as can be seen most clearly in the case of nations" (Freud, 1927:192). The accuracy of this can be simply noticed in nationalistic rhetoric. Most ethnic groups and nations have the same rhetoric about cultural superiority, higher achievements etc., which is perceived by them as an unquestionable and profound truth. They all share this same truth because they all have a narcissistic ideal ego, which is now the target of self-love. This way, "the subject's narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego" (Freud, 1914:88).

The Group for Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) in the US conducted a research between 1972 and 1977, on the causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. The GAP report states that,

our land, nation, country, and state are part of our extended self. Damage to our country is felt as damage to our own self. Each side feels and believes that its hurts were caused by the other side but in reality is also mired in a conflict with its own self. The group narcissism of each side is badly injured, and each side strives to repair its own self image...The root cause of the conflict [must be searched for] in the internal conflicts of each side, not in external circumstances¹⁷.

Individuals and groups thus create the illusion of the 'grandiose group self', an illusion of might and right that develops as a defence against feelings of inferiority and helplessness. The grandiose self first emerges in the first years of life, when the infant internalises all the good aspects of itself and the others in an attempt to preserve for itself an ideal image of value and omnipotence. "The grandiose group

¹⁷ Quoted in Falk, 1992:225.

self and narcissism”, Falk argues, “whether personal or national, develop as defences against deep, painful feelings of helplessness and worthlessness” (1992:224).

The issue of inequality within a group as expressed in class differences has been left unexplained, though. The Freudian explanation is that narcissistic satisfaction is a force that combats successfully hostility to culture within a cultural unit. “This satisfaction can be shared in not only by the favoured classes, which enjoy the benefits of the culture, but also by the suppressed ones, since the right to despise the people outside it compensates them for the wrongs they suffer within their own unit” (Freud, 1927:192). On the other hand, the suppressed classes can be emotionally attached to their masters and see them as their ideals. This is not, of course, the only applicable explanation that can be given to this issue, but only the psychoanalytic one; this explanation points to the fact that, nationalistic rhetoric can unite different and conflicting sub-groups within a nation, for it exploits the individuals’ emotions and addresses to the unconscious, thus minimising their differences. It is often the case in politics that, when social instability within a country occurs and, also, dissatisfaction for the government arises too, a potential external danger is stressed and overemphasised. This provokes ‘national awakening’, which has proved to be an effective way to disorientate the national group from their internal social and political problems. In the same way, oppositions often accuse the governing party for treachery as the more effective way to rally their voters and, also, the governing party’s disappointed supporters.

The Aggression Instinct and The Need to Have Enemies

It is not only narcissistic identifications that dictate the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the hostility directed towards them but, also, the aggression instinct. As mentioned in the previous chapter¹⁸, aggression can be directed inwards, to the self, and outwards, to others. It is the second case that interests us here. Individuals, Freud argues, have such a powerful share of aggressiveness that makes them regard every neighbour as a potential object of exploitation, humiliation, wounding and even killing. Then, someone would logically ask, how is it possible to maintain a group’s cohesion, since its members are inclined to aggression towards everybody,

¹⁸ Chapter 1, p.13-14.

even their love objects? Freud's answer is that "it is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness. The advantage that a comparatively small cultural group offers of allowing this instinct an outlet in the form of hostility against intruders is not to be despised" (1930:305). This partly explains why national or ethnic groups are so aggressive to each other: their integrity is maintained to a large extent by diffusing their hostility towards other groups. Linda Colley offers a characteristic example in her book *Britons, Forging the Nation*, where she is concerned with the making of the British identity. Going back in the late eighteenth century, she argues that the massive wars and empire building of that period of Britain against all the others –Americans, French, Indians, Africans, and so on– brought the English, the Welsh, the Scots, and the Irish in unprecedented contact and made them perceive what they had in common. So, she remarks that "if the inhabitants of the United Kingdom are now more conscious of their internal divisions, this conversely is part of the price they pay for peace and the end of the world-power status. They are no longer under the same obligation to unite under a hostile Other, against the outside" (1992:164).

This brings Volkan and his book *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies* (1988) into the discussion, where he is dealing with the issues of conflicts, nationalities etc. from the perspective of psychoanalysis. His main argument is that individuals and groups need enemies in order to create and maintain a sense of identity and self control, enemies that act as *external stabilisers*. At the same time, individuals need allies to provide and secure an identity, as *internal stabilisers*. Throughout his work, Volkan tries to show the implications of that need on ethnicity and nationalism. His method of analysis is largely influenced by the Kleinian analysis of the early infant's object relations.

One of the early tasks of the ego, Volkan argues, is the integration of certain opposing –good and bad, self and/or object– images. Some of them still persist, though, unintegrated, while laden with aggressive and libidinal drives. These create an internal conflict and, for that reason, it is very important that they be diffused somehow outside the self. So, the ego externalises those unintegrated, good and bad, self and object, images into "certain durable, shared reservoirs under the influence of the mothering person" (Volcan, 1988:31). He calls these reservoirs 'suitable targets

of externalisation', and they can also include, apart from one's own images, internalised images of others (which also become his, since they are internalised). "The suitable targets of externalisation sponsored for children by important others in their group (who share identical investments on them) make children alike in as much they all draw from the same reservoir (1988:32). It is the externalisation of the good images that makes the allies and, respectively, that of the bad ones that makes the enemies. The members of a group share the same targets; it is those that 'glue' them together. The search for and identification with good and bad targets is initially provoked under the influence of the family, but later on by the peer group, educators etc. Volkan's theory shows explicitly the close connection of the polarisation between 'us' and 'them' as the 'good' and the 'evil', to the 'all good' and 'all bad' representations of the infant that occur out of narcissistic identifications with the other (who is indistinguishable from the self at this phase)¹⁹. As Bromberg argues, "one special form that this evasion may take...is the displacement of the whole interpersonal conflict on the more impersonal arena of conflict of political ideologies" (1960:33).

The concept of suitable targets of externalisation presents certain similarities with the concept of the super-ego. There are many parallels in their formation and the internalisation of their composing elements is a long lasting process that starts in early infancy and continues through adolescence. As the members of a group have similar 'registrations' in their super-ego, influenced by a common background, so their 'suitable targets of externalisation' are similar and attributed by their parents, their teachers, peer-groups, and even their group(s) leader. A nation, to follow our example, influences the super-ego of its members equally in enhancing their national affiliation and determining the 'suitable targets of externalisation' with large scale mechanisms, such as the education system, the military, the mass media, etc. Also, we should not forget that parents, who influence them first, have themselves grown up and lived in the same nation and have, thus, acquired many of the group properties that form national identity²⁰. This is not to eliminate individual differences

¹⁹ Oversimplification is a trait of the unconscious that accounts for the tendency to perceive one self and the others as either/or (either good, or bad, that is totally good and totally bad)).

²⁰ Members of a national state acquire similar 'targets of externalisation' also because of their collective unconscious and their common history, that is the history of their nation that is ascribed to all of them. The issue of collective unconscious (as well that of 'collective traumas') will be analysed in the next chapter.

but to stress that the super-ego is an important agent of the unconscious and it is also formed through identification with national ideals²¹.

Volkan argues that the suitable targets of externalisation are often determined by one's ethnicity and nationality²², while affirming it at the same time. In late adolescence, a person's group identity is crystallised after spending his/her childhood in a given culture; this culture is embodied in him/her. This provides an understanding on how national identity is acquired and why it is of such importance for individuals. Since someone is born and bred within a given ethnic or national group, the crystallisation of his social identities will no doubt include his ethnic/national identity too. It is his group, the people whom he identifies with; "by identifying with others in one's own group...one identifies with their investment in religion, ethnicity, etc." (Volkan, 1988:49). Also, from that perspective, ethnic and national identities are similar, in the sense that they are of equal psychological importance and their formation passes through the same unconscious channels. The use of the two terms interchangeably is not intended to disregard the differences between ethnic and national groups, but to point out that the two identities, ethnic and national, have similar psychological foundations and importance and can in that respect be considered as similar²³.

It would be useful to make two remarks. One is that, multiple and conflicting identifications may provoke an internal conflict and, maybe, identity crisis. When someone simultaneously invests in more than one group that are in conflict with each other, his/her sense of self may suffer in case they constitute conflicting identities. Second, we should not underestimate the influence of love relationships in late adolescence. Whether the partner, for example, is of the same or other ethnic group may significantly affect the person's attachment to the group's reservoirs. Personal relations are more influential during adolescence, says Volkan, although group identifications are still very significant.

²¹ Rieff argues, in relation to war and violent acts, that "mass murder often presupposes a strong superego and positive identification with national ideals" (1960:250).

²² Later on though Volkan says that ethnicity and nationality are themselves targets.

²³ The differences and similarities of 'ethnic' and 'national' will be considered in detail in chapter 4; there we shall deal with the issue from a multidimensional perspective.

Castoriadis' view, as expressed in his article 'The Roots of Hatred' (1999)²⁴, is quite interesting and relevant here. He argues that the two expressions of psychic hatred –hatred for the other and hatred for the self– have the same root, which is the inability of the psychism to acknowledge what is unfamiliar, alien to it. Through the process of socialisation some energy of this hatred is bridled and directed to constructive outlets, but not all of it. The remaining energy is in a state of latency, meaning that it waits for the opportunity to be externalised. War is an institutionalised outlet of aggression, and, although hatred is not the cause of war, it is certainly an essential and necessary condition for it. When the reservoir of hate does not find a way out in war, it is manifested in the more disguised form of contempt, xenophobia and racism. In racism, for example, the other is viewed as having natural (biological), unchangeable characteristics that are the objectified receivers of aggression. But, this extreme manifestation of hatred is connected with a deep, unknown hatred: hatred for the self.

The disastrous aggressive drives of individuals, Castoriadis continues his argument, are in accordance with the need of each society to strengthen its laws, rules and values, presenting them simultaneously as the best, as the ones serving the truth and the just purposes of the whole group, while anything beyond that is presented as inferior disgusting, evil. When individuals form their social identity, they perceive the group and its values as theirs, and whatever alien as ugly and inconsistent. For them, any threat against the –institutionalised– groups to which they belong is identified as equally or more serious than a life threat against them; it is a threat against their identity and integrity. As an example Castoriadis mentions that, in capitalistic societies the collapse of traditional –and supporting for the individual– communal values resulted in the rallying of individuals around religion, nation, or race, in a search for identity.

Sameness or Difference?

When the issue at stake is inter-group relations it is often thought or said that the others become the receivers of aggression because they are different. However,

²⁴ Article published after his death in *Le Monde*, and reappeared in the Greek newspaper *To Vima* under the title 'I Rizos Tou Misous' (Roots of Hatred); 24 January, 1999, Nees Epohes section, p.3.

this is not really the case. The others are distinguished not because they are different, but because they do not belong to the group; as it was mentioned earlier, their presence is a threat to the group's integrity and identity. What is very important and, even, striking at first is the fact that those others that usually become the receivers of aggression are not so different in reality. It is most often the case, in addition, that the more different the others are the less aggressiveness is addressed towards them or the less vivid stereotypes concern them. We are all familiar with antipathies and conflicts between neighbourhoods of a city, or between towns within the same country as well as between neighbouring countries. One explanation for this is the fact that, the closer people are and the better they know each other, the more reasons may arise to provoke a conflict. While this is true, there is an additional explanation, inferred from Volkan's argument that "conflict refers not only to our relationship with external enemies but... to our internal representations of them" (1988:95). The more two groups resemble each other, while differing in minor aspects, the more they tend to project upon and hate the other group. 'Projection is a very crucial factor in the causation of wars', argues Falk, who continues:

The enemy makes it possible for us to externalise all the bad aspects of our group self upon it. All the evil figures of our childhood, witches and demons, are projected upon the enemy. The Arabs see Israel and Zionism as the symbol of Evil. The late Ayatollah Khomeini saw the United States as the Great Satan. Turks and Greeks in Cyprus see each other as the embodiment of Evil. This also happens between Muslims and Hindus in India, Catholics and Protestants in Ulster, Flemings and Walloons in Belgium, Viets and Khmers in Indochina, and so on throughout the world. The enemy, the stranger, the foreigner, make ideal objects for projection and externalisation (1992:234).

Thus, the enemy is a suitable target of externalisation, of projection of one's own disturbing realities. Yet, most of the pairs mentioned above have much more to unite them than separate them. So, the question remains as to why familiarity between groups is more likely to provoke aggression? Proximity is certainly one reason, as there are more issues and disputes to be resolved between neighbouring countries than remote ones. At the same time, proximity necessitates some familiarity, in the sense of sameness, that is more apparent between regions that may encompass a few countries.

Volkan argues that there is sameness between the enemy and ourselves because the enemy is the reservoir of our unwanted self and object bad representations: we externalise and project on the enemy our own unintegrated images. There is an unconscious likeness that binds us together, but we consciously see huge differences that support our sense of self and group membership. We *perceive* the enemy as different, but our hatred or antipathy for ‘him’ is derived from the fact that we see all the bad unintegrated images of ourselves projected on ‘his face’; we project on the Other all our internal negativity. In addition, Volkan argues, we consciously need to be distant from the enemy, to have a ‘psychological gap’, but this necessity establishes a connection in a negative way (negative identification)²⁵. Thus, difference is merely an excuse for hostility²⁶.

From an other point of view, Charles Cooley has argued that hostility requires “a union of likeness with difference” (1902:235), and he associates it with ‘highly imaginative personal ideas’, in the sense that we cannot feel hostile towards someone totally unlike us because they are totally unimaginable and have no interest for us. He talks about ‘hostile sympathy’²⁷: “we enter by sympathy or personal imagination into the state of mind of others...and if the thoughts we find there are injurious to or uncongenial with the ideas we are already cherishing, we feel a movement of anger”. However, the thoughts we find and provoke our anger can also be projections of our own thoughts. So, in order to justify our anger, Cooley argues, “we input to the other person an injurious thought regarding something we cherish as a part of our self...” (1902:237), and then we can more openly express our aggressiveness. In nationalistic discourse, for example, there is always a perception of the nation being in danger and surrounded by enemies who have designs on it; quite conversely, it is most commonly the nationalists and their thoughts and designs who cherish a bigger territory or wish to subordinate other populations etc.

²⁵ Also relevant to this is ‘pseudospeciation’, a term coined by Erikson, to emphasise that we lower our inhibitions against killing our own kind by identifying the enemy as less human, or as evil. See the reference in Caspary, 1993:420.

²⁶ It is important to note that, it is not just sameness and the attribution of someone’s bad images to the Other that makes ‘him’ an enemy. There are multiple reasons, particularly as politics are involved, but sameness, that is familiarity, makes the Other a more suitable target and a potential enemy than ‘he’ would be if ‘he’ were unmanigable.

²⁷ Sympathy is used by Cooley in the sense of ‘communion’, meaning relation, contact etc.

As far as conflicts are concerned, Volkan uses Freud's term 'narcissism of minor differences'²⁸ to indicate the fact that, there are extremely minor differences that may even be invisible to an external observer, but which play an extremely important role as barriers and differentiating features. Three points are important here. First, minor differences exist, no matter how alike two groups may seem. Second, each group has certain rituals that maintain (or even celebrate?) these differences and absorb the flow of aggression; it is exactly these rituals that are considered particularly significant parts of national identity. Third, when these rituals cease, for any reason, attack comes to the fore. In clinical practice, Volkan remarks, rituals reflect defences against anxiety. The rituals are playful and keep aggression under control: when tension between groups increases, the playfulness of rituals decreases. Also, when (and if) war occurs, the individual experiences a discharge of aggressiveness, a strengthening of the self, of group sense and of 'group narcissism'. Cooley has argued that, refinement, culture and taste have no necessary ability to diminish hostility: "they make a richer and finer sympathy possible, but at the same time multiply the possible occasions of antipathy" (Cooley, 1902:237).

Finally, I would like to refer briefly to a last point that is often apparent in many conflicts and it regards *naming*. Nations and ethnic groups are often involved in conflicts about the name of a territory, which they claim to be theirs, about the group's name etc, and it often strike us as absurd that hostility, skirmishes, or even military encounters occur for a simple name. Nevertheless, it seems that the issue is not simply the name; what is at stake is the very issue of identity. Naming is very important, for it both confers and imposes an identity (Moscovici, 1985:372). Laclau has argued that the very identity of an object "is the retroactive effect of naming itself: it is the name itself, the signifier, which supports the identity of an object"²⁹. In that sense, naming of an object is "discursively constructing it" (ibid). Conflicts about a name are actually conflicts on identity. Thus, labelling and language are very significant aspects of the issue of national identity, too.

Lipowatz argues (in relation to propaganda) that, although sounds and images can have a more direct access to individuals' unconscious, it is only words that can coherently structure a suggestive message. Words have a suggestive power and they

²⁸ The notion of 'narcissism of minor differences' is referred to in Freud, 1921:131 and Freud, 1930:305; also, see Volkan, 1988:103-118.

²⁹ See Ernesto Laclau's preface in Žižek, 1989, p. xiii.

infer a whole world of symbolic images and contents (Lipowatz, 1990:97). They are not just what is said but, also, what is signified and understood under a given word. We can thus see labelling as an attempt to identify 'us' and 'them', but also as an act of stereotyping and of ignoring the differences. For example, when referring to other members of a particular national/ethnic group, people often use the single instead of the plural tense: for example, they say 'the German' instead of the Germans. This practice indicates the fact that, the word 'German' (Turk, Indian, etc) is connected with certain properties that are attributed to all Germans alike, as if they were just one person (the single tense indicates one person). This is a common way of referring to others in the nationalistic discourse. Similar examples indicating the categorisation of the others exist in the Japanese and Thai description of the Western (and white) people as *gaijin* and *farang* respectively. Creighton argues about Japan that, "the social construction of *gaijin* denies the individual uniqueness of Westerners, transforming all Caucasians into an essentialised category that reduces the complex variations among them", while the same applies to Thailand according to Nedpogaeo (2001)³⁰.

Sublimation

We should close this chapter with a reference to the social mediation of the drives, particularly the aggressive ones, meaning the possibilities and conditions that drives be diverted to socially constructive goals. We will once more start with the individual and neurotic anxiety. Freud argues that "a person only falls ill of a neurosis if his ego has lost its capacity to allocate his libido in some way" (1917c:434). There are two types of anxiety: the one is realistic anxiety, which is a reaction to an external danger, and the other is neurotic anxiety, in which danger plays no real part. In neurotic anxiety the patient is in constant fear of a danger, whether the danger exists or not. It has been argued earlier in this chapter³¹ that nationalism is somehow related to neurotic anxiety. In neurotic anxiety the patient forms symptoms as a means to escape an otherwise unavoidable generation of

³⁰ Quoted, and analysed in Nedpogaeo, 2001:105. The essay on the Japanese example that he refers to is Creighton, M. R. (1995): 'Imaging the Other in Japanese Advertising Campaigns', in Carrier, J. G. (ed): *Occidentalism: Images of the West*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.37.

³¹ Chapter 2, page 50-1.

anxiety. In the same analogy, nationalism is a symptom of a neurotic society, as it is also racism, xenophobia etc. A neurotic society can be one that suffers from persecution phobias, a society in which insecurity and uncertainty rises because of major social and/or economic changes, and so on. The rural population, for example, has been most prone to nationalism since urbanisation posed a clear threat to their stability and security. Big changes, in general, produce symptoms that are quite dangerous for a society. Another example is Nazi Germany, where Hitler used the latent, to some extent realistic, anxiety of the defeated post-war Germans and transformed it into neurotic and persecutory anxiety by using hatred against a 'common enemy', the Jews. The means to achieve that were terror³² and propaganda. The Jews, interestingly enough, have always been a target because they have been perceived as powerful and successful: thus, they 'provoke' envy and negative identification (Lipowatz, 1990:193-4).

A neurotic society could potentially get rid of its neurotic symptoms if it could provide with alternative means for allocating libido. That is, by means of *sublimation*, which is the Freudian term describing the transfer of libidinal energy to different objects. This is not an easy task, though, because neurotic symptoms offer pleasure as they satisfy their repressed ego. Thus, the outlets for aggression, for example, must be offered long before a given society/group come close to anxiety. Individuation is thus important as, the more differentiated individuals are the more resistant they are to social anxieties. But, identification with a group is also inevitable, as it is also part of the socialisation process. Education, science, art and sports could possibly mediate the drives and direct their energy to competitiveness in fields that cannot be destructive for humanity. Another way that Freud has suggested is love³³, in the sense of libidinal ties with other people. Love could diminish egoistic and self-feelings because "love for oneself knows only one barrier – love for others, love for objects" (1921:131). Love can act as a civilising factor, for it can make the change from egoism to altruism, from narcissism and antisocial tendencies to love as a desire for union.

The extent to which narcissism is antisocial needs a further clarification. On the one hand, group narcissism is antisocial in the sense that it leads to discrimination

³² Terror is the panic directed towards the people outside the group. Panic is directed to the group itself.

³³ Freud, in *Why War?* (1933a), proposes love and identification. It is not clear, however, how can the latter serve as a sublimation process, for it provokes the distinction of "us" and "them" that is responsible for conflicts.

against the others, those who are not like 'us'. On the other hand, it is both social because it brings individuals together in groups, society etc. Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge that it does not bring them together because of social feelings but, instead, because of an egoistic attachment to what is considered to be 'ours' (through identifications). We could assume that this may be the reason why this apparent socialness has destructive, antisocial outcomes, such as conflicts, wars etc. However, the tendency to exclude others could be mediated (not disappear) if, for instance, education were oriented to that aim.

Education is particularly important in directing children's activities towards constructive aims. Beyond education, however, the wider political environment and the discourse transmitted from politicians and the media is also important. To the extent that politics, for example, are as defined by Moscovici, meaning "the rational form of exploiting the irrational substance of the masses" (1985:37), and the maintenance of power is of first priority for politicians, educational and other 'civilisational' outlets lose much of their effectiveness. Since individuals tend to regress to infantile fixations and seek for instinctual satisfactions, the issue is to manage, through effective sublimation, to direct desire (the 'vehicle' of all drives) towards less destructing alternatives. This, though, requires strong political will and commitment, as well as social surveillance and a constant effort towards this direction. The reason is that, as Freud has argued, the instinctual inclination to aggression forces civilisation to such an expenditure of energy that "civilisation has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive instincts" (1930:302). This is not an easy task for it requires a continuous process and effort, while it can never be an achievement in the sense of being a stable accomplishment. The constant tendency of unconscious drives to manifest themselves free from inhibition is one major difficulty for sublimation. Yet, the other significant difficulty towards this aim is that these unconscious drives are manipulated at the collective level and even occasionally cultivated. Thus, the issue is not whether collective sublimation will be effective but whether it can exist in the first place. We shall return to this issue in subsequent chapters because this is also a matter of political analysis.

Limitations to Psychoanalytic Approach?

Ross, in an article titled 'Psychocultural Interpretation Theory and Peacemaking in Ethnic Conflicts' (1995), tries to offer an explanation of ethnic conflicts through what he introduces as 'psychocultural interpretation theory', which he defines as the implementation of psychoanalytic theory to issues of ethnic conflicts. His analysis is followed by a last section where he discusses the limitations of psychoanalytic approach in explaining phenomena related to group psychology. It is important to see these limitations that Ross identifies because they express not only his own but more general misunderstandings about the way psychoanalysis can be connected to the analysis of political and social phenomena, and also because a response to them will help clarify the need for a multidimensional approach. So, to begin with, Ross defines as the first limit of psychoanalytic approach the fact that it gives a secondary role to concrete interests and power differences. This may be true if one exaggerates the importance of this theory and ignore that sociopolitical issues involve other dynamics as well. Beyond this exaggeration, though, it is not true that power relations are considered secondary because most scholars view psychoanalysis as an additional, although not secondary, dimension. So, when psychoanalytic explanations are presented in relation to social/political phenomena they cannot be presented as the *only* explanation. Ross's second argument is that "psychocultural accounts, even if they have some merit, offer a more complex explanation than is often required, ignoring proximate causes of disputes in favour of more remote ones. Why...worry about long-term developmental forces when much more obvious causes of conflict are clear to all?" (1995:540). However, the 'more obvious causes' that he mentions do not offer a full explanation, because if they did, then nationalism and national identity would not be broadly dismissed as irrational and paradoxical³⁴. Political, economic and other specific explanations explain part of the conflict and can be concrete only when referring to a given case, while the individual dimension remains unexplored. There are more dynamics involved than the 'obvious' ones, and the contribution of psychoanalytic approach is towards a deeper explanation.

Ross ascribes to psychocultural theory vagueness in specifying the targets of hostile impulses, forgetting that these targets are socially and politically determined.

³⁴ On the perception of nationalism as resurgence of primitive and irrational instincts, but also for an explanation of the reasons for such perceptions that goes back to 19th century thinkers, see Berlin, 1990.

Likewise, he says that, “the theory is not very precise about how particular dispositions are invoked in situations where alternative dispositions might direct behaviour in different directions” (1995:540). But, psychoanalytical interpretations explain the existence within individuals of those drives that determine the tendencies of their behaviour. Individuals need an outlet of aggression, for example: which of the many available they will pick up is not to be answered by psychoanalysis. The outlets available and individuals’ and groups’ social behaviour are determined by the social structures, the political situation and historical period they live in –coincidence being also another, underestimated variable. The theory of unconscious mechanisms that direct individual actions needs political and historical analyses as indispensable in examining specific cases. This is the reason why I initially argued in favour of a multidimensional understanding of these perplexing issues. Thus, an answer to Ross’s limitations would generally be that, in issues that both individuals and society/politics are involved, an adequate and complete comprehension requires the analysis of all dynamics –individual and collective. In particular regarding national identity, we shall refer to political, social and other circumstances that affect individual and group behaviour in the following two chapters (particularly in chapter 4).

* * *

Our analysis up to this point has led us to a psychoanalytic understanding of individual’s psychology, their potentials within a group, as well as an understanding of the constitution of common identity among members of a group; particular reference has been made to the formation of national identities. Yet, a number of issues need to be further clarified. For example, as national identity is one of the several identities one acquires, why is it so prevalent within modernity and, also, how does it relate to other types of group and individual identity? This question would help us illuminate the question why is national identity so pervasive in world politics in the modern era. In order to address national identity we need to address, not only the process of identification but, also, the characteristics of ‘national’ identification. So, we need to analyse nationalism because it has signified the nation

with certain characteristics that determine the nature of national identification. Also, nationalism has appeared in modernity, which is exactly the context of reference of the debate on national identity. In addition, as nationalism was referred to in a few instances in this chapter in relation to its pathological forms, we need to understand what makes nationalism manifest itself in a pathological way because there are several types of nationalism, such as liberating, defensive, and so on. Thus, one of the questions addressed will be whether there are benign forms of nationalism. These questions are important as national identity is mostly influenced by the existing nationalistic rhetoric.

So, in the sequel of this thesis we shall confine our discussion to national identity. In particular, the context of reference will be modernity and nationalism, while in the last chapters we will come closer to contemporary era and examine national identity in relation to late-modernity's globalisation. In the next chapter I will begin by addressing the questions posed in the last paragraph and examine national identity in accordance to nationalism.

PART TWO

National Identity and its Signification by Nationalism

In part two, the main concept in our analysis of national identity will be nationalism. As it will be argued, nationalism is a prevalent ideology within modernity and also an ideology that has signified the nation and people's identification with it to a large extent. Thus, an analysis of national identity requires a respective analysis of nationalism and the national state. In chapter 3 we shall proceed in the definition of nationalism and explain the reasons for its success and prevalence in the modern era. On the grounds of this analysis we shall make a schematic distinction between national and 'nationalistic' identity, which is the identity that comes out of identification with the national state as signified by nationalism. In the sequel, in chapter 4 we shall examine the initial emergence of nationalism in modernity and the subsequent nationalistic manifestations throughout modernity. That means that, we shall first examine the reasons for its initial emergence as a prevalent ideology and movement in the modern era, but also the particular circumstances that result in the emergence of nationalism or its transformation into different types (i.e. militant, moderate etc) through different times and places within modernity. The analysis of the initial emergence of nationalism in modernity will also involve the question of the existence of national groups before modernity and their distinction from ethnic groups.

CHAPTER 3: NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE ERA OF NATIONALISM

We examined in the previous chapters the inner mechanisms of identification and the psychological dynamics of group identification, with particular reference to ethnic and national groups. We analysed the changes that individual psychology undergoes when they become members of a group, and the unconscious determinants in acquiring a group's identity. We have, in a sense, explored the 'subjective', the psychological dimension of national identity, its *identity* component. But, as it has also been mentioned, national identity is a social and political identity as well: social, as it is formed through the interaction with other people and groups, and political, for it is a social identity that is collectively attributed to people through highly organised means, procedures and political structures. As a political identity, however, it is necessarily social, as the political dimension directly refers to a social environment, group, etc; so, emphasis will be laid on the political aspect of national identity. An additional reason for this is that national identity is influenced and signified by the political ideology of nationalism. So, in order to explore the socio-political dimension of national identity, its *national* component, emphasis will be shifted from identity *per se* and will be put on the political dimension of national identity in order to explain its influence by nationalism and the fact that national identity is politically manageable and easily exploited so as to mobilise people towards certain political ends.

In this chapter psychoanalysis will act as a complementary tool in approaching political and historical phenomena. As it has been argued, the complexity of national identity requires a multidimensional perspective for its deeper understanding. In the previous chapters we were introduced to the main psychoanalytic concepts and showed their applicability in issues regarding the individual as a social being, and in particular regarding its group identification. Now, having acquired a deeper knowledge of the individuals we can add to the examination of national identity the standpoint of political analysis.

The basic question still remains: ‘Why *national* identity?’ What makes it so prominent and appealing among other identities? What accounts for such a strong sentimental attachment to the nation, what renders individuals so highly ‘mobilisable’ for the sake of their nation? Why does reason seem to withdraw along with any personal interest – that is, more accurately, why are personal interests identified with national ones? In order to answer these questions it is important to examine *nationalism*. On the one hand, nationalism (re)defines the nation with certain characteristics that determine in their turn the nature of identification with it. On the other hand, nationalism creates a context that fits and accommodates the mechanisms and structures of identity, as they were analysed in the previous chapters. Also important is that the questions we want to answer about national identity are questions posed in the context of modernity, and nationalism is a modern ideology. Thus, nationalism is indispensable in explaining national identity. Throughout this chapter, the main concept, and context, in our analysis of national identity will be nationalism.

Nationalism

Nationalism is a huge topic in itself, with diverse parameters and multiple points to focus on. The relevant bibliography is quite rich and an increasing number of scholars address this issue. Certainly, not every sub-issue of the debate on nationalism can be referred to in this chapter, nor is it my intention to offer a brief summary of it. In reality, as this research is addressed to scholars of the field, it may be assumed that the reader has some minimum familiarity with the debate on nationalism, and national identity, and a basic knowledge of the issues involved.

As this analysis of nationalism is motivated by the study on national identity, any reference to nationalism will be made in that context. Consequently I will elaborate those aspects of nationalism that I have estimated as more important in explaining national identity –its prevalence in the modern era and its perceived irrationality– without insinuating that other aspects are

not, or are less, important in general. Thus, in the following sections we will define nationalism and elaborate it further through its definitional characteristics, and then we will refer to its dominance within modernity in an effort to explain its presence and ubiquitousness.

Definition of Nationalism

As it is very often the case with complex sociological and political concepts, so with nationalism there is not a broadly accepted definition. The multiplicity of definitions has to do with the intricacy of nationalism itself and its diverse manifestations that scholars in the field try to address. Nevertheless, several elements of the existing definitions overlap or are closely connected and a general consensus can be inferred on several aspects. At the same time, however, the particular focus of each analysis is usually implicit and results in the absence of some other elements. So, I will propose a definition of nationalism that, although it was not intended to be a synopsis of most definitions, it finally integrates much of its definitional characteristics. My intention was to develop a definition of nationalism that would entail most of its elements, certainly the most crucial ones, and those that are generally omitted, though important. Specifically, my initial concern was to include in the definition of nationalism those elements that are disregarded in a number of analyses but are nevertheless indispensable for its understanding. At the same time this definition had to be accurate and, for the sake of methodological precision, should be valid beyond the strict context of the current research. Yet, these two concerns did not come in contradiction to each other. So, the proposed definition will be one that identifies those elements of nationalism that constitute its definitional characteristics and accurately identify its most important and indispensable elements.

To the extent that the aim of a definition is to provide an understanding and a clarification, a 'Nationalism is...' sentence is not clarifying without a more concrete elaboration of the definitional characteristics. For that reason, the following paragraphs will serve as a definition of nationalism.

*Nationalism is an ideology, a discourse, a movement, and a sentiment*¹.

As an *ideology*, nationalism appears in the modern era and it holds that the world is divided into distinct nations, each of which should find political expression in its own sovereign state²; it also holds that their interests are of primary importance before any other interest, value or loyalty, and the state's role is to secure these interests. The aim of 'self-determination' in a state is the initial concept; nevertheless, several movements have claimed for some degree of autonomy within existing 'nation-states'³. This deviation from the norm is a political or tactical compromise, and it more often emerges in contemporary politics. As an ideology, nationalism rationalises the external world and addresses reason; but, by systematising thinking, it can also block the development of argumentation and obstruct the mediation between individuals and their social environment (Lipowatz & Demertzis, 1994:139).

Nationalism is a political ideology that creates and sustains mobilisation with three basic ideological mechanisms: generalisation, naturalisation, and identification⁴. These ideological mechanisms are highly mobilising because they appeal strongly to the unconscious desires and they result in the creation of powerful identities. Through generalisation, the particular appears as universal, as general, and the interests of a group appear as public interests. So, too, the interests of a nation derive general validity through nationalism and are

¹ This sentence alone could be applied to several other ideologies; if it was intended to serve as a complete definition of nationalism it could read as *nationalism is an ideology, a discourse, a movement, and a sentiment that represents a world of nations as being natural and inevitable*. However, the chosen phrasing outlines the basic axes around which nationalism's definition will evolve, and the next three pages will serve as a full definition of nationalism.

As to the defining elements/axes of nationalism themselves, Gellner's definition of nationalism as a "political doctrine, a movement and a sentiment" (1993:1) seems quite similar but he defines sentiment in quite narrow terms as "the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment" (p.1). Smith (1995a) also defines it as an 'ideology and a movement', and Hastings (1997) as a 'political theory and a practice'. Also, nationalism has not merely been defined as a negative force: for example, Breuilly (1993) defines it as a form of politics and considers the current views of nationalism as ideas, sentiments etc. as a loosening of the specific meaning of nationalism.

² As Gellner put it, nationalism is "a political doctrine, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (1993:1).

³ I put the term 'nation-state' in inverted commas because the vast majority of existing states are not nation-states in the sense of one-nation in one-state. I rather prefer the more accurate term that Smith introduces: national state. This will be further explained in more detail in chapter 4.

⁴ In Lipowatz & Demertzis, 1994:97-100. These are mobilizing mechanisms of ideologies, in general, and thus apply to nationalism as well.

thus given supreme priority. Naturalisation is a mechanism by which the social and the political appear natural, given, unchosen. Naturalisation is largely used by nationalism, through which each nation is seen as an 'eternal' social category. In Barthes words, "ideology speaks with the 'Voice of Nature'... nationalism is the ideology by which the world of nations has come to seem the natural world"⁵. Naturalisation is closely connected to legitimation, a fundamental function of ideologies⁶, for what is natural becomes automatically excused, justified and, in the end, legitimised. The third mechanism, identification, makes the ideology unconsciously internalised and formulates individual and collective identities. When nationalism is internalised, national identity is ascribed to the individuals who, thereafter, tend to identify –wholly or partially– their interests with their nation's and naturally act out for their defence. According to Breuille, there exists in the modern world a general need for identity expressed as a general need for ideology, and he stresses that, "nationalist ideology is a particularly powerful response to this need" because it is both abstract (in the ways of achieving its goals) and repudiating of the depersonalising character of modernity (1993:381-2). So, the success of nationalistic ideology is connected to its quality of providing strong identities. This success is not only related to the aspiring type of identities that nationalism advances, but also with its claim for a state that will accommodate a national unit: the modern state apparatus possesses the means to largely ascribe and systematise collective identities and thus make them stronger⁷.

Nationalism provides with strong identities because its ideologisation goes through these processes –generalisation, naturalisation and identification– that further account for its high mobilising quality; in particular, its widespread ideological appeal is not irrelevant to its ability to present the particular as universally valid. This process, for example, generates a perception of the 'world' as a unitary and homogeneous whole, which satisfies the need to deny external reality and the unconscious search for pleasure through an imaginary

⁵ Barthes, R. (1977): *Roland Barthes*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, p.47, quoted in Billing 1997:37.

⁶ According to Breuille, the three functions of ideology within a political movement are co-ordination, mobilisation, and legitimation (1993:93)

⁷ The function of the modern state in relation to the success of nationalism will be analysed in the sequel of this chapter, pp.92-93.

return to ‘the natural state of things’⁸. Thus, identification with the nation becomes a particularly gratifying process. Although the three mechanisms are interrelated, generalisation is particularly important for the ideologisation of nationalism (as it gives universal validity to a particular idea), while we can most clearly see the mechanisms of naturalisation and identification functioning through nationalism as movement and sentiment respectively.

Nationalism is a *discourse* too, a discourse that expresses the ideology of nationalism and its basic principles (as they were defined above) through nationalistic rhetoric. It is more than that, however: it is a universal discourse comprised out of particularistic elements. Its universality is twofold. First, nationalism is the regulatory principle of modernity, according to which the international order and the relations of the nations and the states are established. Second, it is a discourse that can be traced in all existing nations, and ethnic groups, even in those that have their own sovereign state. To the extent that nationalistic rhetoric is used even when the aim (of ‘self-determination’) is accomplished, it usually serves so as to maintain national coherence; it is doing so both by ‘reminding’ nationhood (to use Billing’s term), and by helping to diffuse aggression outside the national group (i.e. through verbally expressed aggression against other national groups). The simultaneous particularism of nationalistic discourse is expressed in the way people address *their own* ethnic and national group, and in the idea that each such group holds for itself. This –universally articulated– particularistic discourse is characterised by almost every nation’s self-estimation that its distinctive characteristics are unique and of a superior or distinctive value and merit. In other words, it is a discourse that flatters the group and satisfies its narcissism. It is also a discourse that is used by both extreme nationalists and ‘mild’ political leaders. It is, for example, very common to hear political leaders addressing their national group as the “greatest nation in the world”, as Bush and Clinton, Thatcher⁹, along with Milosevic and others have done. Also,

⁸ These characteristics of the unconscious are described by Freud, 1915d:191-192; they are also described in this thesis in chapter 1, p.19.

⁹ Billing (1995) quotes several examples of the nationalistic rhetoric used by political leaders, especially in the US and the UK; see particularly his introduction, pages 87-91, and chapter five.

a contemptuous attitude towards other nations is usually implicit in nationalistic discourse, and occasionally explicit. This contemptuous attitude is directly relevant to the high self-evaluation of each nation, and they are both explainable through the process of identification: during identification, individuals internalise external images that please their self-image and, thus, they project their unwanted self/group images to the others¹⁰. In that sense, the positive image for one's self/nation and the negative image of the others – particularly the neighbouring and familiar others– are the two sides of the same coin.

A common reference in nationalistic rhetoric is made to a 'Golden Age', a time in 'antiquity' when the nation was glorious, powerful, and capable of high achievements; or, it can be the time of its 'birth'. Anthony Smith, in a study on 'The Golden Age and National Renewal', argues that, the use of the Golden Age in nationalism fulfils six main functions: to satisfy the "quest for authenticity", to locate and "re-root the community", to "establish a sense of continuity", to "remind the members of a community of their past greatness and hence their inner worth", to "proclaim an imminent status reversal", and to mirror and point towards a glorious destiny (1997, pp.48-51). These functions directly relate to basic particularistic discursive elements of nationalism that formulate much of its discourse, a discourse that points to the future looking backwards. Thus, nationalism traces the nations' origins to the past and establishes continuity with the present, a continuity either uninterrupted or interrupted by 'external' and 'evil' forces; either way, the promise to restore the nation's former glory is always manifest, thus pointing to the future. In this discourse, the search for authenticity represents an effort to answer the question 'where do we come from?', to find our origins, to identify ourselves and the others. The 'Golden Age' discourse is particularly appealing because it refers to the initial narcissistic perfection and bliss of the infant, to a wholeness that is gradually interrupted and distanced as it grows up. So, the nationalistic discourse about a 'Golden Age' derives its strength and appeal from the pre-existing structures of personality and the promise to 'repair' or compensate for

¹⁰ As it was explained in chapter 1, p.22-23 and chapter 2, pp.61-69 of this thesis, based on the theories

the lost paradise, hence rendering it one of the most generally employed and successful nationalistic discourses. In the example of the ‘Golden Age’ we see nationalism functioning as an ideological discourse that serves all three processes of generalisation, naturalisation, and identification.

Nationalism as a *movement* is the activation of nations and ethnic groups in order to achieve political expression in *their* ‘nation-state’ and to have their independence and autonomy recognised within the international arena of national states. In this sense it is connected to the right of ‘self-determination’, which is mainly used in connection to liberation nationalisms, but it also includes secessionist movements of ethnic groups and minorities within established national states which may make claims for an autonomous status within the existing state in which they operate. Nationalism as a movement also includes the operation of established national states towards their expansion and, as a consequence, glorification. These nationalisms are usually characterised by the appearance of the adjective ‘great’ in their name and rhetoric (i.e. ‘Great Albania’, ‘Great Germany’, etc), and they are often explicitly militaristic.

The ideological mechanisms of generalisation and naturalisation have boosted the claims of nationalistic movements because they justify them and make them appear obvious, natural. That happens because, in an age where the ideology of nationalism prevails and the ‘nation-state’ is recognised as the supreme conveyor of sovereignty and an higher value as well (at least until very recently¹¹), the wish of a nation to participate in this international order on equal terms is not only justified, but it is also created by nationalism itself. Also, the connection of a nation or an ethnic community with antiquity, which ascribes to it an eternal value, renders the claims of these movements natural and enriches them with an ethical quality.

Nationalism as a *sentiment* is the feeling of pride and self-esteem arising out of belonging to a nation, which is perceived as the primary form of

of Volcan (1988) and Klein (1988).

¹¹ In chapter 5 I will refer to globalisation and the relevant discussion about the repudiation or not of the national state within the global era.

belonging, and engendered by its present and/or past glorious achievements; it is also the sorrow, shame and anger arising out of the nations' misdeeds and misfortunes; and, it is the higher self-evaluation of the national group as opposed to other national groups, for whom contempt is occasionally shown. As membership in a group contributes to the fulfilment of the emotional needs of individuals, the positive evaluation of one's nation is the natural outcome of participation in it; its 'great accomplishments' serve as a rationalisation, a justification for that. But, as there are other nations surrounding one's own, self-elevation often comes through comparison, and looking down on other nations can be a prerequisite for sustaining feelings of self-worth. Externalisation of unwanted aspects and characteristics of nations as an outcome of collective identification is also relevant here, as already explained. In addition, the misfortunes in a nation's history most commonly provoke aggression and anger against others, for it is usually external forces that are blamed for the nations' sufferings. This is not to deny that, in politics, it is often the case that certain national states interfere into the affairs of others, often with dramatic consequences. Psychologically, however, people tend to project unconscious feelings, such as anger and aggressiveness, against others and then to use these projections as justifications for their discrimination against them.

It is not only identification with a nation but, also, its being considered as the ultimate 'communal' grouping that makes it the primary form of belonging¹². Only the Family is of a similar importance –sometimes of less importance in extreme nationalistic discourses. It is not a coincidence that people often refer to the nation as 'a family', to co-nationals as 'brothers' and 'sisters', and to the country as the 'motherland' or 'fatherland'. "A nation is a large scale solidarity", writes Renan (1996:53), expressing this particularity of belonging to a nation. Thus, identification with a nation, and with the co-nationals, creates a family-bond; and national identity derives its strength from

¹² The sense of belonging is an essential feeling of nationalism as a sentiment and closely connected to the ideological mechanism of identification, which directly engenders national identification. However, the sense of belonging is not distinctive of nationalism; it is the claim that the nation is the ultimate form of communal belonging that is highly distinctive of nationalism, which also makes belonging to it so important.

it. That is because these new family-bonds exert similar psychological appeal to the powerful unconscious desires that determine the psychological constitution of individuals, and they act as a ‘simulation’ of real family-bonds (which are the stronger bonds for every individual).

* * *

Now that we have defined nationalism it would be useful to refer to its dominance and strength as an ideology and practice that is prevalent for the last two hundred years.

A Dominant Ideology Within Modernity

“The world is divided between nations and states; if nationalism is the ideology which maintains these nation-states as nation-states, then ‘nationalism is the most successful ideology in human history’”¹³. Birch is certainly right about the success of nationalistic ideology, considering that it is confined to modernity: modernity is the age when the very term of ideology was initiated in order to correspond to a new, modern concept, as this is the time when ideologies came to the fore¹⁴. The success of nationalism can be observed through three main manifestations. The first is that the ‘nation-state’ has gained universal recognition as the basic and legitimate body of exertion of authority and power; second, that nationalism claims and attracts extreme loyalty to the nation and belief in the ideal of ‘nation-state’ (of statehood of the nation); and third, that nationalism combines with theories and practices that may be opposed to each other without been in contradiction to itself or to them.

The first observation is closely related to the particular and universal character of nationalistic discourse. As Billing argues, “if ‘our’ nation is to be imagined in all its particularity, it must be imagined as a nation amongst other nations” (1995:83). An independent and sovereign national state is one that is

¹³ Birch (1989), *Nationalism and National Integration*, p.3, quoted in Billing (1995), p.22.

¹⁴ See on ideology Lipowatz and Demertzis (1994), particularly p.47.

acknowledged as such in an international environment, meaning by other national states; “the emergence of nation-states coincides with the emergence of international relations” (Billing, 1995:83). The modern era is exactly an era of national states, whose status and particularity is either recognised or leads to conflicts and/or war, and which (particularity) is self-evaluated by each one as superior; this is a consequence of nationalism. For instance, Kristeva shows that in the Declaration of Man and Citizen the ‘natural’ man is immediately *political* and *national* (1991:148-9). And that provokes Kristeva to ask: what about peoples with no homeland? Where do their rights come from, since even one of the most liberal and humanistic of declarations ascribes to them universal rights only so long as they are part of a specific political unit, the national unit?

The second observation that manifests the success of nationalism within modernity is also manifest in the strong commitment and loyalty people feel towards their ethnic and national community, just as nationalism postulates, and the continuous effort of those who are ‘unsettled’ towards statehood. The making of national states that started massively in the late 18th century is a prospect still appealing for those ethnic communities that are a minority within a state; it also proved appealing for the several new nations that emerged right after the break-up of the former USSR. For them, but also for all other nations in the world that already enjoy statehood, the ‘nation-state’ is an aspiration or a reality, respectively, that captures their imagination and gives them the will to sacrifice.

The third important observation on nationalism and its success is that it can express itself through various and diverse manifestations; this is a consequence of its being an all-encompassing ideology. We have witnessed all kinds of nationalistic movements and rhetoric: liberationist, integrative, expansionist, chauvinist, liberal, socialistic, fascistic, etc. Nationalism can be combined with other political ideologies and practices without been in contradiction to itself, largely because it does not specify the means by which the nation should acquire its own state, neither does it specify who shall belong to it. It is exactly because it does not specify the means, but only the end, that

nationalism is so flexibly combined with other theories. Jenkins and Sofos argue that the ambiguity of nationalism is due to the potential coexistence of democratic and authoritarian elements, which render it both ambiguous and malleable (1996:19). They are not right, though, in specifying the order of cause and effect: nationalism is *inherently ambiguous* (exactly because it does not specify either the means or the content of its aim, meaning the means to capture the state and the content/character that this state will have), and it is this ambiguity that allows for the potential coexistence of democratic and authoritarian elements, not the other way round. It is this characteristic that makes it compatible with other trends, religions, ideologies. In Billing's words, "Liberalism and Marxism have been territorially limited, as was Christendom or Islam in the Middle Ages, but *nationalism is an international ideology*" (1995:22, emphasis added). It is this characteristic of nationalism, its inherent ambiguity, that also finds fertile ground on the unconscious structures and desires¹⁵, which allow for the unproblematic coexistence of contradictory and even conflicting elements.

It is very interesting to note that nationalism is not incompatible with religion either. Religion is often argued to constitute an integral part of national identity, of a nation's history, and a sustaining value. What is more peculiar, in addition, is that religion can equally 'speak' in nationalistic terms. Let us take the example of Rached Gannouchi, leading intellectual of the Tunisian Islamist movement, who expressed the view that "the only way to accede to modernity is by our own path, that which has been traced for us by our religion, our history, and our civilisation"¹⁶. What is important in this quote is that 'our' can equally refer to the nation (*Tunisian Islamic Movement*) and to the religion (*Tunisian Islamic Movement*) and still have an appeal without losing its coherence –despite the obvious contradiction of the combination of nationalism's cultural particularity and Islamic religion's universality¹⁷. This is

¹⁵ Such as timelessness and exemption from mutual contradiction (defined in chapter 1, p.19).

¹⁶ Interview with Jeune Afrique, in July 1990. Quoted in Castells, 1997:13.

¹⁷ It is remarkable that, although, theoretically, Christianity and Islam should be incompatible with the particularism of nationalism, in practice they have been combined, to a larger or lesser extent. The fact that this significant contradiction is not only acknowledged but, on the contrary, disregarded by the bulk of believers and 'nationals' is indicative of the ability of the unconscious to accommodate contradicting postulates –to the extent that they offer pleasure and satisfaction.

only one of many instances where religious leaders use nationalistic rhetoric – or nationalist leaders use religious rhetoric? Indeed, the relation is often reversed as nationalism ‘speaks’ in religious terms too. For example, it sanctifies the origins, the starting point of a nation, it eternalises the national community beyond life and death (of its members), and it maximises the value of the nation by attributing to it a metaphysical substance. Lipowatz and Demertzis (1994:49) argue that ideologies, in general, differ from religions in that they are not a regulating representation of the world, and they do not refer to a metaphysical being. They do have the capacity, though, to function in a religious way, and nationalism is a characteristic example of that. Thus, nationalism appears as a “secular political religion”, in Demertzis’ words (1996:148-9).

So, nationalism has been one of the more lasting, penetrating, and aspiring ideologies of modernity. How can this success be explained? Let us see the proposed explanations of two important scholars in the field: Gellner and Smith. Like several scholars, Gellner (1983) refers to more concrete explanations and tangible characteristics of nationalism. Gellner, for example, examines language as a cultural trait definitive of a nation seeking statehood (language as a criterion of ethnicity and thus of potential nationalism), and argues that there are *n* potential nationalisms for every successful one¹⁸. This way, however, he reduces the success of nationalism in all its characteristics to its success as a movement to actually establish a national state. Thus, nationalistic aspirations and even failed movements do not account for Gellner as an indication of nationalism’s predominance and nationalism is reduced to certain tangible characteristics. Smith, on the other hand, argues that the success of nationalism as a movement “depends on specific cultural and historical contexts...and pre-existing and highly particularised cultural heritages and ethnic formations”; at the same time, he distinguishes nationalism as an ideology, which “can take root only if it strikes a popular chord...” (1995a, preface p.viii). He connects the possibility of ‘striking a popular chord’, however, solely with these specific cultural contexts and pre-existing heritages.

Regarding Smith's explanation, we could make two remarks. One is that, to the cultural and historical contexts that Smith defines, we should add the role of specific political circumstances and internal or external policies (governmental policies, international interventions etc) that may give rise and facilitate the spread of nationalism and its success towards statehood. The second remark is that nationalism has the potentials to strike a chord to several individuals because of their inner predispositions, independently of the specific cultural and historical context¹⁹.

Regarding the success of nationalism I would propose two explanations: the first stresses the psychological reasons for its success and the second stresses the political explanation. The first is a set of three sub-explanations which are interrelated to a large extent and together account for the psychological explanation. These are: that nationalism has a strong psychological appeal and it finds support in peoples' unconscious, that it provides a sense of 'wholeness', a complete explanation of the surrounding world –a secular explanation of course, and that it provides people with strong and fulfilling identities. The second explanation is related to the changing character and functions of the state in modernity²⁰. Let's see each of these causes separately.

The first, psychological explanation for nationalism's success that will be supported in this study relates to the psychical foundations of human beings – certain aspects of which have been mentioned in the process, but it would not be superficial to systematise them here. One psychological aspect that explains nationalism's success is that it finds supporting ground in the human psyche by its strong appeal to the unconscious. Nationalism appeals to the unconscious drives mainly in two ways: it satisfies and enhances individual and group narcissism, and it offers guilt-free outlets of aggression. To begin with, nationalism as a sentiment is narcissistic and its narcissistic character is

¹⁸ Meaning that there are much more languages, and thus potential nationalisms, than effective ones. See Gellner (1983), pp.44–45.

¹⁹ Or, perhaps, we could say that, because of these individual psychic predispositions, the cultural and historical context that facilitate nationalism can exist in all nations in specific periods of time.

²⁰ A political explanation, as it concerns the changing character of the state, but also one with economic connotations as well, as these changes were also necessitated by economic changes.

supported by the ideology and discourse of nationalism too; nationalism is often described in the readings of political psychology as “defensive group narcissism” (Falk, 1992:227). That is because it flatters the group as a whole and individuals separately. Nationalism presents each particular nation as having an inherent, and inherited, worth and value, and it elevates the self-esteem of its members. In its extreme forms, especially when it is combined with racism, it directly and openly addresses a nation as superior and is, simultaneously, militant against the outsiders (i.e. Hitler’s nationalism). Thus, through its connection to narcissism, nationalism is particularly appealing. Simultaneously, nationalism finds also fertile ground on the unconscious as it ‘justifies’ offence and, thus, liberates the unconscious drives, aggression in particular. In its discursive form, nationalism allows for aggressive utterances against the others and, as a movement, it allows for physical violence. Individuals have an urge to externalise their aggression drives but, at the same time, they try to inhibit and divert them towards more constructive ends so as to be accepted within a social environment. Nationalism, however, blocks this process by ‘generously’ offering an alibi, a ‘legitimate’ way out to aggression. It is, to that extent, largely antisocial –just like narcissism is. So, for example, when politicians use nationalistic rhetoric (although repudiating violence), they provoke a significant retrogression in people’s efforts to accommodate their drives within society: they do so by allowing and provoking unconscious regression, since they legitimise nationalistic reactions by rendering them acceptable within the social environment.

Nevertheless, even if nationalism is to the extent just mentioned largely antisocial, it is not wholly antisocial if we examine it from another perspective. Nationalism also appeals to the love, self-preservation drives. Therefore, it provides a given society with a strong cause to live and work together, as a ‘community’. So, nationalism is antisocial to those who are beyond the community, but it has also a uniting appeal to those who are included²¹. Therefore, I would like to add the love drives to the drives of aggression and narcissism as an additional, although contradictory, way by which nationalism

²¹ Nationalism is, in that sense, ‘anti inter-social’, or ‘anti-international’, although universally applied.

strongly appeals to the unconscious. I suggest that it is this quality, of being social and anti-social at the same time, of matching the contrary, that makes it so inspiring.

A second aspect of nationalism's psychological appeal that explain its success is that it provides individuals with a sense of completeness that, however illusionary, is essential for their being. This completeness corresponds to the narcissistic perfection and 'autonomy' in which infants live, a perfection that has been interrupted as they have been gradually denied the gratification of their narcissistic desires, and the dominance of the pleasure principle has been mediated or seriously undermined by the reality principle. In addition, nationalism locates individuals within a broader environment of space and time, it makes them feel they are at the centre of this environment and that they serve an upper value, a superior cause. "Nations... always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future", as Anderson argues (1991:11). This way, they give an answer to 'Who we are?' and delineate peoples' origins and future: 'Where do we come from?', and 'Where are we going?'. People have always been asking about their origins, their point of departure, and this has given rise to multiple religions and dogmas. Nationalism serves the same need, but in secular terms: it transforms nations into metaphysical entities, it gives them a point of departure and a limitless future²². And this is an experience that all co-nationals can participate in. Thus, it gives them the feeling that, by supporting their nation and acting for its defence, they participate in an everlasting experience, a life before and after death. We should keep the analogies in mind, though, and not equate nationalism and religion.

The third aspect of the psychological appeal of nationalism is that it provides individuals with strong and fulfilling identities. This is a way by which ideologies become broadly acceptable and mobilising: by formulating individual and collective identities. Identification occurs as nationalism unifies

²² In a world more secular than before (before nationalism came to the fore), nationalism is analogous to religion, it is a 'secular political religion', as it was indicated earlier. And, if Hastings is right that Islam, a non-secular world, is less influenced by nationalism than the West, we can infer that, the rise of

a given collectivity through shared past and common destiny. It also dictates that members of a national unit will act with equal commitment and determination for the well being of the community, which is their well being as well. No prosperity can be imagined outside the nation, for love for the country is felt as the ultimate value. These identities are, thus, very strong and fulfilling: they provide a sense of belonging, an identity for the self, and a timeless orientation towards the past and the future.

