The London School of Economics and Political Science

Policy Interconnections in Party Competition: Issue Linkages in 23 Countries

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Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis argues that party ideologies are made up of a series of issues that vary in the extent of their interconnections. This approach to party programmes builds on Converse's (1964) description of belief systems and on Downs' (1957) understanding of ideologies. The concept of policy interconnections, originally applied to voter preferences, can also be used to understand party ideologies. In fact, parties are likely to exhibit stronger interconnections than voters. The strength, nature and effect of policy interconnections are examined for 23 Western European and English-speaking democracies using two expert surveys and the dataset of the Comparative Manifesto Project.

Three distinctions need to be made in order to understand how party policies are interconnected. First, linkages between issues are based either on an inherent logic or on historical and sociological circumstance. Logic-based interconnections are more consistent across contexts than circumstance-based interconnections. Moreover, parties are more likely to alter policy stances on two areas simultaneously if the issues are linked through logic. Second, linkages exist for position and salience, but salience interconnections are weaker than their positional counterparts. This helps explain the strategic attraction of salience manipulation. Finally, positions can be more extreme or more moderate than the overall mean party preferences, a characteristic termed the 'degree of unusualness'. Parties are likely to stress such unusual positions, especially if they are small, niche competitors.

The findings of this thesis have important implications for the study of party competition. For example, strategies such as vote-maximization and salience manipulation are directly affected by the impact of policy interconnections. This approach therefore significantly extends existing spatial models of party competition and challenges some of their assumptions. As interconnections influence voter choice and coalition formation, there are also broader implications for political representation.

To my parents

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In his 2005 novel *Saturday*, Ian McEwan describes a competitive and emotion-filled squash game between Henry Perowne, an English surgeon, and his American colleague Jay Strauss (McEwan, 2005, p. 100). *Saturday* is, among other things, a political novel that takes on the subject of the Iraq War, and the fraught squash game takes place on 15 February 2003 – the same day as the largest march in London in opposition to the planned US-led invasion. Henry Perowne, the main character of the novel, is nervous about the impending war and not sure about his views. His American opponent, Jay Strauss, does not suffer from such uncertainties and is clearly in favour of the invasion: 'Iraq is a rotten state, a natural ally of terrorists, bound to cause mischief at some point and may as well be taken out now while the US military is feeling perky after Afghanistan. And by taken out, [Jay] insists he means liberated and democratised.'

But Jay Strauss is no raving neo-con. He is a great supporter of the National Health Service and is known for his love of children, of which he has five. As Perowne notes, 'The proposed war ... generally doesn't divide people predictably; a known package of opinions is not a reliable guide.' The Iraq War, McEwan suggests, was so troubling to Perowne in part because it did not fit into existing schemes of ideologies. Neither support for socialised medicine nor a general love of humanity was a useful heuristic. By implication, opinions on the war also cross-cut the left-right opinions that characterise political competition in most countries. Whether this is true or not is

debateable, but Ian McEwan's account nevertheless illustrates two important aspects of political ideologies.

The first is that ideologies can be summarised as packages of opinions. They are a series of views on different and distinct issues. Of course, there is more to an ideology than just a collection of opinions. As Converse (1964) argues, these views have to be coherent in some way in order to be called an ideology. Ideologies are a 'set of idea elements', but that is not enough: they also have to be 'bound together' (Gerring, 1997, p. 970). This coherence means that ideologies can often be used to predict people's views on individual topics. This predictive capacity is the second aspect of ideologies that McEwan alludes to. As Poole (2005, p. 12) notes, ideology is 'the knowledge of what goes with what'. McEwan argues that the Iraq War was so unusual a political event in part because it was difficult to predict positions from other ideological views. The implication is that in general it is possible to fit political views on issues of the day into the rest of the 'known package of opinions'.

Thinking of individual voters' political ideologies in this way is well-established in political science. One of the key contributions is Converse's 1964 study of the coherence of packages of opinion among citizens. He examines to what extent voters can be seen as ideological actors, that is, as actors who possess a minimal level of coherence and consistency in their views. Converse's work has been highly influential, and debate about the political sophistication of electorates continues (e.g., Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, 2006; Converse, 2007; Kulinski and Peyton, 2007). Importantly, Converse describes an individual's political views as a collection of positions on different issues, which are ideological if there is coherence to these views. In other words, the series of views we have on separate issues are connected in some way, perhaps through underlying values and beliefs that provide the foundation for our

individual opinions. Converse came to the conclusion, since challenged, that many people in fact hold incoherent and therefore unideological views on political matters.

The political ideologies of individual citizens have thus been described and analysed as packages of policy views. To be ideological, these views have to be characterised by their interconnections rather than mutual independence. This framework can also be applied to the programmes espoused by political parties. It is largely uncontroversial to argue that parties take decisions on their views on a series of issue areas, so that their overall programmes take the shape of a package of policy positions. However, there are two strands within political party research concerning the existence of interconnections within party ideologies. A first strand, which simplifies the argument originally made by Downs (1957), posits that political parties are motivated primarily by the prospect of electoral success. Downs (1957, p.28) thus famously argued that parties formulate policies in order to win elections instead of winning elections to implement policies. If parties care solely about their electoral success, then party ideologies are likely to be developed without regard to the linkages between issue areas. A second strand, following arguments made by Wittman (1973, 1983), takes the opposing view. Here, parties are 'solely interested in policy and ... winning elections is just a means to an end' (Wittman, 1973, p. 495). If parties are policy-motivated and sincere, then their ideologies will exhibit the strong interconnections also found among politically sophisticated citizens. Within the literature on party ideologies there are thus two poles with opposing views on the existence of interconnections in party programmes.

In this thesis, I argue that the ideologies of political parties are packages of *interconnected* opinions and views. Indeed, parties may be more likely than voters to strive for coherence among their policy positions. There are three reasons for this. First,

parties gain electoral benefits from presenting themselves to voters as ideological actors. Without a coherent programme, parties will arguably find it difficult to credibly commit to implementing promised polices (Hinich and Munger, 1994). This means that parties may not be able to convince voters they will actually implement what they promise unless they can show that an ideological commitment underlies their programme. A coherent and consistent programme may also help to attract committed activists. Conversely, appearing inconsistent and incoherent is potentially dangerous: voters are likely to punish parties that present inconsistent and contradictory programmes to the public (Downs, 1957). Political parties thus often present themselves as expressly ideological actors who aim to realise specific goals in accordance with sincerely held beliefs. Even if this is just a facade, parties will act as if it were true because an ideology has such clear electoral rewards. A second reason why parties are more likely to be ideologically coherent than voters is that parties tend to discuss and debate their overall policy programme at length, which means that clearly illogical views are likely to be changed. Finally, the policy-makers in parties are well-educated, highly specialised elites – precisely the kind of people who tend to think in ideologically coherent terms (Converse, 1964).

Of course, parties are not unitary actors, which make them very different from voters. For example, parties will not suffer from the 'cognitive dissonance' that ideological incoherence might create in voters. Nevertheless, there is sufficient reason to believe that party programmes can be characterised as packages of connected policy positions, and that these connections are in fact stronger than among voters.

With regard to policy interconnections the distinction in the literature between vote- and policy-seeking parties is therefore largely a false one. Parties that desire electoral success have a significant incentive to present coherent, simple programmes to

the public, so that their individual policy positions will be interconnected. In addition, Downs (1957) discusses at length why it makes strategic sense for vote-seeking parties to at least appear to be pursuing the realisation of sincere ideological preferences. On the other hand, parties that only want to implement their favoured policies will discuss their programme at length internally and exhibit the tight interconnections that are characteristic of elite actors. Parties will thus act ideologically whether their fundamental motivation is winning elections or implementing policy.

This thesis therefore argues that parties' views on different issues will be interconnected, as expected of ideological actors. However, the precise nature of these linkages also needs to be examined. There are two aspects to this line of inquiry. First, it is worth knowing how particular issues in political competition are linked to each other – say, for example, economic policy and the environment. Second, there may also be systematic patterns that underlie the ways in which issue positions are interconnected. The first part of the research question of this thesis is thus: 'How are issues within party ideologies interconnected?'

The linkages between the policy views that make up a party's package of opinions may also have an effect on how parties compete, and this is why policy interconnections matter. Mainly, they can act as a constraint on the freedom of political parties, further limiting Downsian vote-maximising strategies. Some combinations of policy positions may be unlikely or unattractive to a party because they entail tolerating a certain level of incoherence. In addition, if an issue is strongly interconnected with others, then a party may be less able to move on that issue than it wishes. The full research question of this thesis is then: 'How are issues within party ideologies interconnected, and how does this affect party competition?'

The characteristics and effects of policy interconnections

In this thesis, I build on Converse's framework for thinking about ideologies in order to construct a theory of policy interconnections for political parties. I therefore suggest that party ideologies can be deconstructed into individual issue components and their links to each other. In other words, the overall ideological profile of a political party is an issue system made up of a series of elements that vary in the extent to which they are interconnected. The components of these issue systems have two aspects: a position and a given salience. If each element represents a distinct issue or policy area that a political party has a stance on, then each such component contains information regarding the precise view of the party (i.e. its position) and how important it thinks this topic is (i.e. its salience).[1] This view of issue systems combines the spatial and the salience models of party competition (Downs, 1957; Budge and Farlie, 1983), in line with other recent work on party strategies (e.g. Meguid, 2008).

I highlight three characteristics of policy interconnections. The first two apply Converse's distinction between static and dynamic linkages to party ideologies. To Converse, an ideological voter is characterised by two features: first, it is possible to predict her position on one issue by her position on other issues, and second, if she changes her views on one topic she will also change her stance on other, closely related matters. Converse calls these two aspects of ideological coherence 'static' and 'dynamic' interconnections. It is also possible to apply these concepts to the issue systems of political parties. A static interconnection between two policy areas thus means that it is possible to predict a party's position on one of those issues from its stance on the other. The existence of a dynamic interconnection will cause a party to

[1] In this thesis, some words will be used interchangeably in order to avoid repetition. This applies to 'policy area', 'issue' and 'topic', which I take to mean the same thing, and to 'interconnections', 'linkages' and 'ties'.

change its views on two issues at the same time and in a similar way. While static interconnections refer to one point in time, their dynamic counterparts are concern changes in party policy. The third characteristic introduced in this thesis is the unusualness of issue positions. A position is unusual to the extent to which it is more extreme or more centrist than the party's general average stance. Due to its outlier character, it is difficult to predict an unusual position from the party's overall policy profile, so unusualness is a concept linked to static interconnections.

Not all interconnections are the same. While they of course vary in strength, another important difference is the source of the linkage. Again following Converse's (1964) work, I suggest that there are two types of interconnection sources: logic and circumstance. Logic-based interconnections are those where there is an inherent link between the two policy areas. Milyo (2000) gives the well-known example of a budget constraint: increased expenditure on guns may require spending less on butter. Circumstance is a more complicated basis for interconnections. The reasons behind this type of linkage lie in the connections forged by history and society. For example, the ties between two positions may simply be *perceived* as logically necessary (Converse, 1964). Poole argues that in the United States the link between gun control and abortion rights in an example of such a perceived logical connection (Poole, 2005). Another possibility is that some views tend to co-occur within certain segments of society, leading them to be associated with one another. A possible example for this are views on New Politics issues: Green parties tend to be in favour of liberal immigration rules and tight environmental regulation, but the ties between these positions are probably more due to the origins of this movement among well-to-do urban strata than any inherent logical connection. Differentiating between logic and circumstance as sources of interconnections is important because logic-based linkages are by their very nature

stronger. They are thus more likely to re-appear across different contexts and are more likely to be dynamic as well as static.

Policy interconnections have four key consequences for party competition. First, issues differ in the extent they are statically interconnected. This means that the range of positions a party can take on one issue varies depending on its position on a second issue. Some issues are therefore more flexible than others, and parties are then freer to take up or change position on such policy areas. Issue pairs without connections are the most flexible, followed first by those connected through circumstance and finally those linked by logic. Second, issues vary in the extent they are dynamically interconnected, that is, how much movement or policy change on two topics is correlated. Again, dynamic interconnections limit a party's freedom of policy choice. Dynamic interconnections are more likely if the static interconnection is based on logic. Third, salience interconnections are in general weaker than position interconnections. This means that parties are freer in terms of salience choices than they are when it comes to deciding on their position. Finally, parties emphasise those issues that are unusually extreme within their overall package of positions. This reflects a need to carve out an electoral niche and develop a unique profile. Consequently, it is mainly small parties who engage in this strategic behaviour. While the first two consequences thus refer mainly to limitations on vote-maximising behaviour, the second two relate salience change to issue interconnections.

Policy interconnections are of course not the same for all parties. They may depend on the particular historical context of the country or party family and can also change over time. This applies in particular to circumstance-based interconnections, which grow out of the specific historical and social context of a party. Logic-based linkages should, on the other hand, remain relatively constant across time, countries and

party families. In this thesis, I take these various differences into account. Nevertheless, the main aim is to look at broad, cross-national patterns in the nature of issue systems. I thus focus on the similarities rather than the differences across contexts.

In accordance with this aim, my empirical approach uses two datasets that provide information on a series of issues. The first source of data is two expert surveys carried out by Laver and Hunt in 1989 and by Benoit and Laver in 2002-3 (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Benoit and Laver, 2006). These expert surveys contain positional and salience information for six issues, four of which were asked in both rounds. The second source of data is the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2007). This large cross-national research endeavour has analysed party manifestos since 1945 using a single coding scheme. I extract party positions and issue salience for ten issues based on the 56 categories coded. This dataset, although more complex in structure than the expert surveys, provides an important across-time element that allows me to examine party policy change in detail. In total, I consider party positions and issue salience in 23 countries (mainly located in Western Europe and the English-speaking world). Throughout the thesis, the findings from the two data sources are compared, with consistent results taken as strong support for my theoretical arguments (Marks, 2007).

Theoretical contributions

This thesis contributes most clearly to the study of party competition: it furthers the debate on the nature of political ideologies and suggests additional considerations that affect the strategic behaviour of political parties. The claims advanced here also have relevance for the broader study of political representation, as issue interconnections can

limit the freedom of choice of voters and can influence coalition formation and thus public policy outcomes.

First, the theory of issue interconnections as applied to political parties makes an important theoretical contribution to the study of party ideologies. It is not usual to present ideologies as issue systems made up of variously connected components. However, I argue that this is a simple and useful way of understanding what a party's ideology actually *is*. This thesis therefore provides an answer ('a package of interconnected policy positions') to a constitutive question ('what is a party ideology?'), and the answer in itself sets the foundation for an explanation of party behaviour (Wendt, 1998). Conceiving of party ideologies as issue systems is built on Converse's framework designed for voter beliefs, but it is also relevant for Downs' (1957) suggestions concerning the ideological coherence of political parties.

Even though Downs is now often seen as a rational-choice scholar with simple vote-seeking assumptions concerning the motives and behaviour of political actors, a re-reading of his 1957 work shows that his understanding of ideology is relatively complex. Ideology, which he defines as 'a verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society' (1957: 96), is first and foremost a useful 'cost-saving device' (1957: 99). Voters thus use ideologies to decide which party to support without having to find out information on all the party's positions. This means that parties can try to fashion an ideology that will generate electoral success. To attract votes, parties need to be 'responsible and reliable' (Downs 1957: 109). As a result, it is rational for parties to exhibit a certain consistency in their policies: 'Any party which is both responsible and reliable will probably have an ideology which is relatively coherent and immobile' (ibid.). In sum, Downs provides a vote-seeking motivation for programmatic coherence.

Downs' approach to ideology has remained relatively under-employed in political science research, with the work of Hinich and Munger a notable exception (Munger and Hinich, 1993; Hinich and Munger, 1994; Hinich and Munger, 2008). Mostly, however, the vote-seeking approach has been taken to indicate non-ideological party behaviour, and party programmes in this simplified view would not be characterised by issue linkages. The policy interconnections approach to party ideologies presented in this thesis builds on Downs' claims regarding the attractions and consequences of ideologies and suggests that party programmes will be characterised by interconnections whether they are motivated by policy implementation or by electoral success. Those who assume parties and politicians to be policy-motivated, such as Wittman (1973, 1983), would undoubtedly agree that party ideologies are characterised by policy interconnections, but linkages between issue areas should also develop if we assume parties to be mainly interested in increasing their vote share. A pure vote-seeking approach that ignores the fact that a party will develop policy interconnections is not an accurate representation of party preferences and behaviour. Instead, party programmes are ideologies in the sense defined by Converse (1964): they are packages of interconnected policy programmes.

The policy interconnections approach is related to studies of party system dimensionality. This term refers to the number of underlying conflicts that are needed to adequately summarise the distribution of policy positions of political parties on all salient issues. For example, it is often argued that many countries have two-dimensional party systems, with economic issues on the first dimension and issues related to liberalism and authoritarianism on the second (Kitschelt, 1994; Hooghe et al., 2002). The conceptual underpinning of issue interconnections is similar to that of party system dimensionality, with both based, for example, on a spatial model of party competition.

However, dimensionality is a system-wide concept, while issue interconnections refer to the ideologies of each party individually. The level of analysis in this thesis is therefore lower. Nevertheless, there are important connections between these two concepts. In particular, dimensionality may affect the circumstance-based interconnections present within party ideologies, while issue systems can influence the nature and evolution of party system dimensionality. This thesis therefore contributes to the dimensionality literature by providing a related but lower-level analysis and suggesting a further cause for the level of dimensionality and its change.

The second theoretical contribution of this thesis relates to the strategic behaviour of political parties. The two key debates addressed are the limits to Downsian vote-maximising strategies and the use of salience as an electoral tool. Downs (1957) suggests that parties' main and even overriding goal is to win votes. For example, he argues that this is the primary reason they formulate an ideology at all. However, this very simple approach to party goals has been nuanced in the years since 1957 (Grofman, 2004). Famously, the number of party goals has been extended to include office and policy (Budge and Laver, 1986; Strom, 1990). In addition, the relatively strong assumptions underlying Downs' model have been relaxed. Modifications that have been suggested include probabilistic voting (Cox, 1987; Hinich and Munger, 1997) and the influence of party activists (Aldrich, 1983; Laver, 1997; Schofield, 2003) and of campaign donors (Miller and Schofield, 2003).

These party goals are important because they also provide different explanations for why parties move – or fail to do so. While Downsian vote-maximising strategies would appear to mean that parties will move wherever there are votes to be had, Downs' own conception of ideology, as described above, means that there is a certain rationality to sticking to previous commitments and remaining relatively immobile.

Party activists and campaign donors may also tear parties away from pure vote-maximising strategies by insisting that their programme be realised. As Downs himself acknowledged, his prediction of median convergence does not hold in multi-party settings, which of course make up the majority of party systems in the world. Finally, niche parties may have a particular incentive to carve out their own political home within a party system, and this is often located far from the party-political median (Meguid, 2005; Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008b).

This thesis adds to this debate by providing a further reason why parties cannot pursue pure vote-maximising strategies. The dynamic interconnections between issues mean that parties cannot move on each issue at will. Instead, they will have consequences for other policy positions within the party's programme. If the party fails to adapt its overall ideological package accordingly, it may gain a reputation as an incoherent and inconsistent actor – and, as Downs argues, this is electorally disadvantageous. Unless a party is therefore willing to carry out policy change on the series of tightly interconnected issues, it will be reluctant to maximise votes.

The policy interconnections approach also has relevance for the role of salience within party strategies. The salience theory of party competition was originally suggested as an alternative to the Downsian spatial model, with the main argument being that parties tend to 'talk past each other' when they compete, instead of confronting each other over specific policy choices (Budge and Farlie, 1983). In the salience model, parties thus stress those topics on which they have an electoral advantage and de-emphasise those on which they are weak. Recently, there has been a revival of interest in salience as a feature of party competition, though this time it is generally integrated into the spatial model (Meguid, 2008; Tavits, 2008; Libbrecht et al., 2009; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009).

This thesis adds to this recent renewal of interest in two ways. First, I suggest that it is right to see salience as a more flexible element of party strategies than position (Petrocik, 1996; Steenbergen and Scott, 2004). In other words, salience interconnections are generally weaker than position interconnections. This means that parties face fewer constraints when trying to modify the salience levels of individual issues. Second, certain issue positions are more likely to be stressed than others. In particular, there is a strong incentive for some parties to emphasise unusually extreme views (as defined above). I therefore provide an additional explanation for varying salience levels by considering the place of the relevant policy position within the party's overall profile. This argument also ties into the examination of Downsian vote-maximising strategies, as the emphasis on unusually extreme issues goes against the predictions that this most simple approach to party goals would make.

Finally, this thesis also has relevance outside the field of party competition research. In particular, it affects the possibility of political representation through parties (Pitkin, 1972; Stimson et al., 1995; Miller et al., 1999; Powell, 2000). In this process, parties stand between voters on the one hand and governments and policy outputs on the other. Policy interconnections in party ideologies limit both the freedom of choice open to voters as well as the process of coalition formation.

Issue interconnections limit voter choice because they restrict the number of policy combinations that are likely to be presented to voters. If voting took place on each policy area or even each individual topic separately, issue interconnections would not be a restriction. However, in representative democracy the choices open to voters are essentially package deals (Thomassen, 1999, p. 34), so that it becomes important how parties are likely to combine different issue positions into a whole programme that is then presented to voters. If, as I have argued, the tendency towards interconnections

is stronger within parties than within voters, then issue linkages provide a further restriction on the types of choices voters can make. This problem is akin to that posed by low dimensionality. In small party systems, it is no surprise that competition will take place on relatively few dimensions. However, larger party systems could feasibly create more complex dimensionality, but this is rarely the case (Miller et al., 1999; Benoit and Laver, 2006). Policy interconnections could provide one reason for the relatively simple choices presented to voters, in addition to factors such as the usefulness of left-right as a heuristic device and the low political sophistication of voters. The flipside of this simplicity is of course that more unusual or complex constellations of preferences among voters will not find representation easily.

Issue interconnections can also influence processes of coalition formation and thus the resulting policy outputs. The effects are here less direct than the limitation on voter choices but are nevertheless possible. For one, issue interconnections influence party system dimensionality, as noted above. The dimensionality of a party system is important in shaping the likelihood and attractiveness of various coalitions and in increasing the complexity of the process. For example, a major feature of theoretical debate has been the underlying instability of coalition of multidimensional spaces (McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1978) as well as solutions to that problem (Laver and Shepsle, 1995; Adams and Adams, 2000). If issue interconnections are important for understanding party system dimensionality, then they also have consequences for our understanding of coalition formation. The interconnections between issues may also influence which coalition partners appear attractive to a party in search of parliamentary support. If the two parties fit well except for their opposing positions on one issue, the two parties' amenability to compromise on that topic may depend on how closely it is integrated to these parties' overall policy profile.

Empirical contributions

This thesis has relevance beyond its theoretical contributions to the study of party competition and political representation. In particular, it adds empirical knowledge to two areas of party-political research: first, it maps in detail the static and dynamic issue interconnections for position and salience as well as the occurrence of 'unusual' issue positions, and second, it presents a way of measuring party positions on a series of issues over time using the Comparative Manifesto Project.

First, this research maps the connections between the distinct issues in party competition. The contribution here is twofold. First, it is established to what extent party ideologies can be described as packages of interconnected policy positions. It is not uncontroversial within the literature on party ideologies to argue that parties possess coherent, well-structured ideologies. This debate is evident in the aforementioned contrast between vote- and policy-seeking parties (Downs, 1957; Witmann, 1973, 1983). The empirical work in this thesis explicitly considers how distinct issues within parties' policy programmes are interconnected. The ties between issues are examined from a number of different and innovative angles. The main body of my empirical work concentrates on measuring static and dynamic interconnections for both position and salience across 23 countries. In examining static linkages, party ideologies are analysed at lower levels of aggregation: the differences between the economic left and right, between party families and between families of nations are thus considered in detail. Finally, this research concludes with an assessment of the existence of 'unusual' issue preferences, defined as positions that are relatively extreme or moderate compared to the party's mean position. Second, the range of issues included in my analysis is very broad, and as a result the amount of empirical information provided consequently large. In the expert surveys, I consider a minimum of six issues for each of the two years,

while in the manifestos I cover ten distinct policy areas. The empirical mapping of linkages between issues is therefore the first major empirical contribution of this thesis.

Second, this thesis develops a way of measuring party positions on ten issues using existing manifesto data. The Comparative Manifesto Project has been the subject of continued debate concerning its usefulness as a source of information on party positions. While the dataset provides a wealth of information due to its breadth of coverage both in terms of parties included and of the categories coded, the measurement approach, which is based on the salience theory of party competition, does not provide direct information on party positions. However, it is this information which most political science research would require. As a result, a variety of methods have been developed that relatively successfully extract left-right positions from the manifesto data (Budge and Laver, 1992a; Laver and Garry, 2000; Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006). They have been cross-validated with other sources of information, with generally satisfactory results, and have been used to investigate a variety of research questions. Despite its imperfections, the CMP data therefore has gained a measure of respectability as a source of left-right policy positions.

Given the nature of my research topic, a simple left-right measure is of course not useful. However, the CMP data has not generally been seen as a possible source of information on positions beyond the left-right dimension (Dalton, 2009, p. 165), and even the left-right measure has been criticised (Pelizzo, 2003; Benoit and Laver, 2006). As part of the research into policy interconnections, I propose a way of using the CMP data to measure and use positional information on ten issue areas. The approach builds on the subtractive left-right method suggested by Budge and Laver (1992a) and on the salience measurement carried out by Stoll (Stoll, 2005, 2008). Using this approach, the CMP can provide information on ten issues ranging from economic policy and liberal-

authoritarianism to urban-rural relations and education. This new method of analysing CMP data is the main methodological advance of this research.

Plan of the thesis

This thesis is made up of two theoretical and five empirical chapters, with a conclusion that sums up my findings and provides ideas for future research. The first two chapters contain the main theoretical contribution. Chapter 2 places this research into the context of the existing literature and provides the motivation for this study. First, it describes and justifies the use of the spatial model of party competition, which underlies most of the arguments made in this thesis. Second, it outlines the concepts of issue constraints and interconnections and provides reasons why it should be applied to party ideologies. Finally, this first chapter also addresses the theory of party system dimensionality, a concept closely related to that of policy interconnections.

Chapter 3 builds on this groundwork and presents the theory of policy interconnections in party competition. It begins with a definition of issue systems and static and dynamic interconnections before considering the probable patterns of variation between parties – for example by left and right, by country and by party family, as well as within issue systems – for example between position and salience or across time. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how policy interconnections influence party competition, especially in terms of party system dimensionality, Downsian vote-maximization, citizen choices and policy outcomes.

Chapter 4 considers the advantages and disadvantages of different measurement approaches of issue interconnections. The issues contained in the two expert surveys and the party manifestos, the two sources of position and salience information used in this thesis, are then described in detail.

Chapter 5 maps the existence of static interconnections, both across the 23 countries in the aggregate as well as by economic left and right, by party family and by family of nations.

Chapter 6 uses the information on static interconnections to predict the existence of dynamic linkages. First, however, I present in detail how Downsian vote-maximising strategies by political parties can be restricted by dynamic interconnections and then map them, again using expert surveys and party manifestos. The results are compared to the findings on static interconnections, with particular attention paid to the difference between logic- and circumstance-based linkages.

Chapter 7 applies the theory of policy interconnections to salience. First, the salience theory of party competition is described, followed by an assessment of the applicability of policy interconnection theory to its study. I then map static and dynamic interconnections for salience using expert surveys and party manifestos.

Chapter 8 provides a different way of looking at the place of issue positions within policy profiles of political parties. It considers policy interconnections by examining the 'unusualness' of a party's position on an issue compared to its mean position on all other issues. After empirically mapping this phenomenon, I consider whether parties increase their emphasis on policy areas where their positions are more unusual within their overall profile. Relative extremeness and relative centrism are compared and the institutional influences on this party behaviour assessed. The effect of unusualness on salience is assessed in a cross-sectional analysis as well as over time.

Finally, in the Conclusion I tie together the theoretical and empirical findings and summarise the core arguments in the light of the results as a whole. I finish by considering how this work has furthered and challenged existing research and by outlining possible ways this topic could be investigated further.

Chapter 2

Constraints and dimensionality in party competition

Anybody who spends any time at all paying attention to political events will develop opinions on a whole range of topics: for example, an individual may oppose the invasion of Iraq, support the removal of the inheritance tax and also believe that the European Union is a bureaucratic behemoth. The development of opinions and positions, sophisticated or not, is a constant process in any political system. If there is an underlying consistency to these positions, it is possible to say that an ideology forms the basis and provides the source for the different opinions professed (Converse, 1964; Gerring, 1997). Issue positions are not created anew with each topic that emerges on the agenda; instead, there is a fundamental belief system from which opinions spring. In other words, our opinions are often linked to one another. For parties, too, issue positions are not independent, but are formed and persist in an environment characterised by significant constraints. In fact, these constraints may be stronger for parties than for voters.

This chapter presents three key approaches to studying political ideologies, each of which contributes to the theoretical basis of the present research: the spatial theory of party competition, individual-level issue constraints and party system dimensionality. The spatial theory of party competition is the foundation of any examination of ideological constraints. Though this theory is by now well-established, it may at first glance appear surprising that complex policy views can be summarized as numbers on a

scale. I thus begin this chapter by explaining why it is possible to conceive of issue positions as numerical locations within a geometrical, 'Euclidean' space.

I then move on to consider how the links between issue areas have been examined at the level of voters and of party systems. The concept of issue constraints has so far only been directly applied to individual-level research, but I argue that it can be usefully employed to study party ideologies and programmes as well. Here, I consider in detail the reasons why issue constraints should exist within packages of party positions.

Finally, the links between issues in party competition have so far been analysed mainly using the concept of dimensionality, which applies the idea of issue constraints to the level of the political system. The focus of this thesis is not on party systems but rather on the attributes of particular parties and of specific policy interconnections, but the findings concerning dimensionality will provide a first indication of how different issue areas are linked. In this section, my discussion is centred on the approaches used to determine the dimensionality of party systems and on the various suggestions concerning the number and content of dimensions.

Issue positions as numerical locations: the spatial theory of party competition

One of the main foundations of this thesis is the spatial theory of party competition. According to this approach, parties compete by choosing positions on political issues, and these positions can be represented spatially. This means that it is possible to transform the policy stances of political parties into comparable numerical values. For example, using a scale from 1 to 9, a party at 5 would be in the political centre. A party at 3 or 7 would be equally distant from the political centre, but to different sides (the

'left' and the 'right'). Hotelling (1929) is generally credited with introducing into academic debate the idea that parties can be located along a single continuum; he also argued that they should converge on the median position of that dimension. He used the example of a small town where all the houses are situated along the main highway; given this set-up, the best location for two grocery stores would be adjacent to each other in the centre of town. Hotelling (1929, pp. 54-5) explicitly saw political competition between two parties as analogous. His approach was picked up by others (Smithies, 1941; Black, 1948, 1958), but it was Downs' (1957) *Economic Theory of Democracy* that really established spatial approaches to party competition in political science. Since then, it has become the foundation for most analyses of party politics.

The transformation of complex political debates into numerical scores can at first sight appear unusual and simplistic. Two objections could be made: politics is not a matter of geometry and it is too complex to be summarised in such simple terms. However, there is good reason to believe that the spatial approach actually reflects the way humans think about complex and abstract matters. Recent analyses of human cognition indicate that we tend to think in concepts borrowed from Newtonian mechanics (McGinn, 2007). Categories such as space, time and motion underlie much of our analysis of events and frame our thinking. It is likely that we see party politics in similar ways, so the spatial analysis of party competition reflects an instinctive cognitive approach to understanding politics. Indeed, it has become natural to say that a party is 'to the left' of another or moved 'too far right' to win the election. Geometrical and numerical comparison is an instinctive way of thinking about how parties compete.

Moreover, it is no surprise that complex political debates can be simplified into simple spatial terms. Poole (2005) gives a detailed explanation of the cognitive limitations that lead people to reduce the great number of possible issues to a reduced

'basic space' with just one or two dimensions. Even if party elites could cope with the demands of a complex political world, this would not apply to voters (Downs, 1957). More precisely, there may be three reasons why parties reduce the complexity of their ideological offering: first, voters may find it difficult or impossible to process highly multidimensional information ('cognitive limitations'); second, they may not be willing to spend the time and energy to understand complex platforms ('cognitive costs'); and third, parties have limited resources to transmit their position to voters ('advertising costs') (Ferejohn, 1993, p. 112). Parties therefore have an incentive to simplify their political programmes into relatively clear and straightforward terms.

Of course, most research using the spatial theory of party competition does not restrict itself to very simple assessments of party positions which, for example, only state that one party is to the left or to the right of another. Instead, actual scores are usually assigned to each party, as indicated above, and this means that parties are seen as acting within a well-defined geometrical space. It is unlikely that voters regularly think of party positions in numerical terms, and even party elites may have a difficult time reducing complex views to a single number. However, this step from a general yet vague spatial approach to a clear-cut numerical world is not as far-fetched as it may seem. The numerical scores should only be seen as an approximation of real party positions, but one that can be surprisingly accurate. Moreover, the use of such detailed spatial models and testing has proved itself through a great number of empirical applications. The spatial understanding of party competition has found application in studies of voting behaviour and parliamentary politics and has yielded theoretically grounded, substantial results. For example, including policy distances has been consistently found to help explain voter preferences and voter choice (Clarke et al., 2004; Duch and Stevenson, 2008), while parliamentary behaviour has been found to be

related to the legislator's spatial location (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Hix et al., 2007). In other words, the spatial theory works. As a result, it is possible to conclude that geometrical, numerical spatial models provide a firm foundation for the study of party competition.

While this thesis builds on the spatial theory of party competition, I do not argue that parties *only* compete by taking up positions on geometrical ('Euclidean') dimensions. Instead, this is just one of parties' possible actions, even if it is one of their most important choices. Apart from spatial positioning, parties also take decisions regarding the importance or salience of each political topic in their programme (Budge and Farlie, 1983). This feature of party competition is also addressed at length in this thesis and provides the focus of two chapters. Beyond policy competition, parties also try to gain a competency (or 'valence') advantage over their competitors (Stokes, 1963). Finally, it is even possible that political parties may simply hope that the fact that their candidate is more likeable, trustworthy or good-looking will boost electoral results. In line with recent research on party competition, I do not claim that one theory perfectly captures the nature and outcomes of political conflict. Instead, spatial positioning is just one – but an important – feature of how parties compete, and can usefully combined with other approaches (Kriesi et al., 2006; Meguid, 2008; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009).

Issue constraints among voters and parties

Parties therefore compete at least partly by taking up positions on political issues. A party needs to decide on its stance on each politically relevant topic. In this thesis, I consider the extent to which these decisions are in fact independent and argue that it is unlikely that political parties are able to choose freely which position to take on each

issue. Instead, parties are constrained in the way they combine stances on different policy areas. The idea of 'issue constraints' is taken from research into voter ideology (Converse, 1964) but can be applied to political parties. In fact, it may be that this concept actually has greater relevance for parties than for voters.

Voter preferences and issue constraints

This concept of 'issue constraints' as the key characteristic of coherent ideologies was first suggested by Converse (1964), who examined 'belief systems' among mass and elite publics. A belief system is 'a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence' (1964, p. 207). In other words, constraints are the defining feature of belief systems, as they produce ideological coherence and consistency. Only if constraints exist can we say that a voter has a real ideology. Poole summarises the idea of constraints in simple terms: 'ideology is the knowledge of what goes with what' (2005, p. 12). Constraints are useful as they make it easier to interpret a complex reality. The more highly constrained political issues are, the more simply they can be summarised. At the extreme, single words – Converse suggests 'liberalism' and 'conservatism' – can transmit an extraordinary amount of information to the voter (Converse, 1964, p. 214).

To Converse, there are two aspects to issue constraints. First, in a static context, they 'may be taken to mean the success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual holds a specific attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes' (1964, p. 207). For example, if we know that an American voter is in favour of abortion, we would also suspect that he or she would be in favour of gay marriage and against the death penalty. Second, in a dynamic context, constraints imply that changes in one element of a belief system 'would psychologically require, from the

point of view of the actor, some compensating change(s) in the status of idea-elements elsewhere in the configuration' (1964, p. 208).

Where do these constraints come from? They spring from two sources: logic and circumstance. First, issue positions can be constrained because there is a logical connection between the two policy areas. Such constraints are therefore innate characteristics of the issue themselves. Two examples may help to illustrate this source of interconnection. First, we can think of a situation characterised by a budget constraint. Thus, the links between 'government revenues, government expenditures and budget balance' can be seen as the result of logical association (Converse, 1964, p. 209; see also Milyo, 2000). When there is a restriction on the amount of money that can be spent, then there is necessarily a logical connection between two issues that require public expenditure: in the classic example, guns and butter. The second way we can think of logical sources of interconnections is by reference to underlying values. Finer (1987) and Bobbio (1996) both identified an economic and a liberty dimension to political ideologies. For them, all issues within each of those two dimensions are logically linked. This means that all politically relevant topics are related to either economic or liberty, and our views on each topic stems from our underlying ideological stance on one of these two dimensions. Of course, which issues are linked in terms of logic can be a matter of debate: it is unlikely that everyone will agree which issues are tied in terms of logic and which are not.

The second source of constraints identified by Converse is circumstance. These are constraints that exist through processes that are not clearly and relatively uncontroversially linked to an inherent logic that connects the two issues. According to Converse, the two sources of circumstantial constraints are quasi-logic and society.

'Quasi-logical' sources of constraint are based on the consequences of 'cogent argument': these constraints spring not strictly from logic but have merely been *experienced* as 'logically constrained clusters of ideas' (Converse, 1964, p. 210). A truly logical interconnection means that that a position on one issue necessarily has to be combined with a certain position on a second issue. In the case of quasi-logical associations, this consequence is less stringent even though convincing arguments may underlie the interconnection. One example of this phenomenon is found in the United States: while the Democrats are generally against restrictions on personal liberties, e.g. abortion and divorce, they are in favour of strong gun control (Poole, 2005, p. 203). The same fundamental argument – individual freedom – could be seen as the value underlying support for both abortion rights and liberal gun laws. However, Democrats may prize more highly the freedom of living in a gun-free society. Quasi-logic constraints are based on well-founded arguments, but unlike logical constraints the direction of the ties is not well-defined. Thus, liberalism can serve as a justification for both restrictive and liberal gun laws; the actual nature of the link to abortion views is therefore less stringent and context-dependent. The historical evolution of the issues in the United States means that the constraints on these two issues have developed in opposite directions and are quite strong. The ties between issue positions eventually become 'quasi-logical' because citizens view the two issue positions as naturally associated, even if their actual basis is possibly up for debate.

Social issue constraints do not spring from logical or even quasi-logical sources. According to Converse (1964, p. 211), there are instead two ways in which social issue constraints can come into being. First, some views simply tend to co-occur due to the characteristics of certain segments of society. Each of these niches has specific interests and sources of information, so issue positions will become linked even without logical

or quasi-logical necessity. For example, Green parties tend to be both strongly in favour of environmental protection and of liberal immigration and integration laws. The connection between the two is not strictly logical, but perhaps not surprising due to the social origins of environmental movements in well-to-do and well-educated social strata. Second, constraints are a result of the diffusion of ideologies within each social segment. Elites in each niche develop certain packages of beliefs that are then spread among all members of that segment. They eventually see these packages as 'necessary wholes'. Patterns of ideological beliefs become self-perpetuating over time due to the parties' need to appear credible and responsible and because of the path-dependent development of party programmes (Downs, 1957; Knight, 1992; Marks and Wilson, 2000). There is clearly some overlap between Converse's social and quasi-logical sources of constraints. However, what distinguishes merely social from quasi-logical constraints is the absence of even a perceived logical link between the two issues.

The central distinction remains that between logical and non-logical ties between two issues. In the first case, there is some stable, inherent and almost incontrovertible linkage between views on two topics. In contrast, non-logical ties – be they quasi-logical or social – stem from circumstance. The ties in this case are historically and socially contingent. In sum, constraints can be distinguished by the existence or absence of logical ties between the two issues in question, and this distinction is a key way of understanding differences between policy interconnections.