These three aspects of the psychological appeal of nationalism stress the psychological explanation for nationalism's success within modernity. However, as indicated, national identity is also a political identity that is derived through identification with the nation as 'nation-state' –existing or aspired. So, a second explanation, a political one, is needed too so as to account for the success of nationalism. This explanation is the changing function of the *state* in modernity. Among its various changes, the one that concerns us here is the unification of social, economic, administrative, judicial and political functions of the local and peripheral authorities with the central authorities. In pre-modern times the state existed as a central authority that was detached from the segmented local provinces and communities –which had a relative autonomy regarding the social, administrative and other spheres– and had a remote role, as tax-collector for example. With the oncoming modernisation of the state, this relationship changed significantly²³. The state penetrated the periphery and it united the local communities in a common large 'community', the national community. Thus, the spheres of organisation of each community were now common, as they were common with the so important administrative and other spheres of the central state too. In addition, this process coincided, or rather resulted in, the development of *mass politics*. As a consequence, the state synchronised and systematised the various localisms and local/regional identities into one single national identity shared by all members of the national state.

nationalism in modernity, an age when religion declined, provides a 'substitute' for religion, to the extent that it answers our origins and provides us with a sense of community.

²³ As also changed the 'central' and the 'local' in the sense that, within an empire, for example, the central and the local expressed much different concepts themselves.

So, the modern state was a determinant in the success of nationalism as it organised and united the qualitatively similar desires and identities of dispersed peoples and communities into 'one people' and 'one community'. This process also strengthened the feelings that are associated with nationalism because of the increased number of people sharing them. This strengthening of nationalistic sentiments can be explained by the notion of 'emotional contagion' (or 'exaltation or intensification of emotion'), which means that impartation of emotions through direct or indirect contact intensifies the emotional charge of individuals²⁴.

The explanation about the success of nationalism because of the transformation of the state is limited, however, by two inherent requirements of this explanation. First, it applies only to those cases where there is a national state and, second, it concerns mostly the states that followed the path of modernisation. At the same time, however, these requirements verify the validity of this explanation, meaning that nationalism was initiated and was most powerful exactly in those regions and periods that these requirements were (first) met. If we examine the history of nationalism we can see that it was initiated and first became powerful in Europe, particularly where there was a state in the process of modernisation and a national state further on. After its initial emergence, nationalism became a prevalent force in most places of the world in the twentieth century as decolonisation proceeded and nations claimed for their own state as well. In these later cases nationalism was 'imported' by the dominant colonising powers or western-educated elites²⁵. In this later phase, however, where nationalism is imported and reproduced, the prevalence of nationalism seems to be relatively independent of the transformation of the state, even independent from the existence of a state. So, for example, the success or failure of certain states to modernise did not question the overall success of nationalism; perhaps it is in those cases that tribalism or localism are still relatively significant and powerful. On the other hand, there are certain cases of nationalisms that are strong and lasting despite the fact that the

²⁴ This concept was analysed in chapter 2, p.56.

²⁵ This is the 'secondary reproduction' after its initial emergence in Europe, which will be analysed in chapter 4, under the heading 'Why has Nationalism Appeared in Modernity?', p.168-173.

countries concerned never had states, let alone modernised ones (i.e. Kurdish and Tibetan nationalisms). In such cases, the national state remains an aspiration, whose appeal and strength indicates the overall success of nationalism²⁶.

* * *

Now that the basic, indicative lines have been mentioned, and we have defined our context, the context of nationalism, we can proceed to the analysis of national identity, as a social identity and as a political identity influenced by nationalism, and directly answer the question ‘Why national identity?’, and why does it occasionally appear so ferocious.

National and ‘Nationalistic’ Identity

It was argued in the introduction of the current and the previous chapters that national identity is a social and a political identity. This is a peculiarity that is responsible for much of the complexity and misunderstanding regarding national identity. So, the analysis and description of national identity must take under consideration this dual characteristic, its being both a social and a political identity, in order to comprehend its peculiarity. At the same time, it is important to grasp the emotional depth of national identity. In the present analysis we shall proceed with a schematic distinction between national and ‘nationalistic’ identity, that is a division between its social and political aspect.

²⁶ This second, political explanation of nationalism’s success is no less significant than the psychological ones; however, it has occupied less space in the present analysis. The reason is solely that, the ‘state’ and its transformation have been analysed extensively by several scholars thus far. In particular reference to nationalism and the transformation of the state see, Gellner (1983), chapters 2 and 3; Greenfeld (1992), for the cases of Britain, France, Russia, Germany and America; and Breuilly (1993), for detailed analyses of several specific case-studies and the development of nationalism in relation to state’s transformations.

National identity

Sociologically, national identity is the identity a person acquires out of identification with the nation/social group he/she is born and bred in. It is one of the multiple identities one obtains because of participation in a group, the national group, and identification with it. Even as a social identity, however, it has a particularity that distinguishes it from most other identities: it is not voluntary, in the sense that it is not elective but ascriptive. Firstly, the nation is not like any other group that one decides to enter for ideological, cultural or any other reason. The nation is a group that we find ourselves living in and with. This is a characteristic found in few other identities, like familial and, to some extent, religious; the similarities of these identities with national identity is indicative. The non-voluntary character of national identification lays in that there is no choice of *the* nation we find ourselves living in. Even when someone leaves, permanently or not, his/her country, either as an economic immigrant, or as a student, or because of love, or just because it was narrowing his/her potential, his/her national identity remains a reference point for external categorisation, but also self-categorisation. Also, when one makes a choice of another place, this is more likely to be a choice of another state than of another nation, and it is usually accompanied with nostalgia. Secondly, national identity is not voluntary because, we have no choice of whether we are going to be part of *any* nation (or ethnic group) at all. As a group categorisation, it is one that we do not evaluate before entering, and there is no way out either: even if we wanted to ‘repudiate’ our, or all, nations, he might find ourselves either externally identified as Greeks, Germans, or whatever our origin was, or socially isolated/marginalised. Thus, such a decision has been practically/realistically improbable –though not theoretically impossible²⁷.

So, national identity is, in a sense, inherited: it is the identity of our parents, and of the group we found ourselves living in. This is even more evident in the example of persons who have two national identities. These are

²⁷ An exception to this could be a cosmopolitan outlook, along with the simultaneous repudiation of *nations* in that context. The exception consists in that such a choice would not necessarily result in social marginalisation of the person that might confer such view (unless one repudiated the state as well),

most commonly the cases of the children of mixed marriages, whose dual identities are the national identities of their parents. Certain factors will determine which of the two identities will be most significant, such as the place of residence (it is most likely, for example, that identification with a group through everyday interaction and socialisation will render this national group more important than the distant one), or the relationship with the parents. Thus, national identities are inherited by the parents. National identity in the USA offer a significant example of the importance people ascribe to family heritage. The choice of this particular example is made because the USA is a nation constituted by voluntary immigration and it is a successful example of strong national identification, no less strong than other 'historical' nations. Yet, the 'Americans' tend to remember their old and distant origins and to occasionally call themselves and/or the others according to them: African-American, Greek-American, Irish-American, etc. Let alone that this also happens with second, third etc generation immigrants, who only know about this other country through family narratives or from occasional visits. Even so, the sense alone that there is a family bond with another country creates a sentimental attachment or even (loose) identification. This is not to say that these remote identities are more important than the 'American' identity, but only to stress the fact that these family/national affiliations remain important for many 'Americans'²⁸.

While national identity is inherited from the parents, it may nevertheless not be the *same* as our parents', in the sense that it may not be comprised out of the same elements. For example, religion is for some a fundamental component of their national identity, while for others it may not be a component at all. This, however, does not diminish their sense of nationhood: the appeal of national identity is independent from the perception individuals may have about its constitutive components. The sense of identity is developed within the context of upbringing and the familiar environment, which is unique for each

although this view itself is marginal, meaning a minority view. Nevertheless, even in such case, one would not avoid the external identification/categorisation according to his/her nationality of origin.

²⁸ The inverted commas connote the inaccuracy in the self- and external definition of the national identity of the USA as American despite the fact that this national state is just one of the several national states of the American continent.

one; beliefs and ideologies play a significant role in the making of identity and its constitutive elements for each individual, yet national identity as a sentiment and identification with the nation has the potentials to apply to all co-nationals. That is due to its flexible, encompassing character that makes it not to contradict with other identities, but also to integrate them. As Demertzis argues, it appeals to everybody without losing its coherence (1996:77).

A consequence of being part of a nation without a choice, *a priori* – without having evaluated it, its characteristics and its members before becoming part of it– is the high valuation of it *a posteriori*, in retrospect. The additional factor of being, not just a member but an integral part of a nation – because we are part of it since birth, and our actions are connected to its image and destiny– makes its positive valuation a ‘compelled’ necessity. A necessity because, as one identifies with the nation and its members, the nation’s valuation is self-valuation as well. National identification also provides one with a sense of belonging essential for the elementary constitution of personality and a sense of security. Thus, national identity becomes a very significant identity²⁹.

‘Nationalistic Identity’

The social aspect of national identity explains partly why national identity is so important among identities. Nevertheless, national identity has a political aspect as well, one that further illuminates its persistence, its supposed ‘irrationality’, and its emotional depth. The political aspect of national identity is derived by its being influenced and determined by the political doctrine of nationalism, along with its systematisation by the modern state apparatus as argued above, whenever there is a national state. National identity is not only the product of identification with the nation, but it has peculiar characteristics

²⁹ We should not forget that, “identification in all its forms is the repetition of an infantile narcissistic rite” (Bowie, 1991:37): an effort to high self-esteem and a defence against anxiety. Identification is a process that, primarily, helps us distinguish our selves and the others and, to identify those who are familiar and, thus, reassuring. In addition, as identification serves the individual need to belong, which serves the pleasure principle as well, identification with the nation is primary source for the sense of belonging.

arising out of the particular character that nationalism attributes to the national group. More specifically, under the influence of nationalism, the national group is not (viewed as) any group, as it is considered to be of utmost importance and value; so, too, national identity is ascribed more importance than other identities. The more influential nationalism is, the more importance is ascribed to national identity. Thus, in its political aspect, national identity is a ‘nationalistic identity’.

In addition, the prevalence of nationalism throughout modernity directly explains the strength and prevalence of national identities in modernity –*partly* though, if we add the psychological reasons as well. Nevertheless, the psychological reasons, however important, are not confined in modernity. In addition, they apply to other identities as well, such as local and religious. For these reasons we have argued that the prevalence of nationalism and the transformation of national to ‘nationalistic’ identities that follow is the determining reason behind the prevalence and importance of national identification *in the modern era*³⁰. Let us now see certain important characteristics of ‘nationalistic’ identity, in relation to the nation as signified by nationalism.

The nation is imagined as a community, “as a deep, horizontal comradeship”, argues Anderson in *Imagined Communities* (1991:7). It is imagined, though, as even more than that: it is imagined as a big ‘brotherhood’, an extended ‘family’, to cite only some of the usual rhetoric. As in a real family, the uniting symbols of such imagined communities are derived from parenthood. Thus, for example, Grant tells us how the Americans, while searching for unifying national symbols, proclaimed George Washington as “the Father of his Country”³¹, their first ideal figure. The parental figure best serves as a unifying point of reference, a symbol conferring the strongest appeal. That is because it directly appeals to the unconscious memories and

³⁰ The shift of emphasis from religious (in the Middle Ages) to national –that is territorial– identities (in modernity) is due to political transformations to power control. Beyond that, the reasons behind the success and strong appeal of nationalism to individuals are both psychological and political, as it was stressed above (current chapter, pp.89-94).

³¹ Grant, 1997:93. Her study concentrates in the USA and its founding myths. It is very illuminating regarding current perceptions of the American National Identity and their consequences.

infantile identifications, the most important and lasting in an individual's life. The potentials of national identity in mobilising the co-nationals sometimes provoke astonishment. Nobody, though, would deny defending their family and act for its interests, which are their interests too. This is an additional reason why 'nationalistic identity' is today one of the most appealing kinds of attachment: it resembles a family bond.

Connected to the above is the territorial specification of the nation as 'nation-state'. The territorial specification of the nation –and of the state it finds political expression in– is presumed to be absolute and nonnegotiable. Borders can change only through wars or treaties –that are usually agreed and signed after a war (Demertzis, 1996:106). The territory within the borders is 'the holy land of the ancestors', the 'fatherland' or 'motherland'. That means that there can be no nation without a territory as the *home* of the nation, and as a *reference point* as well. As a 'home', it is the dominion within which the nation finds political expression, the national state. As a point of reference, it means that same national state (the 'home') for the Diaspora of a particular nation (i.e., the Italians outside Italy); it also means the birthplace of a people with no national state at all (i.e., the Jews until the mid-20th century, the Kurds); or it means the 'still un-redeemed territories', as is North Ireland for both Britain and Ireland. The case of the Jews is characteristic here. The Jews had retained their national/religious³² identity for long, even though they had no land, no state of their own. At some point, however, as nationalism developed as a powerful force and 'nation-states' became the norm of political organisation, the political movement of Zionism emerged, demanding resettlement in the land of Israel. The nationalistic political order in the world proved so powerful that, as Hastings argues, it 'forced' the Jews, who had long retained their national identity through their religion, to act against their scriptures and claim political expression; for, "Jewish religion was fully acclimatised in a diaspora existence and was in fact for long highly

³² It is difficult to decide whether the Jewish identity should be defined as religious or national. On the one hand, it is unquestionably a religious identity; on the other hand, the Jews developed a distinctiveness as a 'people' and thus a national identity, based on that religious identity however. Therefore, it is both.

unsympathetic towards Zionism” (Hastings, 1997:186). The new identity that Zionism delineates is a ‘nationalistic identity’.

So, national land is a basic component of ‘nationalistic identity’, which partly explains why people are so easily mobilised when their territory is threatened, or perceived to be under threat. Another thing that should be mentioned regarding national territory is its naming. As indicated in the previous chapter, the name of an ‘object’ is the discursive formation of it. The name of a nation is its identity, its members’ identity, a name that is given to them as well (the Israelites, the French, the Indians). In this line of argument, Billing argues that, “if we are to imagine ‘ourselves’ as unique, ‘we’ need a name to do so” (1995:73), a name that is unique too. For example, the recent conflict between FYROM and Greece³³ provoked anger between the two peoples (while it provoked irony among the external observers, who considered the matter trivial). The reason is that, in Billing words, “the world is too small to bear two homelands with the name ‘Macedonia’, even if clear borders between the two are agreed. Each homeland must be considered a special place, separated physically and metaphorically from other homelands” (1995:75).

Another peculiarity of national identity in an era of nationalism is the discovery of a *unique* identity. It is derived by the narrative of the ‘chosen nation’, which ascribes to the given nation holiness and special destiny. Hastings connects this to the way Christianity has shaped nation-formation and he argues that nationalism makes use of Old Testament’s predilection to one nation so as to provide the sense that each people can be chosen by God, just like Israel. “The root of the more extreme wing of European nationalisms lies precisely here, in a widely held Christian assumption that there can be only one fully elect nation, one’s own, the true successor to ancient Israel”(Hastings, 1997:198). So, Hastings argues, the more one nation identifies itself as chosen, the more it wants to eliminate the first chosen nation, the Jews. This

³³ A conflict over the name ‘Macedonia’, among other things. Macedonia has been the name of a large territory, half of which is part of Greece, and the other half was divided between former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Greek slogan ‘Macedonia is Greek’ was referring to the northern Greek province, that was

combination of nationalism and anti-Semitism found a terrible expression in Nazi Germany –which is why the ‘Aryan race’ wanted to exterminate their own citizens, the Jews.

The ‘chosen nation’ rhetoric is found in most extreme nationalistic movements, but it is also implicit in many milder nationalisms. We can assume that most people can recall hearing, not from extremist circles but in every day life, that their nation is unique in this or that characteristic, that no other nation is similar or as distinct, that it has a Great history, or that it ought (because of its greatness?) to redeem an exemplary future. Let us give some examples, mainly from countries whose governments usually condemn nationalism. In the American myths of national construction there is the central assumption that “the ultimate victory of the Americans over the British and, later, the North over the South, was in some way *preordained*, that a nation destined to provide guidance for the rest of mankind could not have failed to emerge the way it did... as a ‘*nation under God*’, as a *Redeemer nation*” (Grant, 1997:91, emphasis added). On the other side of the Atlantic, the British think that they have a stronger sense of national identity, because they are the oldest nation – along with all the rest who think the same. Last, a personal example that has greatly astonish me is that of an acquaintance, a mild and moderate person who had travelled a lot and lived abroad as well, who told me many years ago with an equally mild and confident tone that, “We Greeks are superior, aristocrats, because... we are not racists”!

Last, but not least, ‘nationalistic identity’ is an identity of loyalty to the nation. This loyalty is expressed in various ways. In general, it is expressed in peoples’ willingness to act for the interests of the nation and to defend their national identity. For example, they “resist changing their identities, even when they expect to benefit” (Stern, 1995:223) by adopting another identity (that of the host country, in the case of an immigrant³⁴, etc). Loyalty is easily

called that way. In Yugoslavia, too, the same name was given for its Macedonian part and, so, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, they wanted to keep the same name as their country’s name.

³⁴ Usually, first generation immigrants are very willing to integrate and adapt to the host country, while second and third generation immigrants tend to explore their origins. However, even first generation immigrants do not abandon their national identity and keep their cultural distinctiveness, which then passes on to their children.

manipulated, however, usually in order to mobilise or to gain obedience. Loyalty is a determinant for assenting to war too, argues Caspary, who says that, obedience during war (by both soldiers and non-combatants) “can be achieved by manipulating in-group loyalty and out-group enmity...” (1993:423).

* * *

The distinction between national and nationalistic identity is a schematic, descriptive one, because in reality the two appear as one. To begin with, the one includes the other. To be accurate, ‘nationalistic identity’ necessarily includes national identity as it is a political identity and, thus, a social identity as well. The reverse does not apply, though: national identity could stand as a social identity without any further connotations. The presence –and prevalence– of nationalism, however, has had the implication for national identity to entail the ‘nationalistic identity’ in most national states in their course of time. This can be better explained by the fact that, in the era of nationalism, national and nationalistic identities appear interchangeably. This means that, as national identity is inevitably formed, under certain circumstances it gives its place to ‘nationalistic identity’. It ‘regresses’ in a sense, for it becomes more liable to unconscious drives and characteristics. Ulman and Abse have argued that there are two aspects of collective regression. The one is, regression of an individual when placed in a group; individuals “regress to the level of a child in relation to a parent”, whose strength and superiority provide an answer to feelings of frustration. The other is, regression of the group (of all the members of the nation simultaneously and as a whole): “members of a group replace their ego ideal with that of the leader because the individual member is repeating an unconscious psychic process already completed during childhood” (1983:648-9). The circumstances under which a nation may regress can be both internal and external, such as political mobilisation on behalf of a party, or extreme nationalisms that come to the fore in neighbouring countries and, therefore, cannot be indifferent to one’s own.

But, because regression to nationalism or to extreme forms of nationalism is also an individual process, individuation plays an important role: individuals are influenced in different ways from ideologies and can ascribe more or less importance to some issues or can react differently to mobilisation. In addition, although we have defined above the main characteristics that national and 'nationalistic' identities may assume, it is not necessary that any such identity (or nationalism) will possess all of them. Nationalism, however, is particularly influencing because it appeals strongly to the unconscious drives, which always strive for expression and is waiting in a latency to (re)appear. Also, it provokes 'emotional contagion' and, so, the more people fall under its sway even more people are attracted by it.

As it has been argued so far, 'nationalistic identity' is the national identity as influenced by nationalism. For the rest of this thesis we shall use the term national identity in general and, unless otherwise indicated³⁵, it will mean the identity that includes all those elements that characterise national and nationalistic identities, all those elements that constitute the 'reservoir' of nationalistic ideas and discourses. Thus, each time the term national identity is used we put emphasis on the latency of 'nationalistic identity'. Thus, I will define national identity as follows: *national identity is the outcome of the constant process of identification with a nation, and the sentiment aroused by this identification*. In the modern era, the nation is signified by nationalism. So, the sentiment aroused by identification with the nation is, most likely, the nationalistic sentiment, and the nation, with which one identifies, is whatever is comprised under the word 'nation': shared origins, myths, common language, etc. This is quite a flexible definition, but very precise as well. Its precision is due to its flexibility: it does not define national identity according to certain tangible characteristics, which appear interchangeably any way, or some may not appear at all. It emphasises the subjectivity of the process, and individuation. It also leaves ground for different significations of the nation and national identity that appear in different times and places. National identity

³⁵ That is, if I refer to national and 'nationalistic' identity explicitly this will be done in order to emphasise on the distinction between the two, on the explicit regression of national identity. Otherwise, I

does not necessarily become a nationalistic identity, like nationalism is not a necessary phenomenon; but, since it has occurred, it tends to shape –and it has shaped– national identifications in a nationalistic way. So, according to this definition, national identity is not defined by the tangible characteristics that define each nation but by the feelings aroused out of identification with it. We shall return to the nation and the national state in the next chapter. For now, let us discuss some additional elements about nationalism and national identity.

Symbolic and Imaginary Identification

Symbolic and imaginary³⁶ identification provide an additional dimension to the understanding of national identity, and nationalism. *Symbolic* identification is the identification with someone or something or a particular characteristic that facilitates the subject's effort to constitute an identity and a sense of being. In this effort, the object of identification is simply a medium, a 'transitory' object in a sense, that the subject steps on for a while during the course of his/her search for an identity. *Imaginary* identification, on the other hand, is when in a search for identity the subject uses the objects of identification not as mediums but as a continuation of the self. In this case, the object captures the ego and becomes fully internalised and felt as part of the self. Thus, the self-image of the subject depends on the image of the object of identification. In imaginary identification narcissism makes an idealised image of the self and its surroundings, with which someone identifies while, simultaneously, regresses into that image. The ideal image that captures one's imagination is an imaginary one, one that finally traps the self within it³⁷.

shall refer indiscriminately to national identity, thus emphasising on its continuous potential to be both national and 'nationalistic'.

³⁶ The symbolic and the imaginary are not used here in the Lacanian sense, as two orders of the psyche, the one of which (the imaginary) exists before the unconscious is brought into existence. They are rather two ways to symbolise: the symbolic way uses symbolism as a medium, as an example and a metaphor, while the imaginary uses the symbol as real, it disregards the symbolic aspect of a paradigm and use it as the real case.

³⁷ See also Lipowatz and Demertzis, 1994:110-1.

Symbolic and the imaginary identifications are not either-or situations, that either characterise an individual or not: there is a constant ambivalence and oscillation between the two, unconscious though. The symbolic aspect, in general, represents the mediation of society, an effort to understand the surrounding world. The imaginary represents the anxieties of a narcissistic ego to fulfil a holistic and complete view of itself, to verify its phantasies of independence and omnipotence. Both of them use symbols –symbols can easily transmit a certain meaning because they comprise a wide range of experiences condensed in one image³⁸. However, the distinction of the symbolic and imaginary identification and of the use of a symbol in a symbolic or in an imaginary way is often quite obscure. Castoriadis argues that the imaginary necessarily passes through the symbolic, both to express itself and, mainly, to become something more; the imaginary is in a sense a regression from the symbolic (1985:189). In the imaginary “the symbol ceases to be a symbol and ‘takes over the full functions of the thing it symbolises’”³⁹.

Nationalism provides an imaginary relation of individuals with the world of national states, a view of the world that is idealised⁴⁰. But, nationalism is imaginary also because of its narcissistic characteristics, of its illusions of perfectness that have already been mentioned. So, what happens when people identify with the nation? Is their identification the product of imaginary or symbolic identification? Let us for a moment bring to the discussion Benedict Anderson and his famous definition of the nation as an ‘imagined community’. There is a wide misunderstanding that by ‘imagined’ he meant ‘fabricated’, ‘illusionary constructed’ (he even criticises Gellner on that

³⁸ See Caspary, 1993:428-9. Also, this is connected to Mead’s concept of the *significant symbol*. This symbol tends to call out in the other a group of reactions. This is the *meaning* or significance of a symbol: it is the common response of individuals that constitute the meaning of an object, conscious or unconscious: “Awareness or consciousness is not necessary to the presence of meaning in the process of social experience” (Mead, 1967:77).

³⁹ Freud, *The Uncanny*, S.E.:17, p.244, quoted in Kristeva, 1991:186. The distinction of the symbolic and the imaginary identification, and symbolism, will be further clarified as we shall apply a few more tangible illustrations.

⁴⁰ Althusser’s view that “ideology is the *imaginary relation* of individuals to their real conditions of social existence” (in Elliott, 1999:148), which means that it provides an idealised view of the world, finds an illustration in our discussion on nationalism.

misunderstanding⁴¹), perhaps because Anderson does indeed support the argument that nations are constructed. By ‘imagined’, however, he means ‘conceived’. As he explains, in such large communities, where we do not know most of our fellow-members, we imagine in our mind their communion; “in fact”, he argues, “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even them) are imagined” (1991:6). So, imagining the nation is having a picture of it in our mind. Imagining this ‘community’, the nation, can be either symbolic or imaginary. Nevertheless, the nation is not just any sociological category; it is rather a ‘comradeship’, a special union, as nationalism signifies it. The nation is a group to which one owes loyalty, and that means that one gives special weight to the interests of co-nationals. This is when identification with the nation has an imaginary dimension, for one ‘imagines’ the co-nationals as part of the self, and results in ascribing to them special rights and duties. So, ‘nationalistic’ identity (that is, national identity under the influence of nationalism) is mainly characterised by an imaginary identification to the nation –even more so in turbulent periods or other particular circumstances. Symbolic identification, on the other hand, is mostly apparent in the formation of national identity (in contrast to nationalistic one), in identification with the national-as-social group.

Let us explain further the imaginary –and narcissistic– identification with the nation as it is particularly manifest in the attitudes toward outgroups: foreigners, immigrants, minorities, or simply the other nations and ethnic groups.

National Identity as a Distinctive Barrier

It has been shown throughout this study, and it should perhaps be repeated here, that identity is more an issue about boundaries between individuals and between groups rather than what the term ‘identity’ often brings to mind, meaning a perception of self. Kyper (1999), in an

⁴¹ He writes: “...Gelner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’, rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’” (Anderson,

anthropological study about culture and cultural identity, argues that, “the term identity is an oxymoron used in relation to an individual, since how can an individual not correspond to –be identical to– himself or herself?” (p.234-5). Identity implies “identity with others” when “the inner self finds its home by participating in the identity of a collectivity” (p.235)⁴². In that sense, individual identity is the identity composed of the traits one (often selectively) internalises out of identification with a collectivity.

National identity, in turn, is an identity of national sameness and difference, whatever this ‘national’ may include (usually cultural, civic, religious or other). It is an identity of sameness with a particular national group and of difference with all the rest⁴³. Thus, it requires ‘the rest’ for its existence; it presupposes the distinction of ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is this distinction, symbolic or imaginary, upon which the distinctiveness of a given national group rests. This distinction is a symbolic one when it is just an acknowledgement of certain differences that account for the constitution of a distinct social group, and it doesn’t stand in the way when it comes to the recognition of certain similarities as well. It is a symbolic sameness, as well, when one does not identify wholly and uncritically with a group. This distinction is imaginary, however, when it necessarily generates negative sentiments toward other nations who are perceived as different by definition and, also, it is constitutive for the cohesion of the national group. Additionally, it is an imaginary sameness when it deletes the existing differences within the nation. But, this distinction is not a fixed one, meaning either symbolic or imaginary at all times, as it can change due to political or even other contingent events. Nationalism plays a significant role in transforming symbolic into imaginary, for it always involves an other ethnicity/nationality, usually a rival one. This is its relational characteristic, as Demertzis argues, its being in relation to some

1991:6).

⁴² See Kyper’s anthropological study on culture, with significant references on American perceptions on culture.

⁴³ Although some of the rest are less different and others are more different than all the nations in general; these are the allies and the enemies respectively.

other nations and nationalisms (1996:163)⁴⁴. Symbolic identification is largely manifest in ‘normal’ periods of relative (economic, political, etc) tranquillity, except for extreme nationalistic circles, the members of which usually have an internal reason (i.e. anger) for their imaginary reception of external reality. Imaginary identification (and ‘nationalistic’ identity) is most likely to replace the symbolic one when the surrounding circumstances change and put individuals into uneasiness and anxiety or even rage.

Beyond the relational characteristic of nationalism (the need for other nations as reference points), national identity acts as a distinctive barrier with particular harshness against individuals (foreigners) and groups (minorities) within the nation. Foreigners are the ones who *do not* belong to the group, as Kristeva (1991:95) defines them, a definition made in a negative fashion (emphasising negative identification). They are discriminated against for several reasons. First, they are a constant reminder of ‘our’ lack, of the lack of purity and wholeness of ‘our’ national group. The others are usually accused of contaminating the purity of ‘our’ nation, but in reality they dispel the imaginary image of purity that nationalism holds for each nation –an image that each individual holds for itself. This is related to the second reason, that the presumed similarity of ‘us’ and difference with ‘them’ cannot be logically sustained when we contact the others, because then we come to realise that we –the co-nationals– are not so similar *per se*, and that we –the co-nationals and the others– are not so different after all. In this sense, the Other poses a threat for the group’s cohesion. It is indicative, for example, that American conservatives worry that multiculturalism, and multicultural critique, will pose a threat to their national coherence⁴⁵.

Billings argues that we exclude foreigners not because we perceive ourselves as intolerant, but because we believe ‘we are tolerant’ and we are threatened by ‘their intolerance’. This is the third reason why we discriminate the others: projection. We project on others all our bad feelings and internal

⁴⁴ As Shafer argues, nationalism unites a people by separating the peoples (Shafer, B.C. (1972), *Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p.19, as referred to in Demertzis, 1996:164).

⁴⁵ On this example, see Kyper, 1999:234.

perceptions (i.e. intolerance), giving ourselves simultaneously the perfect alibi (that the others are intolerant). In the same line of argument Kristeva (1991) writes that hatred for the others is a defensive reaction originated into “hatred for oneself”, for “our own foreignness”, for we are all strangers to ourselves (p.24). She also argues that, immigrants in particular, provoke both our contempt and, mostly, our jealousy for having abandoned their motherland, their origins in a sense, in a search for new ones. But, if foreigners are excluded, she rhetorically asks, why don't they unite? The answer she gives is characteristic of the unconscious dynamics that determine much of peoples attitudes: “one must take into consideration the domination/exclusion phantasy characteristic of everyone: just because one is a foreigner does not mean one is without one's own foreigner...In France, Italians call the Spaniards foreigners, the Spaniards call it out on the Portuguese, the Portuguese on the Arabs, the Arabs on the blacks, and so forth and vice versa” (p.24). This explicitly reveals that the imaginary phantasies of exclusion are not only related to nationalism, but also originate in our unconscious predispositions.

In order to understand better the concept of the imaginary, it would be useful to refer to the unconscious desires that nationalism satisfies in direct reference to its imaginary characteristics. For that reason, we shall analyse further what has been briefly referred to earlier on about the ‘Golden Age’ discourse⁴⁶.

‘Return to the Womb’

Why is it that, by returning to the past, leaders and elites appeal more to the emotions of the people? “Why, in a post-Cold War, post-industrialist world, conjoined by multinational economies and electronic mass media, do we mediate *our present* as an interruption, an iteration of the shibboleths of a past age?” (Bhabha, 1994:202). The instrumentalists argue that reference to a common ancestral past is essential in order to mobilise the masses. They do not explain ‘Why’, though; what effect the past has on people.

⁴⁶ Current chapter, page 82.

Let us analyse what was previously briefly explained about the psychological appeal of the past. The return to the past of the nation should be seen in analogy to the unconscious return of individuals to their infancy. There has been a time that the newborn was living in a state of 'narcissistic perfection', when no frustration could disturb its perfect narcissistic image. As soon as the external world began to pose 'threats' to the infant's sense of 'wholeness', the infant started an effort to control them with defence mechanisms, identification being one of them. It is a characteristic of human psychology that, thereafter and throughout their life, individuals will have the tendency to regress mentally to a former state of wholeness and security, to long in a sense for this psychological time in their life. This tendency emanates from the 'compulsion to repeat' of the drives, as well as their striving for pleasure. Nationalism and the rhetoric of a past Golden Age appeals strongly to the unconscious desire to restore an earlier order of things, as we have already explained. This past order for an individual means also one that the infant's drives were granted full satisfaction and were free of inhibition or repression. The nation's past can be viewed, in a metaphoric analogy, as the nation's infancy. For, the return to the past is a return to a glorious past, which represents the time when the nation was living in all its perfection, pure and uncontaminated, when no one was standing in its way and it was let free to accomplish its glorious destiny. But, why is it that, as Smith argues, "the collective appropriation of antiquity, and especially of shared memories of the 'Golden Age', contributes significantly to the formation of nations" (1997:39)? Because, I would argue, the narrative of the national past resembles closely the individuals' infancy and, by discursively returning to the national past, they imaginary return to their own past as well. This return to the past is a 'return to the womb'.

The success of nationalism, however, is not only its nostalgic, backward looking, but also its simultaneous orientation to the future. This seemingly strange particularity of nationalism encompasses the real meaning of the phrase 'return to the womb'. For, 'return to the womb' is the return to perfection, to wholeness, to narcissistic completeness, to absence of lack. By referring

simultaneously to the past and the future, nationalism invites people to *restore* the ‘right’ order of things, a time of great achievements in the future. This future, however, must not be distanced from the present in order to be appealing. So, nationalism invites people to work *now*, to do what it takes in the *present*, so as to enjoy their blissful longing in the *near* future. This is the power of nationalism in mobilising the people: it generates the strongest identifications that people can form apart from their family, and promises a future that restores the past. Thus, each individual can imagine, imaginary and not symbolically, his/her return to an uninterrupted union with the Mother –as this is what the womb symbolises. So, the rhetorical manipulation of the past and future of a nation in the present gives strength to nationalism as a movement⁴⁷.

* * *

After analysing symbolic and imaginary identification and their implications in conjunction with nationalism, let us move on to another subject. There is an issue left open even from the previous chapter, regarding malign and benign types or manifestations of nationalism. We have referred to nationalism without making any such distinction and, so, it would be useful to refer to that matter now.

Benign or Malign Nationalism

There are many typologies of nationalism, most of which originate in or explicitly specify diverse types of nationalistic movements (i.e., liberation, imperialistic, pan- nationalism). These typologies occasionally infer a moral evaluation; for example, the distinction between nationalism of existing states

⁴⁷ The reference to the past (and the future) of the nation can be made in another way when a great past history is lacking. Then the others, external forces are blamed for the misdeeds, or the suffering, and negative identification becomes even more prevalent.

and that of nationalistic movements has often been regarded, as Jenkins and Sofos argue (1996:19), as a distinction of conservative and exclusionist as opposed to progressive and democratic nationalisms respectively. The most basic typology used in contemporary literature, however, is the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. These two types are often regarded as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ pairs of opposites, thus themselves inferring a moral evaluation. Let us examine these two types of nationalism in relation to the question whether they actually correspond to a distinction between benign and malign manifestations of nationalism.

Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

Civic and ethnic nationalisms are two types of nationalism that originate in the formations of particular national states in Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and they were first expressed in respective movements. Civic nationalism “envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values” (Ignatieff, 1993:3). This is also called the ‘citizenship model’ because it holds that everybody, regardless of race, gender, religion and ethnicity, can be part of the nation as soon as they “subscribe to the nation’s political creed” (Ignatieff, 1993:3). It is considered to be democratic by definition because, it “vests sovereignty in all of the people”, and provides the idea of respect of other nations⁴⁸. Civic nationalism is also known as the French model, for it originates in the citizenship criteria of the French Revolution, according to which nationality is voluntarily acquired based on residence. These criteria emanate from the Constitution of 1790 and the liberal decree stipulating that foreigners, residing for five years in France and owing some property, could be naturalised and ascribed full citizenship rights⁴⁹.

Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, envisages the nation as a cultural, ethnic, linguistic etc. group, attachment to which is not voluntary but inherited.

⁴⁸ In Ignatieff, 1993:3. See also Jenkins and Sofos, 1996:21-2.

⁴⁹ See Kristeva, 1991:155.

Membership, according to the ethnic model, is derived by common descent, language, tradition, and even religion. It is considered to be authoritarian and exclusionist, because it vindicates the rights of a particular group. It is otherwise known as the German model, for it emerged among the German romanticists, partly as a reaction to the French revolution. Full citizenship rights in Germany were automatically ascribed only to those who had the German nationality by birth until recently, even to those ethnic Germans that were born outside Germany, while the children of immigrants that were born in Germany could not have the German citizenship before the naturalising period passed; thus, there was a direct link between German blood ties and nationality (full citizenship rights and nationality go hand in hand in this instance). This changed in spring of 1999 with the new citizenship law that automatically grants full citizenship rights to foreigners' children that are born in Germany and reduces the naturalising period from fifteen to eight years for foreign residents. Nevertheless, these children must make a decision by the age of 23 as to which nationality to keep officially (their parents' or the German), as they are asked to relinquish one of the two passports.

The argument that will be supported in this thesis regarding civic and ethnic nationalism is that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, beyond its analytical utility and validity, does not correspond to a clear-cut distinction in practical terms. As we will see, there are many instances where civic and ethnic elements coexist in a given nationalism. In addition, and more importantly, their analytical distinction cannot be equated with a distinction between benign and malign manifestations of nationalism or as a distinction between democracy and authoritarianism. Civic and ethnic types of nationalism are distinguished by the fact that the former emphasises on citizenship criteria and while the latter on blood ties. This is an existing and analytical distinction, but it should not be confused with any other distinction associated with them. Let us develop the argumentation for these claims –argumentation that is to a large extent interrelated.

The analytical utility of this typology can, if it becomes a classificatory tool for existing cases, lead to misinterpretation of these particular cases. That

is because, in practical terms, the distinction between types of nationalism is not so clear-cut as it is in theory¹. The analytical utility of this distinction between civic and ethnic lays in that it helps identify and classify different characteristics of nationalisms and, also, accounts for its historical and political diversity. However, the taxonomy of a case-study in either type of nationalism can lead to a confusing schematisation, a caricature of these two types that ignores internal variations and subtle successions and coexistences of ethnic and civic elements of nationalism. As stressed, the reason is that civic nationalism, for instance, is usually one where civic elements prevail, yet they are not the only ones –and vice versa. For example, Catalan nationalism is one that stresses the cultural and linguistic particularity of the Catalans, but it is also assimilative in the sense of the recognised and desired coexistence within the Spanish state and with the Spanish people, with whom they acknowledge their similarities and differences as well.

If we consider the definitional characteristics of ethnic and civic nationalism as defined above by Ignatieff (and Jenkins and Sofos), we shall be led to regard civic nationalism as highly integrating and assimilating, while ethnic nationalism as exclusionist and discriminatory by definition. However, if we carefully examine the criteria set for assimilation we can see that ethnic elements of nationalism are always implicit in civic nationalism almost by definition, even though they may not be manifest and explicitly uttered in their nationalistic discourse. Citizenship is acquired by membership to ‘a people’, which is often used as a synonym to a nation. Participation to ‘a people’, however, is made with criteria of sameness and of ‘voluntary’ abandonment of one’s own particularity in order to ascribe to another particularity. Being different is in reality an issue even for civic nationalism; its rhetoric appears to be tolerant, while in essence *it is not by definition* more or less tolerant than ethnic nationalism. In a similar vein, Smith indicatively argues:

from the standpoint of affected minorities, [civic] nationalism is neither tolerant nor as unbiased as its self-image suggests. In fact, it can be every bit as severe and uncompromising as ethnic nationalisms. For civic nationalisms often demand, as the price for receiving citizenship and its benefits, the surrender of ethnic community and individuality, the privatisation of ethnic

religion and the marginalisation of the ethnic culture and heritage of minorities within the borders of the national state; for example, to become citizens of France, [Jews and blacks] were compelled to become black or Jewish Frenchmen... [for] their cultures and heritages were depreciated, their traditional religions were despised and privatised or suppressed, and their ethnicity striped away from them (Smith, 1995a:101).

In that sense, civic nationalism can be as harsh as ethnic nationalism is considered to be. The nation is the upper form of social affiliation and the main body of legitimacy and belonging for both civic and ethnic nationalism. Thus, nationality and *full* citizenship essentially go hand in hand –full, meaning on absolutely equal terms. At the same time, however, we must stress the definitional difference of civic and ethnic nationalism: while they can both have exclusionary expressions, the former allows outgroups to become members of the nation, even by abandonment of their national particularity, and the latter does not allow it by definition. This difference is very important, but it does not apply to all known cases of civic nationalism by definition: its essence has to be verified case by case.

There are not, I argue, two kinds of nationalism, but only one, comprised out of civic and ethnic elements, each of which is emphasised or eradicated according to the political and historical circumstances. The reason lies behind nationalism's postulate that the nation ought to find political expression in its own state: this is the 'nation-state'. The civic elements set the political, administrative, judicial and economic criteria of being part of the national *state*, which are common legal and political rights and duties for all members, common economy, residence within the country and territorial mobility, etc. These are in reality citizenship criteria, but they have become a prerequisite for the determination of the nation as *nation-state*, which nationalism dictates to be the consummation of an ethnic/national group. So, the criteria for participation in a state have come to merge with the definition of the nation as a social and cultural group. The ethnic elements of nationalism, on the other hand, set the cultural criteria that determine the nation's distinctiveness, which are common language, tradition, myths and historical memories, a homeland, religion etc, and can appear either selectively or all together. Thus, according to the

nationalistic ideology, both civic (that is, political) and ethnic (that is, cultural) elements are those that constitute and define the national state. Certain nationalisms may emphasise more on the civic or ethnic criteria, an emphasis often affected by the nations' origins and history. For example, in France the state had predated the nation to a large extent, and so the civic criteria are more emphasised; in Germany, the process was inverted, and an appeal was made to ethnic criteria in order to unify the diverse kingdoms. The emphasis on each kind of criteria, though, is also a matter of other circumstances. It is characteristic that, in France of 1793, three years after the enactment of the liberal Constitution of 1790, French citizens were discriminated against and were used as scapegoats according to their nationality. Kristeva points out how foreigners were blamed for the bad news coming from the battlefields: "on April 5, 1793, Robespierre asks the Jacobins 'to expel all foreign generals whom we have unwisely entrusted with the command of the army'" (1991:157). So, my argument is that civic and ethnic are two dimensions constitutive of nationalism, and also two analytical concepts *within* nationalism.

This lead us to my main argument that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism does not correspond to a distinction between benign and malign nationalism –where benign means democratic, integrative and tolerant, and malign means militant, authoritarian and exclusionary⁵⁰. Nationalism is not a program of political conduct, but an ideology of national (self)determination: as indicated earlier⁵¹, whether the state is democratic, authoritarian or anything else is indifferent to nationalism. It is the political ideology of the government, economic factors and historical and other circumstances that determine the regime and the exercise of power. It would be more accurate to argue that this political power further determines the use of nationalistic rhetoric and practice that will be used in order to implement the politics chosen. This means that the policies of the state are chosen and/or justified in the name of the nation's interests. Thus, the choice of whether the civic or ethnic dimension will be

⁵⁰ The view that civic nationalism is democratic and tolerant while the ethnic one is authoritarian and exclusionist is widely expressed. See, for example, Ignatieff, 1993:3-6, and Jenkins & Sofos, 1996:21.

⁵¹ Current chapter, p.86.

emphasised depends on the political tradition of the country but also on the contemporary circumstances and the choices of the leadership. Czech nationalism is considered as an example of ethnic nationalism but is both peaceful and democratic. Also, Pilsudski's nationalism was inclusive as a movement, while also during his ruling in interwar Poland (from 1926 to 1935) all groups were attributed equal rights and duties within the state; however, Pilsudski was a virtual dictator who had come into power with a coup d'état in 1926.

Ignatieff argues that civic nationalism is democratic because it “vests sovereignty in all of the people”, and that ethnic nationalism is more authoritative because it is a “form of democracy conducted in the interests of the ethnic majority” (Ignatieff, 1993:3,5). Such a categorisation is dysfunctional, however, because it merges the ideology of self-determination with the political ideology and the ruling of the government, with the direct consequence that many cases cannot be classified according to this dichotomy. If civic nationalism and democracy go hand in hand, then Pilsudski's nationalism remains out of this typology for example. The same applies to democratic governments that do not ascribe full citizenship and political rights to their immigrants with a permanent residence (such as Germany and Greece until 1999). So, I would argue that the connection of certain qualities of nationalism with the political system or ideology of the government is not only irrelevant (as the ideology of nationalism can be accommodated within every other political ideology) but also dysfunctional, because it obscures the classification⁵² between civic and ethnic types of nationalism by setting additional criteria (criteria irrelevant to nationalistic ideology).

A last point that should be made regarding the categorisation of countries into this or the other type of nationalism is that these classifications must not be regarded as fixed categories. Czech nationalism may be today characterised as peaceful, but this is not a ‘fixed’ characteristic. It was only half a century ago, right after World War II, that the Czechs (the Czechoslovaks, to be accurate)

⁵² A classification already obscured because, as we saw, it is not easy to find examples of nationalism that are clearly civic or ethnic.

begun their violent ethnic cleansing of the Sudeten Germans, which resulted in the expulsion of three million people. Similarly Germany, which generated WWII and provoked the cleansing and extermination of millions of Jews and Romas, is now a democratic country that respects human rights and works towards their implementation, in Germany and elsewhere. An other example is Yugoslavia, which was constituted as a multiethnic federation with relative success under a peculiar communist ruling, the collapse of which was accompanied with the destructive wars and genocides that erupted in the early 1990s. These examples also illustrate my argument that both civic and ethnic nationalisms have benign and malign manifestations and outbreaks. This is not to deny that nationalism manifests itself in different ways while some of them are clearly preferable, but rather to emphasise that no type of nationalism is purely benign or malign, neither can they be a constant and given reality. The above examples illustrate that benign or malign manifestations of nationalism are not the property of any national state, political system etc, and that certain particular circumstances determine the type of nationalistic or other reactions that will prevail. Therefore, the fixed taxonomy of countries and case-studies into those two types of nationalism without regard to their temporal accuracy can deprive the existing typologies from their analytical validity and empirical utility.

As argued, the manifestations of nationalism are not a constant reality. Nationalism has always the inherent potentials to become militant or exclusionist, or to become democratic and inclusionary, whether its civic or ethnic elements prevail. That is because it unites 'a people' by separating the people: it is based on both positive and negative identifications, meaning positive self-image and negative image of the others. We can identify three cases in the swift of nationalistic manifestation. One is that, a case of civic nationalism (where civic elements prevail, meaning civic criteria of citizenship) may be replaced by ethnic nationalism, that is the ethnic elements may come to prevail. Another case is that a predominantly ethnic nationalism may evolve to predominantly civic. A third case is that, even when there is no swift in the type of nationalism, the national state may become militant against

other states; thus, civic and ethnic nationalisms can both have militant outbreaks, whether in the name of their civic culture and tolerant civilisation or in the name of blood ties. The UK is considered as a characteristic example of civic nationalism with respect to multiculturalism, but it fought the Falklands war in the early 1980s in the name of the national 'soil' and interests. This example, however, should not be considered as characteristic of civic nationalism, but mainly characteristic of the easy exploitation of nationalistic rhetoric when 'needed', that is when the state's leadership decides the implementation of a specific project –be it military, economic, or other. This is directly connected to my argument that the manifestations of nationalism are largely determined by the political ideology of the ruling elites and by specific policies that these elites want to implement. Yet, the easy manipulation of nationalistic rhetoric and sentiments in such cases⁵³ is due to the psychological importance of the sentiments that nationalism appeals to.

Here lays the importance of the type of regime and government, and their choice of nationalistic rhetoric that will be used. As argued, nationalism satisfies the unconscious desires, particularly the desire to maintain the self-image uninterrupted and to exclude the Other, for the Other is a constant reminder of the impossibility to do that exactly. An individual has always the inherent potential to regress to a more destructive or exclusionist manifestation. For that reason, it is very important that the ruling elites do not take advantage of this psychological feature, or do not 'regress' themselves to their own inherent psychological desires. In that sense, the distinction between civic and ethnic types of nationalism is significant in describing the prevailing elements in a given nationalism⁵⁴.

Consequently, a distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms as benign and malign types is a misconception of nationalism. Some nationalistic movements are more militant or more extreme than others, but we should not equate nationalism with movements solely: it is also an ideology, a discourse

⁵³ Here I refer to established national states. In the case of i.e. liberating nationalistic movements the political necessity is no less important than the psychological appeal of nationalism.

⁵⁴ Only that, let us repeat this point, such typologies must not be treated as absolute categories, but as flexible ones, in time and space.

and a sentiment, that may exist even when it is not severely demonstrated. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ nationalism is also a projection, of the good aspects ascribed to us, and the bad aspects projected on to the others. These two features of the customary use of nationalism –first that it is not always manifest and recognised, and second that it is projected on others– are very important and need some further explanation and elaboration, as they have serious implications in understanding today’s politics. To clarify those, we shall refer to the significant contribution made by Michael Billing and his book *Banal Nationalism*.

Billing’s Banal Nationalism

In his book *Banal Nationalism*, published in 1995, Michael Billing deals with the problem of everyday nationalism that passes through unnoticed, and he emphasises on Western states’ nationalism and the fact that it remains largely ignored in scholarship and everyday rhetoric. According to customary usage, Billing argues, nationalists are considered the separatists or the extreme rightists, and this view locates nationalism on the periphery –the periphery of the state (guerrilla) or the periphery of the West. This view is misleading because “it overlooks the nationalism of West’s nation-states. In a world of nation-states, nationalism cannot be confined to the peripheries” (1995:5). So, he analyses nationalism and its manifestations in established states of the Western world. The national states, once created/emerged, are reproduced in between times and are sustained as the ultimate body of loyalty and legitimacy. Not only the creation but also the reproduction of the national states is a sequel of nationalism and its constant function. Banal nationalism is the term Billing introduces to describe “the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced” (1995:6). Banal nationalism reproduces habits of practice and belief, as well as sentiments, that perpetuate nationhood. Symbols that are used to symbolise the sacred character of the nation, like national flags outside public buildings, are “flagging” the nation and nationhood “unflaggingly”, that is, through a mild and unnoticed activity.

Throughout his book Billing cites many examples of Western politicians who ‘play the patriotic card’, like the nationalistic rhetoric used by Bush and Thatcher during the Gulf and the Falklands wars respectively, and although they have used the rhetoric of nationhood repeatedly, they spot nationalistic feelings and manifestations beyond their rhetoric and their countries. Billing draws our attention on this: “Gaps in political language are rarely innocent. The case of nationalism is no exception. By being semantically restricted to small sizes and exotic colours, ‘nationalism’ becomes identified as problem: it occurs ‘there’ on the periphery, not ‘here’ at the centre. The separatists, the fascists and the guerrillas are the problem of nationalism. The ideological habits by which ‘our’ nations are reproduced as nations are unnamed and, thereby, unnoticed” (1995:6). So, he argues, there are two types of theorising about nationalism, the projecting and the naturalising theories of nationalism – which usually go hand in hand. Projecting theories equate nationalism with nationalistic movements and extreme irrational emotions. They take the world of ‘nation-states’ for granted, and they view nationalism as a disruption of our tranquillity by others. So, these theories are ‘rhetorical projections’: “nationalism as a condition is projected on to ‘others’; ‘ours’ is overlooked, forgotten, even theoretically denied” (1995:16). Naturalising theories of nationalism regard national loyalty as endemic to human condition; as such, “banal nationalism not only ceases to be nationalism, but it ceases to be a problem of investigation” (1995:16).

Thus, Billing’s insight offers a discerning account of the reality of nationalism in today’s politics because he does not confine nationalism to a movement or to extreme reactions. Nationalism is an everyday phenomenon that has, of course, its eruptions but it is not confined to them. It is, however, identified as something ‘bad’, a destructive force and a discriminatory feeling, and for that matter no one is willing to accept it for oneself, one’s nation, etc. On the contrary, there is a tendency to ascribe it to other people and nations; this way, one gets the extra satisfaction of being ‘more than good’ because, not only one is ‘good’, but the others are ‘bad’ at the same time⁵⁵. Thus, I would

⁵⁵ That is to get a positive self-evaluation through comparison, as argued earlier on this chapter, p.84.

argue that this projection of nationalism finds a moderate expression in the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism as a distinction between benign and malign forms of nationalism. This distinction is not real, as it has been explained thus far. Let us recapitulate the three main reasons. First, both civic and ethnic nationalisms divide individuals and peoples according to a set of criteria, whether political, economic or cultural⁵⁶. Those criteria, however, are *both* civic and ethnic, for the two have merged under the influence of nationalism and its claim that the political and the cultural be congruent – in the form of *nation-and-state*. So, the second reason is that civic and ethnic elements coexist in most nationalisms, not equally but also not in a stable analogy –of course, the analogy is important in rendering a given nationalism more integrative than another. Third, ‘civic nationalism’ can become as severe and harsh as other forms of nationalism, and it can prepare the ground for more militant manifestations. On this last remark, I would like to quote Billing and his view about banal nationalism, the everyday and unnoticed nationalism of Western national states, that are most commonly regarded as civic.

It would be wrong to assume that ‘banal nationalism’ is ‘benign’ because it seems to possess a reassuring normality, or because it appears to lack the violent passions of the extreme right... banality is not synonymous with harmlessness. In the case of the Western nation-states, banal nationalism can hardly be innocent: it is reproducing institutions which possess vast armaments. As the Gulf and the Falklands Wars indicated, forces can be mobilised without lengthy campaigns of political preparation. The armaments are primed, ready for use in battle. And the national populations appear also to be primed, ready to support the use of those armaments (1995:7).

⁵⁶ One could rightly interrogate whether which of these criteria will be set is of importance, particularly in terms of the potentials for integration and peace. In theory, or rather in normative terms, the choice of the criteria used should make a difference in the final outcome and in making a type of nationalism less malign than another. In practice, however, ‘civic’ criteria can become equally discriminating and destructive as ‘criteria of blood’ are. For example, the political criterion of liberal as opposed to communist governance during the Cold War served as an exclusionary discriminating barrier between the Western allies and the ‘Great Satan’ (the USSR); in the US, in particular, an American communist was equated to a traitor. Also, in multicultural Canada, Quebec has a strong secessionist movement which forward claims at preserving their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness. In addition, in France the so-called ‘war on chador’ (‘la guerre de chador’) was initiated in 1989 when three Muslim girls were expelled from school because they were wearing the traditional chador. The examples stressed here are chosen from national states that are civic, so as to clearly show that even within them there are criteria and reasons for exclusion, secessions, etc.

Banal nationalism is the reason why people are mobilisable without any lengthy campaigns: it is an everyday campaign of loyalty and commitment to the nation and its interests.

Because nationalism is identified as a negative concept, patriotism is used much more freely and broadly, since the latter is identified as a positive value. Of course, patriotism is a large issue itself, but it is largely connected to nationalism and should be viewed in connection to it. At present, we shall refer to patriotism in relation to nationalism, and particularly in relation to the point of discussion, which is benign and malign nationalism and nationalism as projection.

Patriotism and Nationalism

The word patriotism derives from the Greek *pater*, which means *father*, and *patria* (*patrida*) means the place of birth, the *fatherland*; patriotism is the “love and devotion to one’s own country”, as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary⁵⁷. In this sense, it is a feeling of loyalty to the familiar environment, and it can be found in any ethnographic group, as Bar-Tal argues (1993:48). Patriotism is considered as a positive and desirable value, fundamental for the nation. It reflects beliefs and emotions, and it provides with a sense of belonging.

Patriotism is often used as opposed to other concepts, nationalism being one of them. The distinction made between patriotism and nationalism is a common one, although the terms used by scholars to describe them vary. So, we can find a distinction between patriotism and ethnocentrism or chauvinism (Bar-Tal, 1993:51), between constructive and blind patriotism (Schatz et al, 1999:153), between genuine patriotism and pseudopatriotism (Adorno et al)⁵⁸, or simply between patriotism and nationalism (Gellner, 1993:138). In essence, I argue, the distinction is between the positive and negative aspects that both nationalistic and patriotic feelings confer because both patriotism and

⁵⁷ Oxford English Dictionary (1953), cited in Bar-Tal, 1993:46.

⁵⁸ The term used by Adorno, Flenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (*The Authoritarian Personality*, New York: Harper, 1950) to describe ‘blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical

nationalism can be defined as ‘love and devotion to one’s own country’. So, on the one hand, genuine, constructive patriotism is regarded as love for the country and attachment to national values; it is characterised by “critical loyalty” (Schatz, 1999:153) and criticism driven by a desire for positive change, as well as respect for other nations and tolerance towards outgroups. Nationalism, chauvinism, ethnocentrism and blind patriotism, on the other hand, are described as the blind attachment to national values, characterised by uncritical positive evaluation, intolerance of criticism and rejection of other nations. We can clearly see that, patriotism and nationalism are both described as attachment to the nation, the country and the people, and devotion to the national values. They represent the two sides of the same coin: patriotism describes all the positive outcomes of such an attachment, while nationalism all the negative. Is such an acute dichotomisation correct, or is it perhaps an oversimplification?