Sources of constraints on party ideologies

It is not obvious that political parties should be constrained in their ideologies. After all, they are not unitary actors: we should beware of the danger of anthropomorphising parties and expecting similar cognitive mechanisms to operate for parties in the same

way as they operate for individuals. Moreover, there is no direct reason why purely vote-seeking parties should care whether their policy programmes is appropriately interconnected or not. In a simplified Downsian view, it is only important is whether the chosen policy positions promise electoral success. However, there is good reason to believe that political parties are in fact heavily constrained ideologically. Indeed, it is likely that the pressures leading to strong issue constraints are more important among parties than among voters.

Returning to the two sources of issue constraints identified for citizen belief systems, each should also apply to political parties, albeit for different reasons. First, the constraints may be the result of the dictates of logic. Downs (1957), for example, argues that parties have a need for coherent and stable ideologies. In his words: 'Simple logic dictates that ... ideologies exhibit at least some coherence because no party can rationally espouse a policy set containing mutually exclusive proposals' (1957, p. 109). This means that positions on different issues are not always distinct or separable. Separability is a common assumption in multidimensional spatial theories of voting: a party's position on one issue does not limit its positions on other issues (an assumption criticised by Milyo, 2000; Benoit and Laver, 2006, pp. 25-31). However, as Milyo argues, trade-offs are at the heart of politics: in the classic example, spending more on guns means there is less money left for butter. In other words, all issues are in this view 'subject to some overarching budget constraint' (Benoit and Laver, 2006, p. 29; see also Hinich and Munger, 2008). Parties will experience issue constraints because they attempt to formulate an internally coherent ideology.

Why should parties care about having a logically consistent platform? Presumably, an incoherent ideology will cost votes. Downs (1957) argues that parties will be punished if they seem incoherent and inconsistent. They will not propose 'an

unorganised jumble of policies' (1957, p. 110) since they would then appear irresponsible and unreliable to voters. Since voters tend to use ideology as a shortcut in their decision-making and parties want to attract as many voters as possible, maintaining a level of coherence in the policy package is thus a strategic requirement for rationally acting parties. This view is echoed by Munger and Hinich (1993, p. 37), who argue that successful ideologies are characterised by logical and temporal consistency, that is, parties endorse the same policy in similar situations and do not radically change position on policies previously espoused. Parties do this because '[v]oters evaluate candidates based on their reputations for probity, commitment and consistency' (1993, p. 43).

Coherent ideologies are useful to parties as they help them to communicate their positions. Voters may not be inclined to spend a lot of time learning about each party's precise programme (Downs, 1957; Ferejohn, 1993; Denzau and North, 1994). The cost to citizens of gaining such information is likely to be greater than the possibility that his or her vote will count in the election. However, ideologies provide an easy information shortcut. This is due to the nature of voter choice: in elections, political parties combine positions on salient issues into a package of policies. Electors do not decide on single issues. Instead, when voting for a particular party, they vote for the entire 'package deal' on offer (Thomassen, 1999, p. 34; Stimson, 2004). If the packages of positions that parties present to voters are heavily constrained, then one word – Converse suggests 'liberalism' and 'conservatism' – can transmit an extraordinary amount of information to the voter (1964, p. 214). Using simplified left-right terms reduces the transaction costs of communicating policy positions to voters (Downs, 1957, p. 96ff.; cf. North, 1990). There is convincing evidence that voters often think in simple left-right terms rather than comparing, issue-by-issue, their position with that of parties

(Miller et al., 1999). Because political advertising and public position-taking can contain only very broad descriptions of party programmes, politicians cannot distinguish themselves very subtly from their opponents (Hinich and Munger, 2008). As a result, the use of relatively uncomplicated and thus highly constrained policy packages also has communication advantages for parties: establishing a 'brand name' is easier if ideological packages are kept simple (Snyder and Ting, 2002).

Finally, one of voters' central concerns according to Munger and Hinich is the danger that parties will fail to implement the promised policies. Building an internally consistent ideology is one way for parties to convince voters that the party platform will indeed serve as the basis for action (Ferejohn, 1993; Hinich and Munger, 2008). Ideological coherence is how parties solve the problem of credible commitments: the main means by which parties persuade voters that they will *not* move – the 'primary goal of campaigns' – is ideology (Munger and Hinich, 1993, p. 42). While parties are not perfectly consistent, there is 'a threshold above which contradictions in an ideology weaken its foundations of legitimacy and cause it to lose adherents rapidly' (1993, p. 37).

Of course, the internal coherence of party programmes need not only stem from such instrumental concerns. Politicians may simply be pursuing their sincere beliefs (Adams and Adams, 2000, p. 148). After all, party elites are citizens too, so their policy goals will reflect the 'underlying correlation structure that exists in the electorate' (ibid.). As Converse (1964) notes, elites are more likely to hold consistent ideologies than the mass public. The sources of such ideological constraints among elite actors can be both logical and social. What is important is that these constraints will also be present in the programme formulated jointly by the party's politicians. Even if we conceive of the party elite quite broadly, say to encompass all party activists, the level

of information and political sophistication should mean that constraints among party leaders and members will be replicated within the party programme. This explanation for constrained policy spaces is related to the sociological view of party ideologies (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; von Beyme, 1984). In this view, political parties have 'highly distinct and durable identities' (Marks and Wilson, 2000, p. 434) whose historical origins are tightly linked with their ideology (Mair and Mudde, 1998). For example, von Beyme (1984) emphasises the ideological coherence and commonalities within party families. The historical evolution of party ideologies means that there is a clear social or circumstantial source of constraint on party programmes.

Looking beyond the party elite, voters provide another reason why we should expect party ideologies to be characterised by constraints. Parties generally seek to position themselves where there are voters, and since voters' views tend to be characterised by a certain – though imperfect – level of interdependence, party programmes should exhibit similar constraints (Adams and Adams, 2000, p. 148). This source of issue constraints within party policies is notable because it is completely independent of a party's desire or concern for internal coherence. Instead, if parties face constraints simply because voters do so too, then the constraints are simply a product of strategic positioning. There is nothing intrinsic within various issues that make certain policy packages more or less likely to occur: parties are only placing themselves where they can attract as many voters as possible. Presumably, the largest agglomerations of voter positions exhibit relatively strong coherence and consistency: while ideological constraints among some voters are weak, the most frequently occurring combinations are more likely to be logically interconnected.

Finally, parties may exhibit strong constraints because they have an incentive to prevent the emergence of unconstrained issues. Schattschneider (1960, p. 64) sees

politics as a conflict of conflicts, with some issues 'winning' by imposing their divisions onto society. This victory is important as political cleavages are not easily compatible: depending on which issue is dominant, politics will take different forms. In other words, the alignments that result from the competition between conflicts shape the fundamentals of politics. Since this is the case, Schattschneider argues that 'control of the scale of conflict has always been a prime instrument of political strategy' (1960, p. 8). A similar argument is made by Riker (1986), who sees the manipulation of the dimensionality of policy space as a key element of party strategies. An example of the importance of the 'conflict of conflicts' is the salience of European integration: according to Hix (1999, p. 78), parties in Europe have tried to avoid open competition on integration-related issues as this conflict would divide them internally instead of differentiating them from their opponents. Parties therefore collude in order to keep cross-cutting, internally divisive issues off the political agenda (Crum, 2007). If such policy areas do not become salient, the actual policy space that parties operate in will remain relatively simply structured. High constraints may thus be the result of parties' efforts to allow competition only on certain issues.

The constraints within party ideologies should be stronger than among voters. If voters' aggregate positions were the only source of parties' issue constraints, then these would be expected to be quite weak, just as they are among voters. However, the existence of two other sources of constraints within party ideologies – the need for coherence and the replication of elite and activist beliefs – mean that issue constraints are likely to be stronger among parties than among the electorate. First, unlike voters, parties face the danger of being punished if they present incoherent and contradictory policy packages to the public. This external sanction does not exist for voters: no one polices the internal consistency of citizen preferences. Second, elites tend to be more

ideologically coherent than average voters, and it is of course the well-informed, politically interested and engaged citizens who decide on party policy. Moreover, while many voters may not spend much time reflecting on the consistency of their beliefs, party policy tends to be debated and discussed at length. This should also prevent the emergence of significant incoherence within a party ideology.

There is some empirical evidence that ideological constraints are indeed greater among parties than among voters. For one, the issue opinions of voters are generally relatively heterogeneous. As Converse (1964) already found, voters do not always think in ideologically coherent terms, and the opinions they profess are of an impressive diversity. There is often an overlap between supporters of each party (e.g., Charnock and Ellis, 2004). The range of opinions present among party voters is relatively large and more diverse than that found within the party elite. There is clear evidence of this in the United States. There, parties have become increasingly polarised over the last decades, leading to a situation where the distance between the two parties has increased substantially (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Issue alignment has strengthened among party elites, with each side becoming more homogenous. This has not been mirrored by an equally strong development among party voters, which remain heterogeneous and characterised by significant ideological overlap (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008). To the extent that empirical evidence of the difference in ideological constraints between voters and parties exists, it seems that constraints are stronger among the latter. This is far from surprising considering the theoretical arguments outlined above.

To sum up, a key variable concerning voters' belief systems is the extent that they exhibit constraints. The source of these constraints can be logical or circumstantial. Such constraints are also likely to exist among political parties because they are punished for ideological inconsistency, because party elites are the most likely to be

ideologically coherent and because parties follow voters' constrained aggregate positions. The sources of ideological constraints are therefore a mixture of the logical and the circumstantial. Finally, parties are probably more likely to be ideologically constrained than voters.

The issues that go together: party system dimensionality

Party ideologies are undoubtedly characterised by strong internal constraints, but their precise nature and content have been examined in the existing literature mainly through the lens of the concept of party system dimensions. This concept captures the extent to which different issues 'go together' at the systemic level and thus provides a first look at issue interconnections in party ideologies. Examining dimensionality here has two purposes: first, it is a concept that is related to the concept of issue interconnections and, second, existing descriptions of the number and content of dimensions provide an indication of the type of interconnections that should be expected. In this section, I define the term 'dimensions' before addressing two different approaches to understanding party system dimensionality, the first based on a priori theorising and the second guided by empirical information.

What are dimensions?

There are two conflicting definitions of dimensions, and it is worth being clear about the meaning used in this thesis. The first definition – which is not used here – sees dimensions as the main lines of conflict that find expression within a political system. This is the approach taken by Lijphart (1984) and Stoll (2005, 2008). However, neither Lijphart nor Stoll address the issue of how the various dimensions are related.

The second use of the term dimension, and the one that I will use here, pays attention primarily to the way salient issues in party competition are linked. Under this definition, each dimension is a summary of correlated party positions on a series of issues. For example, take a political system where parties compete only on economic and education policy. If on both of these issues all parties take up identical spatial positions, then it is very easy to summarise political conflict in that system: one fundamental dimension underlies party competition. Even if the positions on the two issues are merely similar (and not identical), we can summarize party competition using one dimension without losing too much necessary detail. Thus, if all parties are located at similar points on economic and education policy, we can collapse these two issues into one dimension. If all issues within a political system can be collapsed in this way, then just one dimension remains – usually referred to as the left/right dimension. Because dimensions are based only on the similarity of party positions, there need not be a substantive meaning to the dimensions found by collapsing issue positions. Dimensions are constructs and do not necessarily conform to a preconceived idea of what politics is about.

The difference between a dimension and an issue is identical to that between the action space and the basic space (Poole, 2005). An action space is the pure, unadulterated collection of all 'contemporary political issues [and] government policies' (Ordeshook, 1976, p. 308; cf. Poole, 2005, p. 14). Where political conflict is carried out, whether among legislators in parliament or parties in elections, this is done in an action space. In this, all actors can be located at a specific point, as long as they indeed take up a position on each salient issue. The action space thus contains all party positions on salient issues. As a result, it is complex and difficult to represent visually. The positions of political actors are more easily understood if we refer to the 'basic

space': this captures the 'underlying evaluative, or *basic*, dimensions' (Poole, 2005, p. 1). These basic dimensions are the fundamental preferences from which political opinions on all issues are drawn. This reduction of political competition to a simplified form is psychologically convenient, as it is difficult for us to grasp the complexities of the action space. Seeing the world in lower dimensions allows us to interpret politics more easily. Poole's conception of the basic space builds on multidimensional scaling, which summarises the similarities between various units, 'model[ing] these similarities as distances between points representing the [units] in a geometric space' (Poole, 2005, p. 7). The basic space does not contain all the information included in the action space. Instead, it is a reasonably accurate simplified representation of the relationships between actors. Dimensions are thus descriptive shorthand representations that summarise essential characteristics of a more complex reality.

As may have become clear in this discussion, dimensions are directly related to issue constraints. While issue constraints exist for every political actor, whether an individual or a party, dimensions reflect the general effect of such constraints on political competition. I have argued that party policy packages are likely to be characterised by strong constraints. If issue positions are constrained in similar ways for all parties, then the content of party competition can be reduced to a low-dimensional space. The dimensionality of party competition therefore captures the system-wide presence of issue constraints. The types of dimensionality that have been identified therefore give a first indication of the policy interconnections likely to be exist within party ideologies. It is thus worth describing in some detail how issues have been seen to be linked in party systems.

		How many dimensions are there?	
		One	*Two or more*
How is dimensionality determined?	*A priori / deductive*	Hotelling (1929), Black (1948), Downs (1957), Budge (1994), Powell (2000), McDonald and Budge (2005)	Finer (1987), Flanagan (1987), Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997), Bobbio (1996), Kitschelt (1994, 1995), Laver and Shepsle (1995), Schofield and Sened (2006)
	A posteriori / inductive	Miller et al. (1999), Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009)	Poole and Rosenthal (1997), Hooghe et al. (2002), Warwick (2002), Benoit and Laver (2006)

Table 2.1 **Party system dimensionality: main distinctions within the literature**

Party system dimensionality has two main characteristics: number and content. The minimum number of dimensions is naturally one, and this dimension then forms the aforementioned left/right continuum. This does not mean that party competition can always be summarised in this way, and party systems will vary in the number of dimensions needed to capture political competition (Benoit and Laver, 2006). When there is more than one dimension, the content of each dimension can vary. Since dimensions do not themselves require logical connections between their component issues, the make-up of each dimension can potentially be quite different in each country. For example, in one country, party positions on immigration may coincide largely with parties' stances on economic policy, while in another system the issue may be more strongly integrated with a libertarian-authoritarian dimension. A further difference is between those who determine dimensionality ex ante and those who use an empirically-driven approach. As summarized in Table 2.1, the literature on party system dimensionality divides along two main lines: first, scholars disagree about the number and, if there is more than one dimension, the content of each line of conflict; second, they differ in the method of determining dimensionality.

Ex ante versus empirical determination of dimensionality

Overall, there are two basic ways in which the number and content of dimensionality of party systems have been determined in the literature. In the first approach, the content of political ideologies is considered and the number and content of dimensions decided ex ante, based on theoretical reflection. The second looks instead at the party positions on salient political issues and decides on the nature of party system dimensionality based on empirical analysis. These two approaches can be said to reflect the two sources of issue constraints. While the first sees dimensions as the result of the fundamental logical connections between issues, the second sees issues as linked mainly because of social or circumstantial factors.

Many researchers into party competition take an ex ante approach to the determination of party system dimensionality. This means that they decide on the number and content of party system dimensions without basing this decision directly on empirical evidence. The first strand of such research proceeds solely based on the analysis of political ideologies; here, the authors consider what dimensions can potentially exist within a political system. The decisions reached are necessarily subjective and open to debate, but have been important in framing the direction of research. Examples of accounts based primarily on the consideration of political ideologies are Finer (1987), Bobbio (1996) and Kitschelt (1994). In many cases, an ex ante decision on party system dimensionality is nevertheless empirically informed, that is, based on other research or in-depth knowledge. Here, a given dimensionality is used as the starting point for further research. This is the approach used, for example, by Downs (1957), Hooghe et al. (2002) and McDonald and Budge (2005). Ex ante determinations of dimensionality are united by the fact that little or no effort is made to seek empirical validation. This does not mean that these accounts do not differ: while

Downs and McDonald and Budge assume a simple one-dimensional party system, Finer, Bobbio and Kitschelt argue that party systems are mostly two-dimensional.

Another strand of research has taken a different approach to determining party system dimensionality. Here, party positions on a series of issues are taken as a starting point, and no specific links between issues are assumed. Using this positional information, the dimensionality of the party system is determined using statistical methods. This means that this approach is closely linked to the definition of dimensionality introduced above, as the nature of the 'basic space' is inferred from the information provided by the 'action space'. For the United States Congress, dimensionality has been determined using roll-call votes and multidimensional scaling (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Two examples of cross-national research into party system dimensionality are Warwick (2002) and Benoit and Laver (2006). Both use common data reduction techniques – principal components and factor analysis, respectively – to uncover the dimensions underlying party competition, highlighting again the close link between statistical techniques and dimensional theory.

The number and content of party system dimensions

Both approaches to determining party system dimensionality have provided a variety of different answers concerning both the number and the content of the dimensions. On the one hand, there are a number of authors who argue that party systems can be usefully simplified into one dimension. This would mean that the policy interconnections between all salient issues would be strong. On the other hand, a large body of work has questioned this approach and argued for the existence of multiple dimensions, at least potentially. In particular, it has been suggested that there are two main dimensions, economics and society/culture, which are logically independent of one another.

One-dimensional representations of party competition

At their simplest, party systems can have just one dimension: a straightforward left-right continuum. The concept of 'left and right' was not invented by political scientists. Rather, the tendency to characterise political opposition using a single dimension has existed since the beginnings of modern representative democracy. The first use of left and right as a shorthand for ideological positions was probably during the French Revolution, where members of the National Assembly sat according to their political views. At one of its meetings in 1789, the more revolutionary, 'destructive' members sat to the left of the speaker and the less revolutionary, 'constructive' members to the right (Finer, 1987, p. 324; Hakhverdian, forthcoming, p. 2). In the first spatial models, party competition was also represented as occurring on one single dimension (Hotelling, 1929; Smithies, 1941; Black, 1948; Downs, 1957).

This one-dimensional representation of political competition is still used very frequently in political science research. Authors such as Budge (1994), Powell (2000) and McDonald and Budge (2005) argue that representing party positions using one dimension remains the most insightful approach. For example, according to McDonald and Budge (2005, p. 33) '[t]he one-dimensional Left-Right representation has so many advantages of parsimony, comparability and theoretical relevance, that there are strong presumptions in favour of its use'. Budge (1994, p. 456) thus argues that using one dimension enables party positions to be 'directly visualised' and easily interpreted. In addition, he argues that restricting analysis in this way allows useful cross-national comparisons of party positions; including further dimensions is not practical in his view (1994, p. 456). He adds that 'a more directly compelling reason' for using a one-

dimensional policy space is that this is how parties and media tend to present party policies in election campaigns (Budge, 1994, p. 457).

What would a one-dimensional party system mean for the existence of issue constraints within party ideologies? If there is just one dimension, all salient issues can be collapsed into a single scale. Thus, positions on all issues are interconnected. This applies to both static and dynamic interconnections, that is, at one point in time, or when considering party policy change. In terms of static interconnections, a one-dimensional party system means that we can predict a party's position (relative to other parties) on all issues based on our knowledge of its position on just one issue. Turning to dynamic interconnections, a party that moves to the right or left in a one-dimensional system would carry out such a move on all component issues of that dimension. While a one-dimensional system requires that all issues be collapsible into one continuum, the issues that are summarised by that one dimension need not always be the same. The make-up of the dimension is therefore context-dependent. This ability of the terms 'left' and 'right' to absorb a variety of diverse topics explains why it is such a powerful concept. As Huber and Powell (1994, p. 294) state: 'The language of "left" and "right" creates a unidimensional discourse that can assimilate the various issues and alternatives that continuously appear before the electorate.' This conception of left and right is used, for example, by Laver and Budge (1992b), Miller et al. (1999) and Powell (2000).[2] In essence, these authors therefore argue that the issue constraints within party programmes are generally considerable, to the extent that positions on all topics are strongly interconnected.

[2] Some authors use left-right to mean the class conflict and economic ideology (Thomassen, 1999, p. 38). For example, Downs (1957) argues that the left-right dimension, the basis of his theory, consists of positions on economic matters.

Two-dimensional approaches

This is not a view shared by all political scientists. While a one-dimensional representation of party competition can give us a useful simplified picture of politics, this picture may miss out details that would help us understand politics because it reduces party competition to the most basic form possible. As Benoit and Laver (2006, p. 13) argue, '[t]he richer the description of politics we seek, the more dimensions we need to describe the positions of political actors. The more dimensions we use, the more fine-grained our descriptions of politics can be.' In addition, the historical and sociological development of party systems appears to point to frequent multidimensionality, as do accounts based on empirical assessments of the basic space. It is not just the fact of multidimensionality that is important; the content of each dimension is also significant. The issues that make up the dimensions indicate which issues go together (or 'what goes with what'), providing information on the interconnections present on a system-wide basis. In the following, I describe a series of different conceptions of multidimensionality based on different approaches, highlighting the relationship between the dimensions and the content of each.

Using an ex ante approach, some authors argue that there are two fundamental – and ever-present – dimensions to politics. Broadly, these two dimensions are economic and social/cultural. Finer (1987, p. 324), for example, identifies four distinct 'sets of attitudes' and argues that this is a more accurate depiction of the nature of political debate than the simple use of left and right. In his view, a political left and right is complemented by an economic left and right. The political left is associated with the ideas of progress, civil liberty, internationalism and secularism, while the political right is sceptical about human nature, nationalist, and morally and socially conservative. The economic left favours state intervention on behalf of the disadvantaged, while the

economic right believes in the free market and a minimum of state involvement in the economy. The four sets of attitudes can be combined freely: for example, Finer sees European liberal parties as combining a stance on the political left and the economic right (1987, p. 325).

A relatively permanent two-dimensional world of party competition is also consistent with Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) historical-sociological approach to the development of party competition. They argue that parties emerged and confronted each other in a series of conflicts: church-state, rural-urban, centre-periphery and owner-worker. These cleavages amount to a conception of party competition as structured around four dimensions, which may or may not find expression in any given (Western European) country. The key here is that parties can capture support by reflecting one or more societal conflicts, with their core voters fundamentally isolated from the electoral marketplace. In other words, parties can compete on a series of potentially separate dimensions. Kriesi et al. (2008a) argue that Lipset and Rokkan's four cleavages actually boil down to two core dimensions: economics and culture. According to them, these two dimensions are permanent fixtures of party systems, and they are strengthened by the fact that they absorb and integrate new conflicts rather than being overshadowed or replaced by them. There are thus several accounts that argue that there is a general potential within party systems for a two-dimensional structure of competition, based around economic policy and socio-cultural attitudes.

A second line of argument proposes that the development of a new dimension of political competition occurred in the last half-century. Broadly, the old dominant dimension summarising economic positions has been joined by a new axis that contains what could be termed 'non-economic' issues. Such issues are commonly grouped together under various titles, but most frequently they are given the name New Politics

(Flanagan, 1987; Müller-Rommel, 1989; Poguntke and Müller-Rommel, 1995; Dalton, 2006). Inglehart (1997) describes these debates as clashes between postmodernists and fundamentalists, with each defending different sides of a conflict of values. Kitschelt (1994, 1995) argues that there is a liberal-authoritarian dimension that covers all issues concerned with the organisation of society and the quality of politics and is unrelated to economic goals. All these authors state that non-economic topics – under whatever name – are increasingly important to political competition and group them within a second dimension that is separate from the 'old' economic dimension.

To Inglehart (1977, 1990), the two dimensions of political conflict are materialism/modernism and postmaterialism/postmodernism; Flanagan (1987) calls this the difference between 'old' and 'new' politics.[3] Inglehart argues that industrial societies have been undergoing a process of value change: materialist goals, i.e. economic and physical security, are gradually being replaced by postmaterialist goals, for example self-expression and personal fulfilment. This value shift has consequences for politics. As people's priorities have changed, so has the political agenda, leading to a growing importance of the modern-postmodern or old-new polarisation (1997, p. 237). Issues such as the environment, abortion and gay rights are taking on the importance that, say, the nationalisation of industry used to have. Postmodern issues are fundamentally distinct from the divisions of traditional politics, namely 'conflict over ownership of the means of production and distribution of income' (1997, p. 237).

[3] Confusingly, the term New Politics has also been used very differently by Poguntke and Müller-Rommel (e.g., 1995). Like Inglehart, they argue that old politics was about economic and military security and that a new political divide emerged in the 1960s and 1970s (1995, p. xi). However, they stress the nature of political participation rather than beliefs and values. New Politics thus means 'the interrelated extension of participatory dispositions and techniques and the partial change of the political agenda through the surge of new political demands' (Poguntke, 1993, p. 9). The central elements of the political ideology of New Politics activists are: individualism, equal rights, participatory democracy, ecology, unilateral disarmament, third world development and leftism (Poguntke, 1987, p. 78). This approach to New Politics is thus narrowly focussed on the new political movements that emerged on the left around 1968 and after. They are the type of movement that Flanagan would call New Left and which Kitschelt terms left-libertarian.

For Flanagan, old and new politics are clearly separated: as he states, 'the point is that the New Right is as much non-materialist as the New Left' (1987, p. 1308).[4] This could be taken to imply a complete independence of the two dimensions of conflict. In fact, both Inglehart and Flanagan argue that parties only take positions either on new/postmodern politics or on old/materialist politics. This clearly contradicts one of the core assumptions of this thesis, namely that parties generally take positions on all salient issues. Looking at contemporary party politics, though, the assumption of this thesis is given weight. Green parties do take position on economic matters, especially as they have grown to become permanent parts of the political landscape. Far-right parties, meanwhile, often play upon economic fears and uncertainty. As a result, it is perhaps reasonable to adapt Inglehart and Flanagan's argument to the extent that the two dimensions are independent rather than completely separate. In other words, knowledge of a party's position on new/postmodern politics does not help an observer to determine that party's economic views, which anyway will be of little salience to such a party. The same applies for the new/postmodern views of old/materialist parties.

The concept of a libertarian-authoritarian dimension has been strongly shaped by Kitschelt's work (1994, 1995). He starts from an ex ante approach but also marshals considerable sociological evidence in support of his argument. For him, there is an independent dimension that cross-cuts the traditional economic axis of political conflict: liberal-authoritarianism. According to Kitschelt, this dimension includes policies concerning individual rights and freedoms, law and order, participatory democracy as well as environmental policy. This is also the sense in which Hooghe et al. (2002) have formulated their influential gal-tan dimension (green-alternative-libertarian/traditional-authoritarian-nationalist), which forms the basis of their research into party responses to

[4] This is an argument also made by Savage (1985), who sees a postmaterialist constituency within both the left and the right.

European integration. Starting often from ex ante beginnings, the libertarian-authoritarian dimension has thus become a frequent feature of research into political competition, irrespective of whether the emergence of this dimension is seen as recent or not.

This approach appears to be justified when considering the real-world evidence provided by empirical analyses of basic spaces. Warwick (2002) considers the number of dimensions present in West European political systems using manifesto and expert survey data. He finds that a single socio-economic dimension is not enough to summarise political competition. Instead, two further dimensions are also present: postmaterialism and social control. These can be seen as broadly equivalent to liberal-authoritarian topics. Benoit and Laver (2006, ch. 5) also find that only three countries have simple one-dimensional structures: the US, the UK and Switzerland. One of their core arguments is thus that most party systems are multidimensional, so that simple one-dimensional representations are likely to miss much of the detail that characterises and differentiates political systems. However, they do not find a clear-cut pattern of dimensional content. Each country differs in the issues that form part of its dimensions.

There is thus a remarkable consistency in the two-dimensional depictions of party systems. Most authors see a left-right, economically-based dimension as the primary line of conflict between political parties. The second dimension generally refers to 'non-economic' issues. What exactly falls under this heading remains, however, a matter of debate. While some authors restrict it to questions of liberty and authority, others add elements such as environmental policy, participatory democracy, interventionist foreign policy, immigration and so on. Moreover, the empirical evidence from the Benoit and Laver expert survey points to great diversity between countries as well. Not only are there additional cross-cutting issues in some countries (e.g., religion,

regional nationalism and European integration), but the content of the two main dimensions also varies. Nevertheless, there remains a large body of research that distinguishes between economic issues and (variously named) second-dimension issues. It is therefore likely that this distinction is also important for interconnections within party ideologies, in particular because the two dimensions appear to be free of strong logical interconnections.

Conclusion

This chapter has brought together the three theoretical and empirical literatures that underlie the present research. First, a key past argument is that party competition can be summarised in spatial and numerical terms. Parties take positions on political issues: this is one of the core assumptions of the spatial theory of party competition. However, it is not the case that the positions on all issues are independent. This has been examined in great detail for individual voters and for party systems by looking at issue constraints and dimensionality respectively, which provide the next two political science foundations for this thesis.

It is thus well-established that, among voters, a well-developed ideology means that positions are characterised by constraints. These can be both static and dynamic, that is, describe correlation among issue positions at one point in time and correlation among position change. It is also well-established that party positions on the large amount of issues debated in a political system can usually be reduced to a smaller number of dimensions: in Poole's terms, there is a basic space that underlies the action space. Dimensionality has been determined both ex ante, based on the analysis of political ideologies, and empirically, using data sources to establish the nature of the basic space. The answers concerning the number and content of dimensions in real-

world party systems have also differed between those arguing for broad unidimensionality and proponents of more complex multidimensional spaces.

The theoretical approach of this thesis is thus based within the work of Converse and his individual-level concepts of issue interconnections and constraints. These can be easily applied to party ideologies as well. Parties have a clear incentive to develop coherent, consistent platforms: such coherence is rewarded at the polls because then parties can more easily communicate their views, are seen as responsible and reliable and can solve the problem of credible commitment. Moreover, there will be a general tendency towards ideological coherence simply because party elites are well-informed and politically sophisticated and because parties will follow the aggregate positions of voters. Finally, parties can sometimes prevent the emergence of issues that are unconstrained and could therefore threaten the stability of the party system. Thus, parties will exhibit interconnected policy programmes independent of whether their overriding motivation is votes or policy, as both fundamental aims will lead parties to develop constrained ideologies. The simplified Downsian argument that parties will simply place themselves wherever the greatest electoral gain is to be had is therefore unlikely to be empirically valid.

By applying these individual-level concepts to political parties, this thesis re-considers how party views on different issues are translated into the more simplified low-dimensional spaces that are found across contemporary democracies. Instead of proceeding directly to the aggregate basic-space continuums, this thesis takes a step back and considers how specific issue pairs are connected. The present research thus provides more detail on particular issue linkages than can be achieved by considering only party system dimensions and makes explicit the policy interconnections that low-dimensional spaces are created from. This research takes a step back in another way as

well: instead of comparing party systems, the focus lies in the attributes of particular parties and of specific policy interconnections. This approach is not just a re-evaluation of the nature of party ideologies and of party system dimensionality: throughout, the effects of policy interconnections on party competition are examined. Building on the literature presented here, the following chapter develops in detail the theoretical approach of policy interconnections, examining the key characteristics and the most important effects of this feature of party programmes. This theory will then provide the basis for the empirical analysis in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3

A theory of policy interconnections in party ideologies

At the core of a political party stands its ideology. In Michels' (1962 [1911]) words: 'A party is neither a social unity nor an economic unity. It is based upon its programme.' Each party ideology contains its stances on different issues, and these positions are not independent of one another but connected by overarching constraints. Thus, party programmes are characterised by issue linkages. Based on the conclusion of the previous chapter, this chapter presents the theory of policy interconnections and their effect on party competition. Gerring (1997, p. 970) has argued that ideologies, though a term with diverse interpretation and muddied uses, can at the very least be seen as a 'set of idea elements that are bound together'. Sets of elements are commonly described as systems, so party ideologies can be seen as 'issue systems'.

This chapter describes the basic characteristics of issue systems within party profiles. After defining the key concepts, the main attributes of issues and their interconnections are considered. In particular, I distinguish between two aspects of policy interconnections – their basis in logic or circumstance and their static or dynamic nature – and between four issue characteristics – position, salience, interconnectedness and unusualness. This chapter also presents possible ways that policy interconnections may be structured predictably, in particular across time, party families, countries, and left and right. Finally, the likely effects of the nature of policy interconnections on party competition are examined. Issue interconnections are not merely an incidental characteristic of the way parties formulate programmes: they have important

implications on party strategies and party system dimensionality. Beyond parties themselves, issue systems can have an impact on the extent of citizen choice and on political outcomes resulting from elections.

This chapter is organised as follows. It begins with a definition of issue systems and a description of their basic characteristics. Then, the possible systematic differences across left and right, party families, and countries are examined. Finally, the effects of policy interconnections on political competition are considered.

Party ideologies as issue systems

A system is commonly defined as a 'set of elements standing in interaction' or an arrangement of interrelated components (Snyder, 1993, p. 6). The term has been applied widely in the natural and social sciences: two examples are the solar system and the international system (Waltz, 1979).[5] The aim of such analyses is to present a picture of all the components of the system and, more importantly, how they stand in relationship to one another. Knowledge of these interconnections provides an understanding of the sequence through which outcomes are realised; a frequent example in the social sciences is the events leading up to World War I, where the structure of the system of nation-states played a crucial role in the breakout of conflict.

The application of the term 'system' to political parties is of course not new. In the context of party competition, a party system is the collection of parties within a polity and their relationship to each other (Sartori, 1976; Smith, 1989; Bardi and Mair, 2008). A party system is thus more than just its components, the 'set of parties' in a political system (Bardi and Mair, 2008, p. 153). What distinguishes party systems from

[5] An occasional second characteristic of systems is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts: 'the entire system exhibits properties and behaviours that are different from those of the parts' (Jervis, 1997, p. 8). Treating a system just as the sum of its parts has been called a reductionist approach (Jervis, 1997, p. 12f.).

sets of parties is that the 'patterned interactions' among components are an essential element of each system (Sartori, 1976, pp. 43-4). The core of the analysis of party systems is therefore the nature of the interaction between the political parties, rather than just the parties individually or collectively.

Party programmes themselves can be analysed in the same way: party ideologies are also systems, that is, they are sets of interrelated components.[6] The components of party-ideological systems are distinct issues or policies. Each of these issues has two fundamental attributes, position and salience (Kitschelt, 1994). A party thus makes two choices concerning each issue on which it competes, its position and its salience. To qualify as a system, the various issues need to be interrelated. Importantly, the nature of interconnections is variable, so the effect on other elements produced by change in one component depends on how that component is related to the rest of the system. Broadly speaking, the elements of a system can be tightly or loosely coupled (Snyder, 1993, p. 12). Therefore, a simplified conception of a party programme is as a system of variously salient issue positions that differ in the extent of their mutual interconnection. Party ideologies – if conceived of as issue systems – have two main features: their components and the links between them. When describing both the components and their interconnections, it is possible and useful to distinguish between different attributes of each issue component as well as between different aspects of interconnections. More precisely, the connections between issues have two possible sources, logic and circumstance, and can be static or dynamic in nature. The components, or issues, can be described using four attributes: the position and salience

[6] A party programme may also possess the second characteristic of systems by being more than the sum of the various issue components. For example, the differences between party families have been described as differences in what parties are, not what they do: an ideology is more than a policy profile (Mair and Mudde, 1998, p. 224). However, in the following I disregard this second characteristic: I focus on the interrelationships between the distinct components that form the system. The nature of the system as a whole is therefore of less importance for the topic of this thesis.

Issue attributes	
Position	The policy stance of the party on the issue
Salience	The emphasis the party gives the issue
Interconnectedness	The extent the issue is linked to other within the party programme
Unusualness	The extent to which a policy position is more extreme or moderate than the party's mean position
Types of interconnections	
Basis	
Logic	Issues are connected due to an inherent constraint contained within the nature of the two issues
Circumstance	Issues are connected due to quasi-logical, social or historical reasons
Manifestation	
Static	The extent to which the position/salience of one issue predicts the position/salience of another
Dynamic	The extent to which change in the positions/salience of two issues co-occurs

Table 3.1 **Issue attributes and types of interconnections**

the party gives to each as well as each issue's overall interconnectedness and unusualness. A summary of interconnection types and issue attributes is presented in Table 3.1, together with the definitions of each distinction. In this section, these types of interconnections and attributes of components are described in detail.

A final note concerns the use of systems to describe the policy bundles that make up party ideologies. The term 'system' may imply an overly scientific approach to the study of ideologies, with issues rigidly linked and consequences perfectly predictable. However, this is not how issue systems should be understood. Issue systems merely reflect an underlying structure that characterises party programmes and allows the distinction between characteristics of each component and of the links between them. Moreover, no simple determinism is implied. The influence of

interconnections on patterns of policy positions is therefore probabilistic rather than deterministic (Hall, 2003). I do not argue that strong interconnections mean that the party position must be in the predicted location or that a party must move in the same way on both issues; instead, strong interconnections only increase the probability of such a pattern.

The characteristics of policy interconnections

In the context of party programmes, two aspects of issue interconnections need to be distinguished: interconnections take static or dynamic forms. Static links between issues are those that are in place at one point in time. They can be well described by referring to the predictive power of one issue for the other: the stronger the interconnections, the more the position on one issue can predict the position on the other. In other words, if the interconnections between issues are strong ('tight'), knowing a party's position on one issue allows us reliably to predict its position on the second issue. The weaker the issue connections, the more difficult it is to make such a prediction. Dynamic issue interconnections concern party policy change. In all systems, interconnections are most visible in a dynamic context: if one component changes, this will also produce changes in related parts of the system (Jervis, 1997, p. 8). The question here concerns the system effects that occur when a political party changes its stance on one issue. If two (or more) issues are very tightly linked, then movement on one issue should have clear and immediate consequences for the second issue. If the issues are loosely linked, then policy change in one area should be free of implications for other issues.

Types of static interconnections

There may be a variety of static issue interconnections, but three different types of interconnections in particular can be distinguished: complete independence, linear association, and non-linear association. These three different types can be illustrated using the diverse accounts of how liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy are connected in party competition. These two issues have been described as the fundamental line of division that is characteristic of political conflict (Finer, 1987; Kitschelt, 1994; Bobbio, 1996), and a variety of different conceptions of the interconnections between them have been put forward. The two issues are therefore well-suited as an illustration of the three types of interconnections presented here.

Complete independence

The simplest way two elements can be interrelated is, of course, not at all. Two issues within an ideological system can thus be characterised by a lack of interconnections: they are then completely independent from one another. If this is the case, knowing a party's position on one issue would not provide any indication of the party's position on the second issue. Statistically, this would be called a situation where two variables exhibit a lack of association or correlation. Graphically, party positions would form a cloud, with no effect of one variable on the other visible. The regression line summarising the relationship between positions on the issues would be flat: changing the value of the first variable would not cause a change in the prediction for the second variable. Complete independence between two issues is illustrated in Figure 3.1: the parties are randomly distributed on the two fundamental axes of political conflict.

In terms of liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy, this lack of association was suggested as the most likely form of interconnection by Finer (1987), who states

that there are no logical reasons why positions on the two topics need to be interdependent. For example, he argues, a party on the economic left could without difficulty take up positions on either the political right or the political left. According to the empirical analysis carried out by Flanagan and Lee (2003), the relationship between economic issues and the new authoritarian-libertarian dimension does indeed follow such a pattern. Putnam (1973, p. 217) also argues, based on a survey of British and Italian MPs, that support for political equality is equally divided between the economic left and right. As in Figure 3.1, the line that expresses the relationship between the two fundamental conflicts is therefore flat: economic and socio-political issues are orthogonal to each other, and one cannot predict a party's position on one topic from its position on the other.

Linear association

McDonald and Budge (2005, pp. 42-4) argue that issues are too often imagined as being orthogonal to one another. In other words, they are seen as being at right angles to one another, implying that positions on one issue are independent from positions on the other. If this were true, it would be impossible to predict a party's position on one issue from its position on another issue, as described above. However, they argue that it is more likely that most issue positions are correlated to some extent. The most straightforward correlated relationship would be linear. Such representations of party competition are indeed the simplest and most common representation of the strength of different linkages. For example, Kitschelt (1994) sees political competition as taking place along a straight line that has shifted over the years. Imagining issue connections as straight lines is clearly related to the statistical technique of simple linear regression, which constructs the *line* that best captures the relationship among a set of data points.



Figure 3.1 **Example of static policy interconnections: complete independence**



Figure 3.2 **Example of static policy interconnections: linear and quadratic association**

If the interconnection between two issues is linear, then it is possible to predict a party's position on an issue from its position on another issue, no matter where the party is located. Thus, the relationship underlying the prediction is constant across the political spectrum. The interconnections between two issues can vary in strength, and this is captured by the extent to which the predicted line is accurate. In other words, the better the line fits the distribution of parties on two policy areas, the stronger the issue interconnections. The strength of interconnections is therefore well summarised by the amount of variance that is explained by the line that best describes the association between the two issues.

Even if a linear association is found, the nature of the interconnections can vary. At its simplest, there could be a direct correspondence between positions on two issues: $y = x$. In other words, if party A is three 'ideological units' to the right of party B on one issue ('x'), party A is also predicted be to three units to the right of party B on the second issue ('y'). Adding a constant and a coefficient to this equation (i.e. $y = ax + b$) alters the nature of the relationship: the constant ('b') affects whether positions on the second issue are generally more (or less) extreme than on the first, while the coefficient ('a') determines the range of policy positions parties take. This can be easily illustrated graphically (Figure 3.2). Line 1 has a 45-degree slope and has a constant equal to 0, so the two positions would be 'identical', at least in their ideological content. In Figure 3.2, party B is the same distance to the left of party A on both issues. Line 2 has a different slope, so the nature of the linear association is different: party D's position on liberal-authoritarianism is only marginally different from party C's, even though party C is much further to the right on economic policy. This does not mean, however, that the strength of issue interconnections is lower for Line 2. On both lines, party positions on the two issues that are being compared are related in a linear, predictable way. In

fact, the strength of the association could easily be greater for Line 2 if the distribution of parties fits this line better. The constant and coefficient simply affect how party positions on the independent-variable issue are translated into dependent-variable issue positions. When considering the linear association between two policy areas, the strength of issue interconnections is therefore accurately captured only by the amount of variance explained by the linear prediction.

Of course, we are unlikely to find perfectly linear relationships in real-world party politics. However, a linear representation of the interrelationship between issues can be a reasonably accurate summary of the links between party positions on two issues. The interconnections between liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy have been presented in this manner. Kitschelt (1994, 1995), for example, argues that these two dimensions are now correlated due to a realignment in the policy space over the past decades: the economic left has become libertarian while the right has incorporated authoritarian appeals. The main axis of political competition is now left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian and no longer simply left versus right. However, it has also been suggested that the correlation between the two issue areas is in the reverse direction to that predicted by Kitschelt. For example, Duch and Strom (2004) find that economically right-wing parties are more likely to endorse the goal of liberty than left-wing parties. It is thus possible to argue that there is a connection between positions on economic and socio-economic issues, but with economic liberalism likely to be combined with social liberalism rather than authoritarianism. What both conceptions have in common, however, is that they see the relationship between the two issue areas as fundamentally linear in nature.

Non-linear association

Since many issues within party competition are thus likely to be related and not independent, McDonald and Budge (2005) have a point in arguing that the assumption that policy spaces are orthogonal is unrealistic. However, one can raise a similar objection to their argument. While they argue that dimensions can either be correlated or independent, we can quite easily also conceive of other types of relationship between issues. For example, there might be a U-shaped link, so that extreme positions on both sides of one issue are connected with extreme positions on one side of the second issue. Using the terminology of linear regression, the relationship between the two issues would then be quadratic. Again, the interconnection strength would be equivalent to the accuracy of the predicted line of association. A U-shaped association is also shown in Figure 3.2.

The interconnections between liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy have also been seen as U-shaped. For example, Bobbio (1996) argues that respect for liberty distinguishes extremists from moderates: 'The different attitude to freedom is the relevant criterion for distinguishing the moderate wing from the extremist wing on both left and right' (1996, p. 78). In Bobbio's view, the centre-left and the centre-right are libertarian, that is, they oppose totalitarianism, while the extreme left and extreme right are authoritarian. Their similar view on liberty explains why the economic extremes can become potential allies (Bobbio, 1996, p. 79). Translating Bobbio's approach into two-dimensional terms, his prediction is that there will be a quadratic relationship between economic and social issues. Perhaps the best-known empirical example of such an interrelationship is given by Hooghe et al. (2002, p. 968), who suggest that the link between left-right ideology and party positions on European integration is best described by an 'inverted U'. They argue that centrist parties tend to

be in favour of European integration, while parties on the far right and far left are generally more Eurosceptic.[7]

So far, the discussion has only considered static interconnections, that is, the cross-sectional association between party positions on distinct issues. The second feature of issue interconnections is their potential dynamic character. It is here that the nature of issue systems takes on significant importance for the development of party competition over time.

Dynamic interconnections

In systems, the links between components are above all visible over time and through processes of change. Specifically, interconnected parts of a system change together. The strength of the interconnections has an effect on how the parts move: the more tightly two elements are tied to each other, the more similar the movement of these two system components. As a consequence, parts that are less connected to others are also more independent in their movement overall. In his description of the interconnections between policies among voters, Converse already identified the possibility that issue constraints may not just be static but also dynamic (1964, p. 208). In terms of voter ideologies, a dynamic interconnection means that opinion change on one issue 'would psychologically require, from the point of view of the actor, some compensating change(s) in the status of idea-elements elsewhere in the configuration' (1964, p. 208). A shift in one element of the system occurs with or leads to related changes in other system components.

[7] The shape of the 'U' does not need to be symmetric: the tail on one side could be shorter than on the other. Hooghe et al. (2002, p. 977) identify such a pattern for the link between party positions on New Politics issues and European integration. On the traditional-authoritarian-nationalist half of the dimension, there is a strong relationship with positions on the EU, as extreme parties are reliably Eurosceptic. On the Green-alternative-libertarian half, the relationship is much weaker.

This approach can also be applied to how parties carry out ideological change as a political strategy. Party programmes are, as argued above, conceivable as issue systems made up of a series of interrelated policy elements. If two issue areas are linked, then this will have an effect on how parties move on these topics. If a party changes its policy position on one of these issues, then it will have to follow suit on the second, interconnected issue; if not immediately, then within a brief period of time. Otherwise, it will leave itself open to the charge of inconsistency and incoherence. As we have seen, there is an electoral incentive in maintaining an ideologically convincing platform, and this has an effect on how parties carry out policy shifts.

Dynamic interconnections, i.e. correlated policy movement, need not only be the direct result of a concern for ideological consistency within the party elite. It can also be the consequence of the composition of the party leadership and the nature of its activist and voter base. Thus, party policy change can also occur if a different coalition of actors within that party takes over the reins. This new leadership will have a different set of opinions and policy preferences. Since some of these will be correlated and interconnected, party policy change on sets of issues will also tend to co-occur as a result. For example, a social democratic party may be split between centre-left and left groups. The left faction may have more statist economic preferences, but also be more libertarian, environmentalist and Eurosceptic. If the left faction gains new weight in the party, the overall position of the party will have changed on several issues, and in this way will be characterised by dynamic interconnections. Similarly, dynamic interconnections may be the result of change in the activists or in the support base of the party. Just as with internal factions, positions among activists and supporters will be characterised by static interconnections. If a party changes its position, either because a

different group of activists gains ascendancy or because it is trying to attract a different group of voters, then correlated policy movement should occur.

The basis of interconnections: logic and circumstance

The distinction between static and dynamic interconnections refers to the two ways in which the linkages between issues are visible to observers. Another distinction between issue interconnections is also important, namely whether the origin of the linkage lies in a strong underlying logical connection or in circumstantial historical and social developments. As described in Chapter 2, this distinction was first made by Converse (1964), who divided interconnections into logical, quasi-logical and social sub-groups. Here, the last two types of interconnections are grouped together as 'circumstantial' since both quasi-logical and social linkages are similar in their lack of clear logical ties. 'Logic' and 'circumstance' are both abstract categories, so it is worth explaining in more detail the nature of this distinction.

First, issue positions can be linked to one another because there is a logical (i.e. intrinsic and inherent) connection between the two policy areas. A clear example of such a case is the budget constraint that limits expenditure on two items ('guns' and 'butter'). Here, there is an inherent link between two policy areas because a position on one of the two issues has a direct effect on the position or range of positions that can be taken on the other (see also Converse, 1964; Milyo, 2000). In effect, there is one issue, the level of public expenditure, which connects the two issues. Not all intrinsic connections are as obviously logical as the situation of a budget constraint, but all logic-based connections are based in some way on a value or dimension that underlies and binds together specific policy positions. Many students of political ideologies, for instance Finer (1987) and Bobbio (1996), have identified an economic and a liberty

dimension to political ideologies. For them, all issues *within* each of those two dimensions are intrinsically linked. Thus, as Poole (2005) notes, knowing someone's views on abortion will help when attempting to guess his or her views on gay marriage: the issues are tied together through the underlying value of liberalism. Similarly, an issue area such as environmental protection is linked to economic ideology as policy positions on it can have economic consequences. Greater environmental regulation will increase the burden on businesses and costs to the consumer. Overall, inherent or intrinsic linkages can be summarized as those connections based on some underlying mutual constraint or political value.

The second source of interconnections is circumstance. These are constraints that exist through processes not based on an inherent linkage. As described in Chapter 2, circumstance-based linkages are those where interconnections have developed over time. Converse (1964, p.211) argues that such circumstantial linkages are those that happen to exist within certain social segments. He offers two explanations for the development of such interconnections. First, the association between two issue positions may be spurious, with both views the result of a third, non-ideological factor. Above, the example of Green parties' generally pro-immigration and pro-environment stance was mentioned: while there is no logical connection between the two positions, they can be explained by the social origins of these parties in middle-class, highly educated social strata. Second, Converse argues that circumstantial interconnections can be the result of ideological diffusion carried out by elites. These elites develop certain packages of views and then spread these among all members of their social group. Eventually, the issue positions are seen as naturally associated. The important characteristic of circumstantial ties is thus that there is no necessary inherent linkage between two issue positions. There is nothing within the content of the issues

themselves that mandates a policy connection. Instead, if such a linkage exists it is the result of historical and social developments. In sum, constraints can be distinguished by the existence or absence of inherent logical ties between the two issues in question; of course, what constitutes a logical linkage may well be a matter of debate.

The interconnection bases of static and dynamic linkages

The two distinctions made above – between static and dynamic interconnections and between logic and circumstance as the bases of interconnections – are not unrelated. Static interconnections can be brought about due to logical and circumstantial foundations. As discussed above, both bases of interconnections are likely to exist frequently among political parties. However, when we turn to dynamic interconnections the basis of the policy linkage takes on importance.

It is when issues are inherently connected that dynamic interconnections are most likely to exist. If two issues are linked through a need for coherence, then this tight association means that parties will tend to modify their position on both issues at the same time and in a similar manner. Otherwise, the party will open itself up to charges that its policy package is inconsistent. In many cases, the associated policy shifts that characterise dynamic interconnections may even simply occur automatically as the two issues are so closely linked in the minds of politicians. In the example of factional replacement in a social democratic party, a centrist faction wrested power from a left-leaning subgroup. This change in party leadership would lead to policy modification on an issue pair because they are characterised by strong inherent links: the party may thus become, say, more in favour of deregulation and more pro-European at the same time.

Dynamic interconnections are less likely to occur when issues are only linked by circumstance. A dynamic interconnection based on circumstance would mean that there

is an association of policy change simply because positions tend to co-occur, for example within certain segments of society or among groups of activists, or because an association has developed over time. Looking again at the example based on factional replacement, the argument here would be that policy change will co-occur as the leaders and activists that make up the newly dominant faction have systematically different preferences to the old faction. In the 1990s, Tony Blair's pre-election repositioning of Labour included both a move to the economic centre as well as well as a toughening up of the party's stance on law and order. These two policy preferences are not directly linked through inherent ties but reflect a co-occurrence of these views among the newly dominant group within the party. Dynamic interconnections are more are more likely to be based on inherent ties rather than circumstance.

This leads to a pair of predictions regarding the occurrence of static and dynamic interconnections. First, since dynamic interconnections are likely to require a logical foundation, there will be fewer dynamic than static interconnections. This means that the total number of issue pairs exhibiting dynamic interconnections will be lower than for static linkages. Second, only logic-based static interconnections should be replicated at the dynamic level. Since circumstance-based static linkages do not provide a strong foundation for a dynamic interconnection, such static interconnections are unlikely to be mirrored by a dynamic linkage. However, logic-based static linkages are likely to also have dynamic counterparts. In sum, there will be fewer dynamic than static interconnections, and those dynamic linkages that do exist should be on issue pairs linked through logic.

Component attributes within issue systems

Static and dynamic interconnections describe the links between two particular issue components. Turning back to the individual issues within a party ideology, each component also has specific attributes. First, each party has a certain position on each issue and endows the policy area with a specific salience. Second, the pattern of interconnections for parties means that each issue also has a given overall interconnectedness as well a level of relative unusualness. This section describes the relationship of these four concepts to policy interconnections.

Position and salience

While most theories of party competition since Downs concentrate on the positions parties take, there are other important party activities with regard to issues. Parties also have to decide what importance to accord to each issue;[8] this is usually called the 'salience' of an issue, as compared to the party's position (Budge and Farlie, 1983). In the original formulation of the salience theory of party competition, parties are seen as talking past each other, to the extent that it is not accurate to see parties as taking opposing positions on the same issue. Instead, parties compete by stressing only those issues on which they have a comparative advantage. In more recent attempts at integrating salience and position, this sharp distinction has been blurred, with parties now seen as making choices regarding both aspects of policies (Meguid, 2005; Kriesi et al., 2006; Tavits, 2008; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009).

It is likely that the interconnections within issue systems are weaker in terms of salience than in terms of position. Parties tend to find it easier to amend the salience of

[8] This is not meant to imply that parties are completely free in this choice; other actors (e.g. other parties, the media) have an important agenda-setting function.

an issue than their position, for two reasons. First, the overall internal programmatic logic is less affected by salience change. The relationship between economic and environmental policy can provide an example of this. Environmental protection often has significant implications for economic policy, for instance by requiring increased government regulation. As a result, the two issues are likely to be strongly connected in terms of position due to the inherent logical ties between the two policy areas. However, this does not mean that a party that chooses to campaign primarily on environmental policy must also stress economic policy. While a party would find it hard to espouse positions on two areas that are fundamentally contradictory, it could quite easily emphasise one strongly and fail to address the other.

Where salience interconnections do exist, they are likely to occur on issue pairs whose static interconnection is logic-based. The reasoning here is similar to the comparison between the static and dynamic linkages between issue positions; there, only logic-based static interconnections were seen as good predictors of the existence of dynamic linkages. The constraints on salience ties are also likely to be weak compared to the static linkages between positions. When salience interconnections are present, their foundation is likely to be in logic rather than circumstance. There is little reason for issue pairs to be consistently linked in their salience if there is no logical association between the two. However, if the two topics are closely related in terms of their content, then parties may exhibit clear patterns in their salience interconnections.

Second, the need for ideological stability has less of an influence on the choice of issue salience. As we have seen, Downs (1957, p. 109) argued that party positions are likely to be generally stable as parties need to project an image of reliability and responsibility. Moreover, even when parties do attempt to change position, their success may be limited due to voters' 'perceptual inertia' (Ordeshook, 1976, p. 295); and party

reputations may be difficult to change easily (Petrocik, 1996). Modifying issue salience is more easily achieved. Issue importance has far less of an impact on ideological coherence than issue positions. Moreover, it might be relatively straightforward for a party to change the extent to which it stresses a policy area. As a result, parties may try to exploit the relative flexibility of issue salience to make up for their positional rigidity (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, p. 167). Past reputation creates less of a limitation for salience change than it does for positional change. Since salience and salience change is less limited by internal logic and ideological stability, the overall level of interconnections is likely to be weaker than for positions.

Interconnectedness and unusualness

The place of each policy area within the overall pattern of interconnections can be seen as an attribute of that component of the issue system. Within each party ideology, each component will thus have overall characteristics that describe its place within the party programme as a whole. Two such characteristics are the general interconnectedness of an issue as well as the unusualness of a position within the party ideology.

First, the interconnectedness of issue areas as a whole will vary: within a party's ideological profile some issues will be more independent, generally speaking, than other issues. While some policy areas will have strong static and dynamic interconnections with many other issues, other topics will be characterised by the relative absence of such linkages. This may also mean that it is easier to move on such weakly-linked issues than it is on issues that are mostly characterised by strong interconnections. The effect of issue interconnections is thus not just on specific issue pairs, as each issue differs in its overall amenability to party movement.

Second, a position within a party profile can be characterised by comparing it to the other positions that form part of the issue system. One way of summarising this comparison is by considering the position's unusualness in relation to the system in general. The degree of unusualness is here the extent to which a policy position is more extreme or moderate than the party's mean position. The assumption is that parties will tend towards a similar level of extremism on all issues in an effort to increase the coherence of their policy programme and to allow the use of heuristics by voters (Ferejohn, 1993; Thomassen, 1999; Poole, 2005; Sniderman and Levendusky, 2007). Given a mean distance from the political centre, each issue position within a system will differ in the extent to which it is unusual. This concept is explained in more depth in Chapter 6.

The structured diversity of issue systems

Policy interconnections are not the same for all parties in all countries, and yet the differences between them are not entirely random and unstructured. Instead, there are likely to be clear patterns that underlie the variation of issue systems across context. This can be described as 'structured diversity'. While it is not accurate to argue that policy interconnections are entirely constant, the differences we find stem from a clear underlying pattern. The term 'structured diversity' is used by Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009, p. 284f.), and they argue that Central and East European party systems can be characterised in this way. In their view, party competition is not identical across all contexts, but the differences between countries are not random or unexplainable. Instead, patterns of party positions and salience vary due to specific country-level factors that complement a broader cross-national trend. This approach also applies to policy interconnections. Here, I will describe four possible patterns of

issue systems, which can differ predictably between left and right, between party families, between countries and across time.

Left and right

The strength and nature of interconnections may differ systematically between the left and right halves of each issue. Before addressing this possibility, it is worth explaining in what sense a policy spectrum may be considered to be made up of two 'halves'. Such a conception is, of course, at odds with the unique Euclidean space that forms the basis of the Downsian model of spatial party competition. However, it has been suggested that political issues are not continuous. Instead, they may be characterised by a 'neutral point' that divides an issue into two sides (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989; Bruter and Harrison, 2007).[9] They claim that there is a fundamental difference between being on one side of a political debate rather than on the other, an argument also put forward in terms of cleavage voting and party system change by Bartolini and Mair (1990). Therefore, describing issues as continuous Euclidean spaces might underestimate the importance of the direction of the policy position, that is, which side of the issue the party is taking. If the two sides of a political issue are fundamentally separate, then the kinds of issue interconnections present on either side may differ as well.

Policy interconnections may differ between left and right in terms of both strength and nature. The first case is that the strength of the interconnections varies between left and right. For example, the predicted line of association could be a better fit for the distribution of political parties on the left than for those on the right. Here, the

[9] Accepting the possibility of a 'neutral point' does not mean that I accept or use the heavily-criticised directional model of voting (Westholm, 1997; Lewis and King, 1999), which drops positional competition in favour of competition based on emphasis and direction. Here, I merely argue that the existence of a central point at which the two sides are clearly distinguishable might have an effect on the interconnections present on each side.

line can look identical on both sides; what matters is the extent to which this line accurately summarises the location of political parties. Thus, the extent to which one issue can predict another may differ systematically between left and right. The most extreme contrast between the two sides would be a very strong association on one side and complete independence on the other. In this case, the predicted line on one of the two sides would be flat, while there would be a clear slope on the other. In Figure 3.3, this case is represented by Line 1, with the parties represented as circles.

Another possibility is that the direction of the association is different on each side, so that the slopes on the two sides mirror each other. This is illustrated by Line 2, with the relevant parties on the right marked as boxes. Thus, extreme parties at opposite ends on the first issue – thus radically different – are actually similar on the second issue. The strength of the interconnection is nevertheless equal on left and right. Graphically, the distribution of parties would then resemble a V-shape; this difference in direction is very similar to a U-shaped quadratic relationship between two issues.

Turning again to the example of liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy, there are empirical indications that the relationship between these two issues do vary between each side of the political divide. There has historically been a greater variety of parties on the right than on the left (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1970, p. 158; Boix, 1999). On the economic right, there have always been both liberal and authoritarian parties, partly due to the fact that these parties were formed based on cleavages that mobilised prior to owner-worker divisions (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Moreover, at least partly for non-economic reasons, liberals found it difficult to work with conservatives and Christian Democrats, so that these parties continued to exist as separate forces. The left, which was of course not necessarily more united, tended to disagree mostly on economic matters. More recently, political parties have had to



***Figure 3.3* Static policy interconnections: left-right differences**

respond to changing social and value structures (van der Eijk et al., 1992, p. 426f.; Kriesi et al., 2008b). The left has had to incorporate new political priorities into their programmes (Kitschelt, 1994; Rohrschneider, 1994). Indeed, it can be argued that the emergence of the 'new left' and the strategic reorientation of social democracy have strengthened the links between economic egalitarianism and social liberalism on the left. On the right, however, the success of the extreme right has underlined further the contrast between economic ideology and views on liberal-authoritarian concerns. While the mainstream right has thus had to respond to the increasing salience of authoritarian concerns, parties that combine economic and social liberalism remain very much relevant. Thus, the ideological heterogeneity of parties on the right appears to be greater than that of parties on the left. In the terms used above, there seems to be a linear association between the two issues on the left, while the right is characterised by

complete independence; in Figure 3.3, Line 1 summarises this left-right difference graphically.

Party families

Party families may also differ in their issue interconnections as they broadly capture general patterns in party ideologies. The use of families to categorise parties is of course not without conceptual and methodological difficulties. As Mair and Mudde (1998, p. 214) argue, the concept of party families is one that is intuitive to most observers but 'nevertheless remains one of the most under-theorized and least-specified approaches to the general classification of parties'. In their view, party families continue to be a useful way of distinguishing between parties, as the classification 'goes right to the heart of a party's identity and is therefore more likely to address the question of what parties are, rather than ... the question of what parties do' (Mair and Mudde, 1998, p. 220). The two main characteristics that separate party families from each other are their shared historical origins and their overall ideology (Mair and Mudde, 1998, p. 223f.). This approach is related to that of von Beyme (1984, p. 43f.), who stresses the differences between the *Weltanschauungen* of party families. As pointed out by Mair and Mudde, the approach goes back to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who argued that parties should be understood as the representatives of the core cleavages that divide societies. Party families can be taken to represent fundamentally different ideologies, and the concept of the party family thus goes beyond mere policy positions and captures an essential difference between parties.

However, while their essence may be more than their simple policy profiles, each member of a party family nevertheless still competes on the basis of an ideology which can be summarised in terms of their policy interconnections. The diverse

historical origin and social grounding of party families means that they may differ systematically in their types of issue interconnections. Consequently, looking at how these may differ by party family, it is possible to consider whether some issues are more consistent parts of their ideologies than others. As Marks and Wilson (2000, p. 434) argue, parties in the Lipset and Rokkan framework have 'highly distinct and durable identities', and these condition their reaction to emerging policy areas. This means that even issues that were not important during the party's creation may be tied strongly to original positions.

There are two ways to explain how issue interconnections can differ for party families. First, it may be that the strength of the links between two issues varies depending on the party family. For example, in Kitschelt's (1994) analysis of ideological change among social democratic parties, their placement on economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism ends up in a diverse pattern, with parties' positions on economic policy unrelated to views on social liberalism. For other party families, there may well be a link between their stances on these two issues: thus, Christian Democratic parties that are more liberal socially may also tend to be more liberal economically. In Figure 3.4, party family SD ('Social Democrats') shows no relationship between the two issues, while party family CD ('Christian Democrats') does.

Second, party families may also differ in their positional diversity on issues. This is also illustrated in Figure 3.4. Party family A does not vary very much on economic policy, but shows a large spread of positions on liberal-authoritarianism. Party family B exhibits the same pattern but varies on economic policy instead of on liberal-authoritarianism. Party family C shows a similar amount of variation on both issues.



Figure 3.4 **Static policy interconnections: party families**

Note: SD = Social Democrats; CD= Christian Democrats; A to D = hypothetical party families

The positions of party family D are very similar to one another on both issues. The strength of interconnections can be linked to this difference in the extent of intra-family variation. If the party family is consistent on both issues, connections are strong; if, however, variation is large on one issue but low on the other, the interconnections are weak. Overall, it is likely that policy areas closely related to the core of that party family's identity will exhibit less intra-family variation. One should expect, for example, Green parties to vary little on their position on environmental issues but perhaps more on economic policy. Social Democratic and Conservative parties should be relatively consistent on economic issues; the same should be the case for Liberal parties and liberal-authoritarianism.

Countries

The types of interconnections present within political parties' issue systems can also vary depending on the country under consideration. This will be influenced by three interrelated country-specific factors: history/society, party strategies and institutions. First, the types of issue systems in each country will depend on the historical evolution and social make-up of each country. These country attributes will of course not affect interconnections based on inherent logic, but interconnections can also be based on looser sources such as quasi-logic and dominant aggregate voter distributions. The way in which two issues are seen as 'naturally associated' – such as gun laws and the death penalty – and the location of voters will of course be affected by each country's specific development.

Moreover, the number and content of issues that are present in each political system will differ. We know from existing empirical work that, unsurprisingly, countries differ quite significantly in the number and type of salient cleavages that play a role in party competition (Lijphart, 1984; Stoll, 2005); this is likely to apply to issues as well. Of course, the extent to which socially important cleavages and issues are translated into party systems differs by country (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). In this, parties themselves play an important role, as they can decide whether to turn latent conflicts into particised issue divisions (Schattschneider, 1960; Riker, 1986). This means that the extent to which parties in each country have activated certain political divisions will influence the number and nature of the issues present in party conflict. This in turn is likely to affect the types of issue systems, if only by influencing the total number of issue components within each system.

Finally, party system size may have an effect on the types of issue systems present in each country. This goes beyond the numerical impact of the number of

parties on dimensionality addressed in the previous chapter. Kitschelt (1994, p. 34) argues that a larger party system also means that the policy space becomes more 'crowded'. In Kitschelt's view, the choice of electoral programmes by a party will depend on the positions of its competitors, in particular the extent to which certain political spaces are still unoccupied. If there is only one dimension of political competition, a system with fewer political parties creates 'convergent spatial incentives', while larger party systems induce 'divergent spatial incentives' (Dow, 2001, p. 111).[10] This is due to the fact that the ideal positions for vote maximisation are nearer to the centre when there are fewer competitors in the system. There is thus a stronger incentive for 'product differentiation' when a system is more fragmented (Cox, 1990; Kitschelt, 1994, p. 118).

If this is applied to a polity where the potential for multidimensionality exists, then an increase in the number of parties could also mean that parties will have an incentive to show greater flexibility in terms of their issue interconnections. So parties may be motivated to combine issue positions in more diverse ways if they face a greater number of competitors. However, the theoretical counter-argument – that larger party systems create tighter interconnections between policy positions – has also been made. Sartori (1976, p. 304) states the simple hypothesis that 'the more the parties, the more their competition tends to spread along a linear, left-right type of space'. In other words, the interconnections are tighter if there are more parties in the system. Multidimensionality will only occur when there is a second dimension where two or more parties (forming part of a larger party system) compete only with each other, in a distinct arena. Sartori sees an even greater need for simple representations of political competition where there are a large number of parties. Theoretically, it is difficult to

[10] An argument could also be made that electoral systems can affect strategic incentives as well. However, the primary effect of electoral systems in this context is likely to be their influence on party system size (Duverger, 1954; Cox, 1997), so the focus here is exclusively on party system size.

decide which of the two accounts is more plausible; here, I thus mainly want to point out the possibility that issue interconnections may differ systematically depending on party system size.

Time

Issue systems can also change over time, although this should happen less often than might be expected. A change in an issue system is a change in the relationship between two of the component issues within a party ideology. This could mean a wholesale change from strongly interconnected to independent, but an issue pair could also simply weaken in terms of the extent of the mutual linkage. Such change could be restricted to one party within the party system or could affect it as a whole. In terms of static interconnections, change over time means that one issue becomes a more or less strong predictor of the chosen position or salience on the other issue. For dynamic interconnections, change over time implies that, when a party moves on one issue, the implications for a second issue strengthen or weaken.

The extent to which change over time is possible depends on the source of the particular issue interconnection. Those based on logic should be the least amenable to change: if two issues are linked due to the need for ideological coherence, this pair is unlikely to evolve much over time. A possible example could, however, be the links between economic and environmental policy. In general, these two issues areas are seen as closely linked, at least partly due to the need for internal coherence. It would have been difficult for parties to defend a platform that was based on free-market reforms but advocated stronger environmental regulation. However, a case has been made recently, for instance in the Stern Review on the economics of climate change, that tighter environmental regulation is necessary to protect economic growth in the long run

(Stern, 2006); it could therefore be logically consistent to advocate economic growth and environmental protection. Nevertheless, in most cases a change in the fundamental logical links between two issue areas should be rare.

However, other sources should be more amenable to change over time. For instance, the quasi-logic that in the United States binds support for weak gun laws to opposition to abortion and gay marriage could be undermined in the long run (Poole, 2005). Issue interconnections may also simply result from the aggregate distribution of voter preferences, and these may shift more frequently over time. Thus, it may be that some packages of issue positions are quite rare in the electorate, for example an opposition to immigration coupled with left-leaning economic policies. However, due to social and political change, these two issue position may become more heavily represented, leading parties to follow suit by weakening their interconnections on that issue pair. This can be reflected in static terms, as the extent to which economic policy can predict a party's immigration stance may weaken. However, the change may also be dynamic, with movement on economic policy no longer mirrored by movement on immigration. However, in general it appears that issue interconnections should be relatively stable, as the causes behind issue system change are likely to be gradual and rare.

Issue interconnections and political competition

Issue interconnections would be of little interest if they did not have an effect on political competition more generally. However, the way issues are linked to one another is of significant importance for the way parties compete. In this section, I will first draw in detail the distinction between policy interconnections and party system dimensionality; in particular, I will show that issue interconnections within party

ideologies influence the dimensionality of the party system as a whole. Then, I will argue that policy interconnections represent a further limitation on pure Downsian party competition and, finally, I will address the larger implications of issue interconnections for voter choices and policy outcomes.

Policy interconnections and party system dimensionality

Describing the shape of party systems and the nature of policy interconnections requires treading the line between oversimplified and overwhelmingly detailed description. This was already recognised by Lipset and Rokkan (1967, p. 36), who contrasted the dangers of 'getting lost in the wealth of fascinating detail' and of 'succumb[ing] to facile generalities'. As an approach, examining policy interconnections provides a greater level of information than looking at party system dimensionality, yet the additional detail is useful and helps to understand both dimensionality and policy competition.

Policy interconnections and party systems are related concepts. They are related because both concepts concern the links between policy areas; they are different because the former refers to the ideologies of individual parties, while the latter considers the policy packages of all parties within a political system. While dimensionality is a concept that operates at the system level, issue interconnections and issue systems operate at the party level, that is, an analytical step below that of party system dimensionality. When comparing policy interconnections, we look at parties and issues, not party systems and dimensions. The approach is therefore more disaggregated than comparing party systems, and the level of detail provided consequently greater. Studying the links between policy areas at this lower level allows the study of the characteristics of parties and issues as opposed to party systems as a whole. This means that different topics can be examined. Two examples are:

- The precise interconnection in static and dynamic terms between two specific issues, for example environmental and economic policy, that is, whether positions and salience of one predict position and salience of the other and whether position and salience move together on both issues.
- The attributes of the issue systems of specific parties, in particular the unusualness of certain issues within their programmes, and of different policy areas, in particular their general interconnectedness.

In dimensional analysis, using a greater level of aggregation, these characteristics of party ideologies could not be examined as easily as dimensions refer to the nature of the party system as a whole rather than the attributes of particular parties.

Yet the two concepts are of course clearly related and the boundaries not easily drawn. It is worth illustrating the links between policy interconnections and party system dimensionality using a simple example, Figure 3.5. The starting situation is a two-dimensional three-party system, where party positions on the only two salient issues are not correlated. Party A is liberal and on the economic left, Party C is authoritarian and on the economic right. Party B1 is centrist on economic policy but more socially liberal than the other two parties. On economics, the order of parties is thus ABC, but on liberal-authoritarianism BAC. In this party system, knowledge of a party's economic policy position is not of significant help in predicting a party's views on liberal-authoritarianism. More precisely, it appears that economics and liberal-authoritarianism are statically linked for parties A and C, but not for B.

What about party policy change? For parties A and C, dynamic interconnections are similarly simple: all issues are strongly linked, and movement on one issue would also lead to movement on all other issues. They would thus move along the straight line indicated in the Figure. However, party B has a more complex issue system: its position



Figure 3.5 **Party system dimensionality and policy interconnections**

on liberal-authoritarianism is independent of its position on economic policy in terms of its interconnections. This means that, for that party, change in the economic policy position has no consequences for its views on liberal-authoritarianism, and vice versa. By moving from B1 to B2, party B collapses the two dimensions of party competition: as B2 is at the centre on liberal-authoritarianism, this decreases the dimensionality of the party system as a whole. Nevertheless, there has been no change in the nature of the issue interconnections for parties A and B. In sum, party system dimensionality and issue systems are clearly related - but not identical – concepts.

Issue systems and Downsian party competition

Issue systems are a limitation on pure Downsian party competition (Downs, 1957). In what has been called the 'comic-book' version of this theory (Grofman, 2004), party positions on a single left-right dimension of economic policy are chosen as a simple consequence of the distribution of voter preference. In a two-party system, parties should locate themselves at the position of the median voter. Moreover, parties will closely track any changes in the median voter's opinion. This simplified version of Downs' account depends on a large number of assumptions (Grofman, 2004). Its predictions are modified if one takes into account, for example, the need for campaign contributions (Miller and Schofield, 2003) and the influence of party activists (Aldrich, 1983; Schofield, 2003). Other variations of Downs' model, such as abstention and alienation, different electoral systems and multidimensionality, have also led to greater nuance in the rational-choice conception of party competition (Smithies, 1941; McKelvey, 1976; Cox, 1990; Adams et al., 2005). Starting from the very basic model of Downsian competition, a more realistic picture of how parties pursue electoral success has been constructed.

Issue systems represent another limitation on the pure Downsian understanding of party competition. One reason for this is that static interconnections provide a different explanation of party locations in the policy space. As Marks and Wilson have argued, party positions are not always 'efficient responses to electoral incentives' (2000, p. 434). Parties cannot simply consider the range of salient policies and choose the one on each that is closest to the median voter. This is not possible in issue systems characterised by strong interconnections. In such party profiles, positions are interdependent, with choices in one policy area necessitating a similar position on closely interconnected issues.

Of course, if issue systems are the same for parties as they are for voters, interconnections are not a limitation on political parties' strategic choices. In other words, if the interconnections present within citizens' packages of policy positions are identical to those within party programmes, then parties' choices are not additionally constrained by the interrelationships within issue systems. However, this is unlikely to be the case in any realistic political system. Voter opinions tend to be more complex than those of parties: there is a greater diversity in issue interconnections among citizens than among their political representatives. This may simply be a result of numbers, as there are obviously far more voters than there are parties, so the likelihood that there will be more and different patterns of policy interconnections is naturally larger. Finally, voter opinions are likely to be growing more complex as part of the more general process of electoral dealignment and cognitive mobilisation (Dalton, 2006; Mair, 2008). It is probable that the diversity of voter opinions is always greater than that of party ideologies.

It is not just because of the multiplicity of voter views that issue systems are likely to be less tightly organised among individuals than among parties. As we have seen, parties have a particular incentive to be seen to follow the dictates of logic and present a coherent, reliable platform (Downs, 1957; Ferejohn, 1993). While voters are not punished for ideological incoherence, this may well happen to parties. Moreover, citizens have few practical incentives to shape a relatively simple ideology, while parties benefit from providing a useful heuristic for voters. In addition, the actors who decide on party policy are all members of the political elite: these are exactly the type of people Converse (1964) would expect to exhibit stronger issue constraints. In sum, it is likely that the issue interconnections within party profiles are stronger and less diverse

than among voters, and, as a consequence, the nature of issue systems represents a real limitation on positional choice as a pure result of electoral incentives.

A second reason why issue systems represent another limitation on the pure Downsian understanding of party competition is that dynamic interconnections mean that party movement cannot be seen as the simple reflection of changes in the median voter position. Instead, if two issues are dynamically interconnected, movement on one issue also leads to similar policy change on the second issue. The party may choose to change its position on one issue in order to achieve its strategic objectives. These can be pure vote-seeking, of course, but they may also be mediated by (among other factors) the influence of activists, campaign resources and probabilistic decision-making, or motivated by office- and policy-seeking considerations (Strom, 1990). The choice to move on one issue, however, may have consequences for other components of the issue system. Here, again, this is not relevant or problematic for parties if issue systems among voters and parties are identical, as the associated movement caused by interconnections would also reflect voter views. Yet, the arguments above have shown that such party-voter congruence of issue systems is unlikely to be the case. Therefore, issue interconnections limit pure Downsian policy change due to the lack of independence between policy areas.

Issue systems, voter choices and political outcomes

So far, I have considered the implications of issue systems for party systems and party competition in isolation, that is, without considering the events that precede and follow elections: voters' choices and public policy outcomes. Yet, the existence of issue interconnections has political effects on these two aspects of political conflict and thus for democratic decision-making in general.

First, the pattern of policy interconnections may have an effect on the choices that citizens can make. More specifically, citizen choices are limited by the existence and nature of issue systems among political parties. This is because the complexity of voter preferences on distinct issue areas is unlikely to be fully represented by the party system. Policy interconnections within party ideologies contribute to this lack of equivalence. I have already described above that the interconnections among political parties should be stronger and less diverse than among citizens. Moreover, as a result of factors such as the strategic incentives created by electoral systems (Cox, 1987), there will be fewer political parties within each political system than there are common issue system types among citizens. This means that policy interconnections, which constrain the positions and movements of political parties, also limit the political choices open to voters. This may also reduce the ability of voters to select and control their representatives effectively (Ferejohn, 1993).

These limitations are partly the result of the fact that citizens have to vote on the entire package of policy positions presented by parties (Thomassen, 1999, p. 34). As Stimson (2004, p. 61) argues: 'The problem is that the mechanism of choice [in elections] does not permit the expression of multiple and conflicting views.' If it were possible to choose a party for each distinct issue area at a time, voters would find themselves in a less restricted position. Parties would still be limited in their freedom of choice concerning their positions, as the requirements of logic and coherence would still apply. However, voters could pick the party that best fits their position on each issue, even if their precise issue system was not represented by any one political party. Yet, given that elections in representative democracies are always on packages of positions, the fact that political parties operate within a world of constrained issue systems means that voter choice is fundamentally limited. In Stimson's (2004, p. 61)

words, 'as the number of issues goes beyond, say, two or three, it becomes exceedingly unlikely that either of two candidates will have the same mix [of views on multiple controversies] you have.' This problem is exacerbated by the fact that policy interconnections are stronger for parties than for voters.