I believe that the distinction between patriotism and nationalism is not so clear-cut. We must bear in mind the distinction between national and ‘nationalistic’ identity, because the distinction between patriotism and nationalism is analogous. Patriotism describes feelings and beliefs that derive from attachment to a country. It is a natural attachment with the place one is born and is familiar with, an identification with the ‘fatherland’ that has always been appealing for peoples’ sentiments, as it has been widely expressed through songs, narratives, poems, and through history as well. It is a ‘natural’ attachment in the sense that identification with the *patria* is a primary sentiment of affiliation with what is familiar and, also, connected with the first experiences in life. It is also the *milieu* where other attachments and identifications take place.

Love for the country, and love for the patriots (the fellow countrymen) that comes as a secondary identification, are positively evaluated qualities. Patriotism, however, can have some negative aspects, mainly derived by the need to evaluate the country and the group members positively. Thus, self-

conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups” (p.107). It is cited in Bar-Tal, 1993:47.

criticism, aiming at the amelioration and positive change, is welcomed, while the same is not true when the criticism comes from outgroups; their motives are usually questioned and their judgment denied. Patriotism is connected to national identity, to its social aspect, and is characterised by all the positives and negatives that characterise national identity. For example, it provides with a sense of belonging, but it also delineates ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is the same psychological attachment as regionalism and localism: s feeling of attachment towards the particular place of origin (town island, region) within a country.

Nationalism has an analogous relation with patriotism as ‘nationalistic identity’ with national identity. It is not something different from patriotism, but it is something *more*. It is a sentiment, like patriotism is, but it is also an ideology and a movement and thus it has an additional nuance. Nationalism absorbs patriotism, for it identifies the country with the nation, as Demertzis argues (1996:202). As a political ideology, it transforms the social attachment to a country into a value that is obligatory –if you are not loyal to your country/nation you are a traitor! It also transforms the nation into a political unit, the ‘nation-state’, that is ascribed the ultimate value and importance. According to Deutch, the difference is that, patriotism appeals to all the inhabitants of a country, irrespective of ethnic origin, while nationalism appeals to all members of a national and ethnic community, irrespective of their country of residence⁵⁹. This is an important distinction but not so clear-cut: both have a territorial aspect, for it is the country of origin that counts as a criterion. Also, patriotism as Deutch describes it is quite similar to ‘civic nationalism’.

Billing argues that “there is no direct psychological evidence to distinguish the rational state of patriotism and the irrational force of nationalism” (1995:56). Indeed, they have the same psychological foundations. Sacrifice, for instance, is a ‘heroic’ value, a merit that a good patriot, and all nationalists, ought to possess –nationalists must be good patriots by definition, although in reality their actions may harm the nation. Identification and group attachment are essential for nationalism (as sentiment) and patriotism; only that

⁵⁹ Quoted in Demertzis, 1996:204.

the former is differentiated by its political dimension. It is important to note that in most cases they appear interchangeably, like national and 'nationalistic' identity do. Patriotism is a necessary prerequisite of nationalism: it is the first step towards sentimental attachment with one's place of origin. Patriotic feelings may easily regress to nationalistic feelings –and actions– under certain circumstances and the necessary influence (nationalistic rhetoric).

The greatest difference between patriotism and nationalism is functional: it is derived by their use in everyday rhetoric and propaganda. Patriotism is considered as a healthy identification with the nation, as a rational state of mind that generates positive sentiments and great deeds. Nationalism is considered as a pathological fusion with the nation, as an irrational force that generates discrimination, violence and exclusion. As a consequence, individuals, movements and nations often reserve the term 'patriotist' for themselves, and easily ascribe the term 'nationalist' to others. As Billing argues, "'our' loyalties to 'our' nation can be defended, even praised. A *rhetorical distinction* is necessary for accomplishing this defence. 'Our' nationalism is not presented as nationalism, which is dangerously irrational, surplus and alien... 'Our' nationalism appears as 'patriotism' –a beneficial, necessary...force" (1955:55, emphasis added). Let us stress an example. In January 1996, British newspapers commented ironically on the dispute of Greece and Turkey over the Imia (a tiny island/rock), which they thought incomprehensible and irrational, and also nationalistic. Most of the same newspapers, however, supported the war in the Falklands, a tiny territory miles away from Britain, as a defence of their national identity, as a reasonable and patriotic operation that intended to 'do justice'. This is an example of how people, without difficulty, identify the others as nationalists, when they (believe that they) act irrationally, but at the same time they perceive their own actions as rational and fully justifiable in every instance.

* * *

Having finished with the above constants that relate to the issue of ‘benign or malign nationalism’, I would like to add the following concluding remarks. It has been argued thus far that the distinction between benign and malign types of nationalism is incorrect. Conceptually, civic nationalism is more assimilating and less serious in its consequences than ethnic nationalism is⁶⁰. However, this does not mean that civic nationalism is benign nationalism, but only that it is *normatively* preferable in comparison to ethnic nationalism. So, however *comparatively* preferable at the normative level, civic nationalism is not benign nationalism. Civic and ethnic are two sub-categories of nationalism, and not two independent categories themselves. In that sense, I have refrained from referring to any type of nationalism in a positive way. In practical terms, we can see that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism and their consequences is even weaker, not only in the sense that civic nationalism can also have disastrous outcomes, but also in the sense that the distinction itself is not practically useful. The reason is that, there are very few countries that could be considered as cases of civic nationalism – considering as civic cases not only those that are exclusively civic but also those where civic characteristics prevail significantly for a considerable time. Such cases are the USA, Australia, Holland, France; also, Canada, UK, Spain – although the latter have recently had ‘ethnic type’ problems because of the cases of Quebec, Scotland, and Basque country⁶¹. Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that clear civic cases are a minority compared to the overall number of national states that exist today (taking into account the 189 member states of the UN). Ethnic and civic elements are most likely to intermingle and coexist, however in different proportions; and, if we add the various regime types that combine with any one of these nationalisms, it is certainly invalid to connect specific types of nationalisms and regimes together in fixed categories.

Certainly, there are more and less disastrous manifestations of nationalism. War is certainly more devastating than looking down on a

⁶⁰ I refer here to consequences concerning tolerance and integration, and not to the regime-type that is usually associated with it: as argued, we should not consider that democracy or any other political system is connected to any type of nationalism.

⁶¹ Canada, in particular, has nullified the assumption that law, tolerance, economic growth etc account for stable, successful civic nationalisms.

foreigner, and ethnic cleansing more ferocious than banal nationalism. Of course we consider verbal discrimination less harmful than killing, national pride than racism, but they too are closely connected: the one precedes the other. The 'Aryan race' is an extreme manifestation of national pride, and genocide an excessive conception of the other as an enemy. Thus, what seems to be a benign nationalism can actually be the precondition for more extreme manifestations to come to the fore and, as we can see from multiple historical examples, they actually do come to the fore –and vice versa. So, we should refrain from referring to good and bad nationalisms, both because such a distinction is misleading (as nationalism includes both good and bad manifestations), and because it escapes a deeper understanding of nationalism and of the reasons that make it appear so diverse. Nationalism is an ideology, a discourse and a sentiment that paves the way for nationalistic movements. The Second World War, for instance, was the peak of the iceberg; an analysis of the causes has to search for what lies beneath, even if it is not so destructively manifested. Also, we have to look beyond the evident political expressions and search for their appeal to the people. For example, although Pilsudski's nationalism was integrative, it was only few years after his death that three million Jews were executed in Poland⁶². Thus an analysis of nationalism, and national identity, has to take under consideration every aspect of it – particularly the seemingly innocent ones. Hence the need to avoid such conceptions of 'good' and 'bad', especially as far as nationalism is concerned.

Not all of us become extreme nationalists, of course. Individuation and personal history plays an important role in that. Education, culture, social activities, etc. shape different personalities and different needs. Childhood and personal history –meaning first identifications, childhood traumas, repressed desires, and fixations– are of utmost importance for the personal leanings towards nationalism of each individual. Similar factors, by analogy, apply to nations as well. Such factors are the level of education and cultivation, the political institutions, but also the past history of a nation: collective traumas

⁶² Certainly, Poland was under the German occupation; however, the extent of Jewish genocide is connected with the underlying Polish anti-Semitism. There is much evidence today that, while in other

and historical facts that have 'stigmatised' the collective unconscious of the nation. Many of them can be found in myths and narratives. However, as far as collectivities are concerned, these factors are not so important *per se*, meaning that they cannot provoke nationalistic reactions in a remote present if emphasis is not laid upon them. For example, a past event can acquire significance if and when it becomes the centre of successful nationalistic propaganda. Here lays the major determinant for the kind of nationalism that will be developed or articulated, and for the swift from mild and tolerant to aggressive manifestations of nationalism: whether emphasis will be laid upon them. This is a political determinant that refers to the state apparatus and its leadership, the role of the ruling government and the political movements that may develop within the national state. Psychological determinants are very important, as we have seen, but the major cause in the swift from one political condition and expression to another is the goal aimed at and the means chosen to achieve them. Also, there are other circumstances or contingencies that can account for a nationalistic revival. Such circumstances include the political and economic situation of the nation, international circumstances (for example, if a neighbouring country articulates nationalistic rhetoric that may give rise to similar reactions in one's country), as well as social and political coincidences. These can be best analysed and explained when we have a particular nation/region on focus and, thus, we can answer the reasons for a nationalistic reaction in a given place and time⁶³.

Let me stress an example regarding the political determinant of the ruling government. It was a political decision of Thatcher's government to employ a highly nationalistic discourse during the Falklands war in order to gain support for the military means used to achieve that political (and economic) decision. In the same country, almost two decades later, the current government of the Labour party tries to gain support for another decision (to join the Economic and Monetary Union in the EU) with the use of several arguments, some of them with conflicting logics from the standpoint of our discussion about civic

European occupied countries many Jews were hidied or helped to escape by the locals, in Poland this was not the case. The scale of genocide in Poland verifies these subsequent findings.

⁶³ These 'particular circumstances' will be analysed in the following chapter.

and ethnic elements: on the one hand, the support is invited in the name of Europe's further integration and economic (and political) cooperation with members of the EU, while on the other hand support is invited in the name of the preservation of the British interests, of a stronger Britain within the EU⁶⁴. Thus, the argumentation used each time is usually the one considered to be more successful, with no particular commitment to civic criteria by definition even from considerably civic national states. So, what really triggers a nationalistic reaction is the political decision to manipulate the national(istic) feelings of the national group, a decision based on the realisation that the appeal to national identity is particularly successful.

Thus, the political determinant, that is the choices of the 'state', of the leadership of the national state, is the one that makes a substantial difference in the transformation or the swift of emphasis towards a more or less nationalistic rhetoric (or practice)⁶⁵ –without disregard for other, particular circumstances (as will be analysed in the following chapter). Hence the various roles and uses of nationalism in different political and historical contexts⁶⁶. It is interesting to see, however, how a nationalistic rhetoric manages to appeal to the members of a nation or movement. It was mentioned a few paragraphs above that, by analogy to individual fixations, the nation's history is important for its leanings towards nationalism. Collective traumas in particular can often explain to a certain extent the success of a nationalistic movement or the spread of nationalistic discourse within a given nation or ethnic group. So, it would be

⁶⁴ See the press conference of the Prime Minister Tony Blair on the 20th of June 2002.

⁶⁵ 'Nationalistic' here does not need any other qualification (i.e. civic, ethnic or other) as the term is always used to describe practices that would be described as ethnic. In practical terms, the characterisation of a national state as nationalistic means that it emphasises its ethnic components; civic nationalism is no even referred to as nationalism. For example, a nationalist leader is not every leader of a national state, but the one that expresses an intense ethnic nationalistic discourse (meaning that, no distinction is made saying 'He is a nationalist, yet a civic one'; similarly, when we characterise a national state as nationalistic, we never qualify whether we mean civic or ethnic). So, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism seems like a distinction between non-nationalism and nationalism (in the every day use of the terms in politics, in journalism, even in academia). This brings to the fore once more the projection argument described before: that is, by distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad' nationalism, and preserving the 'good' one for oneself, one projects the whole ideal that nationalism expresses onto the others. It is indicative that those countries that are considered to be civic instances are to a large extent a (loose) alliance and they also tend to define the very terms of civic and ethnic.

⁶⁶ For a detailed analysis of various nationalisms and the contexts within which they emerged see Breuilly (1993).

useful to end this chapter by explaining the meaning of nations' 'childhood' and of common traumas in their history.

Collective Unconscious

The course of a nation is celebrated in historical documents, narratives, myths, songs, etc. These are its history, its past, and they are inscribed in the minds of its members. This is a past that only members can get hold of, for it includes all the perceptions the nation has for itself and the others, along with its culture and mentality. This past can be totally held only by members of a nation because it is quite different from the knowledge one has for other countries, knowledge that comes from genuine interest, visits and/or study of historiography. It includes this knowledge as well, but it is more than that: it is also the mentality generated by this knowledge and by other perceptions, myths, narratives and lived experiences. This is the *collective unconscious* of a nation. As it has been indicated earlier on this thesis⁶⁷, Freud has used the term collective unconscious to describe an archaic heritage whose traces are to be found in a "collective mind, in which mental processes occur just as they do in the mind of an individual" (Freud, 1913:220). The word 'collective unconscious' should not become subject to misinterpretation and be understood as referring to one unconscious, group mind, that 'we all' collectively possess, which is not the meaning that Freud had specified. He rather talked about the appropriation of the same elements in the unconscious of each member, individually, elements that are commonly held because of identification. These elements include the history of the nation, its relation to other nations, its traditions, its language etc, which are elements that can easily identified and described, but also myths, narratives, perceptions and certain mentalities that are acquired and understood mainly through the experience of common living. So, the collective unconscious rather connotes the existence or knowledge

⁶⁷ I have referred to the 'collective unconscious' in chapter 2, p.42-43. See references on the same subject in Brown, 1961:108.

within each individual of these elements that are common for all members of the nation –or simply the capability to identify and understand them.

Parts of the collective unconscious of a nation are major unpleasant events, disasters, defeats etc. that –occasionally and under certain circumstances– can be experienced in the present as traumatic events. As in individual cases, when the past is experienced as a trauma it generates extreme and pathological attitudes. Like a person, a whole nation may regress in a pathological situation, where it will seek to boost self-esteem and repair earlier narcissistic damage to national image –which is self-image as well⁶⁸. Falk analyses this in his article ‘Unconscious Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, where he argues that major traumas in the history of the Jews and the Palestinians have affected their present situation and led into a conflict. “Zionists”, he argues, “wished to restore to the Jews their great historical losses...They wished to make sure that the Jewish future was not like the past, yet they longed for past glories at the same time...From the psychoanalytic viewpoint the Zionist longing was like that of a child for its split-off Great Good Early Mother, which exists only in the child’s phantasy...Those who came in Palestine longed for a new life in a new motherland...They certainly did not wish to find brothers or cousins in Palestine who would be their rivals for the love of their ideal motherland”. Arab historiography, on the other hand, blamed external forces for their failures and defeats, and many of them “still wish to turn back the historical clock and restore the medieval Arab glory” (Falk, 1992:216-7, 218). This last comment, about the wish to restore a glorious past, is common in many cases of nationalistic exaltations.

Berlin argues that nationalism “usually seems to be caused by wounds, some form of collective humiliation” (1990:245). Past losses in a nation’s history become traumas and have an unpleasant effect because –and when– they are experienced as present losses. These we can call *collective traumas*, because these are not traumas that each member of the nation necessarily has (although this can also be the case), but they are traumas that the nation has, as a collectivity, as part of its history. By making this distinction I intend to allow

⁶⁸ Ulman & Abse (1982) refer to the individual regression in group pathology. See particularly p. 638.

an outlet for individuation: for, a common trauma is one that *everybody* within the nation has, while a collective one is one that the nation as a collectivity has and someone can distance him/herself from. Such traumas can be (re)experienced *in the present* when the past is imaginary experienced *as present* (Castoriadis, 1985:197)⁶⁹. Similarly, Castoriadis argues that an incident is not traumatic by itself (with the exception of marginal events), and it is experienced as traumatic only if an individual ascribes to it extreme importance (1985:200)⁷⁰. The same applies to collective traumas of an ethnic group or a nation. If a charismatic leader or an influential group that can exercise propaganda have experienced a past loss as a major traumatic event, they can transmit their perception to the nation, at least to a large part of it, provided that it is indeed a major event that provokes sorrow to them. In periods of crises this can become a reference point with mortal consequences. In the Serbian propaganda, for example, the ‘Kosovo myth’, which referred to a major traumatic event in the Serbian history, exercised great emotional appeal to the Serbian people, particularly in a time of violent turbulences and change.

Nations try to keep their memories ‘alive’ through the creation of monuments and commemorations. These are like symptoms in individuals, which are not always traumatic but reveal their history or important parts of it. The function and significance of these commemorations varies from person to person, as it varies for the nation as a whole in different periods. These commemorations can be symbolic representations of an event that is considered as a landmark in the nation’s history (like a revolution), and its celebration may signify the foundation of its modern history, a great achievement, a significant loss etc. These symbolic representations can take an

⁶⁹ Marx underlined in *The Capital* that, the memory of past generations puts an extraordinary weight in the consciousness of the living, as Castoriadis refers in 1985:197.

⁷⁰ This argument closely relates to Freud’s ‘economic’ factor in explaining the individual’s formation of symptoms. He argues in *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* that the formations of symptoms and libido’s regress to repressed fixations need an additional determinant to be explained, a *quantitative* condition (1917c:420). According to this “*economic line of approach*” (p.421), an individual may fall into ‘mental illness’ when he/she reach the amount of cathexis that can tolerate and cannot master an additional amount of excitation. So, the difference is made when *more* cathexis is required and the individual cannot correspond to it; this quantitative factor is different among individuals. This economic approach is indispensable in order to explain conflicting situations and must accompany the *dynamic* ones (which can be summarised in the qualitatively endeavour to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure). See Freud, 1917c: 420-422.

imaginary significance, and be experienced as a present misdeed or as a past glory that has to be restored. Freud has shown how an event can be experienced quite differently, individually, in relation to his hysterical patients.

He writes in *Five Lectures of Psychoanalysis*:

our hysterical patients suffer from reminiscences. Their symptoms are residues and mnemonic symbols of particular (traumatic) experiences. We may perhaps obtain a deeper understanding of this kind of symbolism if we compare them with other mnemonic symbols in other fields. The monuments and memorials with which large cities are adorned are also mnemonic symbols...[i.e. in London the Charing Cross, and the Monument]. These monuments, then, resemble hysterical symptoms in being mnemonic symbols; up to that point the comparison seems justifiable. But, what should we think of a Londoner who paused to-day in deep melancholy before the memorial of Queen Eleanor's funeral [Charing Cross]...or of a Londoner who shed tears before the Monument that commemorates the reduction of his beloved metropolis to ashes although it has long risen again in far greater brilliance? Yet, every single hysteric and neurotic behaves like these two unpractical Londoners. Not only do they remember painful experiences of the remote past, but *they still cling to it emotionally; they cannot get free of the past* and for its sake they neglect what is real and immediate. This fixation of mental life to pathogenic traumas is one of the most significant and practically important characteristics of neurosis (1910a:16, emphasis added).

Thus, we can see how the commemoration of the same event can be the origin for surpassing it through its symbolic representation, while it can also function as an imaginary re-experiencing of the past for some people or for a whole nation in a given period. Nationalism resembles a pathology that is collectively experienced by members of a nation: it enhances group self-esteem and it intensifies emotions, exactly because it appeals to a collectivity rather than a person. Particularly in periods of nationalistic exaltations, past memories and traumas become hysterical symptoms, and members of a nation regress to them collectively, meaning each one separately but all together simultaneously. In 'normal' conditions, common traumatic experiences and nationalistic rhetoric appeal mainly to individuals whose own personal history is traumatic and they seek for an outlet for aggression, a sense of 'whole', etc.

It has been argued before that a common characteristic of most nationalisms is the wish to restore a glorious past. Another common characteristic, connected to this one, is the *denial* of the past losses. This is a fundamental characteristic of the unconscious: denial of unpleasant facts that disturb the pleasure principle⁷¹. Thus, frustration provoked by an event combined with the inability to accept it has as a result its denial. A consequence of this is the *inability to mourn*. Mourning is a process that has a cathartic effect. It requires, however, that one first acknowledges a problem and accepts its existence, which is a prerequisite for mourning for it and, in the sequel, for getting over it. Mourning has a regenerative role in our lives, argues Falk, as without mourning our losses we are stuck in the past (1992:238-240). Without mourning (or with ineffective mourning) we keep being overwhelmed by feelings associated to a specific event, such as anxiety, guilt, anger or sorrow. “There is no moving beyond without some experience of mourning” (1995:537), argues Ross, a process by which an individual or group comes to terms with a significant loss.

Volkan has suggested that objects and processes, like monuments and rituals, that link the past to the present –and to the future– can assist group mourning. Thus, monuments to the victims of Holocaust, for example, have *also* a cleansing, therapeutic effect⁷². ‘Also’ means that they can have another effect as well. So, Ross argues that “communal rituals of mourning can also exacerbate tension and communicate intense threat, for what is celebrated as a victory by one side is often marked as a bitter defeat by another” (1995:538). This is also true because monuments and rituals can have a symbolic meaning or an imaginary one for certain people or for a nation as a whole (for example, they can just remind a historical event, or generate emotional exaltation about it). Particularly about rituals, Schopflin has suggested that, “acceptance of and participation in [it]...is vital, if not obligatory, if the system is to be sustained, but belief in the ritual is less important...” (1997:21); rituals provide for a sense of strengthening of the community and the individual’s role in it, without

⁷¹ See the analysis of this point in chapter 1, page 19-20; also Freud, 1911, 1915d, and 1920.

⁷² The example is stressed by Ben-Amos, 1999:298.

imposing uniformity of belief. By analogy to the children, we can say that ritualisation is a useful, adoptive mechanism; nevertheless, excessive ritualisation is a manifestation of anxiety, as Parin argues (1988:101-102). For example, in an era of nationalism, national parades, commemorations, monuments etc. have always the potential to regress into hysteric symptoms. In any case, as Anderson argues, “no more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers” (1991:9). These are the heroic ancestors, with whom one –the members of a nation– identifies, either symbolically or imaginary, and their tombs are unificatory symbols, full of significance and emotional fascination.

Significant turnpoints in the history of a nation are inscribed in myths and narratives. These myths can also be manipulated for reasons of political expediency. For that reason, they are usually part of nationalistic rhetoric.

Myths and National Identity

Myths have a particularly strong and mostly unconscious influence in peoples’ (national) identity, as they contain much of the perceptions a nation has for itself, and for nationhood in particular. A myth is a “legendary narrative that represents part of the beliefs of the people or explains natural phenomena [...]...it does not require empirical proof...The original purpose of a myth is to provide meaning” (Schutz, 1993:96). A myth is a narrative rich in ideas, images and phantasies, and it is thus attractive to everybody. Lipowatz and Demertzis explain that the myth is an autonomous necessity of the human psyche: it does not try to clarify meaning, but to symbolically mediate humans and their world and to familiarise them with their own contradictions (1994:52-53). It is interesting that primitive myths show remarkable similarity in content. As Brown argues, “accounts of patricide and incest with the mother, castration, punishment and reparation, matricide, cannibalism, and dismemberment, form part of the mythology of all people”; psychoanalysis explains that by noting that “such phantasies are universal during the earlier years of life” (1961:115). Otto Rank has similarly argued that myths on national heroes are “especially

invested with fantastic features, which, in different peoples, even though widely separated by space and entirely independent of each other, present a *baffling similarity* and... *a literal conformity*" (emphasis added)⁷³.

Myths reveal peoples' self perceptions, wishes and fears; so does fixation on certain myths. Fixation on myths does not tell us the 'true' story of a people, but reveals those elements that are of particular importance, those that influence most their self-perceptions and mentality. Myths are not historical truths anyway; they contain contradictions and usually naturalise the facts. Thus, they are "immune to criticism" (Schutz, 1993:96). In addition, they appeal to emotions and not to rational thinking. These characteristics make them easy to use for mass manipulation and demagoguery. Their use in the public sphere for propaganda is also due to their uncritical acceptance because people do not understand the metaphor and take it literally; this way, they confuse its symbolic use with reality (Lipowatz & Demertzis, 1994:55).

In a taxonomy of the myths of nationhood, Schopflin refers to the following categories of myths, categories that may overlap and even co-exist. Myths of territory (of motherland, the land of purity; they are usually connected with myths of a 'Golden Age'); myths of redemption and suffering (in which the suffering will soon come to an end and the nation "will be redeemed or, indeed, redeem the world" [1997:29]); myths of unjust treatment (mistreatment that has caused the suffering); myths of election and civilising mission ('chosen nation', for any reason, meaning because God chose us, because of 'civic qualities', because 'we are not racists' etc.); myths of military valour (emphasises heroism); myths of ethnogenesis and antiquity; myths of kinship and shared descent (genetic transmission of the group's qualities). These myths that Schopflin mentions are all integral part of nationalistic rhetoric and are used widely by all national states. Smith (1997:48-51) includes some of their content as the functions of the 'Golden Age': their function is to enhance integrity and cohesion. These myths are also widely used in political campaigns, to the extent that the best way to influence the electorate has proved to be the appeal to emotions. As an example, in a thirty minutes film

⁷³ Rank, Otto (1914): *The Myth and the Birth of the Hero*, New York, p.1; in Freud, 1939:247.

produced for Reagan's election campaign in 1984, analysed by Schutz, Reagan appears as "an 'American Hero' who personifies traditional values such as religious beliefs, *patriotism*, happy family, life and liberty, in other words as a true representative of the American Dream. That picture is painted against a background that shows America as a strong nation which has regained the military and economic power it *once had*" (1993:97, emphasis added).

The above example is not only one of a specific myth used in order to mobilise an ethnic or national group. It is rather a usual nationalistic mythology found in the nationalistic rhetoric –presented as patriotic– of most established national states. Particular myths are used in more specific circumstances, and they are understood only by, or they appeal only to the national group. The myth of Kosovo is an example of a myth used effectively by Milosevic, for it was a myth that had influenced to a large extent and had shaped the feeling of a constant threat to the Serbian national identity. It was also a myth with a clear demarcation of 'us' and 'them', and it could be used to present clear parallels to the given conflictual situation during the 1990s. In addition, it referred to a great loss, a loss not only articulated and used by Milosevic, but felt as such by the Serbians as well (which is prerequisite for a loss to be experienced as a collective trauma and, thus, be mobilising, as indicated earlier)⁷⁴. So, a myth can be effective in mobilising people only if it is still 'alive' in the collective unconscious of the group (and will be chosen if it meets political interests). Of course, other factors matter, factors that cannot be generalised, as they are apt to the particular space and time.

A last issue that should be stressed at this point concerns the selective 'forgetting' and 'remembering' of certain aspects in the collective unconscious of a nation that conveniently allow national narratives, myths, history etc. to be presented without contradictions⁷⁵.

⁷⁴ For more details on this myth see Hastings, 1997:190.

⁷⁵ As it was argued about myths, the unconscious has the ability to overlook contradictions. However, the process of selective memory and stereotyping that will be mentioned now refers to an additional process that creates a unitary historical narrative, which can include history and myths that suppresses contradictions even to the conscious thinking.

Selective Memory and Stereotypes

Members of a nation have a collective unconscious, that is the memory of the nation's past. The formation of this collective unconscious involves collective remembering and forgetting. It resembles, by analogy, childhood memories, memories that an individual has of his/her childhood. Childhood memories, Freud has argued, are often mere phantasies formed in a later date; they are memories "elicited at a later age, when childhood is already past", and they are often falsified because they "are put into the service of later trends". Similarly, he argues about nations, contemporary writing of a nation's past is inevitably influenced by present perceptions, beliefs and wishes, "for many things had been dropped from the nation's memory, while others were distorted, and some remains of the past were given a wrong interpretation in order to fit in with contemporary ideas" (1910b:83). Thus, Freud argues that "a man's conscious memory of the events of his maturity is in every way comparable to the first kind of historical writing [as a chronicle of current events], while the memories that he has of his childhood correspond, as far as their origins and reliability is concerned, to the history of a nation's earliest days, which was compiled later for tendentious reasons" (1910b:84). However, he stresses, we should not reject those phantasies, or the legends and traditions of a nation, because they do present some reality of the past, on which latter distortions ('forgettings') have occurred.

Shared memory is produced through 'calendar custom' or 'ritualised remembrance', as Noys and Abrahams (1999), and Zerubavel (1995) have called it respectively. It is the collective repetition of practices that produces common customs and common memories, which are mainly defined by these practices. Rituals, commemorations, museums etc. safeguard peoples' memory and create stronger bonds in the community of the nation. Shared memory is a "complex dialectic of remembering and forgetting" (Billing, 1995:37), which involves keeping the memories that sustain 'our good self-image' for our group/ nation, and remembering the 'bad' aspects of other nations' history. Renan calls forgetting an historical error (1996:45). An error that is not contingent, as its name indicates: what is usually 'forgotten' is the violent

origin and past actions of the nation that are occasionally glorified while simultaneously condemned in other nations' history⁷⁶. Thus, a nation's perceptions about itself and the others are formed through a selective appropriation of history and sustained through the selective ritualisation of its memories. Political and historical myths are created and advertised through this process as well.

A consequence of this selective appropriation of history is *stereotyping*. Stereotypes are "shared cultural perceptions of social groups" (Billing, 1995:80), both about themselves and about other groups. They are, however, mostly ascribed to outgroups, as Billing argues, because 'our' group is usually considered as the standard, the 'normal'. This way groups maintain a positive group identity by comparison to contrasting others. Stereotypes are not static, however, and their content may change through a constant process of (re)defining ourselves and the others. Stereotyping is linked to categorisation and self-categorisation, which is divisive. "The theory of self-categorisation", Billing argues, "focuses upon the first person singular: it is connected with the declarations of identity which 'I' make about myself...Nationalism is, above all, an ideology of the first person plural" (Billing, 1995:70).

National stereotypes concern a perception of one's nation and of other nations. It is important to note that stereotypes are usually self-confirming, as Lipman has argued and recent studies confirm. Hirsberg (1993) conducted a study upon US university students and their national perceptions, which confirmed the view that people tend to recall stereotype-consistence information and to forget stereotype-inconsistent information. The results of this survey are very interesting. The vast majority of the Americans appear to be proud to be Americans, as Hirsberg concludes, with basic elements of American image to be freedom and democracy. Events and criticisms that have threatened their patriotic self-image (like the coup-d'etat in Guatemala or the

⁷⁶ Whole nations tend to 'forget' their own history and nationalisms and criticise that of the others. For example, Western countries often criticise the nationalistic eruptions and conflicts in Eastern Europe after 1989 as representative of a lower level of civil society, democratisation, education, etc. Nevertheless, they forget this way, firstly, that Western nation-states were not formed in a more civilised way but they followed similar paths more than a century ago, and secondly, that similar nationalisms and conflicts within Western countries are constantly to the fore (Northern Ireland, Quebec, Catalonia, Belgium, etc).

Vietnam war) were rarely remembered or interpreted as antidemocratic or oppressive. Subjects of the survey “recalled stereotype-consistent information (US support for democracy or opposition to communism) far more readily than they recalled inconsistent information [US antidemocratic interventions]”. Information given was interpreted in such a way as not to threaten the national image these students had for their nation and themselves. So, “helpful behaviour [i.e. airlifting supplies] was considered to be naturally American and voluntary, while a harmful act [i.e. bombs dropping] tended to be viewed as uncharacteristic behaviour the US had been forced to engage in” (Hirsberg, 1993:96). As this survey shows most clearly, stereotyping has serious political implications, as it can be used in order to secure support for domestic and external policies, for mass mobilisation, and for political propaganda.

* * *

To conclude, I would like to make a brief remark. Thus far, we have referred to almost every aspect of nationalism, and national identity, at least all those estimated to be of utmost importance. Yet, it is not my intention to make a caricature of nationalism but, instead, to analyse and explain its most important aspects. This is not to say that all of these aspects and characteristics will appear in every specific case of nationalism. Rather, that most of these elements are manifest in many nationalisms if we examine them in the course of time. For example, ‘banal’, everyday mild nationalism has a number of characteristics, as defined above, but they are not ‘fixed’: there is no historical evidence to suggest that it cannot be replaced, or ‘enriched’ with militant and extreme manifestations. In fact, every nation has been subject to aggressive manifestations in the course of its history. Psychological conditions change, as also –or because– the external conditions change; each particular nation has been subject to such changes. What is, more or less, stable is the internal, psychological predisposition of individuals to become influenced by destructive influences and rhetoric (be they racist, nationalistic, or other). What is also important is the deliberate attempt of leaders and elites to take

advantage of these predispositions and address peoples' unconscious drives and dynamics. Unfortunately, the deeper knowledge of individuals and their inner psyche since the late 19th century has provided the means for mass manipulation and exploitation, instead of facilitating the effort towards a more peaceful and harmonious living.

In the next chapter we will proceed with a further elaboration of issues concerning nationalism and national identity. Specifically, we shall refer to the distinction between ethnic and national identity, to the emergence of the nation and nationalism, and to the particular circumstances that account for the launch of actively aggressive and extreme manifestations of nationalism.

CHAPTER 4: THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM

In the previous chapter we analysed the close relation between nationalism and national identity. There, we made the distinction between national and nationalistic identity and analysed the imaginary character of nationalism and the specific reasons for its strong psychological appeal. In addition, we referred to the commonplace distinction between civic and ethnic types of nationalism as benign and malign forms of nationalism, which it was argued that is misleading and due to projection. There is a gap left, however, in the development of the argument, and this must be filled, so as to have a more complete picture of national identity.

One of the issues raised thus far is that, since human psychological foundations are not confined in space and time, then can we argue that nations, nationalism and national identity have existed in earlier times? Is nationalism and national identity new? The second issue is that, as it has been argued in the previous chapter, the influence and success of nationalism depends on specific political circumstances and internal or external policies, along with existing cultural and historical contexts; but if nationalism has the potentials to strike a chord to all individuals, it is because of their inner predispositions. The appeal of nationalism on the unconscious has been further analysed, but the first prerequisite, that of political, economic and other circumstances that match and facilitate the spread and appeal of nationalism has still been left unanswered. The study of these circumstances is thus indispensable for the comprehension of the political and social aspects of the issue. Their study is required so as to complement and complete the analysis of the previous chapter. This will also provide an additional answer to the relevant and inferred question of what accounts for extreme manifestations of nationalism¹, that is, what makes a nation adopt an actively aggressive nationalism? These questions have emerged from the previous analysis and need an answer. So, in this chapter we

¹ Additional to the psychological and political determinants that we analysed in chapter 3.

shall deal with those two issues, which are also a thematic continuation of the previous one.

Is Nationalism and National Identity New?

The following questions have to be answered: are nationalism and national identity new phenomena? Have they first appeared in modernity? These questions inevitably emerge because nationalism is considered by many scholars² to be a new phenomenon, confined in modernity; the same applies to the nation, and national identity too. But, in the previous chapters we have referred to ethnic and national identities interchangeably, providing a psychological explanation for them that was quite similar. So, these issues need some further clarification.

Nationalistic Attitudes Throughout History

History is full of instances of ‘nationalistic’ attitudes and discriminatory behaviours based on similarity and difference. In Herodotus it is referred that Egyptians looked down on Greeks because they were not undergoing circumcision³. Ancient Greeks, in their turn, believed that ‘non-Greeks are barbarians’. Also, in the late Hellenistic period the Pauline church offered favourable material and legal conditions to poor and foreign people, including Christian hospitality in *hospita* and *xenodohia* placed at the entrance of the city and nearby the churches; this generosity, though, was reserved only for Christians, and a Christian passport attesting Christianity (that was used since the apostolic times) became generalised (Kristeva, 1991:86-87). Discrimination based on belonging and a specific identity is not new in history irrespectively

² The most prominent of which are Gellner (1993), Anderson (1991), Hobsbawm (1990), Kedourie (1994), and others, whose argument (the modernist argument –the modernists) is the most influencing in the studies of nationalism and national identity.

³ Herodotus (1921): *History*, Vol.I, London/New York: Loeb Classical Library, pp.36-47, translation by A.D.Godley from Book II; referred in Freud, 1939:269.

of the criteria used each time, whether religious, cultural or other. Are these enough, however, so as to talk about nationalism in the Middle Ages or in antiquity?

Nationalism as an explicit claim that the nation has an upper value and loyalty demands and that it must have its own sovereign state is new in history and confined in modernity. Thus, nationalism as an ideology and a movement is clearly a characteristic of modernity. Nationalism as a sentiment and, partly, as a discourse, though, is very similar to many appearances throughout history. This is not to argue that it is the same now and then because, certainly, nationalistic ideology has ‘enriched’ both the nationalistic sentiment and, mostly, the discourse with new elements and a more concrete orientation (i.e. the claim for a ‘nation-state’ is an explicit one in nationalistic ideology). Nevertheless, certain nationalistic elements (that is, certain elements that we find in nationalistic sentiments and discourses) are not new in modernity, nor is the backwards orientation of societies and ethnic and national communities (i.e. the rhetoric of a “Golden Age”). Smith refers to classical ancient Greeks – a society highly idealised today –, their idealising of their “great past” and of heroes of Homeric epics, and after mentioning several examples he concludes that: “the ideal of a ‘Golden Age’ is not a creation of the nationalists and the Romantics. It can be found among several people in the ancient world” (1997:40). Neither is it a characteristic of modernity the sentiment of pride and high self-esteem, the sense of belonging and the identity one acquires out of participation in an ethnic or national group. Gellner mentions that people have always lived in groups, many of which have persisted in time; “one important factor in their persistence was the *loyalty* men felt for these groups, and the fact that they *identified* with them” (1993:138, emphasis added). Nevertheless, he denies that nationalism, even as a sentiment, has existed before modernity. He argues that, “if one calls this factor [loyalty and identity], generically, ‘patriotism’, then it is no part of my intention to deny that some measure of such patriotism is indeed part of human life”, and he adds that “nationalism is a very distinct species of patriotism...” (1993:138), distinguished because of few but important features: homogeneity, literacy, anonymity. Following the

argument elaborated in chapter 3 (about the similarities of patriotism and nationalism and the use of patriotism as a ‘good’ aspect of nationalism), I would argue that nationalism is indeed a modern phenomenon –as an ideology and a movement–, but nationalistic/localistic/chauvinistic attitudes have been apparent since antiquity. Nationalism as *group chauvinism* has existed before.

One can go so far as to argue that, nationalism as a sentiment is not a derivative of the ideology of nationalism, at least exclusively, because such sentiments have been expressed several times throughout history, but it is only enriched and specified by it. Patriotism, chauvinism (which the Oxford Dictionary defines as “exaggerated or aggressive patriotism”)⁴, racism, localism, ethnocentrism, regionalism: all these terms describe attitudes, behaviours and sentiments originated in attachment to the *patria* and the group. Such attachments are both universal and extend from archaic times to modernity. One of the oldest epics, the *Odyssey* of the Homeric epics, for example, describes the effort and longing of Odysseus (Ulysses) to return to his beloved homeland. Such attachments and attitudes have found explicit expression today in nationalism, which not only describes such attitudes and sentiments but also systematises them and enriches them with new elements and qualities. For this reason it might be misleading to argue that nationalism, as defined in the previous chapter, has existed before: that could cause misunderstandings, because nationalism is also a modern ideology and form of politics. But, certainly, nationalism as a sentiment and, partly, discourse⁵ is quite similar, even identical, to analogous sentiments, such as regionalism, chauvinism etc., which have all existed before.

The refutation of nationalistic (as patriotic and chauvinistic) attitudes in the pre-modern era is connected to the denial that nations have existed before modernity (because the prevailing modernist argument is that nationalism forged the nations for the first time). Inevitably, so, the nation comes to the fore. It is not my intention to address here the huge debate about the creation of

⁴ *Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus*, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995, p.240.

⁵ I say ‘partly’ about the discourse because it also refers to the explicit claims to national determination, which characterise the modern era and the ideology of nationalism.

nations, but to refer to the re-signification of the word 'nation' in modernity. My contribution to this debate will be as limited as needed in order to address the main question about national identity and its relation to ethnic identity.

When Does an Ethnic Group Become a Nation?

There is a general question regarding whether the nation is an artifact created by nationalism. This view is broadly accepted as its supporters (Hobsbawm, Gellner, Kedourie, Anderson, etc) and the modernist paradigm are the most prominent and largely influencing in the study of the nation, nationalism and national identity. What is going to be argued in this section is that, because of the emergence of nationalism, the nation is attributed a different meaning and definition. This modern definition has created, in its turn, two different problems: one is the confusion and merging of the definition of the nation with that of the state and, second, the 'search' in pre-modern times for nations by using this modified, modern definition.

Nationalism as a political ideology postulates that the nation and the state should be congruent, merged as a 'nation-state'. Thus, the nationalistic practice during the last two centuries has been to claim for and to establish 'nation-states'. Nevertheless, it should be remarked that this ideological claim has not led to the establishment of real national states –real in the sense of the union of one nation with one state. In 1970, of a total of 132 states, only the 9,1% were totally homogeneous and 18,9% had the 90% of the population belonging to one ethnic group (data in Connor, 1994:29-30). Nevertheless, even the remaining 72% with more than two significant ethnic groups composing their population are called 'nation-states'. Thus, Smith has accurately proposed the term 'national state'⁶, to connote the composition of current states by more than one nations and ethnic groups. So, the nation has been signified by nationalism as a 'nation-state'. This signification of the nation by nationalism,

⁶ Smith, 1995a:86. Following Smith's argument, I refer throughout this thesis to national states, or use the term 'nation-states' in inverted commas and mainly when I want to refer to nationalistic claims or to 'nation-state' as a normative paradigm within modernity.

that prevails for as long as nationalism has been prevalent, has rendered the notion of the nation as 'nation-state' an accepted norm, a concrete knowledge that many scholars do not question today. This is the reason why definitional elements of the state form part of the definition of the nation; for example, *mass* public culture, political rights and duties, economic articulation and mobility, and possession of military apparatus (that is, elements that define the state) are now considered integral parts of the definition of nations, along with the shared memories, myths and cultures.

A consequence of the above is that, it is difficult for scholars to identify any nation existing in the past, prior to modernity. Anthony Smith (1995a), who seeks to critically assess these perspectives, the growth of national sentiments can be traced back to 15th century or even earlier; however, he cannot find any group in much earlier times that would fit the definition of the nation because he rigorously applies the current perception of the nation to other epochs. He writes, for example, referring to the city-states in ancient Greece that they "might well be described as precocious or small scale nations", as the size of ancient Athens was the same of the size of modern Iceland (200,000 citizens). "On the other hand", he continues, "only the 30000 adult male Athenians were citizens; metics, women and slaves were excluded" (1995a:169, endnote 7). Thus, he confines nations to modern mass phenomena and mass citizenry, which today are "much more numerous than the politically active membership of pre-modern *ethnies* or city-states" (1995a:54). In the same context, however, he does not question the 'nationness' of many Western national states whose half population (women) was excluded from full political participation until very recently (for example, general suffrage rights were not introduced in Belgium until 1948, and in Switzerland until 1971). In the same example of ancient Athens, Smith objects its 'nationness' with the assessment that, from the nationalist standpoint, the city-states "lacked the key component of cultural individuality... Athenian culture was a variant of a wider Ionian ethnic, and still wider cultural, network" (1995a:169, endnote 7). Yet, this argument is as if, keeping the analogies in mind, we questioned today the German or Spanish 'nationness' on the basis of

their being part of a wider European network and culture. Thus, Smith's argument is a projection of today's criteria of mass-nations to another time, a time where the scales of communication were smaller but analogous. In addition, city-states did not lack the organisation and functions of more recent national states. In essence, Smith acknowledges these facts by saying that the ethnic state is the pre-modern equivalent of modern nations but, nevertheless, argues that we can best call them *ethnies* but not nations (1995a:57-8).

So, the re-signification of the word 'nation' in modernity can itself lead to the perception that there were not nations in pre-modern times while, at the same time, calling them ethnic states/*ethnies* is enough to make a qualitative difference. Certainly, to the extent that modernity is a different epoch its structures will have differences as well. This, however, should not result in a perception of a cutting-edge dichotomy in-between times, in a perception that not even nation-like entities have existed before modernity. There is a certain continuity based on similarities, and these similarities have to be acknowledged –along with differences as well. Certainly, Smith makes this acknowledgement but, since his stance is a critical one against the modernist paradigm, it is also indicative of the widespread perception that argues for the novelty of nations as a result of nationalism.

Perhaps it is also the case that the reluctance to recognise any existence of nations in the past is due to the perception that by doing so one might support nationalistic claims and arguments. This is another issue, though, as the one does not presuppose the other. Demertzis argues that it is a nationalistic bias to confuse the nation with ethnicity and to believe that it exists from antiquity (1996:62). It is true that nationalists are thus biased. It is also true, however, that it is a bias not to identify a nation before modernity because that might support the claims of nationalists. So, we can suggest that no nation has been 'found' in the past because it is searched for with modern criteria, and with a reluctance to find it. Castoriadis calls this 'reflective projection': the languages of different societies (different in terms of both space and time) do not correspond to identical codifications, because beneath their formulation lay different images and desires. So, Castoriadis argues that the Western claim

towards the constitution of a 'whole' and complete explanation of other societies is doomed to fail if it only reflects the history and ideas of Western societies (1985:242). This in particular means that, if we use examples of the past but analyse them according to the exact present criteria (without even keeping the analogies in mind), it is natural that we will not find any nations in these so distant and different times.

The term nation, however, is quite old, and its meaning is not so distant from contemporary concepts on nations (not as 'nation-states' though). It appears in the Old Testament, and in many citations in subsequent years (Hastings, 1997:14-19). Hastings cites from Regino of Prum's *Chronicon*, of about 900 ac., the following passage (which sets the Christian view of society): "just as different people (*diversae nationes populorum*) differ between themselves in descent, manners, language and laws... so the holy and universal church throughout the world, although joined in the unity of faith, nevertheless varies its ecclesiastical customs among them" (1997:195, emphasis added). Hastings also criticises Kedourie and Hobsbawm for their reference on the Latin usage of the word 'nation' as division of students into universities, and he mentions that in the Middle Ages the word was used in the sense "of a people distinct by language, laws, habits, modes of judgment and customs..."(1997:17).

In an illuminating study titled 'Nation: the History of a Word', Guido Zernatto (1944) analyses the use of the word nation in different periods, starting with the Latin *natio* which means to be born. He argues that "a word is like a coin" (1944:351), whose value changes as people's lives change. In the Roman times, for example, "in ordinary speech a *natio* was understood to be a group of men who belonged together in some way because of similarity of birth" (1944:352). *Natio*, however, connoted a community of foreigners, and was ascribed to foreigners who were bound together in the large cities and ports in order to speak their own language. In the Middle Ages, *nationes* was indeed referred to university students gathered in small towns. Nevertheless, it did not simply mean divisions of students into universities, but it referred to unions that expressed the distinctiveness between students who were foreigners

there. Later on these *nationes* came to connote a ‘community of opinion’, and this was the first significant change of the initial meaning, as Zernatto argues. After the 13th century and until the 18th, the word nation underwent a second important change of meaning from foreigners to representatives: “...a nation came to mean above all a representative body, whose chief characteristic was that it was assumed that a certain loose bond of territorial origin existed among the individual members of this body. A representative body is however ...a *select* group of men, an elite” (1944:361). A third major shift of meaning occurred from the late 18th century onwards, when the term lost its distinguishing connotation between the aristocrats –the elite (nation)– and the people –the plebs– and it encompassed all citizens of the state. “With this mass concept begins the new sense of the word nation” (1944:366), Zernatto argues.

The terms used today to describe national groups before nationalism are *ethnic groups*, *ethnicities*⁷, or *ethnie*. These, however, originate in the Greek word *ethnos*, which means nation. The word *ethnos* originates in the word *ethos*, which in ancient Greek means habit/tradition/manners. We actually meet the word *ethnos* in the Homeric epics, where it means the sum of a population living together, where it also applies to animals. In Thukydides it connotes the race, and similarly in Plato it connotes the race and the distinct social group⁸. It is quite interesting that the word, as it appeared in the plural tense (*ethn e*, which means nations in contemporary Greek) had a specific meaning in the Old Testament: it meant the idolater, pagan *ethn e* (nations) as opposed to the chosen *ethnos* (nation) of Israel⁹. In the New Testament the word *ethn e* continued to apply to idolaters, but it became synonymous to Greeks; soon after the distinction was overcome¹⁰. So, as in Latin, the word signified a

⁷ Ethnicity is not an accurate term, as it does not mean the ethnic group but the attribution of ethnic identity on members of the group (like nationality).

⁸ It should be noted that in ancient Greek the race did not have the current biological connotation of the word, but it referred to different groups of people with distinct characteristics, be they biological, social, cultural or other.

⁹ It is interesting that those people of pagan *ethnie* who adopted Judaism were called *prosiliti*, which means converts.

¹⁰ I have found and verified these data through search in a number of dictionaries of the Greek and ancient Greek language. Indicatively, I will refer here the following three most known: *Encyclopaedia Papiros Larrousse Britannica*, Athens: Papiros publications, 1984, Vol.22; *Hydria: Grand General Encyclopaedia, Greek and Universal*, Athens: Ettairia Ellinikon Ekdoseon, 1982, Vol.22; Stamatakos, Ioannis (1999): *Dictionary of the Ancient Greek Language*, Athens: Bibliopromitheftiki.

population with common characteristics (with unspecified criteria though), but it referred to other groups and not to one's own. In the contemporary use of the word *ethnos* has the modern meaning of the word nation; the only 'paradox' is that, in the absence of a word to translate in Greek the word *ethnè* (that is introduced in English and originates in the Greek *ethnos*), another word was invented, the word *ethnotites*. This process of inventing new words is also apparent in other terms widely used in English bibliography, such as 'ethnonationalism' that describes nationalism of ethnic groups instead of nations.

The above analyses shows how the meaning of a word –the nation– has changed and how these changes are provoked in the course of time by changing conditions. It also reveals that the word nation has been used to describe groups of people that, no matter how loosely defined, had certain similarities, most common of which similarity of birth. This does not tell us that there were nations as we define them today in earlier times. But it does tell us two things. Firstly, that the meaning of the nation as used today is not a modern invention and it is not irrelevant to its roots, that is to criteria of sameness by birth, language etc. Secondly, irrespective of the term used, group categorisation according to, primarily, territorial origin, and then language or other criteria of similarity is a characteristic ubiquitous in human societies. This is also an external categorisation but we can suggest that it is due to the initial self-identification with the *patria* and the familiar group –which then provokes external categorisation. This means that people highly evaluate their origin (as sentimentally important), and thus consider it important when defining other people as well.

Let us now consider for a while the distinction between nations and *ethnè*. According to the common use of the words, nations have a "designated homeland" and "mass public culture", while *ethnè* have "some link with a historic territory" (Smith, 1995a:56-7); the former have common economy and equal rights and duties for all members, which the latter lack; nations have a particular language, while *ethnè* have dialects (Hastings, 1997:12); also, members of national groups are self-aware of their distinctiveness and

recognise each other as members of the same nation, while the ethnic group is not a self-conscious group (Connor, 1994:43). At the same time, what characterises both is common cultural identity, shared myths and historical memories, common language (or dialect?) and often religion. We can see from the differences and similarities mentioned above that their major distinction is made because the nation is defined as 'nation-state': it is more organised and systematised as a result of been congruent with the modern state.

It follows that what distinguishes the nation and the ethnic group is the 'merging' of the former with the state. This is not a trivial, inconsequential distinction. The state is not solely the agency that monopolises violence within society (as Weber and Giddens define it); it also organises the law system and citizenship rights, and the economic function within a specifically delineated area, and it systematises the diffusion of a single common language and public culture to a mass population. Thus, the fusion with the modern state renders the nation a more concrete and stable community. It protects it from external threat and internal erosion; it systematises and transmits its language; and, it organises and regulates the common living of the nation, which is more loose and fluid for an ethnic group. This fluidity becomes a threat for ethnic groups in a world of national states as it renders them 'fragile'. This distinction between nations and ethnic groups is of great importance, as it makes a big difference for two cultural groups if the one is 'merged' with a state apparatus¹¹. Let alone the importance of such merging with the modern state: as argued elsewhere¹², the transformation of the state in modernity was an important factor in the success of nationalism itself, a success largely due to the organisation and systematisation of dispersed communities and fluid cultural groups in one nation.

Another distinguishing factor between the nation and the ethnic group is the *aspiration* to merge with one's own state. This is the self-consciousness of the group: a nation does not exist if its members are not aware of it, of its existence, or of their distinctiveness (Connor, 1994:43). In modernity when a

¹¹ There are also consequences for people's identities as well, but we shall refer to them in the following section.

group identifies itself as a nation it usually wants to receive international recognition, and thus aspires to capture its own state (i.e. the Basques and the Kurds), or to have some degree of political autonomy within a state (i.e. the Catalans, the Scots). An *ethnie* is in a sense a community that precedes the nation, and the 'nation-state'. Smith argues that there is "a continuing relevance and power of pre-modern ethnic ties and sentiments in providing a firm base for the nation-to-be" (1995a:40). In a similar line Hastings argues that nations come from certain ethnicities and that "ethnicities naturally turn into nations or integral elements within nations" when vernacular becomes written language (Hastings, 1997:12). To the extent, however, that the nation is in essence identified as ethnicity-and-state in one, as 'nation-state', we can argue that the nation is an ethnic group internationally recognised as a nation, as having its 'own' modern state, or been justified in claiming for one, or being part of a multi-national state. Self-consciousness, that turns *ethnē* into nations, can come from 'below', from an augmented self-awareness of the group; it may not come at all, though, and then the ethnic group may vanish or be absorbed. But, it can also come from above, when the state precedes the nation and appeals to national or ethnic identities in order to gain loyalty. In this case it is not self-awareness, however, but imposed or ascribed 'awareness'.

As Connor argues, nations cannot be defined in reference to their tangible characteristics, such as language, religion, territory etc, which are symptoms of the nations and not their essence. Nations, he argues, are self-defined groups of people who believe they are ancestrally related. "The essence of a nation is intangible... This essence is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious¹³ of its members, from all other people in a most vital way" (Connor, 1994:92). This strong psychological bond inscribed in the unconscious of individuals is rather their national identity, we would suggest, their own self-categorisation and understanding of being part of a nation. It is also the essence of national identity that is intangible. The nation

¹² Chapter 3, pp.92-93.

¹³ The term "subconscious" is a mistaken popularisation of the proper Freudian term "unconscious".

is defined by certain characteristics but they are not essential for the national identity one acquires, meaning that identification with the nation is not provoked because of these tangible characteristics. Identity is grounded on the constitutive structures of individuals themselves and influenced by external circumstances; but these circumstances are subject to a number of political and other criteria and, thus, do not apply to all people alike. As it was indicated earlier¹⁴, a particular religion may be historically attached to a nation, but one who is not a believer will not be less attached to his/her nation than those who are. Identification with the nation one is born and bred in comes irrespectively of the definitive characteristics of the nation. So, language, territory, (perceived or real) common ancestry, common myths and history, shared customs and religious or other beliefs are the definitive characteristics of a particular nation each time –some of them or all of them simultaneously– but not the definitive characteristics of a person's national identity.

National and Ethnic Identity

In the previous chapter on identification, the terms national and ethnic identities were often used as if they were the same. That is because of two reasons. First, the mechanisms of identification are the same for all individuals; there may be different forms and expressions through time and space, but individual subjectivity is universal. Second, both identities serve the same needs and desires: sense of belonging, sense of self-worth and value, protection from external threats, etc. Thus, by using them interchangeably I intended to stress the psychological similarity of identification with an ethnic and national group that generates family-type attachments. Nevertheless, national identity in modernity, which is also an era of nationalism, is somewhat different from ethnic identity. Identification with the nation as *nation-state* differs from identification with the nation as ethnic group, and their greatest differences come from the *institutionalised* character of national identity.

¹⁴ In chapter 3, page 96.

In the era of nationalism and of 'nation-states', national identity is not just a derivative of social and group identifications: it is a process highly organised and systematised through political organisation. That is because, and largely when, the nation is fused with the state. Nations that aspire for self-determination can have a high sense of national identity, as the Kurdish and Tibetan examples indicate, but the actual realisation of their aspiration is a great leap forward. As the greatest difference of nations and ethnic groups lays in the formers' capturing (or being captured by) the state, this also accounts for the greatest difference of national and ethnic identities. National identity is attributed in a sense and then constantly reminded by the organised means of the national state. National states often capture large territories, where common identities cannot be formed by local, direct contact; thus, it is the institutionalisation of the nation as national state and the constant scheduling of its maintenance and continuation that makes national identity not really something essentially different, but certainly something *more* than ethnic identity. Some initial elements –crucial though– of one's national identity are internalised by the parents and the direct social environment of the infant during its first years of life. Thereafter, when the state undertakes the role to induce children with a stable, solid identity, it enhances and strengthens the whole process of national identification. This is mainly done so through education. Largely influencing are the mass media too, which both form and remind nationhood. In addition, the military apparatus and men's (in most cases) military service, literature, political rhetoric etc. fulfill this role.

Let us briefly refer to education, the mass media and the elites as the main providers and/or manipulators of people's national identity. Main, of course, only when referring to an age of five and more, because the parents and the relation with them are of most importance before that age. In general, the parents themselves transmit a number of familiar images of their own childhood and upbringing.