Second, policy interconnections also have an effect on political outcomes. First, and most directly, the existence of strong issue linkages will limit the possible combinations of policies that will be enacted by governments. When choosing a government, voters also choose the specific package of policies they want to be realised; if the policy profiles are constrained, then so are governments' policy outputs. To use a simplified example, economic policy might be strongly connected to environmental policy positions. In that case, it is very unlikely that a government will be formed that supports, say, free-market reforms as well as tough environmental protection through industry regulation. Issue interconnections can also have an effect on coalition formation, which will of course also influence policy outcomes. In particular, the strength of issue interconnections should affect the flexibility of potential coalition partners. Imagine a situation where two parties are attempting to form a government, but they are separated by great differences on a specific issue. The two potential governmental parties may be more willing to compromise if the issue in question is one that is relatively independent. This would mean that it would be easier for one or both parties to agree to a shift in their position in order to achieve the gains of office, as moving on this isolated issue would have very few effects on their policy profile as a whole.[11] Policy interconnections may therefore also influence the dynamic of coalition negotiations. To sum up, issue systems will influence more than party ideologies and

[11] I also assume here that the issue is not one of overriding salience, at least for one of the two parties.

strategies as they may place limits on voter choice, policy outcomes and coalition bargaining.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented in detail the theoretical framework that will guide the empirical analysis in the following chapters. Party ideologies are usefully conceptualised as issue systems: a set of interconnected issue components containing positional and salience information. These interconnections can be static or dynamic, that is, visible at one point in time or visible during component change. This chapter also shows how the policy interconnections approach is related to the concept of party system dimensionality.

Crucially, the issue components within a party ideology vary greatly in the extent of their mutual interconnection. It is this diversity that creates important implications for party competition: interconnections represent a further limitation on pure Downsian vote-maximising strategies. However, as policy areas are generally more tightly bound within parties than among voters, issue interconnections also create limitations for electoral democracy (in particular citizens' freedom of choice) and for public policy outcomes (in particular the range of likely coalition outcomes). Patterns of policy interconnections can also vary predictably between the economic left and right, between countries and between party families; within each party, variation may exist over time or between position and salience.

So far, the discussion has remained largely theoretical, though continued reference was made to the well-examined issue pair of economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism. The following chapters will examine in detail and empirically the nature of policy interconnections and their effect on party competition. Chapters 5 and 6

examine interconnections between issue positions: static interconnections are first mapped and then used to predict the occurrence of dynamic interconnections. Chapter 7 turns to salience interconnections and examines their static and dynamic strength. Chapter 8 explores an issue-specific measure of interconnection strength – unusualness – and uses this to predict salience levels. Before turning to the empirical analysis of interconnections, it is first necessary to consider how issue positions and salience can be measured, and this is the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Measuring positions and salience in expert surveys and party manifestos

Measuring political science variables is one of the key challenges in the discipline. Even if we accept that complex empirical phenomena can be reasonably captured by relatively simple quantitative measures, there will still be a need to debate exactly how real-world occurrences should be transformed into comparable indices. While the discussions surrounding measurement may quickly appear arcane and over-detailed, these concerns are of central importance to comparative political science. If the aim is to compare in any meaningful way, either across countries or across time, then we need to be sure that our measurement strategy is accurate. This also applies to the location of party positions and estimates of issue salience.

Thus far, the focus of this thesis has been on the theoretical aspects of issue interconnections. Beginning with this chapter, these ideas are applied to an empirical analysis of the ideologies and programmes of political parties. To compare party stances, we first need to be able to measure position and salience on a series of distinct policy areas. Given the complexity of political debates and party ideologies, this is no simple or obvious task. The aim of this chapter is therefore to assess different ways of measuring party positions on distinct issue areas. Two data sources will prove to be particularly useful: the expert surveys of Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006), and the work of the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001;

Klingemann et al., 2007). Most importantly, both sources provide information on a series of different issues and provide for clear cross-country comparability.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I assess possible approaches to measuring party positions and detail how expert surveys and party manifestos can be used as sources of evidence on issue interconnections. I then briefly describe the policy areas included in each survey and how position and salience are measured. In the final section, I present outline descriptive statistics for the two measures, including a brief analysis of their intercorrelation.

Approaches to measuring the positions of political actors

It will never be possible to measure policy positions directly. While we can determine with considerable certainty phenomena such as temperature or elevation, the assessment of the location of political parties will always be approximate (Benoit and Laver, 2006). This is because the measurement of party positions necessarily represents a simplified summary of a complex reality. Take, for example, a simple statement such as: 'Labour is to the left of the Conservatives on economic policy.' Already, this sentence contains certain important assumptions. For example, what is the time period under consideration: this week, this year or this decade? What topics fall under the heading 'economic policy'? And what level of the party is concerned: the party leaders, the parliamentary party or the party members? And, of course, what is it that means that Labour's position is to the 'left' of the Conservatives'? In describing party positions in spatial terms, we always have to make important conceptual decisions, and these are not always made explicit.

Nevertheless, the usefulness of even approximate measurements of party positions makes the endeavour worthwhile. Political scientists have taken several routes

in trying to assess empirically the spatial location of political parties. These can be summarised under four headings: self-reported, behavioural, reputational and textual (Ray, 2007). First, self-reported party locations are based on information provided directly by political actors. The most straightforward example is opinion surveys, with party positions measured, for example, as the mean position of a party's supporters. This information could also be provided by members of parliament (e.g. Farrell et al., 2006). Second, the primary behavioural measurement of party positions is through roll-call votes. Here, the publicly available information on the voting behaviour of members of parliament is used to provide summary scales of the positions of individual legislators and party groups (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Hix et al., 2007). Third, expert surveys measure party positions based on their reputations. The surveys differ significantly from one another in terms of the number and content of the questions asked and of the number of experts consulted, but all are based on the assumption that the aggregated assessments of well-informed observers will provide a reasonable approximation of a party's spatial location. Finally, textual approaches use political documents to extract party positions.

Two types of textual analysis need to be distinguished. The first is based on hand-coding: this approach is represented by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), which has used human coders in gathering data on party policies since 1945, using party manifestos (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2007). A more recent project based on human coding has used newspaper articles instead of party manifestos (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008b). The second, more recent approach to text analysis is based on computer-assisted document coding, limiting the amount and extent of human input required (Laver and Garry, 2000; Laver et al., 2003; Slapin and Proksch, 2008).

The data needed to map policy interconnections has to provide reliable and internationally comparable information on party positions on a series of issues. This means that measures that only provide positions on a left-right dimension are of no use, and neither are measurements that do not allow for direct comparisons across countries. A third requirement is that it be possible to follow changes in party positions over time, as a core feature of this research is the examination of dynamic interconnections. These three requirements mean that the sources of positional information that I can use are greatly reduced in number.

Two approaches to measuring party positions, self-reported and behavioural, are clearly not suited to mapping issue interconnections. First, self-reported measures are not useful for my purposes. Measures of party ideology based on MP self-placement is simply too thin on the ground to be used in this research. Voter-based information, which is of course more broadly available, is limited for two reasons. First, on a practical level, my need for easily comparable measures of party positions over time means that it would be difficult to find such information on a consistent series of issues in the wealth of (not necessarily overlapping) studies of voter opinion. If the questions and contexts are not consistent between countries and over time, then extracting party positions on a series of issues would require significant compromises in terms of reliability and accuracy. In addition, I am primarily interested in party elite's ideological positioning; indeed, I mostly assume parties to be unitary actors. Voter assessments of party positions are not necessarily reliable or accurate. They are therefore not a methodologically appropriate source of positional information. Second, behavioural measures are not a useful source of party positions, either. Parliamentarians' voting behaviour in most countries is characterised by government-opposition dynamics rather than policy differences (Hix and Noury, 2007). The United

States Congress is unusual rather than typical in this regard. Even if policy voting was dominant, then the lack of broad and easily available cross-national data would represent a significant limitation.

Measuring party positions using expert surveys and manifestos

This leaves reputational and textual measures of party positions, both of which can be used to examine issue interconnections. In particular, this thesis makes extensive use of the expert surveys carried out by Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006) and of the textual data coded by the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2007). Since there is no objective measure of party positions, each data source has its limitations – but also its strengths. If the findings are consistent, using both sources will add considerable weight to the results (Marks, 2007). I will now describe what exactly is measured in expert surveys and manifesto coding and present the advantages and drawbacks of each measure in turn.

Expert surveys

The first expert survey in political science was carried out by Jean-Michael Morgan for his (unpublished) 1976 dissertation (Morgan, 1976; Gabel and Huber, 2000). Since then, a number of these studies have been conducted, beginning with Castles and Mair's (1984) survey in the early 80s (Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Ray, 1999; McElroy and Benoit, 2007). The geographical coverage of these surveys has been increasing steadily, with broad coverage now of countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Benoit and Laver, 2006) and in Latin America (Wiesehomeier and Benoit, 2009) as well as the usual 'advanced' democracies of Western Europe and the English-speaking world.

Expert surveys have taken three forms. First, some surveys have simply asked for party positions on a left-right dimension (e.g., Castles and Mair, 1984; Huber and Inglehart, 1995). At the other extreme, the surveys carried out by Laver and Hunt and Benoit and Laver requested experts to place parties on at least seven distinct issue dimensions. Indeed, the first of these two broad-based surveys did not even include a question on the general left-right position of each party. Finally, a third group of surveys occupy a half-way point by measuring parties' left-right positions as well as their stance on only a limited number of other issues. In the case of the 1999 and 2002 Chapel Hill surveys, these are parties' views on economic policy and 'gal/tan' topics.[12]

Even though they differ in the number of issues or dimensions examined, all expert surveys are based on a strong a priori definition of policy spaces (Benoit and Laver, 2006, p. 108). This means that in these surveys the leading researcher decides on the issues to be measured in each country before asking for expert assessment of party positions. This is also the case when the researcher consults experts in advance on the topics that should be considered salient in each country. A further complication arises when the survey contains questions concerning distinct issue areas rather than clearly aggregate dimensions such as left-right or gal-tan. Even a question concerning party position on, say, immigration is necessarily an aggregate assessment of separate policies. To use Poole's (2005) terms, expert surveys cannot assess party positions in the 'action space', the pure, unreduced set of party positions on all political topics. Instead, experts can only provide information on a simplified policy space. This may or may not be equal to the 'basic space', the low-dimensional world that parties and politicians actually operate in. As the main researcher pre-defines the main issues, the nature of the action space is primarily determined by the survey approach chosen. The

[12] Gal/tan refers to 'green/alternative/liberal' and 'traditional/authoritarian/nationalist'. The most recent Chapel Hill survey (Hooghe et al., 2008) includes a far greater range of issues, but for a smaller number of countries than measured in Benoit and Laver.

Laver/Hunt and Benoit/Laver surveys are the most open regarding the real shape of the action space, as they at least provide party positions on a relatively broad range of distinct issues and are agnostic concerning the way these are then reduced into a low-dimensional space. Nevertheless, all expert surveys are by their very nature indirect measurements of policy positions (Benoit and Laver, 2006, p. 110).

The questions asked of experts possess surface clarity. However, to request an assessment of a party's position on a given issue or dimension is actually vaguer than it appears. Budge (2000) highlights four key ambiguities. First, which party is being measured? Experts could, for example, assess party members or party leaders. Second, do experts judge party intentions or party behaviour? Third, what time frame is being assessed in order to determine party positions? Here, experts may look at the past month, the past year or even the past decade. Finally, what criteria do experts use to judge party positions? Referring to left-right judgements, Budge argues that it is not clear what each expert considers as part of that dimension and how each element is weighted. This is also true for other summary dimensions such as gal/tan, but can also apply to the distinct issues measured by Laver/Hunt and Benoit/Laver. Even when it comes to single issue areas such as immigration or the environment, it is not obvious what each expert considers to be part of each political topic. These four ambiguities would be less of a concern if experts varied consistently on each, but internal diversity among survey respondents is also likely. For example, some experts may give an assessment of party positions within the past year or so, while others will take a longer-term view.

In fact, the latter seems most likely: the assessments of policy positions by experts are remarkably stable over time (Volkens, 2007, p. 109). For example, the correlation between the left-right scores recorded by Castles and Mair (1984), Laver

and Hunt (1992) and Huber and Inglehart (1995) is extremely high (McDonald and Mendes 2001, p. 100). It seems that experts tend to ignore short-term changes in party positions and instead provide long-term estimates of left-right views. As a result, expert surveys scores will tend to underestimate the actual level of parties' ideological movements. This of course means that it is difficult to assess party policy change using expert surveys (McDonald et al., 2007).

Another concern with expert survey measurements, especially for this research, is that the respondents might make party profiles appear more coherent than they in fact are. This is because the experts provide positions on each issue in turn. They are thus perhaps automatically inclined to giving similar scores to the party on each issue, maybe even more so if they are unsure of the party's actual position. Moreover, the expert's sophisticated understanding of politics is likely to create a tendency to see coherence where there is none: for example, a respondent may link positions on economics and the environment even though the party does not do so.

However, despite these conceptual and practical shortcomings, expert surveys possess a number of considerable virtues. Survey responses are conceptually clear as they are openly based on a spatial interpretation of party competition. The scores are thus 'unequivocally positional' (Laver and Garry, 2000, p. 621). In addition, each issue or dimension is relatively well-defined, as questions are explicit concerning what should be assessed by respondents, even if this is only a vague left-right scale. The information provided by experts is easy to interpret and straightforward. As a result of the survey, researchers are provided with a mean party score on a pre-defined scale. This also increases the comparability of party positions, not just within but also across countries. Given these significant advantages – and of course the problems associated

with the other approaches to positional measurement – I use expert surveys as one of my two main data sources.

Party manifestos

The Comparative Manifestos Project is one of the most important research endeavours in political science (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2007). The extent of its coverage is impressive: it has made publicly available information on 1314 election manifestos by 651 parties in 51 countries (Benoit et al., 2009). For some countries, the range of elections included begins in 1945, providing researchers with a long time-series of party policies. This is one of the strengths of using texts as a source of information on party ideology: it is much easier to extract a position from a sixty-year-old text than it is to travel back in time to request an expert assessment. Such a document is also a real and unchangeable historical artefact that records a party's programme at a specific point in time. In contrast to expert views, manifestos are thus a tangible and immutable object.

Why code manifestos? It is argued that these documents provide one, and possibly the only, collective and negotiated statement of party policies (Hansen, 2008). They are usually decided at a high level within a party and are produced to set out a party's positions on a wide range of issues, addressing a broad audience. Moreover, party manifestos have been written for a long time, making them amenable to long-term analysis. These documents are therefore well-suited to content analysis. Yet the status of manifestos is not entirely clear or consistent (Ray, 2007, p. 17). They can be seen as contracts, advertisements or statements of principle. As contracts, manifestos would be (theoretically) binding and realistically implementable; as advertisements, they would adhere to less stringent norms of truth, accuracy and realism; and as statements of

principle, they would reflect a party's ideal policy preferences and have little connection to the election at hand. It is likely that manifestos vary in their purpose, and they could even combine all three elements. While manifestos may at first sight appear to be a constant, cross-national feature of party politics, they also differ in their aims and content. Nevertheless, systematically analysing party manifestos at the very least improves upon mere anecdotal political research and may provide a relatively consistent and coherent means of measuring party policies (McLean, 2006).

The CMP extracts information on party policies through the hand coding of these manifestos. Its general approach is somewhat idiosyncratic. For one, its conceptual foundations lie in salience theory (Budge and Farlie, 1983), a rival to Downsian positional theory whose core thesis is that parties tend to 'talk past each other', in other words, each party selectively emphasises only those topics on which it sees itself as having an electoral advantage. Parties thus do not take positions on the same issue in election contests, but compete on separate ideological ground. Based on this theory, each textual unit is assigned to 1 of 56 categories, with an additional category for 'uncoded' units. A unit is a quasi-sentence: this term refers either to full sentences or to parts of the text the coder sees as a stand-alone statement. The scores for each category are the percentage of each manifesto devoted to each topic. Yet, the salience approach is not pursued fully. Of the 56 categories, only 1 is purely salience-based ('economic goals'). All other categories are either explicitly positional (and described as 'positive' or 'negative') or include a clear normative statement (McDonald and Mendes, 2001, p. 92). Indeed, the main use of the CMP dataset to date – as well as the main controversies surrounding it – have been based on the left-right scores extracted from the database (Budge and Laver, 1992a). In other words, a coding project

based on the assumptions of salience theory has found greatest application as a source of positional information.

The CMP data has also been the object of other criticisms. In particular, users of the data have questioned the design of the coding scheme and its implementation. A key disadvantage is its use of a fixed coding scheme. This was originally developed in 1979 (Pennings and Keman, 2002, p. 66), thirty years ago, and has started to show its age. For example, it does not contain an explicit reference to unemployment, while the topic of migration is also only inadequately reflected.[13] The assumption that one coding scheme can summarise all political documents successfully is a strong one, and one that will become less defensible with time and with the inclusion of further countries. Already, many manifestos contain a large number of 'uncoded' text units: in Denmark, for example, the average since 1945 has been over 30 per cent (Hansen, 2008). In the most recent version of the CMP data, additional categories were included for the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, but this has done little to remedy this problem. Laver and Garry (2000) have proposed a more flexible, collapsible and amendable coding scheme, but manifesto coders have not taken this up. In any case, it is now difficult to go back and re-code all manifestos, so there is little option but to use the data as it is now coded.

There is also little way of knowing how uncertain the manifesto coding is. First, each manifesto was in most cases only coded once. Human coding will always be subject to unavoidable errors and subjective judgements, but a minimum level of inter-coder agreement is necessary for users of the data to be confident that the scores provide an approximate measurement. Even though the CMP coders received individual training, it is difficult to know how accurate the coding has been. Recent research

[13] The only relevant categories are multiculturalism and nationalism.

shows that coder reliability is remarkably low (Mikhaylov et al., 2008). Another form of error arises from the fact that only one manifesto is coded for each party for each election (Benoit et al., 2009). We can think of a manifesto as a randomly distributed representation of the party's true policy stances. Each manifesto is then related to the party's actual views, but there is uncertainty concerning the distance between the document and the party's stance. Unlike expert surveys, the manifesto data contains no measurement of the uncertainty surrounding the data provided. Benoit et al. have provided a possible remedy for this second form of error, but the first source cannot currently be overcome.

The existence of such errors, which may be quite large, means that it is difficult to assess party movements. In contrast to expert surveys, parties change their political views considerably in the CMP-coded manifestos (McDonald et al., 2007). The question is then how this movement should be interpreted. Is it just random 'noise' arising from the inaccurate measurement of policy positions provided by manifesto coding? Or is it 'real' movement, that is, actual and intended policy change carried out by political parties? Among observers of political parties, there is no consensus on whether parties are overwhelmingly stable or frequently erratic (McDonald, 2004). The fact that the nature of the error in policy position estimates is unknown makes it difficult to assess ideological change within political parties, as we are unable to separate the 'noise' from the 'signal', that is, parties' actual and intended movements.

Other doubts concerning the manifesto data have also come to the fore. Hansen (2008) has examined the Danish part of the CMP in detail and found significant shortcomings. For one, the documents used vary considerably in length: the number of words ranged from 268 to 16,371. In fact, there are many very short manifestos in the CMP dataset. According to Benoit and Laver (2007a), 14 percent of all manifestos have

less than 50 quasi-sentences, and one-third contain less than 100. The shorter the manifesto, the greater the possible error in measurement. Moreover, Hansen also finds that the documents were not all party manifestos in the strict sense of the word. Some of the manifestos used were speeches in local constituencies, while others were selections from party newspapers. In total, the selection of documents is not consistent and somewhat eclectic. Pelizzo's (2003) detailed analysis of the left-right positions of Italian parties also shows some startling inconsistencies compared to in-depth political analysis of each election. Finally, there is a large number of zeros in the coding of each manifesto (Hans and Hönnige, 2008). In each document, over half of possible categories were not used. It is unclear whether these are strategically de-emphasised categories, issues that were not salient at that election – or categories that suffer from significant overlap with others (Mikhaylov et al., 2008).

Despite this avalanche of criticism, CMP data is still worth analysing. For one, it has proved remarkably useful and does not perform particularly badly when compared to other sources of positional information (Keman, 2007). While not perfect, the data is also far from being completely random and unreliable. It is particularly remarkable that this coding method, based on salience theory, has shown itself to be useful as a source of positional information as well. Moreover, the time period, countries and parties covered is simply unparalleled in current research. Importantly, the project used a unique coding scheme for all manifestos, making scores directly comparable. Unlike the expert surveys, the manifesto data is at least unequivocal in terms of what it measures: each case refers to a specific time point, with information taken from a (usually) clearly defined document, analysed using a consistent coding scheme. For my purposes, CMP data is of particular use as it contains information on a wide variety of issues, with few a priori assumptions concerning the structure of the party-political

space. In sum, manifesto data is useful because it has a proven track record, covers a long time period, can be used for positional analysis, is based on clear, transparent foundations and contains information on a broad range of topics. All these factors make manifesto data an indispensible source of information on policy interconnections.

Issues measured in expert surveys and manifestos

Party stances on political issues will be measured using two data sources, expert surveys and party manifestos. While using two data sources will add weight to my findings, it is also necessary to underline that, as described above, the two data sources are based on very different assumptions and approaches. It would go too far to expect results from both datasets to be completely identical. In addition, issue positions are extracted from each dataset using different approaches. In the following, the precise issues included in each dataset are described briefly, and the next chapters will address in more detail how these are used to measure issue interconnections in party competition.

Expert surveys

As already noted, the analysis of distinct issue areas is limited by the number of issues that have been included in expert surveys. Only two surveys, by Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006) currently go beyond left-right and other summary dimensions. The two surveys, carried out in 1989 and 2002-03 respectively, are unique in that at least seven issues are covered for each country, with many more issues available for some political systems. However, two aspects limit the use of these issue measurements in my research. First, the questions differed in the two surveys. Benoit and Laver decided not to repeat the same questions in their follow-up to the original

Laver and Hunt research. This is not surprising, as a question on the attitude to the USSR would have been nonsensical in 2003, while clericalism and urban-rural relations had both declined quite strongly in terms of political importance. Second, while the Laver and Hunt survey requested party positions on the same eight issues in almost all countries, Benoit and Laver decided to let the questions vary in the follow-up survey. This is of course a reasonable strategy to estimate national party positions, as the salient issues are not the same in each country (Stoll, 2005). However, this clearly limits the cross-national comparability of positions.

This leaves a core of four questions that are available for all countries in both surveys (see Table 4.1): economic policy (taxes versus spending), liberal-authoritarianism[14], environmental policy and decentralization. Instead of simply asking for positions on such abstract concepts, experts were asked concrete questions (also presented in Table 4.1). These four core questions will also be the focus of the empirical analysis in the following chapters: using these issues, issue interconnections in static and dynamic terms are analysed for 23 countries.[15] I do not, of course, claim that these four issues cover all important topics in the political debates of each country. However, the aim is to examine interconnections between issues cross-nationally and not to present an exhaustive account of political competition in each party system. The four main issues included are nevertheless wide-ranging and cover many of the core political conflicts in contemporary societies (see also Warwick, 2002, p. 104).

[14] This is called 'social policy' in the Laver-Hunt and Benoit-Laver surveys; however, due to the many meanings of that term, as well as in order to be consistent with the manifesto data and existing research, I have renamed this issue 'liberal-authoritarianism' throughout. Obviously, this term is not perfect either, as the topics mentioned in the question refer more to liberalism than to authoritarianism, but it probably captures the intentions of the survey question better than 'social policy'.

[15] The 23 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US. I excluded parties scoring less than 1% at the most recent election from my analysis. Liberal-authoritarianism is not available for New Zealand in 2003; Decentralisation is not available for Israel in 2003.

Issue	Question wording	B&L survey (2003)	L&H survey (1989)
Economic (Spending v. Taxes)	Promotes raising taxes to increase public services. (-9.5) Promotes cutting public services to cut taxes. (9.5)	Yes	Yes
Liberal-authoritarianism	Favours liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (-9.5) Opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (9.5)	Yes	Yes
Environment	Supports protection of the environment, even at the cost of economic growth. (-9.5) Supports economic growth, even at the cost of damage to the environment. (9.5)	Yes	Yes
Decentralisation	Promotes decentralization of all administration and decision-making. (-9.5) Opposes any decentralization of administration and decision-making. (9.5)	Yes	Yes
Immigration	Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into society. (-9.5) Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin. (9.5)	Yes	No
EU Support	Several questions combined; negative values (up to -9.5) indicate support for further European integration or joining the EU, positive values (up to 9.5) indicate opposition to European integration or EU membership.	Yes	No
Economic (Public Ownership)	Promotes public ownership. (-9.5). Opposes public ownership. (9.5)	No	Yes
Foreign policy	Supports friendly relations with the USSR. (-9.5) Opposes friendly relations with the USSR. (9.5)	No	Yes
Clericalism	Anti-clerical (-9.5) Pro-clerical (9.5)	No	Yes
Urban-rural relations	Promotes urban interests (-9.5) Promotes rural interests (9.5)	No	Yes

Table 4.1 **Issues and question wording in the Benoit and Laver and Laver and Hunt expert surveys**

Source: Laver and Hunt (1992), Benoit and Laver (2006).

For each survey, a few other issues are also available, and these will also be included in the analysis when possible. In the Laver and Hunt survey, four other policy areas were included for almost all countries: public ownership, USSR, urban-rural relations and clericalism.[16] In the Benoit and Laver survey, one further issue, immigration, is also available for a large number of Western European and English-speaking democracies.[17] Moreover, for European countries there is information on party stances towards the European integration.[18]

Party manifestos

As already described, the CMP codes party manifestos into 56 separate issue categories. In this research, these categories are not analysed separately. For one, doing so would present practical difficulties due to the large number of zeros contained in each manifesto (Hans and Hönnige, 2008). Moreover, some categories are so similar that it does not make sense to analyse these as separate topics in party competition (Mikhaylov et al., 2008). Finally, and most importantly, the level of analysis is that of broader and general political topics or issue areas rather than detailed, time-specific issues. Similar to expert surveys, I do not look at each separate political problem but consider a higher level of aggregation, since the aim of my research is to analyse the interconnections between broad and relatively constant issue areas. A certain amount of aggregation of single political issues is a necessary step in order to make such an

[16] Clericalism is not available for Iceland.
[17] Immigration is not available for Israel. A further issue, regulation, is also available for many countries but is not analysed here as it is heavily correlated with taxes versus spending.
[18] This information is not available for non-European democracies: Australia, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand and the US. The main question I use is EU Authority, as this should assess general support or opposition to integration better than EU Accountability. EU Authority, i.e. whether the party supports or opposes the areas in which the EU has influence, is available for most 'old' EU countries (except France and Ireland). In France, Benoit and Laver asked for the party position on whether the EU should be larger and stronger, while in Ireland experts assessed party positions on a stronger and more centralised EU. In Norway, assessment of party support for joining the EU is used. For all questions, the party position can be broadly taken to represent the general position on European integration.

analysis possible and worthwhile. For example, economic policy is examined as a whole rather than broken down into its components.

Here, I present in detail my aggregation of issue categories from the CMP coding scheme. The combinations of issue categories are based largely on Budge and Laver (1992a) and Stoll (2005). The precise decision on the issues chosen and their component categories was nevertheless finally made based on my own 'accumulated substantive knowledge' (Stoll, 2005, p. 7), which was used to assess the extent to which each category relates to the others. Of course, the way categories are combined is thus researcher-led, bringing with it an unavoidable subjectivity. However, as Stoll (2005) notes, the alternative would be to abandon the endeavour altogether. The ten distinct issue areas extracted from the CMP categories are thus as follows: economic policy, foreign policy, liberal-authoritarianism, cultural-ethnic attitudes, democracy, urban-rural relations, environmental protection, European integration and decentralization (see Table 4.2). For eight of these areas, two sides of each policy, a left and a right, are identified. This means that there are categories that clearly represent opposing positions on each issue. These sides have been titled 'left' and 'right' according to their general association, but this does not indicate hypothesised static or dynamic interconnections, nor does it reflect any value judgement.

What, briefly, is the content of each of these issues? On economic policy, the opposition is between those categories that represent redistribution, regulation and state involvement and those that reflect free-market, trade-oriented values. In foreign policy, sentences favouring pacifism and internationalism are contrasted with those that support

"Left" issues	"Right" issues
Socioeconomic issues	
(from Laver/Budge, 1992):	
403 (Market Regulation: Positive)	401 (Free Enterprise: Positive)
404 (Economic Planning: Positive)	402 (Incentives: Positive)
406 (Protectionism: Positive)	407 (Protectionism: Negative)
412 (Controlled Economy: Positive)	414 (Economic Orthodoxy: Positive)
413 (Nationalisation: Positive)	
504 (Welfare State Expansion: Positive)	
701 (Labour Groups: Positive)	
(additional issues)	
409 (Keynesian Demand Management: Positive)	702 (Labour Groups: Negative)
415 (Marxist Analysis: Positive)	
503: (Social Justice: Positive)	
Foreign policy	
103 (Anti-Imperialism: Positive)	104 (Military: Positive)
105 (Military: Negative)	109 (Internationalism: Negative)
106 (Peace: Positive)	
107 (Internationalism: Positive)	
Liberal-authoritarianism	
	305 (Political Authority: Positive)
604 (Traditional Morality: Negative)	603 (Traditional Morality: Positive)
	605 (Law and Order: Positive)
Democracy	
201 (Freedom and Human Rights: Positive)	204 (Constitutionalism: Negative)
202 (Democracy: Positive)	
203 (Constitutionalism: Positive)	
Urban-rural	
703 Farmers: Positive	
Cultural-ethnic	
602 (National Way of Life: Negative)	601 (National Way of Life: Positive)
607 (Multiculturalism: Positive)	608 (Multiculturalism: Negative)
705 (Underprivileged Minorities: Positive)	
706 (Non-economic Demographic Groups: Positive)	
Education	
506 (Education Expansion: Positive)	507 (Education Expansion: Negative)
Environmental protection	
416 (Anti-Growth Economy: Positive)	
501 (Environmental Protection: Positive)	
European integration	
108 (European Integration: Positive)	110 (European Integration: Negative)
Decentralisation	
301 (Decentralisation: Positive)	302 (Centralisation: Positive)

Table 4.2 **Aggregate issues and their category components as coded by the Comparative Manifesto Project**

the military and a national-interest based approach. The third issue, liberal-authoritarianism, is intended to summarise (and borrows its name from) Kitschelt's (1994) dimension of the same name; in many ways, this issue is also similar to Inglehart's postmaterialism (1977) and postmodernism (1997). It contains sentences related to social tolerance, hierarchy and liberalism. I have separated out of this conflict the issue of environment, which is represented in the CMP by just two categories. Under the rubric of democracy fall those categories that refer to constitutional rights and the importance of democracy. The cultural-ethnic issue summarises manifesto sentences that refer to nationalism, multiculturalism and minorities. Related to this is the urban-rural cleavage, containing just one category, which is retained, following Stoll (2008, p. 6), in homage to Lipset and Rokkan (1967): while the issue may seem of little relevance today, it was clearly a core issue in earlier years. Moreover, it was also included in the Laver and Hunt survey, so is worth examining for the sake of comparison. Education, an issue that is only rarely examined in party-political terms, contains categories referring to its expansion. Finally, two issues refer to multi-level institutional changes: European integration and decentralisation.

Combining CMP categories into larger issues attenuates one of the problems identified above, namely the danger of coder unreliability. A certain amount of 'seepage' between related categories has been found (Mikhaylov et al., 2008): this means that quasi-sentences can be coded into any of several categories, making each single category an unreliable indicator. Often, but not always, this occurs on related categories (Meguid, 2008, p. 47). Combining related categories into one issue should at least overcome part of this problem, even if not all miscoding follows predictable or simple patterns. The ten issues introduced here will form the focus of the empirical analysis of party manifestos in the following chapters.

Positions and salience in expert surveys and manifestos

The expert surveys and party manifestos thus provide information on a series of issues: four or more in the surveys and ten in the manifestos. For each of these issues, two types of information are required: the position the party takes on the policy area and the salience it allocates to it. In this section, the methods for extracting position and salience are described and the two data sources briefly compared.

Policy positions in expert surveys and party manifestos

Determining policy positions using the expert surveys is straightforward. In both surveys, party positions on each issue were assessed by the respondents on a scale ranging from 1 to 20, with a midpoint of 10.5. I have recalculated the issue ranges so that this midpoint is at 0, with the scale ranging from -9.5 to 9.5.[19] For 1989 and 2003, there is thus a clear number that we can assign to each issue for each party. These are the position scores used throughout the empirical analyses. Figure 4.1 presents histograms for the six main policy positions measured in the Benoit and Laver survey and Figure 4.2 the eight issues in the Laver and Hunt survey.

Measuring the issue positions using party manifestos is far more complex than with expert surveys. It is thus worth describing in some detail the procedure used to extract positional information from a dataset at least nominally based on salience theory. The ten issue categories described above provide the starting point. By subtracting the percentage of left statements from the percentage of right statements, a raw left-right position for each issue for each party and election can be created. For

[19] It might be objected that the measurement of issue positions in both expert surveys is ordinal, so that they should not be treated as an interval-level variable in statistical analysis. However, as Warwick (2002, p. 105) argues, it is nevertheless reasonable to do so due to the precision of the scale used and the likely interpretation of the scale as interval-level by experts.



Figure 4.1 **Histogram of party positions on six main Benoit and Laver issues**

Note: Range recoded to -9.5 to 9.5; EU question wording differs by country, see text for details; y-axis shows the percentage of parties with each score; number of parties and countries for: economic policy (161 parties; 23 countries); liberal-authoritarianism (153; 22); immigration (149; 22); environment (161; 23); decentralization (149; 22); and EU (117: 16); data from Benoit and Laver (2006).



Figure 4.2 **Histogram of party positions on eight Laver and Hunt issues**

Note: Range recoded to -9.5 to 9.5; y-axis shows the percentage of parties with each score; sample: 149 parties in 23 countries, except clericalism (143; 22); data from Laver and Hunt (1992).

example, for economic policy the salience of the nine left categories is subtracted from the five right categories. This is of course not possible for the two issues for which only one 'side' of the issue is represented by coding categories; the issues in question are environmental protection and urban-rural relations. For these two policy areas, the salience score is taken as a proxy for position.

To examine static interconnections, the long-run average positions for each party across all elections are used. The mean left-right position is thus calculated for each party on each issue.[20] This is done for two reasons. First, calculating the average score should increase the reliability of the measure. Long-term means are often used to assess the validity of CMP scales (e.g. McDonald and Mendes, 2001). Second, calculating the mean score creates a value for each issue for almost all parties. It would not be theoretically justified to include an issue position if that topic was not salient in the country at the time; a possible decision rule would be a country-election salience of 1 per cent. Implementing such a cut-off line leads to a large number of missing values and limits the comparability of results between issue pairs.[21] Using long-term averages means that a score is available for almost all issues for almost all parties. Clearly, some information is lost by averaging issue scores in this way, in particular the extent to which parties move, but this aspect of party programmes is considered extensively in the Chapter 6. Here, the increased reliability and availability of issue scores justifies averaging issue positions over time. Figure 4.3 presents the histograms for the ten issue positions extracted from the party manifestos. These long-

[20] Parties were included in the analysis based on the following rules: first, all parties for which positions are available in either the Laver/Hunt or the Benoit/Laver surveys were included; second, of those parties not included in those surveys, all parties with more than 5 data points (=elections) available were included. This means that parties that only ran for election before 1989 and quickly disappeared were excluded from the analysis.

[21] In calculating the long-term issue positions, I excluded those elections where the topic was not salient. Only issues that are salient are worth examining if one is to assess the correlation among policy positions: otherwise, it makes little sense to speak of a concrete *stance* on a policy. I therefore exclude from my calculations elections where the country-election average salience is lower than one percent of statements.



Figure 4.3 **Histogram of party positions on ten issues measured by party manifestos**

Note: Outliers over +15 for urban-rural relations and environment and lower than -15 for decentralization not shown; x-axis shows the long-term average balance of right and left quasi-sentences; scale of x-axis varies by issue; y-axis shows the percentage of parties with each score; sample sizes: 192 parties in 23 countries; EU: 148 parties in 17 countries; data from Budge et al. (2001), Klingemann et al. (2007) and own calculations.

run averages can of course not be used to examine dynamic interconnections, so here the raw party-election scores are utilized; the precise model specification for this is described in detail in Chapter 6.

It is worth comparing the expert surveys and the manifestos to see the extent to which they measure the same phenomenon (Keman, 2007; Netjes and Binnema, 2007). Of course, perfect concordance should not be expected. For one, the two data sources are based on different theoretical assumptions, so it would be surprising if the resulting positions were identical. Second, the definitions of the policy areas are similar but not exactly the same. Most clearly, in the party manifestos there are no directly equivalent policy areas for the expert survey questions on liberal-authoritarianism and immigration. Finally, the time period considered is different. While expert surveys measure respondent opinion at one point in time, the CMP scores are long-run averages.

The correlations between the policy areas as measured by experts and manifestos are presented in Table 4.3. The CMP issues are listed in the rows, with the equivalent Laver and Hunt and Benoit and Laver policy areas in the columns. The CMP score is the simple long-run average of the raw policy score, that is, right minus left statements; for environment and urban-rural relations, the long-run salience averages are used. As expected, the association between the two measures is not always very strong, with most correlation coefficients between .3 and .5. The exception is economic policy, where the r-value is over .7 for both expert surveys. This is not surprising given that this category is very similar to the extensively validated left-right measure (Budge and Laver, 1992a), which correlates highly with other measures (Ray, 2007). Other issues where position measures on both datasets are similar are foreign policy, decentralisation and the EU. Correlation is also relatively strong on the environment, which supports the decision to use a simple salience measure where only one side of the

Expert survey		**Laver/ Hunt**	**Benoit/ Laver**	*Notes*
CMP Issue				
Economic Policy	**r**	0.74	0.71	
	n	134	141	
Foreign policy	**r**	0.54		*correlation with expert survey question on 'USSR relations'*
	n	132		
Liberal-authoritarianism	**r**	0.40	0.50	
	n	134	133	
Democracy	**r**	0.36	0.30	*correlation with expert survey question on 'social policy'*
	n	134	133	
Culture-ethnic matters	**r**	0.17	0.26	*correlation with expert survey question on 'social policy'; significant at only .05 level for 1989 survey*
	n	134	133	
Culture-ethnic matters	**r**		0.37	*correlation with expert survey question on 'immigration'*
	n		132	
Decentralization	**r**	0.36	0.51	
	n	128	132	
Urban-rural relations	**r**	0.35		
	n	132		
Environment	**r**	-0.47	-0.61	
	n	134	141	
EU support	**r**		0.42	*EU support measure for expert survey described in text*
	n		103	

Table 4.3 **Correlation between expert survey and CMP-extracted positions**

Note: r-value of bivariate correlation between the CMP position (long-term average) and the expert survey position on the equivalent issue shown, with sample size in the row below; all correlations significant at .01 level except as noted.

argument is coded.[22] Importantly, the correlations are always strongly significant and in the right direction. There is thus clear evidence that the policy positions in both data sources are related to a real characteristic of the parties examined.

Issue salience in expert surveys and party manifestos

As with policy positions, the two data sources differ substantially in how they measure issue salience. The expert surveys assess salience very straightforwardly: participants were asked for the 'relative importance' of each policy area for each party (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Benoit and Laver, 2006). The scale again ranges from 1 to 20, and these are the scores used throughout the empirical analyses in Chapters 7 and 8. Despite the surface clarity of these numbers, it is not obvious to what extent the expert assessment is based on a comparison to the rest of the party profile or the rest of the party system. Nevertheless, the expert surveys provide a reasonably clear, easily-employed measurement of salience on a series of issues. The histograms for the six Benoit and Laver and the eight Laver and Hunt salience scores are presented in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.

For the CMP data, the separate ten issues identified are again used. To establish party positions, 'left' statements had been subtracted from 'right' statements. Here, the calculation is even simpler, as we are merely interested in the total percentage of each manifesto devoted to each of the ten topics, so the sum of all mentions is used instead (i.e., 'left' *plus* 'right' statements). The histograms for the salience scores for eight CMP issues are shown in Figure 4.6 (with the relevant histograms for environmental policy and urban-rural relations in Figure 4.3).

Table 4.4 presents the correlation between the salience levels as extracted from the expert surveys and the party manifestos. As before, the columns refer to the two

[22] The correlation is negative rather than positive as a higher score in the CMP averages signifies greater environmentalism whereas a higher score in the expert surveys less environmentalism.



Figure 4.4 **Histogram of issue salience on six main Benoit and Laver issues**

Note: range is 1 to 20; EU question wording differs by country, see text for details; y-axis shows the percentage of parties with each score; number of parties and countries for: economic policy (161 parties; 23 countries); liberal-authoritarianism (153; 22); immigration (149; 22); environment (161; 23); decentralisation (149; 22); and EU (117: 16); data from Benoit and Laver (2006).



Figure 4.5 **Histogram of issue salience on eight Laver and Hunt issues**

Note: Range 1 to 20; y-axis shows the percentage of parties with each score; sample: 149 parties in 23 countries, except clericalism (143; 22); data from Laver and Hunt (1992).



Figure 4.6 **Histogram of issue salience on ten issues measured by party manifestos**

Note: Outliers not shown over 30 for liberal-authoritarianism, culture-ethnic matters and democracy; over 16 for education; and over 10 for EU; x-axis shows the long-term average of the percentage of quasi-sentences on each topic; scale of x-axis varies by country; y-axis shows the percentage of parties with each score; sample sizes: 192 parties in 23 countries; EU: 148 parties in 17 countries; data from Budge et al. (2001), Klingemann et al. (2007).

Expert survey		Laver/ Hunt	Benoit/ Laver	*Notes*
CMP Issue				
Economic Policy	r	0.54	0.22	*significant only at .05 level for 2003 survey*
	n	134	141	
Foreign policy	r	0.23		*correlation with expert survey question on 'USSR relations'*
	n	132		
Liberal-authoritarianism	r	-0.11	0.35	*correlation not significant for 1989 survey and significant only at .05 level for 2003 survey*
	n	134	133	
Democracy	r	0.03	0.10	*correlation with expert survey question on 'social policy'; not significant for either survey*
	n	134	133	
Culture-ethnic matters	r	0.07	0.23	*correlation with expert survey question on 'social policy'; not significant for 1989 survey*
	n	134	133	
Culture-ethnic matters	r		0.17	*correlation with expert survey question on 'immigration'; significant at 05. level only*
	n		141	
Decentralization	r	0.59	0.51	
	n	134	132	
Urban-rural relations	r	0.40		
	n	131		
Environment	r	0.56	0.63	
	n	134	141	
EU support	r		0.22	*EU support measure for expert survey described in text; significant at 05. level only*
	n		113	

Table 4.4 **Correlation between expert survey and CMP-extracted salience**

Note: r-value of bivariate correlation between the CMP position (long-term average) and the expert survey position on the equivalent issue shown, with sample size in the row below; all correlations significant at .01 level except as noted.

surveys and the rows to the manifestos. Correlations are relatively high, with an r-value over .5, for environment, decentralisation and economic policy (in 1989). Other relatively high correlations (at between .39 and .5) exist for EU support and urban-rural relations. Again, most associations are in the right direction and significant, so there appears to be an underlying commonality between the two measures.

Conclusion

One indication of the importance of measuring the political positions of political actors is the fact that so many alternative ways of determining policy locations and issue salience have been proposed. Four potential measures have thus been identified: self-reported, behavioural, reputational and textual. Of these, the last two are useful for the examination of issue interconnections, and their best-known implementations are expert surveys and manifesto coding. However, while both approaches have undeniable benefits, each also suffers from clear shortcomings, though this is perhaps unavoidable considering the challenge in transforming complex political views into relatively simple numerical scores. In order to maximise the support for the empirical analysis, both sources – expert surveys and manifestos – will be used in the analyses in the following chapters.

The expert surveys by Laver and Hunt and Benoit and Laver provide a core of four issues that are generally central to the political debate, and these four topics can be supplemented by up to four issues if each survey is taken separately. The party manifesto dataset, originally based on a coding scheme with 56 categories, is reduced to ten broader policy areas. It is possible to measure both positions and salience using both data sources, and a brief comparison through correlations shows that the two measures are usually related, if only weakly. In the next chapter, these measures will be used for

the first time in order to explore the occurrence of static interconnections among policy positions.

Chapter 5

Mapping static interconnections in party ideologies

As noted in the Introduction, Ian McEwan describes in his novel *Saturday* the difficulty of predicting people's views on the Iraq war from their existing package of views. Knowing someone's stance on the NHS or on the importance of childcare, he argues, did not help to guess correctly a person's position on the US invasion. Such an attempt to predict one policy position based on other views is the focus of the chapter. Thus, static interconnections are measured in order to assess the extent that parties' views on different issues are linked to one another. Such interconnections refer precisely to the predictive capacity (or lack thereof) alluded to by McEwan.

The main aim of this chapter is therefore exploratory. The existence of static interconnections is examined in two ways. First, a very general approach is taken: the occurrence of interconnections is described by looking at all parties cross-nationally. This first analysis thus presents the broad patterns of static linkages between policy areas. As described in Chapter 3, interconnections will however vary systematically depending on the side of the left/right divide, on the party family and on the country under consideration. How these interconnections vary forms the second part of the analysis of static linkages. This analysis makes it possible to decide which policy positions are consistently connected to one another and which are the result of historical and social circumstances. The findings presented here will form the basis of the analysis in the following three empirical chapters.

This chapter is structured as follows. The existence of static interconnections is first mapped for the issues presented in the previous chapter. Next, possible variation across left and right, party families and groups of countries is investigated. In particular, consideration is given to the possibility of a general pattern that summarises the nature of static interconnections. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the main findings.

Linear static interconnections among policy positions

In this first section, the broad cross-national patterns of static interconnections are presented. In particular, the focus is on linear interconnections. As described in Chapter 3, these are linkages where a direct relationship between positions on two issues exists and is the same across the political spectrum. This is captured by the linear relationship $y = ax + b$, so the correspondence between positions is mediated by the existence of a constant ('b') and a coefficient ('a'). What is more important than the precise nature of the association is its strength: to what extent does one issue position help predict another? In the following section, this linearity assumption is relaxed, but here the focus is on the existence of such simple relationships between positions on two issues.

Expert surveys

The analysis begins with the expert surveys, which are more simply structured and more easily interpreted. First, a principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted separately for both surveys: while this is mainly a descriptive tool, it provides easily interpretable results, which are presented in Table 5.1 for both the 1989 and 2003

	2003 Survey		
	Comp 1	**Comp 2**	**Unexplained**
Economic policy	**0.51**	-0.22	0.21
Liberal-authoritarianism	0.46	0.03	0.32
Environment	**0.50**	0.09	0.16
Immigration	**0.53**	0.06	0.09
Decentralization	-0.02	**0.82**	0.28
EU support	0.08	**0.52**	0.66
Eigenvalue	3.2	1.01	
Variance explained	0.5311	0.1804	
n	117		

	1989 survey		
	Comp 1	**Comp 2**	**Unexplained**
Economic policy	0.49	0.17	0.26
Liberal-authoritarianism	**0.53**	0.16	0.18
Environment	0.16	**0.59**	0.17
Decentralization	-0.14	**0.73**	0.19
Urban-rural relations	**0.66**	-0.24	0.18
Eigenvalue	2.89	1.13	
Variance explained	0.46	0.35	
n	149		

Table 5.1 **Principal components analysis of party positions in the 1989 and 2003 expert surveys**

Note: Component loadings over .5 in bold; components with Eigenvalues over 1 extracted; varimax rotation used and rotated components shown; data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).

surveys. For the 2003 survey, the PCA indicates that one main dimension summarises most positions well, explaining 53 per cent of the variance; four core issues of political conflict – economics, liberal-authoritarianism, immigration and environmental policy – are all to be found on this component.[23] Two issues, decentralisation and EU support, load onto the second component, though the unexplained variance for EU support remains very high. In the 1989 survey, the PCA

[23] The PCA for the 2003 survey includes all six widely-measured positions, which were measured as described in the previous chapter. Including EU support and immigration naturally reduces the sample size, but running the PCA without these issues provides identical results.

again indicates that economics policy and liberal-authoritarianism are to be found on the first component (along with urban-rural relations), with decentralisation and environment on the second. So, environmental policy positions are linked with decentralisation in 1989 but with the more 'mainstream' topics in 2003, indicating that since 1989 this issue may have become more strongly tied to the more central political issues.

The results from this PCA provide a first look at the interconnections present between different policy positions in the expert surveys. Regression models can provide a firmer foundation for these claims, most importantly by indicating the nature and the strength of the linkage as well as allowing significance tests. Here, I followed a two-step procedure to establish first the existence and then the strength of the static interconnection. First, a series of multiple linear regressions was therefore run on the party positions in order to check whether an interconnection exists and how robust it is. In these regressions each issue was used as a dependent variable in turn, with the other issue positions as independent variables.[24] The second step used the r-value of the bivariate association to assess the strength of the interconnection.

It is worth explaining this two-step approach in more detail. An example of the first step, which establishes the existence of an interconnection and its robustness, is presented in Table 5.2. The dependent variable in these regressions is economic policy, and the focus here is on the interconnection with liberal-authoritarianism. The simplest model with liberal-authoritarianism as the only independent variable indicates that the two positions appear to be closely linked, with a position 1 point to the right on liberal-authoritarianism predicted to be mirrored by a position .41 points to the right on economic policy. While the association remains if decentralisation is added as a further

[24] The regressions were run using robust standard errors clustered by country.

Dependent variable: economic policy	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Liberal-authoritarianism	0.41**	0.49**	0.07	0.01	-0.02
	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Decentralization		-0.04	-0.23*	-0.22*	-0.23
		0.13	0.09	0.09	0.12
Environment			0.76**	0.67**	0.59**
			0.05	0.09	0.1
Immigration				0.17	0.30*
				0.11	0.12
EU support					-0.12
					0.07
Constant	5.83**	5.69**	3.42**	3.40**	4.44**
	0.66	1.41	0.94	0.94	1.4
Observations	153	141	141	141	117
R^2	0.25	0.34	0.65	0.66	0.66

***Table 5.2* Example of multiple linear regression on expert survey party positions**

Note: Robust standard errors below coefficients; *: significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1 % level; dependent variable: economic policy (taxes versus spending); data from Benoit and Laver (2006).

predictor, it vanishes if environmental policy position is included. If immigration policy is added instead of environmental policy in Model 3, liberal-authoritarianism also loses significance (regression results not shown). However, liberal-authoritarianism is strongly correlated with both immigration and environmental policy (r=.79 and r=.66, respectively), so the positions on all these issues are perhaps too closely associated to estimate effectively any independent connections. The evidence therefore nevertheless points to an interconnection (albeit weak) between positions on economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism.

The key difficulty with the 2003 Benoit and Laver survey is thus the high levels of correlation between some issue positions, for example immigration and environment (r>.8). Similar concerns also make model-building difficult for the Laver and Hunt

survey. Thus, economic policy is strongly correlated with public ownership and USSR relations; the same applies to liberal-authoritarianism and clericalism. I decided to drop clericalism and public ownership from my analysis as these two issues are substantively closely related to liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy, respectively, and are not included in the 2003 survey or in my manifesto recoding. I included information on USSR relations as this issue is substantively different from economic policy (even if positions are highly correlated) and foreign policy is one of the key manifesto issue groups. For both datasets, the regression results were therefore interpreted cautiously, with issues adding individually to each model and collinear variables removed to check the robustness of the results.

Using the approach illustrated above using economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism, I decided which issue interconnections are statistically significant. The next step is to establish the strength of the static interconnections. This was assessed using the r-value in pairwise correlations. While this ignores the potential influence of other policy positions, the r-value provides a relatively straightforward impression of the strength of the links between two issues. The static interconnections and their bivariate strength are presented in Figure 5.1. Each box represents the interconnection between two issues, as identified using multiple regressions. Boxes that remain unshaded are those where no interconnection was found. The shades of grey represent the level of the r-value of the bivariate correlation. Table 5.3 presents the data that makes up this figure, with issue pairs ranked in order of their strength, based on the r-value of their bivariate correlation. The first five issue pairs are those included in both rounds of the survey.

Among these five pairs, a broad pattern is visible: while three issues included in both surveys (economic policy, environment, liberal-authoritarianism) are strongly



Figure 5.1 **Summary of bivariate correlations between issue pairs in the 1989 and 2003 expert surveys**

Note: Only boxes where the issue interconnection is significant in multiple regression are shaded in; shadings refer to the strength of the bivariate association as recorded in Table 3; each box summarises the correlation between one issue pair; data from Benoit and Laver (2006) and Laver and Hunt (1992).

interconnected, decentralisation positions are relatively independent. It is striking that the order of interconnection strength did not change between 1989 and 2003, with only the links between decentralisation and environmental policy clearly weakening. The issue interconnections between these four core issues thus appear to be relatively consistent. Moving beyond the four issues common to the two rounds of the survey, we can see that immigration and USSR relations also form part of the group of issues that are strongly interconnected, thus joining economic policy, liberal-authoritarianism and the environment. The other two additional issues – urban-rural relations and EU support – are relatively weakly interconnected. While positions on urban-rural relations are generally quite closely linked to economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism, they are relatively independent of positions on the environment, foreign relations and decent-

		Benoit and Laver		Laver and Hunt	
		r	n	r	n
Economic policy	Environment	0.75	161	0.63	149
Liberal-authoritarianism	Environment	0.66	153	0.61	149
Economic Policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	0.5	153	0.66	149
Environment	Decentralization	0.19	149	0.58	149
Economic policy	Decentralization	(-0.02	161)	0.26	149
Immigration	Environment	0.81	149		
Immigration	Liberal-authoritarianism	0.8	141		
Immigration	Economic Policy	0.71	161		
EU support	Immigration	0.32	117		
EU support	Liberal-authoritarianism	0.24	117		
Urban-rural relations	Liberal-authoritarianism			0.69	149
Urban-rural relations	Economic policy			0.54	149
Urban-rural relations	Environment			0.22	149
USSR relations	Economic policy			0.83	149
USSR relations	Environment			0.7	149
USSR relations	Liberal-authoritarianism			0.54	149
USSR relations	Decentralization			0.52	149
USSR relations	Urban-rural relations			0.22	149

Table 5.3 **Bivariate correlations for issue pairs significantly associated in multiple regression models**

Note: Only issue relationships that remain robust in multiple regressions are shown (see text for details of this approach); 'r' refers to the r-value of the bivariate correlation; all bivariate correlations statistically significant at the 5% level except for economic policy and decentralisation (correlation not significant in 2003 survey); data from Benoit and Laver (2006) and Laver and Hunt (1992).

ralisation. Positions on the issue of European integration are significantly related only to immigration and liberal-authoritarianism, and even there the relationship is weak. It is surprising, given existing research (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2002), that the link to economic policy positions is not significant.

A general pattern can be retained from this analysis. First, there is a core group of issues that tends to be strongly interconnected. This group contains the topics that are usually considered the main political conflicts: economics and liberal-authoritarianism, but also newer topics such as the environment and immigration. It is also worth noting that the stance on the USSR also joins this group, although foreign relations is a topic only rarely considered in analyses of party competition. Second, there are other issues which remain generally weakly or not connected. Party positions on EU support and decentralisation are broadly independent of other issues, at least compared to the core group. Urban-rural relations positions are placed somewhere in between these two groups. I now turn to the analysis of party manifestos to see whether this pattern is also present there.

Party manifestos

Compared with expert surveys, measuring the association between issue positions using party manifestos is more complex. As a result, I will first describe in some detail the procedure used to detect issue interconnections. Due to the advantages described in the previous chapter, the long-run average positions of parties are used. Using these positions as the dependent variable, a series of regressions is run in order to establish the existence of interconnections between issue pairs. So far, the approach is thus similar to that used for the expert surveys. However, while regressing the long-run

positions on each other would be a possible first step, the unusual nature of the CMP data means that several other factors need to be controlled for:

- First, national differences in issue positions need to be taken into account. To do so, the long-run systemic position for each issue is calculated: this equals the average position of all parties in each country except for the party in question.[25] This variable was calculated only for those elections contested by the party.
- Second, the observations for the manifesto data are not completely independent (Benoit and Laver, 2007b, p. 95). As all percentages have to sum up to 100, the total emphasis on each topic will depend on the salience of other issues in the manifesto. If the total percentage of sentences devoted to decentralisation is 15, then -15 to +15 is the automatic range of the positional score. In the previous chapter, it was shown that issue salience (that is, the percentage of sentences devoted to a topic) varies widely, and this will influence the possible range of the positional score. It is therefore necessary to control for the salience of each issue analysed (Ray, 2007). Where possible, I thus also controlled for the average total salience of both issues.[26]
- Third, salience could not be included for all issue pairs as the specification of the model had to be adapted for certain cases. The modifications are necessary because salience and position resemble one another, as measured in the CMP dataset. Specifically, there are two issues where I use salience as a measure of position: on environment and urban-rural relations, there are thus no negative mentions in the CMP coding scheme. Salience had to be dropped as this is identical to the party's position for these issues. For liberal-authoritarianism, democracy, education and decentralisation, salience also had to be dropped.

[25] For environmental protection and urban-rural relations, which only have coding categories for one side of the issue, this value is the same as long-run systemic salience.
[26] These issues are economic policy, foreign policy, culture/ethnic matters and European integration.

Dependent variable: economic policy	**Model 1** b	std. err.	**Model 2** b	std. err.
Foreign policy			.88***	0.19
Systemic position				
Economic policy: systemic position	.18	0.19	.13	0.16
Foreign policy: systemic position	-.72**	0.32	-.64*	0.33
Salience variables				
Economic policy: Salience	.31**	0.14	.31**	0.13
Foreign policy: Salience	-.51***	0.14	.04	0.17
Constant	-5.92	2.16	-6.32	2.01
R^2	0.1383		0.2895	
n	185		185	

Note: *:p<0.1, **:p<.05, ***:p<.01

***Table 5.4* Example of a multiple linear regression using CMP-extracted party positions**

Note: Model 1 includes the main controls (systemic position and salience); Model 2 adds the party position on the independent variable issue; positions used here are economic policy and foreign policy; *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

While positive and negative mentions do exist for all these issues, one side is rarely used by parties. For example, few parties ever argue against democracy, and as a result, the raw position is very similar to the raw salience. For liberal-authoritarianism, decentralisation, education and democracy, the correlation is above r=.90.

- A final concern is that other country-specific factors may affect party policy position; this is addressed by using robust standard errors. I decided against adding country dummy variables to the models, as the size of the sample (at around 180 cases) means that this control would probably lead to an increase in

Type II errors, that is, a failure to detect actual associations. Moreover, the inclusion of a measure of systemic position already takes account of some country-specific characteristics.

Table 5.4 presents an example of my approach by listing the detailed results of one regression. The dependent variable issue is economic policy and the independent variable issue foreign policy. The first model includes the average systemic position on economic and foreign policy and the average salience on both issues. In the second model, I add the raw average position on foreign policy. The coefficient for foreign policy position is strongly significant. Controlling for the other independent variables, each percent of manifesto coverage that stresses the military and the national interest or de-emphasises internationalism and pacifism is predicted to be associated with .88 percent more emphasis on free-market economic policy. In simpler terms: the more pro-military and nationalist a party's foreign policy position, the more liberal its economic policy.

Differences in the strength of issue interconnections are assessed by comparing the 'added R^2': the variance explained by the full model compared to that of the baseline model that excludes the average raw position on the independent-variable issue. This is by no means a perfect measure; sample sizes, for example, vary slightly due to my salience requirement. However, in the absence of other possible measures, it does provide an indication of the extent to which interconnection strength differs by issue pair. In the example above, the R^2-increase created by adding the average foreign-policy position is over 15 percent, so quite substantial.

Figure 5.2 presents the simplified results of these regressions, following the approach in Figure 5.1. Each box represents one regression; the economic policy and foreign policy example above can be found in bottom left. Because of the large amount



Figure 5.2 **Static policy interconnections using CMP-extracted party positions**

Note: The number at the end of each row represents the total number of interconnections for each issue (e.g. 7 for economic policy, 4 for foreign policy and so on); each box represents the added variance explained; each of the two issues is used as the dependent variable in turn, with the shading summarising the finding for both approaches (e.g. the box at the bottom left contains the information on the regression with economic policy as the dependent variable and foreign policy as the added independent variable, as well as the regression with foreign policy as the dependent variable, and economic policy as the added independent variable); boxes are only shaded where the coefficient of the added variable is statistically significant at .1 or better (as in Model 2, Table 5.4); the shadings are based on the amount of added variance explained by the additional variable (e.g. more than .05 for economic policy and foreign policy, see Table 5.4); more detailed results in Appendix 5.1; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

of variance explained, this box is shaded dark grey. Boxes are left blank for regressions where the coefficient of the independent position variable was not significant. The full results that form the basis for this Figure can be found in Appendix 5.1. The number listed to the right of the correlation matrix for each issue indicates the total number of other issues significantly associated with that one policy area. For example, EU support is linked to six other issues overall and liberal-authoritarianism to five.

Overall, the manifesto data support the pattern that positions on the core policy areas – such as economic policy, culture/ethnic matters and liberal-authoritarianism – tend to be statically interconnected. Taking the total number of interconnections as an indicator of overall linkage strength, culture/ethnic relations and economic policy rank most highly (7 out of 9 possible significant links), followed by the environment and EU integration (6 each). While foreign policy is tied to only four other issues, these four are some of the most important political conflicts – economics, culture/ethnic matters, the environment and democracy – and the ties are relatively strong. Liberal-authoritarianism is linked to five issues, including economic policy, culture/ethnic matters and the environment. Very rarely interconnected across the board are relatively minor issues: education (2), urban-rural relations (3) and democracy (3).

The decentralisation and European integration issues deserve a closer look. They had a remarkably low number of links with other issues in the expert surveys, but in manifestos they occupy a middle ground with respectively 5 and 6 significant interconnections. In the case of EU support, the links are often also particularly strong. In fact, its tight interconnections with economic policy and culture/ethnic matters capture two key aspects of the integration project and opposition to it (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). In contrast, the links tying decentralisation to other policy areas are generally rather weak.

These overall patterns are broadly similar to those found in the expert surveys, where the strongest interconnections were also between topics central to political debate, that is, economic policy, culture/immigration, liberal-authoritarianism and the environment. The results from the expert surveys and manifestos are directly compared in Figure 5.3. Shaded boxes are those where an interconnection was found for both data sources. In total, 12 of the 18 static interconnections that were found in the expert surveys are also statistically significant in the CMP data; the interconnections that were not also found in the CMP are overwhelmingly the weaker ones. Moreover, the issue that was the most independent in the expert surveys – decentralisation – is only characterised by weak interconnections in the manifesto data. Some differences are nevertheless present, especially on the issues where links were generally weaker (EU, decentralisation, urban-rural relations). Given the different measurement approach and timeframe of the two datasets, the overlaps are nevertheless more remarkable than the differences.

Non-linear interconnections: left-right differences in linkage strength

So far, the assumption has been that positions are linearly related to one another. This means that the connections between policy areas are constant across the political spectrum and can be graphically summarised by a straight line. This assumption is, however, weakened somewhat when the occurrence of two other types of interconnections are considered: left-right differences and quadratic links. The main focus here is on left-right differences between static interconnections. In Chapter 3, it was argued that such differences may arise due to the different historical development of the left and the right. In particular, the right has generally seen a greater variety of



Figure 5.3 **Comparison of static policy interconnections found in expert surveys and party manifestos**

Note: Foreign policy contains information on USSR relations (Laver/Hunt) and culture/ethnic matters on immigration (Benoit/Laver); issue pairs marked with n/a are only available for party manifestos; shaded boxes represent issue pairs where an association was found for both data sources; source of information: Figures 5.1 and 5.2.

parties than the left, so the static interconnections observed may well be weaker on this side of the main political divide.

Left-right differences can be investigated using both the expert surveys and party manifestos. It is worth noting here that the main left/right division was thus measured by using economic policy positions. A party is coded as 'left' if it is on that side of the economic issue. The assumption is therefore that economic ideology is the main underlying cleavage in party systems.



Figure 5.4 **Left-right differences in static interconnections, Benoit and Laver and Laver and Hunt expert surveys**

Note: Each box is vertically divided in half; the left side of the box refers to economic left parties and the right to economic right parties; economic left = parties below 0 on economic policy (taxes versus spending), economic right = those above 0 on same issue; shadings based on bivariate correlation of policy positions; only boxes with left-right differences shaded in; detailed results in Appendix 5.2.

Expert surveys

The findings for the expert surveys are summarised in Figure 5.4, with fuller results in Appendices 5.2 and 5.3. The figure, with the Benoit and Laver results on the left and the Laver and Hunt results on the right, is to be read as follows. First, the boxes that are blank are those where there is no measurable difference in association for economic left and right. For example, this applies in both surveys to liberal-authoritarianism and decentralisation: there is no difference in the association between these two issues on the economic left and the economic right. Second, each box is divided into two halves, with the left half representing the strength of the interconnection on the economic left

and the right half that on the economic right. For example, in both surveys the association between issue positions for economic policy and environment is stronger on the right. Similarly, there is no association on the right for economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism, but a medium-strength linkage on the left.

Looking first at the four issues present in both surveys, there appear to be strong differences between the economic left and right. One key difference is the place of liberal-authoritarianism. This issue area is much more strongly connected to economic policy and the environment on the left than on the right. In short, liberal-authoritarianism is well-integrated into other political conflicts on the left, but far less so on the right. The place of environmental policy also varies between left and right, if less starkly. On the right, the association between economic and environmental policy is stronger than on the left. The inverse is true, however, for the links between environmental policy and liberal-authoritarianism: here, links on the left are stronger.[27]

Figures 5.5 and 5.6 illustrate this clear difference between the left and right sides of an issue by presenting two scatterplots for issue pairs where the association weakens on the economic right. Both plots are based on data from the Benoit and Laver survey. Figure 5.5 shows party positions on economic policy (on the x-axis) and liberal-authoritarianism (on the y-axis). The dotted line shows the predicted association based on a simple linear regression with economic policy as the only independent variable. The two solid lines present the results of the same regression augmented by an interaction that lets the slope vary between left and right, that is, between less than 0 and more than 0. The summary results for these regressions are to be found in Appendix 5.3. The curved line represents a quadratic association between the two policy

[27] The results for the Laver-Hunt survey are generally very similar to those of the Benoit-Laver survey. Most of the patterns are neatly replicated in the 1989 survey, with the one exception: the association between decentralization and the environment, which appears to have changed quite radically, perhaps as these issues have become less identified with Green parties.



Figure 5.5 **Party positions on economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism**

Note: The range is -9.5 to 9.5; predicted lines shown for simple linear regression, for regression with left/right dummy as interaction term, and for regression with quadratic term.

equation for simple linear regression (robust standard errors in parentheses): liberal-authoritarianism (predicted) = -.51 (.33) + .61 * economic policy (.11), R^2=.25 =153;

with left-right dummy: liberal-authoritarianism (predicted) = 1.10 (.83) + .53 * economic right dummy (1.46) +1.01 * economic policy (.19) - .99 * economic policy*economic right dummy (.31), R^2=.29, n =153;

with quadratic term: liberal-authoritarianism (predicted) = .67 (.49) + .56 * economic policy (.12) - .06 * economic policy^2 (.02), R^2=.29, n =153; data from Benoit and Laver (2006).



Figure 5.6 **Party positions on liberal-authoritarianism and environmental policy**

Note: The range is -9.5 to 9.5; predicted lines shown for simple linear regression, for regression with left/right dummy as interaction term, and for regression with quadratic term;
equation for simple linear regression (robust standard errors in parentheses): environment (predicted) = .37 (.17) + .53 * liberal-authoritarianism (.05), R^2=.43 =153;
with left-right dummy: environment (predicted) = -1.05 (.24) + 3.84 * economic right dummy (.43) + .48 * liberal-authoritarianism (.04) - .28 * liberal-authoritarianism *economic right dummy (.09), R^2=.62, n =153;
with quadratic term: environment (predicted) = 2.09 (.37) + .52 * liberal-authoritarianism (.04) - .06 * liberal-authoritarianism^2 (.01), R^2=.54, n =153;
data from Benoit and Laver (2006).



Figure 5.7 **Party positions on economic policy and immigration**

Note: The range is -9.5 to 9.5; predicted lines shown for simple linear regression, for regression with left/right dummy as interaction term, and for regression with quadratic term;
equation for simple linear regression (robust standard errors in parentheses): immigration (predicted) = -.88 (.27) + .75 * economic policy (.07), R^2=.50, n =149;
with left-right dummy: immigration (predicted) = -.31 (.53) + .15 * economic right dummy (1.21) + .89 * economic policy (.14) - .34 * economic policy *economic right dummy (.22), R^2=.51, n =149;
with quadratic term: immigration (predicted) = -.41 (.32) + .73 * economic policy (.07) - .02 * economic policy^2 (.01), R^2=.51, n =149;
data from Benoit and Laver (2006).

positions; this will be discussed later. In Figure 5.5, issue interconnections remain if we only consider the left but weaken or disappear for the right. This is similar in Figure 5.6, where the association between liberal-authoritarianism and environmental policy weakens severely on the right. For some issues, the associations weaken less strongly on the right, as seen in Figure 5.7, which shows the link between economic and immigration policy. Here, all three types of association (linear, left/right and quadratic) are very similar. Overall, there is thus strong evidence that static interconnections differ, depending on the side of the economic divide.

There are also left-right differences for those issue pairs only available for one of the two surveys. Positions on immigration and EU are only measured by Benoit and Laver and can be found in the matrix on the left in Figure 5.4. Immigration, which was found to be the most tightly connected issue in the previous section, is slightly more strongly linked to other political topics on the left, and less on the right. Here, the difference is not great and is rather one of degrees than of wholesale change. EU support shows no left-right differences. Turning to the Laver-Hunt survey, summarised in the matrix on the right, urban-rural relations also appears to be slightly more strongly connected to other issues on the left; this applies in particular to the positional links with economic policy and decentralisation. USSR relations have an ambiguous position in that it is more strongly connected to some issues on the left as well as to others on the right. USSR policy links with economics are thus stronger on the left, but connections are tighter on the right for the environment and decentralisation. In this changing position, USSR relations positions are similar to environmental policy.

In sum, the expert surveys show that there are clear differences between the static interconnections depending on whether we look at the economic left or the right. One striking finding concerns liberal-authoritarianism: the right and the left differ in

how issues related to social liberalism and authoritarianism are integrated with other issues. On the right, positions on liberal-authoritarianism are independent of positions on economic topics and weakly tied to environmental views, while on the left these areas are closely linked.

Party manifestos

Left/right differences can also be examined using the data from party manifestos. One difficulty is the division of parties into the economic 'left' and the economic 'right'. In the expert surveys, this was straightforward as the raw score of 10.5 (recoded as 0) is the exact midpoint of the scale provided. The manifesto data contains no such inherent or natural midpoint. The average raw economic policy score of 0 is used as a proxy for this point: parties with a mean of 0 on economic policy mention left- and right-wing economic policies in equal amounts. The results of the regression analysis are presented in Figure 5.8; only those issue pairs where the differences between left and right, as indicated by the interaction term, are statistically significant are shown. Appendix 5.4 presents the bivariate correlations that underlie the colouring of this figure. The structure of this figure is similar to Figure 5.4, so the left and right side of each box represent the associations on the economic left and the economic right. Again, only boxes where there are significant left-right differences are coloured. Thus, an empty box does not mean that there is no interconnection, but simply that the links do not differ between economic left and right. The shadings represent the strength of the association; the two boxes marked by numbers indicate where an association exists but is in the opposite direction on the economic right.

The manifesto dataset confirms that issue interconnections differ regularly between left and right. A few key results are worth highlighting. First, the relationship



Figure 5.8 **Left-right differences in static interconnections, CMP-extracted policy positions**

Note: Each box is vertically divided in half; the left box refers to economic left parties and the right to economic right parties; left and right defined as <0 and >0 respectively on economic policy; shadings based on bivariate correlation of policy positions; only boxes with left-right differences shaded; 1: detailed results in Appendix 5.4.

between economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism is again different on each side of the economic divide. While on the left a relationship exists, this is absent from the economic right. Though not statistically significant, there are indications that the relationship between liberal-authoritarianism and the environment is also stronger on the left. Second, the relationship between European integration stances and economic and cultural issues is in accordance with recent research (Kriesi et al., 2008b; Hooghe

and Marks, 2009). On the left (but not on the right), there is a strong association with economic policy positions, while on the right (but not on the left), there are strong interconnections with culture/ethnic relations. Finally, there are general trends for some issues. Thus, decentralisation, education policy and urban-rural relations are generally better integrated with other issues on the economic right.

Evidence of quadratic interconnections

Finally, the review of the literature on issue connections suggested that some issue pairs might be associated in a 'u' shape, with the extremes on one issue similar on the other. Examples are economic policy as the first issue and liberal-authoritarianism (Bobbio, 1996) or EU support (Hooghe et al., 2002) as the other. On these issues, the extreme parties on economic policy on the left and right are united by their anti-liberal attitudes and their opposition to European integration.

However, the data sources used here show almost no evidence for U-shaped relationships between issues. In the expert surveys, quadratic terms are frequently significant in linear regressions, but fitted values show that this is the result of a weakening association towards the right rather than a U-shaped reversal of the association – as in Figures 5.5 to 5.7. Another way of detecting a quadratic or U shape is to look at the left-right differences: if there is a change in the *direction* of association between left and right, then it is possible to speak of a U-shaped linkage. However, this does not occur in the expert surveys. More precisely, where the bivariate correlations for left and right have different signs, at least one of those correlations is not statistically significant. This is the case, for example, on economic policy and EU support. In the manifesto data, there is also little evidence for a change in the direction of association between two sides of an issue. While there is thus a large amount of

evidence that the strength of association differs between left and right, this does not mean that there are also quadratic or U-shaped associations between issue positions.

Party families

The existence of party families may structure and provide an underlying pattern for static interconnections. The left-right differences found above may therefore reflect how party families vary in the linkages between issue positions, as argued in Chapter 3. In addition, it is also worth examining the internal diversity of party families in terms of the positions they take up. The more a family varies in its position on an issue, the less that issue is a strong and consistent feature of that family's policy bundles. In this section, party family differences in policy positions are therefore examined, again using expert surveys and manifestos.

Figures 5.9 to 5.11 present the mean party positions in the two expert surveys and the manifesto data for six party families: Greens, Communists, Social Democrats, Liberals, Christian Democrats and Conservatives.[28] Figure 5.9 includes the six main Benoit and Laver issues, Figure 5.10 the eight Laver and Hunt issues and Figure 5.11 the ten CMP issues, with mean positions and the range of the confidence interval represented by a solid circle and '+' signs respectively. The scores for parties from the manifesto data are the 'raw' scores, simply the long-run average percentage of positive statements minus the average percentage of negative statements.[29] The detailed mean scores and standard deviations are included in Appendix 5.5. The focus in the following discussion will be on the expert survey scores shown in Figures 5.9 and 5.10; except for a handful of issues, such as economic policy, environment and liberal- authoritarianism,

[28] Information on the 'family membership' of parties was taken mainly from the manifesto datasets (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2007).
[29] Again, for environment and urban-rural relations, the raw scores are the simple salience scores. Scores between issues should not be compared, only between parties.



Figure 5.9 **Party positions by party family, Benoit and Laver expert survey**

Note: Mean and 95% confidence interval for each party family shown; Coms=Communists, Grns=Greens, SDs=Social Democrats, Libs=Liberals, CDs=Christian Democrats, Cons=Conservatives; full results in Appendix 5.5; data from Benoit and Laver (2006).



Figure 5.10 **Party positions by party family, Laver and Hunt expert survey**

Note: Mean and 95% confidence interval for each party family shown; Coms=Communists, Grns=Greens, SDs=Social Democrats, Libs=Liberals, CDs=Christian Democrats, Cons=Conservatives; full results in Appendix 5.5; data from Laver and Hunt (1992).



Figure 5.11 **Party positions by party family, CMP-extracted party positions**

Note: Mean and 95% confidence interval for each party family shown; Coms=Communists, Grns=Greens, SDs=Social Democrats, Libs=Liberals, CDs=Christian Democrats, Cons=Conservatives; full results in Appendix 5.5; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

the results from the CMP dataset do not differ enough by party family to allow for clear interpretations.

First, distinguishing between party families makes it possible to provide a clearer interpretation of these left-right differences. Focussing the analysis on the main issues of political conflict, it is possible to confirm that a relatively well-ordered left confronts a more complex right. The Greens, Communists and Social Democrats have consistently negative scores in the expert surveys, with EU support and decentralisation as partial exceptions. Moreover, the Social Democrats are always the most centrist of the three families.[30] As can be most easily seen from the Benoit and Laver results, the Greens tend to be the most 'left-wing' on liberal-authoritarianism and environmental issues and the Communists on economic topics. One party family occasionally joins the left: the Liberals have clear negative scores on liberal-authoritarianism, pro-/anti-clericalism and urban-rural relations in the expert surveys. The Liberals thus have a relatively unusual position in party competition.

The right is less clearly organised than the left: the ordering of the parties on the right is more complex. Nevertheless, a pattern can be identified. On economic issues (taxes vs. services, public ownership and the environment), the Christian Democrats are the most moderate, followed by the Liberals and the Conservatives. On more social issues (liberal-authoritarianism, pro/anti-clericalism, immigration and urban-rural relations) and also on foreign policy (USSR relations), the Liberals are the most centrist, with the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats to their right. Again, there is an obvious division on the right between social and economic issues.

The comparison of the policy positions of party families also shows that cohesion within families tends to be higher on some issues than on others. Here, I

[30] With the exception of urban-rural relations and immigration

assess cohesion by comparing the standard deviations of party positions for each family; only the expert survey scores are considered as the mixture of salience and positional information in the manifesto dataset means such comparisons do not lend themselves to straightforward interpretation. The standard deviations can be found in Appendix 5.5, though the range of the confidence intervals in Figures 5.9 and 5.10 provides a visual impression of the main differences. Across party families, cohesion is relatively high on economic and environment policy, and low overall on EU support and decentralisation (Appendix 5.5).[31] Further, party families differ in their general level of cohesion across issue positions. For example, the Greens, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats very consistently exhibit low diversity in their positions compared to the other party families. For these families, there appears to be a relatively strong ideological core that its component parties adhere to. The Liberals are very diverse across all issues: on two of the main issues, economic and social policy, they have some of the highest internal variance among party families.

Static interconnections and families of nations

Finally, it is worth exploring whether static interconnections differ by country. Ideally, it would be possible to take each country and consider the static interconnections present in each, again using correlations and a series of linear regressions. However, given that some countries (such as the United States) have as few as two parties, there is little sense in doing so. As a result, it is necessary to group countries in order to achieve the necessary sample size to produce valid results. I therefore analyse the differences between 'families of nations' as defined by Castles (1993), whose division of countries is similar to Esping-Andersen's famous 'worlds of welfare capitalism' (Esping-

[31] The mean standard deviations are not directly comparable due to the different sample sizes in each case.

Andersen, 1990). The four groups I use are thus Nordic, Continental European, Southern European and Anglo-Saxon countries. Dividing the entire sample of 23 states in this way takes account of some of the national differences in public policy and political culture but allows the application of the methods used above.

Expert surveys

The expert surveys are remarkable primarily because of the consistency of the linkages found, even across families of nations. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 present the results of bivariate correlations. These figures repeat Figure 5.1, but with separate matrices for each family of nations. Only significant associations are coloured in, with each box representing the correlation between two issues. The full results for the expert surveys can be found in Appendix 5.6. The results are shown separately for the Benoit and Laver (Figure 5.12) and Laver and Hunt (Figure 5.13) surveys, but the results for the four core issues are overwhelmingly stable, with clear differences only in the Central European family of nations.