Education

Education is unquestionably one of the most important processes in someone's life, as it provides a space for socialisation, and it is in many ways

responsible for the qualities and qualifications people have in their lives. Mass education, specifically, is a recent development, that started in about the late 18th and early 19th century. As mass education has become a concern of the national state, it provides –directly or not– the means for identification with the national group. In fact, through education in all levels, the state contributes significantly to the formation of national identity. We shall refer here to three aspects of national-oriented education: school teaching, language, and sports¹⁵.

As Zerubavel argues, “schools play a prominent role in the socialisation of national traditions” (1995:6). In early childhood education (from nurseries to first grade schools), children “learn about major historical figures and events from stories, poems, school plays and songs. These genres often blend facts with fiction and history with legend, for this colorful blend is believed to blend literature more appealing for the very young. These commemorations contribute to the early formation of sentiments and ideas about the past that might persist even in the face of a latter exposure to history” (1995:6). This shows that the collective unconscious of a nation is not just the one they learn from history courses, but also the perceptions they have of it since childhood.

Apart from perceptions of national history one may have from narratives and myths, history taught in latter classes (i.e. high school) is mostly subjective and nation-oriented when it refers to national issues; in fact, it does not come in contradiction to myths and perceptions one may have from nurseries. In real history it is rarely the case that one side is always and totally right or always good. However, national histories tend to present those aspects that are in favour of the national group. This happens through certain omissions and modifications brought about in the presentation of the facts that result in the schematisation of perceptions towards a specifically determined view that favours the nation –each given nation. Christos Katsikas¹⁶ (2002), in his article

¹⁵ All of three aspects can be relevant, or contain elements that are also relevant in the life of a grown-up, beyond education. Sports, for example, is not only an aspect of education, in the sense that they may concern everybody; however, they are initially introduced to children and, so, we shall analyse it in the context of education.

¹⁶ Christos Katsikas is the author of several books concerning education, and the Greek educational system in particular; the most relevant to our subject are *Dodeka Mythi tis Ekpaidefsis* (Twelve Myths of Education), Tramakia publications (199?), and *Ta Paramythia tis Sholikis mas Zois* (The Tales of our School Lives), Ellinika Gramata publications, 1999.

concerning ‘The Image of the Other: the 1921 Revolution in the History Textbooks of Greece and Turkey’, argues that wars, massacres and injustices are presented as a national characteristic of the Other (nation). According to Katsikas, despite the tendency towards amelioration of history textbooks according to UNESCO’s recommendations¹⁷, the contemptuous description that constructs the image of the other, hostile nation as ‘a nation of evil’ is evident to the eyes of the analyst. In that way, autarchic governments, imperialism, violence etc. are naturalised as characteristics of the ‘bad’ enemy instead of been presented as social and historical phenomena. History is thus displaced and substituted by *memory* –a memory selective, that uses hyperbole in certain aspects and events or keeps silent in others, as Katsikas describes– which becomes a commonly used word that serves the need of the present and is determined by present relations between nations. For example, the Greek revolution of 1921, that led to the creation of the Greek national state and largely initiated the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, is presented in Greek textbooks as the absolute expression of freedom and self-determination of an oppressed nation by the barbaric ‘Turk’; the same event is presented in Turkish textbooks as the result of foreign intervention in the affairs of the Empire, but also as an initiative of a nation that was the most privileged and affluent in the Empire and, hence, the most ungrateful and greedy, bellicose and expansionist by definition.

Such perceptions are enhanced and supported through rituals and myths. Rituals involve national anniversaries, celebrations and parades where children are invited to say poems that glorify the national cause, to sing songs that pay tribute to the ‘great heroes’, and to march behind the waving flag. Myths and narratives render the desired message more appealing, while they contribute to its effortless reception in the unconscious, as history is presented in a way that can be easily ‘accommodated’ in the unconscious structures. It is interesting to remark at this point that, while these myths and rituals are present through education (along with history teaching), they are also apparent in latter life as

¹⁷ In the Recommendation for education (article 15, 1974), UNESCO stresses that history textbooks must present all the determinants behind a dispute or conflict among nations so as to reveal the real interests of nations and groups that monopolise economic and political power and foster conflicts.

well, where they serve to ‘remind nationhood’ and maintain attachment to the nation in the whole life of an individual. These rituals and anniversaries, such as USA’s and Myanmar’s Independence Day (4th of July, 4th of January), Norway’s Constitution Day (17th of May), China’s Grand National Day (18th of September), involve parades and other celebrations, which are organised by the state and in which schools and the army are most commonly involved. Indeed, almost all of the contemporary national states hold such celebrations and rituals, with the exceptions of Russia, Yugoslavia, East Timor and Belarus (which are newly-born, but hold several local celebrations and rituals), Western Sahara (whose legal status of the territory is still unresolved), a few Pacific-island states (Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu), and the notable exception of Britain.

So, we see in history learning three main processes. One is the modification or selective presentation of historical facts in a way that conceals those aspects that are not in favour or are controversial for the nation. Second, there is a reconstruction of historical myths and narratives that strongly appeals to the unconscious drives as they create a good image for ‘us’ and bad image for ‘them’, idolise persons and make them heroes who manage to defeat the – usually much more numerous and barbaric– others. Third, rituals and commemorations help foster and maintain these images. The specific message conveyed depends on the context and historical period that it is employed. For example, in the early 19th century Britain, education was celebrating masculine heroism as an expression of Britishness¹⁸, while in 20th century Myanmar children take part in the celebrations of the Independence Day (that start on the 4th of January and last for a week), a national holiday in memory of gaining independence from the British colonial reign¹⁹.

Education fosters nationhood in an additional way: through language. Language does not only provide the means for communication and the means to educate a given population: it is by itself a “fundamental attribute of self-

¹⁸ For an analysis of the transition from private to mass education in Britain, see Colley, 1992, chapter 4.

¹⁹ These two examples are selectively chosen so as to show the connection between events and perceptions among countries, irrespective of their temporal and spatial remoteness.

recognition” (1997:52), as Castells argues, and the most distinctive barrier of nationality. It is very important because it conveys our desires and it acts as a ‘vehicle’ that transports people’s wishes to the outside world: “it provides a linkage between the private and the public sphere” (Castells, 1997:52). It is also the first determinant, the first distinctive element of one’s nationality. As Anderson (1991) argues, language is the external and visible badge of these differences that distinguish one nation from another, and the most important criterion by which a nation is recognised to exist.

Language is of major importance not only as an attribute of self-recognition, but also as a means of socialisation for children into speaking a single or common national language. For example, the translation of the Bible by Luther, which became very popular in a very short time, facilitated German unification because it provided the Germans with a single German language (Wittels, 1954:271-7). The transmission of one communication code, a language, among the members of a delineated territory is essential for their unification in a single state, and in a single nation too²⁰. Certainly, there are several examples where there is one common official language and yet the coherence or existence of the given national state is questioned (i.e. Spain, UK, Canada). However, these cases –mainly instances of multinational/multiethnic states– actually verify the argument that language is an important unifying factor for a state and a nation, only that the two are not equated in practice, meaning that most states are composed by more than one nations. More explicitly, in these cases the *states* are unified under a single language; however, their *national* coherence and unity is undermined by other, existing languages (or dialects?) that serve as uniting bonds for the nations within these multinational states. This importance of language in uniting nations can be shown, for example, in Quebecois’ perceptions and claims to national distinctiveness: the French language is a distinctive barrier for those who perceive themselves as distinct from the rest of Canadians, but also a uniting bond among the Quebecois. On the other hand, there are few cases where there

²⁰ Hastings (1997) and Anderson (1991) are two prominent scholars that have analysed the function of language as a factor contributing to national unification.

are two officially recognised languages (i.e. The Netherlands) and yet the national coherence is not undermined. Thus, language serves as a feature that socialises and integrates people into their nations; yet, its efficacy varies according to the character of the state and the existence or not of multiple nations within it.

Languages are former dialects, or a combination of dialects. Their difference is that languages are written and so they can be transmitted outside the borders of a local community. As stressed by the German example (the translation of the Bible by Luther), the more a written language develops a literature, the more it can unite a nation. According to Renan (1996), language does not necessarily unite people, however, as the examples of US and Britain, and Latin America or even Spain show. Not necessarily indeed, for other factors play a significant role. But, the transition from dialects to written vernaculars has been a unifying process that largely contributed to the formation of the national state. Contingency has played its role in this process to a large extent, for the criteria out of which a dialect becomes a language are not specified. Dialect is a new concept, Billing argues, and it today connotes the fact that “not all speakers of a language speak the same way” (1995:31). Their difference is not specified, as it is not easy to decide if two languages are different or they are two dialects of the same language. Haugen has suggested that, “a dialect is frequently a language which did not succeed politically” in becoming a language²¹. Thus language is a very important element of national identity, much more so than it is for ethnic identity; an ethnic dialect may not ‘succeed’ politically or even be absorbed and forgotten. Whole ethnic groups can ‘disappear’ like this.

Last, we should refer to sports. Sports are a very important component of education because they involve physical exercise and could thus be an indispensable aspect in the process of sublimation, in the diversion of drives towards socially constructive ends. For example, according to Langman, American superbowl is a substitute for actual territorial competitive violence, “a simulation of phallic aggression and male combat” (2001:201); through this

²¹ Haugen, ‘Dialect, Language, nation’, *American Anthropologist*, 68, 1966, quoted in Billing, 1995:32.

simulation it can act as to displace violence and move the ‘battle’ in the football field (p.205-6). Similar was the idea, and implementation, of the Olympic Truce in 8th century b.c., which was been put in force seven days prior and after the Olympic Games where the athletes could compete with one another in sports.

It seems, however, that the efficacy of sports as a *replacement* of violent conflict is contested by views that envisage their contemporary practice as a *preparation* for the battlefield in the name of a national cause. Billing locates sports in those processes that constitute the daily banal preparation of nations to sacrifice for their ‘causes’ and are at the same time bearers of nationhood (1995:124). Indicatively, athletes have been reported as saying about a sport event that “when your country needs you...you cannot say no”, or that “this was a do-or-die situation. The tour had to be saved” (in Billing, 1995:124), thus articulating a warfare rhetoric. Indeed, it is evident in international contestations that identification with the national team comes as a natural outcome and, also, victory becomes a matter of national pride, particularly when the other national team is that of an ‘everlasting enemy’. After the end of the (contemporary) Olympic games, for example, each nation counts its national successes while the gold medals confer a symbol of national pride –or humiliation. I can still remember the speaker on the radio saying, when a Greek athlete won the gold medal in weight-lifting in 2000, that ‘today all Greeks are golden champions with him...’.

These images are largely transmitted through the mass media²². As Billing concludes from a survey on newspapers’ rhetoric, “personal sacrifice in the cause of the nation was applauded on the sports pages” (1995:124) and constituted a major part in nationalistic rhetoric. Similarly Lasch describes what he calls ‘the cult of victory’, meaning that the “mania for winning has encouraged an exaggerated emphasis on the competitive side of sport...” (1980:103). Lasch ascribes this exaggerated emphasis on the media, which in the pursuit for profitable topics have connected spectatorship with violence and

²² We shall refer to the mass media right below, but let us make this reference here in direct connection to the issue of sports.

competition. In such a context, where sports are used as an additional way to appeal to the co-nationals and transmit nationalistic values, sports are incorporated into the process of national identification; in Hobsbawm words, they are “a medium for national identification” (1983:300)²³. Thus, sport activities in school cannot be indifferent to the wider context and values praised in the wider society. At the same time, however, sports function in this way both during and beyond education.

Mass Communication Media

By media of mass communication we mean the media that transmit news and information, and offer entertainment as well; we refer here to radio, newspapers and television²⁴. The mass media act mostly as reminders of nationhood, but they also influence individuals and groups further to a large extent. That happens because they convey meanings to a large population and reference points for the nations. The mass media are nationally focused, no matter how internationalised their means of transmission and organisation are. Not only because they ‘speak’ a national language, but, as Smith argues, because through them “the world is largely seen through the lens of one’s nation state” (1995a:93). For example, “Britons Killed” was the headline of a British newspaper when an airplane crashed in Taiwan and more than a hundred people were killed or injured, only four of them being British²⁵.

“Propaganda and advertising transmitted by mass media... have the real aim of mobilising narcissistic needs and offering means of narcissistic

²³ For analyses on sports and their role and transformation since the late 19th century see Hobsbawm, 1983:288-303, Billing, 1995:123-7, Lasch, 1980:100-123, and Langman, 2001:201-8.

²⁴ I will refer only to these media here and not to the Internet because, first, these are the ones widely transmitted up to now and the ones that exert the widest influence, and second because the internet has been used a means of information and communication in adolescence and beyond until now and so, as it is not used by very young children, its influence is less determinative than that of other media (earlier images and internalisations are most determinative in later life, as it has been argued). A third reason why we shall not refer to the Internet is that it has an international character and, also, it is highly ‘egalitarian’ in the sense that each one can create a site of his/her interest while access to it is as easy to everybody as access to a governmental site etc. So, there are significant particularities of the Internet that have not been subject to adequate scientific research, let alone from the specific perspective of this thesis.

²⁵ Evening Standard, November 1st, 2000. I shall refer in more detail and present certain relevant data regarding the national orientation of the mass media in chapter 6, pp.233-239.

gratification”, writes Parin (1988:127), particularly connecting it with consumerism, on an individual scale. On the national scale, mass media offer narcissistic gratification by using a nationalistic language that appeals more to the sentiments of the co-nationals: the media transmit dramatised images and organise the national imaginary through distance. Ethnocentrism and ‘patriotism’ are standard rhetorics used in the ‘News’, for instance (Demertzis, 1996:335-7). Billing writes: “Anderson is surely correct in stressing the importance of newspapers in the reproduction of nationality. They operate directly through their messages, stereotypes and deictics, rather than by setting up the possibility of what Freud called ‘secondary identification’, or a perceived feeling of similarity” (1995:125). Secondary identification, however, is initiated before one reads newspapers: a feeling of similarity is already perceived, which is the reason why newspapers can transmit their stereotypes so easily.

Another important issue is that the mass media (particularly television) exert great influence upon individuals. This is not so because individuals are passive receivers of the television images, but mainly because the media have the power to make the selection of the issues for discussion and to impose them on the public sphere. Citizens today are largely under the influence of the mass media and submitted to their power. To the extent that the ‘agenda setting’ is decided with criteria of appeal and easy reception by the public –leaving aside political and economic criteria– their content is mainly national, while it can occasionally be nationalistic. Of course, as Demertzis argues, their influence can be a matter of circumstances, such as the international contingency, the media’s competition, their status (private or state controlled), the influence of nationalism on public culture, etc (1996:377). In any case, however, they exert great influence and largely contribute to the formation and, particularly, maintenance of nationality. This is the reason why politicians today use the media, particularly television, to address the nation.

Elite and Mass Manipulation

By the term 'elites' we refer to intellectuals and politicians. The role of elites in the construction and reproduction of nationhood is an issue largely discussed: the critique that originates mainly from scholars of the modernist strand has orientated the contemporary discussion towards the direction of considering nationhood as the outcome of a deliberate action of mass manipulation. This has often been the case, indeed, particularly in current politics; as studies have proliferated, there is a wide field of knowledge about the ways to mobilise people. However, there is an aspect of that matter that is largely ignored, and it should be useful to refer to it –although this does not mean that the aspect of deliberate manipulation is of less importance. The additional aspect is that the elites themselves are often strongly identified with the nation, and their promotion of nationhood is not always a deliberate action but their effort to promote and secure their nation and their national identity.

To begin with, it is both reasonable and predictable that the elites regulate much of the 'nation-states' functions and apparatuses; they are those who have the means, the education and the position to do so; they, by definition, influence people and politics. It is the elites, particularly the intelligentsia, Smith argues, "who guard and run the cultural and educational institutions... they do so not just in terms of their material and status interests, but as an expression and embodiment of the identity, unity and autonomy of the people of the nation, who are generally represented by ethnic intellectuals and professionals who direct the nation's cultural policies and authenticate its heritage, culture and symbols on behalf of 'the people'" (Smith, 1995a:100). They are also the ones who were first inspired by the nationalistic ideal and gave birth to the ideology of nationalism; it is the role of the intelligentsia to systematise mentalities and culture, and thus 'produce' ideologies, the ideology of nationalism included²⁶. Elites have a weight in shaping national identities, but they are also influenced by previous perceptions of national identity themselves. As historians and intellectuals search in their past to find their origins, their perceptions and ideas pass on to wider strata of population.

²⁶ On the transformation of mentalities to ideologies see Lipowatz and Demertzis, 1994:66-69.

Archives, for instance, that historians use today are biased to some extent and are products of nationalistic predilection: in a study on ‘Libraries as a Locus of Cultural memories’, Traister shows that, the materials available for study are themselves a construction, a selection made prior to historians (1999:220).

Nationalistic rhetoric is evident in contemporary politics, and it is uttered in a way that is largely organised and planned in advance, independently of whether the politicians are themselves nationalists or not. Today all rulers, including dictators, claim ‘national legitimacy’ for their governance. There is a whole set of professional advertisers and image makers who know how to appeal to people and are, thus, indispensable to the politicians, even if they are themselves sometimes biased and subject to nationalistic and other stereotypes. Yet, the psychological factor is always determinative for an extreme nationalistic rhetoric to be influencing, although circumstances have to match as well. For example, people will react eagerly when the national image is threatened, because the national image corresponds to the good image of oneself. Similarly, when the good image is damaged, people are led into depression and inhibition. Le Pen’s nationalism has taken advantage of such depression and inhibition, as Kristeva (1993) stresses the example. The national image can be most commonly hurt when national pride is hurt. “National pride”, Kristeva argues, “is comparable to the good narcissistic image of the child” (1993:37). National pride gets hurt when a shameful event occurs; and, “shame easily turns to anger” (Billing, 1995:101). Anger is directed against those who caused the suffering, the enemies. A scapegoat is not difficult to be found: Le Pen’s scapegoats are the foreigners. Certainly, not many people have followed Le Pen thus far, but in certain contexts his rhetoric can become more widespread and successful²⁷.

So, my argument is that there are certain cases that elites are influenced by nationalism while it is also true that nationalistic rhetoric and stereotypes are used deliberately. Nationalism and nationalistic rhetoric seems to have become a constantly used means of manipulating propaganda, particularly in

²⁷ For example, in a context of great uncertainty and insecurity such extreme political positions may become the receivers of despair, as it will be argued in chapter 6.

serving the personal interests of politicians through manipulation of their 'own' people, even when they do share the same national identity. That happens because, 'playing the patriotic card' has proved to be a valuable weapon of political propaganda. At the same time, however, it would be inconsistent to believe that the elites can (always) escape the influence of nationalistic messages and manipulate them with composure in order to achieve its political or economic goals, since these messages find fertile ground in the unconscious desires of every individual.

* * *

To conclude, national and ethnic identities are different in their potentials and dynamics, although they originate in the same type of groupings and the process of identification with these groups is qualitatively similar. The main reason is that national identity is also a political identity. Through the state, national identity is preserved, advocated, enhanced, and occasionally manipulated, while it acquires additional strength because of the transformed structure of the state in modernity. National identity is not invented as such, but its strength and spread are created and, to some extent, imposed. In the shadow of such dynamics, the potentials of ethnic identity are either to strive in order to become national identity (that is, for an ethnic group to become national state), or to remain marginalised or oppressed; that is, to be recognised or to be absorbed. In the era of nationalism, however, ethnic groups are more likely to strive towards recognition as a minimum guarantee for their existence, due to the widespread influence of the political ideology of nationalism.

Nationalism has changed the political arena and has thus mobilised people's identifications and loyalties. As a sentiment is a large-scale systematised loyalty. By large-scale we mean that it has transferred loyalty from local communities to much bigger ones, to societies that it 'dresses up' as big communities. It has altered localism and regionalism to nationalism. Not that people today lack their narrower affiliations, towards their native town or

village for instance. In reality, these attachments are equally strong sentimentally²⁸. These local attachments have been formed in a fluid way, but they are very strong because they constitute the familiar environment of birth and belonging. Simultaneously, people learn to be equally attached to their co-nationals –even if they have never met. So, while people are attached to their ‘private homeland’ because of the perceptions they have about it and about its inhabitants, they also become artificially attached to the wider perceptions and peoples of their nation. Thus, a Parisian and a southern French peasant are sentimentally united in an imagined way. Their common identity is national identity. In that sense, nationalism is a large scale and systematised localism/regionalism.

Why has Nationalism Appeared in Modernity?

So, what are the reasons for the emergence of nationalism in modernity? This is a huge question and its full account would probably require another thesis in itself. Nevertheless, the development of my previous argument has inevitably raised this question because, since nationalism has existed before as a sentiment, the question rises as to why has it only appeared as an ideology and a movement in modernity? So, what I intend to do is to briefly present the arguments already offered by well-known scholars in the field, and to briefly as well present my argument. The existing arguments will be briefly presented because this is a task already accomplished by other analysts²⁹: besides, this is not intended to be an elaborate presentation of the existing bibliography on the subject, neither a full critical assessment of them. I have examined nationalism to the extent that it was necessary for the analysis of national identity; however, the reasons for its occurrence in the modern era cannot contribute significantly

²⁸ The Eurobarometer survey has a question measuring the degree of attachment of the citizens of the European Union towards their country, their town/village, their region, and Europe. The responses have shown that, people feel attached by 89% to their country, 87% to their town/village, and 86% to their region [and 56% to Europe]. These are the results of Eurobarometer 51, Spring 1999, p.8, but the percentages remain similar throughout the 1990s.

²⁹ For a summary and critical assessment of the answers provided to the specific question of the emergence of nationalism in modernity see Hutchinson, 1994, chapter 1 (particularly pp.19-26), and Hastings, 1997, chapter 1.

to the further understanding of national identity and, thus, they will not be my focus. As it was indicated, it will only be referred to because it has risen as a question from my previous argumentation.

Gellner (1993) in his controversial yet influencing study on nationalism places its founding causes on industrialisation. The transition from stratified agrarian societies to the mobile industrial ones required a new and bigger labour force whose training had to be generic. This required an educational infrastructure so large that only the state could organise it. Thus, state and culture had to be linked. In a quite similar way, Hobsbawm (1990) argues that nationalism was necessitated by capitalism, which created the need for a mass population in a specific territorial and political unit speaking the same language that would be the fuel of capitalism. Two more developments largely contributed towards the creation of the nation, according to Hobsbawm: the democratisation of politics along with the attribution of voting rights to a mass of people, and the creation of the modern state along with its increasing ability to influence and mobilise the people. This last development is connected to his argument that nationalism was an efficient way used by the rising bourgeoisie in the capitalist system to unite separate parts of the people³⁰.

Some of the elements that appear in the analysis of Gellner and Hobsbawm are central causal factors in other analysis of the emergence of nationalism. The appearance of the modern state is on the focus for Breuille (1993), for whom nationalism is a form of politics that seeks to exercise or is already exercising state power. It is the state's inadequacies that generate nationalism, he argues, either through nationalist movements that try to capture state power, or through the use of nationalist arguments by the state in order to justify its policies. On the other hand, Anderson focuses on capitalism, though in connection with its "vernacularising thrust" (1991:39)³¹. Capitalism, print, and human linguistic diversity were the catalysts in creating national consciousness: capitalism assembled vernaculars and "created mechanically

³⁰ This must also be connected with his argument that since 1870 politicians and analysts discovered the importance of 'group psychology' because of the advanced studies of anthropology, social psychology and psychoanalysis. So, they realised that "whatever held human collectivities together it was not the rational calculation of their individual members" (Hobsbawm, 1983b:269).

reproduced print-languages capable of dissemination through the market” (Anderson, 1991:44), thus giving fixity to a language and a means of communication for diverse and separate people. This is, however, his argument about the emergence of national consciousness and not about nationalism, leaving their relation in fluidity. For example, we can infer from this that, as these conditions generated national consciousness, it was this national consciousness that gave rise to nationalism; but this does not fit with his argument that nationalism created the nations. Similarly, Hastings refers to the reasons that contributed to the rise of national consciousness, but he does not fall into this contradiction because he does not confine nations in modernity and he places the first nations in the Middle Ages. He actually argues that in the early period nations produced nationalisms as they grew self-conscious, while in the later period the process was reversed in several instances. Hastings also argues that nations grew “out of certain ethnicities, affected by the literary development of a vernacular and the pressures of the state” (1997:11). The production of a literature and, particularly, the translation of the Bible, have been central in Hasting’s analysis for the development of national consciousness. This is a meeting-point for Hastings and Anderson.

Other factors are stressed as well, like the end of religious community and dynastic realm, the impact of warfare in the shaping of ethnicities, the impact of the French Revolution, etc. One of the analysts that initially stressed the intellectual impact on the formation of nationalism is Kedourie (1994). Kedourie argues that it was the Enlightenment and its intellectual influence that largely contributed in the formation of nationalism, particularly the impact of Kant’s ideas. The logic of Kant’s doctrine is that the aim of man is to be free, autonomous and self-ruling. As the famous slogan later put it, Kant believed that “self-government...is better than good government” (Kedourie, 1994:22); this had the impact of placing the right of self-determination on the top of moral and political values, at any cost. Kedourie describes that post-Kantian philosophers deduced from this the idea of the state as being higher than any individual, and that the coming together of the two would be the realisation of

³¹ Anderson also asserts that nationalism is an American invention (see p.191).

individual freedom. Thus, eventually Kant's doctrine resulted in Fichte's postulation that "true individual freedom can be secured only in a state which regulates to the minutest detail the life of its citizens" (in Kedourie's words, 1994:31). So, Kedourie ascribes the responsibility for the emergence of nationalism to these intellectual developments.

All of the aforementioned arguments are, to a larger or lesser extent, correct while, at the same time, they cannot be applied in every case. An indicating example is the one of industrialisation: nationalism has emerged in many instances before industrialisation, and that leaves unexplained many cases where a nationalistic movement had already achieved its goal of establishing a national state while the society was still based on agrarian forms of production. Yet, an answer to the emergence of nationalism would be more accurately given if we separated its initial emergence and its secondary 'reproduction'. Nationalism first made its appearance in Western Europe and North America in the late 18th century and it was soon spread and had achieved its goals (meaning that it established national states) there. This same period and area was characterised by huge social, political and economic changes, which accounted for the 'transition' to modernity. These changes include industrialisation and capitalism, state-organised education, the development of print literacy and the transmission of certain vernaculars into universal languages, and the spread of electoral democracy along with mass politics. Which of the above was more or less a determinant can be a matter of further investigation, as well as whether nationalism was provoked or just coincided with any of the above changes.

From my study on the subject thus far, I believe that the development of print languages and literacy and the emergence of the modern state are of particular importance for nationalism at its initial stage. On the one hand, print-languages created a cohesive field of communication larger than the locality and rendered the members of the given language-group imaginable (the importance of language both as a distinctive barrier and as a defining element of similarity and identification has already been stressed). On the other hand, the state, along with democratisation and mass politics, had to justify its power

over all these people by claiming to speak on their behalf, to represent them, while it also had to unite the different and even conflicting interests of those people and groups. These two factors combined accounted for the transference of local and regional affiliations to greater ones, to the states, to national states. Thus, the nation would necessarily claim to be ruled by its own people, to have a state representative of its power.

“Nation formation is a process, not an occurrence”, as Connor argues (1994:219), and in the process the preconditions for its appearance have changed. Since the initial emergence of nationalism in the West, nationalism has spread and influenced the conduct of politics elsewhere –or perhaps everywhere. We can say that its subsequent occurrence elsewhere was to a large extent the outcome of its first emergence in the West. Two points support this argument. First, after the establishment of the national state in Western Europe and North America, nationalism as the right of self-determination was the political norm, intellectually sustained and positively evaluated. Second, the developed countries of the West were the most powerful in every respect and could influence and, even, impose, their politics and ideas upon other countries. Consequently, nationalistic politics were transferred to the ‘periphery’ in various ways; through the impact of nationalism on elites that had acquired western education; through the support of the Western national states to movements seeking national self-determination; through the indirect impact that these dominant countries had by setting the norm; or through their direct policies in colonised countries. For example, France, Britain and Russia largely supported the movement for national independence in 1821 in Greece, a movement initiated by intellectuals with mainly Western education, in the territory they claimed to constitute their national state. This is one of the many cases where nationalism emerged in a non-industrial country. Another example is Rwanda’s ethnic conflict, which has been created by the subjective interpretation and manipulation of the Hutu and Tutsi, which the Belgian colonial state defined as two distinct and opposing ethnic groups, although they were two distinct social and productive classes in direct contact and

interdependence³². Thus, the emergence of nationalism in the West was to a large extent a determinant for its subsequent appearance, its ‘secondary reproduction’ and success under different circumstances.

When Does Nationalism Actively Manifest Itself?

A general claim of the previous chapter(s) is that human psychology is predisposed to nationalistic-as-chauvinistic attitudes and that nationalism has found a fertile ground within human psyche, which is partly the reason for its great success. Partly, however, because nationalism has only been to the fore for a couple of centuries, and it has not manifested itself always and with the same activeness. As it was argued in the previous section, nationalism did not come to the fore before certain essential social, economic and other conditions were met. Now, we should provide some explanations as to why, within the era of nationalism, it occasionally becomes an active force and occasionally remains in a state of latency. The question, therefore, is what triggers the release of an actively aggressive nationalism as opposed to a mildly expressed one, and the shift from national identity to ‘nationalistic identity’? Why do we see some nations acting more nationalistically than others, or the same nation becoming actively nationalistic in a certain period throughout its history? It has been mentioned that the trigger can be certain ‘particular circumstances’, but this is a statement left unexplained. So, now we should refer in more detail to those circumstances that may give rise to nationalistic exaltations.

The Particular Circumstances

There are events that provoke big and direct changes in a society and, therefore, the society’s reaction, a reaction that can be a nationalistic one. These circumstances may be of economic, political, social, historical, or

³² For a brief overview of this case see Castells, 2000b:105-114.

individual nature. Many of them are interrelated and it is often difficult to distinguish between, and they can emerge simultaneously. However, the direction of the reaction is difficult to be predicted as the same event can provoke contradictory reactions. Thus, the analysis of similar past historical events is useful for the prediction of the possible reaction of a given society.

Economic circumstances mainly refer to major economic changes and crises. The economic situation in combination with the direction of possible economic changes and reforms is very important for the feeling of security of the people. In general, we can expect that severe and long-lasting economic uneasiness will generate frustration and sense of insecurity, which is a trigger for reactionary manifestations. The advancement towards capitalist economy, for example, initially gave rise to new elites who eventually advocated the creation of the national state. Economic reforms and the widening of the economy, however, have often posed a threat and provoked the fearful reactions of economic actors such as shopkeepers, small merchants, etc. Labour migration is another determinant of such reactions, easily combined with xenophobia, especially when the unemployment rate is high. Much depends, as Breuilly says, on the capability of the urban economy to accommodate, educate and employ its population: “competition for such resources, especially when they are scarce, is a major ingredient in creating and sustaining communal conflict” (1993:23).

Political circumstances vary from war, political and/or party system collapse, limited participation of a certain ethnic group (when there are more than one), the level of political participation and commitment to democratic values *and* methods³³, feelings of disdain against politicians in a democratic system, to external threats and/or interventions, and international contingencies. An unfair or humiliating treaty signed after a war is most likely to generate anger to a nation and, thus, put the foundations for future conflicts, as the example of post WW1 Germany most characteristically stresses. In addition, nationalism is very often generated as a reaction to a –real or

³³ That is, commitment not only in democratic values but also in democratic methods used in order to defend and strengthen these values.

perceived— threat or to the nationalistic demands of neighboring groups, as was the case with Magyar nationalism. Magyar nationalism (in the mid-18th century) was the response of a culturally dominant group to attempts at reform by the Habsburg government. These reforms were seen as a German threat to the Magyar position; this in turn promoted nationalistic response from subordinate groups, like the Croatians and the Rumanians³⁴. As for external threats and interventions, their direct impact is well known and there are many such examples, like the support of the French and the British to resistance and separatist movements within the Ottoman Empire, which strengthened them and helped towards their success. The external influence can, also, be more indirect but equally or even more influencing: such was the example that the German and Italian unification set in the nineteenth century by establishing the national state as the norm and initiated conflict in Europe and elsewhere³⁵.

Social circumstances refer to the composition of society, whether social, ethnic, religious or other, and to changes that have a general impact upon this society or to any particular group within it. I do not refer to any necessary relationship between particular social and economic groups and nationalism, because such relationship has not proved to exist, as Breuilly argues³⁶. I rather refer to the collaboration between different groups as opposed to polarisation, the involvement of religion to state's affairs and jurisdiction, etc. Social circumstances are the least distinguishable and independent of all the others. For example, discrimination against a minority group constitutes a social determinant that can generate nationalistic reactions, but it is usually combined with economic discrimination. However, an immigration influx can provoke reactions and social upset irrespective of the economic implications it may have. Religion is also a determinant that can be included in the political circumstances too, as it is a form of politics, but it is also a social determinant to the extent that it is a means of socialisation for many people. Thus, reforms aiming at secularisation of a traditional religious society may offend the

³⁴ On the Magyar case see Breuilly, 1993:125-131.

³⁵ In Breuilly, 1993:379, where he discusses the influence of certain nationalisms beyond their countries. Japanese nationalism is also one of them.

³⁶ See Breuilly, 1993, chapter 2.

religious sentiments of the believers and provoke their reaction to these reforms, as was the case with Muslims in the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century. Religion in Northern Ireland is a distinctive barrier between the Protestants and the Catholics, but it has generated (or has been generated by) other social and economic disparities (better jobs for the Protestants for example).

Social circumstances also include the *cultural* characteristics of a society, such as education, mass literacy, the development of civil society etc. As with an individual, the more educated the population of a nation is, the more difficult should it be to engage into an offensive nationalism. However, there are examples that indicate that this is not necessarily a condition and, so, the level of education cannot account as a determinant of the reluctance or not to engage into a nationalistic conflict when the feeling of national identity is threatened. Perhaps, an active and developed civil society, characterised by the interest and participation of the citizens into public affairs, could prove to be a positive mediator and discussant when a crisis occurs³⁷.

Another factor that determines the development of active nationalism is the *historical context* within which it develops. The historical context, like the cultural characteristic, differ from the other circumstances in that they do not give rise to a conflict immediately, they do not have a direct outcome. They rather set the foundations upon which later conflicts can develop. Thus, the conflict between Greece and FYROM over the name 'Macedonia' did not occur as suddenly in the 1990's as many thought: it had started as a dispute between Greece and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (because it named one of its provinces 'Macedonia') after the second world war, but it was not further stressed at that time because of Western pressures over Greece, in an effort to support Tito's Yugoslavia and his remoteness from the Soviet Union. As soon as Yugoslavia broke into pieces, the dispute with the newly emerged state (re)appeared. Historical contexts show that people will respond to nationalism as long as the message conveyed is relevant to their history, if it thus meets a felt.

³⁷ This determinant is both a political and social one.

Last, we should refer to the *individual* circumstances, meaning the role of persons in the development of nationalism, and more specifically the role of elites and the role of leaders. The role of elites in generating nationalism is largely discussed, as it is the intellectuals that are the conveyors of ideologies in general, but also those who have very often given rise to nationalist movements. What is less discussed is the important role a certain leading personality, usually charismatic, plays in mobilising a nation. It was Gandhi, for example, who transformed an elitist, Congress-based nationalism into a popular, mass-based anti-colonial nationalism in India. It was Hitler who transmitted a strong, heroic image and gained support to a party without having any concrete policy. I am not asserting that it was, in these and other cases, the role of the leader alone that generated an active nationalism, but that their presence was of determinative importance, while assisted by the occurrence of other circumstances as well.

These are the economic, political, social, historical and individual circumstances that can become the trigger in transforming a mild nationalist into an extreme one (and vice versa), or generate an aggressive nationalism or an active liberation movement. In general, these circumstances refer to any external occurrence that would provoke internal uneasiness, meaning situations that may alter peoples' psychological balance by posing a threat, or altering the familiar circumstances to an unknown and uncertain situation. Fear and uncertainty is a major threat to social and political stability. Usually, the occurrence of just one of the particular circumstances is not enough to provoke extreme nationalistic reactions, while in most cases there is a combination of circumstances behind an unforeseen event. Let me stress the example of Nazi Germany, because it is very characteristic in combining most of the aforementioned circumstances.

Germany had suffered a heavy blow after its defeat in the First World War and a bad economic setback both because of the war and because of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (June 1919), which left no ground for the development of the German economy. Both the defeat and the humiliating treatment after the settlement were a stigma for the Germans. Fascism begun as

a response to the threats posed from the Left, threats more perceived than real, though, as the left was fragmented between the socialists and the communists. Although most political parties of the Weimar republic were committed to parliamentary democracy, the Germans were eventually disappointed by them for three main reasons: first, many decision areas were left outside parliamentary control (to the army and police, employers and trade unions); second, the lack of a party representing the Protestant, the conservative and the non-working class created a political vacuum; third, there was fragmentation, not only within the Left but among the rest of the political spectrum, which was partly responsible for the lack of collaboration against the fascist threat. Within that context, the two contingencies of the depression of 1929-30 and of the involvement of Hitler into politics, which followed the public disappointment over parliamentary effectiveness, were decisive for the German support for the fascism. This was not so much a support for the Nazi party, as it had no schedule or program and it initially addressed even to the working class; it was rather a desperate option. As Breuille argues, the Nazi party "... was the beneficiary of the failure of other parties, ...a single party unattained by power, with a strong looking leader...that led voters to it" (1993:298)³⁸.

Thus, we can see how these particular economic, political and individual circumstances were synthesised in the German case and gave this disastrous historical example known to everybody. No less relevant is, at the same time, the centrality of racism in favour of the Aryan race and against the Jews (and Romas, homosexuals, and communists, though to a lesser extent) in German nationalism. Racism and anti-Semitism were part of Hitler's stance even before he came into power³⁹, but they were also 'embraced' by many Germans who actively engaged to this dehumanising 'final solution'. It is important to add an additional element about the historical context of this case. In his study about invented traditions, Hobsbawm refers to the second German Empire and its founding acts, which attempted to stress its continuity with the first Empire and

³⁸ Most of the information on Germany is taken from the comprehensive historical study of Breuille, 1993:291-307.

³⁹ His racism and Anti-Semitism was already expressed in his book *Mein Kampf*. Consequently, these views were not a convenient ideologisation of an appealing propaganda, but were views that had strongly appealed to Hitler himself.

the historical links between Prussia and Germany that brought them together in the new Empire in 1871. These attempts, however, could not be historically sustained, so two devices were used: the use of a secular national enemy, and “the concept of conquest or cultural, political and military supremacy” (Hobsbawm, 1983b:274). To the extent that these devices were used at the founding moments of the second German Empire, they constituted a basic perception of the German national identity. Hitler appealed exactly to these perceptions with the use of, actually, two secular and internal enemies (the communists and, mainly, the Jews), by stressing the racial superiority of the Germans, and by appealing to military ethos. The psychological appeal this propaganda had upon the, frustrated and disappointed, Germans is obvious, for reasons stressed in the previous chapters.

Particular Circumstances and the Particularity of Each Case

These are the circumstances that can provoke nationalistic eruptions as outlined above. Yet, they can be of relative help in arriving at a conclusion of when and how a certain type of nationalism (mild or militant, passive or active, etc.) will emerge. To begin with, each of these circumstances does not *necessarily* provoke a nationalistic reaction. The political vacuum created by the lack of representation for certain groups in Germany contributed in the development of extreme nationalistic (and racist) politics, but this was not the case in Italy, where nationalistic groups failed to fill in effectively the political vacuum created by the political breakdown in 1848. Secondly, even when these circumstances do provoke a nationalistic reaction, it is difficult to know in advance the direction it will take. For example, we saw that economic changes towards a capitalistic economy, on the one hand, created a new elite supporting these changes and, on the other, provoked the reactions of the small merchants and shopkeepers who were threatened by such changes. Thirdly, and most importantly, these particular circumstances as a whole are too vague and general to provide a sort of ‘typology’ for the emergence of nationalism, in the

sense that they include almost every social, political, economic or other condition so that they lose their specificity.

So, can we be more specific about these particular circumstances? The answer is negative as long as we discuss the emergence of nationalism in general and not in connection to a specific case-study. Conversely, we can be very specific about which particular set of events provoked what reaction and when, but only when we examine and analyse a particular case. Yet, the attempt at generalisation is derived from the conclusions drawn from specific cases: it is through the analysis of case-studies that we draw certain general conclusions and arrive at a broader account of 'particular circumstances' that generate nationalisms. These, however, are not exhaustive and do not consider exceptional cases. They can be useful points of attention when examining the emergence of nationalism in a particular country, but they can be misleading if used in order to apply them 'generally', to explain or predict nationalistic eruptions in a broadly valid theory that will aspire to become a typology. So, in such a theoretical account of the reasons that can generate nationalism, this seemingly lack of specificity does not correspond to a lack of precision. The most concrete conclusion can be that, in circumstances that provoke feelings of threat and uneasiness among the people, one has to be cautious about the direction that a reaction to these feelings may take, and about the alternative outlets that might become the receivers of disappointment, as retrogressive reactions are most likely to be advanced or provoked by such feelings and/or their manipulation⁴⁰.

This last remark stresses the importance of fear and uncertainty in creating defensive reactions. These feelings provoke uneasiness and displeasure, and they can turn out to be the foundations for anger. Another important, similar factor, that was briefly referred to a few paragraphs above but should be rather emphasised, is the role of humiliation and hostile or even unfair treatment by other nations. As stressed with the example of Germany, a humiliating treaty signed after a war can leave its 'mark' on the collective

unconscious of a nation and become the source for aggressive reactions in the future. Yet, the determinant of humiliation does not only refer to the specific historical point of warfare and its termination with a treaty. It also refers to negative perceptions, images and attitudes that may be widely articulated on behalf of a nation or a group of nations against another (group of) nation(s). Such perceptions –that often come as projections of the negative aspects of those who convey them and thus sustain their own positive self-image– enrich nationalistic discourse of the ‘contempered’ nation/region with rejection and repudiation of the ‘conveyors’ and create a self-image in reaction to them. In his analysis of nationalism, Isaiah Berlin (1990) examines the role of “wounds” and “collective humiliation” (p.245) in the manifestation of nationalism. As he argues, “to be the object of contempt or patronising tolerance on the part of proud neighbours is one of the most traumatic experiences that individuals of societies can suffer. The response, as often as not, is pathological exaggeration of one’s real or imaginary virtues, and resentment and hostility towards the proud, the happy, the successful. This, indeed, characterised much German feeling about the west, more especially about France, in the eighteenth century” (p.246)⁴¹.

The negative inscriptions in the collective unconscious of a nation can become at any time the foundation of aggressiveness, the basis upon which future nationalistic manifestation will develop –as is also the case with fear and uncertainty. As Langman argues, “the denial of loss of respect and dignity can foster shame and humiliation and this, in turn, may trigger rage, anger and violence in the attempt to ameliorate a loss of self-esteem” (2001:197). Yet, we cannot be very precise as to the exact reasons that provoke these feelings in each given period and place, even less so as far as the effect of a nationalistic

⁴⁰ If, for example, there is no political party to receive and accommodate the frustration of a given social, political, religious or other group, then it is more likely that this group will become subject to manipulation by non-parliamentary forces.

⁴¹ *Ressentiment* is the term Greenfeld (1992) borrows from Nietzsche and Scheler to describe the “psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings” (p.15). *Ressentiment* is caused through a contact that generates feelings of inferiority to one of the contactors, for any reason. Greenfeld argues that “*ressentiment* not only makes a nation more aggressive, but represents an unusually powerful stimulant of national sentiment and collective action...” (p.488); however, he connects this feeling more with mobilisation to aggressive warfare in what he calls ‘collectivistic nations’ than in ‘individualistic nations’ (p.488).

reaction of such feelings is concerned. As argued above, there are particular circumstances that account for the active manifestation of nationalism, but we cannot know in advance the conjunction and the contingency of events. However, we can safely argue that feelings of humiliation and resentment, fear and uncertainty, can be easily exaggerated when they combine with other particular circumstances –or contribute in the exaggeration of forthcoming circumstances– and they can very easily become subject to manipulation by aspiring nationalist leaders. Nationalism, along with any kind of group-chauvinism (racism being the most common) is an expected reaction to unforeseen developments and circumstances when they combine with present or past traumatic experiences, for nationalism pledges to restore the ‘right way of things’. “Hence”, writes Berlin, “the value of a real or imaginary rich historical past to inferiority-ridden peoples, for it promises, perhaps, an even more glorious future. If no such past can be invoked, then its very absence will be ground for optimism” as it has to be achieved in the future (1990:247).

Let us stress a recent example in which the negative perceptions conveyed appear to be a decisive determinant in the support of nationalistic reactions: the Bosnian Serbs. Armakolas’ study on the Bosnian Serbs has concluded that the huge involvement of the “global constituency” was determinative for the actual struggle and for the Serbian identities. Armakolas defines as “global involvement” not only military action (or inaction) but also the thousands of people and NGOs that “became involved indirectly through fund-raising, networking, organising activities and transmitting information relevant to the conflict”, the media, the books written and academic debates as well as “cyberspace appeals” (2001:50). As Armakolas argues, all these “global actors” put immense pressure for active involvement in the Yugoslav war, but at the same time projected on it their own perceptions and biases: they saw the conflict as a naturally violent Balkan history, and the Serbs as primitive and less civilised; they projected an essentialist idea of separate Serb, Croat and Muslim ethnic identities; they indiscriminately blamed Serbian aggression for the conflict; and they “projected their image and values” (p.61) to the conflict. Similarly, Sorabji argues that, global involvement was largely

constitutive of the conflict: “the exclusionist projects advanced by nationalist leaders had initially received little support among the population”⁴². Their turn in attitude seems to have been a combination of their feeling that the western images were totally negative about them, their perception of injustice and indiscriminate accusation on behalf of the western world, their exclusion from the remaining Yugoslavia after its break-up, as well as the ‘either-or’ dichotomy of their leadership. In a defensive reaction, the Bosnian Serbs excluded the others and found refuge in a strong ‘nationalistic’ identity, while “the Great Serbian project was developed as a ‘remedy’ to the ‘dangers’ presented to the Serbs being left outside the remaining Yugoslavia after the break-up of the federation” (Armakolas, 2001:59).

As we can see from the example of Bosnian Serbs, a number of circumstances resulted in the catastrophic and aggressive nationalism of the Bosnian Serbs. One of these circumstances that should be emphasised was the false-dilemma posed by their leadership (an extreme nationalistic line that actually posed the dilemma, ‘You are either with us or against us’), which combined with the extreme negative perceptions of the others about the Serbs, thus leaving no room for mediation and internal accommodation for the feelings of resentment. If we take the example of Germany under consideration, the permanence of Germans resentment of the West since the eighteenth century along with their developed feelings of superiority (probably developed as a remedy for their perceived inferiority), and the results that they had for both Germany and Europe, we can anticipate, and certainly not be surprised if the Serbian anti-Westernism and humiliated pride, as well as their perceptions of unfair and biased treatment, come to the surface again with an active manifestation. What is also interesting to emphasise on is that the erupted conflict in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s offered the occasion, or alibi, to, what Armakolas calls, ‘global actors’ to project their negative images, their justified or unjustified perceptions, and their biases. This process originates to the never-ending need to sustain and verify the positive image one has for oneself and one’s group; this unconscious negative identification is

⁴² Sorabji, Cornelia (1993): ‘Ethnic War in Bosnia?’, *Radical Philosophy*, 63, pp33-35. Quoted in

indispensable for the (positive) group identification and unity, as argued elsewhere⁴³. This seems to be the meaning in Bauman's view that there is an apparent symmetry between friends and enemies, in the sense that the one cannot exist without the other; yet, this symmetry is an illusion for "it is the friends who define the enemies" (1990:143).

So, it seems that the determinant of humiliation and resentment, fear and uncertainty is the most concrete conclusion we can make about conditions that generate nationalism. However, this determinant concerns mostly the emergence of actively nationalistic reactions and the swift into aggressiveness, that is nationalism as a defensive reaction or group-chauvinism. In that sense, it is not sufficient to answer the emergence of nationalism as an ideology and a movement. In addition, the conditions that provoke these feelings cannot be specified. So, while this is still a psychological determinant that results from other particular circumstances (political, economic, social, etc), these circumstances cannot be identified with precision in relation to their outcome.

Some general remarks can be made, of course, mainly when analysing nationalism within a given area with certain similarities and/or within a given period of time, when a comparative study is taking place. For example, it is accurate to stress the differences between the type of nationalism that was developed in Western and Eastern Europe, based on previous comparative analysis on the formation of the national state in Western and Eastern Europe respectively. However, variations within them should be accounted with care. For that reason, after comparatively assessing certain cases of separatist nationalisms in the developed national states, Breuilly argued that the only generalisation we can make is the extremely important role played by economically advanced or advancing regions in the development of such nationalisms; beyond that, other generalisations do not apply, as the political situation, the cultural appeal and the methods used by nationalists vary significantly (1993:334). The distance between terrorist tactics of the Basques

Armakolas (2001).

⁴³ In chapter 1, p.24-7, chapter 2, pp.59-60, 65-69; see also, Freud (1921:129), Volkan (1988), and Klein (1988) on projective identification.

and the parliamentary methods of the Quebecois cannot be 'generally' explained, but only specifically.

Breuilly has argued that, in a world of 'nation-states', particularly in the developed world, "the conditions for the emergence of [nationalist] movements have largely cease to exist" (1993:400). Breuilly means by nationalism the efforts at capturing the state, and not the sentiments aroused through identification with the nation or nationalistic rhetoric. Even thus defined, however, his argument is undermined by the emergence of nationalisms in various parts of the Western world, nationalisms that claim either for autonomy within the state or an independent state and cannot be neglected as 'exceptions'. In addition, according to his central argument that nationalism is a form of politics engendered by the structures and policies of the modern state, we can see that these structures and policies have not ceased to exist. On the contrary, as Breuilly himself argues, nationalism has lost its specificity and is applied more eagerly and indistinguishably from other sort of policies. Moreover, he stresses that in other parts of the world, as in Eastern Europe, there are still the conditions that initially generated nationalism, and these are: "the combination of regional disparities in political influence, political elites able and prepared to oppose the present state, the non-involvement of much of the population in other, non-nationalist forms of politics, and the existence of plausible cultural and/or institutional characteristics for a regionally based opposition" (1993:398). These are only some of the conditions that have generated nationalism, but not all of them; as shown throughout the various case-studies presented in his book, this is also the reason that we cannot make a typology of such conditions and their outcomes. Also, the contingent facts of the presence of a charismatic nationalist leader or of an international economic crisis are not considered in the outlined conditions. Last, but not least, some of these conditions still exist in developed national states (like Britain and elsewhere).

No nationalism is predestined to develop or succeed. There are conditions that apply to each case, the combination of which is often unique. Analysis of each case must be based on examination of its particularities along with its trivialities. Some hypothesis and predictions can be made about future nationalisms, not based on explanatory models (at least not alone), but based on the rigorous knowledge of the whole context within which a situation is evolving –on which one may apply a general theory. Also, good knowledge of history is indispensable, as it is through historical comparisons that one can arrive at the safest conclusion possible. To conclude, three points need particular attention. First, the aforementioned particular circumstances are ones that the analyst must have in mind while studying a case as general guidelines, as points of attention, but not as concrete explanations. A second central point is that in most nationalisms there is a reference to a common enemy, a reference not marginal but central. This reminds us that the particular circumstances constitute part of the explanation, while the other part rests on human psychology⁴⁴. And third, that the existence, prevalence and success of nationalism further generate nationalism itself.

It is a general difficulty as far as political and social events are concerned to make specific predictions. The problem is that there are not laws or specific requirements that, when fulfilled, will result in this or that reaction. On the other hand, however, it may be sometimes feasible to examine the likelihood of certain trends and/or to define a number of alternatives in the effort to create or avoid a phenomenon. This can only be possible if all the possible variants be examined, meaning psychological, political, economic, cultural and other. An additional variant that is indispensable in such a process includes the examination and analysis of similar occurrences in the past, which would provide with already existing paradigms. That, of course, does not mean that we shall be able to predict a specific event with precision. It means that it may be feasible to identify existing *trends* in the process of events and, with the

⁴⁴ The analysis of the psychological appeal of nationalism was more concrete than that of the social, economic, political and other conditions. This is not because the former is more important. It is rather because of the universality of the human characteristics that facilitates their concrete analysis, while the particularity of each case of nationalist appearance does not leave much ground for a general argumentation.

study of the particular circumstances that characterise this case, to identify some potential in the making, some future dynamics –which can also suggest a number of policies that one should apply.

PART THREE

National Identity in the Era of Globalisation

In the third and last part of this research we shall examine and analyse national identification and its prospects in the current era, the era of globalisation. In the previous two parts, and particularly the second part, we explored the dynamics of national identification in the era of nationalism, the properties of nationalism that can transform national identity into a 'nationalistic' identity, and the circumstances under which nationalism and national identity manifest themselves in more reactionary ways. Yet, it is widely asserted that contemporary living has been largely affected by another process, namely globalisation. The era of globalisation is a process characterised by changes in many domains of human life, and also by ambivalence in the direction of that change, meaning that it has both negative and positive aspects and consequences. It is also producing new forms of conflict and political change both within and between nations, while it is estimated to have an influence upon people's identities, and on national identities in particular. For these reasons, a complete analysis of national identity could not avoid an analysis of the consequences of globalisation on its formulation and strength.

The third part of this thesis will be divided in three chapters. In chapter 5 we shall provide the working definition of globalisation that will be used in this analysis. In chapter 6 we shall explore the changes and possible dynamics of the national state. To do that we shall first analyse the state and the debate about its apparent transformations in the era of globalisation, and then we shall examine whether there are changes regarding its mechanisms that produce national identification. Thus, we shall analyse national identity in its relation to the conclusions drawn regarding national states under the influence of globalisation. In the last chapter we will analyse the particular circumstances that make globalisation a source of insecurity and anxiety for the people, and examine the potentials of national as a form of collective identification within that context.

CHAPTER 5: DEFINING GLOBALISATION

The debate on globalisation is a huge and a very significant one, but also a very recent one. The very term 'globalisation' is only recently used: for example, the British Library of the Political and Economic Science (the library of the LSE) has 492 titles containing the word 'globalisation', only five of them being between 1988-9, and the rest published from 1989 onwards. So, titles on globalisation have been published since 1989 at an accelerated pace, indicating the rapid growth of interest in, and the importance of this new subject. Indeed, globalisation is today one of the most commonly used keywords in a range of related disciplines and sub-disciplines (economics, sociology, political science, as well as international relations, cultural studies, etc.), but also very frequently uttered and referred to in everyday use, by politicians, journalists, managers, etc.

Globalisation has many and diverse meanings, and various aspects that one can focus on. In addition, despite its recent introduction in our scientific and everyday vocabulary, the discussion on globalisation includes issues that have long preoccupied sociologists, political scientists, and other scholars. For these reasons, a brief and complete definition of globalisation is difficult to provide. In order to overcome this difficulty, we shall first proceed with a brief review of the debate on globalisation, followed by a definition of the framework of reference that will be used in this study as far as globalisation is concerned. So, we will start with a brief summary of the debate and the definitions proposed, while concentrating on its most important aspects. Then, we will provide the working definition on globalisation that will be used in this analysis. As in the case of nationalism, this will not be a 'globalisation is...' sentence, but rather a section where we shall outline the definitional characteristics of globalisation that will serve as the definition on globalisation for the rest of the thesis.

The Globalisation Debate

It is rather odd, in the first place, to talk about the analytical field of globalisation, because globalisation is a process relevant to most, if not all, human experiences and activities. As Nederveen Pieterse argues, we can conceive of 'globalisations' in the plural because we have so many globalisations as we have disciplines, and they are all relevant (1995b:45). This multidimensionality is partly responsible for the complexity in systematising the arguments; yet, both multidimensionality and systematisation are prerequisites for the complete analysis of a process that covers so many aspects of political and social organisation.

There are various ways to categorise the assorted arguments on globalisation and the definitions proposed by scholars in the field¹. At the same time, there is a dispute about the very differentiation between globalisation and internationalisation². At present, in order to proceed in the delineation of the basic arguments that characterise the debate and clarify what we mean by

¹ One of the usual categorisations used is between sceptics and advocates. A good summary of the debate that follows this division is made by Held and McGrew (2000): they divide between the main fields of the debate -definitions, power relations, cultural issues, economy, inequality, and global order- and analyse the arguments of both the sceptics and the globalists of each aforementioned field. Nevertheless, it is usually the case that scholars are not either sceptics or globalists, in the sense that some could agree with globalists as far as the economy is concerned, for example, and with sceptics as far as culture is concerned (i.e. Castells). Other scholars follow a categorisation of the debate according to the model or approach used. Sklair (1999) describes the debate according to four main approaches: the world-systems approach, the global culture approach, the global society approach, and the global capitalism approach. The first is mainly economic, the next two are cultural and quite similar, while the last one, which is also Sklair's argument, has economic foundations while distinguishing between the economic, cultural, and political sphere. These three spheres are analysed by Halliday too, who reviews the arguments about world politics under the headings of Hegemonic Optimism, Liberal Reform, New Anti-Imperialism, and 'New Middle-Ages' (2001, chapter 3). Beck (2000, chapter 1), on the other hand, divides theorists into two groups, according to the number of dimensions used in their analysis. The first group includes those who identify one dominant dimension of globalisation as central (i.e. Wallerstein's school concentrates on capitalism, Rosenau, Gilpin, Held, etc concentrate on international politics and the challenge to the national state, etc; the second group is comprised by those who suggest that globalisation is based on a complex set of causes and fields (Robertson, Appadurai, Albrow, Featherstone, Lash, Urry, etc).