Overall, issue interconnections appear to be strongest in the Southern European family and weakest in the Nordic family of nations. As in the cross-national analysis, most issues are consistently tightly interconnected with most other issues. This applies in particular to immigration, environment and USSR relations. However, two issues tend to vary across groups of countries: EU support and decentralisation. These are also the two issues that were found in the broader analysis to be weakly linked to the core policy areas. EU support is only interconnected with other issues in the Continental European group, with one link in Anglo-Saxon countries and none in the Nordic and Southern European countries.



Figure 5.12 **Static interconnections by family of nations, Benoit and Laver expert survey**

Note: Bivariate correlations between issues shown; each box represents the association between one issue pair; * indicates a negative association; Nordic family: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland; Central European family: Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy; Southern European family: Spain, Portugal, Greece; Anglo-Saxon family: UK, Ireland, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand; data from Benoit and Laver (2006); full results in Appendix 5.6.



Figure 5.13 **Static interconnections by family of nations, Laver and Hunt expert survey**

Note: Bivariate correlations between issues shown; each box represents the association between one issue pair; * indicates a negative association; Nordic family: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland; Central European family: Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy; Southern European family: Spain, Portugal, Greece; Anglo-Saxon family: UK, Ireland, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand; data from Laver and Hunt (1992); full results in Appendix 5.6.

Decentralisation is closely linked to other issues only in the Southern European family of nations, though there is evidence of association in the Continental group in the 1989 survey. Interestingly, in the 2003 survey the association between decentralisation and economic policy is positive in the Southern group but negative in the Continental group. In other words, in the Southern European family economic liberalism is associated with centralisation and in the Continental family with decentralisation. This provides additional proof that decentralisation's links with other topics may be based more on circumstance than on logic.

A further finding concerns the links between economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism. In 2003, liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy are most strongly linked in Anglo-Saxon and Southern European families but less tightly associated in Nordic and Continental countries. This pattern is also present, if weaker, in 1989. This corresponds with what we know about the development of party systems in these groups of nations: Nordic and Continental countries tend to have a more diverse party system, especially on the economic right. These countries are thus the main examples of a co-existence of Christian Democratic and Liberal parties and, more recently, of the emergence of an extreme right. These factors are likely to at least partly explain the increasing weakness of the ties between liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy in these two groups.

Party manifestos

Figure 5.14 presents the results of regression models for each of the issue pairs for each family of nations, thus replicating the above general analysis shown in Figure 5.2 at a lower level of aggregation (detailed results in Appendix 5.7). Each box again reflects the amount of added variance explained by including the position on the second issue in

order to predict the position on the first issue. The regression models in Table 5.4 are thus rerun separately for each family of nations, with the results summarised in Figure 5.14.

The results for the manifesto data are less clear-cut than for the expert surveys. A quick glance at the four figures shows that there is clearly less consistency across families than in the expert surveys. According to the party manifestos, the differences between families of nations are therefore quite large. However, these differences should not be over-interpreted. The manifesto data is less reliable and more volatile than that provided by the expert surveys. Moreover, the sample size for each family (between 30 and 50, see Appendix 5.7) coupled with the number of independent variables (up to five) means that the results may mask relationships that do in fact exist.

Some of the differences between families in the party manifestos are similar to the expert surveys. For example, decentralisation is most strongly associated with other issues for Southern European countries. It is also interesting that this is the only group for which democracy is an interconnected issue, perhaps reflecting these nations' relatively recent emergence from dictatorship. The Southern countries are also unique in that environmental policy is not integrated into other issue positions, unlike the other three families. This may be a consequence of the lower salience of this issue in Southern countries. Other differences between the families are less systematic. For example, we do not find the same result for the interconnections of EU support with other issues, nor is the liberal-authoritarianism-economic policy results as clear-cut.

For a summary overview of the consistency across countries, Table 5.5 presents the number of families in which static interconnections were found for each issue pair. The columns represent the number of families of nations that showed the association in



Figure 5.14 **Static interconnections by family of nations, party manifestos**

Note: Shading based on the amount of additional variance explained by adding the position on one issue to a regression predicting another issue position (see also Figure 5.2); Nordic family: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland; Central European family: Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy; Southern European family: Spain, Portugal, Greece; Anglo-Saxon family: UK, Ireland, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007); full results in Appendix 5.7.

cross-country interconnection strength	families of nations with interconnections					
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	*row total*
Strong	0	1	2	3	2	8
Medium	0	4	3	2	0	9
Weak	1	2	3	1	0	7
None	8	8	4	1	0	21
column total	9	15	12	7	2	

Table 5.5 **Strength of cross-country interconnection and number of families with interconnections**

Note: Based on results in Figure 5.2 (rows) and Appendix 5.7 (columns); data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007)

question (ranging from none [0] to all [4]); the rows use the results from Figure 5.2 for each of the 45 issue pairs. It is clear (and unsurprising) that issue pairs that were found to have strong links in the aggregate analysis are also more likely to be interconnected in each family of nations. Most of the issue pairs without general static interconnections are never linked or just linked in one group of countries, though there are a few exceptions. Some issue pairs are very consistent across families of nations, for example economic policy on the one hand and foreign policy, liberal-authoritarianism and environmental policy on the other. More detailed results can be found in Figure 5.15, which disaggregates Table 5.5 so that aggregate connection strength and family of nation differences are visible. Overall, it is in any case necessary to be cautious with these results given the limitations of the data structure, research method and sample size. Nevertheless, there appear to be important differences between families of nations, though these are more pronounced in the manifesto than in the expert survey data.



Figure 5.15 **Strength of cross-country interconnections and number of families with interconnections**

Note: Numbers in boxes refer to the number of families with interconnections; shading of boxes based on additional variance explained by the position on the other issue pair (see Figure 5.2); figure based on results in Figure 5.2 (rows) and Appendix 5.7 (columns); data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

The patterns of static interconnections

The description of the findings so far has gone into considerable detail concerning the different static interconnections present within party ideologies. To sum up these results and to provide a more general overview of the general linkages between the main issue areas, it is worth taking a step back and examining the broader patterns that can be seen to underlie static interconnections. Based on the important distinction between links based on logic and those based on circumstance, it is possible to divide the different policy areas into three types.

First, the relationship between two issues that fundamentally divide the political space, economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism, is characterised more by circumstantial than by logical ties. The division between economic and social issues is a frequent claim made by *a priori* analysts of political ideologies. Among others, Finer (1987) and Bobbio (1996) have argued that politics is characterised by two underlying dimensions of competition, economic liberalism/egalitarianism and social liberalism/authoritarianism, and this view has been taken up by, for example, Kitschelt (1994) and Marks and Wilson (2000). These two dimensions are theoretically separate, in that there is no logical reason why positions on each need to be connected to one another. However, in practice we know that parties may still forge a single dimension from these two fundamentally distinct issues. Indeed, this is the general pattern observed on the economic left. Overall, there may thus be a relationship between the economic and liberal-authoritarian dimensions of party competition. Individual party systems will of course differ in the extent to which the two fundamental dimensions are integrated or separate. Essentially, however, the static interconnections found for these two issues are a political choice rather than a logical necessity.

Second, some issues have strong interconnections with both economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism: for example, environmental protection and immigration. There are thus obvious strong logical ties between environmental and economic policy (Dalton, 2009). While liberal-authoritarianism and environmental policy might not have such strong logical links, voters tend to package environmental protectionism with social liberalism, as emphasised by Inglehart's (1977) diagnosis of a value shift towards postmaterialism. Indeed some authors assume a priori that both issue areas are essentially synonymous (e.g. Kitschelt, 1994; Hooghe et al., 2002). Meanwhile, immigration policy is closely tied to both economic and liberal-authoritarian issue

positions.[32] This is a political issue that touches on both aspects, through the economic consequences of increased immigration as well as the liberal-authoritarian aspects of religious tolerance and multiculturalism.

Finally, the patterns in the two data sources indicate some issues are overwhelmingly flexible. These are policy areas which are not naturally tied to either the economic or the liberal-authoritarian dimension of competition. In both data sources, institutional policies – decentralisation and European integration – were largely weakly linked to other issues. In the manifesto data, democracy, urban-rural relations and education also showed low levels of interconnection. In the cases of decentralisation and European integration, the issues themselves do not have direct policy content, referring instead primarily to institutional arrangements. The positions that parties are likely to take on these issues are thus heavily context-dependent (Taggart, 1998; Hix, 2007): parties should favour integration and decentralisation if this furthers their broader policy goals in other areas. There is no predetermined logical connection between economic and social policy positions and views on institutional design. Arguably, this lack of substantive links to the main axes of competition also applies to topics such as education and democracy.

There is thus a threefold division among issues, with the first group consisting of the circumstantially linked core issues of economics and liberalism, followed by secondary issues such as the environment and immigration, and a third group containing weakly interconnected issues such as EU support and decentralisation. A uniting feature is the importance of the distinction between interconnections based on logic and those based on circumstance. Following Converse (1964), it was suggested in Chapter 3 that these are the two fundamental sources of interconnections. Thus, a priori

[32] It is interesting to note that immigration policy is the best predictor of overall left-right position in the Benoit-Laver survey; this is perhaps a reflection of its position at the intersection of economic and social issues.

the two core issues of economics and liberalism are not connected logically, which helps explain their variability across contexts. The secondary issues are tied through logic to both liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy, perhaps reinforced by circumstantial connections. An example would be environmental policy, strongly logically tied to economics but tied at least circumstantially to liberal-authoritarianism. Finally, the third group of issues is mainly circumstantial in its association: while logic certainly plays a role (for example in how EU support is linked to economic policy), this is more variable than for other issues. The logic/circumstance distinction will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter.

Conclusion

The main aim of this chapter was to explore the occurrence of static interconnections. The first approach to mapping the existence of such links across countries was simply to take the most basic form of interconnection, linear association, and measure this for all countries and parties analysed. In the expert surveys, most issues appeared to be very closely linked, with decentralisation and EU support the exceptions. The party manifestos presented a different result, with the various issues less strongly interconnected. Nevertheless, here too many of the core topics such as economic policy, liberal-authoritarianism and the environment were tightly linked and good positional predictors of each other.

These results were then nuanced by dividing the overall sample and comparing the resulting subgroups. Specifically, differences in static interconnections by left-right, party families and families of nations were considered. The left-right divisions were particularly striking concerning the relationship between economic policy and issues such as liberal-authoritarianism and environmental policy. The analysis of party family

differences confirmed the picture of a well-ordered economic left compared with a more complexly structured economic right. However, no evidence of U-shaped interconnections was found. Country differences were more pronounced in the party manifestos than in the expert surveys, with variation most pronounced among weakly connected issues (such as EU support and decentralisation).

Overall, the pattern to be retained from this analysis is a threefold division of issues that underlines the importance of the key distinction between logic and circumstance as the basis of interconnections. First, economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism, the core issues of political competition, can but do not have to be interconnected in static terms, reflecting the fact that there is no logical link between the two policy areas. Second, a further group of issues is tied to both economics and liberal-authoritarianism, though the exact nature of the linkages is context-specific. Finally, a third group is generally independent: decentralisation and EU support are the main issues here.

In the next chapter, I return to a broader level of aggregation by examining the existence of dynamic interconnections across 23 countries. The findings presented in this chapter will provide an important foundation: first, it will be assessed whether and how dynamic linkages can be predicted by static interconnections; second, the logic/circumstance distinction will be a central factor in understanding the occurrence of dynamic interconnections.

Appendix 5.1 Detailed results for Figure 5.2: Static interconnections, CMP-extracted positions

Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 2 --> Issue 1		Issue 1 --> Issue 2		
		b	R^2 added	b	R^2 added	n
Economic policy	Foreign policy	0.88	0.1512	0.2	0.1006	185
Foreign policy	Culture-ethnic matters	0.34	0.0988	0.52	0.1297	184
Education	EU support	0.26	0.0953	0.43	0.0961	137
Economic policy	EU support	-1.28	0.0825	-0.07	0.0745	141
Culture-ethnic matters	EU support	*0.8*	*0.0823*	0.18	0.116	140
Economic policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	0.33	0.075	0.24	0.067	190
Education	Environment	0.08	0.0505	0.86	0.0547	163
Foreign policy	Environment	-0.14	0.0438	*-0.55*	*0.0652*	164
EU support	Environment	0.07	0.0375	0.62	0.0374	135
Economic policy	Environment	-0.29	0.0366	-0.13	0.031	167
Economic policy	Culture-ethnic matters	0.34	0.0324	0.1	0.0247	190
Foreign policy	Democracy	0.19	0.0271	0.23	0.0388	183
Liberal-authoritarianism	Decentralization	0.42	0.0271	0.09	0.0259	162
Economic policy	Urban-rural relations	0.28	0.0234			165
EU support	Decentralization	0.11	0.0228	0.25	0.0192	135
Democracy	Decentralization	-0.25	0.0226	-0.11	0.0184	163
Democracy	Culture-ethnic matters	0.14	0.0222	0.18	0.0186	187
Liberal-authoritarianism	Environment	-0.15	0.0193			165
EU support	Urban-rural relations	-0.1	0.0185			131
Culture-ethnic matters	Environment	-0.12	0.0176	-0.21	0.0216	166
Culture-ethnic matters	Decentralization	0.24	0.0154	0.15	0.0228	161
Economic policy	Decentralization	-0.46	0.012	-0.04	0.0131	163
Liberal-authoritarianism	Urban-rural relations	-0.1	0.0053			164
Liberal-authoritarianism	Culture-ethnic matters			*0.1*	*0.0178*	188

Note: 'b' refers to the value of the coefficient for the independent-variable position; 'R^2 added' to the additional variance explained by adding that position to the model; regression set-up as in Table 5.3; values in italics significant at .1 level only; all others significant at .05 level; no values shown if coefficient not statistically significant; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

Appendix 5.2 Detailed results for Figure 5.4: Left-right differences in static interconnections, expert surveys

		Benoit and Laver				Laver and Hunt			
		Left		Right		Left		Right	
		r	n	r	n	r	n	r	n
Economic policy	Environment	0.43	94	0.63	67	0.27	83	0.57	66
Liberal-authoritarianism	Environment	0.67	90	0.32	63	0.61	83	.06(x)	66
Economic policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	0.46	90	.01(x)	63	0.56	83	.02(x)	66
Environment	Decentralization	.20(x)	68	0.33	64	0.67	83	0.39	66
Economic policy	Decentralization	-.02(x)	85	.23*	63	-.01(x)	83	0.31	66
Immigration	Environment	0.76	85	0.56	64				
Immigration	Liberal-authoritarianism	0.8	81	0.62	60				
Immigration	Economic policy	0.58	85	0.3	64				
EU support	Economic policy	-0.11(x)	68	.20(x)	49				
Urban-rural relations	Economic policy					0.58	83	.07(x)	66
Urban-rural relations	Decentralization					-.20*	83	0.12(x)	66
USSR relations	Economic policy					0.82	83	0.46	66
USSR relations	Environment					.19(x)	83	0.39	66
USSR relations	Decentralization					-.14(x)	83	0.31	66

Note: only issue relationship significant in multiple regression shown; 'r' refers to the r-value of the bivariate correlation; r-values marked with (x) are not significant at a .05 level.

Appendix 5.3 Detailed results for Figure 5.8: Left-right differences in static interconnections, expert surveys

Benoit and Laver

		Issue 2--> Issue 1		Issue 1 --> Issue 2		
Issue 1	Issue 2	Left	Right	Left	Right	n
Economic policy	Liberal-Authoritarianism	0.21	0.01	1.01	0.02	153
Economic policy	Environment	0.27	0.49	n.s.		161
Economic policy	Decentralization	-.01(x)	.17*	n.s.		149
Economic policy	Immigration	0.37	0.17	n.s.		149
Economic policy	EU support	-.06(x)	.09(x)	-.23(x)	.40*	117
Liberal-Authoritarianism	Environment	0.94	0.53	0.48	0.2	153
Liberal-Authoritarianism	Immigration	1.02	0.72	n.s.		141
Environment	Immigration	0.76	0.41	n.s.		149

Note: the coefficient for right parties is calculated by adding the coefficient of the interaction term (right*policy position) to the coefficient for the policy position; the significance for right parties refers to the significance of the interaction term. All coefficients significant at the .5 level or better, except those marked with a * (.1 level of significance) or with (x) (not significant). n.s. stands for 'not significant'.

Laver and Hunt

		Issue 2--> Issue 1		Issue 1 --> Issue 2		
Issue 1	Issue 2	Left	Right	Left	Right	n
Economic policy	Liberal-Authoritarianism	0.33	0.01	0.96	0.04	149
Economic policy	Environment	0.16	.44*	n.s.		149
Liberal-Authoritarianism	Environment	0.61	0.1	0.61	0.03	149
Economic policy	Decentralization	-.01(x)	.20*	-.02(x)	.52*	149
Economic policy	Urban-rural relations	0.41	0.04	0.79	0.12	149
Environment	Decentralization	0.79	0.3	n.s.		149
Decentralization	Urban-rural relations	-.20(x)	0.12	-.19(x)	.13*	149
Economic policy	USSR relations	0.77	0.31	n.s.		149
Environment	USSR relations	n.s.		0.12(x)	.46*	149
Decentralization	USSR relations	-.19(x)	0.34	-0.1(x)	0.29	149

Note: the coefficient for right parties is calculated by adding the coefficient of the interaction term (right*policy position) to the coefficient for the policy position; the significance for right parties refers to the significance of the interaction term. All coefficients significant at the .5 level or better, except those marked with a * (.1 level of significance) or with (x) (not significant). n.s. stands for 'not significant'.

Appendix 5.4 Detailed results for Figure 5.8: Left-right differences in static interconnections, CMP dataset

			Left		Right	Issue 2--> Issue 1		Issue 1 --> Issue 2		
Issue 1	**Issue 2**	**r**	**n**	**r**	**n**	**Left**	**Right**	**Left**	**Right**	n
Economic policy	Liberal-authorita	0.25	118	.02(x)	72	0.25	-0.17	ns		190
Economic policy	Democracy	.06(x)	120	-.04(x)	69	ns		.09(ns)	-0.14	189
Economic policy	Decentralization	-.01(x)	102	.10(x)	62	-0.46	0.43	*-0.06*	0.08	163
Economic policy	EU support	-.52	90	-.15(x)	51	-1.33	-0.03	-0.17	0.01	141
Economic policy	Education	.03(x)	116	.33	70	-0.24	0.44	-.06(ns)	0.08	186
Economic policy	Environment	-.32	104	-.15(x)	63	-.08(ns)	*-0.64*	-0.24	*0.12*	167
Foreign policy	Decentralization	.02(x)	100	-.37	61	-.03(ns)	0.32	0(ns)	0.36	160
Foreign policy	Education	-.03(x)	112	.45	68	-.43(ns)	0.37	-0.12	0.13	180
Foreign policy	EU support	-.25	89	.30	51	-0.36	0.27	-0.19	0.27	140
Foreign policy	Environment	-.34	101	-.53	63	-0.09	-0.49	ns		164
Foreign policy	Urban-rural relat	.26	101	-.22*	61	.14(ns)	-0.14	ns		162
Democracy	Culture-ethnic m	.15(x)	119	.05(x)	68	.20	0	ns		187
Democracy	Education	.17*	116	-.09(x)	67	-.43	0.41	-0.13	0.15	183
Liberal-authoritarianism	Culture-ethnic m	.21	117	.17	71	0.17	-0.02	ns		188
Culture-ethnic matters	Education	-.0	116	.18(x)	69	-.17(ns)	0.61	ns		185
Culture-ethnic matters	EU support	.05(x)	80	.52	51	.07(ns)	2.18	ns		140
Democracy	Urban-rural relat	-.07(x)	103	-.12(x)	62	0.23	-0.07	ns		165
EU support	Environment	.21	86	-.09(x)	49	*0.06*	-0.34	*0.87*	*-0.05*	135
Education	Urban-rural relat	-.04(x)	103	-.24*	60	-0.22	0	ns		163
Education	Environment	-.09(x)	101	-.27	62	0.1	-0.19	1.38	0.24	163
Decentralization	Environment	-.08(x)	96	-.38	59	-0.04(ns)	-0.61	ns		154
Environment	Urban-rural relat	-.08(x)	95	.49	58	-.34(ns)	0.11	-.03(ns)	0.91	153

Note: the coefficient for right parties is calculated by adding the coefficient of the interaction term (right*policy position) to the coefficient for the policy position; the significance for right parties refers to the significance of the interaction term. All coefficients significant at the .5 level or better, except those in italics (.1 level of significance) or with (ns) (not significant). n.s. stands for 'not significant'.

Appendix 5.5 Detailed results for Figure 5.9 to 5.11: party family positions in expert surveys and party manifestos

Benoit and Laver survey

	Communist			Green			Social Democrat			Liberal			Christian Democrat			Conservative		
	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n
Economic policy	-5.91	1.60	18	-5.02	1.87	15	-2.30	2.49	28	2.69	3.81	18	1.35	2.55	14	4.24	2.28	22
Liberal-authoritarianism	-4.77	2.84	18	-7.24	1.08	14	-4.53	2.57	26	-3.12	3.34	15	5.36	2.42	14	2.84	2.78	20
Environment	-3.82	2.72	18	-8.09	0.75	15	-0.99	2.22	28	2.07	3.93	18	0.90	2.33	14	4.23	1.81	22
Decentralization	-1.33	3.17	18	-6.93	1.29	15	-0.06	2.38	28	-1.76	2.43	18	-1.22	2.53	14	-0.86	3.10	22
Immigration	-5.37	2.31	18	-2.70	2.79	15	-3.33	1.90	28	-0.98	4.27	18	0.82	2.56	14	2.18	2.36	22
EU support	1.59	4.75	17	-1.14	4.09	12	-2.33	2.30	20	-1.71	3.59	13	-0.60	2.92	13	0.09	4.69	13

Laver and Hunt survey

	Communist		Green		Social Democrats		Liberal		Christian Democrat		Conservative	
	mean	st.d.	mean	st.d.	mean	st.d.	mean	st.d.	mean	st.d.	mean	st.d.
Economic policy	-5.97	2.87	-4.47	2.27	-3.02	2.12	3.01	3.27	2.06	1.62	4.54	1.63
Liberal-Authoritarianism	-6.38	1.98	-6.71	2.00	-4.15	2.11	-2.78	2.10	5.90	2.22	1.81	3.40
Environment	-3.22	3.66	-8.30	1.09	-0.52	2.65	-0.11	4.19	0.68	2.16	3.18	1.85
Decentralization	-1.29	4.15	-5.49	2.14	0.32	2.40	-0.64	3.27	-0.05	3.33	0.74	2.88
Urban-rural relations	-5.30	2.09	-2.13	3.49	-3.20	2.48	-1.22	2.13	2.97	1.30	0.22	3.43
USSR	-6.53	2.60	-3.98	2.30	-3.43	2.06	-0.77	2.75	0.21	2.02	-0.04	2.82
Public ownership	-6.80	3.24	-3.24	2.53	-1.80	2.08	4.32	3.00	3.71	1.99	4.98	2.40
Clericalism	-5.89	3.65	-3.79	2.96	-2.29	1.39	-1.40	2.63	6.24	2.06	3.47	2.43
	18		14		25		16		15		16	

Note: the sample size for clericalism for Social Democrats is 23, for Conservatives 15.

Party *manifestos*

	Communist			Green			Social Democrat			Liberal			Christian Democrat			Conservative		
	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n
Economic policy	-11.62	6.53	28	-8.39	5.45	14	-8.43	5.53	42	3.69	7.13	26	0.46	3.86	23	7.47	7.66	24
Foreign policy	-8.09	7.16	28	-6.91	4.95	14	-4.74	4.90	40	-2.71	2.90	24	-3.52	4.59	23	-0.96	3.58	24
Liberal-authoritarianism	5.42	6.79	28	7.30	9.03	13	5.35	7.03	41	6.57	6.80	26	15.98	13.83	23	8.30	5.05	24
Culture-ethnic matters	-5.83	4.85	28	-5.96	3.64	13	-4.35	4.51	41	-3.89	3.61	26	-5.49	5.12	23	-2.45	3.70	24
Democracy	-8.41	5.72	28	-7.86	3.36	14	-7.80	6.52	42	-7.30	3.85	25	-5.60	2.51	22	-5.79	2.98	24
EU support	0.62	2.03	23	-0.17	3.04	13	-1.68	1.19	25	-2.04	1.11	19	-2.09	1.46	19	-1.69	1.04	14
Decentralization	-1.30	1.02	25	-2.32	2.22	12	-1.87	1.46	33	-1.62	1.15	20	-1.90	1.22	20	-3.30	3.97	22
Education	-3.11	1.88	27	-2.82	1.48	12	-4.58	2.14	41	-4.53	3.22	25	-3.58	1.23	23	-3.99	2.23	24
Environment	4.37	3.38	26	24.52	10.48	14	3.72	2.70	34	3.52	2.70	20	4.28	2.48	18	2.78	1.34	23
Urban-rural relations	2.32	1.73	24	1.83	1.10	11	3.77	3.67	36	4.17	6.17	21	2.99	1.65	21	3.85	2.10	21

Appendix 5.6 Detailed results for Figure 5.12 and 5.13: bivariate correlations in the expert surveys by family of nations

Benoit and Laver expert survey

Nordic family of countries

	Econ	Envi	Lib-Auth	Decent	Immig
Envi	0.76				
p	0.00				
n	38				
Lib-Auth	0.43	0.47			
p	0.01	0.00			
n	38	38			
Decent	0.07	0.40	-0.02		
p	0.70	0.01	0.91		
n	38	38	38		
Immig	0.58	0.74	0.68	0.27	
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10	
n	38	38	38	38	
EU	-0.12	-0.07	0.10	0.15	0.22
p	0.53	0.68	0.59	0.41	0.23
n	32	32	32	32	32

Southern European family of nations

	Econ	Envi	Lib-Auth	Decent	Immig
Envi	0.90				
p	0.00				
n	15				
Lib-Auth	0.90	0.95			
p	0.00	0.00			
n	15	15			
Decent	0.57	0.57	0.56		
p	0.03	0.03	0.03		
n	15	15	15		
Immig	0.93	0.97	0.97	0.53	
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	
n	15	15	15	15	
EU	-0.19	-0.02	0.11	0.35	-0.02
p	0.51	0.93	0.69	0.20	0.96
n	15	15	15	15	15

Central European family of nations

	Econ	Envi	Lib-Auth	Decent	Immig
Envi	0.80				
p	0.00				
n	54				
Lib-Auth	0.56	0.61			
p	0.00	0.00			
n	54	54			
Decent	-0.34	-0.03	-0.08		
p	0.01	0.82	0.58		
n	54	54	54		
Immig	0.78	0.83	0.80	-0.14	
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.32	
n	54	54	54	54	
EU	0.23	0.34	0.33	-0.17	0.45
p	0.09	0.01	0.02	0.23	0.00
n	54	54	54	54	54

Anglo-Saxon family of nations

	Econ	Envi	Lib-Auth	Decent	Immig
Envi	0.83				
p	0.00				
n	37				
Lib-Auth	0.65	0.83			
p	0.00	0.00			
n	29	29			
Decent	0.14	0.18	0.07		
p	0.40	0.28	0.70		
n	37	37	29		
Immig	0.62	0.80	0.83	0.14	
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.39	
n	37	37	29	37	
EU	0.17	0.25	0.42	0.38	0.46
p	0.52	0.35	0.11	0.14	0.07
n	16	16	16	16	16

Laver and Hunt survey

Nordic family of countries

	Econ	Envi	Lib-Auth	Decent	Urb-rur
Envi	0.64				
p	0.00				
n	43				
Lib-Auth	0.67	0.47			
p	0.00	0.00			
n	43	43			
Decent	0.08	0.63	0.12		
p	0.63	0.00	0.44		
n	43	43	43		
Urb-rur	0.30	-0.16	0.55	-0.41	
p	0.05	0.29	0.00	0.01	
n	43	43	43	43	
USSR	0.82	0.46	0.59	-0.03	0.30
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.82	0.05
n	43	43	43	43	43

Southern European family of nations

	Econ	Envi	Lib-Auth	Decent	Urb-rur
Envi	0.85				
p	0.00				
n	19				
Lib-Auth	0.96	0.88			
p	0.00	0.00			
n	19	19			
Decent	0.41	0.42	0.44		
p	0.08	0.07	0.06		
n	19	19	19		
Urb-rur	0.83	0.75	0.85	0.41	
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08	
n	19	19	19	19	
USSR	0.88	0.79	0.91	0.27	0.67
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.27	0.00
n	19	19	19	19	19

Central European family of nations

	Econ	Envi	Lib-Auth	Decent	Urb-rur
Envi	0.61				
p	0.00				
n	51				
Lib-Auth	0.66	0.54			
p	0.00	0.00			
n	51	51			
Decent	0.35	0.68	0.42		
p	0.01	0.00	0.00		
n	51	51	51		
Urb-rur	0.67	0.27	0.84	0.19	
p	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.19	
n	51	51	51	51	
USSR	0.85	0.48	0.74	0.30	0.66
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00
n	51	51	51	51	51

Anglo-Saxon family of nations

	Econ	Envi	Lib-Auth	Decent	Urb-rur
Envi	0.71				
p	0.00				
n	24				
Lib-Auth	0.81	0.86			
p	0.00	0.00			
n	24	24			
Decent	0.22	0.25	0.14		
p	0.31	0.25	0.53		
n	24	24	24		
Urb-rur	0.65	0.59	0.85	-0.04	
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.84	
n	24	24	24	24	
USSR	0.92	0.63	0.81	0.10	0.81
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.65	0.00
n	24	24	24	24	24

Appendix 5.7 Detailed results for Figure 5.14: static interconnections by family of nations using CMP-extracted positions

Issue 1	Issue 2	Nordic			Central European			Southern European			Anglo-Saxon		
		R^2 added			R^2 added			R^2 added			R^2 added		
		2-->1	1-->2	n	2-->1	1-->2	n	2-->1	1-->2	n	2-->1	1-->2	n
Economic policy	Foreign policy	0.2145	0.1422	45	0.0898	0.073	57	0.1407	0.1128	30	0.3057	0.2797	31
Economic policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	0.078	0.0808	44	0.0928	0.0742	57					0.0482	35
Economic policy	Democracy							0.3962	0.3283	32			
Economic policy	Culture-ethnic relations				0.0813	0.0352	57						
Economic policy	Education	0.0776	0.07	44									
Economic policy	EU							0.2617	0.1685	31	0.3415	0.3098	11
Economic policy	Environment	0.0663	0.0472	45	0.0304		52				0.0634	0.0589	32
Economic policy	Urban-rural relations				0.0953	0.0691	55				0.0754		33
Foreign policy	Liberal-authoritarianism					0.0681	57				0.176	0.1636	31
Foreign policy	Democracy							0.0839	0.102	30			
Foreign policy	Culture-ethnic relations	0.0192	0.0491	45	0.1919	0.1401	57				0.055	0.0318	31
Foreign policy	Decentralization							0.049	0.0665	30			
Foreign policy	Environment	0.0614	0.0922	44	0.0308	0.0359	52	0.0576		30	0.0437	0.0469	31
Liberal-authoritarianism	Democracy				0.1209		57						
Liberal-authoritarianism	Culture-ethnic relations				0.1192		57	0.0599		30			
Liberal-authoritarianism	Decentralization							0.077	0.1307	32	0.2694	0.2374	27
Liberal-authoritarianism	Environment	0.0457		43	0.0319		52				0.1264		32
Liberal-authoritarianism	Urban-rural relations										0.048		33
Democracy	Culture-ethnic relations	0.0257		46				0.0404		30		0.0759	34
Democracy	EU							0.1524	0.1158	31			
Democracy	Decentralization	0.0757	0.0819	41									
Democracy	Environment				0.0653		52	0.0357		31			
Democracy	Urban-rural relations										0.05		33
Culture-ethnic relations	Education	0.0538	0.0402	44									
Culture-ethnic relations	EU	0.0375	0.0333	43				0.0344		30			
Culture-ethnic relations	Decentralization				0.036	0.052	56		0.0218	30			
Culture-ethnic relations	Environment		0.0291	45	0.0151		52						
Education	EU	0.0204		41		0.034	55	0.2581	0.1868	30			
Education	Decentralization	0.1237	0.1516	41				0.0698		31			
Education	Environment				0.1251	0.0895	51				0.0692	0.1142	32
Education	Urban-rural relations	0.0599	0.0522	38	0.0988	0.076	55	0.1854	0.1416	28			
EU	Decentralization				0.0429	0.044	55	0.0549	0.0671	31			
EU	Environment										0.1316		11
Decentralization	Environment				0.013	0.0158	51				0.0464		26
Decentralization	Urban-rural relations	0.431	0.3346	36		0.0971	51						
Urban-rural	EU							0.0689		28			
Urban-rural	Environment				0.1042		51	0.0291		28			

Note: only added level of variance for models with significant coefficients shown.

Chapter 6

Issue interconnections and party policy change

Policy movement is at the core of party competition. Even journalistic analyses of elections, employing the common spatial metaphor, explain the success and defeat of parties through their strategic move to the centre or their foolhardy shift to the extremes. To use an example from the UK: Labour's disastrous performance in the 1983 general election is often linked to its leftward shift, including an election programme dubbed 'the longest suicide note in history', while its success in 1997 under Tony Blair is often credited to the decision to move decisively to the political centre. Going beyond such simplified interpretations of electoral dynamics, academic studies of party competition in the rational choice tradition have tried to examine the balance between ideology and strategy for political parties.

Two main debates concerning party policy change have emerged. First, the existence of strong strategic incentives to converge on the median voter has been contrasted with the fact that parties nevertheless continue to differ significantly in their policy prescriptions. Second, while it would be rational for parties to shadow large shifts in public opinion, there also remains a need for ideological consistency and coherence. In sum, parties should move if this promises political success, but their ability to do so is limited by factors such as their supporters, activists and donors, their ideology and their organisational constraints.

This chapter proposes an additional constraint to party policy change: issue interconnections constitute a further rational limitation on the freedom of movement of

political parties. In the previous chapter, I presented the strength of static interconnections within party programmes, distinguishing between the economic left and right, party families and countries. Here, these findings are used to explain the existence of dynamic interconnections, that is, whether there are links between various issue areas in terms of parties' ideological change. In general, parties should arguably exhibit associated policy change on issue pairs that also showed static interconnections. Policy change should also be less pronounced if the issue is generally strongly connected to others and thus a tightly-linked part of the issue system.

Static interconnections can thus help predict the existence of dynamic interconnections, but there are two ways in which they may do so. In the first approach, all static interconnections are equally likely to also be mirrored by dynamic interconnections. The overall empirical regularities found in the previous chapter would then be reproduced for party policy change as well. A second approach distinguishes between static interconnections based on logic and those based on circumstance. Here, the pattern of issues described in the previous chapter takes on importance, as it provides a guide to those issues that are logically linked. The results indeed indicate that the second approach, in which only logic-based static interconnections are mirrored by dynamic linkages, is a more accurate predictor of the ties between the two phenomena.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I consider existing explanations of party policy change: why do parties move? Then, I present the way in which static issue interconnections could influence dynamic interconnections. After describing the empirical results, I conclude with a brief discussion of my findings.

Explanations of party policy change

Why do parties move? The simplest answer to this question was given by Downs (1957): parties should be seen as vote-maximisers. They position themselves in the ideological space, in his view a left-right continuum, in such a way as to gain as many votes as possible. The aim underlying vote maximisation is winning and staying in public office. In Downs' description, leaders 'act solely in order to attain the income, prestige and political power which come from being in office' (Downs, 1957, p. 27). This led to his prediction that parties will converge towards the median voter in a two-party system. In the most basic model of Downsian political competition, there are no limits to the types of movement a party may undertake in order to maximise its votes. Since parties fashion their policies in order to win elections instead of winning elections in order to implement their political programme (1957, p. 28), they will take up any position that promises electoral success. If we assume vote maximisation and unrestrained median convergence, there are two scenarios that will make a party move: first, a party will shift its position if it can move closer to the median voter; second, it will shadow changes in the position of the median voter. In the first scenario, parties are located at a certain distance from the median voter, and they shift their position in order to increase their electoral success. The second scenario describes a change in the make-up of voter preferences, so parties as vote-maximisers are expected to follow public opinion shifts. Evidence that this is indeed the case has been found for the US (Stimson et al., 1995; Erikson et al., 2002) and for Europe (Adams et al., 2004; McDonald and Budge, 2005; Adams et al., 2006). In sum, parties are predicted to move towards the preference of the median voter, with no limits on their freedom to pursue electoral success through policy movement.

However, if the assumptions of this 'comic-book version of Downs' (Grofman, 2004, p. 40) are relaxed, then complete median voter convergence is not predicted.[33] In general, it is rare for all the requirements for full convergence to be in place, so divergence should in fact be the norm in party competition (Grofman, 2004). While predicting divergence does not always mean that parties will fail to follow shifts in public opinion, this is nevertheless the clear implication of some of the work in this area. Thus, the influence of party activists (Aldrich, 1983; Laver, 1997; Schofield, 2003) and of campaign donors (Miller and Schofield, 2003) means that parties have an incentive to present non-centrist platforms, but for reasons only indirectly related to vote-maximising ambitions: instead, party positions are partly the result of the need for scarce campaign resources (Adams et al., 2005, p. 8). In this view, parties will move if the preferences of activists or donors – and not those of voters – make this a sensible strategy. Similarly, if we adopt Budge and Laver's (1986) and Strom's (1990) argument that parties may not just seek votes but also policy or office, parties might not always track public opinion (Schofield and Sened, 2006, p. 3). If parties and candidates care only about policy, they would indeed generally not be expected to change at all due to electoral incentives.[34] Meanwhile, parties that primarily seek office can decide to take up a less popular stance that nevertheless guarantees inclusion in a government coalition. For both policy- and office-seeking parties, the pursuit of votes and thus the freedom of party movement are limited by other rational motivations.

Downs himself realised that parties' freedom of movement is not without limits. Parties, he argued, constrain their movements because they need to prove to citizens that they are credible and reliable: they need to be 'rationally immobile' (1957, p. 110).

[33] See Grofman (2004) for a full account of the explicit and implicit assumptions of the pure Downsian model.

[34] The three motivations are clearly difficult to separate: for example, it helps if a party is in office if it wants to realise policy goals. Indeed, Laver and Shepsle (1995) have argued that parties would always behave as if they were pursuing policy aims, even if their actual goal was office or votes.

The means through which parties achieve this is ideology, which he defines as 'a verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society' (1957, p. 96). To attract votes, parties need to be 'responsible and reliable' (1957, p. 109). By presenting themselves as ideological actors capable of credible commitments, parties can reassure voters that they will in fact implement the promised policies. As a result, it is rational for parties to exhibit a certain consistency in their policies: 'Any party which is both responsible and reliable will probably have an ideology which is relatively coherent and immobile' (1957, p. 109; see also Knight, 1992, p. 80). Once a reasonably constant set of policies has been established, it is rational to modify it only slowly. Parties benefit from having a strong brand name (Snyder and Ting, 2002) and are conservative and risk-averse due to the potential costs of losing the support of certain social groups and power bases (Janda et al., 1995, p. 174; Adams and Somer-Topcu, forthcoming). Moreover, voters only adapt their beliefs of political parties slowly since they suffer from 'perceptual inertia' (Ordeshook, 1976, p. 295). Thus, the importance of ideology means that parties will find it 'difficult or impossible to move' (Munger and Hinich, 1993, p. 42).

Related to ideological movement are explanations of how parties incorporate new issues – such as environmental protection or the 'war on terror' – into their existing policy profile. The pure Downsian explanation would be for parties to choose that policy position that promises the greatest political success. However, parties may also be limited in their flexibility in choosing positions on newly salient issues. First, parties will exhibit the path-dependent immobility characteristic of all actors and organisations. Parties can be seen as 'boundedly rational': they react to political change based on the ideologies they have constructed over time (Marks and Wilson, 2000, p. 434; Pierson, 2000, p. 260; Kriesi et al., 2006). As Greif and Laitin write: 'Hence, past behaviour

would reign ... because institutionalized rules enable individuals with limited knowledge and information to choose behaviour. And thus, behavioural rules learned in the past are the best predictor of future behaviour' (2004, p. 638). Party ideology thus provides the basis for responses to current events and changes in public opinion and therefore constrains the party's strategic freedom (Budge, 1994, p. 446; Beeler Asay, 2008, p. 115). Second, activists and campaign donors not only entice parties away from the median voter (Aldrich, 1983): they may also limit party flexibility when reacting to newly salient political topics by encouraging parties to adopt a position that they agree with. When choosing positions on emerging issues, parties will thus nevertheless respond to the same activists and donors who supported them in the past.

Policy interconnections and party movement

Political ideologies thus create limits that constrain parties from picking those positions that promise the greatest electoral gain. An ideology is an internally coherent set of beliefs and preferences. As we have seen, this coherence can stem from multiple sources: it may be the result of logic and quasi-logic or simply reflect the aggregate consistency of voters, supporters and politicians. In any case, the internal coherence of party programmes will have consequences for how parties move.

Again, it is possible to extrapolate from the nature of preference change among individuals. At this level, ideological constraints can be 'dynamic' and not just 'static' (Converse, 1964, p. 208). This means that a change in views on one issue will lead to a similar adjustment on the strongly linked second issue. For example, we can imagine a situation in which there is a budget constraint between two distinct issue areas, guns and butter. If an individual wants to spend more on butter, then his or her views on spending on guns should also change. Conversely, there is unlikely to be great change

on views on spending on guns without some complementary movement on butter expenditure: the independent range of preference change on linked issues is limited. Here, the issue constraint is dynamic because it is also visible in the nature of preference change.

This conception of the change in individual political beliefs can also be applied to the policy movements of political parties. I have already argued that a party ideology can be described as a bundle of issues whose components are interconnected, albeit with varying strength. The focus of the previous chapter was the static interconnections that exist within party programmes: in other words, the extent to which the position on one issue is able to predict the position on a second issue. Now, I turn to the examination of dynamic interconnections.

Where the components of the issue system are interconnected dynamically, the policy movements on pairs of issues reflect these constraints. If the dynamic interconnection is 'perfect', then a movement on issue A leads to an equal and immediate adjustment on issue B. However, as Budge (1994) argues, all ideologies provide a certain level of ambiguity which allows parties to move within a limited area, and the same applies to strongly interconnected issues. Realistically, even with a dynamic interconnection, a certain level of freedom of movement exists on both issues: a certain position on issue A can be combined with a limited range of positions on issue B. However, at the very least parties will not move independently on two tightly interconnected issues. In sum: the stronger the dynamic links between two issues, the more policy movement on one issue predicts a similar adjustment on the second issue.

The sources of dynamic interconnections

What are the causal sources of dynamic interconnections? I have suggested that the two main origins of issue constraints can be summarised as logic and circumstance, where 'logic' refers to innate characteristics linking the issue pair and 'circumstance' to historically and socially produced associations. Some interconnections may thus be based on an inherent and intrinsic linkage between two issue areas that is based on a joint value or constraint that underlies both topics. Other interconnections may result from the regularities present in aggregate voter preferences and the historical development of political parties. As argued in Chapter 3, such interconnections will develop when elites spread values and opinions among one social group or if certain social strata happen to share specific views without there being any logical need for a correlation between them. This distinction between logic and circumstance as the basis of interconnections is also applicable to dynamic interconnections.

In theory, dynamic policy interconnections could be based on both types of origins of issue interconnections. If two issues are connected through logic and coherence, then this tight association should also be reflected in the fact that parties will tend to modify their positions on both issues at the same time and in a similar manner. This can be due to both electoral incentives and sincere ideological behaviour. First, independent movement on logically linked issues may open the party up to charges that its policy package is inconsistent. Other parties will point out their opponents' incoherence, and voters may punish parties for inconsistent promises. There is therefore a strong electoral incentive to maintain coherence: the observable consequences of this incentive are dynamic interconnections between issue areas.

Logic-based dynamic interconnections may also be the result of ideological behaviour on the part of elites. In many cases, the associated policy shifts that

characterise dynamic interconnections may thus simply occur automatically as the two issues are very closely linked, also in the minds of politicians. This can be illustrated by taking one mechanism through which party policy change can occur: factional replacement. For example, in a social democratic party, a centrist faction may wrest power from a left-leaning subgroup. This change in party leadership could lead to policy modification on an issue pair because it is characterised by strong logical links: a party may thus become more in favour of deregulation and more pro-European at the same time. Dynamic interconnections are thus likely to exist for issue pairs linked through underlying inherent logical ties.

Second, dynamic interconnections could also occur on issue pairs linked through circumstance. This means that there is an association of policy change simply due to the fact that the positions tend to co-occur, for example within certain segments of society or among groups of activists. This co-occurrence of views can be purely coincidental or due to the fact that two issue positions are seen as associated despite the absence of logical links. If policy positions on economics and law and order are linked, then this would be mostly coincidental, as these two issues are not generally seen as associated within party programmes or social strata. On the other hand, positions on social liberalism and pro-environmentalism have been seen as associated issues that are part of one dimension, liberal-authoritarianism or gal/tan (Kitschelt, 1994; Hooghe et al., 2002). In either case, joint policy change on both issues would *not* be due to underlying logical ties. Looking again at the example based on factional replacement, the argument here would be that policy change will co-occur because the leaders and activists in the newly dominant faction have systematically different preferences to the old faction. Tony Blair's pre-election repositioning of Labour included both a move to the economic centre as well as a toughening up of the party's stance on law and order.

These two policy preferences are not directly linked through logic but may well have reflected a co-occurrence of these views among the newly dominant group within the party.

While it is possible for dynamic interconnections to have logic or circumstance as their underlying basis, the preceding discussion also indicates that logic may provide the more solid foundation for interconnected policy change. The hypothesised mechanisms leading to logic-based dynamic interconnections are arguably stronger: the two explanations highlighted were the electoral incentives towards coherence as well as the ideological behaviour – possibly almost unconscious – of elite politicians. The mechanism leading to circumstance-based dynamic interconnections relied on a weaker explanation, namely the co-occurrence and association of certain policy positions among voters or groups of politicians.

This has consequences for the expectations one should have concerning the number and nature of dynamic interconnections. The previous chapter examined the static interconnections in party programmes. These can be used as a basis for predictions on policy change: the simplest expectation would then be that the static interconnections found should be replicated at the dynamic level. However, it is more likely that only some interconnections will be dynamic as well as static: as argued above, it is logic-based static linkages that are more likely to occur over time. Politicians, activists and voters will see such issue pairs as naturally bound, and policy change will co-occur without the more complicated mechanisms required by circumstance-based interconnections. The second consequence of this is that there will be fewer dynamic than static interconnections. If only the logic-based portion of static interconnections is likely to be replicated dynamically, then the overall number of dynamic linkages should be lower than that of static linkages. In addition, there should

also be few issue pairs that have dynamic ties without an equivalent static linkage. In sum, it is expected, first, that logic-based static interconnections are more likely to also exhibit dynamic interconnections than circumstance-based static interconnections and, second, that there are fewer dynamic than static interconnections.

Two approaches to predicting dynamic interconnections using knowledge of static interconnections are therefore possible. First, the static interconnections found in the previous chapter can be seen as the links also expected in dynamic terms. However, only static interconnections deemed to be based on logical foundations should be seen as a likely basis for dynamic interconnections. The second approach is therefore differentiate between static interconnections based on logic and those based on circumstance, with only the former providing a likely basis for dynamic interconnections. I thus expect that this second understanding of issue systems is more likely to depict accurately the strength of dynamic interconnections. I will therefore use an a priori division of static interconnections in ties based on logic or circumstance as a basis for developing detailed expectations concerning the predictive capacity of static interconnections.

Predicting the extent of policy change

Finally, static interconnections may also help predict the extent to which parties move on each issue. The more tightly a policy area is tied to others, the less likely a party is to carry out significant policy change on that issue. Such policy movement would require a broader refashioning of party ideology, which should only occur rarely. Since (as noted above) parties are usually conservative and risk-averse organisations, such wholesale change would presumably be a step that parties would be less likely to undertake quickly. Conversely, it should be easier for parties to move on issues that are

in general characterised by loose static connections to other issues. In such policy areas, parties can choose their position relatively freely as they will feel less pressure to modify other positions as a consequence of this one ideological adjustment.[35] In the analysis of policy change, I will thus also examine the total extent of movement on each issue and compare this to the static interconnections found in the previous chapter.

Data sources and measurement of policy change

There are very few datasets that provide information on change in party positions on separate issues over time. As in the previous chapter, I will make use of the Laver-Hunt and Benoit-Laver expert surveys as well as the CMP dataset. Here, I will briefly describe the issues and parties included in each dataset as well as the measurement issues associated with each data source.

The two expert surveys were not expressly designed to provide information on party policy change. The issues assessed in each expert survey are not identical, with the Laver-Hunt version providing positions on eight issues for almost all countries and the Benoit-Laver survey allowing the issues included to vary by country. This means that, in total, we only have information on four issues for a wide range of parties: economic policy, liberal-authoritarianism, environmental policy and decentralisation. Moreover, the restriction imposed by the existence of only two time points that are fourteen years apart is of course quite severe. Nevertheless, the expert surveys can successfully be used to show how party systems have changed between 1989 and 2003 (e.g. Laver and Benoit, 2006). This is because these data sources also have some

[35] Other factors are clearly also important in the extent to which parties will move on a given issue. For example, parties will be less likely to move strongly on an issue that is at the core of their identity: Green parties will rarely take a stance that opposes environmental protection, and (economically) liberal parties are unlikely to give up their support for free-market capitalism. This may reflect, among other factors, a brand-name consciousness and a need to retain the support of party activists. The following chapter addresses the place of salience in party movements on interconnected issues.

undeniable advantages. Apart from the general reliability of these surveys, the identical scoring system and the consistent question wording (at least on four issues) means that the party positions in 1989 and 2003 can be easily compared. In this chapter, I therefore examine correlated policy change on four core issues for 118 parties in 23 countries.[36]

The most frequently used data source for longitudinal, cross-national estimates on party positions is the CMP dataset. In this chapter, I will again use the division into ten distinct issue areas introduced in the previous chapters. The obvious advantages of the CMP data lie in the large amount of policy information included as well as the relatively complete coverage of elections in advanced democracies since 1945. The data structure is not as straightforward as in the expert surveys, so positional information (and thus policy movements) cannot be directly assessed. As noted in the previous chapter, it is nevertheless possible to derive positional information from the CMP's salience information by subtracting positive from negative references to a topic. Using these raw 'positions' it is possible to assess the extent of policy change; the exact model specification is discussed further below. In total, this chapter examines party movements for 243 parties in 24 countries.[37]

As noted in Chapter 4, both data sources face particular limitations when used to analyse the existence and nature of policy change. The expert surveys tend to see parties as programmatically extremely stable. Arguably, then, experts take a long-term approach to estimating party positions, downplaying short-term changes in party views. It is therefore likely that experts underestimate the actual level of ideological movement in an effort to provide a generally applicable estimate of a party's position. In contrast, manifesto coding presents parties as erratic, changeable actors. Some of this election-to-

[36] These countries are (with number of parties in parentheses): Canada (4), Japan (4), Norway (7), UK (4), US(2), Australia(4), Austria (4), Belgium (10), Denmark (8), Finland (7), France (6), Germany (4), Greece (4), Iceland (3), Ireland (5), Israel (6), Italy (5), Luxembourg (5), Netherlands (7), New Zealand (2), Portugal (5), Spain (5), Sweden (7).
[37] As above, with Switzerland added.

election movement may be down to actual party movements, but an unknown proportion will be 'noise'. In other words, and in marked contrast to the expert surveys, the CMP approach overestimates the level of party policy change. In sum, each measure is plagued by its own measurement error problems. This makes it difficult to assess correlations among policy change within party programmes, as this measurement error will in both cases lead a researcher to commit a Type-II error, that is, fail to reject the null hypothesis of no association when in fact there is an association. This problem will need to be kept in mind during the empirical analysis that follows.

From static to dynamic interconnections: detailed expectations

The findings from the previous chapter are used to formulate predictions concerning the existence of dynamic interconnections. The predictions relate, first, to the amount parties move on each issue and, second, to the extent that policy change on two issues is similar and thus interconnected. Turning first to the amount of policy movement, the extent to which an issue is statically interconnected should indicate how much a party will tend to move. In the expert surveys, it is only possible to look at four issues, and of these four, only one – decentralisation – was clearly different from the other in terms of the overall strength of interconnections. I therefore expect greater movement on decentralisation than on the other three issues. For the manifestos, ten issues are available, and the differences in terms of the overall strength of static interconnections were greater. Figure 6.1 presents again the main summary of results from the previous chapter. The numbers to the right of the pyramid indicate the overall number of other policy areas linked to that one issue; for example, positions on education are statically connected to two other areas, EU and environment. The most weakly interconnected issues are urban-rural relations, education and democracy, while economic policy and

culture-ethnic relations appear to be the most strongly linked. The other five issues are all moderately strongly linked: they are either weakly connected to most issues or strongly connected to a few. The former group is made up of liberal-authoritarianism and decentralisation, while the latter consists of foreign policy, environmental policy and EU integration.

Second, the results for the static interconnections can be used to predict the existence of dynamic interconnections. In the expert survey, only one of the relevant issue pairs (liberal-authoritarianism and decentralisation) appeared to be entirely unconnected, though the other five pairs did vary in the strength of their linkage. A ranking of this interconnection strength can be found in the third column of Table 6.1. For the manifestos, Figure 6.1 also presents the precise issue pairs for which static interconnections were found. A first and most simple approach would be to expect all static interconnections to be reproduced as dynamic linkages.

Yet it might be necessary to develop a more nuanced set of expectations. As already explored in the previous chapter, it is possible to divide static interconnections into those based on logic and those based on circumstance, and this distinction may help to improve the prediction of dynamic interconnections. A summary of the distinction between logic- and circumstance-based interconnections can be found in Table 6.1 for the expert surveys and in Figure 6.2 for the manifestos. Table 6.2 summarises the reasons why the different issue pairs were assigned to either logic or circumstance. The distinctions between logic and circumstance are based, where possible, on previous discussions in the literature but are completed based on my own decisions. The disadvantage of this method is that it depends on a researcher-led identification of the sources of static interconnections. However, the other option would



Figure 6.1 **Static policy interconnections in party manifestos**

Note: The number at the end of each row represents the total number of interconnections for each issue (e.g. 7 for economic policy, 4 for foreign policy and so on); each box represents the summary of two multiple regression models (e.g. the box at the bottom left contains the information on the regression, with economic policy as the dependent, and foreign policy as the added independent variable, as well as the regression with foreign policy as the dependent, and economic policy as the added independent variable); boxes are only shaded where the coefficient of the added variable is statistically significant at .1 or better (as in Model 2, Table 5.4); the shadings are based on the amount of added variance explained by the additional variable (e.g. more than .05 for economic policy and foreign policy, see Table 5.4); more detailed results in Appendix 5.1; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

be to discard the importance of this distinction altogether. I present the assumed basis for each connection openly in the table and figures below so that the reader can draw his or her own conclusions as to the plausibility of these claims. Finally, it is also necessary to note that only those issue pairs where a static interconnection was found are considered. While it would be possible to hypothesise either logic- or circumstance-based connections for issue pairs without static interconnections, this serves little purpose if the aim is to predict dynamic from static linkages.

Analysis and results: extent of policy change

The first hypothesis concerns the extent to which parties move on each distinct issue. Here, the level of policy change is presented for the expert surveys (Tables 6.3 and 6.4) and the manifesto data (Table 6.5). For the expert surveys, the mean absolute level of change for each of the four issues available is shown.[38] Given the findings for static interconnections in the previous chapter, I expected decentralisation to exhibit the most movement, as it was only weakly connected to the remaining issues. The other three issues are all strongly statically interconnected, so movement on these should be similarly low.

However, the differences between the levels of change are not clear-cut. The average change for liberal-authoritarianism was 1.28 points, 1.79 for environmental policy, 1.81 for economic policy and 2.02 for decentralization.[39] One issue – liberal-authoritarianism – thus sees the least policy movement overall; the difference in means is statistically significant at a .05 level compared to the other three issues. The other three issues are not statistically different from each other in their total movement, though decentralisation is, as predicted, the issue with the most policy change.

[38] This was calculated as the absolute difference between the 2003 and 1989 positions.
[39] All means are statistically different from 0 at a .05 significance level (one-sample t-test).

Issue 1	Issue 2	Strength ranking, exp survey	Logic or circumstance?
Economic policy	Environment	1	L
Liberal-authoritarianism	Environment	2	C
Economic policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	3	C
Environment	Decentralization	4	L
Economic policy	Decentralization	5	C
Liberal-authoritarianism	Decentralization	6	C

Table 6.1 **Summary of expert survey findings and probable interconnection basis**



Figure 6.2 **Probable interconnection basis for CMP issues**

Note: L or C only indicated for issue pairs found to be statistically associated as static interconnections

Issue 1	Issue 2	Logic or cirumstance?	
Economic policy	Foreign policy	C	No necessary economic implications
	Liberal-authoritarianism	C	Distinct areas of political debate: Bobbio (1996), Finer (1987), Kitschelt (1994), Kriesi et al. (2008)
	Culture-ethnic matters	C	Distinct areas of political debate: Bobbio (1996), Finer (1987), Kitschelt (1994), Kriesi et al. (2008)
	Environment	L	Environmental policy can have economic consequences (and vice versa)
	EU	L	The EU is partly an economic project (Kriesi et al. 2008, Marks and Hooghe 2009)
	Decentralization	C	No necessary economic connection: Hix (2007)
	Urban-rural relations	L	Support for farmers has economic implications
Foreign policy	Culture-ethnic matters	L	Both policy areas can be influenced by (inter)nationalism and multiculturalism
	Democracy	L	Foreign policy can be linked with a desire to spread democracy
	Environment	C	No necessary mutual implications
Liberal-authoritarianism	Culture-ethnic matters	L	These two issues are part of the underlying value of community and fraternity (Kitschelt 1994)
	Environment	C	No necessary implications
	Decentralization	C	No necessary implications
	Urban-rural relations	C	No necessary implications
Culture-ethnic matters	Democracy	L	A concern for improved democracy is linked to a concern with nationalism and minority protection (Kitschelt 1994)
	Environment	L	These two issues are part of the underlying value of community and fraternity (Kitschelt 1994)
	EU	L	The EU is an international project, often opposed on national sovereignty grounds (Marks and Hooghe 2009)
	Decentralization	L	Decentralization can be supported due to ethnic/national motivations
Democracy	Decentralization	C	No necessary link between democracy and decentralization
Environment	EU	C	No necessary implications
	Decentralization	L	A desire to protect the environment is often linked with a desire for decentralization of decision-making (community involvement) (Kitschelt 1994)
	Education	C	No necessary implications
EU	Decentralization	L	Both issues affect governance structures of the state
	Education	C	No necessary implications
	Urban-rural relations	L	The EU has implications for farmer due to large support for agriculture

Table 6.2 **Interconnection basis of CMP issues**

	All parties		
	mean	st.d.	n
Economic policy	1.81	1.57	118
Liberal-authoritarianism	1.28	1.44	116
Environment	1.79	1.61	118
Decentralization	2.02	1.99	112

Table 6.3 **Absolute change in policy positions between 1989 and 2003**

Note: Data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).

Table 6.4 shows the differences between party families.[40] The levels of change on liberal-authoritarianism (low) and decentralisation (high) is constant across families. Issues that are core features of that family tend to be those that exhibit the least change. For example, Green parties change least on environmental policy: the mean change between 1989 and 2003 was less than one point, with a low standard deviation. Similarly, Liberal parties are most stable on economic policy, though the mean absolute change is not statistically significant from the other issues. An interesting exception to this is the level of change on economic policy among social democratic parties, which

	Communists			Greens			Social Democrats		
	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n
Economic policy	1.31	1.82	14	2.48	2.00	10	1.77	1.59	26
Liberal-authoritarianism	1.09	0.93	14	1.32	1.51	10	0.82	0.56	25
Environment	1.63	1.62	14	0.76	0.75	10	1.58	1.11	26
Decentralization	2.19	1.88	14	3.12	3.48	10	1.22	1.29	26

	Liberals			Christian Democrats			Conservatives		
	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n	mean	st.d.	n
Economic policy	1.79	1.09	14	2.33	1.83	14	1.50	1.58	16
Liberal-authoritarianism	2.10	1.50	14	1.65	1.27	14	1.57	2.59	16
Environment	2.48	2.02	14	1.65	1.24	14	1.42	1.56	16
Decentralization	2.22	2.45	14	2.56	2.16	14	1.83	1.15	16

Table 6.4 **Absolute change in party positions between 1989 and 2003 by party family**

Note: Data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).

[40] Again, all means were different from 0, using a .05 significance level.

probably reflects this party family's general move to the economic centre in the years in question.

The evidence from the manifesto data is potentially more useful than the expert surveys, which only cover change between two time points.[41] Table 6.5 shows the level of absolute change for the manifesto data. First, it is worth briefly describing how this information is presented in this table. Total policy movement is measured as the level of absolute change proportional to the total salience of the issue at t-1. This way of measuring change is calculated because the raw level of change may not give an accurate picture of the extent of policy movement. For example, a party may use 30 per cent of its t-1 manifesto to state its economic policy and 5 per cent to state its position on decentralisation. A 5 per cent change to the left or right between t-1 and t on economic policy is therefore not as large a change as it is for decentralisation. Medians are also shown, as the means may be skewed by large outliers. Change is only shown for parties where the salience of the topic was greater than 1 per cent in both manifestos(at t-1 and t).

In the manifesto data, two issues were found to be particularly strongly interconnected in static terms, economic policy and culture/ethnic matters. On the other hand, three issues showed low levels of static interconnection overall: democracy, urban-rural relations and education. I therefore expect movement to be relatively low on the first two issues and relatively high on the second three. The remaining five issues were expected to exhibit medium levels of policy change.

[41] In addition, the expert surveys contain information on three issues that exhibited strong static interconnections and only one with weak static interconnections (decentralisation), making generalizable conclusions difficult.

	all parties			
	mean	st. dev.	median	n
Decentralization	0.91	1.50	0.55	1078
EU	1.14	2.47	0.53	810
Urban-rural relations	0.93	2.16	0.52	1234
Liberal-authoritarianism	1.17	3.45	0.51	1468
Environment	1.02	2.13	0.50	1048
Democracy	0.89	1.79	0.47	1635
Education	0.83	1.80	0.47	1350
Culture/ethnic matters	0.80	1.46	0.46	1602
Foreign policy	0.71	1.95	0.36	1586
Economic policy	0.52	1.60	0.30	1796

Table 6.5 **Absolute change in party positions using CMP-extracted data**

Note: Ordered in descending order by median value; change measured as proportional change relative to party position at t-1; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

The median level of policy change is indeed lowest for economic policy, closely followed by foreign policy. These two issues are also identified as characterised by strong interconnections. However, the other eight issues do not differ greatly in their median level of policy change. As expected, policy change is relatively large in policy areas such as decentralisation and urban-rural relations. However, two issues that were expected to be relatively average in their extent of change – EU integration and environmental policy – actually exhibit relatively high levels of change. A striking difference to the expert survey data is the position of liberal-authoritarianism. While the expert survey showed this to be particularly stable (somewhat contrary to expectations), here the issue is relatively flexible.[42]

[42] The differences may stem from the different source of information or the longer time frame used in the manifesto data.

Overall, the manifesto data thus shows support, albeit relatively weak, for the hypothesis that policy change is lower for issues that are strongly statically interconnected. Two issues that are strongly interconnected – economic and, to a lesser extent, foreign policy – tend to exhibit relatively low levels of policy change, while some weakly connected issues – primarily decentralisation and urban-rural relations – are characterised by particularly high levels of such change. For other issues, the findings are less clear, perhaps due the difficulty of measuring this indicator.

Analysis and results: dynamic interconnections

I now move on to the analysis of dynamic interconnections. For each data source, I begin by mapping the existence of such interconnections before comparing the results with the findings for static interconnections.

Expert surveys

For the expert surveys, the key variable is policy change on each of the four issues. This was calculated by subtracting the 1989 position from the 2003 position. Positive values thus signify a move to the right by the party, negative values a shift to the left. The results are presented in two different ways: as a principal components analysis and as separate regressions for change in each issue. The PCA results serve a mainly des criptive and presentational purpose: they give a quick overall understanding of the relationship between changes on each issue (Table 6.6). The regressions (with change on one issue as the dependent and change on the other three issues as independent variables) indicate the level of statistical significance and the magnitude of the

	Comp 1	Comp 2	Unexplained
Economic policy	**0.57**	0.19	0.51
Liberal-authoritarianism	-0.01	**0.97**	0.04
Environment	**0.67**	-0.14	0.37
Decentralization	0.47	-0.01	0.70
Eigenvalue	1.36	1.01	
Variance explained	0.3399	0.2541	
n	110		

Table 6.6 **Principal component analysis of policy change between 1989 and 2003**

Note: components with Eigenvalues over 1 extracted; varimax rotation used and rotated components shown; data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).

relationship (Table 6.7).[43]

Policy change tends to be correlated on only one of the six issue pairs: economic and environmental policy. The PCA table presents the results for all 110 parties for which data on positional change is available. Here, we see that economic policy and environmental policy load strongly onto the first component. Liberal-authoritarianism loads onto a separate component in the PCA. The results for decentralisation are a little unclear, as it seems to load onto the first component; however, the unexplained variance is very high, so it is safer to conclude that this issue, like liberal-authoritarianism, is independent of the others.

These results are confirmed by the regression results. Holding movement on liberal-authoritarianism and decentralisation constant, a one-point move to the right on environmental policy is predicted to be mirrored by a 0.28 point move to the right on economic policy. While these two issues are thus dynamically interconnected, liberal-authoritarianism tends to be independent across the board. This means that party movement on this issue between 1989 and 2003 did not tend to correlate with

[43] Regressions were run using robust standard errors clustered by country.

DV:Economic policy			DV: Environment		
	b	std.err.		b	std.err.
Liberal-authoritarianism	0.08	0.19	**Economic policy**	0.23***	0.08
Environment	0.28***	0.08	**Liberal-authoritarianism**	-0.06	0.10
Decentralization	0.02	0.12	**Decentralization**	0.13**	0.05
Constant	-0.19	0.24	Constant	0.55**	0.23
R^2	0.07		R^2	0.10	
n	110		n	110	

DV: Liberal-authoritarianism			DV: Decentralization		
	b	std.err.		b	std.err.
Economic policy	0.06	0.14	**Liberal-authoritarianism**	0.04	0.12
Environment	-0.05	0.09	**Economic policy**	0.03	0.17
Decentralization	0.02	0.06	**Environment**	0.24	0.15
Constant	-0.24	0.26	Constant	0.60**	0.23
R^2	0.01		R^2	0.04	
n	110		n	110	

Table 6.7 **Regression results, policy change between 1989 and 2003**

Note: *: p<.1, **: p<.05, ***: p<.01; data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).

movement on other issues. Decentralisation movement is not tied to economic policy or liberal-authoritarianism, but there is some evidence of a weak link to environmental policy.

This pattern is illustrated in Figure 6.3, which presents the predicted regression lines for change on liberal-authoritarianism, environmental policy and decentralisation, with economic policy change as the dependent variable. The results are taken from Table 6.7. It is clear that there is little association between change on either liberal-authoritarianism or decentralisation on the one hand, and change on economic policy on the other. For environmental policy change, there is a definite link to economic policy change. However, the strength of this dynamic interconnection is not very impressive: a five-point move to the right on environmental policy – quite an extreme shift – would lead to a rightward adjustment on economic policy of little over one point.



Figure 6.3 **Predicted change in economic policy positions based on change in three other policy positions**

Note: Predictions drawn from regression shown in Table 6.7; data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).

Issue 1	Issue 2	Strength ranking, exp survey	Logic or circumstance	Dynamic interconnection
Economic policy	Environment	1	L	Y
Liberal-authoritarianism	Environment	2	C	N
Economic policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	3	C	N
Environment	Decentralization	4	L	Y
Economic policy	Decentralization	5	C	N
Liberal-authoritarianism	Decentralization	6	C	N

Table 6.8 **Comparison of results for static and dynamic interconnections, expert surveys**

Note: Information drawn from Table 6.1 and Table 6.7; data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).

These results are compared to the expectations in Table 6.8. The issue pair with the strongest static interconnections is the one that is the most clearly associated in dynamic terms as well: economic policy and the environment. This was also seen as an issue with logical linkages. The second issue pair with dynamic interconnections, albeit far weaker, was environment and decentralisation, which was also characterised by weak, logical static interconnections. Overall, no interconnection identified as logical was reproduced in dynamic terms. Interestingly, while the cross-sectional results on static interconnections indicated that liberal-authoritarianism and economic policy were strongly linked, this does not seem to have an effect on party movement. This may confirm that the strong static interconnection is in fact mostly due to circumstance.

A final finding that is common to both the PCA and the regressions is that dynamic interconnections are weaker than static interconnections. Just two issue pairs are dynamically linked, compared to the five that were connected in static terms. Moreover, the Eigenvalues for the two components in the PCA are far lower (1.36 and 1.01, respectively) than for the static interconnections, where the first component had an Eigenvalue close to 3 for both surveys. Looking at the regressions, the explained

variance is always very low (at .10 or less). The explained variance for the static interconnections was far higher, to the extent that multicollinearity presented problems of interpretation. It appears that dynamic interconnections are relatively rare and weak overall, reflecting the fact that this is a far more demanding type of linkage between issues.

Overall, the findings from the expert survey are twofold. First, issue pairs differ in the extent to which parties move together on them. While policy change on some issues is largely independent, on other issues there is clear evidence of an association. Second, the nature of these differences between issue pairs is systematic. The static interconnections found in the previous chapter are a relatively good predictor of the extent of joint policy movement, but only if logic and circumstance-based static interconnections are distinguished. For example, the weaker-than-expected links between movement on economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism may reflect the logical independence of these two issues.

Manifesto data

The extent to which policy movement on different issues is linked was also examined for the manifesto data. Here, the model used requires somewhat more elaboration. Separate regressions were run for policy change for each issue pair, with each of the two issues once used as the dependent variable.[44] The dependent variable in each regression is the raw change in the party's policy position on the first issue (A), that is, the percentage of positive ('left') statements subtracted from the percentage of negative ('right') statements. The main independent variable is the raw change in the policy position on the other issue of the pair (B). While this set-up was sufficient for the expert

[44] A PCA could have been run for the manifesto data, but due to the different sample sizes for each issue pair because of the salience requirement, this would not have provided useful results.

survey, the analysis of the manifesto data requires further controls due to the unique nature of the positional information; some of these are similar to the controls required in the previous chapter.

First, it is worth controlling for changes in position within the whole party system. In the expert surveys, we can assume that party positions are usually assessed at least partly in comparison to a system-specific median position. This means that broad changes in policy positions across all parties are already controlled for. In manifestos, however, the balance of positive and negative statements made by a party may change due to a systemic shift in the content of party competition. This does not mean that the party has really 'moved' on that issue, as its relative position to other parties has stayed the same. In the regressions I will therefore control for the systemic change in party positions. This is calculated as the average raw change for all parties in that party system, excluding the party in question.[45] So, two further variables are included: systemic position change between t-1 and t for A and B.

Second, the observations for the manifesto data are not completely independent, a characteristic that already needed to be taken into account in the previous chapter. Issue salience (that is, the percentage of sentences devoted to a topic) varies strongly and will influence the level of change that is possible and likely. As a result, it is necessary to control for the salience of each issue analysed. So, four further variables are included as controls: the total salience of issues A and B at t-1 and the change in salience between t-1 and t for A and B.

However, including salience as a control is not possible for all issues, so that the specification of the model had to be adapted for certain regressions, as was already necessary in the previous chapter. First, the change in the salience of environment and

[45] All parties included in the dataset and scoring more than 1 per cent of the vote are taken into account.

urban-rural relations had to be dropped due to the lack of negative mentions in the CMP coding scheme. On four further issues, one side of the argument is not used by parties even though positive and negative mentions exist; this applies to liberal-authoritarianism, democracy, education and decentralisation. For these issues, salience change could thus also not be included. For liberal-authoritarianism, the correlation reaches r=.98; for decentralisation, it is still r=.77.[46] All other issues have correlations with raw salience change under .7, so this additional variable was included for these issues.

Finally, it is important to exclude issues that are not salient within the political system. In other words, only issues that are salient at both t-1 and t are worth examining if one is to assess the correlation among policy movements: otherwise, it makes little sense to speak of a policy *movement*.[47] I therefore exclude from my analyses cases where the total salience is lower than 1 per cent of the manifesto at t-1 and t for issues A and B. The number of cases excluded depends on the issue pair: while almost all parties address economic policy, fewer than half consider EU integration. A final concern are elections-specific factors that may affect party policy shifts; this is addressed by using robust standard errors clustered by election (as is done in Adams and Somer-Topcu, forthcoming). Country-specific factors were taken into account by adding country dummies to the regression model.

Before moving on to the results for all issue pairs, I will briefly describe in more detail the regression results for one issue pair, economic policy and foreign policy, as an example of my general methodological approach (Table 6.9). Model 1 contains the results, without the key independent variable, for change in the foreign policy position;

[46] For democracy, the correlation is r=.86; for education, it is r=.93.
[47] Of course, this is not to say that the case of a change from not salient to salient is not worth studying as well.

Dependent variable: economic policy (change)	**Model 1**		**Model 2**	
	b	std. err.	b	std. err.
Foreign policy: change, t-1 to t			0.12**	0.05
Previous position				
Economic policy, t-1	-0.30***	0.03	-0.31***	0.03
Foreign policy, t-1	0.18***	0.04	0.23***	0.04
Systemic change				
Economic policy: systemic change	0.18***	0.05	0.18***	0.05
Foreign policy: systemic change	0.02	0.06	-0.00	0.06
Salience variables				
Economic policy: Salience, t-1	0.11**	0.04	0.11***	0.04
Foreign policy: Salience, t-1	-0.05	0.05	-0.08*	0.05
Economic policy: Salience change	-0.07	0.05	-0.07	0.05
Foreign policy: Salience change	0.02	0.04	0.08**	0.04
Constant	-0.12	0.66	-0.19	0.66
R^2	0.187		0.1908	
n	1347		1347	

***Table 6.9* Example of a multiple linear regression using CMP-extracted party positions**

Note: Model 1 includes all controls for previous position, systemic change and salience for both the dependent-variable and the independent-variable issue; Model 2 adds the raw position change on the independent variable issue; *: p<.1, **: p<.05, ***: p<.01; standard errors clustered by election; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

this is added in Model 2. The controls are the previous policy position, the level of systemic change, and the previous salience and change in salience. These three types of controls are included for both issues. Most of them do not change with the inclusion of the change in foreign policy position, both in terms of significance or magnitude. No specific expectations were linked to these controls, but it is interesting to note that economic policy change tends to be similar to more general systemic changes in position. Foreign policy change itself is clearly significant. For each percentage move to the right on foreign policy, parties are expected to move .12 percentage points to the

right on economic policy. The level of variance explained only increases marginally here, rising from 18.7% to 19.08%.

Similar regressions were run for all issue pairs. A summary version of the results of these regressions is presented in Figure 6.4, which is based on the added variance explained by Model 2 compared to Model 1. In other words, each issue pair is shaded in to the extent to which policy change on one of the two issues helps explain policy change on the other issue, that is, whether including policy change on the independent variable issue adds anything in terms of the explanatory power of the statistical model. To take the models described above, the additional explained variance for economic and foreign policy is less than one per cent.[48] The relevant area is thus shaded in as the relationship is significant, but the shading is a light colour as the added variance explained is low. Appendix 6.1 presents more detailed results for those issue pairs where a statistically significant relationship was found, together with the relevant coefficient of change of the independent-variable issue and the added amount of explained variance (measured by the R^2-value).

Even a quick glance at Figure 6.4 shows that issues clearly vary in the extent to which they are dynamically interconnected with others. Liberal-authoritarianism and culture-ethnic matters are significantly linked with six other issues, out of nine possible interconnections. Four issues are only interconnected with two others (education, EU, decentralisation and democracy). Economic policy is linked with just three other topics. Foreign policy, the environment and urban-rural relations are connected with four other issues each. The three issue pairs with the strongest dynamic interconnections are economic policy and EU; liberal-authoritarianism and the environment; and liberal-authoritarianism and urban-rural relations.

[48] The added variance explained is equally low if the dependent and independent variables (i.e. economic and foreign policy) are reversed.



Figure 6.4 **Dynamic interconnections using CMP-extracted policy positions**

Note: The number at the end of each row represents the total number of interconnections for each issue (e.g. 3 for economic policy, 4 for foreign policy and so on); each box represents the summary of two multiple regression models (e.g. the box at the bottom left contains the information on the regression with economic policy as the dependent, and foreign policy as the added independent variable, as well as the regression with foreign policy as the dependent, and economic policy as the added independent variable); boxes are only shaded where the coefficient of the added variable is statistically significant at .1 or better (as in Model 2, Table 6.9); the shadings are based on the amount of added variance explained by the additional variable (e.g. less than .01 for economic policy and foreign policy, see Table 6.9); more detailed results in Appendix 6.1; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

Figure 6.5 compares these results to the findings for static interconnections using the manifesto data. Issue pairs with both static and dynamic interconnections are marked in grey, with static-only pairs highlighted by an 'S' and dynamic-only pairs with 'D'. For example, economic policy is linked statically and dynamically to foreign policy, the environment and the EU, but only statically to liberal-authoritarianism, culture-ethnic matters, decentralisation and urban-rural relations.

A first conclusion from this comparison is that some issues tend to be far less connected to other issues in dynamic terms than in static terms. Economic policy has seven static and three dynamic interconnections; EU integration, six and one; decentralisation, five and two; and environment, six and four. The other issues do not differ as strongly between the two types of linkages. This means that the New Politics issues – culture/ethnic matters, environment, liberal-authoritarianism and democracy – appear to be similarly strongly connected in both static and dynamic terms, while other issues are less frequently dynamically interconnected. But this broad comparison only provides a first impression of the differences between static and dynamic interconnections.

Second, it is possible to assess whether static interconnections in general predict dynamic linkages. Overall, the predictive power appears rather limited. Out of a total of 45 issues, both types of interconnections are found on only 10 issue pairs and neither type on 14. This means that 24 of the 45 issue pairs are correctly classified: about 50 per cent. Counted differently: 10 issue pairs with static interconnections exhibit dynamic interconnections, compared to 14 pairs with static linkages that do not. In other words, there appears to be a less than 50 per cent chance that a static interconnection will also be mirrored by a dynamic interconnection. This is a less than impressive result. Overall, it therefore seems that static interconnections (that is, the



Figure 6.5 **Comparison of results for static and dynamic interconnections, CMP-extracted party positions**

Note: Shaded boxes are issue pairs with both static and dynamic interconnections; boxes marked respectively with 'S' and 'D' have static or dynamic interconnections only; information drawn from Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.4.

empirical regularity of positional association) do not provide a useful guide to the existence of joint movement.

Distinguishing between logic- and circumstance-based static interconnections improves the ability to predict the existence of dynamic interconnections. Of the twelve issue pairs with static linkages that I identified as circumstance-based, only three exhibit dynamic interconnections. On the other hand, seven of the twelve issue pairs identified as having logical static interconnections also have dynamic linkages. In total, 16 out of 24 issues, or about 67 per cent, are classified correctly. This is obviously not a

perfect record. However, it is reasonable to conclude that circumstance-based static interconnections are unlikely to be replicated in dynamic terms. The evidence is weaker for the inverse conclusion for logic-based static interconnections: it is less clear that these are always replicated as dynamic linkages. Overall, this approach clearly improves on the approach using the simple existence of a static interconnection as a means of predicting dynamic interconnections, so distinguishing between logic and circumstance as sources of linkages is clearly worthwhile. Of course, the drawback of this method is that it depends on the prior identification of these sources of static interconnections, which in this case was a researcher-led process.