² The two terms are not always differentiated and, occasionally used interchangeably. Thus, a number of globalisation theorists make the case for the necessity of distinguishing between the two, often from a different angle though. Hirst and Thompson (1999) for example contest the whole notion of globalisation on the basis that there is nothing specifically and distinctively global in contemporary economy and society, and argue that the term international can better define our age. On the other hand, others try to emphasise the differences of the 'global' and the 'international' condition in order to argue for the new era of globalisation that we have entered. Castells (2000a:101), for example, talks about the 'global economy' as distinct from the 'world economy' (which has existed since the sixteenth century), while Sklair (1999:323) argues that inter-nationalisation should be referred to with the hyphen to emphasise its foundation on the system of nation states, and thus make the distinction with globalisation that is not.

globalisation, we will proceed with the presentation of classic definitions of globalisation and the most widespread arguments and views. We shall categorise the definitions into those that are one dimensional *and* economic, and into those that are multidimensional. That is for two reasons: first, the vast majority of the one-dimensional approaches are economic; and second, the economic arguments are usually confronted or questioned by scholars that are placed within the second category of multidimensional approaches.

Economic Approaches

The approaches that are solely or predominantly economic focus on capitalism and the free-market as their object of analysis and, also, as their object of criticism in most cases. As capitalism is not a new system, these approaches usually hold the view that globalisation is long predated and they tend to lay emphasis upon the similarities with previous times of an open international economy, which a number of theorists identify as more open and integrated than today's system. The very idea of a globalised economy is generally contested, arguing that there is rather a 'trilateral' organisation of worlds' economic activity, between the three core blocks of Europe, the Americas, and Japan (or the Asia-Pacific).

The first reference to economic approaches on globalisation is most commonly made to the famous work of Immanuel Wallerstein and World-Systems Theory (which has developed more like a school of thought than just a theory). According to Wallerstein, every society is placed within one system, the capitalist world system, which is characterised by three elements: one single market and the principle of profit maximisation, facilitation of the market forces by many states, and by surplus based on exploitation, not between two classes, but among three layers. These layers are the 'core', the 'periphery', and the 'semi-periphery'. Countries are distinguished according to an international division of labour that places them in each of these layers. Thus, the core countries, which are North America and Western Europe, are those that have historically exploited poor countries of the periphery, like

Africa and Asia, and the semi-periphery, like Latin America and East Asia; the 'core' countries 'play' the others against one another, as they move their factories from the periphery to the semi-periphery and vice versa according to criteria of wage and raw material prices, that is criteria of profit. So, the theory continues, this system produces, apart from wealth and prosperity (mainly in the 'core' countries), poverty and inequality, and it also generates conflicts. Wallerstein does not use the word globalisation in his theory, which was first introduced in the mid-seventies, but he refers to 'world system' and 'world capitalism', or to the universal and the national as the distinction between the worldwide and the particular³. Nevertheless, his focus of analysis is no less relevant to the debate on globalisation and, therefore, is regarded as a classic in the globalisation literature.

Another significant economic approach is that of Hirst and Thompson and their book *Globalisation in Question* (1999), in which they actually put globalisation in question. For them too, globalisation is the same as the international capitalist economy, an economy not unprecedented but based on the modern industrial economy that became generalised from 1860 onwards. This economy, they argue, is actually less open in some respects than the economy of *La Belle Époque*. They also argue that the Third World remains marginal in terms of investment and trade, and that the world economy is concentrated on the G3 'countries' (Europe, North America, and Japan). Hirst and Thompson object to the widespread claim that today's global markets are beyond regulation and control, arguing that the G3 retain "the capacity... to exert powerful governance pressures over financial markets and other economic tendencies" (1999:2). Their work is concentrated on the economic dimension of globalisation because, as they argue, it is a precondition for other consequences on culture and politics. Lastly, they criticise the economically founded argument that globalisation is an accomplished and unavoidable fact and that it is ungovernable, on the grounds that this argument ignores and further diminishes the political choices and governance attempts that politicians can make to regulate world economy.

³ See Wallerstein, 1991.

The view that globalisation means the creation of a ‘global free market’ and worldwide capitalism is also held by John Gray (1998), who dedicates much of his analysis to the Great Transformation period in England, between 1870 and 1914. Nevertheless, he does so for different reasons than those for which Hirst and Thompson examined the same period (*La Belle Époque*). Gray does agree with Hirst and Thompson in their criticism over the ‘hyper-globalisation’ theories⁴ and the implications these views have on politics⁵, but he argues that they neglect the fact that in the last two decades the world has become less governable, and that the extent and scale of the economy’s transformation renders globalisation indeed unprecedented. Gray’s analysis involves an attempt to compare contemporary free-market with a period characterised by *laissez-faire* and draw some conclusions about it. He draws two significant conclusions. First, that “*laissez-faire* must be centrally planned. ...it is not a gift of social evolution”; it is rather the outcome of a process of political engineering, “...whose outcome we *can* know in advance” (1998:16,17). This leads to his second important conclusion: as the *Belle Époque* resulted in severe social instability and turbulence, the same can be safely expected from globalisation. As he argues, the incorporation of the world’s economies into a single global free market is “a Utopia that can never be realised; its pursuit has already produced social dislocation and economic and political instability on a large scale” (1998:2). What he also considers as unprecedented is the social breakdown that is already apparent in advanced societies.

If globalisation is equated with capitalism, then what is distinctive about it? Let us have Leslie Sklair answering that question. First of all, globalisation is a capitalism that is continuously spreading to more and more countries of the world. Today’s global system, Sklair (1999) argues, is based on transnational practices. These can be distinguished in three spheres, each characterised by a

⁴ The term ‘hyper-globalisation’ theories is used by Held to refer to the enthusiastic and supporting theories of every aspect of globalisation, such as expressed by Ohmae (1990) and Reich (1991). For a critique on these theories see Perraton, Goldblatt, Held and McGrew (1997): ‘The Globalisation of Economic Activity’, *New Political Economy*, Vol.2, No 2, 257-77. Also, for the criticism of Gray on Hirst and Thompson, see Gray (1998), pp.63-67.

⁵ In that they provoke further disappointment and also offer an alibi for the lack of political initiative to regulate market economies in favour of social benefits.

major institution: the *economic* sphere, characterised by transnational corporations, the *political* sphere, characterised by a transnational capitalist class, and the *cultural* sphere, characterised by the ideology of consumerism. The transnational capitalist class is made up of four groups: “those who own and control these corporations, their allies in the state (globalising bureaucrats) and in political parties and professions (globalising politicians and professors), and consumerist elites” (1999:334). Thus, a second distinction of globalisation is that, membership in the capitalist class is not restricted to those who own the means of production. And thirdly, the relative autonomy of the state to dominate and control the capitalist class is reduced.

Most economic analyses of globalisation share the common characteristic of putting capitalism at the centre of their critique. These are not the sole economic analysis of globalisation, however, but those that concentrate predominantly on its economic dimension. Other economic analyses are based on multidimensional approach. So, there are many who argue that the global market is rapidly expanding, world trade is higher than ever before, and electronic money and capital flows are unparalleled. Also, that the excess and scale of transnational transactions have rendered the nation state obsolete, and point towards intensifying integration between countries. Some are reluctant to use the term ‘capitalism’, even though they do not oppose the view that economic globalisation concerns capitalism, but rather prefer more neutral terms, such as ‘global economy’. In addition, and this is the main difference, they base their arguments equally on cultural, social and political criteria. Actually, this is a common, and to some extent the main, criticism exercised against ‘economic dimension theories’: that they are monocausal and overlook other important aspects of globalisation. Let us examine some representative ‘multidimensional’ arguments.

Multidimensional Approaches

Under the heading of multidimensional approaches we will consider arguments that look both on the economic and other dimensions, independently

of the weight they put on each one of them. That is not to say that economic approaches ignore these other aspects for, as Hirst and Thompson argue, they focus on the one that is more important or determinative for the others. It is rather that multidimensional approaches actually include more than one dimension in their analysis as basic. So, Giddens (1999), for example, argues that globalisation is not only economic, but also cultural, political, and technological (including the communications revolution), and Beck (2000) concentrates on the international, economic, ecological, globalised labour cooperation or production, and on the cultural dimensions of globalisation.

Most commonly, the two dimensions emphasised are the cultural and the communicational (including technology revolution); in reality, the latter has largely influenced the former. The conception of a global culture has its origins in the famous idea of the world as a 'global village' that McLuhan expressed in the 1960s⁶. This idea was influenced by the rapid growth of communication technology and particularly the capacity of the media to transmit the same images everywhere in the world simultaneously. Economic globalisation and homogenisation is accompanied by a globalisation of culture, it has been widely asserted. Yet, the critics of this view use the word 'MacDonaldisation' so as to indicate that the world is not becoming one-world, but a single commodity-world. Featherstone (1990) argues that there can be no global culture but only global cultural flows. At the turn of the century, we can safely remark that the homogenisation thesis has lost a lot of ground, or has been moderated by arguments that there is a global culture marked by diversity rather than uniformity (Ulf Hannerz, 1991).

Electronic communication and media have been transformative for the economy too. According to Castells, the current technological revolution was an essential tool for the global restructuring of capitalism; it took place from late 1970s onwards, and in the process it re-shaped capitalism. "In the new, informational mode of development the source of productivity lies in the technology of knowledge generation, information processing, and symbol communication" (2000a:17). It is indicative that in the US, the key industries,

⁶ In his work *Understanding Media: the Extensions of Man*, New York: Mecomillan, 1964.

finance and information technology, had an average annual growth of 10.4% during the 1990s, five times the growth rate of the whole economy; Internet industries were at the core of it⁷. Thus, he names the new economic system ‘informational capitalism’, and the society ‘information(al) or network society’⁸.

Communications technology has largely influenced additional developments and important debates, such as the ‘global awareness’ debate, whether it refers to ecological cultural issues. Robertson, for example, stresses the importance of awareness and consciousness that the world has become a single place. He defines globalisation as the “compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (1992:8), thus focusing on the two key terms of interdependence and consciousness. In a quite similar way, Giddens defines globalisation as “the intensification of worldwide relations which link distinct localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa”⁹. Electronic communication and media are also the medium for the communication between the ‘landscapes’ that Appadurai identifies. Appadurai distinguishes between five interrelated dimensions of global cultural ‘flows’: ethnoscaples, mediascaples, technoscaples, finanscaples, and ideoscaples. These ‘landscapes’ constitute what he calls ‘imagined worlds’ (extending Anderson’s phrase), meaning “multiple worlds which are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe” (1990:296). Without the media, these landscapes would be unimaginable.

There are more issues that have preoccupied to a large extent the scholars in the field, such as the role of multinational and transnational corporations, the debate on ‘glocalisation’ (that is the distinction between the global and the local), etc. Not to mention on of the most prevalent debates that concerns the nation state and its future. These will be referred to in the sequel, as the argument will develop. However, it would be useful to end this outline

⁷ See data in Castells, 2000a:148-9.

⁸ Castells explains the distinction and the use of terms ‘information’ and ‘informational’ in 2000a:100.

⁹ Giddens (1990), *The Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford Univ. Press, p.64; in Robertson, 1992:141.

with a reference on the timing of globalisation and the various views about its precedence.

The views about 'when' globalisation came to the fore vary according to the definition one holds of globalisation. For Wallerstein, for example, the whole process was initiated in the 16th century, when the capitalist system was being born. Hirst and Thompson see the origins of a genuinely international system in the 1870s, when the first and qualitative change took place in communications and technology¹⁰. A number of scholars relate globalisation with modernity. Giddens considers globalisation to be a consequence of modernity, which is 'inherently globalising', but he nevertheless argues that it appeared in the 60s. Beck too places it in 'late-modernity', while Robertson believes that globalisation long pre-dates modernity, as there are texts about the coming together of the world since the second century B.C., but he analyses recent developments, which have only recently managed to bring the world more physically together. Demertzis argues that "the debate on globalisation is not radically different from the debate about modernity and post-modernity, and, in that sense, the changes that occurred at the turn of the 1990s do not constitute a swift in the paradigm, at least not according to Kuhn's definitions of 'change' and 'paradigm'"¹¹. On the other hand, Castells argues that the informational society is distinct from the industrial one, and that globalisation, initiated in the late 50's, had already altered the society with the technological revolution of the 70's. In most views, however, what seems to be the underlying idea is that, while globalisation has a long history, it is in the last decades that it develops new forms and impetuses (Hall, Halliday, Robertson, Beck). Its peculiarity lies in the density, scale, scope and extend of the changes that occurred in the last two-three decades of the twentieth century. There is no much disagreement, however, as to 'where' globalisation first emerged: globalisation was initiated by western countries in general, and the United States in particular.

¹⁰ Hirst and Thompson (1999:9) argue that it was in the 1870s that the qualitative technological change took place; that is the change of a trading system where goods and information were moving by sailing ship to one that they moved by steam ships and electricity.

¹¹ My translation from Demertzis, 1996:262.

Definition of Globalisation

“Globalisation does not supersede and displace everything that preceded it. As well as recognising social innovation, we must have regard to the evident continuities in social and cultural life” (Robins, 2000:197). This qualification Robins makes is proper and should be recalled when we discuss globalisation as any other process that deeply affects societies¹². Let me then proceed by identifying the definitional characteristics and the main aspects of globalisation, and clarify the meaning of this process. The following will be my working definitions on globalisation in order to proceed to the analysis of national identity.

Many of the dimensions of globalisation that have been argued for are indeed part of the complex and diverse scenery of this process. Some of those, however, are more important, or have the capacity to shape and significantly affect other aspects connected to globalisation. It is those dimensions that we shall refer to in the attempt to define globalisation. Those dimensions are two: the *economic*, and the *civilian*. The economic dimension is the most important as it has been the driving force of globalisation, and the one that has deeply affected the other domains (political, social, cultural). The civilian dimension concerns the citizens, as individuals and as part of social groups. It is not an autonomous dimension, like economy is, in the sense that it has been influenced significantly by the economic, and other dimensions. Yet, it has become so significant within globalisation in the last decade as to deserve a place in defining it, and it is also very important to the extent that it is often organised in opposition to economic globalisation. Let us see these two definitive dimensions of globalisation.

¹² The view that globalisation is a process can be mediated or accepted according to the way one defines globalisation. Due to the complexity that surrounds globalisation, it is often regarded as both a process and an accomplished fact, in the sense of an already established living reality. Beck (2000), for example, argues that globalisation is indeed a process, but also that we are already living in globality. Beck distinguishes between *globalism*, which is the ideology of neoliberalism, *globality*, which means that “we have been living for a long time in a world society” (p.10), *world society*, a boundary-free society of “multiplicity without unity”, and *globalisation*, which is the process of the transnational transcending the national.

Economic dimension

Globalisation, in its economic dimension, is the unprecedented spread of capitalist economy worldwide, the diffusion of the free market to more and more places in the world. The basic criterion in the process of economic globalisation is the maximisation of profit. The capitalist criterion continues to apply within countries, but it is also applied globally. Within a country with a capitalistic economy, the ‘periphery’ of the working class depends on the capitalist class. This, by analogy, happens to the global capitalist system, where a country today has two choices: either conform to the rules of the game, or to be totally isolated. The globalised capitalist economy is the outcome of central planning and political engineering, as Gray (1998) argues. Liberalisation of the economy could not have been expanded without the necessary regulation on behalf of individual actors –the states– nor without withdrawing the barriers that states have put to world trade for the protection of their countries. So, although the extent and scale of the transformation of the global economic system may be unprecedented, its governance is not impossible as it has been a process facilitated through political measures and regulation. Indeed, the citizens are less protected, as the patterns of global inequality indicate, and their consensus for these policies drops continuously. As both Wallerstein and Gray argue, global capitalist economy can only generate intense conflict and uneasiness in the midst of its realisation¹³.

Thus, economy is the engine force of globalisation. But, hasn’t economy always been the locomotive of a society? Indeed, but societies have traditionally been regulated through economic, social and political criteria; thus, societal evolution has been a continuous ‘bargaining’ and compromise between those three. This is the reason why power has always been divided and distributed between economic, social and political actors. Yet, as Demertzis argues, “globalisation is instrumental in the asymmetrical (re)structuring of power relations” (1996:304). In the recent restructuring of power relationships, not only do we see the prevalence of economic factors, but also an increasing

¹³ For the most part my following analysis on the economic dimension of globalisation accedes to the views of Hirst and Thompson, Gray and Wallerstein as outlined in the previous paragraphs.

distance from their ‘civilian casualties’. Economy is becoming an increasingly dominant and ‘autonomised’ dimension regulating societies. It is exactly this uneven balance, this asymmetry, that has provoked social dislocation and, therefore, conflict. Beck argues that, the balance of power of first modernity has now ended, and it has now become “the independent realm of economic action” (2000:4). How has this become possible?

The reason for the pervasiveness of the economic over the social and political elements of the societal constitution is the *ideologisation* of globalisation. To the extent that the ideologisation of globalisation has ‘boosted’ its economic (that is its main) dimension, we should extensively refer to it. As an ideology it is often referred to as ‘globalism’ (Beck, 2000, Robertson, 1992), and it is in brief the ideology of neo-liberalism. The term ‘globalisation’ became widely articulated simultaneously with its ideologisation since 1989. When the Soviet block collapsed, its opponents celebrated the victory of liberal capitalism, which was praised as the only viable system, and postulated the rule of the free market on a global scale. At the same time, socialists and social-democrats, left-wingers, as well as supporters of the Soviet Union were left in embarrassment and bewilderment by these unexpected events, which forced many of them either to passively accept the celebrations, or to be convinced and accede to the neo-liberal ideology¹⁴. Thus, the spread of the free market rule naturally followed the celebrations. The task was not very hard, considering that Thatcher’s and Reagan’s administrations had already paved the way towards the removal of barriers to free trade and further liberalisation of the economy. What was further claimed under the globalisation heading was the deregulation of domestic economies and of welfare states on the grounds that they could no longer be afforded if the state wanted to be competitive in the global capitalist market: *competitiveness* became the new principle so as to serve the criterion of profit, the basic criterion or economic globalisation. What was going to be

¹⁴ Thus, for example, the widespread rhetoric about the end of ideologies (i.e. Fukuyama), the inapplicability of the left-right division (Giddens’ *Third Way* is the most mild and reputable among them), or the lack of alternatives in the politics adopted (mostly claimed by politicians).

globalised –more accurately, further internationalised– thereafter was the capitalist economy.

Huntington accurately remarks that the argument of the overenthusiasts about the ‘end of history’ and the universal victory of liberalism, that prevailed after USSR’s collapse, suffers from the ‘single alternative fallacy’: “it is rooted in the Cold War assumption that the only alternative to communism is liberal democracy and that demise of the first produces the universality of the second” (1996:63). In addition, one might argue, the argument of the overenthusiasts also neglects the role of *contingency* in history. Certain contingent events always happen, events not predestined to happen but with catalytic consequences in the root of history, like the emergence of important historical figures. For example, “...the world, and societies, would have been very different if Gorbachev had succeeded in his own *perestroika*”, as Castells argues (2000a:18), which means that many more factors account for the collapse of the SU than the failure of ‘communism’ and the consequent superiority of liberal capitalism. This, and other contingencies have often been interpreted as a structural transformation in the international economy, as Hirst and Thompson argue¹⁵, and have contributed to the ideologisation of globalisation.

Let us see another aspect of the ideologisation of globalisation. Globalisation is most often described as interdependence, or growing interdependence (Sklair, 1999, Halliday, 2001, Castells, 1997, Giddens, 1999). Interdependence, though, was the term used in the 70s and 80s to describe similar processes to economic globalisation. For example, Keohane and Nye in their book *Power and Interdependence*, published in 1977, describe their contemporary debate between the ‘modernists’, who argued for the creation of a ‘global village’ and the eclipsing power of the nation state, and the ‘traditionalists’, who considered the above view ‘globaloney’ and argued about continuity in world politics. This debate is almost identical to the one taking

¹⁵ Hirst and Thompson extensively refer to changes in the international economy in the 70s and their confrontation by politicians towards a certain direction, i.e. with the abandonment of exchange controls; see 1999:14-16.

place in 2001 (except from the implications of the SU collapse), and the usage of interdependence is similar to that of globalisation. Keohane and Nye argue that, apart from the use of interdependence as an analytical concept (of the major changes of the features in the international regime), the word was also an ‘analytical device’, employed by publicists and statesmen. “For the statesman, eager to increase the number of people marching beneath his banner, vague words with broad appeal are useful”, they have argued (1977:6). The two authors stress the revealing example of the United States: “during the Cold War, ‘national security’ was a slogan American political leaders used to generate support for their policies”, such as economic and political structuring of the ‘Free World’, support for alliances and military interventions, etc (1977:6). Yet, as the security threat slackened, foreign economic competition and domestic distributional conflict increased, the descriptive accuracy and symbolic power of national security as related to military concerns declined. National security was soon joined by another symbolic rhetoric: interdependence. “Political leaders often use interdependence rhetoric to portray interdependence as a *natural* necessity, as a fact to which policy (and domestic interest groups) must adjust, rather than a situation partially created by policy itself” (1977:7, emphasis added). This new rhetoric, Keohane and Nye argue, however contradictory, had been used along with ‘national security’ to legitimise US presidential leadership in world affairs.

The parallels with today’s use of globalisation are more than obvious. As we can see, words are rarely innocent: they always infer a meaning. King (1991) makes a very interesting remark on that matter. The notion of the word ‘global’, he argues, is much more neutral than that of the word ‘world’. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, includes half a page for ‘globe’ and four pages for ‘world’; linguistically, for instance, globe is a limited connotation referring to the earth or terrestrial globe, while world refers to humankind, human society, or it is used in theories, and infer a more specific symbolism. Hence his conclusion that “...the language of the debate forces positions and pre-empts particular options. The *over-generalising sweep of globalisation* submerges difference at the local, regional or national scale”

(1991:12, emphasis added). Exactly because language is an important signifier, I have chosen to keep the term ‘globalisation’ when I refer to its ideologisation (instead of ‘globalism’ for instance),¹ in order to show that, first, it is itself a conveyor of ideology and, second, that its (ideological) articulation goes hand in hand with its widespread implementation.

Beck (2000) is quite clear about the implications of globalisation’s ideologisation. “Globalism”, he argues harshly referring to the ideology of globalisation, “is a thought-virus...Its main article of faith is not that people must engage in economic behaviour, but that everyone and everything...should be subordinate to the primacy of the economic. [...] Neo-liberalism is *high-politics* which presents itself as *non-political*...” (2000:122). But, he continues, “economic globalisation is *not* an automatic, mechanical process; it is a thoroughly *political project* involving transnational players, institutions and discourse coalitions...which pursue a neoliberal economic policy” (2000:123). So far so good. However, Beck seems to have fallen under the sway of the most influential fallacy of globalisation as ideology because he accedes to the view that globalisation is irreversible. “...the new globality cannot be reversed”, he claims (2000:11). The same claim is made by Castells who, notwithstanding the fact that he also considers global economy as “politically constituted”, he is reluctant to support the view that it can be “politically undone”: “this is because the global economy is now a network of interconnected segments of economies...Once such a network is constituted, any node that disconnects itself is simply bypassed” (2000a:147). Hirst and Thompson have criticised that view, and its adoption by many politicians, as the “pathology of overdiminished expectations” (1999:6), that is due to the overenthusiasm of analysts and politicians in “overstating the extent of the dominance of world markets and their ungovernability” (1999:6).

As we saw, globalisation also means growing interdependence, a term introduced as an analytical term in the 70s and 80s and meant, according to Halliday, the “vulnerability of the society to events in another” (2001:10). But, Halliday continues, “this was an illusion of the few, very few, societies that had not been affected...by colonialism and the politics of the 19th and 20th centuries:

for over 90% of the world...this experience of vulnerability was not new” (2001:10). This brings us to the Westernisation view. Globalisation as Westernisation means that it is a concept and a process initiated by the West, and not that it concerns only the West, for it has affected many parts of the world. In that sense, and through its connection to modernity, globalisation is seen as Westernisation¹⁶, or even Americanisation¹⁷. There are other views, however, that moderate the Westernisation thesis by pointing to its ‘western’ or ‘anti-western’ bias.¹⁸ However, globalisation has been initiated by western countries, which provoked its further spread.

As a spread of the western economic system and values to the world (economic mainly, such as consumerism), globalisation has been largely perceived as homogenisation. But this has largely to do with the celebrations of the neo-liberals (neo-conservatives in the US). Such celebrations are declarations like those that the US president Bush made before the Genoa summit of G8 in 2001: “What some call globalisation is in fact the triumph of human liberty stretching across national frontiers”¹⁹. This points to both cultural, and politico-economic homogenisation. Such views express a “Western arrogance”, in Huntington’s words, and are based on the assumption that economic development will have a homogenising effect and will produce the same social and cultural patterns everywhere; “but, modernisation does not equal Westernisation” (1996:63), as the examples of Japan, Singapore and Saudi Arabia demonstrate. Political and economic homogenisation has been attempted indeed, as globalisation spreads into more and more countries, leaving the non-capitalist ones in the margin. In its march, however, it creates

¹⁶ According to Giddens, “globalisation today is only partly Westernisation” because the world is becoming “increasingly decentred” (1999:16).

¹⁷ According to Castells, the US is “the main globaliser” (2000a:142).

¹⁸ Appadurai argues that, equally or more worrisome than Americanisation may be Japanisation for the Koreans, or Russianisation for Soviet Armenia or the Baltic countries, and he points to the fact that, “for politics of small scale, there is always a fear of cultural absorption by politics of large scale” (1990:295). Another relevant view is that through globalisation “we are slowly becoming aware that the West is both a particular in itself and also constitutes the universal point of reference in relation to which others recognise themselves as particularities” (Featherstone, 1990:12 referring to Sakai (1988): ‘Modernity and its Critique: the Problem of Universalism and Particularism’, *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 87:3).

¹⁹ BBC News Online, 19/7/01.

huge problems, because it does not take into account country differences and peculiarities²⁰.

To conclude, by economic globalisation we mean the further internationalisation of capitalist economy, a process thereby ideologised and thus included in the public realm of the domination and homogenisation discourse that characterises much of modernity. As a process it has given prevalence to the economic over the social and political dimensions. The uniqueness of globalisation lies in two characteristics. The first is that the scale of its expansion globally, and its implementation and/or articulation in most countries in the world are unprecedented. The second has to do with technological revolution. The advancement of technology has boosted economic transactions since the 19th century, but the new technological and communications revolution has facilitated the rapid spread of capitalism. It has even transformed it, according to Castells who uses the term 'informational capitalism' in order to show the informational character of the 'new economy' and its transformation into a distinct economy from the industrial one, which "does not oppose its logic, [but] subsumes it through technological deepening" (2000a:100). This has as an outcome the deeper isolation and economic retardation of those countries that are technologically backward.

Civilian Dimension

The civilian dimension concerns the understanding and appropriation of globalisation by citizens, both individually and collectively, and the (re)determining of their visions and actions by it. This aspect of globalisation is based primarily on the communicational and organisational capabilities of people and, secondarily, on the content of their organisation and communication. Here, again, communication technology has played a significant and transformative role on this aspect of globalisation. The

²⁰ Gray (1998) and Hall (1991a) argue that globalisation has been able to spread because of the differences in several countries, because capitalism needs a contradictory terrain in order to expand, and it exploits these differences in its march. That, however, does not mean that it leaves the terrain unaltered or

information technology revolution –initiated to a large extent from military concerns²¹–, had unintended consequences over society, and provoked new forms of social interaction and change²², ranging from consumers movements that could encourage corporations to meet ecological and democratic standards, to Chiapa’s Zapatistas, or Seattle protesters against World Trade Organisation in December 1999. Thus, it is not so important whether the movements are nationalistic, religious, consumerist, liberating or cosmopolitan; it is rather their ability to inform and receive information and to organise on a world-wide scale that matters.

Civilian globalisation means global awareness. Global awareness is a consequence of the everlasting necessity of knowing what is around us, what affects our lives and determines our (re)actions. In the era of globalisation, however, what surrounds and affects us tends to be the whole world: for example, citizens in Europe are today much more sensitive to an ecological disaster in China. That process does not erode particularities, but enlarges the point of reference for the citizenry, renders it less narrow and encompasses the most of the world. That does not only indicate that the world is more interdependent, but also that the citizenry is a lot more conscious of its interdependence. This has only been possible because of the new communications technology. In reality, civilian globalisation is global only to the extent that these new technologies are spread and used; more accurately, civilian globalisation applies particularly in those places that communication technologies are widely diffused and used by the population. So, civilian globalisation is very advanced in Western Europe and North America in

equally differentiated. This view, however, has opened another debate, about the future of capitalism after its full expansion, if the very differences that facilitated the spread of capitalism disappear.

²¹ The Internet originates from the United States Defence Department Advanced Research Projects Agency and its initiative to create a system of communications that would be comprised of many autonomous centres. This was part of the Cold War defence initiatives and their aim was to prevent the destruction of American communications in the case of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. That would be possible by making a communications system that would not have one controlling centre and thus would be able to operate, even following a nuclear attack, because this system would function with different types of radiowaves that would not be affected by a possible nuclear explosion. See also on that matter Castells, 2000a, pp. 6-7, 45-53.

²² New forms of social interaction and change, which Castells has argued that one should expect because of the linkage brought into cultural and production forces because of informationalism. See Castells (2000a), p.18.

general, while still in an embryonic phase in Africa; or, it can be very advanced among high professionals in China's commercial centres, while still embryonic among the less educated Chinese of the rural areas. Civilian globalisation has the potentials to concern every citizen of the world, but in reality it concerns only those regions that are technologically (and economically) developed or developing.

An example that best illustrates civilian globalisation is that of the anti-globalisation movement(s). To begin with, there would not have emerged such movements if it weren't for economic globalisation and new communications technology and civilian globalisation. Globalisation has provided a common reference point for all those groups that, for various reasons, feel threatened, and this has rendered reaction a possible alternative. New communications media have provided the means for communication and interaction between the scattered –geographically and ideologically– protest groups, and have united them symbolically in a movement, whose sole common reference is opposition to economic globalisation –whatever globalisation means for each one of these groups. So, these anti-globalisation movements are an expression of globalisation itself: economic globalisation has provided the reasons for these movements and their reactions to exist, and civilian globalisation has provided the means to organise against the economic aspect of globalisation. Robertson (1992) argues that these movements are an aspect of globalisation because they are encapsulated within the globalisation discourse. An additional reason is that they can be and they largely are organised on a global scale. “Electronic communication makes possible what has previously been excluded: namely, active, simultaneous and reciprocal contact between individuals across all frontiers...” (Beck, 2000:105). These movements create their Internet sites for their information and communication, they exchange experiences and views in real time, and they have a solidarity that, however loose, is (or can be) for the first time experienced on an international scale and to that extent. These are movements that use the media developed within the process of globalisation, and also have the potentials to organise on an international scale. That is another aspect of them: to organise on an international scale means to organise

on a globalised scale, meaning in advanced globalised countries and regions. It is not a coincidence that the first anti-globalisation protest took place in the West Coast of the United States, in Seattle, and it spread thereafter in (Western) Europe. These parts of the world provide the necessary equipment and education in order to be able to use the high technology needed to organise²³.

Globalisation has produced global awareness and increased contacts, physically and, mostly, symbolically and potentially. This has led many scholars to see or anticipate an emerging 'world society' or 'global culture'. There are certain strands of this view. An initial, yet vaguely articulated view, that was pointing towards greater unification and homogenisation on a global scale, has lost ground because of the wider acceptance and empirical remark that globalisation also involves localisation and that "globalisation produces greater contact between people but it can also produce greater misunderstanding" (Halliday, 2001:12). Another, more substantiated view is that, "there is now a world culture...marked by an organisation of diversity rather than the replication of uniformity" (Hannerz, 1990:237), rather called "global cultures in the plural" (Featherstone, 1990:10), or 'creole' and 'hybrid' cultures (Hannerz, 1990, Nederveen Pieterse, 1995b), as there can be no unified global culture. However, this is not the first time in human history that there exist 'global cultures in the plural', nor is it the first time that people (in a lesser scale, of course) and scientists are aware of this fact. In addition, to talk about 'creole' or 'hybrid', mixed cultures, is certainly a tautology because cultures have been 'a mixture of cultures' all along (as Nederveen Pieterse [1995b] acknowledges too). Last, but not least, I would like to refer to the similar view that Hall (1991a) and Beck (2000) hold in relation to the mass media. Hall argues that there is a 'global mass culture' spread through film and advertising, the epitome of which is satellite television (1991a:27), while Beck talks about 'place polygamy' (2000:72-75), thus meaning the multilocation and inner mobility of individuals as a result of their exposure to the media

²³ In addition, in the Western world, where such movements first emerged, societies are more affluent and provide their members with the means to think beyond the limited issues of nourishment and

influence (meaning, their being able to conceive of themselves in other, remote places). There is much truth in these two views to the extent that the media are indeed powerful and capable of transforming one's perceptions. However, it is an exaggeration to argue that they can create a global mass culture. Media are to a large extent conveyors of biases and stereotypes that can least point towards a unified cultural space. Culture is an attribute of people, formed through multiple sources, the media being only one of them. Also, common culture needs common experiences, which just watching CNN or the Dallas on television cannot create. Let me invoke Habermas on this, who argues that "a substantive collective identity for world society is neither possible nor necessary; universalist participation in global communicative action is the maximum attainable"²⁴.

So, civilian globalisation refers to the citizens, their possibilities to conceive of the world and their potentials to act globally. Yet, the content of these actions and reactions can be both universal and particularistic, such as claims for ecological regulation or nationalistic retreats respectively. Either way, globalisation provides the means to a movement or group of citizens to both gain sympathy or hostility worldwide. Also, in relation to economic globalisation, civilian globalisation comes as a response, either negative or positive, but always determined by it. There are other aspects of globalisation as well, and some of them will be mentioned in direct reference to the following analysis on national identity.

* * *

So, these are my working definitions for the rest of this analysis. Globalisation is the term used as a result of ideologisation to express the spread of neo-liberal capitalism in more areas of the world. It is also the increasing

accommodation. So, ecological concerns, anti-capitalism mobilisation and issues related to equal distribution of wealth globally logically appear in these societies first.

global awareness of the interdependence of each part of the world and the capacity of the civilians to communicate and organise with no territorial or temporal barriers. Both economic and civilian globalisation have been boosted because of the technological revolution, which provides the means to conceive the 'global' in the first place –to make the global conceivable not only for the intellectuals, cosmopolitans and mobile executives, but also and for the first time for the citizenry. Although technological revolution has been of primary importance to globalisation, it has not been included to the definition of globalisation, because the change in technology and communications signifies a change in the modes of production and information transmission, while globalisation signifies the ideologisation²⁵ of interdependence and the ideologisation of the 'victory' of liberal capitalism. Globalisation, however, is a process that is rapidly and continuously altering the society that we live in. We do not live in 'globality', a society shaped by globalisation: we are in the midst of major changes that are still going on and we don't know yet how the picture will be like when the dust falls.

²⁴ In Robertson's words; 1992, p.74, from Habermas (1974): 'On Social Identity', *Telos*, 7. Further analysis of the mediation of cultures in the era of globalisation, with particular reference to the influence of the mass media will be made in the next chapter, pp.233-239.

²⁵ Some additional elements that result from or explain the ideologisation of globalisation will be further introduced in the context of national identity in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER 6: GLOBALISATION, THE NATIONAL STATE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Having defined the current framework of analysis, globalisation, we can now analyse national identity within it. To the extent that the national state has been the object of national identification and/or aspiration, our analysis of national identity should begin with the issue of the national state and its fate in the process of globalisation. So, having answered the question of the psychological foundations of national identity, and having examined it in relation to nationalism, we should now examine its prospects in the era of the specific historical time of the end of the twentieth century that is globalisation.

The question whether the speed of economic and political changes has weakened the national state is directly relevant and so it will be addressed. The state is, historically and ideologically speaking, the goal of nationalism, the object of desire of nationalistic aspiration. Therefore, if the state were to wither away then the content of nationalism –as an ideology and a movement– would have to change significantly or, alternatively, replaced by another concept/ideology that would most accurately fit the new circumstances. In addition, the state has been important in organising and systematising the existence and living of nations. However, the question should be divided in two parts. First, whether the modern state apparatus has been weakened in its most important functions. Second, whether its mechanisms of national identification have been weakened, either independently or as a result of the weakening of other functions of the state. Thus, we shall first analyse the *state* component of the national state in general, and then the *national* component of the national state, that is the state as national state and its function in ascribing national identities.

Before we proceed I would like to explain the reason for this explicit division between the state in general, and its function as a national state, as a regulation of a national group. The reason for this division is that in the

relevant debate there is no such distinction made, at least not explicitly, and the reference is made to the national state in general (in most references, the object of analysis is the 'nation-state'). Certainly, what is meant or indicated is the state in modernity, which is terminologically equated with the national state. For example, in Held and McGrew (2000) it is made clear that what is under discussion is the state, the modern 'nation-state'. The conclusions drawn, however, from the debate about the modern national state should not be extended to national identity without specific connection to the mechanisms of the state that provoke national identification. The state in modernity may be characterised by its (claims to) organisation of a specific cultural group and maintenance of its interests, but this must not lead by definition to analogous considerations about national identity drawn from the sole analysis of the state in the era of globalisation. It is often argued that the weakened state in the era of globalisation has as a direct result the weakening of national cultures and identities (see the debate in Held and McGrew, 2000), but this argument is not accompanied by any specific connection to the mechanisms that generate national identification, with the sole exception of the reference on the mass communication media. Therefore, an analysis of those mechanisms in the era of globalisation is needed. We shall begin this chapter with the debate about the functions of the modern state in the era of globalisation¹.

¹ Our analysis of the state in the era of globalisation will be as basic and brief as possible, as it is a huge debate itself and cannot be wholly embraced at present –let alone that it contains aspects that are not directly relevant to the issue of national identification. More emphasis will be given to those aspects that facilitate the current analysis, and the subsequent section that will directly deal with the mechanisms of identification of the national state and, thus, the fate of national identities.

The Modern National State² in the Process of Globalisation

The issue of dismantling the state is (considered by many to be) at the core of globalisation, and it is a significant part of the whole globalisation debate. Beck (2000) for instance considers that, among the various views on globalisation, this issue is a ‘common denominator of globalisation’ (p.20). The debate has been determined to a large extent by those who argue that the process of globalisation brings with it the end, or the serious weakening, of the national state; Beck even identifies the “escape from the categories of the national state” (2000:1) as a defining characteristic of globalisation. Based on the perceived strength of global market forces it is argued that ‘nation-states’ cannot provide effective governance (Horsman and Marshall, 1994), and that they are mere ‘municipalities’ of the global system while their continuing existence is in serious doubt (Ohmae, 1990). Some views go even as far as to argue that nationalism will eventually fade away, along with national identity and nationality (Reich, 1991). On the other hand, those who object to these views argue that, the modern national state is still the major regulatory force, however undermined its monetary and fiscal policies may be, and that the changes have been politically initiated (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, Gray, 1998). Also, the state is the only locator of welfare provision and of institutions that provide the necessary conditions for social existence and still the only representative body of collective will (Mann, 2000, Smith, 1995a). Last, there are always those who stand between the two opposing views and find appropriate arguments in both strands and believe that, while the national state’s powers are diminished, it is still a, more or less, significant player in world affairs (Castells, 1997, Robertson, 1992). Robertson (1992) and Nederveen Pieterse (1995b) in particular argue that the nation state’s formation and prevalence in the 19th and 20th century has been a process of globalisation itself, not a process contrary to it, and that while it seems to be weakened in the present phase of globalisation, this is not a one-dimensional process (as the

² In this section about the state I will refer to the ‘modern national state’, thus indicating that I refer to the state within modernity, where it is defined as a national state as stressed above.

uprising of nationalism for example indicates)³. Overall, the position of the national state at the centre of sociological inquiry is being reconsidered.

We shall follow with the main arguments and counter-arguments of this debate, classified into specific categories according to their content. The main categories that will be referred to in this debate are the economy, warfare, the environment, and government and sovereignty⁴. The selection of these categories is made based on the prevailing debate that questions the continuing efficacy of the modern state to keep its prevailing role around them (with the exception of government, an issue largely ignored). The selected categories also encompass those aspects that mostly characterise the modern national state, that are indeed the most important functions of the state by definition, and should thus be involved in an analysis of the state. Thus, through these categories we can directly answer the argumentation about the weakening of the modern national *state*. Moreover, this classification will provide the additional advantage of specifying the topics of globalisation debate that we have not yet been referred to, and thus offer a whole outlook of it.

Economy

The argument that the modern national state is eventually rendered obsolete by the economic changes that globalisation has provoked is the most common, not only among the so-called ‘hyper-globalisation’ theorists but also by others who may stand more critical against globalisation but nevertheless agree that the economic function of the state has been severely weakened (i.e. Beck, 2000). One of their basic arguments is that the state cannot make any macro-economic planning –if it can do any economic planning at all– because the globalised economic forces are very powerful and capital is mobile and beyond national control or location. Much of the discussion is about transnational corporations (TNCs) that, in their search for comparative

³ In Robertson, 1992:57-8, and Nederveen Pieterse, 1995b:49.

⁴ The issue of the effect of new communication technology is basic in this debate, but it will be referred to in the next section, as it is most relevant to the issue of national perceptions and identities.

advantage globally, are indifferent to frontiers, institutions or regimes. Some of these corporations are even stronger than several states: in 1996, only 70 out of 200 countries had a GDP larger than \$10 billion, while the annual sales of the 400 largest TNCs of the world had more than \$10 billion earnings⁵. Another, related argument concerns the welfare state. Welfare provisions, which provide and sustain states' stability and cohesion, cannot be sustained any more, first because states have to cut their expenses in order to become more competitive, and second because they have diminished revenue from TNC's taxation, although the latter conveniently use the expensive infrastructure of wealthy countries. Two forces matter in world economy, according to Ohmae (1990), global market forces and TNCs, and neither can be subject to effective public governance.

These are in sum the arguments for the dismantling of the modern national state. These arguments have been subject to strong criticism. If we leave aside the issues of whether there is truly global economic activity, and the accuracy of the distinction between MNCs and TNCs⁶, a significant and related to this thesis issue is the argument that economic globalisation has been promoted and supported according to national interests. Castells argues that, "for the main globaliser, the US government, an open integrated global economy works to the advantage of American firms, and American based firms, thus of the American economy. [...] Clinton and his economic team...worked hard to bring the liberal trade gospel to the world, applying US economic and political muscle when necessary" (2000a:142). Similarly, China and India "saw in the opening of world trade the opportunity to...build the technological and economic basis for *renewed national power*" (2000a:143, emphasis added). It is also important to note at this point that the state

⁵ In Sklair, 1999:324. The first data is from World Bank's Development Report, and the second from Fortune Global 500, 1996.

⁶ These are important issues in the globalisation debate but not directly relevant at this point. For the first, see Mann (2000) and Hirst and Thompson (1999), who argue that economic activity should be rather characterised as 'trilateral' and not global since over 85% of world trade is concentrated in Europe, North America and East Asia. Mann also argues that "capitalism retains a geo-economic order, dominated by the economics of advanced nation-states" (2000:139). As for the second matter, some scholars contest the use of the term TNC; Castells, for example, argues that TNCs belong more to the "world of mythical representation (or self-serving image-making by management consultants) than to the institutionally

maintains its centrality as a player in the economy, even though diminished: in OECD countries, for example, states' assets account for about 40% of total GDP (Halliday, 2001:7).

As far as the welfare state is concerned, it has been threatened by the expansion of capitalist economy because of the reduced income in the states' budget, and because of their cutting of expenditures in order to become more competitive. The German example is indicative: "since 1979 corporate profits have risen by 90% and wages by 6%. But revenue from income tax has doubled over the past ten years, while revenue from corporate taxes has fallen by a half. It now contributes a mere 13% of total tax revenue, down from 25% in 1980 and 35% in 1960"⁷. At the same time, the most commonly uttered phrases by politicians are competition, cost-cutting and adjustment to the new reality. Does that render the state feeble? On the one hand, it is broadly argued that the state has lost a lot of its power and its capacity to provide its "fundamental component of stability and legitimacy" (Castells, 1997:254), the welfare state. Yet, on the other hand, it has not lost its significance, since its citizens claim from it to guarantee the necessary conditions for their well-being. So, citizens ask their governments to protect them and, to the extent that they do not correspond to this claim, they may face fierce social disturbances and turbulence that can jeopardise their power. This is a political decision that governments have to make. The question is, have governments lost their power, or have they 'surrendered' power as they have chosen to implement the politics of economic globalisation?

That brings us to the argument that the modern national state is unable to exercise effective economic governance in the era of globalisation. This view about the non-governability of the new global economy by the nation state is also questioned. There are various counter-views concerning that matter, but they all have a common denominator; the observation that the global free market is politically constituted. As it has been mentioned before, a number of

bounded realities of the world economy" (2000a:208). Nevertheless, the term has been –and is now– broadly used and has thus become part of the globalisation context. See also on this debate Sklair (1999).

⁷ Interview of Andre Gorz, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1 August 1997, p.35, quoted in Beck, 2000:6.

authors argue that the present and the previous phase of an open international economy (that of 1870-1914) require state intervention “on a most ambitious scale” (Gray, 1998:7)⁸. Gray also argues that states “will remain decisive mediating structures which MNCs compete to control” (1998:76), and that their function as to seize control over natural resources is a prerequisite for economic growth⁹. The argument supported in this thesis is consistent with that of Gray and Hirst and Thompson on that matter.

We should add to the above the argument that the question of whether economic globalisation undermines the state is a political and not an economic issue. It is an issue that has to do with the traditional dilemmas of international relations and power/domination issues¹⁰. This is related to the observation that the ‘choice’ as to whether a country shall liberate its economy is not unrestricted: rather, the choice to “stay out of the system” is penalised. Yet, the burden of such penalties is not a natural free market choice, but an imposition by other countries and/or institutions, which have an already established

⁸ Hirst and Thompson relate this issue to the mythologisation of globalisation, which has spread the unjustified view that globalisation is ungovernable. See on that matter Hirst and Thompson, 1999:268-269, and Castells, 2000a:137-147.

⁹ Gray draws the analogies from his comparative study on the open international economy of 1870 to 1914 –an era created through state centralisation and regulation that ended just when the state had been vitally weakened– and contemporary period. The three key measures that decisively contributed towards free market in Britain during the first period were, his argument continues, the removal of agricultural protection and establishment of free trade, reform of the poor laws, and removal of controls of wages –all measures that weakened the control and protection of the state, but initiated by it.

¹⁰ Castells’ view might be illuminating regarding that matter. As he argues, “the mechanism to bring in the globalisation process to most countries in the world was simple: political pressure either through direct government action or through imposition by the IMF/World Bank/World Trade Organisation. Only after economies were liberated would global capital flow in. The Clinton administration was in fact the true political globaliser [...] putting direct pressure around the world, and instructing the IMF to pursue this strategy in the strictest possible terms. The goal was the unification of all economies around a set of homogeneous rules of the game. [The outcome of this process was economic crisis in many areas]. In most cases, after such crisis, the IMF and the World Bank came to the rescue, but on the condition that governments would accept IMF’s prescriptions for economic health. These policy recommendations (in fact, impositions) were based on pre-packaged adjustment policies, astonishingly similar to each other, whatever each country’s specific conditions; [...] Even the large economies of very important countries, such as Russia, Mexico, Indonesia, or Brazil, were dependent on the IMF’s approval for their policies. Most of the developing world, as well as the transition economies, became an economic protectorate under the IMF – which ultimately meant the US Treasury Department. The power of the IMF was not so much financial as symbolic. [...] Credit given by the IMF meant credibility for global financial investors. And withdrawal of the IMF’s confidence meant, for a given country, becoming a financial pariah. Such was the logic: if a country decided to stay out of the system (for example, Alan Garcia’s Peru in the 1980s) it was punished with financial ostracism – and it collapsed, so verifying the IMF’s self-fulfilling prophesy” (2000a:140-141).

opinion about the way international market should function¹¹. So, these ‘established opinions’ about the way the market should function are in fact political ideologies, and the necessity to comply with their rules is rather political than economic. It is indicative that those countries that face such economic burdens also face political burdens; rejection from the so-called ‘international society’ is such an example¹².

To conclude, globalisation is not an interest-free process; it has been actively (that is, ideologically, economically, politically, militarily) promoted by the US government, and to a lesser extent by Britain, and by ‘international’ or ‘world’ organisations, whose decisions are determined by the ideological standpoint of their strongest members. For this, and the above reasons, economic globalisation is a political process too. It is politically initiated and necessitated by the economic and political centres of powerful nation states that aim at maintaining and expanding their dominance and interests¹³. The de-politicisation of societies and the prevalence of economics is a highly political project, conveniently supported by the rhetoric and debate of the dismantling of the national state. The reason is that, as Benjamin Barber argues¹⁴, in a world of increasingly globalised economy, trade, and division of labour, what remains least globalised or is under shrinkage are the democratic institutions, human rights and liberties, the welfare system and the protection of the citizens: these remain the field of the states’ responsibility, where states obstruct or control the uncontrolled predominance of the market forces –at the normative level, of course.

¹¹ Indicatively, one of the obstacles against this ‘liberalising’ trend that countries had, namely the imposition of tariffs on imports, is detected and penalised by the World Trade Organisation.

¹² For example, the agreement signed between China and the US in November 1999 on a series of measures that would liberate and open the Chinese vast and underdeveloped economy, was welcomed by many US and WTO officials as a positive effort of the China Republic to join the international family. In reality, China came closer to international society through the agreement that it would remove or diminish tariffs and export subsidies and would provide major opportunities for US companies in agriculture, industrial goods, automobiles, telecommunications, Internet services, banking and finance, in exchange with US support for its joining the WTO¹².

¹³ As Castells argues, “the global economy was politically constituted”, enacted by governments and international institutions in order to preserve and enhance the interests of their states (2000a:147).

¹⁴ From an interview at the electronic journal *Boiler*, re-published at *Eleftherotypia* newspaper, 18/11/2001, Simiomatario Ideon, p.36.

Warfare

The issue of warfare is another field where it is argued that states' sovereignty is limited. The end of the Cold War has been the hallmark of a new era in world politics. One of the features generally emphasised in the aftermath of the Cold War (while concerning the post-WW2 period in general) has been the augmenting interdependence and the subsequent declining decision power of the national states to go to war. The monopoly of means of violence has been a fundamental feature of the state since the Treaty of Westphalia, and the exercise of its power to warfare has been the ultimate expression of its sovereignty. Now, it is broadly argued¹⁵, national states cannot easily exercise that power and they are more dependent on each other. Many reasons have been given to account for that, such as the impact of new technologies or the dissolution of the two military blocks, but the main reason generally emphasised has been the development of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, I would argue, states have always been dependent on each other to a certain degree and that has not prevented them from going to war. Even in the contemporary era, where states are even more interdependent, they do not refrain from using their military forces when deemed necessary. I will elaborate my argument in juxtaposition with the view that Hirst and Thompson (1999) present on this matter, which also delineates the broad argument that states have lost their power to warfare¹⁶.

Hirst and Thompson develop a broadly articulated argument as far as warfare is concerned. Its main features are three. Firstly, that "nuclear weapons drove war out of international relations between advanced states" (1999:264) or at least have made it a lesser option. That is because the use of nuclear weapons holds the threat of mutual destruction and is thus "making war impossible" between nuclear powers. This has led to mutual agreements, which have the effect of granting to each other powers of inspection and

¹⁵ See indicatively, Castells, 1997:262-5; Hirst & Thompson, 1999:263-5; Beck, 2000:134; for a more balanced view on the issue of warfare in the era of globalisation see Halliday, 2002, chapter 4.

¹⁶ I have chosen to do so because Hirst and Thompson's general argument is in favour of the continuing existence, significance and power of the national state, while on the issue of the warfare they take the contrary view; also, because their argument on warfare summarises the respective arguments on that matter, and because I have mostly agreed on their arguments thus far.

supervision and relinquish a significant degree of sovereignty. Secondly, however, this does not guarantee a peaceful world: “Lesser states” will continue to fight one another. Advanced states will be threatened by terrorism. Revolutionary movements will continue to arise...” (1999:265). Thirdly, at least the advanced states have lost the legitimation and the ability to mobilise to war. According to Hirst and Thompson, “the liberal state, claiming to live peacefully with its neighbours...could claim great legitimacy if attacked...*These legitimations are gone*, and with them whole classes of provision for ‘national’ needs justified by the possible contingency of war: ‘national’ industries, health and welfare to promote ‘national efficiency’, and social solidarity to unite rich and poor in a common struggle”; also, “governments are unlikely to have the occasion to call on the lives and property of their citizens for war. They will no longer be able to mobilise their societies... Without war, without enemies, the state becomes less significant to the citizen” (1999:265, emphasis added).

The use of nuclear weapons can indeed produce mutual destruction if employed by two or more nuclear powers, as Hirst and Thompson argue, and we must also agree that without enemies the state loses much of its coherence (for reasons explained in chapter 2). Unfortunately, however, actual warfare is by far the strongest prerequisite for enemies to exist: its threat can equally provide enemies. The United States did not go to war with the SU, yet the latter was their biggest enemy, and it did provide legitimacy for a number of ‘national policies’. When the SU collapsed, the US did not remain short of an enemy: terrorism, or even the uprising China, easily replaced communism and served equally as an enemy, justifying the ‘national necessity’ of the Anti-Missiles System. The enemy can be real or perceived but it is effective and invoked in both cases. Also, the view that advanced states have lost the legitimacy and capacity to mobilise to war is a kind of self-delusion. In the last decades of the 20th century, the most developed and liberal states of the West have been engaged in several wars, although these were taking place outside their territories and posed no threat to them; yet, they did go to war, they did mobilise and legitimise, and they did gain support for military action (i.e. Nicaragua, Falklands, Gulf, Serbia/Kosovo wars etc.). Last, the view that

'lesser countries' are still engaged in warfare, while not being accurate, places conflict 'there', in the periphery (real and symbolic periphery) and distances 'us' from 'them' and their horrible deeds. Thus, it comes as a projection, that also justifies 'our' use of violence while not considering it warfare.

To conclude, although nuclear powers have agreed to reduce their weaponry, there are more countries now that possess or anticipate the possession of nuclear weapons, like India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, etc. At the same time, the advanced countries (the EU for example) have tried in the last few decades to drive war out of their frontiers, but they are still involved in warfare –directly or indirectly. In addition, states' decision to go to war is the outcome of many factors. One factor is the real strength of the countries involved. In that respect, small states have always had diminished power in making that decision –a factor certainly independent from globalisation. Another interesting factor is the internal situation of the smaller state. As Keohane and Nye argue, "the smaller state may have greater internal political unity than the larger one" (1977:19), or it may be more willing to suffer; still a factor indifferent to globalisation. These are the so-called imponderable factors, yet the ones that determine facts in several occasions and leave us astonished.

Environment

The environment seems to be in jeopardy as it is now facing severe problems, such as global warming, the ozone layer, pollution of rivers and sea, deforestation etc. Yet, national states are unable to save it because, as it is argued, they are powerless. Indeed, this is true, but we should like to make one qualification: *each* nation state is powerless, each one alone. This means that nation states in conjunction have the power to make an ecological turn, and they are the major actors that can do so. Some of them have realised the necessity to conceive what the global interest is, which is their interest too. Some others have not. For example, while Japan took the initiative for the Kyoto agreement, the world's largest producer of the greenhouse gases blamed

for global warming, the US, has refused to sign it (although it was already parochial), on the grounds that it would jeopardise the US economy and its national interests. At the same time, other newly industrialising countries fail to restrict their gas emissions and thus continue to pollute the planet. Or, similarly, France implemented its atomic bomb testings in the mid-90s, but well away from 'home', in the South Pole Sea.

Citizens and NGOs have proven highly informed and sensitive about the environment, and they exercise pressure and control whenever they can. In the case of the environment, the civilian dimension of globalisation is very strong, not only because of the sensitivity of the people but also because of the effective means that communication technology has given to their organisation. However, although pressure is directed towards modern national states, it does not undermine them. Pressure is directed against states because it is them that have the capacity to change regulations, to sign treaties and exercise control for their implementation. Intergovernmental, non-governmental and other pressure groups are trying to convince states' governments to proceed with the regulation needed, and to persuade them that "global concerns are in the national interest" (Mann, 2000:144). And as Mann argues, these (along with other identity politics) strengthen the national state and undermine their importance.

Government and Sovereignty

In sum, there is an issue that the 'globalists' do not touch upon: the issue of *politics*. There is considerable discussion about the threat posed by globalisation on the national state, about transnational, or international, forces that alter its form and dynamics, about new and powerful pressure groups and NGOs, whose number has increased significantly, and so on. Nevertheless, they fail to touch on a sensitive issue. Who takes responsibility over people's lives? Who will exercise politics if the national state is dismantled? And, also, whom are all these pressure groups, that are supposedly diminishing the state's power, trying to put some pressure on?

Globalisation does not provide an alternative for government, at least for the moment¹⁷. The national state holds the law enactment and law enforcement power, nationally and internationally, and it holds the means to provide and sustain social cohesion. As Smith argues, “the national state remains the only internationally recognised structure of political association” (1995a:104). Since 1991 more than 18 new states were recognised, after a period of general refusal. Indeed, as Smith argues, *it is the behaviour and effectiveness of states that has been challenged, not the national state as a norm* (1995a:105).

A significant function of the national state that guarantees a large degree of territorial control is “the regulation of populations”: as Hirst and Thompson remark, states have a central role in being responsible for a given territory and the population that habituates it (1999:256-257, 275). It is exactly on behalf of this population that they regulate, control and cooperate with other states in order to mutually guarantee the lives and prosperity of their population. This is a function of the national state that globalisation has not altered. The European Court of Justice and its intervening capacity could be considered as an exception, moderated though by the fact that the European Union’s countries themselves have conceded certain powers to it. This feature of national states to regulate their populations brings us to the issue of *sovereignty*.

Sovereignty, it is argued, is a characteristic of the states that is lost, or moderated, in the new globalised era. Held (1989), for example, argues that sovereignty, as the capacity of the states to set goals and exercise legal and actual control and autonomy, as the capacity to achieve goals once set, is limited. That is because states’ power faces certain gaps and disjunctures – mainly posed by the world economy, hegemonic powers and power blocks, international organisations, and international law– that render the boundaries of domestic politics blurred. According to Castells, contemporary national states have been de-powered by themselves, while “nation-states have lost their sovereignty because the very concept of sovereignty, since Bodin, implies that

¹⁷ Although technologies could raise issues about a more democratic and directly participatory democracy within or even beyond the existing types of government, the debate is restricted on whether ‘nation-states’ are able to govern the current affairs, thus creating a vacuum of governance. The rising debate about ‘global governance’ has not yet provided with an answer or with an alternative for the state.

it is not possible to lose sovereignty ‘a little bit’: this was precisely the *casus belli*” (1997:304). In the 1990s, he argues, “nation-states have been transformed from sovereign subjects into strategic actors...” (1997:307), and they now have to cooperate with each other.

The above is true, but not as a new development provoked by globalisation in the last two decades; unless we coincide globalisation with the whole of modernity or the emergence of the state. Most states had never had such sovereignty as described above. During the Cold War their decision-making was constrained by the NATO and Warsaw alliances; as far back as the early 19th century, the very constitution and future of several newly emerging states following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was dependent on the decisions of the Great (European) Powers of that time; and there exist many more similar examples. So, as Hirst and Thompson remark, “it is time the old Bodinian view of sovereignty was buried, along with the conceptions of exclusive governmental powers on which it is based” (1999:235). Perhaps, this perception of sovereignty was part of the Great Powers’ view of themselves, but most states have long experienced not only the need for cooperation but also the imposition of decisions that concern them but would not otherwise make by themselves. In addition, states’ cooperation has always been a prerequisite for the very existence of states and for the concept of sovereignty itself, which depends on ‘external’ consensus, like in the Treaty of Westphalia, and was always dependent on international agreement(s). Therefore, sovereignty has always been limited and interdependent. In Smith’s words, “it is a mistake to imagine that the national state has ever been as sovereign and independent as it likes to portray itself” (1995a:120-1).

An additional aspect of this issue is that the discussion about states’ sovereignty is ‘case-specific’, meaning that it has relevance only in specific contexts. In particular, if the western and other long established national states can discuss or implement the ‘passing out’ of their (perceived) sovereignty, this is by far the case in other parts of the world where the realisation of a nation state is still an aspiration, or only a newly realised one. Some nations, or “much of the world” as Mann argues (2000:139), have not yet acquired their own

state, while there is not any indication that they will stop desiring one. Nationalism has not withered away; on the contrary, there are a number of old nationalisms that have not been settled, either liberating (i.e. Palestinian) or expansionary (i.e. Indian and Pakistani), as well as a number of relatively new nationalisms, mainly secessionist (i.e. Basque, Taiwanese, etc). For them, the debate over giving up 'some' sovereignty has no point of reference: it does not concern them. While for the developed world, the discussion about the demise of the modern/national state could have a substance for the future, and a point of reference as well, this is not so for other parts in the world. So, if our context of discussion is the 'global' and not the EU or the West, we may not be able yet to engage in such discussions.

* * *

So, is the nation state really weakened? Mann addresses a harsh but not unfair criticism on those "enthusiasts" who, "with little sense of history, they exaggerate the former strength of nation-states; with little sense of global variety, they exaggerate their current decline" (2000:146), and he argues that there are today trends that both strengthen and weaken them, while identity politics actually strengthen them. Perhaps we can argue that the harried argumentation that the national state will fade away is deeply influenced by the modernist claim that national states and national identity are modern phenomena; those changes that deeply affect modernity and its structures are then easily seen as affecting the national state too. But, such views ignore or neglect the importance of pre-modern ethnic ties and the existence of ethnic or national-like collectivities in pre-modern times. Analysts who acknowledge the existence of pre-modern ethnic ties argue that the national state and national identity are not going to wither away¹⁸. In general, Mann is right that both the former strength and current decline of national states have been exaggerated. The national state has not been rendered obsolete: it is rather in embarrassment

¹⁸ For example, Smith, 1995:116, and chapter 5 in general.

because of such claims coinciding with rapid changes and the (re)appropriation and (re)allocation of new roles.

Even though there is not specificity in the argumentation that connects the demise of the national state with the respective demise of national identity, as we have seen the modern national state has not been rendered obsolete. On the contrary, it is in the medium of immense pressures, either coming from the citizenry towards a more effective regulation of their lives, either coming from capitalist groups, countries and interests. Either way, the pressure indicates the centrality of the state in organising and regulating the spheres of social, political and economic activity, including its centrality in the deregulation of national economies. So, the argument about the demise of the modern state as a result of the changes associated with globalisation (changes that are to a large extent real) is not sufficiently substantiated. Let us now turn to the directly relevant issues of national identities, identification mechanisms of modern national states, and the strength of nationalism in the context of globalisation.

Globalisation's Effects on Identification Mechanisms of the National State

We were preoccupied with the modern state, the national state and its power as the process of globalisation goes on. So far we examined the effects of globalisation on the main functions of the state as a regulator of a given territorial, economic and administrative area. We should now proceed in examining possible effects of globalisation on the state as a regulator of a given cultural 'space', as a provider of national identification. So, we shall consider whether globalisation has affected the identification mechanisms of the modern state with the nation, that is those mechanisms that render the modern state a *national* state and also facilitate, sustain and/or enhance identification with it. It is important to address this issue because, if those aspects of the national state that generate and sustain identification remain unaltered (or even if they are strengthened), then it is indifferent from the perspective of national identity

whether the state has been weakened in some other aspects¹⁹. At the same time, the issue of nationalism and its relationship with globalisation cannot be absent from this analysis, as nationalism is the force behind the very creation of the national state in modernity.

The basic argument that will be elaborated at present is that the identification mechanisms of the national state have not been weakened by globalisation and, hence, there is no reason to expect a decline in the significance of national identities –taking under consideration of course the previous analysis, according to which the modern state was not been rendered obsolete or seriously undermined. On the contrary, there are reasons to expect the strengthening of national identities because nationalism is still a powerful force within globalisation and, also, the rhetoric about the dismantling of the national state is likely to generate reactions towards its defence. This will be elaborated in twofold argumentation. First, that the national state remains the main object of identification and the main provider of group identity, of national identity. Second, that globalisation may itself help sustain and even enhance national divisions and ethnic classifications.

Identification Mechanisms of the 'Globalised' National State

The first argument is that *national identity is no less powerful than it has been before globalisation*. National identity has been organised by the national state, which has been both a 'state', meaning the institutional and organisational constitution of a given territory and population, and a 'nation', meaning the sentimental bonds that link individuals together in a relationship of belonging. To the extent that the state holds and retains the means to bring national identification and to ascribe these sentimental bonds to the population of its territory, there is no reason to anticipate the weakening in significance of national identifications. Of course, this argument is directly relevant only to

¹⁹ In that sense, there will prove to be a wrong connection of the state's decline in general and national identity's decline as well. Nevertheless, even though wrongly put, the examination of the actual decline of the strength of the state was important to the extent that it did not ignore a vaguely articulated argumentation.

those cases where the state actually refers to one nation or even a vast national majority within it. However, this limitation directly nullifies the claims that the weakening of the national state will bring forth a respective weakening of national identities. Firstly because, since the national *state* has not been weakened in overall, as argued in the section above, and if, in addition, its mechanisms that provoke identification have not been weakened (as will be argued), there is no case for such claims. Moreover, the very fact that these claims essentially concern those ‘real’ nation-states (meaning nation-and-state-in-one), which are minority cases as we have seen²⁰, in combination with the fact that national identities have been prevalent forms of collective identification in the course of modernity nonetheless (that is, although these national identities have not been organised and regulated by a state), proves the fallacy of the claims in the first place. The connection of the existence or strength of the national state with the need or strength of identification with a nation in the era of modernity –which is an era where nationalism and the norm or self-determination in a national state prevails– is thus misleading and it disregards the reality of national identification, meaning the fact that national identities have been also formed irrespective of the actual systematisation and facilitation of a modern national state²¹. In that respect, the very argument that national identities will follow the weakening and repudiating path of national states is put in a wrong context in the first place: it is founded on a theoretical assumption that is empirically invalid, namely that national states are really ‘nation-states’.

So, the applicability of the examination of identification mechanisms of the national state in globalisation’s context is limited because this argument directly refers to national identities as ascribed and systematised by the state;

²⁰ As it was mentioned in chapter 4, p. 147, in 1970 the 9,1% of states were totally homogeneous while 18,9% had the 90% of the population belonging to one ethnic group (see Connor, 1994:29-30).

²¹ In chapter 4 it was argued that the change from ethnic to national identities is due to nationalism and the existence of the national state. The modern state is directly connected with the national identities that it systematises or even creates. Nevertheless, the additional prevalence of nationalism, which renders a national state an aspiration and national/ethnic identities a self-conscious reality also explains the fact that national identities can also become powerful even though not systematised by a state. In that respect, we could refer here also to identification with an ethnic group as, in the context of modernity and the aspiration to national self-determination, ethnic groups and identities are being resignified as nations and national identities, often irrespectively of the existence of a national state.

thus, it cannot adequately correlate to the question of the possible weakening of national identities in general. Despite this limitation, however, it is not superficial to examine it even if it does not refer to majority cases. On the contrary, it has the merit of explaining those while it is also relevant to other cases, where there are more than one national groups within the state but it tries to systematise them around one prevalent or one umbrella identity (i.e. British identity). So, has globalisation affected the identification mechanisms of the national state? We need to clarify here that by identification mechanisms of the national state we do not only refer to mechanisms *of* the state, that is mechanisms that are controlled and/or organised by the state, but also to mechanisms that function *within* the context of the national state and provoke, sustain or remind national identity. For example, the mass media are not necessarily controlled by the state, yet they function as identification mechanisms in the given national contexts that they operate. So, by *identification mechanisms of the national state* we rather mean identification mechanisms that function in the context of the national state, whether state controlled and regulated or not.

In chapter 4 we referred to “education, the mass media and the elites as the main providers and/or manipulators of people’s national identity”²². So, let us examine these three and their possible weakening because of globalisation. Education, to begin with, provides the same reference points and retain its mechanisms of children’s socialisation through identification with the national state as it has been doing until now. Language, first and foremost, which is the most significant internal and external classificatory characteristic, remains ‘national’. Certainly, increased contacts or the use of the Internet may have rendered English language an indispensable tool for people in both communication and work internationally. This, however, does neither undermine national languages nor their centrality as signifiers of national identity because it is merely a tool while its complementarity cannot put ‘mother tongue’ in question. Even in such cases as the Netherlands, where the

²² Chapter 4, p.156 (under the title ‘National and Ethnic Identity’).

English language is officially recognised, this bilingualism has not resulted in weaker national identities²³.

Furthermore, history teaching is primarily oriented on the course of the nation, and secondarily on international events –which are also emphasised according to their relevance or closeness to the ‘neighbourhood’ of the nation, that is to the countries surrounding it or relating to it more closely (politically, economically, etc). For example, the 1998 guidelines of the Greek Pedagogical Institute for history books, stressed among its aims that children must “develop a positive attitude towards the preservation of their national heritage” (1998:14), learn the important events of the Greek history as well as elements of the history of other civilisations, and learn about the history of Hellenism and place it within the context of the global history²⁴. Similarly in Germany: Falk Pingel reports in his book *The European Home: Representations of 20th Century Europe in History Textbooks*²⁵ that, in German textbooks, the proportion of national history is between 40-70%, depending on the context of the book, while the rest concerns ‘European’ and global history alike (2000:39). The same applies to most countries of the EU: as Pingel remarks, while Europe in general and the EU in particular occupy indeed more place in education, it is taught as a wider context within which to regard national history²⁶. As these examples indicate, the national element remains the central

²³ National attachment is no less strong for the Dutch than it is for the rest of the European Union citizens. In the Eurobarometer survey, they have responded that they feel very or fairly attached to their country by 80%, when the EU average is 89% (EB 49, Spring 1998, p.41); also, the 86% feels very or fairly proud for their nationality, while the EU average is 83% (EB 52, Autumn 1999, p.10).

²⁴ Let alone that these guidelines are part of the rewriting of history books with a more European and international orientation, as part of the project ‘Learning and Teaching About the History of Europe in the 20th Century’ (Recommendation 1283 (1996), on history and the learning of history in Europe).

²⁵ Falk Pingel (2000): *The European Home: representations of 20th century Europe in textbooks*, Council of Europe Publishing. The book is written in conjunction with the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig (Germany), and a number of scientists and researchers around Europe, and it is part of the work done during the project ‘Learning and Teaching About the History of Europe in the 20th Century’, funded by the EU. In line with the project specifications, the book examines the content and methods of history teaching in European countries, and proposes the need to modernise history books according to contemporary pedagogic views with the use of new technology, and to the values history textbooks must disseminate. However, the additional impetus of the book is to research on the existence of a ‘European’ idea in history books and to make recommendations on how to promote such an idea.

²⁶ In general, history textbooks are oriented according to the historical context and development path of a country. For example, in FYROM (a non-EU country which is recently involved in nation-building) textbooks show an evident preoccupation with the issue of nation-building and the creation of national identity.

point of reference, not only within the context of globalisation but also within the wider 'European' environment (in which national states strongly cooperate with each other and, also, concede certain aspects of their sovereignty).

Last, visits to national museums, and –active or passive– participation in national celebrations and anniversaries have been part of children's education, as analysed in chapter 4. These celebrations not only remain to be part of what Billing calls 'flagging' of the nation, but they are even more relevant as more and more national states have involved them in the second part of the twentieth century. The reason is twofold: first, new 'nation-states' have emerged during the twentieth century and, second, even older national states have recently employed them (i.e. China initiated its first Grand National Day parades in 1949). So, almost every national state currently organises such activities, as indicated elsewhere²⁷, while schools play an active role in them, and simultaneously there is a trend that more and more national states engage in such activities. This should not be explained as a result of globalisation, however, although it coincides with it, but as a result of nationalism and the tendency towards uniformity among national states that wish to implement the practices of other, established national states. To conclude, the function of education as national education, as analysed in chapter 4, has not been altered in the late 20th century: the national orientation of education is an aspect barely touched by globalisation.

Secondly, we should refer to the elites, meaning politicians and intellectuals. As far as the politicians are concerned, their main concern is to appeal to their electorate, which is national, and to serve national interests. Even when they refer to regional or international alliances, they do so on the grounds of national interest. We have seen the example of the US president Bush who resigned from the Kyoto agreement on the grounds that it would jeopardise the American economy; also, the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair justified his support for Europe and the euro on the grounds of British

²⁷ See chapter 4, p.158-9. The data presented is selected in 2002.

interests²⁸ –these two examples are used here because they are examples of the two most ‘globalised’ countries and the most active supporters and promoters of globalisation (liberal capitalism has been an integral part of their political tradition). Thus, there is no indication that globalisation has altered the national focus and/or references of politicians. Similarly, globalisation does not seem to significantly alter the focus of intellectuals, whichever this focus has been. This means that, while there are intellectuals that are nationalists, or nation-centric, there are others who advocate cosmopolitanism. This trend to see the world from a wider perspective than one’s own locality is not unique in the era of globalisation, as cosmopolitanism is a concept apparent in every historical period (also referred to as universalism or humanism). Certainly, as globalisation is on the focus, a more global and universal outlook is under discussion and has come to the fore again. Yet, this has also been accompanied by the reverse trend among them, that is to stress the dangers of globalisation or to fear about the fate of national distinctiveness.

Nevertheless, there is one change that accompanies globalisation, a change concerning both politicians and intellectuals –although the latter to a lesser extent. It is that globalisation is discursively used to an excessive extent in connection to almost every rhetoric. So, when politicians employ unpopular policies, they tend to justify them as a necessity provoked by globalisation, thus using it as an alibi. We refer here to ‘alibi’ because, as argued in chapter 5, a number of unpopular measures implemented were the result of the spread of the free market economy, which is a political choice and not a necessity: thus, the claim that a number of policies are ‘necessitated’ because of globalisation serves so as to avoid political responsibility for their political choices. In addition, to the extent that these policies were regarded as necessary or justified as such, this is part of the ideologisation of globalisation. At the same time, a large number of intellectuals mention globalisation as a threat to the

²⁸ “...the very reason why we should be there in Europe as a leading player is because we are in fact a strong country, a great country that is doing well, and us being at the centre of Europe is part of that. [...] the reasons why we are in principle in favour of joining the euro are because if the euro is successful and if it is in our economic interests to join then it is going to be good for British industry, for British jobs, for British investment”; from the press conference of the prime minister at 20th of June, where PM Tony Blair began by briefing journalists on the Seville European Council.

national state and to national culture and identity. This change, however, does not weaken national identification. On the contrary: on the one hand, it renders globalisation an alien, threatening force and, on the other hand, it provokes anxiety and uneasiness for ones' familiar environment and for one's very identity. But, a real or perceived threat to identity is more likely to provoke the need to identify more strongly than to abandon it. That is because globalisation does not provide an alternative object for identification, and thus sense of belonging, and furthermore a threat to identity is perceived as a threat to one's personality, which obviously necessitates its defence²⁹. In that sense, globalisation may have caused some changes, however minor or subtle, in the behaviour and perceptions of elites, but certainly not in a direction that weakens national identity.

The mass media have been left last in this analysis, as I would like to make a particular reference to them. The reason is that, in the relevant bibliography regarding the weakening of national identities the mass media and new communication technologies are analysed as the major determinants in such a weakening. Hence, my extensive reference to them.

New Communication Technologies

The argument that state sovereignty is limited incorporates into the debate the new communication technologies. New communication and information technologies have brought significant changes in the ways of communication, image transmission, and organisation of our way of living. They have themselves shaped and influenced several aspects of globalisation, particularly the civilian dimension, and have brought the world into more intense contact, or at least they have provided the means for that. It has been argued by several scholars that these technologies have loosened states' control over their territory and also that they have changed people's perceptions and, through cultural contacts, have brought some level of cultural integration or

²⁹ Some further analysis on the subject of possible reactions to such perceptions of threats will be made in the next chapter.

cultural fluidity: thus, that national cultural homogeneity, a feature of cohesion and stability within the national states, is undermined (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995b, Hall, 1991b). Yet, we might say that there is a misunderstanding not only as far as the 'global' distribution of these technologies are concerned but also regarding the implications of new technologies. On the one hand, developments in technology do not concern the whole of the globe but only certain parts of it, as the new technologies are widely spread in specific segments of the world³⁰. On the other hand, the strength and new capacities of communication and information have been exaggerated towards one direction, and the typical loss of control over the media has been confused with the loss of *any* control over them³¹ –let alone that the loss of states' ownership and direct control over the media is indeed a fact only in those countries that can be characterised as plural democracies. So, the term 'globalisation' and the relevant debate about new communication technologies and the weakening of the national state can be applied and answered only for those areas that new technologies are widespread and the term can be applied (mainly OECD countries).

While these issues are interesting and important in the globalisation debate, we should now focus on the issue strictly related to this thesis, that is the national orientation of news and information transmitted. As it will be argued, irrespectively of the media's interdependence with or independence from politicians, national issues or events of national interest are at the forefront of television, radio, or the press. The bulk of information has been mediated through the perceptions of one's nationality³², which guarantees

³⁰ According to 1999 UNDP report, 91% of all Internet users are in OECD countries, which account for one fifth of the world's population, while South Asia, home of 23% of the world's population, has less than 1% of Internet users (2000:343).

³¹ The direct and official control of governments over the sources of information and communication cannot always be applied indeed. Yet, they often exercise an influence to each other that can be crucial and beneficial for both sides (i.e. unofficial coalitions of radio and, mainly, television stations with political parties and/or the government). At the same time, however, there are no doubt independent journalistic sources that chose to escape coalition with states. There is one aspect of the new communication and information technology that really escapes state's control and it provides the means for its actual control on behalf of its citizens: the Internet. Nevertheless, there is no yet indication as to whether the Internet creates or alters the interests of peoples and nations or it simply facilitates each one to search for what he/she is interested in. My argument is, however, that both trends (to state-coalition, and to independent journalism) are not new, and certainly not initiated by globalisation.

³² See the section *Mass Communication Media*, in chapter 4, p.163.

appeal and thus profit for the media corporations, and this has not changed in the era of globalisation. While this may be quite obvious to everyone having a television at his/her living-room, for example, I will present an elaboration of data collected for a specific survey.

On the 20th of March 2002 the state-owned television channel NET (New Greek Television) broadcasted in their weekly programme 'Protagonistes' a survey on the quality level and content of the television 'News' from the biggest private and state-owned channels in nine countries³³. While the programme concerned the quality of the television 'News' in these countries, they also referred to the content of the news transmitted. The data collected shows that that the content of the 'News' in these countries was on average 68% national, 20% international, and 12% general, where general refers to scientific findings and international anniversaries (like Women's Day). Although this data is enough to show the clear precedence of the national news, I would like to add a few qualitative remarks. First, as the general theme on the 8th of March was dedicated to women, in most cases the reference was on women of a famous woman of the national state that the channel operated. So, for example, the French TF1 presented the wife of the Prime Minister Jospin, and the Italian RAI1 presented the festivities for the day in Italy. Second, any general or international or athletic event was accompanied by a specific and extended reference when there was a 'national' presence. So, the short reference of the French FR2 to the Para-Olympic games of Salt Lake City (0.16 min) was accompanied by an extensive one to the French athletes participating (2.09 min). Last, in several instances the percentages of national and international issues can be misleading, as the time given to each of them is not proportionally analogous. For example, while the 50% of the topics of the German ARD were international, only 38% of the total time of the 'News' was given to them. From these remarks it becomes clear that the overall data

³³ The countries are, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, UK, Russia, Turkey, USA and Greece. The survey was made on the 8th of March 2002 (which is also Women's Day). I should remark that the programme 'Protagonistes' is well reputable for its accuracy, and the survey was analysed by relevant professors and analysts. The journalists of this programme were so kind as to give me all the details of their findings, so that I could check myself on the evidence and compare them with their interpretations and analysis. Based on this evidence is my current analysis.

showing 68% for national issues is the most moderate calculation: if we would add to them the 'general' topics as well or if we considered the time dedicated to each issue the proportion would be much less in favour of international as opposed to national topics.

So, media messages are subject to the contexts of perception, contexts that are mainly local/national. Of course, there is a trend towards an oligopoly of the media ownership, as the 1999 UNDP report demonstrates³⁴, which could delineate a trend towards uniformity. But, let us not forget that the owners of the media are persons with personal interests too, as well as biases. In Smith's words, even in free, liberal countries where media are not controlled by the state, "the world is still largely seen through the lenses of one's national state" (1995a:93). This is because people have identified with their national state long before they search for news and information through the media; thus their interest lies primarily in what is 'theirs': that applies to both journalists and the audience.

Furthermore, as we saw in chapter 4, the media constitute a medium in the process of identification with the nation; there is no indication thus far that this has changed, or that there is a trend towards changing this. The argument that "the globalisation/localisation of media and electronic communication is tantamount to the de-nationalisation and de-statisation of information, the two being inseparable for the time being" that Castells expresses (1997:259) still lacks the adequate theoretical or empirical support. The two are not inseparable in reality, and de-statisation has not been followed by de-nationalisation of information in reality: for example, where journalists criticise the state for inefficiency, they do so on the grounds that it cannot support the national interests. On the contrary, information diffused by private corporations is no less nation-centric than before, due to the convenience of appealing to already fixed perceptions and sentiments of a specific group. Conversely, private media corporations tend to be more nation-centric than state-owned media. Further analysis of the data of the 'Protagonistes' programme survey mentioned above shows that, the total 68% and 20% for national and international topics

³⁴ 1999 UNDP Report, 2000:343.

respectively in private and state-controlled media shows a significant diversion if we separate the two. So, the proportion of national and international topics was 76% and 15% for the private television stations and 62% and 25% for the state-owned ones respectively. We can infer from the profit-aiming nature of private television that the reference to familiar images and to what is 'ours' seems indeed more appealing and interesting, and the owners of private media corporations have followed it as a profit-aiming method.

An additional issue that is directly relevant to this debate about the effect of the mass media and new communication technologies on national cultures and identities is the issue of the increased contact of individuals and nations through the new means of communication and the implications that such a contact might have. Although a few indicating lines were mentioned earlier³⁵, some further brief remarks are needed. Appadurai's 'ideoscapes' are relevant here, for they are flows of images and ideas that transcend boundaries and create shared 'imagined worlds'. Also relevant are the inferred visions about greater understanding and integration on a global scale. However, there is not enough evidence, today or in history, to support such a view. By referring to history I mean that, so long that communication and physical or imagined contact was confined to specific, yet large, regions of the world, no greater understanding was promoted within these regions. Whether the region would be as big as ancient Greece in the 5th century B.C., or the Balkans in the Middle Ages, or Europe in the 20th century, understanding, in the sense of cultural integration or conflict resolution, was not achieved. By referring to 'today' I mean that, whilst in the era of globalisation, what scientists actually observe is the remarkable resurgence of nationalism and of conflicts that fragment the world into pieces rather than uniting the existing ones (Castells, 1997, Halliday, 2001). Is there really any *qualitative* difference that the advocates of such a view see in the world under globalisation that makes them believe that the *quantitative* rise of contacts among people is enough to make a more united or peaceful world? Or is it just 'wishful thinking'? Athens was fighting with Sparta although in a context of increased communication and contact within

³⁵ In the discussion about the civilian dimension of globalisation, chapter 5, p.205-9.

ancient Greece; European countries have fought each other in the two world wars while in a context of broader European communication; and the NATO alliance fought with Iraq and Serbia in the current context of increased contact and communication that characterises the era of globalisation. Thus, there is evidence that points towards the reverse trend: that, increased contact and communication *can* generate conflict and misunderstanding between very distant countries or regions as it renders them less distant than they were without intense communication. On the contrary, there is no evidence to support the view that cultural interchanges and contacts result in the weakening of national identity and cultural distinctiveness (or perception of distinctiveness) of individuals.

The famous work of Karl Deutch on *Nationalism and Social Communication* has dealt exactly with the outcome of increased contacts and the prospects of integration. When first published, in 1953, he argued that increasing contacts between culturally diverse groups were more likely to lead to assimilation. As Connor informs us, he finalised this view after expressing some doubts in the early 1960s about whether that would lead to assimilation or increased antagonism (Connor, 1994:30-35). We do not refer to his doubts here in order to devalue his argument³⁶. We rather intended to show that, since both arguments can find evidence supporting them, this means that the outcome of increased interaction depends on the particular circumstances it takes place in. In addition, it should be reminded that, knowledge of each other is the prerequisite of both being friends and rivals. Thus, increased contact and communication break the walls of indifference and ignorance, and create further contact. Whether this contact will create alliances or enmity is not only a matter of particular circumstances (history, economy, etc), but also a matter of projection of biases and stereotypes. The research of Philipa Atkinson is illuminating on that matter.

Atkinson's research is about 'Representations of Conflict in the Western Media: the Manufacturing of a Barbaric Periphery' (1999), where she draws

³⁶ This kind of open questioning of one's own argument that Deutch has done shows scientific rigorousness and conscientiousness, that is admirable –even more so because it is rare!

some interesting conclusions about the representation of foreign countries in the western media. First, some media corporations, she argues, are funded by the government and thus reflect the state's policy and agendas, while the most are private and usually project news according to the owners' biases, traditions and interests. Second, they reinforce western values, which is partly due to their market-driven nature, and to the mainstream culture of the personnel (and the owner's as well). Third, their subjection to the market forces and their effort to attract customers has had an impact on the quality: "fashion and novelty are the determinants of what becomes news" while the trend is "towards directing news to the lowest common denominator" (1999:104). This translates into sensationalism and little in-depth analysis. The implications of this bring us to the fourth interesting observation that cultures are misrepresented. Atkinson stresses two examples. One is that, complicated events occurring in the 'Third World', like wars and famines, are more easily understood as ethnic conflict and drought, thus avoiding the complicated political and economic analysis: "this method of journalism...satisfies both the necessity for timeliness and interest, and the belief that consumers are incapable of understanding anything deeper. It is *self-perpetuating* as...once established...it becomes the easiest explanation...and can be applied to other situations" (1999:104, emphasis added). The second example concerns the common image held of 'Third World' countries, one of "happy peasants tilling the land or engaging in simple crafts...with a backdrop of sunshine and blue skies" (1999:104). This image is mostly presented through the tourist industry. Through these and other examples she draws the conclusion that, stereotypes are produced and reproduced, perpetuated or established.

So, to conclude, the mass media broadcast news and information that are in their most part nationally oriented –which also means either national or international, but with a national interest. It is indicative that the above data on the content of the 'News' concern in their majority highly developed and 'globalised' countries. Thus, global interest is still inferred in a culturally specific context, the national context, and with perceptions that come from one's locality, since the bulk of people spend their lives in their national state.

* * *

We can see that the identification mechanisms of the national state have not been significantly affected by globalisation, at least not in a direction that signifies the weakening of national identities. Indeed, there is additional researches and evidence to support this view. Indicatively, Paul Kennedy's introduction to *Globalisation and National Identities*, a collection of articles published after the homonymous conference that took place in 1999 at Manchester university, remarks that: "a key theme running through these chapters is that in many situations the nation-state and nationalism continue to provide a pivotal axis around which individuals and collectivities frame their sense of cultural affiliation and feelings of belonging" (2001:1-2). For example, in the late 1990s, the Scots voted (in 1999) for their own parliament (Books, 2001), the Russians emphasised on a return to traditionally defined national identity through Orthodoxy (Danks, 2001), and the Irish experienced a "cultural revival" (Fagan, 2001). It is very important to remark that these affirmations and reaffirmations of national identities are taking place through official-political contexts that are pro-globalisation, political initiatives that try to respond positively and to follow the international contingency of the globalisation of capitalism. This indicates that nationalism and national identity are present and powerful forces in the era of globalisation. As Halliday argues, nationalistic protests today can be equally considered as "a revolt *against* globalisation *and* a component of it" (2001:60).

We can add here one more point in support for the argument that there is no reason to expect the strength of national identification to diminish. This additional point is rather a critique on Nederveen Pieterse (1995b) and his argument that globalisation provides the framework to 'cultural hybridisation', which gives each subject the opportunity to avail of the many options offered

and to draw from multiple sources of identity³⁷. Indeed so, but most individuals are located in a territorially specific society and, however mobile, most of the sources available to them are territorially, culturally, linguistically and economically specific³⁸. So, even if we accept that identity was a purely subjective construction, the closer individuals would be to each other (spatially, and in terms of societal organisation), the more commonalities we would remark on their identities because they would draw from similar cultural, social or other reservoirs³⁹. In addition, national identity is already a mixture of diverse experiences and heterogeneous cultures that have, nevertheless, been synthesised and systematised in one national culture. It does not matter if cultures are enriched with new cultural traits: they are still considered national identities. Also, cultural and, mainly, consumerist similarities (drinking Coke or watching MTV) are profound, but these cannot nullify the –real or perceived– national distinctiveness or the process of national identification; otherwise, there would be no reason for the British and the Americans to be considered different nations and have different identities, for example, as their similarities extend even to the linguistic domain. This has been a function of each national state: to systematise the diverse cultural attributes of a given population and formulate what is called the ‘national culture’. Who is going to do the same for ‘world culture’? A ‘world state’? Cultural specificity, more accurately cultural entrenchment is interwoven with a particular organisation, which is sociologically indispensable, and globalisation does not offer an alternative of such organisation.

Furthermore, Nederveen Pieterse considers that globalisation refers to the “formation of a world-wide historical field and involves the development of global memory, arising from global experiences” (1995b:52). He confronts Smith’s disagreement that world memories, such as wars and colonialism, remind us of historic cleavages, with the argument that these can also unite

³⁷ This is also a critique on what Giddens calls ‘life politics’ (1991:214-7), meaning that the individual constructs its own identity through a variety of available choices. Castells counterargues that, “reflexive life-planning becomes impossible, except for the elite inhabiting the timeless space of flows of global networks and their ancillary locales” (1997:11).

³⁸ These specificities exist for both collectivities and for individuals within them.

³⁹ We can safely infer that, analysts would then construct larger or smaller divisions to categorise people and classify them according to similarities, be they linguistic, racial, religious or other.

humanity: he argues that, “unity emerging out of antagonism is the a,b,c of dialectics. [...] The intimacy constituted by repression and resistance is not an unknown notion either, as hinted by the title of the Israeli author Uri Anver’s book about Palestinians, *My Friend the Enemy* (1986)” (p.52). I think that Nederveen Pieterse misconceives the nature of this intimacy. It is a bond that sustains the unity of the one group with the hatred of the other. Intimacy here refers to familiarity, to the fact that someone is conceivable, and can thus be conceived as an enemy too. Thus, intimacy in this context does not refer to understanding, sympathy or confidence.

Thus, even if we accept that globalisation renders additional cultural references available to people worldwide, that is not enough to make us perceive of a global culture and of the weakening of national cultures and identities. National cultures have been enriched all along through contact with other people and civilisations, however distant or near. The claim that each national identity and culture is unique, coherent and pure is certainly nationalistic and does not correspond to the truth. Thus, the concept of ‘hybridity’ of cultures is not new, only that it is emphasised now, and even exaggerated, as opposed to the nationalistic perceptions that have long prevailed thus far. Two important remarks must be made here. On the one hand, each nation perceives its own national identity as unique, coherent and pure, however in a way of self-delusion. On the other hand, theorists who overemphasise the influence and contact of cultures in the era of globalisation and, moreover, establish on this argument the claim about the erosion of national identities tend to forget that this is not a new process and yet new national identities have been established and sustained.

Nevertheless, it is important to stress this last remark. As argued above, the basic identification mechanisms that operate in a national state are not affected by globalisation. But, in any case, even if we had witnessed the withdrawal of ‘national states’ as a specific kind of organisation and systematisation of a group’s living, this would not necessarily mean that this kind of identification, which is based on ethnic, local, territorial, national –that is familiarity– criteria, would fade away: the psychical structures of

identification were not founded in modernity, and will not alter with globalisation; only their external characteristics, which are case-specific, can change. ‘Globality’ does not provide a reference point for identification or socialisation of individuals. And, as it has already been mentioned, globalisation as yet offers no alternative of social organisation, and it seems unlikely that it will. Theoretically, the specific form of social organisation and identification that the national state represents is not necessarily the only alternative; in other epochs there were different types of social and political institutions. That means that, even if there was not a ‘national identity’, that is an identity as a result of identification with a nation/national state, it is most likely that another form of collective identification would emerge (religious, ethnic, cultural, regional etc.), which would have many of the characteristics of national *identities*. It is in the specific context of modernity that national states have been the prevalent organising structures, and this has not been altered yet. The identification mechanisms of the national state only follow the archetypal inscriptions one has from childhood, which are also for the bulk of people linguistically, territorially, and culturally specific; these have not undergone any apparent transformation in their content because of globalisation as the national state has been until the end of the twentieth century, and the beginning of the twenty-first, the fundamental organisation of collectivities.

Discursive Innovations and Nationalism

Robins argues that one aspect of globalisation is to drive us back to old loyalties, national, ethnic, religious or other, because of a “rejection or turning away from the turbulent changes associated with global integration” (2000:200). That brings us to the second argument that *globalisation may itself sustain or even strengthen national states (as a norm) and further national/ethnic divisions, as well as sentimental attachment to them*; in any case, *it does not show the potentials to diminish them*. This argument can be supported in two ways. First, it will be argued that much of the perceived difference of the era of globalisation and the rest of modernity as far as

nationalism is concerned is due to discursive/rhetorical innovations that do not correspond to respective real or significant changes in the domains of national identification. Thus there is no reason or evidence to support the view that ethnic and national –that is, cultural– divisions will diminish because of the process of globalisation and the new era it signifies. On the contrary, these very misconceptions can generate anxiety and thus enhance nationalistic potentialities. Secondly, we can further establish the previous indication that nationalism is still to the fore and the national state is still an aspiration and a normative value, as argued before. This may itself give rise and put some strength on national identification, irrespectively of the existence of a state that supports and enhances such identification⁴⁰.

To begin with, the simultaneous trends towards larger and narrower units and governmental divisions are considered to be part of globalisation. These contradictory and simultaneous trends are seen as repudiating of national identity and the national state, and as creating other types of identity, i.e. local, regional, ‘hybrid’ or individualised. The use of a distinct terminology is indicative of a debate that questions the national state and national identity in this globalising era, but this effort towards distinction rather creates terminological confusion. For example, what is the meaning of regionalism, of the global and local division, of ‘glocalisation’? Why is the EU called a region? These are defined as trends generated by globalisation, as aspects of it; the global and the local, it is argued, are aspects of the same thing (Hall, 1991a, Beck, 2000). This newly employed terminology implies that something new is taking place, a division that is unprecedented. However, the terminology seems to be more innovative than reality. Let me stress this argument.

National states and national identities are said to be under threat by trends towards both larger and smaller governmental collaborations or governance and administration, but there is not substantial evidence to support

⁴⁰ The first argument, that national identities are not expected to be weakened because the identification mechanisms of the national state are still strong, referred to cases where there is a state and it supports national identification. The current argument rather concerns mostly those cases where there is not a state (but it is an aspiration), or the national group is not the prevailing one within the state. Thus, it helps us to explain the existence and strength of minority national/ethnic identities but also the potency for nationalistic awakenings.

this view. Greater alliances, to begin with, among states that are trying to allocate the benefits and/or control the disturbances of globalisation, such as the EU, NAFTA, Mercosur etc, are considered to threaten and undermine national states and identities. But, it is not the first time in modernity that national states form alliances and coalitions, however typical and institutionalised, in order to confront other national states or alliances or to correspond to a given situation. These coalitions did not undermine their power or legitimacy as national states but, on the contrary, helped sustain them. Besides, these past and present coalitions have neither undermined or replaced the feelings of attachment towards national states, nor have they provoked complementary attachment and feelings of belonging, particularly to the extent that they are perceived as occasional and necessitated, but not optional. The reason is that realistic calculations cannot generate a sense of identity nor overcome already existing ones: we must keep in mind that “whatever held human collectivities together it was not the rational calculation of their individual members” (Hobsbawm, 1983:269).

The other trend, towards smaller (meaning local) scale governance is quite unspecified. On the one hand, some examples offered include large metropolises of the world, whose autonomy and cosmopolitan nature is emphasised elevating them to the stage of ‘city-states’. Thus, their position within a state tends to be neglected. So too the self-identification of their citizens. For example, O’Byrne presents the portrait of Alex, an activist pacifist, who defines himself as a cosmopolitan and yet “profess to have a strong sense of British identity” (2001:144). However, this clear and conscious⁴¹ declaration is interpreted by O’Byrne as identification with Britishness that “exists solely for the sake of convenience” (p.151). He draws this conclusion because Alex’s permanent residence is London, a multicultural locality that connects Alex with the global: being British only provides him with the ground for political action and a social structure to locate himself. Thus, O’Byrne argues that, in Alex’s case we can see “the relationship between the local and the global, bypassing the level of the nation-state, [which] is

strengthened under globalised conditions” (p.153). This interpretation, however, seems to be provoked by a pre-existing model of explanation and is rather inaccurate. Why, for example, would someone ‘strongly’ identify with Britain only for the sake of convenience, since London could equally provide both a social structure and the ground for political action that Alex (or any other activist, like him) would need? Why would he need a local national identity anyway if it were only to serve as a structure for political action instead of a ‘global identity’? Also, what justification exists for regarding London a locality bypassing the national state? Isn’t it the capital of Britain, and thus benefiting from the prosperity, technology, economic and socio-political advantages that this national state has to offer? If London benefits more from other British towns and if it is much more multicultural, that is by definition because it is the capital, not because of an unspecified ‘local-global’ relationship that has the advantage of bypassing the context of its national state.

Apart from the examples of large metropolises, small-scale regionalisms that are referred to as undermining national states and identities are ethnic revivals that aim toward self-determination or towards relative autonomy within a state. However, this observable trend toward smaller scale identifications does not indicate a change in the type of identities that is generated by globalisation, but a ‘regress’ toward smaller, more coherent, homogeneous and controllable units, while still of the ‘national state’ type. That brings us to the second argument regarding globalisation and the national state: these trends, that occasionally threaten the *existing* national states, do not challenge it as a *norm*⁴². Existing ethnic resurgences and national conflicts for autonomy and/or independence shake and undermine the particular state against which the struggle is taking place. But, when this is an effort to create one more unified and homogeneous national state, it empowers the notion of it. Let alone that, nationalist uprisings could be pointing toward the creation of a *true* nation-state, that is one homogeneous cultural unit –one nation in one

⁴¹ As it is inferred from other biographical data presented, such as the interviewee’s education, occupation etc.

⁴² This is also argued above from another perspective; in, p.148.

state— that was claimed by nationalism but is implemented only for the 9.1% of the world's national states. These trends towards cultural affirmation are present throughout the whole of modernity and are even more apparent in an era of global awareness and increased knowledge of the world. The reason why they are present is an other characteristic of modernity, namely nationalism, and the reason why they are more apparent today is the increased contact and rapid information flows that exist in the era of globalisation. Nationalism did not withdraw from the scene when globalisation came in; on the contrary, globalisation gave it strength and power at the global level. Globalisation helped strengthened nationalistic movements in two ways: by providing the means for the effective organisation of nationalist movements (i.e. the means to communicate with Diaspora groups), and by transmitting information and awareness of their existence globally and rapidly. Yet, we need to stress the qualification that Castells makes, that contemporary nationalism is not necessarily oriented towards constructing a state (1997:30)⁴³.

To recapitulate the argument, as Connor argues (1994:108), regionalism is used to refer to two incompatible meanings that involve both “transstate” and “intrastate” identities, which are supposed to create larger and smaller units than the national unit and to undermine the national state and national identities alike. Yet, as he points out, ‘transstate’ regionalism refers to collaborations and alliances made among national states (i.e. NATO, EU, etc) and ‘interstate’ regionalism refers to “intrastate divisions based upon sentimental ties to the locale” (p.108): in this later case, regionalism is improperly used instead of nationalism. Similarly, we should not forget that the shape, size, or any other characteristic, even contradictory, of existing national states have not deprived them of their recognition as ‘nation-states’ throughout modernity. There has been an extensive range of national states –ethnically homogeneous or divided, big or tiny, democratic or autarchic, etc– that have been equally recognised. What is Australia, for example? A country, a continent, or a region? Is China more or less a national state than Holland, or Nepal? Since all these differences

⁴³ Castells deduces from this argument that nations are today historically and analytically independent from the state. However, this does not necessarily follow from the fact that certain nationalisms today

have been indifferent thus far as to whether a national state would be characterised as such, why are current trends towards larger and smaller collectivities articulated with innovative terms and interpreted in a way that questions the national state? The unification of Germany did not put the German national state into question, nor did the fragmentation of the Soviet Union into several pieces or the newly emerged eastern European national states undermine the national state as a norm.

Thus, we can see that the 'new trend' towards regionalisms and localisms is not new at all, while the use of different terms to describe nationalism, such as regionalism, is misleading. A similar example of improper terminological innovation can be found in Robertson and his use of 'glocalisation'. Robertson also argues that nationalism expresses the simultaneity of particularism and universalism, being in itself an example of contemporary particularism, and suggests that the best way to consider contemporary globalisation is "in its most general sense as a form of institutionalisation of the two-fold process involving the universalisation of particularism and the particularisation of universalism" (1992:102). Thus, however, he describes globalisation and nationalism through one another, employing a perplexing terminology that describes a process that is apparent in the whole of modernity. Therefore, the invention of new terms may in some cases be dysfunctional because it obscures the fact that the local and the global have always been aspects of modernity⁴⁴, and have also been apparent within nationalism. This way, historical continuities might be obscured.

The employment of innovative language and new terminology indicates that the dissolution of the national state and the weakening of nationalism could be to a large extent a discursive construction. This innovative language, along with the use of globalisation and its predicted sweeping power over national states and identities by the elites (mentioned a few pages above), can provide one more explanation as to why nationalism is more likely to be

may not require for their own national state, not only because these cases are less common, but because their actions and demands are oriented towards a state and are formed in connection with it.

strengthened than weakened in the era of globalisation. The rhetorical indication that the national group is under threat is capable of provoking real anxiety to members of national groups. This anxiety could easily be manipulated and lead to support for nationalistic or other exclusionist ideologies and practices. That is because, as nationalism satisfies the need to unite the present with the past and the future⁴⁵, it may be strengthened so as to fulfil the gap individuals may feel as a result of the perceived dissolution of their lives' stabilities.

Indeed, several scholars have pointed to the resurgence of nationalism and cultural reaffirmation of groups towards the end of the twentieth century, as pointed above (Kennedy, 2001, Castells, 1997, Halliday, 2001, etc). Apart from the technological 'facilities' that nationalistic movements are provided due to the new communication technologies, there are additional explanations for that (in regard to the national state and not globalisation in general). The basic postulate, established previously in the first and second chapters, is that identification is fundamental for the constitution of any personality, however stable or 'pathologic', and that individuals identify with a collectivity because group identity provides with a sense of belonging and security. Familiarity is a prerequisite for identification, while territoriality has been the most common characteristic of group identification throughout history. Let me repeat a quotation here from chapter one: "identificatory thinking is employed for the purpose of avoiding what is unpleasurable and obtaining what is pleasurable, and it aims at transforming a strange and consequently frightening external world into one that is familiar and enjoyable" (Balint, 1945:318). One of the threats posed by globalisation in direct relation to the national state is the dissolution of it and of the collective identities that accompany it. This perceived threat makes individuals either ascribe immense importance on their existing national states and national identities, or be prone to support the creation of smaller, and more controllable units, particularly if they belong to a

⁴⁴ Perhaps, instead of presenting them as new phenomena some effort should be put in defining the local and the international/global and their meaning, as it has (or whether it has) changed over time and within modernity.

⁴⁵ A need otherwise satisfied by religion. However, where secularism has transformed social organisation, nationalism has replaced or complemented religion.

minority cultural group. Indeed, such reactions have already been observed during the 1990s, and many scholars argue that globalisation is characterised by the return of cultural reaffirmations. Hall, for example, argues that “when the movements of the margins are so profoundly threatened by the global forces of post-modernity, they can themselves retreat into their own exclusivist and defensive enclaves. [It is] the refusal of modernity which takes the form of a return, a rediscovery of identity...” (1991a:36).

Within this context, national identities have not been challenged by any other form of collective identification. In the network society, Castells observes, “societies tend...to retrench themselves on the basis of identities, and to construct/reconstruct institutions as expressions of these identities” (1997:306). This can be explained as a defensive attempt individuals make in order to preserve or relocate their primary identities. In such an effort, and as long as nationalism is still to the fore, the (re)emergence of ethnic/national and local identities does not come as a surprise. Let us not forget the discussion over the outcomes of increased cultural contacts: they can produce greater assimilation on the one hand, and increased antagonism on the other. The outcome is determined by a combination of particular circumstances each time that has to be examined. The evidence thus far has indicated a trend towards increased ethnic and national conflict and fragmentation of existing collectivities, even within member states of the European Union (Castells, 1997, Gray, 1998, Beck, 2000, Smith, 1995a). Yet, as this ‘was not fated to happen’, there must be reasons to explain it. My hypothesis is that the increased contact and awareness of differences brought by globalisation was not accompanied by those developments that would render it a positive process, a process with positive implications for people and collectivities alike. So, to some extent, increased contact became a threatening condition in itself. In that sense, we need to examine nationalism not as a component of globalisation but as a reaction to it. Thus, we need to look at the implications and consequences of globalisation in general in order to understand what it means for the people. That means, to understand the threats that globalisation poses, other than the (perceived) threats it poses for the national state in

particular, and to look at the negative conditions accompanied by globalisation that provoke regression and closeness. That will be our concern in the following chapter: to identify the particular circumstances of globalisation, and to examine the prospects of national identity within that context.

CHAPTER 7: NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION

This chapter begins from the exact point where chapter 6 concluded. Let us begin by briefly summarising the main arguments of the previous two chapters. Globalisation refers mainly to the liberalisation of international trade and the establishment of a global capitalist economy. This trend is neither unique nor historically unprecedented. However, because of the new communications technology, it has coincided with an accelerated pace and intense contact on a wider scale and, also, it has acquired new dimensions and characteristics, like the emergence of the 'civilian' dimension of globalisation. At the same time, its wide spread, implementation and articulation is a result of its ideologisation. So, we have specifically confined globalisation in the last two decades, when the term was initiated anyway. Globalisation was marshalled in the late 1970s and in the 80s by the US, primarily, and British governments, and it was spread to the EU and then to the rest of the world since the late 80s at an accelerated pace. It was the outcome of certain reforms politically initiated, like the deregulation of domestic economies for the sake of productivity and competitiveness and the removal of barriers to free market, which gave precedence to economic criteria with disregard to criteria of social interest and peace. These developments gave rise to an extensive argumentation about the national state, emphasising its 'powerlessness' and often predicting its demise. Yet, these arguments are often a huge exaggeration of reality, enhanced by the ideologisation of globalisation. The national state is not powerless; it has 'conceded' some power in certain respects (on the control of capital, i.e.), but it is even strengthened in some others (as a legislating and executing power, as provider of security etc). It is not the only player in the international chessboard, but it certainly is a primary one.

One of the functions of national states, and the one that makes them *national* states to begin with, is the organisation of cultural/national groups within their jurisdiction and their claim to act for their interests. So, they

systematise citizens' identification with their national group, which ultimately guarantees support for the national state as well. These mechanisms of states, and within states, that produce and enhance national identification have not been undermined in the era of globalisation, as the previous analysis has shown. Furthermore, there are indications that within globalisation nationalistic aspirations and movements will be empowered, while the very discourse about the undermining of national states is more likely to strengthen identification with them than the other way round. In that respect, there is no evidence to support the claim that national identities will eventually fade away in the era of globalisation.

In the current chapter we will directly address the prospects of national identity in the era of globalisation, not in relation to the debate about the fate of national states, but in relation to its potentials as a prevailing collective identification under the influence of globalisation in general. This issue concerns the need for identification with a collectivity that will fulfil individuals' needs and unconscious desires (as they were specified in the previous chapters), and with the fate of identification with the national collectivity as individual perceptions and realities undergo certain transformations during the process of globalisation. So, the attempt is to understand the particular circumstances that constitute the era of globalisation and to proceed with a more direct analysis concerning national identity, its general trends, changes and dynamics in the era of globalisation. Here, the general risks posed by globalisation and the possible reactions to it will be addressed.

The Particular Circumstances of Globalisation

The process of globalisation and the use of new technologies have brought the world into unprecedented contact or, at least, they have provided the potentials for that. This contact makes people aware of both their similarities and differences, but whether it will bring greater understanding or

animosity is not preordained. The outcome of increased cultural, social, political and economic interaction depends on the overall conditions that characterise this interaction and on whether they have a positive or negative effect in people's lives. That is, the outcome of increased interaction will be determined by the *particular circumstances* of globalisation. Certainly, changes in any of the cultural, economic and socio-political circumstances cannot be welcome by everybody, and it is most common that while some may benefit and welcome them, some others react and to oppose the changes. However, the overall conditions, or changes, *associated* with globalisation¹ – either because they are provoked by it or because they have coincided with it due to an immense ideologisation that resembles mythologisation– concern *most* of the conditions of life, affect almost *everyone* in the world, and have in most cases a *negative or degrading impact*. For these reasons, globalisation in general is perceived as a negative and threatening situation. So, the need for security and protection has been enhanced and, as existing collectivities are particularly significant as providers of shelter, national identification, or similar types of identification, can be expected to become stronger. Let me elaborate this argument in detail.

The 1999 UNDP report lists a number of threats created by or associated with globalisation: financial volatility and economic insecurity, job and income insecurity, health insecurity (i.e. AIDS), cultural insecurity (i.e. cultural imperialism), personal insecurity (i.e. criminality), environmental insecurity, and political insecurity (i.e. conflicts, civil wars). These are determinants and circumstances that characterise globalisation or are simply connected with it. Some of them are new while some are not unprecedented in nature but only in scale and global awareness. I will concentrate on those that are considered to be the major ones and are mostly referred to in the relevant bibliography. These are: inequality, economic insecurity, cultural threats, environmental risks, and global awareness of threats (information risks).

¹ Associated means that these changes and developments that will be referred to are included in the debate on globalisation, despite the fact that no all of them are provoked by it, but have simply coincided with this period. Here we are concerned with globalisation in general and not in particular reference to the national state.

Inequality

The figures of global inequality are well-known, so we can restrict ourselves to the most indicative ones. According to 1999 UNDP report, the OECD countries, which account for almost the 20% of the world's population, had in 1999 the 86% of world GDP and the 82% of world export markets, while they received 58% of Foreign Direct Investment; the same percentage for the 20% of the world's poorest countries was only 1-1.5%. Halliday, argues regarding these figures that "herein lies the delusion suggested by the very term globalisation [because] the world, controlled by few states is oligarchic" (2001:66). Moreover, apart from inequality there is *growing inequality*, with accelerating concentration of wealth at the very top. The poorest fifth of the world saw its income share falling from 2.3% to 1% in the last 30 years, while the richest fifth's increased from 70% to 86%. At the same time, the world's 200 richest people more than doubled their net worth from 1994 to 1998, while the income of the richest 358 billionaires exceeded the combined income of countries with 45% of the world's population.

We can observe increased inequality patterns within countries as well. For example, in the 80s and early 90s, the number of families that fell below the poverty line increased by 60% and 40% in the UK and the Netherlands respectively (Castells, 2000b:82). Nevertheless, at the same time, there is data showing that intra-country inequality has decreased in some countries; China and Chile are two such examples of successful reduction of poverty, the former due to high economic growth and the latter due to effective democratic administration (Castells, 2000b:81). Yet, such examples are a minority of successful structural changes and particular circumstances; as Castells argues, while the evolution of intra-country inequality varies, the general trend is towards increasing intra-country inequality. This trend is more prevalent in developed countries, where poverty was largely increased in most of them. The reason is, according to Castells, that "during the 1980s and 1990s most governments gave priority to techno-economic restructuring over social welfare" (2000b:82). For the same reason, he argues, the US, which is the largest and most technologically advanced economy, displays the most blatant

and substantial increase in social inequality, polarisation, poverty and misery. Indeed, inequalities are widening within countries but, at the same time, they are wide and still widening among countries: for example, the poor or unskilled citizen of the US or UK “will enjoy far better material conditions of existence (including 20 more years of life) than will his/her counterpart in Brazil or India” (Mann, 2000:139). There is another reason as well, which is held responsible for both intra-state and inter-state increase of inequality and poverty. It is that, as Castells argues, the logic of this global, informational system is such that it relentlessly incorporates or excludes people, groups, or countries according to their relevance to it and it creates an uneven development not only between North and South but also “between the dynamic segments of society everywhere, and those others that risk becoming irrelevant from the perspective of the system’s logic” (2000a:2).

Those excluded –people or territories– run the risk of shifting to a position of ‘structural irrelevance’, by which Castells means that, once considered irrelevant, they face additional difficulties to access the system again². Avenues creating structural irrelevance are unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, homelessness, mental or other illness, and so on. Following this argument we should ascribe additional weight to another aspect of inequality, that is *access inequality*. Access inequality is inequality that refers to the inability of individuals or groups or regions to incorporate into the market system and economic globalisation, and to the uneven distribution of means that would combat this inability and would guarantee a better living. Education and health are probably those aspects of access inequality that express the most severe and devastating consequences. The reason is obvious: without education and information one stays out of the system, and without health one ‘stays out’ of life.

Information, knowledge and communication are the tools for equal access and productivity in the era of globalisation, and are mainly concentrated to the fifth of richer countries. So, in 1998, OECD countries possessed 74% of

² This is a process that creates the ‘black holes of informational capitalism’ from which one cannot escape; in Castells, 2000b:165-7.

world telephone lines while the bottom fifth had 1.5% of them. The vast majority of Internet users (91%) are also concentrated in OECD countries. Internet users are also divided by gender, education and income divides: 30% of them have a university degree, a proportion that increases to 55% in Russia, 67% in Mexico, and 90% in China. Most users are young and men, while income is a determining factor: a computer purchase would cost the average Bagladeshi 8 years income, while the 90% of Internet users in Latin America come from upper income groups³.

Similarly in education. In 1993 only 10 countries accounted for 84% of global research and applied expenditures, and possessed 95% of US patents. Also, during the 1990s, 50% of PhD research in science and engineering in the United States were granted to foreign nationals; the half of them did not return to their home country. This, according to Castells, “is a matter of the inability of their countries of origin to attract them, rather than an indication of the closed nature of the science system” (2000a:124). However, what does this inability show if not the fact that only a few countries of the world can equally participate in the so-called process of globalisation? How else can we explain that only 13% Japanese and 11% South Koreans stayed in the US (as Japan and S. Korea are technologically very advanced), while the same proportion was 88% for Chinese and 79% for Indian PhD graduates? Lastly, the academic research system may be open to all, as Castells stresses (2000a:125), but it is dominated by those countries that have the best institutions, research funds, and the best publishing and occupational capabilities. As in many other occasions, while the academic system is *potentially/theoretically* free, open and international/global, the flow of knowledge and information is *actually* limited to where money flows.

Many of the above inequality patterns have unpleasant implications on health as well. First and foremost, the worst hygienic conditions are apparent in the poorest areas: in the mid-90s, 33% of the developing world’s population made a living with less than a dollar a day; about the same percentage were not

³ All figures are from 1999 UNDP report, and from Castell’s study of the same report (2000a, pp.124-5, 377-8), unless otherwise indicated.

expected to live more than 40 years. Also, 95% of HIV cases are in the developing world, and the medicines that rich, developed countries produce are too expensive for them. While these countries lack the research facilities and infrastructure to do research on the problems that their societies face, a number of companies sell them their expired medicines and other goods that are controlled or banned in industrial countries; that provokes Giddens to say that the 'global village' is rather a 'global pillage' (1999:16). Also, for nine countries in Africa the world is not moving forward but backwards: their life expectancy is estimated for the year 2010 to have returned to the level of 1960s, by 17 years loss.

The unanticipated fact is that the above inequality patterns exist while statistics show an overall improvement of health, education and income conditions over historical standards in the past three decades –except for former SU and sub-Saharan Africa. This “mixed record of development”, argues Castells, “conveys ideologically manipulated bewilderment in the absence of analytical clarity” (2000b:69). What this means is that this overall improvement could be articulated as it stands (meaning without further analysis) to suggest the beneficial application of free-market for the world's standards of living. However, the detailed analysis of the indicators of inequality, polarisation and poverty (as they were analysed above, and will be further analysed below) shows the uneven distribution of the overall development and the appropriation of the benefits by proportionally fewer people in the era of globalisation.

Economic Insecurity

Another, still financial, particular determinant that characterises globalisation, and directly concerns it, is economic insecurity. Economic insecurity has two aspects. One that concerns financial volatility of both states and individuals alike, and is derived by the fact that the international economic system has the capacity to revalue and devalue individuals and states according to their relevance to the global capitalist production. The other aspect concerns

labour and the newly shaped conditions of extreme economic insecurity. Figures from OECD report of summer 1996 show a rise in the world's output by 17%, but at the same time rise of the poor by 20% (Beck, 2000:153). In Europe, unemployment has been left at about 11% for over a decade. New jobs have been created by the new informational economy but, at the same time, others have diminished or disappeared. The main reasons for this are three. Firstly, technological innovation renders full employment policies impossible as, for example, automatisations sacrifices certain jobs and whole occupational categories (i.e. typists). Secondly, the labour force has been significantly increased as more and more people are now looking for a job (i.e. women). Thirdly, because the wages paid are very low and the cost of living has been increased in the last decade, the additional jobs created are to a large extent captured by the same people, who have or are looking for second or third jobs.

At the same time, labour is fragmented and individualised while capital is becoming increasingly coordinated (Castells, 2000a:506-7, Beck, 2000:152-4). On the one hand, capital is global and is globally synchronised, while on the other hand labour remains local and is locally deregulated. This has only become possible because the 'mediator' between the two, the state, has withdrawn its mediating role or has even oriented it towards the capital, perhaps as part of the effort to attract investments and become more antagonistic. As the French sociologists Michel Pinçon and Monique Pinçon-Charlot (2001) argue in their survey titled 'The Last Social Class' (*La Dernière Classe Sociale*)⁴, the French entrepreneurial class and their collective representative body, 'Medef', are arguing against any public control and regulation to the productive process and the labour bargaining, which has to be done between two partners, the corporation and the worker, 'individually'. However, at the same time, while they claim for such an extreme individualism, they express their demands collectively and they claim and enjoy the states' protection and regulation. A consequence of that trend that is apparent with the globalisation of capitalism has been, for example, the

⁴ Their article was published in September 2001 in *Le Monde Diplomatique*. It can also be found at: <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/09/PINCON/15603>.

weakening of worker dismissal laws in France, as well as in the United Kingdom and other countries as reported in 1999 UNDP report (2000:344), while welfare provision responsibility is transferred back to individuals. Another consequence is that, employers implement “flexible labour policies with more precarious work arrangements” (1999 UNDP report, 2000:344) while individual worker contracts (as opposed to the collective labour bargaining) are less secure and stable. These conditions put additional strain and insecurity on individuals and families. Hence Beck’s description of the new labour situation: “in individualised types of existence, people have to accept individual responsibility...for things that used to be treated by the community as a class destiny rather than a personal one” (2000:153).

As it is usually the case, economic insecurity cannot but provoke political instability. Beck argues that democracy came in Europe and North America as ‘labour democracy’ and it was based on employment, and gainful employment. To the extent that global capitalism dissolves those values on which its development was based, it “undermines its own legitimacy” and it puts everything at stake, even democracy. The reason is that, as Beck argues, “only people who have a home and a secure job, and therefore a material future, are or can become citizens for whom democracy is a living reality of their own making. The simple truth is that without material security there is no political freedom and no democracy” (2000:62). We can understand the weight of Beck’s argument if we take into consideration that all statistical data and trends point towards a diminishing material security in the world today, while there are already indicators of social instability and uneasiness.

Cultural Threats

Globalisation is widely perceived as bringing cultures in unprecedented contact because of the loosening of borders and barriers. However, in that respect, globalisation has not been any different from internationalisation. Rather, globalisation is bringing about *one* specific culture with the form of cultural imperialism: consumerism. Consumerism appears to be the

foundational and sustaining culture of capitalism as a system while, also, in most of the examples of cultural closeness and interaction that are used in the relevant bibliography the key-words used are names of well-known brands, such as Mc Donald, Benneton, Coca-Cola. There are other examples used as well, examples that go beyond the mere reference to product brands, but do not go beyond the description of the 'choice' to eat stir-fry and buy curry ingredients everywhere, and wear 'ethnic-style' cloths.

By cultural imperialism we refer to the domination and expansion of one particular culture. In the era of globalisation, the dominant culture is consumerism but it is also the political ideology of neo-liberalism. Certainly, we must always distinguish between cultures and political ideologies. But, this is exactly our point here: to lay attention to the fact that cultural imperialism cannot be separated from political or economic imperialism, and emphasise on the fact that the leading 'globalising' countries express a discourse that merges them together. Thus, consumerism, the free market, liberalism, prosperity and democracy are all mingled together and presented as one culture. Of course, long-standing political traditions constitute in the end part of a country's culture; this means that for Americans, for example, consumerism is indeed part of their culture. Nevertheless, cultural imperialism is exactly that: the imposition of the whole 'pack' of few countries' long-standing traditions as globalisation's necessity. This cultural imperialism is manifest in the fact that, through its immense ideologisation, the process of globalisation is identified with the above 'one culture' and it is largely promoted. This presentation of 'one culture' through cultural imperialism is complementary and simultaneous to another function of ideologisation of globalisation: namely, the presentation of globalisation and 'its culture' as inevitable developments.

As argued elsewhere⁵, however, the substance of the economic dimension of globalisation is that it politicises the economic aspect of public living, that it gives prevalence to the economic dimension above all else. This is indeed manifest in 'cultural' imperialism. When we discuss imperialism we mean primarily an economic process, an attempt of a nation or a region at

⁵ Chapter 5, p.203.

expanding its economic profitability. Such economic profitability is always backed up by military and political means, and very often by cultural or ideological imperialism. Consumerism, in our case, is the 'cultural' determinant that advocates a mode of life that is consistent with the economic dimension of globalisation, that is the expansion of free market. Thus, consumerism is not a cultural threat but the derivative of a political and economic one.

Environmental Risks

The issue of the threats posed by environmental degradation is one of the prevalent topics in the discourse on globalisation –although it is not directly connected with it. The interest on the environment has been very deep ever since the late 1960s, and has become a passionate concern as the number and strength of environmental movements show. It would be superfluous to analyse the problems that the environment faces as they are well known: the ozon layer, greenhouse effect, decreasing biodiversity, air, land and water pollution. It is necessary to stress, in contrast, the profound unwillingness of political leaderships to accept responsibility and sacrifice present economic benefit for future viability. In 200 years, since the industrial revolution, the mode of development and consumption followed by only a fragment of the world has provoked such damage that it is threatening the quality of living at present and the viability of the earth in the future. There are several trends which point towards a pessimistic view, such as the failure to 'convince' the world's largest producer of greenhouse gasses to sign the agreement on the gas reduction, the implementation of nuclear tests by states as diverse in ecological conscience as Pakistan and France, the threats to extinction for several species of the flora and fauna, and so on. At the same time, there are intense pressures and concerns about the environment, as expressed in citizens' mobilisation and interest on the issue. There is also the context of 'sustainable development' that the UN has established is a serious effort to put some political pressure towards

the protection of the environment, and other initiatives by governments and NGOs⁶.

We should remark that environmental problems are not a consequence of globalisation. Nevertheless, it is due to the civilian aspect of globalisation that they have come to the fore and preoccupy more people and groups internationally. Also, they are often referred to in connection to globalisation, which gives the false impression that they, too, are included in the ‘misdeeds’ of globalisation.

Global Awareness of Threats (Information Risks)

Last, as new communication technologies have largely transformed (or, in other cases, are beginning to transform) societies and their modes of production, they largely constitute a determinative characteristic of the era of globalisation. The issue of communication technologies is huge by itself; our reference to it as a particular determinant of globalisation will be made in regard to certain dangers that they entail. To begin with, global awareness of threats refers to the perception of the threats described above by all, or potentially all, individuals. Global awareness is not a ‘threat’ in itself. The threat exists in the simultaneous, intensified, and globally synchronised appearance of globalisation’s risks, which is even terrorising to the extent that it presents a reality with lack of stability in any aspect of it. Global

⁶ In relation to the attitudes towards the environment of different civilisations, the following is interesting. In a research about the role of myths, Joanna Overing (1997) studied the myths of Piaroa, an Amazonian tribe, and compared them with the respective myths of the Enlightenment and the societies it has influenced. She studied myths because they reflect a community’s perception about itself, remind it of its identity, and have potency over social and political matters. According to the understanding of power in Enlightenment myths, she argues, human beings were ascribed the right of sovereignty over nature. “Power over nature, over the inanimate and the wild, was established as a natural right of humankind. [...] In myths of the right of domination, human beings alone were given the gift of reason. It became therefore their obligation to control nature, all those things of the wild” (p.18). In contrast, the Piaroa myths consider the domination of nature as dangerous because “it was the increase in the capacity to use the earth’s resources during mythic time that led to *the unbridled passions of avarice, vanity, arrogance and pride*” (p.18, emphasis added). For Piaroa, there is no distinction between nature and humanity. They cannot dominate, neither be dominated by any other agency: “the best that human beings can do is to achieve equal relations in their often dangerous dealings with beings of other spaces and times”. This survey is referred to here for the exact same reason that Overing justifies the choice of her study. Because, the study of mythic schemes is essentially important as “*people and nations act in accordance with such myths*” (p.18, emphasis added).

consciousness of globalisation and its threats, along with its benefits, has been possible because of the world-wide circulation of information. So, the role of information is of utmost importance, along with the problems of who holds, manages and transmits information.

As with everything that is involved in human life, information too has a positive and a negative side. On the one side, the flow of information, and non-controlled information, has given more freedom to individuals to do research, to discuss and organise, and the means to verify news transmitted to them. The basic means for this function is currently the Internet. The other side of information is information distortion. The huge and rapid flow of information makes its effective elaboration more difficult and demanding. One of the reasons is that it often becomes difficult to know the source of information. This also facilitates the uncontrolled spread of rumours and myths, a spread that is even more dangerous as it happens so rapidly and broadly. A further consequence of this is also the growing distrust felt for any information, and the formation and susceptibility to conspiracy theories.

In addition, television, newspapers and radio have acquired such enormous power (the Fourth Power) that they need to be subject to some control themselves. This is true particularly about television, which also happens to be the main source, and the most powerful one, of information, entertainment and transmission of images around the world. Giddens argues that, while television has been a democratising force, it has also demolished democracy by nullifying the prospects of dialogue. It does so “through a relentless trivialising, and personalising of political issues” (1999:78). Television is itself dependent on the advertising companies and has a market driven nature. In addition, because of the critical role of the media of communication and information, politicians use them to communicate their messages to the public. Thus, political discourse has been absorbed in the media discourse and the rules of audio-ratings; as a result, “leadership is personalised, and image-making is power-making” (Castells, 2000a:507). Last, as it was mentioned in the previous chapter, the media intensify and contribute

toward standardisation of biases and cultural stereotypes (Atkinson, 1999, Said, 1978).

These are neither totally new developments nor is the critique over the media an aspect of globalisation. Some of them are new while some others are intensified in the contemporary era. For example, the increasing involvement of television and its delineation of political discourse is an older phenomenon that is now at its peak, at least in the developed world. Information distortion can be discovered much easily today than before because of the diversity and multiplicity of information sources. Yet, exactly because the sources are too many, too much information must be effectively handled while messages can be conflicting or include myths and rumours. In that respect, managing this vast amount of information requires special skills and capacity that only specialised professionals or highly educated people have. If we bear in mind the education inequalities mentioned above, we can understand that the effective management of information is an issue at stake. Last, it should be repeated that, as globalisation and its threats have become a subject of everyday reference and broad articulation, the very perception of them in general can provoke a sense of uneasiness or exaggerate the threats posed.

Reactions and Psychoanalytic Explanations

For all these reasons outlined above, the era of globalisation is perceived as a threatening era, while it doesn't embrace all but it affects all. So, globalisation has coincided with or, as Giddens (and others) argues, "is the reason for the revival of local cultural identities in different parts of the world" (1999:13). In reality, the revival of local identities has been an outcome of nationalism by definition. It thus seems that globalisation has provided the reasons for the revival of nationalism and the intensification of already existing trends, or that it has not provided the solutions needed so that these nationalistic reactions and sentiments would be undermined. Apart from the widely referred instances of ethnic revivals and/or conflicts that claim for a separate national state or for relative autonomy (i.e. Scotland, Catalonia, Quebec, Taiwan, and several ethnic conflicts in Africa and Central Asia), there are many cases in the 1990s that show the strengthening of national identities of established national states. The Russian leadership, for example, has returned in the late 1990s to an affirmation of Russian identity through the traditional discourses of blood and soil and the Orthodox church, although it is increasingly approaching the West. This attempt has found fertile ground in the Russian people who feel "humiliated and degraded" because of the "pauperisation of the majority of the population" following the transition to liberal market economy in the early 1990s, and the widespread belief that they were 'fooled' by westernising elites and the West itself, which was 'represented' by the IMF and WTO (Danks, 2001:44). However, it is important to note that such reaffirmations of national identities have not occurred solely in connection to failures to economic modernisation. Fagan's study on Ireland shows a reassertion of Irish national identity and culture in the 1990s, combined with an "economic boom" and "outward-oriented growth" at the same time (2001:115). So, she argues, increased cultural confidence in 1990s Ireland has drawn some possible lines between "increased economic performance and greater cultural self-confidence...[which] apparently contradicts the notion of cultural globalisation as a new form of cultural imperialism that enfeebles national identity" (2001:113). Not that these trends

are unique or have been generated because of globalisation: many nationalisms existed before, and they are the sole outcome of nationalism. Nevertheless, in the era of globalisation, these have not been weakened but, on the contrary, sustained or even strengthened.

In relation to the perils posed by globalisation, a common reaction of those who are excluded from the global capitalist system or are aware and fear of globalisation's risks and increased contacts tend to turn towards their particular identities in order to find shelter and meaning in a familiar environment⁷. Globalisation presents a threatening world, whose basic characteristic is the *lack of familiarity*. Familiarity is an indispensable psychological condition for identification and for a sense of security. It has extensively been argued so in the beginning of this thesis, while the lack of familiarity has been briefly connected with the resurgence of nationalism in the previous chapter⁸. However, the importance of the issue and its centrality in both the causes of 'identity regression' and, therefore, in envisaging of possible solutions, render it an issue that requires some repetition. Familiarity is the basis of identity because the process of identification is impossible with someone or something that is alien and thus unimaginable –the unimaginable cannot even constitute the basis for negative identification. It is also, for similar reasons, a prerequisite for the sense of belonging, which is a fundamental need in the service of the pleasure principle: the sense of belonging satisfies both the love-drives, through the sentimental bonds created among people within a group, and the self-preservation drives, through the shelter provided by familiar faces, images etc. Familiarity is thus the prerequisite in order to constitute an identity, to find our place in the world, to find our friends and rivals, to begin to know and discover more. Unfamiliar circumstances make individuals uneasy and cautious about the unknown as such; let alone when one faces circumstances that are both unknown and presented as threatening. This fear pushes individuals back to what is familiar, to what constitutes their identity.

⁷ Other reactions to the problems and threats of the era of globalisation are the increasing migration movements and the political mobilisation against aspects of globalisation in an effort to achieve a qualitative change in the overall global conditions (i.e. movements for the more equal distribution of wealth globally, for the protection of the environment, etc). I will refer to those separately in the sequel.

⁸ In chapter 1, p.27, and chapter 6, p.249.

This can take the form of regress to primary identities, which can signify the reaffirmation of one's own identity and stability, or it can signify a reactionary rejection of the new era. Certainly, the distinctive lines are very subtle, and the transfer from one condition to the other is a matter of the particular circumstances that shape the profile of a country.

Nedpogaeo's study reveals that, in the case of Thailand, its intense contact with the external West, representing the global in this case, was enough to facilitate the rearticulation of Thai national identity in the 1990s in relation/juxtaposition to the western cultural images and perceptions, even though the perception of the West in Thailand was historically free of hostile biases due to the absence of colonialism: "representations of...white Westerners have reinforced the dichotomy of Them/Us in the construction of Thai identity" (Nedpogaeo, 2001:111). According to Nedpogaeo, this reaffirmation of Thai cultural identity occurred in the context of creative adaptation of the country in the global environment. Quite similar is the case of Ireland, according to Fagan (2001): there has been an Irish cultural revival simultaneously with Ireland's augmenting opportunities in the era of globalisation. What, then, explains this new emphasis on national culture? One aspect of the answer is that increased awareness of the others through increased contacts can also produce greater awareness of 'ourselves' and 'our' distinctiveness⁹. Another aspect is that, the issue of culture is an issue of identity. Intense 'confrontation' with a culture, for example, whichever this culture may be, provokes interrogation or agony about the future of one's own culture, which ultimately means one's identity. This interrogation is part of the emerging need to understand one's own culture and identity and the possibilities posed through contact with the new culture that intensively comes

⁹ One could logically interrogate why this 'increased awareness of the others' cannot be equated with or lead to 'familiarity with'? The answer is not only psychological but also political. For example, in the EU there is an increased contact and cooperation in every domain, and the initial fears and reactions to it have been tamed to some extent, for the moment at least. Certainly, every effort has been put by the political and intellectual elites towards peaceful coexistence. This political commitment is very important in producing familiarity. However, familiarity is not very easy to achieve, as the same example shows: according to data derived from the Eurobarometer surveys, it is evident that national identification has not been diminished in each member state of the EU. In any case, increased contact between already entrenched and delineated groups is more likely to enhance the perception one has about their distinctiveness, for it is taking place within that very context.

to the fore; it is a 'negotiation' of the two. Nevertheless, as in the context of globalisation this increased cultural contact is accompanied with other discourses and realities, such as the fate of the national state and identity, or with the felt weakness to influence things that concern individuals' lives, then the 'negotiation' is most likely to be interrupted or fail. The logical outcome is the strengthening of one's own position –in our case, of national identities. Thus, national identities can be strengthened significantly even when a country positively adapts to globalisation and tries to be located in the changing environment.

The strengthening of national identity is most certainly the outcome of *regressive reaction* in turbulent and humiliating situations, as is the case of Russian identity. This is usually the case when a national state is seriously threatened or excluded by the 'global' capitalist system¹⁰ –let alone when it used to be a superpower. This puts national identities in a position where 'negotiation' with external reality is violently interrupted before its very beginning. Globalisation then seems to leave them at the margins. Thus, in a seemingly reciprocal, but defensive and highly narcissistic reaction, individuals and collectivities psychologically disconnect from the system too, they reject it and repudiate it –'if you don't want me, I don't want you too'! In an unconscious attempt to retain narcissistic perfection, they repudiate this external reality, which has excluded them in the first place. Thus, they deny the frustrating rejection or ineffective incorporation and compensate for it with strong identification with their group. The most exclusionary and strong national identities are likely to emerge from this process, identities that will tend to emphasise on their purity, uniqueness, and perhaps superiority exactly because –and when– they are formed through such a process. We should again mention here the example of Nazi Germany; a Germany humiliated and excluded in the aftermath of the First World War, whose manipulation by Hitler was based exactly on his elevating rhetoric of superiority and uniqueness (though not as a result of globalisation). This process of narcissistic rejection is

¹⁰ We refer here to the failure of the Russian economy in the midst of its transition to liberal capitalism and its sudden dependency on Western agencies, such as the IMF, following the USSR brake-up.

typical of narcissistic identification: this way, strong national identities are provoked by globalisation, which remains the point of reference. In that respect, positive identification with the national state, and negative identification with 'globalisation' are the outcome of narcissistic identification, which has as its aim the avoidance of unpleasure reality. In addition, because this is a *reaction*, which is a defensive response to their initial exclusion and the outcome of negative identification, individuals and groups can become very hostile to whatever may comprise –objectively or in their perception– globalisation. The reaction can range from the apparent rise of nationalistic sentiments and national struggles, to terrorist activities against the perceived enemy. As Beck argues, “the compulsion to self-activity and self-organisation can suddenly turn into despair, perhaps also into dumb rage” (2000:154). The destructive force of Nazi Germany still remains an indicative example of Beck's words.

So, the re-appropriation or emphasis on primary identities as reactions to specific threats of globalisation is *defensive*. They have not emerged for the first time in history either: as Jenkins and Sofos (1996) argue, rapid economic modernisation in the 1880s was combined with the emergence of right-wing nationalism. Then, international insecurity provoked mass migratory movements and national introspection. Similarly today, while national regression is one largely discussed effect of globalisation, *migration* is currently another significant effect of it. Migration too raises issues about identity and boundaries' crossing. So, it could not be absent from an analysis of the reactions to globalisation.

Disappointment and misery have always led many people to search for a better future through migration, but recent data show an increase in the number of immigrants by the end of twentieth century¹¹. Migration is often connected to the mobility aspect of globalisation, and to the remark that people are today more mobile and can move to wherever they want to work and live. Appadurai, for example, presents a quite pleasant reality of 'people on the move' by

¹¹ According to Castells, while the legal records estimated 84 million immigrants in the 1975, the number increased to 130-145 million by the end of the 20th century (2000a:130).

equally including “tourists, migrants, refugees, exiles, guestworkers, and other moving groups” (1990:297) in his ‘ethnoscapes’. However, we should not confuse the international business elite of frequent-flyer cosmopolitans and professionals or tourists with immigrants. Immigrants’ mobility comes mostly out of despair, while they have additional and fundamental differences from tourists and professionals, most important of which that they are poor and usually discriminated against. Another view is that immigrants verify the western model by desperately wanting to live in a western country. Fukuyama expresses this view by arguing: “the central question raised by Huntington is whether institutions of modernity will work only in the west, or whether there is something broader in their appeal that will allow them to make headway elsewhere. I believe there is. [...] Proof lies also in the millions of developing world immigrants who vote with their feet every year to live in western societies. The flow of people moving in the opposite direction...is by contrast negligible”¹². Such arguments do not hold the whole picture right though. First of all, migration is not a free choice but, in most cases, an act of despair. When someone lives in extreme poverty and decides to leave in a search for something better, this is not a ‘vote’ for the West, but a rejection of hunger and misery. At the same time, the globally transmitted images of the West as an affluent society make it a pole of attraction. The picture of the ready-to-sink boats with their holds jam-packed with wretched human beings, who have given their last penny just to board away (this is a frequent picture in countries surrounded by sea) is a picture of an *escape*. It does not show a choice to live in another country, but a desperate attempt to abandon one on the grounds that ‘it cannot get worse’.

Immigrants who abandon their national state do not necessarily abandon their national identity; let alone that there is evidence pointing to the contrary. This is indicated by a large number of third generation immigrants in Germany, Britain, France and other western countries, who not only retain their

¹² In the British newspaper *The Guardian*, 11th of October, 2001. His article titled ‘The West Has Won: Islam can’t beat democracy and capitalism. We are still at the End of History’ came as a response to the arguments that, the events of 11th of September 2001 in New York and Washington proved Huntington’s theory right, and his respectively wrong.

‘original’-ancestral-parental identity (the identity that is inherited¹³), but also have recently begun to emphasise on and reassert it (Castells, 1997:20). It is also indicated by the concentration of immigrants in towns or regions within towns, in nationally/ethnically gettoed communities. Another indication is the existence of Diaspora groups, groups who retain their ‘original’ national identity as an additional identity although born and bred away from the ‘fatherland’: there is no evidence that globalisation has mediated the feelings and –dual– identities for these groups.

The other side of the coin of immigration is racism and xenophobia. The entrance of immigrants in national states –which, however internally diverse, perceive themselves as homogeneous and unitary– often triggers xenophobic sentiments and reactions against the ‘intruders’. Although immigrants are accused by the host-population that they ‘steal’ their jobs or that they are morally vicious and generally ‘dangerous’, in reality they basically decompose the narcissistic image of unity that groups hold for themselves. Racism and xenophobia closely relate to the unconscious characteristic to replace the external with physical reality. As pointed out previously¹⁴, the unconscious tends to deny external reality and to replace it by an illusion of wholeness and completeness. This denial to admit that there is something lacking within it has several implications, as in racism where the Other is blamed for every deficiency and incompetence and, by projection, people ascribe to others all the unpleasant characteristics of themselves. This is why there is always a scapegoat in history, who takes the blame for everything and relieves the rest of the community/society from unpleasure and guilt.

Indeed, xenophobia and increased racism have been identified as one of the problems western societies face today, which has, in its turn, given rise to the far right (or kept it going). Such xenophobic sentiments are also apparent in countries with third generation migrants, like Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. As Castells argues, there is a “transformation of the ethnic make-up of Western societies” (2000a:131) which triggers xenophobic reactions: for

¹³ See the reference on national identity as non-voluntary, inherited identity in chapter 3, p.95-96.

¹⁴ See, chapter 1, p.19.

example, many so-called immigrants are born in Western Europe (second and third generation immigrants), but the word is actually used for the (even discursive) discrimination of minorities. In the era of globalisation, immigration and, consequently, racism and xenophobia are more likely to become more prevalent reactions. There are already estimates of increased migration movements worldwide at the end of the twentieth century; several authors point to this problem, which is unlikely to diminish in the near future because poverty and growing inequality, not to mention wars, will continue to produce migration (Castells, 2000a, Hirst and Thompson, 1999). It seems like a vicious circle: globalisation enhances uneven development, thus inequality, thus migration, thus racism on behalf of the host countries, and often racism (as a defence reaction) on behalf of the immigrants who are not accepted in the lands of 'milk and honey'¹⁵.

Thus, we can see that migration, like nationalism, is both a reaction to and a component of globalisation: it is a tendency apparent throughout modernity, and before that, and it is also enhanced as a reaction to the process of globalisation. We should not consider migration as a defence reaction though, but rather as a reasonably calculated action to escape misfortune: it is well-thought off and not unconscious or reactionary. It is an individualised move towards personal development and amelioration or an escape from poverty or war that goes beyond the defensive retrenchment to psychological stabilities. Yet, however individualised migratory reaction may be, the need for familiarity and sense of belonging finds its expression in the gettoed communities of immigrants in host countries or simply in their formal or informal groupings. Migration is just one re-action to these trends but it is also, a peaceful one, if we do not take under consideration the reactions that it then provokes in the host countries. Nevertheless, the number of migrants is a small

¹⁵ People living in western countries, should not forget that the picture of misery some other countries portray is not a picture of failure as opposed to our picture of success. If we really want to think globally, we should understand that 'our' prosperity and 'their' misery is interrelated, are the two sides of the same coin: if it were not for the one, there would not exist the other. Maybe then the immigrants' arrival in western countries would provoke less xenophobic and racist reactions.

fragment of the population; the bulk of people stay in their locality¹⁶ and, for them, a way out of a threatening, unknown reality, a reality that cannot be ignored either because it affects them, provokes a psychological need to return to the stable realities of their lives.

Migration is an example of individualised and calculated re-action to the real threats of poverty and war –which also shows that extreme and pathologic reactions are not the only ones available. Another individual and logically calculated re-action to globalisation is made by *political mobilisation* in political and social movements. The difference of these movements with immigration is that, while both come as an individual calculation and estimation of future possibilities, the former aim at changing the conditions that create this threatening environment and the latter aim at a personal escape from these conditions¹⁷. So, migration is an individual action individually implemented, while political mobilisation is an individual action collectively implemented, in the sense that it has to be put in practice through the organisation of all those individuals who wish to take this initiative. Such political mobilisation has become apparent in the late 1990s with the so-called anti-globalisation movements¹⁸, and with (International) Non-Governmental Organisations whose number is increasing since the 1980s. Again, like nationalism and migration, political movements are both a component and a reaction to globalisation. Political movements have always been an aspect of modernity, but the new communications technology, which is a fundamental characteristic of the era of globalisation, has significantly contributed to their increasing numbers and international organisation. Also, economic globalisation as well as other problems and threats associated with this period have provoked the rise of oppositional movements who seek economic, social and political reforms (ecological organisations included).

¹⁶ The legal reports estimate a number of 130-145.000 migrants by the end of the 20th century (Castells, 2000a:p.130), which is about 2% of the total 6 billion population. Of course, there is a number of illegal migrants which is unknown.

¹⁷ There are more differences, of course, most important of which that they are comprised by different categories of people. The majority of immigrants comes from very poor countries while political mobilisation is mainly organised in wealthy countries.

¹⁸ Which are not essentially anti-globalisation, but constitute an aspect of globalisation, as argued in chapter 5, p.207. They are rather 'anti-economic globalisation'.

What is then the case with those activists as far as their identity is concerned? Have they repudiated their national locus and, perhaps, identified with ‘the world’? Is a local/national identity less a need for them or have they managed somehow to find familiarity with the world as a whole? Before answering these questions, we should refer to an indicative example that was mentioned earlier on¹⁹ but from a different angle. Alex, the activist interviewee in O’Byrne’s research is presented as a young well-educated man who lives in London, works for Amnesty International and has traveled and lived abroad, and defines himself as ‘citizen of the world’. At the same time, “he professes to have a strong sense of British identity” (2001:144). According to O’Byrne, Alex “adopts an interesting strategy which allows him to identify with such a common humanity at the political level, whilst accepting an identification with his nation at the cultural level” (p.142): he identifies pragmatically and culturally at the national level, and politically at the world level, as he identifies with the concerns and interests that all individuals have around the world (identification with human beings). Thus, Alex has constructed a classic universalism, but “from within the boundaries of the nation-state” (p.144).

I have referred to the example of Alex not as a representative case of cosmopolitanism²⁰ but as an illustration of my argument that evolves around familiarity, around the sense of belonging and security. A sense of familiarity and identity is a prerequisite to discover the unknown, to approach the global, meaning that one has to find first his/her place in the world before he/she discovers the world. People cannot be citizens of the world, in the sense that the globe is too big to provide with a sense of familiarity and belonging. For that reason, a perception of identity and, thus, stability in someone’s life is important in order to envisage and approach other cultures and civilisations. Thus, the reaffirmation of identity is a reassurance that this identity, as a fundamental stability, is still there; this, apart from being a defensive reaction, can be the necessary reassurance in order to confront the unknown realities of ‘the world’, and make them known as well. In that sense, national identity as a

¹⁹ Chapter 6, p.245.

²⁰ O’Byrne refers to Alex as a classical cosmopolitan, but since no data indicating that he is a proportionally representative case is mentioned, there is no substantial evidence so as to use it as one.

particularity is essential for the expansion of universalism. One cannot even begin to conceive of other cultures and different worlds without a cultural identity of his/her own.

Thus, identity, national identity in the era of nationalism, is the foundation, the first steps in a long staircase: without them, one cannot climb upwards, to universality. However, globalisation seems like an earthquake that destroys the first stairs, even the whole staircase. Why is that? To the extent that globalisation poses a –real *and* perceived– threat to existing identities and realities, it poses severe obstacles to the possibility of universalism – universalism as humanism, as an understanding that all human beings have something in common, their humanity. That is because it jeopardises or destroys the foundations upon which universal thinking can be based: a sense of belonging and identification through familiarity. To the extent that within modernity, the era of nationalism, identities are mainly constructed through identification with the national state, national identities are the main expressions of identification and sense of belonging. Consequently, cosmopolitanism cannot be based on the dismantling of national identities but on the securing of them.

So, on the one hand, the development of political mobilisation is initiated by a logical re-action to specific aspects of globalisation. On the other hand, however, the process of identification is not nullified when one undertakes political action on a national or international scale, but remain an important and continuously evolving process that must not interrupted. There are psychological characteristics that function as a pedestal to any reaction, and in this case involve the elements of threat and of the struggle against evil. These characteristic are to some extent apparent in any collective mobilisation and devotion. However, the active involvement in INGOs and political movements encompasses three dangers. First, there are movements that are reactionary or nationalistic in essence and, yet, they find coverage under the wide title of ‘anti-globalisation’ movements. For example, in demonstrations organised (like in Genoa in July 2001) a number of religious or nationalistic groups can equally find expression, even though differing from other groups like ATTAC

or ecological organisations, as these protests functioned as an ‘umbrella’ which could embrace everyone. This further obscures the distinction between them. Second, these movements and organisations run the risk of regressing to a type of psychological reaction when they look at globalisation as a whole and thus demonising it. Demonisation obscures rational thinking and action, which then fails to distinguish between good and bad aspects of globalisation. An indicative, yet quite ‘innocent’ example is the very term ‘anti-globalisation’ to movements that not only use the facilities of the era of globalisation but also essentially think globally in terms of allocating the benefits of development worldwide, diminishing inequality or saving the planet from ecological catastrophe. Thus, they equate every aspect of globalisation with its economic one. The third peril posed is the reverse to demonisation: it is the idealisation of globalisation and its equation as universalism/cosmopolitanism/humanism. We shall refer to this one in more detail as it can alone initiate extreme reactions of a regressive type.

The idealisation of globalisation is manifested in its designation as a positive process by definition, and results in biased analysis for that reason. For example, the Thai and Irish strengthening of identity are analysed by Nedpogaeo and Fagan respectively as creative adaptations to globalisation. For that reason, the reinforcement of us/them dichotomy in Thai identity is interpreted as ‘negotiation of the global’ or example of ‘glocalisation’ (Nedpogaeo, 2001:111), while Irish cultural revival is interpreted as “resisting and feeding of global culture”, or accompanied with conclusions such as “Ireland is something ‘invented’ by the new cultural globalisation” (Fagan, 2001:123). In that way, globalisation becomes a criterion in itself as to whether national cultural revival will be considered a positive or negative development: so, the strengthening of national identities in Russia on the one hand and Thailand and Ireland on the other hand is evaluated as regressive and progressive respectively according to the adaptation of these countries to globalisation, which ultimately means effective economic performance.

Similarly, there are quite a few views that equate globalisation with cosmopolitanism and global values. Giddens (1999) is a characteristic

example. Globalisation, he argues, is characterised by constant change, cultural contact and complexity, among other things. This is connected with two other remarks. First, that the “active, reflexive citizenries” produced by the new communications are dissatisfied by the old orthodox established democracies that are remote from the flood of change (p.73). Second, that “cosmopolitans welcome and embrace this cultural complexity” (p.5). These, along with his claim that globalisation “is the way we now live” (p.18), automatically classify globalisation as the new and progressive process, and ascribe to it extra value through its connection to cosmopolitanism and global values. Yet, such views usually have another nuance. Giddens argues that, one basic impact of globalisation is the “clash between a cosmopolitan outlook and fundamentalism” (p.48). Fundamentalism, he asserts, is new and has arisen as a response to globalisation; moreover, it “is the enemy of cosmopolitan values” (p.50). “The battleground of the twenty-first century will pit fundamentalism against cosmopolitan *tolerance*”; while cosmopolitans welcome cultural diversity, “fundamentalists find it disturbing and dangerous” (p.4-5, emphasis added). And he elaborates further his reasoning: fundamentalism poses the question to modernity whether we can live without something sacred, and Giddens answers that we can’t. “Cosmopolitans...have to make plain that tolerance and dialogue can themselves be guided by *values of a universal kind*...We should be prepared to mount an active defence of these values *wherever they are poorly developed or threatened*. Cosmopolitan morality itself needs to be driven by *passion*. None of us would have anything to live for if we didn’t have something *worth dying for*” (p.50, emphasis added). In this clash, “*we can legitimately hope that a cosmopolitan outlook will win out*” (p.5, emphasis added).

With an exaggerated emphasis we could say that, if we shift the two poles (of fundamentalism and cosmopolitanism), we might be able to cite the above passage as a polemic of a fundamentalist movement. If we skip the large issue of who defines these universal values and with what criteria, and also who are ‘we’ that have to fight for these values, we should remark that the use of word ‘tolerance’ along with a rhetoric of ‘clash’, ‘battleground’ and the like

is a contradiction in terms: the word 'tolerance' should rather be accompanied with a description of those ways that can promote *respect* and *understanding*. This means that support for tolerance can best be effective if it is made in a tolerant way rather than with rhetoric of warfare. What is more important is that the above passage quoted is neither accompanied by a definition of these values that are worth of cosmopolitans' devotion nor by an attempt at understanding the reasons that make fundamentalism exist, in the whole of the study. The objection raised to Giddens' view, therefore, is not so much an objection on that one must be prepared to fight *if needed*, in defence of tolerance and freedom (as Voltaire's tradition on, Western at least, societies holds). It is rather an objection on the lack of analysis of the reasons that generate and promote fundamentalism, since it is the reasons that one has to 'fight' in the first place. Also, it is an objection on the inferred obviousness of the content of these 'universal values', a content that is neither described or explained in his book while an active defence of them is called upon. Yet, these clarifications and explanations are necessary in order to show a tolerant attitude, at least an intention of tolerance in the first place.

By stressing this I rather wish to point to the fact that, just as devotion to the national or religious ideals can regress to nationalism and fundamentalism, so too cosmopolitan ideals can become subject to a *cosmopolitan fundamentalism*. The claim that cosmopolitan values are 'worth dying for' is similar to the claim that nationalists make, only that they put the 'nation-state' instead of 'universal values', for which they also think that have an obvious legitimacy. In that sense, cosmopolitan fundamentalism can emerge as a regress from the logical reasoning of global activism or cosmopolitanism. This is a constant peril that emerges from any kind of ideologisation. In the case of cosmopolitan fundamentalism, for example, the enemy is usually identified as the national/ethnic unit, which is ascribed all responsibility for wars and catastrophes. This, along with the rhetoric that national states have no place in the new era, develops the concept of 'righteous intervention' on the local/national, as the latter is the 'evil'. The article of Segell (2001) moves in that direction: Segell claims that we now live in the era 'after' the nation-state,

and that there exists a global civil society which can use military force to “reinforce global values” (2001:133). This civil society uses “transnational armies”, such as the NATO, EUROCORP (a French-German-Belgian force) and similar military forces that have the legitimate right to operate because they express transnational values. So, he argues, as there are no longer economic borders between nation-states, civil society “*can no longer tolerate* armed forces patrolling along borders that have long since ceased to exist...” (137). The definition of these inter-national alliances as ‘transnational’ is one point for dispute, as is also the existence and ‘globality’ of this ‘global civil society’. The other point is the absence of tolerance of this ‘global civil society’ for national states, for Difference in general.

It was indicated above that the idealisation of globalisation and its equation with ‘cosmopolitanism’ could alone provoke nationalistic reactions. It is very important how an ‘aggressive’ intervention can provoke the contrary reaction from the one desired. This happens when the perception of ‘global responsibility’ that INGOs and ‘global’ actors hold transforms to a demand of change in a given situation without regard of the local conditions and in a less than tolerable way. In such cases, non only these actors project their own biases and perceptions on the others but, also, they can thus provoke a reactionary defence on behalf of the community or nation in question. This might be the outcome when there is absence of the understanding that tolerance requires. Understanding of the fact, first and foremost, that this so-called ‘global civil society’ mainly comes from countries that have long established an identity, a national identity to be accurate. Giddens (1999), for example, holds the view that cosmopolitanism has to stand against the efforts of fundamentalists of any kind to prevent or oppose the inevitable march of globalisation, which is bringing the world together. Is this a view of the ‘globe’ as a whole, or is it ideologically specific? Let us invoke a passage from Ignatieff’s book, *Blood and Belonging* (1993) that refers to cosmopolitanism but directly relates to the last argument.

Cosmopolitanism is the privilege of those who can take a secure nation state for granted. Though we have passed into a post-imperial age, we are not in a

post-nationalist age [...] The cosmopolitan order of the great cities –London, Los Angeles, New York, Paris– depends critically on the rule-enforcing capacities of the nation state. When this order breaks down...it becomes apparent that civilised, cosmopolitan multiethnic cities have as great propensity for ethnic warfare as any Eastern European country. [So,] cosmopolitans like myself are not beyond the nation...In that sense alone, I am a civic nationalist, someone who believes in the necessity of nations to provide the security and the rights we all need to live cosmopolitan lives. At the very least, cosmopolitan disdain and astonishment at the ferocity with which people will fight to win a nation state of their own is misplaced. They are, after all, only fighting for a privilege cosmopolitans have long taken for granted (1993:9).

The rhetorical and easy repudiation of the national dimension should not be disconnected from the fact that the stability and security of the national state is taken for granted for the cosmopolitans of the developed world, or that international mobility and contact is a prerequisite for a successful career for many of the professionals and academics that hold similar views. Also, the imposition of ‘universal values’ that are culturally specific does not always indicate an acceptance of cultural complexity, but rather an effort to transform an unknown reality according to the prejudices and models one holds. This is not to equate cosmopolitanism with cosmopolitan fundamentalism, but to emphasise on the fact that it can also become subject to ideologisation and rhetorical manipulation. The same applies to the political opposition to globalisation: when it demonises globalisation it may apply the same rhetoric or even methods as nationalism/fundamentalism.

The French sociologist Denis Duclos (2001) analyses the reactions to globalisation not in relation to the threats it poses but in relation to the everlasting and unresolved problem of the universal prospect. In his article ‘Will Globalisation Unite the World?’²¹ he argues that globalisation carries with it the prospect of a world that will unite all human beings (which is otherwise known as universalism, humanism, cosmopolitanism etc). This

²¹ ‘La Globalisation Va-t-elle Unifier le Monde?’, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 2001, pp.14-15. Also, in <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/08/DUCLOS/15541>

prospect is both attractive and frightening: it is a deeply narcissistic desire, to obliterate Difference, but it is also an intense anxiety as to whether *we* can erase the Other. By erasing the Other, we erase ourselves, our differences, and that creates the anxiety of us been absorbed in a suffocating Whole. For that reason, Duclos argues, this prospect has always, in combination with economic recessions (as in 1880, 1929, etc), led to fierce mobilisation, and obsession with the particular/local²².

The above certainly relates to views about globalisation as ‘one-worldism’. It refers to the misunderstanding of cosmopolitanism as the upper value, instead of its perception as a rejection of the belief that there is an upper value that must be equally important to everyone. So, globalisation/cosmopolitanism as a regression to a holistic perception of the world is subject to the analyses made to any holistic perception of the world, like nationalist holistic perceptions²³. Instead, the world (or the global) should be understood as the inter-national, as a relationship between very diverse national (or any other local) entities that have the right to be diverse as long as they do not jeopardise –by the use of violence– the different existence of the other. This is the prerequisite for further understanding, as these localities are the providers of shelter and identity that are so indispensable for individuals if they are to begin to sentimentally approach the world in its totality. The issue at stake is not whether the perspective will be national/local or global, but whether it will be fundamentalist/intolerant or not. In the era of globalisation, however, we need to take under consideration Marty and Appleby’s remark in

²² The wish to obliterate Difference is foremost a denial of the inner Other, the unknown self. It is also an expression of narcissism to the extent that it always looks to unite humankind by assimilating the others into one’s own image, into a humanity characterised by one’s own universal truth. This, in the end, is not a desire to obliterate differences, but a desire to replace them with one’s own ‘sameness’. The reaction to this, on the other hand, is a similar attempt to deny Difference, but in a reversed way: by projecting, by dismissing my internal Other and replacing it by an external Other, an enemy. This visibility reassures individuals that they have managed to retain an imaginary unitary self, free of differences, free of otherness. These two trends are the two sides of the same coin.

²³ Keeping the analogies in mind, we may consider the relation of cosmopolitan fundamentalism and cosmopolitanism similar to ‘nationalistic identity’ and national identity: cosmopolitan fundamentalism thus resembles a ‘*nationalism of the global*’ (the term ‘nationalism’ in inverted commas signifies that it is not used as an analytical term with all the specificities of nationalism but rather as a metaphor).

their study on fundamentalisms that, “the strange new world that is unfolding at the century’s end is producing new possibilities for fundamentalisms”²⁴.

Globalisation as a Political Ideology

In order to understand globalisation better and to apprehend the ways it can generate reactions or be a reaction itself (as in civilian globalisation) it would be useful to make here a synopsis of the ideologisation of globalisation. It is because of its ideologisation that I have confined it to the period starting in the mid-1980s²⁵; neither the free market system nor the information revolution are so recent, but this so recent process of ideologisation, that is still under way, has given them new impetus and character. Under the heading of globalisation a number of changes and events have been initiated, intensified or justified. These changes were very significant at both the political and the intellectual level, but the implications were most intensively manifested at the economic level. It would be superfluous to repeat the economic problems associated with globalisation. I would rather like to refer to the political and intellectual level because here lays the uniqueness of the process. This means that, neither neo-liberal ideology nor the problems associated by the implementation of the free-market are unique. Yet, for the first time they have not appeared as a political choice but as a necessity and an almost natural development.

The recent developments both at the political and intellectual level are quite diverse, while the most characteristic of them have already been referred to in chapters 5 and 6. Let us succinctly recapitulate the most indicative, starting with the political ones. One is the embarrassment and bewilderment felt by many politicians and intellectuals alike after the fall of the Soviet Union, a feeling that was mostly provoked by the victory appraisals on behalf

²⁴ Marty & Appleby (1991): *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, p.xii; quoted in Scott, 2001:96.

²⁵ Globalisation as a political ideology could be developed as a third dimension of globalisation. Nevertheless, because it is a very recent process, I have chosen to leave it out of the definition of globalisation, although ascribing to ideologisation the necessary importance.

of its opponent alliance, and less due to the belief that the Soviet Union was the illustration of socialism or communism. Second, in the midst of this bewilderment most countries started the implementation of neo-liberal politics with the opening of markets and the elevation of ‘competition’ to the main criterion for political, social and economic initiatives alike. These two developments resulted in a rhetoric that explained or justified these politics as inevitable necessities in the context of lack of alternatives –ideological or practical²⁶. Third, at the intellectual level, there is lack of terminological precision as to the definition of globalisation; while this could be quite normal, as many sociological terms are difficult to be defined because of the complexity of the phenomena they are trying to specify, the problem is that many analysts tend to include *everything* under the heading of globalisation whether they define it or not. For example, immigration to Israel (Berthomiere, 2001), defensive reactions of eastern Germans after German unification (Hogwood, 2001), and the reconciliation of victims and abusers in South Africa after the Apartheid regime (Stanley, 2001) are all equally treated as examples and characteristics of globalisation. This renders these analyses self-confirming as they leave nothing outside the ‘global’. Fourthly, there is, at the same time, huge terminological confusion due to the use of innovative language to describe contemporary events whether they are new or not. So, the NATO is described as a ‘transnational force’ (Segell, 2001), nations’ alliances and ethnic revivals are called regionalisms and localisms, new terms are introduced, such as ‘hybrid’ cultures or ‘glocalisation’, and a number of terms are replaced by others (chain with network etc), including ‘internationalisation’ that is replaced by ‘globalisation’.

This ideologisation is also apparent in certain visions of globalisation as the force that will unite the whole world and render it a global village.

²⁶ Here lays another peril of globalisation: this is the absence of alternative politics. In the name of globalisation and because of its ideologisation in many states political parties implement or propose a program that seeks to adapt to globalisation by adopting it, that is by implementing neo-liberal policies. In EU member states, and the EU as a whole, for example, this was manifest during the 1990s, although the majority of governments were coming from the centre-left. When this happens, left-wing critique or reactions to globalisation cannot find a parliamentary way-out or they cannot be satisfied by moderate political claims that seek to accommodate globalisation. In these situations there is an obvious peril that people will be attracted by extreme reactionary parties or by non-parliamentary groups.

Probably connected with this vision is the argument that fixed particularistic identities and stable cultural communities have no place in this 'new' world. The claim that national states and national identities will be rendered obsolete and even disappear has gained much support within the last decade of the twentieth century. However, the constant rise of old and new ethnic/national struggles and national/cultural revivals is also part of the era of globalisation. These struggles and revivals are incorporated in the vague context of 'regionalisms' and 'localisms' due to the ideologisation of globalisation, which provokes a holistic view of the world that coincides with its envisaging of national states and identities as the 'bad', the obstacle to the realisation of such a view.

The effort and anxiety to explain the world as a unitary and integrated whole is characteristic of ideologies, as it was argued about nationalism in chapter 3. The argument about nationalism as a political ideology can be applied to globalisation as well: "Nationalism is a political ideology that creates and sustains mobilisation with three basic ideological mechanisms: generalisation, naturalisation, and identification. [...] Through generalisation, the particular appears as universal, as general, and the interests of a group appear as public interests. [...] Naturalisation is a mechanism by which the social and the political appear natural, given, unchosen. [...] Naturalisation is closely connected to legitimation, a fundamental function of ideologies, for what is natural becomes automatically excused, justified and, in the end, legitimised. The third mechanism, identification, makes the ideology unconsciously internalised and formulates individual and collective identities. When nationalism is internalised, national identity is ascribed to the individuals who, thereafter, tend to identify –wholly or partially– their interests with their nation's and naturally act out for their defence. According to Breuilly, there exists in the modern world a general need for identity expressed as a general need for ideology, and he stresses that, "nationalist ideology is a particularly powerful response to this need" because it is both abstract (in the ways of achieving its goals) and repudiating of the depersonalising character of modernity (1993:381-2)".

Globalisation as a political ideology functions with these three ideological mechanisms as well. Through generalisation globalisation is presented as having universal validity and acceptance and, when it is not, this is due to retrogressive attitudes that deny its 'inevitable' march. Moreover, the interests of a particular group, of neo-liberal free-marketers, are presented as global interests. Naturalisation is apparent in the view that globalisation is inevitable and widespread in every part of the world, and that the so-called 'global civil society' has obvious legitimacy. Identification, too, manifests itself in the 'global values', 'global citizenship', and the 'obvious' legitimacy of the latter to be mobilised in defence of these values against their 'enemies' worldwide; Breuilly's words as quoted above find a clear expression in Giddens' view that, life is not worth if we have nothing to fight for while, simultaneously, he identifies globalisation with universal values (naturalisation). Certainly, we cannot expect that identification with 'global values' can create a form of collective identity, at least not of the type of national identity. The main reasons are two. First, because the 'globe' is both symbolically and pragmatically²⁷ too vast and vague a place to become the provider and regulator of primary identities, that is to offer the organisation and the familiarity necessary so that a 'global identity' becomes a primary identity. As argued regarding nationalism²⁸, the modern state had a decisive role in providing the means to organise and systematise a given population and ascribe to them a common identity. Second, because these values can be incorporated into the value system of individuals and collectivities like other ideologies do now, which, however, do not undermine the form of collective identification that national identities present. For both these reasons, it is more likely and practically feasible that 'global values' enrich the discourse and contexts of contemporary identification rather than undermine or substitute them.

Globalisation's similarities with nationalism, as both political ideologies, are manifest in the psychological reactions they can generate and the fact that they can provoke, or facilitate, psychological regression by offering an alibi a

²⁷ Pragmatically means in practical terms, that is territorially, linguistically, in terms of organisation and systematisation of common living, etc.

²⁸ Chapter 3, p.52.

legitimate excuse for the expression of hostility (verbally or actively). For example, globalisation does offer a holistic view of the world and a prospect for the future. In addition, identification with it, or with the global values, can become regressive as both its idealisation and demonisation indicate. In short, globalisation and the 'global' have certain similarities with nationalism and the national: both infer the possibility for constructive and destructive manifestations and, most importantly, they both can be –and have been– manipulated by elite groups towards a certain goal.

The Prospects of (National) Identity in the Era of Globalisation

Within the context of globalisation, the context of current politics, what is the future of national identity? What is the future of identity, of collective identification, in general? We have analysed the prospects of identification with the national state thus far and have indicated a few more directions that identity can follow as a reaction to globalisation. Following the above analysis of the responses to globalisation in general, as well as the previous analysis on nationalism (which is still a prevalent force), we should try to provide an answer to this –fundamental for this research– question. The prospects of large-scale collective identification in the current era are mainly two: either that national identity will remain the primary identity, or that the national state as a source of primary identification will run the risk of being replaced by another provider of group identification (such as religion). In either case, the basic characteristics of identity will not differ in essence from those of national identity, as described in chapter 4.

Before we analyse these two prospects it is important to address and justify the lack of an alternative prospect, an alternative to both national and religious identities, meaning an alternative to this kind of collective identification that is characterised by all those traits described in this thesis. More specifically, the question is whether there is a prospect for individuation

or for 'individualised' identities, such as consumer identities²⁹. Individuation, to begin with, is always a choice: it is not excluded as one, but it is not specifically stressed because it is usually followed by few people. Individuation does not need a specific reference 'in the era of globalisation' because it has always been a choice of critical minds against every ideological power structure³⁰. Indicatively, individuation has been a choice for certain people who refused to acquire the 'nationalistic' identities attributed to them and criticised their countries for nationalistic or militaristic propaganda; individuation has been a choice in the era of nationalism and it will not stop being one in the era of globalisation or any other 'era'. The question about consumerism and consumer identity, on the other hand, is an important discussion but is not relevant to our point of discussion of collective and national identification, although it is relevant to globalisation in general. I would leave aside this issue as irrelevant to the discussion on the potentials of collective-as-prevalent identification because of current indicative evidence. In the most notable examples of our contemporary age where there is a very strong and deeply entrenched consumer culture, the examples of USA and the UK, there is no indication that national feelings and identities are less strong than they are in other countries: on the contrary, consumerism is considered to be part of the customs and values of these two national states. In that sense consumerism too cannot undermine or substitute national identification but be integrated in the identity perceptions of a given nation³¹. So, let us move to the two stronger potentials for collective identification in the era of globalisation.

²⁹ Let me clarify that I do not equate individuation with consumer culture as, for example, the former would most likely present a critique on the latter. I have included both only as responses or alternatives that can be chosen of followed by individuals alone, and they are far from offering a group identity.

³⁰ For example, Marxists who have severely criticised the soviet federation of USSR, or pacifists who deny to serve the military, etc.

³¹ On the contrary, as Castoriadis (1999) argues, in capitalistic societies the collapse of traditional –and supporting for the individual– communal values resulted in the rallying of individuals around religion, nation, or race, in a search for identity.

National Identity as Primary Identity³²

Firstly, people are most likely to reaffirm or hide behind their existing identities; for a large part of the world this means their national identities, but for those that there has been another source of identification, for example religious, that should remain so. There is a general, yet precise, reason for that: in a world that is changing so rapidly, certain points of stability are those that continue to provide meaning. In Hall's words, "identities ought to be stable points of reference which were like that in the past, are now and ever shall be, *still points in a turning world*" (1991a:22, emphasis added). National identities are identities that guarantee a psychological continuity in between time, because nations are (presented as) everlasting entities, in the past, present, and the future. In addition, the importance of the national state will be even greater as provider of security, because it is still the only prevailing entity *and* norm in the era of globalisation that can provide a shelter, at least psychologically. In circumstances of insecurity, nationalism makes a greater psychological appeal too, and the symbols of national identification, the *patria* primarily among them, acquire intense significance.

So, national identity has the potentials to be even stronger in the era of globalisation. As it has been argued, it is not necessary that national identities will be pathologic and exclusionary, as they can be the reference points that will facilitate the departure towards an external orientation to the world. This is a potential, of course. Unfortunately, however, there are serious doubts that this will happen as a reaction to the current international age. National identities tend to regress to 'nationalistic identities' in periods of crisis, when the 'normal' rhythms of life are unpleasantly disturbed. Also, pathological reactions usually accompany economic crises and recessions. So, nationalism, as a sentiment and ideological discourse, is provided with fertile ground on which to develop. For example, in Europe there is already great concern about globalisation, accompanied by great hostility against the increasing number of foreigners who try to enter it. Foreigners have always been 'suitable' receivers of hostility. Even more so now that people are more in a need for a scapegoat,

³² This section is mostly a recapitulation of the relevant argumentation presented thus far.

something more apt than 'globalisation' to blame for unemployment, for cultural threats, etc. For many, the need for a stable national state may coincide with a 'pure' one, and foreigners are obstacles to purity. It is certainly no coincidence that the xenophobic and even racist, but certainly exclusionist, rhetoric won people's sympathy and brought the respective parties into Austria's and Denmark's government in the late 1990s; nor is it coincidence that the EU is implementing the harshest laws against migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, thus creating a 'fortress Europe' in the beginning of the twenty-first century. At the same time, rational thinking is surrounded by too many fundamentalisms at the moment (national, religious and global) that mainly fight each other (as Giddens described) but leave no much fertile ground for moderate, rational activity.

Another possible and already existing trend is the uprising of nationalism as a movement, meaning the mobilisation towards creating more unified and homogeneous national states, or simply recognising ethnic and national identities and groups with relative autonomy within states. The case of the Basques on the one hand, and the case of the Scots on the other are only two of the many existing examples. These are trends towards more solid and stable national identities. As it has been argued, they do not undermine the national state as a form of collective organisation, but they undermine their respective national states. Beyond the domestic reasons that account for the evolution of each case, these nationalisms can be explained by the two existing and prevalent ideologies. The one is nationalism, which is still on the fore and even more strengthened on an international scale. The other is globalisation, as it has been subject to intense ideologisation. One aspect of the dominant rhetoric of globalisation concerns the national state and its fading away. To the extent that the rhetoric about the decline of the national state continues and, furthermore prevails as a public concept (apart from, and because of, being an intellectual and political concept), people will search back for national, ethnic, local identities, so as to fill the emerging vacuum. This search will be based on the model of national identity and the reaction will be an extreme nationalistic one, as the current examples and trends indicate. This is most likely to be made in a

context of panic. According to Freud (1921:125-6), panic arises when a group disintegrates or is under threat, real or perceived. This is expressed in collective fear, which is analogous to neurotic anxiety: disintegration of the group or a threat to its integration can provoke identity crisis, which ultimately means loss of security, certainty and sense of belonging. Thus, it is a disaster for the individual. For that reason, we can expect this anxiety to provoke regressive reactions. At the same time, however, there is also realistic anxiety, anxiety connected with a real and not perceived danger. If we take into account the observed threats connected with economic globalisation, we can see that both types of anxieties can be generated in the current context³³.

Recall of Religious Identity?

The second prospect for national identification is that it could lose its primacy to another form of identification, namely religious identification. This again depends upon the rhetoric of the nation state's decline or upon its possible actual weakening, in combination to the fact that nationalism is a secular religion, in the sense that it uses a similar rhetoric and it serves similar needs. In that sense, if the national state fails to provide a stable source of identification and organisation of the group's life, then another affiliation will be searched for. This search can be directed to more coherent and homogeneous national states, but it can also take refuge in religion. A refuge in religion would not need to replace the national state, as religion is a fundamental component of many national identities, and this increases the likelihood of such a prospect. However, these trends are also determined by the history and the particular shaping circumstances of a region. Collective assimilations are related to pre-existing categorisations, as Smith argues, and to their historical depth and continuity.

Religious fundamentalism could potentially replace nationalism (as national fundamentalism), as the rhetoric of the two is similar, let alone that the one borrows its fundamental features from the other; authenticity, inspiration,

³³ On realistic and neurotic anxiety we referred in chapter 2, p.69-70.

capacity for interpretation, but also the rhetoric of chosen nation, holiness of the motherland, etc, that are used in religious fundamentalism too. The following passage is indicative of their similarities: “fundamentalisms are selective. They may well consider that they are adopting the whole of the pure past, but their energies go into employing those features which will best reinforce their identity, keep their movement together, build defences around its boundaries, and keep others at a distance...”³⁴. Also, “fundamentalism stresses community as a source of strength, an expression of solidarity and a resource for use” (Scott, 2001:82). Thus, community (whether religious or national) can be a source of strength in circumstances that individuals perceive themselves as weakened in controlling their lives and their shaping conditions.

We already have examples of re-emerging religious fundamentalisms. Scott (2001) argues that in the post war period there is a rise of fundamentalism of all religions, particularly Islamic and Christian, a rise that has astonished sociologists of religion who thought that modernisation and secularisation had rendered religion marginalised and individualised. These fundamentalisms, she argues, are retreatist and regressive, and not radical and revolutionary (2001:81). Let us first refer to Islamic fundamentalism. According to Castells, Islamic fundamentalism has re-emerged largely as a reaction to globalisation and the simultaneous devaluation of the nation state. In his words, “the explosion of Islamic fundamentalism seems to be related to both the disruption of traditional societies...and to the failure of the nation-state to accomplish modernisation, develop the economy, and/or to distribute the benefits of economic growth among the population at large” (1997:17)³⁵. Religious fundamentalism became also appealing among Muslim youth born in countries like France, Germany and Britain who became frustrated and disappointed due to social exclusion and discrimination. Thus, several factors contributed to the displacement of national community as a sentimental priority by *umma*, the community of believers; the failure of the national state was one of them. Its

³⁴ Quoted in Castells, 1997:13, from M.Marty & S,Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1991, a project on fundamentalisms by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

³⁵ For an analysis on religious fundamentalism and the particular cases of Islam and American Christianity see Castells, 1997, pp.13-27; also, Scott, 2001.

failure, however, is not enough to explain its repudiation. It is also important to note that the national state was not a long established form of political organisation, while also it was seen as a western imposition. In addition, the 1970s were for the Muslims the beginning of the 14th century of the *Hegira*, as Castells points out, “a period of Islamic revival, purification, and strengthening” (p.14). As we can see, all these factors coincided to provoke the rise of religious fundamentalism among a number of Muslims. All these events together account for the ‘particular circumstances’ that have extensively been referred to as contributing to an important historical event, the knowledge of which is absolutely necessary when we attempt to analyse, or predict, historical events.

In a similar way we should envisage the emergence of Christian fundamentalism in the US. Castells (and Scott) describes this too as a retreatist movement “aiming at constructing social and personal identity on the basis of images of the past and projecting them into an utopian future...” (1997:25), which presents family as the earthly heaven from where one can “pray God to *return them to the state of innocence* where they could be content with benevolent patriarchalism under God’s rules” (p.27, emphasis added). Castells explains these movements as a reaction against the fear and uncertainty provoked by globalisation and the crisis of patriarchalism. Indeed, the psychological appeal of patriarchalism and the unconscious dynamics of the claim towards a ‘return to the state of innocence’ (return to the ‘womb’) are very strong. However, why this particular one was the reaction in the US and not elsewhere cannot be wholly explained by globalisation but by the traditions and the myths of this society. In that respect, it is essential to remark the following: “Christian fundamentalism is a perennial feature of American history” (Castells, p.21) and it is closely connected to the American militia (who are also uprising); in addition, since the early 1990s the Americans were ‘deprived’ of their basic enemy, communism, which was replaced by Islam to some extent; lastly, a fundamental myth in American tradition is the so-called ‘American exceptionalism’, the belief that they would find in the US the ‘promised land’, a heaven in earth (it was in the US and by Christianity that the

very term 'religious fundamentalism' was initiated, having conversion at its heart).

Huntington emphasised, and predicted, that increasing interactions will "intensify civilisation consciousness and awareness of differences between civilisations and commonalities within civilisations" (1996:4), thus pointing to the one trend towards larger affiliations. He mainly defined those larger affiliations according to religious characteristics, thus pointing to the fact that future confrontations will be among religious camp. However, these larger affiliations are to large extent larger *categorisations*, most commonly externally applied and connected with the (reasonable) fact of the 'external' bypassing of internal and subtle differences. Let me be more explicit about that. Huntington stresses the example of a person, who is considered a Catalan in Spain, a Spaniard in Europe, a European in America, and a European/Westerner/Christian in the Middle East. The broader categorisation is used by and to the ones who are not aware of the inner divisions. So, if someone introduces himself as a Rwandan, a name 'we' have never heard before, we will most likely recall him as an African. Such broad categorisations externally focus on similarities, while neglecting the differences. In the 'interior' of such broad categorisations, however, people are more aware of their differences and divisions. Within 'interiors' and when they are particularly big and diverse, there exists the likelihood that differences will be emphasised. His prediction, however, remains a strong likelihood if a number of conditions are met in the future, external categorisation being one of them.

Generally, there are not many regions that the national state seems likely to be replaced as a major source of identification by religion. Yet, this remains a possibility while, also, religion could be reasserted within the boundaries of existing national states. This would be a combination of the two main prospects for (national) identity that have just been described. This is consistent with the strength of nationalism, the existence and potency of religious affiliations, and with the similarities that nationalism and religious fundamentalism express.

* * *

:

The process and reactions described must in no way be exaggerated. Identification is a long process, and changes affect it continuously but slowly. Yet, this is a reason why the national state should not be presented as threatened: because it is the source of identification for many people, and a continuum for national identity. Thus, the demise of the nation state would be a direct threat for individuals, whose life and future is connected with it. If an effort towards new identifications is made under the present circumstances and the impact of globalisation, they will be constructed with fear as a component of it. And, fear, is not a good guide in any action.

CONCLUSION

So, we have reached the end of this study upon the nature, strength and dynamics of national identity. A study that went through individuals and their inner psyche, individuals as members of groups and collectivities and, at the same time, through political ideologies and historical processes. The single individual and its conscious and unconscious mental functioning has been at the core of understanding and explaining the dynamics of collective identification. This is not to claim that psychoanalytic explanations of national identity make historical and political ones redundant but, on the contrary, that they offer an additional insight and a deeper comprehension to the latter. For example, the appeal of the 'Golden Age' or the boundaries' construction of 'us' and 'them' have been often emphasised in many researches on nationalism; yet, the explanation of these phenomena, the answer 'Why?' they have such a potency, is a step further in their full comprehension. Psychoanalysis does not explain any particular nationalist phenomenon (alone), but it does explain the human propensity to develop the kinds of sentiments and dispositions manifested in national identification.

Identity construction is an individual experience but socially mediated. The process of identification begins with the infant's birth and continues thereafter. It is initiated as a defence mechanism in the service of the pleasure principle, as the infant tries to avoid frustration and preserve its narcissistic image, but it also provides an outlet for the love drives. Identification at this first stage of life takes place only with familiar images and persons; this is a characteristic of identification that we can observe in later life as well, and in fact occurs as a prerequisite for identification. Identification with parents and parenting persons is the first and most important identification in someone's life, it is highly constitutive of his/her personality and to a large degree determines later identifications. This is the personal history of a person, whose processes and circumstances of identity construction are unique and constitute an individual experience. At the same time, however, each individual is located in a given historical, social and political environment. So, his/her experiences and choices are largely determined by it. History and the sociopolitical environment

are inscribed to the child initially by its parents and later, in a more systematic way, through the social environment. Yet, even through parental identification, which is personal and unique, one internalises the social perceptions of his/her parents and their environment, their super-ego, that introduce him/her to a specific social order. In that sense, personal experiences are also social ones, and the choice of identity is socially mediated and/or determined. Thus, identification is closely linked to the concept of socialisation. In that sense, the idea that, in the era of globalisation, one can make a free choice from multiple sources of identity overlooks the social and political structures within which each individual is placed and which sociology has considered indispensable thus far, independently of whether these structures would be national or other.

National identity is the identity one acquires through identification with the nation. Emphasis is laid on the national state, however, because, as it has been argued, it is the state that accounts for the major difference between national and ethnic identity. According to the modern definition, a nation is an ethnic group that has found political expression in a state or has consciously aspired to do so. So, national identity is not only a social identity, but it is also a political identity, influenced by the aims and context of the modern political ideology of nationalism. It is nationalism that has rendered national identity a 'nationalistic' identity and has given it the particular characteristics that it manifests with such potency and, occasionally, ferocity. That is because nationalism has signified the nation with new qualities and aspired goals, and national identity has been resignified by it. For that reason I have defined national identity as *the outcome of the constant process of identification with a nation, and the sentiments aroused by this identification*. The characteristics and content of national identification are defined by the object of identification, which is the nation.

National identity need not be by definition such a strong and prevalent identity as it has been throughout modernity. This has been the outcome of its systemic organisation and cultivation, and its manipulation too, by the state apparatuses. However, as it has been shown, this kind of organisation and identification that is based on familiarity criteria is not new in history. On the contrary: sentimental affiliations based on territorial and linguistic criteria, as well as religious and cultural ones are known to us since the Homeric epics. These affiliations are also manifest

today in peoples' sentimental attachment to their particular birthplaces and 'homelands' within their own national states. These affiliations resemble ethnic ties in that they are sentimentally important even though not systematised. This clearly indicates that the criteria upon which nationalism has emphasised are not new or manufactured but rather represent age-old criteria of collective identification, unsystematic though. Criteria clearly derived by the human psychological need to identify with a familiar group and delineate its borders against other groups.

Apart from understanding the human propensities and political circumstances and ideologies that make nationalism and national identity so prevalent within modernity, individual psychology can also help us understand the reasons of conflicts and reactions to specific events. It does so through the acknowledgment and study of the unconscious drives –the aggressive drives in particular– and the need to construct a unitary perception of one's self through the projection of unwanted and undesired images to the others. When applied to collectivities, this need explains the construction of so powerful and hostile divisions of 'us' and 'them', and the creation of enemies may nevertheless be very similar to one's own group. An other important way to understand conflicts is through the study of individual reactions to traumatic events. There are certain events in the life of an individual that are of particular importance in the development of his/her personality, or may even constitute traumatic events. Traumatic events tend to be repressed from memory, but make their appearances into consciousness with symptoms. Certainly, neither all of the potentially traumatic events will become so in every individual, nor a similar event would be equally traumatic for different persons. The likelihood of reactions depends on the ability of each individual to accommodate these events, and his/her potential psychic strength to cathect a given amount of pressure, frustration or anxiety. The same by analogy applies to nations. There is a number of events in their history that are significant or even tragic. These historical events have the *potential* of becoming collective traumas and generate pathologic reactions (symptoms). Such events remain in the common memory of a nation through historical or mythical narrative and become part of the collective unconscious of a nation through time. At the same time, except from marginal cases, past events cannot be experienced as traumatic in the present if someone does not ascribe importance to them. Here lays the importance of leaders in managing to manipulate a whole nation and its history: by

emphasising on a past event and presenting it as traumatic or fundamentally important they can manage to influence a nation, provided of course that other particular circumstances favour such a process.

In the course of this analysis it has been argued that the distinction between benign and malign types of nationalism is inaccurate and thus misleading. That was not an attempt to treat all manifestations of nationalisms as uniformly reactionary or regressive; it was rather an attempt to emphasise on two important points. The one is that nationalism by definition creates boundaries and distinctions and, because the unconscious drives work in that direction as well, it can easily take exclusionary or any other extreme form. Indeed, as much of the evidence indicate, the history of nations is full of instances where a relatively peaceful period is followed by a violent one, and so on. The second point is that one must be cautious as to the definition used to describe others and to the implication of present politics in such definitions. An aspect of this is the projection of nationalistic feelings to other nations and regions, to the periphery as Billing argues, and the attribution of benign or 'civic' types of nationalism to 'our' nation. Another aspect is that political circumstances and balances determine to a large extent the definition of historical events. For example, a movement that once might be called liberating can in another context and period called nationalistic or secessionist. For that reason, political analysis must always take under consideration historical and political circumstances, which can help keep a critical perspective upon political contingencies.

Critical analysis and consideration of political contingencies is necessary when studying any historical period. It is particularly important when studying one's contemporary period, too, so as to complement for the lack of distance from the facts that are under analysis. Globalisation, for instance, is not simply recent: it is contemporary. In the vast bibliography on globalisation, where historical developments have been kept under consideration the perception is usually more balanced. Hence the effort to keep these criteria under consideration when defining globalisation, so as to accurately identify the context of analysis and locate national identity within it. There have been several obstacles to the desired analytical clarity in regard to globalisation, though, due to a number of interrelated developments connected to the ideologisation of globalisation. These characteristics include the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent political, economic and ideological

developments, the perception of the national state as being at the dusk of its history, and the wide terminological confusion and lack of specificity in regard to the definition of globalisation. These developments resulted in a rhetoric that explained or justified the politics of globalisation as inevitable necessities in the context of lack of alternatives –ideological or practical.

It has been often asserted that globalisation will erase nationalism from the world. However, its very evolution as a kind of ‘nationalism’ itself proves the argument wrong; because, by replacing nationalism with globalisation-as-ideology one does not repudiate fundamentalist thinking but only alter the terms of discussion. This only shows the prevalence of ‘nationalism’. Nevertheless, the prevalence of nationalism is manifested in practical terms too. Nationalistic movements continue to be mobilised around the world, while nationalistic sentiments and discourses in established national states are far from negligible. Also, national states continue to be an aspiration and a norm, as well as the only existing form of collective organisation at the moment. In addition, they remain the main organisers of collective identification. National states may have been weakened in some of their economic functioning, but this has been part of their own political initiatives and not the outcome of an uncontrolled and fluid globalisation process. At the same time, those mechanisms that systematise identification with the national state are equally or even more powerful as they have been in modernity, including forces that are independent from the state (like the mass media, that are even more nationally oriented). Finally, pressures posed by the civilian initiatives for reforms, even for ‘global’ reforms (i.e. ecological issues), are posed to national states, thus empowering them.

So, national identities have not been weakened in the era of globalisation. On the contrary, there is evidence pointing to cultural revivals and reaffirmations of identities in many cases and, at the same time, the overall conditions posed by globalisation indicate that national identification and nationalism is more likely to be strengthened than diminished. How can one make such predictions? The likelihood of a process can only be estimated if a multidimensional approach is applied. For example, political analysis of the current situation and trends is necessary to define the state of the art; psychoanalysis then describes the individual feelings and perception of a given situation, as well as the unconscious dynamics that work for or against a given reaction; and, historical sociology is indispensable in informing us

about similar cases and reactions in the past, as well as about the particular circumstances that shape the overall historical and cultural conditions of a given region or nation. Certainly, there are always imponderable factors in history, factors that can never be predicted before they emerge and may have a decisive contribution to the final outcome (a leader, a natural event etc); these are the conjunctures, the contingencies in history.

In the current context, globalisation presents direct threats for individuals and collectivities alike. The reasons are multiple and they include: economic recessions and growing inequality; financial volatility and the weakening of states' protection of their citizens (i.e. cut of welfare provisions); ecological threats and disasters; rapid flows of information and misinformation; cultural threats, including the widespread discourse about the dismantling of the national state and the weakening of national identities. Some of the above are indeed enhanced as a result of globalisation (i.e. economic insecurity) and others by the ideologisation of globalisation (i.e. threats to the national state), while others are not directly related to globalisation (i.e. ecological threats). Yet, all of the above are used in everyday rhetoric as directly connected to the new era of globalisation, which results in its demonisation –as opposed to its idealisation, which is the other side of the same coin. Subsequent rapid changes and the perception of globalisation as a peril cannot but provoke reactions that will point towards the preservation of stable units and identities. That is because local identification is much easier to be accomplished, as it is much more immediate and familiar. This local identification in the era of nationalism is national identification –because the era of globalisation is also an era of nationalism.

There is one issue that should be stressed for the sake of clarity. Since identification is a constant process and identities are continuously enriched, why is emphasis laid on the importance of stable national identities as reference points in the era of globalisation? A basic understanding of national identity involves the remark made in chapter 3 that, while two individuals may experience equally strongly their national identification, the specific component of each national identity may vary to some extent. For example, one Italian may consider Catholicism to be a fundamental aspect of being Italian while another may be an atheist, and so on; these differences, however, are indifferent to the feeling and strength of national identity for each of them. This is the quality of nationalism: to embrace all and to describe no means and

criteria that define the nation and national identification. So, a regress to 'stable reference points' that was indicated is not a regress to stable national identities by definition, meaning to identities that have been and will remain unchanged, but a regress to the sense of stability that national identities offer because they have been 'there' for long and they are familiar. It should be noted that even this regress to existing identities, when it comes as a reaction, does provoke a change in itself because it alters the intensity and emphasis of identification in the first place (intensity that can make a moderate national identity a 'nationalistic' one), and because it redefines them with additional elements that come from the reaction to a threatening Other (i.e. the redefinition of national identity with xenophobic elements as a result of external threats). In addition, when individuals face a threatening external environment, as globalisation is largely perceived, then their identities become more 'closed' and defensive and thus exclude other influences by definition, except from oppositional influences. Last, let us not forget that the process of identification involves the (selective) internalisation of elements from external others that finally shape one's personality. The earlier this process takes place, the more fundamental these elements are in defining one's self. So, however enriched or altered or moderated, pre-existing inscriptions constitute the ground upon which new developments can take place.

In general, we must keep in mind that psychoanalysis illuminates the discussion on national identities in regard to the mechanisms that shape identities and not to their specific content: it answers the 'how' and 'why' they are formed, not 'which' specific one will it be. Identities are shaped through the constant interaction with important others, whether they initially be the parents (initially) or the wider social environment and structures (later on). So, 'which' will be one's particular identity is defined by the wider social and political context. This is partly the meaning of the importance of others in shaping one's identity. So, in order to describe specific national identities we need to look at the historical period in which they emerge and to examine the national state and nationalism in question. The content of identities can be defined only through an examination of the particular political and social circumstances of the given historical time and space.

One last aspect of this analysis that should be stressed in the concluding remarks is that of sublimation, a process by which the aim of a drive is diverted to

another one. As it was explained in chapters 2 and 3, the initiative for the drives to strive for their satisfaction is desire, which stands at the core of every drive. Individuals cannot escape their nature, that is their unconscious drives, but they can certainly mediate them. This is the meaning of sublimation: the objects of desire can be shaped or socially mediated. However, when we refer to the sublimation of unconscious drives of collectivities such as nations, the notion of sublimation becomes mainly theoretical and practically utopian. Individuals have the tendency to regress to infantile fixations and seek for instinctual satisfactions. So, as Freud has argued, drives' inclination to aggression forces civilisation to such an expenditure of energy that "civilisation has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive instincts" (1930:302). So, the issue for effective sublimation is to manage to direct desire towards less destructive alternatives, and also to make this a continuous process and effort that should never be considered as an achievement. This requires strong political will and long-term commitment. It is at the level of political will and effectiveness that the issue of sublimation is, although not theoretically impossible, practically improbable. That is because, the maintenance of power has been the first priority for politicians and leading elites, and political power has often been employed by leaders so as to satisfy their own unconscious drives and desires. People will most eagerly gather and 'forget' their internal differences when they are in opposition to another group; this is a knowledge that political leaderships take advantage of in order to strengthen or maintain unity and/or divert the public's attention from mistakes and inefficiencies of their policies –meaning, not always, but very often. It is this practice that has provoked Moscovici to define politics as "the rational form of exploiting the irrational substance of the masses" (1985:37). As we have seen in the examples of education and sports, in the era of nationalism not only have these potential outlets of desire lost much of their effectiveness but, in addition, they have been used and exploited for the purpose of nation-building and for directing aggressiveness towards specific political ends.

Once more it should be emphasised that it is not national states *per se* as organisations of collectivities that should be blamed for international conflicts and misunderstandings, neither is it religion or tradition as such. As we have seen, fundamentalist thinking can be applied to diverse aims and, wherever employed, it manifests a confrontation-discourse. Also, part of the analysis that proceeded in

regard to national states can be applied to many instances of our everyday life where groups are involved. An analogously similar behaviour to national states and nationalism can be found in football teams and their fans: they can be fanatic or not, they gather mostly when they 'confront' their major 'enemy', they can be peaceful supporters in one game and fanatic hooligans in another, while the players and owners of these teams can tame or exasperate their fans with their actions in the field or with respective statements outside it. As far as collectivities are concerned, both the inner unconscious predispositions of individuals and their ability to be set free more easily when in a group, as well as the behaviour and 'politics' of the people responsible for the groups' organisation (i.e. leaders) are extremely important in understanding and analysing conflicting situations.

During this research we tried to address the issue of national identity, with particular reference to the reasons of its regression to reactionary deeds and politics. This was not an attempt to define the particular characteristics that constitute national identities but to address the issue of identification with the national state. Through this multidisciplinary approach we tried to answer the question of its nature, strength and potential, and to go deeper into explaining phenomena that had been identified but remained a puzzle as to their causes. During this analysis on national identity a number of wider but interrelated phenomena came to the fore and they were addressed as well, although to a lesser extent. These phenomena include racism and xenophobia, exclusion and discrimination, as well as fundamentalisms, and they were related because they have similar psychic predispositions, but also because they are all apparent in nationalistic sentiments and discourses, and they can also be manipulated by leading groups, whether they be religious, national or 'global'. Certainly, I cannot claim to have exhausted the topics related to national identity. There are topics that preoccupied me during this research to the extent that it was thought appropriate or necessary, but they appear to be particularly interesting for future and more extensive research too. Such topics are: the relation of secularism and religious fundamentalism to nationalism, the empirical study of people and/or groups that have double or multiple identities, the 'anti-globalisation' movements and the identities of 'global citizens', as well as the content of cultural reaffirmations (that is, to examine whether they point to a specific trend towards the creation of real nation-states). Other topics that have not been really examined but are nevertheless

relevant and interesting for future research include: the content of identification of the 'globalisation professionals' and frequent-flyer cosmopolitans or the examination of national identification of contemporary global activists, the impact of consumerism as the underlying culture of globalisation, as well as the implications of globalisation on democracy.

However, further analysis of these topics would require and should be based on the understanding of the nature of individuals and their 'regression' potentials when they are in a group, that is the psychological and political conditions that are involved in group psychology; in that sense, this research is the first step towards the further elaboration of these topics. Also, specific cases and empirical examples have been involved in this thesis only to the extent that was necessary to clarify and illustrate the overall argumentation. The attempt made was to provide the analytical framework that can contribute to a deeper understanding of national identities in general and illuminate some necessary steps one should consider when studying a particular case. During this attempt the steps followed were those evaluated as most important, including the analysis of national identity in the contemporary era, which in my judgment would render the nature and potential of national identity more apt and thus comprehensible. I hope and believe that my study has met its aims and that it will contribute to the scientific knowledge and research that is interested in these topics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ANDERSON, Benedict (1991): *Imagined Communities*, 2nd ed (1st ed. 1983), London/New York: Verso.
- APPADURAI, Arjun (1990): 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy', in Featherstone, M. (ed): *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity*, London: Sage.
- ARMAKOLAS, Ioannis (2001): 'Identity and Conflict in Globalising Times: Experiencing the Global in Areas Ravaged by Conflict and the Case of the Bosnian Serbs', in Kennedy, P. & Danks, C. (eds): *Globalisation and National Identities*, New York: Palgrave.
- ARMSTRONG, J.A. (1982): *Nations Before Nationalism*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- ATKINSON, Philipa (1999): 'Representations of Conflict in the Western Media: the Manufacturing of a Barbaric Periphery', in Skelton, T. & Allen, T. (eds), *Culture and Global Change*, London/New York: Routledge.
- BADCOCK, C. R. (1981): 'A Footnote to Freud: Levi-Strauss' Dept to Psychoanalysis', *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society*, Vol. 9, 37-47.
- BALLINT, Alice (1945): 'Identification', *The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis*, 317-338.
- BALTER, Leon (1985): 'The Charismatically Led Group: the Mental Processes of its Members', *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society*, Vol. 11, 173-215.
- BAR-TAL, Daniel (1993): 'Patriotism as Fundamental Beliefs of Group Members', *Politics and the Individual*, Vol. 3, No 2, 45-62.
- BARTH, Fredrik. (1969): 'Introduction' in Barth, Fredrik (ed): *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organisation of Culture Difference*, Bergen: Universitetsforlaget/London: Allen & Unwin.
- BARTHES, Roland (1993): 'Myth Today', in Sontag, Susan (ed): *A Roland Barthes Reader*, (1st English translation, 1982, by Farrar, Straus & Giroux), London: Vintage Press.
- BAUMAN, Zygmunt (1990): 'Modernity and Ambivalence', in Featherstone, M. (ed): *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity*, London: Sage.
- BECK, Ulrich (2000): *What Is Globalization?*, (original German ed. 1986, Frankfurt am Main), Cambridge: Polity Press.
- BEN-AMOS, Dan (1999): 'Afterword', in Ben-Amos, Dan & Weissberg, Liliane (eds): *Cultural Memory and the Construction of Identity*, Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press.
- BERGHE, P.L. (1978): 'Race and Ethnicity: A Sociological Perspective', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1, vol 4, Oct. 1978, 401-411.
- BERLIN, Isaiah (1990): 'The Bent Twig: On the Rise of Nationalism', in *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, London: Murray.
- BHABHA, Homi, K. (1994): 'Anxious Nations, Nervous States', in Copjec, Joan (ed.) (1994): *Supposing the Subject*, London/New York: Verso.
- BILLING, Michael (1993): 'Patriotism and Forms of Community: A Comment', in *Politics and the Individual*, Vol.3, No.2, 63-66.
- BILLING, Michael (1995): *Banal Nationalism*, London: Sage.
- BLINKTHORN M. & VEREMIS Th. (1990): *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, London: Sage/Athens: ELIAMEP.
- BOOKS, John W. (2001): 'Globalisation and Alternative Approaches to the Transformation of Nation-States: Scotland as a Test Case', in Kennedy, P. & Danks, C. (eds): *Globalisation and National Identities*, New York: Palgrave.
- BOWIE, Malcom (1991): *Lacan*, London: Fontana Press.
- BOYER, Bruce L., & BOYER, Ruth M. (1976): 'Prolonged Adolescence and Early Identification: a Cross Cultural Study', *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society*, Vol. 7, 95-106.
- BREUILLY, John (1993): *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd ed, Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press.
- BROMBERG, Norbert (1960): 'Totalitarian Ideology as a Defense Technique', *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society*, Vol. 1, 26-38.
- BROWN, James A.C. (1961): *Freud and the Post-Freudians*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- CALHOUN, Craig (1993): 'Nationalism and Ethnicity', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 19, 211-239.
- CAPUTI, Mary (1996): 'National Identity in Contemporary Theory', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 17, No 4, 683-694.
- CARNEIRO LEO, Inaura (1986): 'Identification and its Vicissitudes as Observed in Adolescence', *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 67, Part 1, 65-75.
- CASPARY, William R. (1993): 'New Psychoanalytic Perspectives on the Causes of War', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 14, No 3, 417-446.

- CASTELLS, Manuel (2000a): *The Information Age, Vol.I: The Rise of the Network Society*, 2nd ed. (1st ed, 1996), Oxford: Blackwell.
- CASTELLS, Manuel (1997): *The Information Age, Vol.II: The Power of Identity*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- CASTELLS, Manuel (2000b): *The Information Age, Vol.III: End of Millenium*, 2nd ed. (1st ed, 1996), Oxford: Blackwell.
- CASTORIADIS, Cornelius (1985): *I Fantasiaki Thesmisi tis Kinonias*, (Original publication, *L' Institution Imaginaire de la Societe*, Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1975), Athens: Rappa publications.
- CASTORIADIS, Cornelius (1999): 'I Rizos tou Misous' (Roots of Hatred), *To Vima* Newspaper, January 24, Nees Epohes, p.3.
- COHEN, Anthony P. (1982): 'Belonging: the Experience of Culture' in Cohen, Anthony P. (ed) *Belonging: Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- COLLEY, Linda (1992): *Britons, Forging the Nation: 1707-1837*, New Haven, CT, USA: Yale Univ. Press.
- CONNOR, Walker (1994): *Ethnonationalism: the Quest for Understanding*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- COOLEY, Charles H. (1902): *Human Nature and the Social Order*, New York: Scribner.
- CRAIB, Ian (1998) *Experiencing Identity*, London: Sage.
- DANKS, Catherine (2001): 'Russia in Search of Itself', in Kennedy, P. & Danks, C. (eds): *Globalisation and National Identities*, New York: Palgrave.
- DAVIS, Thomas (1999): 'Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 20, No 1, 25-47.
- DEFLEM, M. & PAMPEL, F.C. (1996): 'The Myth of Postnational Identity: Popular Support for European Unification', *Social Forces*, The Univ. of North Carolina Press, Vol. 75, No 1, September 1996, 119-143.
- DELANTY, Gerard (1995): *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, London: Macmillan.
- DEMERTZIS, Nicolas (1996): *O Logos tou Ethnikismou (The Nationalist Discourse)*, Athens: Sacoulas publications.
- DEUTSCH, Karl W. (1966): *Nationalism and Social Communication*, 2nd eddition (1st ed. 1953), Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- DUCKITT, John (1989): 'Authoritarianism and Group Identification: a New View of an Old Construct', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 10, No 1, 63-84.
- DUCLOS, Denis (2001): 'La Globalisation, Va-t-elle Unifier le Monde?', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Août 2001, pp14-15 [<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/08/DUCLOS/15541>].
- *Eleftherotypia*, 'Interview with Benjamin Barber', 18 November 2001, Simiomatario Ideon, p.36.
- ELLIOTT, Anthony (1994): *Psychoanalytic Theory: an Introduction*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- ELLIOTT, Anthony (1999): *Social Theory and Psychoanalysis in Transition*, (1st published 1992, Blackwell,), London: Free Association Books.
- ERIKSON, E. (1968): *Identity, Youth and Crisis*, New York: Norton.
- FAGAN, Honor G. (2001): 'Globalisation, Identity and Ireland', in Kennedy, P. & Danks, C. (eds): *Globalisation and National Identities*, New York: Palgrave.
- FALK, Avner (1992): 'Unconscious Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict', *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society*, Vol. 17, 213-247.
- FEATHERSTONE, Mike (1990): 'Global Culture: An Introduction', in Featherstone, M. (ed): *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity*, London: Sage.
- FLUGEL, J.C. (1946): 'The Problem of War and Peace', *The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. II, 207-229.
- FONTAINE, Nicole (2001), contribution to the debate 'The Future of Europe', [http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/contrib/cont241001_en.htm].
- FORDE, S., JOHNSON L., & MURRAY A.V. (1995): *Concepts of National Identity in the Middle Ages*, School of English, Univ. of Leeds.
- FREEDEN, Michael (1998): 'Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?', *Political Studies*, XLVI, 748-765.
- FREEMAN, Derek (1967): 'Totem and Taboo: a Reappraisal', *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society*, Vol.IV, 9-33.
- FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, Else, & SANFORD, Nevitt R. (1947): 'The Anti-Semitic Personality', *The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. III, 243-265.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1901]): *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, Vol.5, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1907]): 'Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices', in *The Origins of Religion*, Vol.13, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1908]): '"Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness', in *Civilisation, Society and Religion*, Vol.12, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1957 [1910a]): 'Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis', in the *Standard Edition*, Vol.XI, London: Hogarth Press.

- FREUD, Sigmund (1957 [1910b]): 'Leonardo Da Vinci, and a Memory of his Childhood', in *Standard Edition*, Vol.XI, London: Hogarth Press.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1911]): 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning', in *On Metapsychology*, Vol.11, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1912]): 'A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis', in *On Metapsychology*, Vol.11, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1913]): 'Totem and Taboo', in *The Origins of Religion*, Vol.13, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1914]): 'On Narcissism: An Introduction', in *On Metapsychology*, Vol.11, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1915a]): 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death', in *Civilisation, Society and Religion*, Vol.12, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1915b]): 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', in *On Metapsychology*, Vol.11, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1915c]): 'Repression', in *On Metapsychology*, Vol.11, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1915d]): 'The Unconscious', in *On Metapsychology*, Vol.11, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1917a]): 'A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams', in *On Metapsychology*, Vol.11, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1917b]): 'Mourning and Melancholia', in *On Metapsychology*, Vol.11, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1917c]): *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Vol.1, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1920]): 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', in *On Metapsychology*, Vol.11, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1921]): 'Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego', in *Civilisation, Society and Religion*, Vol.12, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1923]): 'The Ego and the Id', in *On Metapsychology*, Vol.11, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1927]): 'The Future of an Illusion', in *Civilisation, Society and Religion*, Vol.12, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1930]): 'Civilization and its Discontents', in *Civilisation, Society and Religion*, Vol.12, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1932]): 'The Acquisition and Control of Fire', in *The Origins of Religion*, Vol.13, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1933a]): 'Why War?', in *Civilisation, Society and Religion*, Vol.12, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1933b]): *New introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Vol.2, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FREUD, Sigmund (1991 [1939]): 'Moses and Monotheism', in *The Origins of Religion*, Vol.13, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- FUKUYAMA, Francis (2001): 'The West has Won', *The Guardian* Newspaper, October 11, 2001.
- GELLNER, E. (1993): *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell Press.
- GELLNER, E. (1985): *The Psychoanalytic Movement*, London: Paladin.
- GELLNER, E. (1992): *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*, London/New York: Routledge.
- GEORGIADOU V. (1995): 'Greek Orthodoxy and the Politics of Nationalism', *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, vol. 9, No 2.
- GIDDENS, Anthony (1991): *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- GIDDENS, Anthony (1999): *Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping our Lives*, London: Profile Books.
- GILLINHAM, John (1995): 'Henry of Huntington and the Twelfth Century Revival of the English Nation', in Forde, S., Johnson, L. & Murray, A.V. (eds): *Concepts of National Identity in the Middle Ages*, School of English, Univ. of Leeds.
- GINNEKEN, Jaap van (1984): 'The Killing of the Father: the Background of Freud's Group Psychology', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 5, No 3, 391-414.
- GLEASON, Philip (1983): 'Identifying Identity: a Semantic History', *Journal of American History*, 69, 910-931.
- GOFFMAN, Erving. (1983): 'The Interaction Order', *American Sociological Review*, vol.48, 1-17.

- GRANT, Susan-Mary (1997): 'Making History: Myth and the Construction of American Nationhood', in Hosking, G. and Schopflin, G. (eds): *Myths and Nationhood*, London: Hurst & Co.
- GRAY, John (1998): *False Dawn: the Delusions of Global Capitalism*, London: Granta Books.
- GREEK PEDAGOGICAL INSTITUTE (1998): 'Prokirixi Sugrafis Sholikon Vivlion Istorias' (Announcement for the Writing of History Textbooks), Athens: Pedagogical Institute, Ministry of Education.
- GREENFELD, Liah (1992): *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge-Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press.
- HABERMAS, Jurgen (1992): 'Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe', *Praxis International*, Vol. 12, No 1.
- HALL, Stuart (1991a): 'The Local and the Global: Globalisation and Ethnicity', in King, A.D. (ed): *Culture, Globalisation, and the World-System*, London: Macmillan.
- HALL, Stuart (1991b): 'Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities'. in King, A.D. (ed): *Culture, Globalisation, and the World-System*, London: Macmillan.
- HALL, Stuart (1996): 'Ethnicity, Identity, Difference', in Eley, G. and Suny, R.G. (eds): *Becoming National: a Reader*, New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
- HALLIDAY, Fred (2001): *The World at 2000*, Hampshire: Palgrave.
- HANNERZ, Ulf (1990): 'Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture', in Featherstone, M. (ed): *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity*, London: Sage.
- HART, H. H. (1947): 'Problems of Identification', *Psychiatric Quarterly*, XXI, 274-293.
- HARTMANN, H. (1951): 'The Application of Psychoanalytic Concepts to Social Science', *The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. VII, 81-87.
- HASTINGS, Adrian (1997): *The Construction of Nationhood*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- HELD, David (1989): 'The Decline of the Nation-State', in Hall, S. & Jacques, M. (eds): *New Times*, London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- HELD, David & MCGREW, Anthony (2000): 'The Great Globalization Debate: an Introduction', in Held, D. & McGrew, A. (eds), *The Global Transformations Reader*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- HIRSHBERG, Matthew S. (1993): 'The Self-Perpetuating National Self-Image: Cognitive Biases in Perceptions of International Conflict', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 14, No 1, 77-98.
- HIRST, Paul & THOMPSON, Grahame (1999): *Globalization in Question*, 2nd ed (1st ed, 1996), Cambridge: Polity Press.
- HOBSBAWN, Eric (1983a): 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in Hobsbawm, E.J. & Ranger T. (eds): *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- HOBSBAWN, Eric (1983b): 'Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914', in Hobsbawm, E.J. & Ranger T. (eds): *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- HOBSBAWN, Eric J. (1990): *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- HOBSBAWN, Eric (1996): 'Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today', in Balakrishnan Gopal (ed): *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso & New Left Review.
- HOGWOOD, Patricia (2001): 'Identity in the Former GDR: Expressions of 'Ostalgia' and 'Ossi' Pride in United Germany', in Kennedy, P. & Danks, C. (eds): *Globalisation and National Identities*, New York: Palgrave.
- HOOVER, Kenneth R. (1997): *The Power of Identity: Politics in a New Key*, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers.
- HORSMAN, M. & MARSHALL, A. (1994): *After the Nation State*, London: HarperCollins.
- HUNTINGTON, Samuel, et al (1996): *The Class of Civilizations? The Debate*, USA: Council of Foreign Relations.
- HUTCHINSON, J. (1994): *Modern Nationalism*, London: Fontana Press.
- IGNATIEFF, Michael (1993): *Blood and Belonging*, Toronto: Viking.
- JACQUES, Martin (1989): 'Britain and Europe', in Hall, S. & Jacques, M. (eds): *New Times*, London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- JENKINS, B. and SOFOS, S. (1996): 'Nation and Nationalism in Contemporary Europe: a Theoretical Perspective', in Jenkins & Sofos (eds): *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*, London: Routledge.
- JENKINS, Richard. (1996): *Social Identity*, New York: Routledge.
- KATSIKAS, Christos (2002): 'I Ikona tou Allou: i Epanastasi tou '21 sta Sholika Biblia Istorias Ekkadas kai Tourkias' (The Image of the Other: the 1921 Revolution in the History Textbooks of Greece and Turkey), *Ta Nea Newspaper*, March 23, 2002.
- JONES, Ernest (1948): 'The Genesis of the Superego', *The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. IV, 42-49.
- KEDOURIE, Elie (1994): *Nationalism*, 4th edition (originally published 1960), Oxford: Blackwell.
- KENNEDY, Paul (2001): 'Introduction: Globalisation and the Crisis of Identities?', in Kennedy, P. & Danks, C. (eds): *Globalisation and National Identities*, New York: Palgrave.
- KEOHANE, R. & NYE, J. (1977): *Power and Interdependence*, Boston: Little Brown.

- KING, Anthony D. (1991): 'Introduction: Spaces of Culture, Spaces of Knowledge', in King, A.D. (ed): *Culture, Globalisation, and the World-System*, London: Macmillan.
- KLEIN, Melanie (1988): 'On Identification', in Klein M. *Envy and Gratitude*, London: Vigaro Press.
- KOCH, Jeffrey W. (1994): 'Group Identification in Political Context', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 15, No 4, 687-698.
- KOFF, Robert H. (1961): 'A Definition of Identification: a Review of the Literature', *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 42, 362-370.
- KRISTEVA, Julia (1991): *Strangers to Ourselves*, New York/West Sussex: Columbia Univ. Press.
- KRISTEVA, Julia (1993): *Nations without Nationalism*, (original French ed. 1990, Editions Rivages), New York/West Sussex: Columbia Univ. Press.
- KYPER, Adam (1999): *Culture: the Anthropologists Account*, Cambridge-Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press.
- LACAN, Jacques (1977): *Ecrits: a Selection*, (original French ed. 1966, Paris: Edition du Seuil), London: Tavistock.
- LACAN, Jacques (1994): *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, (original French ed. 1973, Paris: Edition du Seuil), Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- LACLAU, E. (1994): *The Making of Political Identities*, London/New York: Verso.
- LANGMAN, Lauren (2001): 'Globalisation and National Identity Rituals in Brazil and the USA: the Politics of Pleasure Versus the Politics of Protest', in Kennedy, P. & Danks, C. (eds): *Globalisation and National Identities*, New York: Palgrave.
- LAPLANCHE & PONTALIS (1973): *The Language of Psycho-analysis*, London: Hogarth Univ. Press.
- LASCH, Christopher (1980): *The Culture of Narcissism*, (1st published 1978, New York: Norton), London: Abacus Press.
- LIPOWATZ, Thanos (1990): *I Psychopathologia tou Politikou* (Psychopathology of Politics), Athens: Odysseas.
- LIPOWATZ, Thanos & DEMERTZIS, Nicolas (1994): *Dokimio gia tin Ideologia* (Essay on Ideology), Athens: Odysseas.
- LITTLE, Graham (1984): 'Ambivalence, Dilemma, and Paradox: the Nature and Significance of Leader-Follower Ties, with Comments on the Leadership of Margaret Thatcher', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 5, No 4, 553-571.
- LOCKE, John (1975): 'Of Identity and Diversity', in Locke, J. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- LOEWALD, Hans W. (1962): 'The Superego and the Ego-Ideal: Superego and Time', *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 43, 264-268.
- LOMAS, Peter (1961): 'Family Role and Identity Formation', *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 42, 370-379.
- LYDON, E. James (1995): 'Nation and Race in Medieval Ireland', in Forde, S., Johnson, L. & Murray, A.V. (eds): *Concepts of National Identity in the Middle Ages*, School of English, Univ. of Leeds.
- MACDONALD, Sharon (1993): 'Identity Complexes in Western Europe: Social Anthropological Perspectives', in Macdonald Sharon (ed): *Inside European Identities*, Providence, RI: Berg.
- MANN, Michael (2000): 'Has Globalisation Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?', in Held, D. & McGrew, A. (eds): *The Global Transformations Reader*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- McKEOWN, Bruce (1984): 'Q Methodology in Political Psychology: Theory and Technique in Psychoanalytic Applications', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 5, No 3, 415-435.
- MEAD, George H. (1967): *Mind, Self and Society, from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, 2nd ed. (1st ed. 1934), Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- MILLER, David (1995): *On Nationality*, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
- MITCHELL, M. & RUSSELL, D. (1996): 'Immigration, Citizenship and the Nation-State in the New Europe', in Jenkins & Sofos (eds): *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*, London/New York: Routledge.
- MONROE, K.R. & EPPERSON, C. (1994): "'But What Else Could I Do?'" Choice, Identity and a Cognitive-Perceptual Theory of Ethical Behavior', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 15, No 2, 201-226.
- MOSCOVICI, S. (1985): *The Age of the Crowd*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Να βρω περ. Adorno 1972:....και να το βάλω ch.2, footnote 10]
- NEDERVEEN PIETERSE Jan (1995a): 'Europe Among Other Things: Closure, Culture, Identity', in Benda-Beckman & Verkuyten (eds): *Nationalism, Ethnicity and Cultural Identity in Europe*, Utrecht University: Ercomer.
- NEDERVEEN PIETERSE Jan (1995b): 'Globalization as Hybridization', in Featherstone, Lash, & Robertson: *Global Modernities*, London: Sage.
- NEDPOGAEAO, Asawin (2001): 'Global Culture in the Thai Media: the Occidental 'Other' in TV Advertisements', in Kennedy, P. & Danks, C. (eds): *Globalisation and National Identities*, New York: Palgrave.

- NOYES, D. & ABRAHAM, R. (1999): 'From Calendar Custom to National Memory: European Commonplaces', in Ben-Amos, Dan & Weissberg, Liliane (eds): *Cultural Memory and the Construction of Identity*, Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press.
- O'BYRNE, Darren J. (2001): 'On the Construction of Political Identity: Negotiations and Strategies Beyond the Nation-State', in Kennedy, P. & Danks, C. (eds): *Globalisation and National Identities*, New York: Palgrave.
- OHMAE, Kenichi (1990): *The Borderless World*, London/New York: Collins.
- OVERING, Joanna (1997): 'The Role of Myth: an Anthropological Perspective, or, the Reality of the Really Made-up', in Hosking, G. and Schopflin, G. (eds): *Myths and Nationhood*, London: Hurst & Co.
- PARIN, Paul (1988): 'The Ego and the Mechanism of Adaptation', *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society*, Vol. 11, 97-130.
- PARSONS, Talcott (1970): 'Social Structure and the Development of Personality: Freud's Contribution to the integration of Psychology and Psychology' in Smelser Neil J. & Smelser William T. (eds) *Personality and Social Systems*, New York: Wiley.
- PHINNEY, Jean S. (1990): 'Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults: Review of Research', *Psychological Bulletin*, 108, No 3, 499-514.
- PINCON, Michel & PINCON-CHARLOT, Monique (2001): 'La Dernier Class Social', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 2001 [<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/09/PINCON/15603>].
- PINGEL, Falk (2000): *The European Home: Representations of 20th Century Europe in History Textbooks*, Council of Europe Publishing, ISDN: 9287143463.
- POCOCK, J.G.A. (1997): 'Deconstructing Europe', in Gowan, Peter (ed): *The Question of Europe*, London/New York: Verso.
- POST, Jerrold M. (1986): 'Narcissism and the Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationship', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 7, No 4, 675-688.
- PRODI, Romano (2001): 'An Enlarged and More Unified Europe', speech delivered at College of Europe, Bruges, 12 November 2001 [http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/01/528%7C0%7CRAPID&lg=EN].
- PRODI, Romano (2002): 'The past and future of European integration', speech delivered at the Instituto de Espana, Madrid, 7 February 2002 [http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/02/51%7C0%7CRAPID&lg=EN&display=].
- PUNTSCHER RIEKMANN, Sonja (1997): 'The Myth of European Identity', in Hosking, G. and Schopflin, G. (eds): *Myths and Nationhood*, London: Hurst & Co.
- REICH, Robert (1991): *The Work of Nations*, New York: Simon & Schuster
- RENAN, Ernest (1996): 'What is a Nation?', in Eley, G. and Suny, R.G. (eds): *Becoming National: a Reader*, New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
- RIEFF, Philip (1960): *Freud: the Mind of a Moralist*, London: Victor Gollancz.
- ROBERTSON, Roland (1992): *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*, London: Sage.
- ROBINS, Kevin (2000): 'Encountering Globalization', in Held, D. & McGrew, A. (eds): *The Global Transformations Reader*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- RODRIG, Dani (2000): 'Has Globalization Gone Too Far?', in Held, D. & McGrew, A. (eds): *The Global Transformations Reader*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- ROSENFELD, Herbert (1962): 'The Superego and the Ego-Ideal', *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 43, 258-263.
- ROSS, Mark Howard (1995): 'Psychocultural Interpretation Theory and Peacemaking in Ethnic Conflicts', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 16, No 3, 523-544.
- SAID, Edward (1978): *Orientalism*, London: Penguin Books.
- SCHATZ, R.T., STAUD, E., & LAVINE, H. (1999): 'On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind Versus Constructive Patriotism', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 20, No 1, 151-174.
- SCHLESINGER, Paul (1992): 'Europeanness: A New Cultural Battlefield?', *Innovation*, Vol. 5, No 1.
- SCHEIDLINGER, Saul (1971): *Psychoanalysis and Group Behaviour: a Study of Freudian Group Psychology*, (1st published 1952, New York: Norton), Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press.
- SCHOPFLIN, George (1995): 'Nationalism and Ethnicity in Europe, East and West', in Kupchan, C. *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- SCHOPFLIN, George (1997): 'The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths', in Hosking, G. and Schopflin, G. (eds): *Myths and Nationhood*, London: Hurst & Co.
- SCHUTZ, Astrid (1993): 'Political Advertising and the Use of Modern Myths: a Campaign Film for Ronald Reagan, 1984', *Politics and the Individual*, Vol. 3, No 1, 95-103.
- SCOTT, Julie F. (2001): 'You and Me Against the World: Christian Fundamentalism and White Poverty in the USA', in Kennedy, P. & Danks, C. (eds): *Globalisation and National Identities*, New York: Palgrave.
- SEGELL, Glen (2001): 'Civil-Military Relations and Professional Military Identities After the Nation-State', in Kennedy, P. & Danks, C. (eds): *Globalisation and National Identities*, New York: Palgrave.

- SKLAIR, Leslie (1999): 'Globalization', in Taylor, S. (ed): *Sociology: Issues and Debates*, London: Macmillan.
- SMITH, Anthony D. (1991): *National Identity*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Press.
- SMITH, Anthony D. (1995a): *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- SMITH, Anthony D. (1995b): 'National Identities: Modern or Medieval?', in Forde, S., Johnson, L. & Murray, A.V. (eds): *Concepts of National Identity in the Middle Ages*, School of English, Univ of Leeds.
- SMITH, Anthony D. (1997): 'The "Golden Age" and National Renewal', in Hosking, G. and Schopflin, G. (eds): *Myths and Nationhood*, London: Hurst & Co.
- SMITH, D. E. (1974): *Religion and Political Modernisation*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- SOYSAL, Yasemin Nuboglu (1996): 'Changing Citizenship in Europe: Remarks on Postnational Membership and the National State', in Cesarani, D. & Fulbrook, M. (eds): *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*, London/New York: Routledge.
- SPIERING, M (1996): 'National Identity and European Unity', in Wintle, M.J. (ed): *Culture and Identity in Europe*, Aldershot: Avebury.
- SPIRO, Melford E. (1990): 'Culture and Human Nature', *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society*, Vol. 15, 17-44.
- STERN, Paul C. (1995): 'Why do People Sacrifice for their Nations?', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 16, No 2, 217-235.
- SULEIMAN, Ezra (1995): 'Is Democratic Supranationalism a Danger?', in Kupchan, C. A. (ed): *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- SZPILKA, Jaime (1999): 'Some Reflections on Identification', *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 80, Part 6, 1175-1187.
- TORRAS DE BEA, Eulalia (1989): 'Projective Identification and Differentiation', *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 70, 265-274.
- TRAISTER, Daniel (1999): '“You Must Remember This...”'; or, Libraries as a Locus of Cultural Memories', in Ben-Amos, Dan & Weissberg, Liliane (eds): *Cultural Memory and the Construction of Identity*, Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press.
- ULMAN, R.B. & ABSE, D.W. (1983): 'The Group Psychology of Mass Madness: Jonestown', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 4, No 4, 637-661.
- UNDP Report 1999 (2000): 'Globalization With a Human Face', in Held, D. & McGrew, A. (eds): *The Global Transformations Reader*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- VERHEUGEN, Günter (2001): 'Unity in Diversity: What Political Shape Should Europe Take?', speech delivered at 7th European Forum, Berlin Herbert Quandt Stiftung and Financial Times, Hotel Adlon, Berlin, 16 November 2001 [http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/doc161101_en.htm].
- VERHEUGEN, Günter (2002): 'European integration is not about changing the past but about shaping the future', speech delivered at Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Prague, 11 April 2002 [http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/02/147%7C0%7CRAPID&lg=EN&display=].
- VOLKAN, Vamic D. (1985), 'The Need to Have Enemies and Allies', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 6, No 2, 220-247.
- VOLKAN, Vamic D. (1988): *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies*, New Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc.
- WAELDER, Robert (1960): 'Characteristics of Totalitarianism', *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society*, Vol. I, 11-25.
- WALLACE, William (1990): *The Transformation of Western Europe*, London: Pinter.
- WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel (1979): *The Capitalist World-Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel (1991): 'The National and the Universal: Can There be Such a Thing as a World Culture?', in King, A.D. (ed): *Culture, Globalisation, and the World-System*, London: Macmillan.
- WEIGERT, Edith (1962): 'The Superego and the Ego-Ideal', *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 43, 269-271.
- WEIL, Patrick (1996): 'Nationalities and Citzenships: the Lessons of the French Experience for Germany and Europe', in Cesarani, D. & Fulbrook, M. (eds): *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*, London/New York: Routledge.
- WEISSBERG, Liliane (1999): 'Learning Culture', in Ben-Amos, Dan & Weissberg, Liliane (eds): *Cultural Memory and the Construction of Identity*, Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press.
- WINNICOTT, D.W. (1971): *Playing and Reality*, London: Tavistoc.
- WITTELS, Fritz (1954): 'Psychoanalysis and History: the Nibelungs and the Bible', *The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. X, 267-279.
- ZERNATTO, Guido (1944): 'Nation: the History of a Word', *The Review of Politics*, Vol.6, No3, 351-366.
- ZERUBAVEL, Yael (1995): *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of the Israeli National Tradition*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- ZIENTS, Alan, B. (1986): 'Identification and its Vicissitudes as Observed in Adolescence: Object Loss and Identification', *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 67, Part 1, 77-85.

- ZIZEK, Slavoi (1989): *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, London: Verso.
- ZIZEK, Slavoi (1990): 'Europe's Republics of Gilead', *New Left Review*, No 183, Sept.-October 1990.
- ZIZEK, Slavoi (1994): 'Is There a Cause for the Subject?', in Copjec, Joan (ed.): *Supposing the Subject*, London/New York: Verso.