Looking at the actual issue pairs that exhibit dynamic interconnections, there is support for the understanding of issue connections that sees a fundamental division between economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism, as outlined in the previous chapter. Movement on economic policy is relatively independent from change on other issues. While its position was statically connected with six issues, economic policy change is associated only with similar change on foreign policy, environmental policy and EU integration. Conversely, there is a clear grouping of issues on which parties tend to move together: liberal-authoritarianism, culture/ethnic matters, education and urban-rural relations. This group of issues can be seen as a variant of the New Politics dimension, with an emphasis on the Hooghe et al.'s (2002) traditional/ authoritarian/nationalist elements of this ideological divide.[49] This impression is strengthened by the fact that parties move on all of these issues independently of economic policy. While decentralisation is relatively independent as an issue, it is weakly linked to culture/ethnic relations and urban-rural relations, so it could be said to form part of this group, at least at the margins.

[49] Education is not usually seen as a New Politics issue. That said, its place in party competition is only rarely addressed in any case.

In addition, the two other issues – decentralisation and EU integration, which are far more independent in terms of movement than expected – were identified as issues whose interconnections are largely context-dependent. Finally, I suggested that some issues may be associated with both economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism. Here, this applies to environmental policy. While movement on the environment is predicted to occur jointly with movement on liberal-authoritarianism and culture/ethnic relations, its links to economic policy change are also significant.[50]

A final conclusion is that dynamic interconnections are again weaker than static interconnections. There are fewer significant linkages overall (17 compared to 23), despite the far larger dataset used to examine dynamic links. Moreover, the amount of variance explained by the variable for policy change added to each basic regression model is also lower. Of course, given the different datasets, it is not possible to directly compare the R^2 values, but the overall impression is that dynamic linkages are less frequent. This confirms the initial finding from the expert surveys.

A look at the six main issue pairs present in both data sources provides a useful summary of the core findings (Table 6.10). First, all three issue pairs identified as having only circumstance-based static interconnections fail to exhibit dynamic linkages. Therefore, the above conclusion that a static connection based on circumstance is unlikely to be replicated in dynamic terms applies to both data sources. Logic is less clear a guide. The issue pair with the strongest logical static interconnection – economic policy and environment – is indeed consistently also dynamically linked. Two other issue pairs, liberal-authoritarianism and environment and environment and decentralisation should be logically connected and exhibit static links, albeit slightly weaker than for economic policy and environment. However, the static links between

[50] A similar pattern also applies to foreign policy, which is clearly linked to economic policy, but also significantly associated with liberal-authoritarianism, culture/ethnic matters and democracy.

Issue 1	Issue 2	Strength of static interconnection		Logic or circumstance	Dynamic interconnection	
		ES (ranking)	CMP (0-3)		ES	CMP
Economic policy	Environment	1	2	L	Y	Y
Liberal-authoritarianism	Environment	2	1	C	N	Y
Economic policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	3	2	C	N	N
Environment	Decentralization	4	0	L	Y	N
Economic policy	Decentralization	5	1	C	N	N
Liberal-authoritarianism	Decentralization	6	2	C	N	N

Table 6.10 **Summary of findings for four core issues, expert surveys and CMP**

Note: Information drawn from Figures 6.1 and 6.4 and Table 6.8.

these two pairs are not clearly mirrored at the dynamic level. Nevertheless, logic seems to be at least a precondition for dynamic interconnections, even if not all logic-based static linkages are also associated in terms of policy change.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered the existence of dynamic interconnections within party ideologies, that is, the extent to which issue pairs are linked to one another in terms of party policy change. Such interconnections should be seen as an additional limitation on the complete freedom of movement predicted by the pure Downsian model of party competition. Vote-maximising parties cannot pick and choose a policy mix as they wish, but instead are constrained by the fact that policy areas are not independent of one another. Ideological adjustment on one issue can require a similar change on another issue within the party's policy profile. One consequence of this is that parties might be less willing to move on issues that are characterised by tight static interconnections, since such a policy change would need to lead to a broader ideological repositioning of the party. In this chapter, some evidence was found – albeit relatively weak – that

parties do indeed move less on issues that were found to be tightly interconnected in static terms.

There are important differences between static and dynamic interconnections. First, static interconnections occur more frequently and are stronger than dynamic interconnections. This result was found for both expert surveys and party manifestos. Of course, some of this result may be due to the problems with measurement error described above. Nevertheless, the findings are likely to reflect the fact that the requirements for dynamic interconnections to exist are probably higher than for static interconnections. A distinction should be made between logic- and circumstance-based static interconnections. While the former are likely to be reproduced in dynamic terms, there is much less of a reason for circumstantial linkages to lead to dynamic linkages. This was also found when considering the precise issue pairs for which policy change is interconnected. Static linkages based on circumstance were not in general mirrored by dynamic linkages. Conversely, logic-based static linkages were frequently also present in dynamic terms. A logical association between policy areas is an important precondition for the existence of dynamic interconnections. For example, static interconnections were present for economic policy on the one hand and environment and liberal-authoritarianism on the other. Economics and the environment are logically linked, and, as expected, dynamic interconnections were also found for this issue pair in both datasets. Economics and liberal-authoritarianism, on the other hand, are more circumstantially associated, and here no dynamic interconnections were found. The constraints for party movement therefore occur when distinct issue pairs are linked through an underlying logic.

Parties compete on various issues and change their policies in the course of this electoral competition. However, movement on one policy area is not independent of

changes on other topics. Thus, dynamic interconnections do exist in party ideologies. However, these interconnections are weaker than static interconnections, and static linkages are only reproduced dynamically if they are based on logic. Given these findings, dynamic interconnections are a constraint on the policy choices of political parties. Ideological adjustments reflect the logical connections between issue areas, so parties are not free to move on each policy separately since they care about ideological coherence. Instead, the links between issues are taken into account by parties seeking to change their ideological package. As a result, it is not possible for parties to combine positions on different issues at will in order to maximise votes, thus limiting the applicability of pure Downsian approaches to party competition.

Appendix 6.1 Detailed results, dynamic interconnections using CMP-extracted party positions

Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 2 --> Issue 1		Issue 1 --> Issue 2		n
		b	R^2 increase	b	R^2 increase	
Economic policy	Foreign policy	0.12	0.38	0.04	0.22	1347
Economic policy	EU	-0.78	4.62	-0.08	3.32	551
Economic policy	Environment	-0.15	0.55	-.05*	0.51	799
Foreign policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	0.06	0.8	0.17	0.9	974
Foreign policy	Democracy	0.13	1.03	0.18	1.43	1146
Foreign policy	Culture-ethnic matters	.13*	1.05	0.12	0.85	1135
Liberal-authoritarianism	Culture-ethnic matters	0.14	0.97	0.09	0.74	1051
Liberal-authoritarianism	EU	0.21	0.42	.03*	0.24	440
Liberal-authoritarianism	Education	0.21	0.84	0.05	0.73	826
Liberal-authoritarianism	Environment	-0.24	2.06	-0.11	2.05	645
Liberal-authoritarianism	Urban-rural relations	-0.28	2.57	-0.11	2.64	675
Culture-ethnic matters	Decentralization	0.15	0.23	.07*	0.42	676
Culture-ethnic matters	Education	0.21	1.1	0.1	1.53	932
Culture-ethnic matters	Environment	-0.1	0.36	-0.11	0.85	719
Culture-ethnic matters	Urban-rural relations	-0.8	0.29	not significant		800
Decentralization	Urban-rural relations	.06*	0.47	0.11	0.49	479
Democracy	Environment	0.1	0.5	0.08	0.66	695
Education	Urban-rural relations	-0.07	0.41	-0.09	0.43	623

All coefficients significant at less than $p<.05$ unless marked by * ($p<.1$).
Issue 2--> Issue 1: Issue 2 change regressed onto Issue 1 change (and vice versa).

Chapter 7

Issue salience and policy interconnections

In the seventh season of the TV show *The West Wing*, campaign manager Josh Lyman argues that winning elections is not about policies at all: 'People think that campaigns are about two competing answers to the same question. They're not. They're a fight over the question itself.'[51] Like Lyman, some political scientists have suggested that politics is actually about the importance or salience of each conflict rather than the actual content of parties' positions (Schattschneider, 1960; Budge and Farlie, 1983). While we do not have to go as far as Lyman (or Budge and Farlie), who argue that electoral competition is all about differences in salience, it is nevertheless sensible to see issue importance as a key attribute of party programmes and another influential strategic tool that can be used to affect electoral success.

The focus in most party competition literature, and indeed in the thesis so far, has been on the ideological content of each party stance – how liberal the party is, how environmental or how pro-European – and how these views are linked to one another. Yet, parties compete on different policy areas not just by taking up different and opposing positions: they also distinguish themselves in terms of the importance and emphasis they place on different issues. Parties differ in the extent to which they decide to emphasise or avoid certain topics. An issue can be given prominence in campaign literature, manifestos and speeches – but a party could also decide to cut certain topics

[51] From Season 7, Episode 2 of *The West Wing*, http://www.westwingtranscripts.com/search.php?flag=getTranscript&id=136. Accessed 11 February 2009.

out of their electoral appeals. Following Budge and Farlie (1983), this attribute of parties' policy packages is generally termed 'issue salience' and is the second main feature of the components that make up issue systems.

Like choosing and altering policy positions, salience manipulation is a strategic element of competitive behaviour: parties try to modify issue salience in order to achieve political gains (Riker, 1986; Meguid, 2005). Issue salience is important because it influences individual voting decisions (Netjes and Binnema, 2007; Tavits, 2008). For example, voters change their evaluation of a political party depending on whether that party shares their personal priorities (van der Brug, 2004). Since voters at least partly make up their mind based on issue salience, elections are also decided by issue importance and not just issue positions. As a result, parties have a strong incentive to compete in terms of salience as well as position. Issue salience has thus been suggested as a central feature of the strategic behaviour of political parties.

Like Josh Lyman in *The West Wing*, some even argue that it is the only important feature of party competition (Budge and Farlie, 1983). Schattschneider (1960) thus reduces politics to a 'conflict of conflicts', where electoral campaigns are battles to decide which are the key issues facing the country. This is encapsulated by political statements in the vein of 'what this election is really about is x'. The importance of salience may lie in its relative flexibility: it has been argued that parties can modify issue importance more easily than issue positions, increasing its influence on party strategies (Petrocik, 1996). Yet to completely neglect positions in favour of salience is perhaps too strong a view and just as flawed as only considering issue positions. More recently, spatial approaches to party competition have thus favoured the integration of both issue attributes as complementary aspects of political strategies (Meguid, 2005; Benoit and Laver, 2006; Tavits, 2008). This is also the approach taken here.

In this chapter, salience interconnections are examined and compared to positional interconnections. Three core questions are at the centre of this chapter. First, to what extent do issues exhibit static interconnections in terms of salience? Second, to what extent are issues dynamically interconnected in their salience levels, and are these patterns related to static salience interconnections? Finally, what is the relationship between positional interconnections and salience interconnections? In approach and research design, this chapter is therefore closely based on Chapters 3 and 4 and will cite the relevant results as the basis for comparison.

This chapter is structured as follows. In the first section I describe existing salience theories of party competition before considering the potential nature of salience interconnections and the extent to which they should mirror positional interconnections. I then detail the measurement approach before presenting the results of the empirical analysis of static and dynamic salience interconnections. Before concluding, I compare my findings to the results on positional interconnections.

Issue salience and party competition

While salience theories form an important sub-group of the vast literature on party competition, they also constitute a field that has remained relatively under-developed, with few major extensions to the original research. I introduce the main claims of the key theories below and then consider how the relative level of issue salience might be interconnected within the policy profiles of political parties.

Salience theories of party competition

The idea that issue salience could complement or even replace issue positions as an explanation of party politics was first suggested in reaction to Downs' (1957)

unidimensional, Euclidean view of party competition. Since then, a series of approaches suggest that party competition is based on issue importance. The most commonly known are valence theory (Stokes, 1963), salience theory (Budge and Farlie, 1983) and issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996). While there are important differences between these approaches, the challengers' claim is that political parties differ at least as much in the importance they give to various issues as in the positions they take on them, and these differences have substantial consequences for the behaviour of both parties and voters.

The difference between valence and salience theory lies in the nature of the issues that parties emphasise and avoid. In valence theory, the political issues addressed by parties are non-positional: they are goals that (almost) all voters would endorse, but parties differ in the extent to which they are seen as being able to realise that goal. The concept of valence issues was first suggested in Stokes' (1963) early critical review of Downsian theory, in which he argues that party competition takes place neither exclusively nor even primarily on position issues. Instead, there are also 'valence' issues, which are goals that are generally desired and endorsed by voters. Examples of such issues are low unemployment, a clean environment or a low crime rate. Voters will choose the party they think is more able to deliver the desired goal. This perceived ability has been called a party's 'handling advantage' (Petrocik, 1996, p. 826). On valence issues, parties do not differ in terms of position: they differ in terms of which issues they choose to emphasise. In Stokes' summary: 'When the parties manoeuvre for support on a position-dimension, they choose policies from an ordered set of alternatives belonging to the same problem or issue. But when the parties manoeuvre in terms of valence-issues, they choose one or more issues from a set of distinct issue domains' (1963, p. 374).

Salience theory (Budge and Farlie, 1983) takes a different approach to the nature of party competition. The main argument of this theory is that parties fail to confront each other on specific topics and thus do not compete directly at all. Instead, parties talk past each other, emphasising those issues where they are popular and de-emphasising those where they are unpopular (Netjes and Binnema, 2007). In the long run, parties will then end up 'owning' some issues as certain issues become associated with them (Budge and Hofferbert, 1990). Issue ownership, which is based on a party's record and constituency, builds up over time but can also be lost through social change or party actions in office or opposition (Petrocik, 1996). The difference to valence theory lies in the fact that parties try to exploit their positional advantage on certain issues by focussing the campaign on those topics and by steering attention away from issues where they have a positional disadvantage. This means that the issues discussed are not universally endorsed goals. Instead, parties choose to emphasise those positions that will bring them votes and de-emphasise those that will not.

In this chapter, I build mainly on Budge and Farlie's salience theory's approach to issue importance and will disregard performance-oriented valence issues. This is because the focus of this chapter is on comparing the interconnections within issue salience with the findings in the previous chapters concerning positional interconnections. However, unlike Budge and Farlie, I consider position and salience to be complementary (and not alternative) attributes of issues. Thus, each component within the issue systems that make up party profiles has two characteristics, a position and a given salience. This chapter considers the interconnections in terms of salience and how these compare with positional interconnections. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, it is nevertheless necessary to examine the theoretical differences between position and salience interconnections.

Salience and issue interconnections

As with positions, the salience attributes of the components of issue systems may also be interconnected in static and dynamic terms. While parties can thus vary the level of salience they give to each topic, such decisions are not without consequence for the party profile as a whole, depending on how strongly that issue component is linked to other elements of the issue system. Static salience interconnections refer to the predictive power of one issue's importance: does knowing the salience a party gives to one topic help us predict the salience of other issues within its profile? Dynamic salience interconnections are the links that become apparent when change occurs: if a party changes the issue salience of one area, does this affect the salience of other issue areas?

There is some evidence that such salience linkages should exist. The New Politics literature, for example, suggests that Green and far-right parties stress 'their' group of topics – liberal-authoritarianism, environment policy and immigration – while de-emphasising economic ideology (Flanagan, 1987). In fact, Inglehart (1997) argues that 'post-modern' parties do not take any meaningful position on economic policy at all and should not be placed on such a dimension. His argument exaggerates the separation of the modern and post-modern politics but illustrates well the possible interconnections between the salience of political issues. In terms of static salience interconnections, one could expect, for example, that the importance a party gives to immigration policy should be correlated with the salience of liberal-authoritarianism to that party; both Green and far-right parties stress these two topics. Furthermore, both liberal-authoritarianism and immigration may be negatively correlated with economic policy in terms of salience.

Dynamic salience interconnections concern changes within political parties and the issues they decide to emphasise. If a party chooses to increase its stress on a specific

policy area, this may lead it to emphasise related issues as well. It may also mean that a party decides to focus less on other issues. An example of this can be found in Kitschelt's (1994) analysis of social democratic policy change. Among these parties, he argues, there was an increased focus on both environmental policy and social liberalism in response to the change in social structure during the 1960s and 1970s. For Kitschelt, both issues are part of the liberal-authoritarian dimension that encompasses communitarian ideals and concerns. Thus, parties should in his view tend to increase jointly their emphasis on issues that form part of that dimension.

Comparing position and salience interconnections

Though the theoretical background underlying positional and salience interconnections is similar, there are two important differences between the two attributes of issues: first, the strength of interconnections should be lower for salience levels, and second, the nature of salience interconnections is influenced by the existence of an overall limit to the amount of emphasis that parties can devote to each possible issue.

In general, salience interconnections are likely to be weaker overall than the links between policy positions. This is mainly because internal programmatic logic and past reputation creates less of a restriction for salience, so that variation of salience levels is more likely than variation of positions. The lower restrictions created by programmatic logic can be illustrated by considering the relationship between economic policy and environmental protection in terms of position and salience. While economic and environmental policy positions are likely to be similar, due to their inherent logical ties, this does not mean that a party that emphasises economics need also emphasise the environment. Put differently, a party would find it difficult to espouse regulatory environmental policies and liberal economic policies. Nevertheless, it could quite easily

decide to stress one topic and neglect the other. The need for a coherent programme thus has a weaker effect on salience interconnections. Unlike positional variation, the salience levels of policies do not create strong consequences in terms of the overall coherence of a party's policy package.

The restrictions to party freedom should also be weaker in terms of party movement on salience. I have argued, following Downs (1957), that the need to appear responsible and reliable means that a party is unlikely to change its position frequently. This applies far less to salience, as changes in issue emphasis will tend to have fewer consequences for voter judgements on party reliability. Indeed, parties might use the relative flexibility of salience to make up for the need for positional rigidity (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, p. 167). The strength of dynamic salience interconnections should thus also be lower than for positional interconnections. A key difference between salience and positional interconnections is thus that the former should be weaker due to the lower restrictions created by the requirements of logic and a reputation for ideological stability.

However, even though issues are likely to be less strongly interconnected in terms of salience, this does not mean that there will be a complete lack of linkages. Static and dynamic interconnections will still exist for some policy areas. If this is the case, this is likely to be due to logic rather than circumstance. Parties will raise and lower salience levels on two issues together if they perceive these as part of the same basic group of topics. While the restrictions of logic are lower for salience interconnections, they nevertheless provide the basis for such linkages, if they do occur. Circumstance, on the other hand, is unlikely to have much of an influence on the existence of interconnections, as parties are much freer in choosing salience levels than they are in choosing positions.

The general weakness of salience interconnections is not the only difference to position interconnections. Importantly, there is an inherent relationship between issue salience levels that does not exist between issue positions. The latter are independent of one another in one important respect: the extent to which a party is extreme on one issue does not limit how extreme it can be on a second issue. Even the statement itself appears somewhat nonsensical. However, such a restriction may well apply to the salience of issues. Parties have a limited amount of time and resources they can devote to each political topic (Meguid, 2005). Therefore, the extent to which a party stresses one issue may well limit how much it can emphasise a second issue. Parties have to select the topics on which they wish to 'spend' their available time and resources. If they decide to devote 80 per cent to immigration, this is will necessarily limit the salience they can give to other topics such as the economy or foreign policy. This type of mutual interdependence is quite different from that found among positions.

The extent to which this limit applies may depend on the party examined. While large, mainstream parties may have substantial resources to devote to all manner of topics, smaller, niche competitors may have to concentrate their limited funds and public attention on one issue of paramount concern to them (Meguid, 2005). While large parties could thus spread their issue emphases quite broadly and still have an impact on each, small parties may have to focus their time and resources on one key topic. Nevertheless, no party is likely to be able to convince voters that all issues are of equally high concern to it, especially since its competitors will try to contest that claim. This finite amount of salience that can be distributed among issues is an important difference to positional interconnections.

The limitation on the distribution of salience means that there are three different types of empirical observation: positive, negative and no correlation. This can be

illustrated if we take a situation in which a party stresses issue A more than other parties. Two situations are familiar from position interconnections. First, if a party also emphasises issue B more than other parties, there is a positive correlation of salience levels. The two topics are interconnected in terms of importance. Second, if the emphasis on issue B is no greater than the average for the party system, there is no correlation of salience levels. The two topics are independent in terms of importance.

Finally, and this is where salience differs from position, issue importance can be negatively correlated. This indicates a salience interconnection, but one that underlines the opposition rather than the similarity of the two topics. Such an interconnection means that greater emphasis on one topic will sap resources from another issue. For example, one party may spend 30 per cent of its resources on economic policy and 30 per cent on New Politics issues. If the party increases its focus on economic policy to 50 per cent, it needs to divert the necessary salience resources from another issue area. New Politics would be the obvious source, especially as the two topics in question arguably reflect opposing concerns, that is, materialism and postmaterialism. In this way, a negative correlation can also indicate a strong interconnection: the two issue areas are thematically opposite. Such an opposition of salience levels is different from an absence of correlation, as the two opposed policy areas are seen as contradictory or conflicting rather than completely unrelated.

Measuring salience

The most important new measure in this chapter is the salience level of each issue. As in the preceding chapters, the main data sources are the two expert surveys carried out respectively by Laver and Hunt in 1989 and Benoit and Laver in 2003 as well as the

CMP dataset (Klingemann et al., 2007). As in the previous chapters, 23 countries, all EU/OECD members, are included in the analyses.[52]

As outlined in Chapter 3, the two data sources differ in their measurement of salience. The expert surveys assess salience by simply asking participants for the 'relative importance' of each policy area for each party (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Benoit and Laver, 2006). The scale ranges from 1 to 20. We do not know on what the experts base their assessment of the salience of an issue for a particular party, but the score they assign is likely to reflect its involvement in debates on that topic and the focus of its electoral campaigns. Another unknown factor is the extent to which experts assess issue salience relative to the other topics addressed by the party or relative to the other parties that address the topic. Thus, it is not clear whether the measurement is based on a comparison to the rest of the party profile or the rest of the party system. If the answer is both, the weight the experts give to each is not made explicit. Nevertheless, the expert surveys provide a reasonably clear, easily-employed measurement of salience on a series of issues.[53]

For the CMP data, the separate ten issues identified in the previous chapters were retained. To establish party positions, 'left' statements had been subtracted from 'right' statements. Here, I am merely interested in the total percentage of each manifesto devoted to each of the ten topics, so the sum of all mentions was used instead (i.e. 'left' *plus* 'right' statements). It is worth underlining that, unlike the expert surveys, the values

[52] The 23 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US. I excluded parties scoring less than 1% at the most recent election from my analysis.

[53] For two topics, different questions from the Benoit and Laver survey were combined. The salience of EU integration was measured using the same questions as for positions (EU: Authority, EU: Larger and Stronger and EU: Stronger; see Chapter 4 for details). For the salience of foreign policy, three topics were used: EU: peacekeeping (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK), NATO (Norway), and US involvement in world affairs (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, US). Foreign policy salience is thus not available for France, Iceland and Israel.

provided by the CMP are percentages of the manifesto as a whole. The salience of each of the ten issues I identified is thus the total percentage of each manifesto devoted to that topic, as coded by the project. In the CMP coding, the importance of each issue therefore depends on the importance of all other issues. This expresses the fact that parties have a finite amount of resources – captured by manifesto space – to devote to each political issue.[54] Such a limit may also exist and be captured by the expert surveys, but in that data source there is nothing intrinsic within the measurement approach that constrains the level of salience given to each topic. The measurement of issue salience as relative percentages will have to be taken into account in the empirical analysis.

In the descriptive analysis and the principal components analysis, I also took into account the systemic salience of each issue, thus controlling to a certain extent for external agenda-setting as well as country- and issue-specific variation in issue emphasis (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, p. 173). Systemic salience is the average salience for each issue for all parties in a given country; the party under consideration was excluded in order to avoid endogeneity problems. For example, if there are three parties (A, B and C) then the systemic salience for party A is the mean salience for parties B and C. Like Steenbergen and Scott (2004), I use an unweighted measure of systemic salience.

Results and analysis

The results are discussed in three parts. First, I present the salience levels across issues and party families using descriptive statistics. I then examine the patterns of static salience interconnections in expert surveys and manifestos using correlation, principal component and regression analysis. These patterns are compared to the results of the analysis of issue positions in Chapter 5. Finally, I consider dynamic salience

[54] In other words, the manifesto data is compositional in nature (Aitchison, 1986).

interconnections, comparing the results to the static salience interconnections and dynamic positional interconnections.

Levels of salience across issues and party families

I first consider whether the salience of issues differs by issue and party family. Figures 7.1 to 7.3 present the mean salience level of the key topics under consideration for the three datasets used. Each figure also shows the 95% confidence interval for the mean salience of each issue as well as a line at the mean overall salience level. There is one immediately obvious result: economic policy is consistently one of the most salient issues. In manifestos, economic policy is indeed the clearly dominant issue. The topics of liberal-authoritarianism and ethnic relations/immigration are also generally highly salient. The issues that are generally stressed less include urban-rural relations, decentralisation, European integration and environmental policy. The range bars in Figure 7.4, which present the 1 standard deviation range rather than the confidence interval, show that in the manifesto data there is a lot of variation in terms of the emphasis placed on the various issues.[55] Thus, while issues do differ in terms of their general level of salience, the extent of the overlap between issues is perhaps even more striking.

Next, I compare the differences between party families in terms of issue emphasis. Here, only the Benoit-Laver expert survey (Figures 7.5-7.12) is examined. The values presented are the salience levels relative to systemic salience, calculated by subtracting systemic salience from party salience (i.e. $salience_{party}$ - $salience_{country}$, for each issue). Positive values mean that the party stresses the issue more than its political

[55] The equivalent standard deviations for the expert surveys are not as large, so only the figure for the manifestos is shown here.



Figure 7.1 **Mean salience by issue, Benoit and Laver expert survey**

Note: Dotted line at mean salience across all issues (12.61); range bars show 95% confidence interval; *EU* combines measurements of different issues: EU: Authority (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK), EU: Joining (Norway), EU: Larger and Stronger (France) and EU: Strengthening (Ireland); *Foreign Policy* combines the following issues: NATO (Norway), EU: Peacekeeping (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK), US (Australia, Canada, Japan, NZL, US); sample sizes: economic policy (161 parties in 23 countries); liberal-authoritarianism (153; 22); deregulation (118; 17); immigration (149; 22); EU (117; 16); foreign policy (135; 20); decentralization (149; 22); environment (161; 23); data from Benoit and Laver (2006).



Figure 7.2 **Mean salience by issue, Laver and Hunt expert survey**

Note: Dotted line at mean salience across all issues (11.20); range bars show 95% confidence interval; sample sizes: 149 parties in 23 countries, except clericalism (143; 22); data from Laver and Hunt (1992).



Figure 7.3 **Mean salience by issue, CMP-extracted salience**

Note: Dotted line at mean salience across all issues (6.3); range bars show 95% confidence interval; sample size: 2192 party*election cases in 24 countries except EU (1423 party*election cases in 15 countries); data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).



Figure 7.4 **Mean salience by issue, CMP-extracted salience**

Note: Dotted line at mean salience across all issues (6.3); range bars are based on 1 standard deviation; sample size: 2192 party*election cases in 24 countries except EU (1423 party*election cases in 15 countries); data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).



Figures 7.5 to 7.8 **Salience by issue and party family, Benoit and Laver expert survey**

Note: Dotted line at 0; data from Benoit and Laver (2006).



Figures 7.9 to 7.12 Salience by issue and party family, Benoit and Laver expert survey

Note: Dotted line at 0; measure of foreign policy and European integration made up of different questions for some countries (see Figure 7.1: *Note*); data from Benoit and Laver (2006).

competitors; negative values mean that it stresses the topic less. Many of the differences visible in these graphs follow normal expectations. For example, economic policy is particularly salient for Liberal, Conservative and Communist parties, while Green parties are clearly distinguishable as the party family that stresses environmental policy the most. On decentralisation, there is little differentiation between party families, though ethnic-regionalists stress this topic more than most and nationalists tend to de-emphasise it. Overall, there is a great overlap between party families: the differences between them are not clear-cut. Instead, the dominant impression is one of significant intra-family variation.

Static salience interconnections

I now turn to the cross-sectional analysis of the static salience interconnections between issues. The two data sources, expert surveys and party manifestos, are considered in turn.

Results: Expert surveys

The bivariate correlations for salience levels in the expert surveys are shown in Figure 7.13, which presents the results as a matrix using different shadings of grey (with full results in Appendix 7.1). The darker the shading, the stronger the correlation; non-significant associations are left blank. In this analysis, systemic salience was taken into account by subtracting the measure for systemic salience from the raw salience score. However, the results do not differ greatly if the raw measure of salience is used.

The first finding that emerges from the bivariate correlations is that salience levels are relatively weakly interconnected, with the r values over .6 for only two issue pairs. There are also a large number of issue pairs where no association is found at all, as seen in the large amount of non-shaded squares. However, even though the associations



Figure 7.13 **Summary of bivariate correlations for salience in 1989 and 2003 expert surveys**

Note: Shadings refer to the strength of the bivariate association; each box summarises the correlation between one issue pair; '*' signifies a negative association, i.e. the economic policy-environment and economic policy-decentralisation associations are negative; full results in Appendix 7.1; data from Benoit and Laver (2006) and Laver and Hunt (1992).

are weaker, there are very few instances of negative and significant associations. At least in the eyes of the survey respondents, issues do not seem to displace one another, so a high salience level on one issue does not automatically reduce the salience given to other topics.

Second, a grouping of issues according to salience association is visible. Economic and foreign policy issues tend to vary together, as do New Politics issues (environment, liberal-authoritarianism and immigration). Decentralisation and EU integration are linked, possibly providing a third group of topics that refer to multi-level

all parties (n=74)		*Components*		unexplained
Issue	1	2	3	variance
Economic Policy	**.55**	-.01	-.13	.15
Deregulation	**.55**	-.05	-.13	.14
Foreign Policy	**.5**	.03	.2	.26
EU	.18	**.68**	0	.3
Decentralization	-.2	**.68**	-.05	.24
Liberal-Authoritarianism	-.17	-.1	**.68**	.28
Environment	.17	-.06	**.46**	.61
Immigration	.14	.24	**.5**	.55
Eigenvalue	2.77	1.44	1.28	
Proportion of total variance explained	.35	.17	.17	

Table 7.1 **Principal components analysis of issue salience, Benoit and Laver expert survey**

Note: Rotated component loadings shown; varimax rotation used; components with Eigenvalues over 1 extracted; loadings above .4 and lower than -.4 in bold; data from Benoit and Laver (2006).

governance. However, decentralisation and EU views are also associated with the environment and foreign policy, respectively, making this group somewhat less clear.

In order to substantiate these first impressions concerning the underlying dimensions that summarise the relationship between the salience of different issues, a PCA was carried out. Again, the salience values relative to systemic issue salience were used. Table 7.1 shows the results of the principal components analysis for the eight main issues in the Benoit-Laver expert survey.[56] The equivalent analysis for the Laver-Hunt survey can be found in Appendix 7.2. Three principal components have an Eigenvalue above 1 and are thus extracted. The first component contains economic and foreign policy topics, while the second refers to issues of multi-level governance (the EU and decentralisation). The third component can be seen as summarising New Politics as it contains environmental policy, immigration and liberal-authoritarianism.

[56] Including all eight issues substantially reduces the sample size (and the countries included). However, the results do not differ meaningfully if issues are removed to increase the number of parties.



Figures 7.14/15 **Mean component scores by party family, Benoit/Laver expert survey**

Note: Means and 95% confidence intervals shown; component scores taken from PCA shown in Table 7.1; x-axis: component 1; y-axis: component 2 in Figure 7.14 and component 3 in Figure 7.15; ETH = Ethnic-regionalists; CD = Christian Democrats; AGR = Agrarians; SD = Social Democrats; GRE = Greens; LIB = Liberals; CON = Conservatives; COM = Communists; detailed results in Appendix 7.3.

To illustrate the findings of the PCA, Figures 7.14 and 7.15 present the mean component scores for each of the main party families together with their respective 95 per cent confidence intervals (full results in Appendix 7.3). The first figure plots the mean party family positions on the first and second summary dimensions of salience: economic/foreign policy and EU/decentralisation. The second plots economic/foreign policy and the third dimension, New Politics. The figures show that party families tend to give moderate salience to two of the dimensions and stress the third. Greens, for example, emphasise New Politics but do not particularly emphasise the other two dimensions. Communists, Conservatives and Liberals focus on economic and foreign policy, while Agrarian and Ethno-regionalist parties stress topics of multi-level governance. The Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, which are the most centrist and mainstream party families, are noteworthy in their general moderate salience levels across dimensions.

Results: Party manifestos

Next, I consider static salience interconnections using the manifesto dataset, which was analysed as follows. As presented in Chapter 4, the salience levels were averaged across all manifestos for each party, which should capture the long-run issue importance of the ten issues for each case. These values were then used as the main independent and dependent variables in a multiple regression analysis.

An example for economic and foreign policy is presented in Table 7.2. The strength of the association between the salience levels is assessed by looking at the variance explained by adding the long-run salience of a second issue as an independent variable. That is, I compare the R^2 values for the basic model and the full model. The basic model has the long-run salience level of economic policy as its dependent variable,

Dependent variable: economic policy salience	**Model 1** b	std. err.	**Model 2** b	std. err.
Foreign policy salience			.13	0.13
Economic policy: Systemic salience	.11	0.22	.08	0.23
Foreign policy: Systemic salience	.31	0.26	.37	0.29
Constant	16.97	5.50	16.53	5.49
R^2	0.3651		0.3704	
n	185		185	

***Table 7.2* Example of a multiple linear regression using CMP-extracted issue salience**

Note: Model 1 includes systemic salience on the dependent-variable and independent-variable issues; Model 2 adds the issue salience on the independent variable issue; salience values used here are economic policy and foreign policy; *: $p<0.1$, **: $p<0.05$, ***: $p<0.01$; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

with two independent variables: the long-run systemic salience of economic and foreign policy for those elections in which the party competed. In the full model, the key independent variable is added: the long-run salience level for foreign policy. A comparison of the variance explained allows an assessment of the strength of the association between the salience levels for the two issues.[57] In this example, the coefficient for foreign policy salience is not significant and the added variance explained is miniscule (at .0053).

Figure 7.16 presents the results of this regression analysis for all issue pairs, summarised in the added variance explained (full results in Appendix 7.4). Again, the results are presented graphically in the form of a matrix, with each box presenting the added variance explained (as measured by the R^2 value). Darker shades of grey indicate

[57] Only parties that emphasised both economic and foreign policy at some point in their existence are included, meaning that parties that never devoted more than one per cent of their manifesto to either topic are excluded. Robust standard errors were used.



Figure 7.16 **Static salience interconnections using CMP-extracted party positions**

Note: Number at the end of each row represents the total number of interconnections for each issue (e.g. 4 for economic policy, 3 for foreign policy and so on); each box represents the summary of two multiple regression models (e.g. the box at the bottom left contains the information on the regression with economic policy salience as the dependent and foreign policy salience as the added independent variable, as well as the regression with foreign policy salience as the dependent and economic policy salience as the added independent variable); boxes are only shaded where the coefficient of the added variable is statistically significant at .1 or better; the shadings are based on the amount of added variance explained by the additional variable (e.g. more than .05 for economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism; all coefficients negative unless the box is marked by *; more detailed results in Appendix 7.4; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

a larger additional amount of explained variance. Non-significant associations in the regression model (as in the example in Table 7.2) are left blank. The total number of significant associations for each issue is given at the end of each line. For example, economic policy salience is statically interconnected with four issues: liberal-authoritarianism, culture-ethnic matters, environment and decentralisation.

The first finding is that the signs of the coefficients are mostly negative, reflecting the fact that the manifesto coding is based on the percentage of sentences per document and is thus compositional in nature. This means that an increased mention of one topic will often result in a reduced mention of other topics. As noted above, this negative correlation can indicate that the topics are instead opposites, leading to linked salience levels.

The issues that have the most significant coefficients and add the most in explained variance are liberal-authoritarianism (significant for five issues), economic policy (four), culture/ethnic matters (four). Generally weakly correlated, as shown either by a low number of significant coefficients or by little added variance explained, are: EU support, democracy, education and decentralisation. Looking at specific issue pairs, the added variance explained is largest for economic policy on the one hand and environmental protection, liberal-authoritarianism and cultural/ethnic topics on the other. Other relatively strong pairings are liberal-authoritarianism with foreign policy, and environment with education.

A closer examination of the issue pairs that are strongly significant in their association indicates that negative correlation indeed occurs when topics are opposed or unrelated to one another in terms of content. It is not the similar and related topics that are linked in the findings: for example, liberal-authoritarianism is not associated in terms of salience with culture/ethnic matters, democracy or the environment; the same applies

for economic and foreign policy. Instead, topics that are opposites or unrelated tend to feature more strongly in the list of significant results: e.g. liberal-authoritarianism on the one hand, and foreign policy and economic policy on the other.

However, the dominance of negative association does not apply to all pairs of political issues: for a small number of topics, the association is positive. Increased mention of foreign policy is positively associated with increased mention of the environment, and parties that talk more about decentralisation also devote more space to the culture/ethnic matters. These two issue pairs are also issues that are often associated, in particular of course decentralisation and culture. In addition, increased mentions of urban-rural relations co-occur, with a greater focus on education and EU integration.[58]

Discussion: comparing manifesto and expert survey results

It is obvious from the results described above that the empirical results differ depending on the data source used. On the one hand, the analysis of expert survey data shows that there is a relatively distinct link between the salience of certain issues. The importance parties give to three types of policy areas (economic/foreign policy, New Politics and multi-level governance) tend to be associated, at least according to the evaluations of expert party observers. On the other hand, the manifestos do not present such a clear picture, a difference that can partly be attributed to the compositional nature of the data source.

Interestingly, those areas that are linked in the expert surveys are independent in the manifestos. Thus, economic policy and foreign policy are not significantly associated

[58] A PCA was also carried out for the manifesto dataset. A PCA is 'best described as a structure detection method' (Netjes and Binnema, 2007, p. 45), with the aim being to find the main patterns among the correlations between a set of variables. The PCA confirms the general finding that there is very little commonality between the different topics, as the extracted components largely reflect one issue only. It is therefore not useful to extract component scores from the PCA.

in the party documents, nor are EU support and decentralisation. The same broadly applies to New Politics issues such as liberal-authoritarianism, the environment, culture-ethnic matters and democracy. This may be due to the strong constraint imposed by the measurement approach taken by the CMP. In other words, a lack of negative association could then indicate that the issues are strongly linked: if resources are devoted more strongly to one topic in the issue group in question, the party will not take those resources from the related policy area. The empirical finding that shows up in the manifesto is then a lack of association, but this in fact reflects a relatively strong positive link.

Of course, part of the differences between the two datasets may be due to the nature of what is measured. The manifesto data simply provides a percentage of the coverage of a single topic, which I have averaged over time. The expert surveys take into account the overall image and programme of a political party, as well as its actions in government and opposition. It is not surprising that there should be differences between the two data sources given the fact that they do not measure exactly the same thing. Overall, we should not necessarily dismiss the differences between the two data sources as a sign that either approach is limited or faulty. Instead, the different findings are the natural consequence of the different methodological assumptions underlying each approach (Netjes and Binnema, 2007). As a result, the differences between the two data sources will in part be due to the inherent limitations of each approach and the difficulty of measuring issue salience.

Discussion: comparing salience and positional profiles

A comparison of the salience patterns of issue association with the positional links found in the previous chapter is instructive. There are two ways in which salience

interconnections may be different from positional ties: the general strength of the interconnections may differ as may the actual issue pairs for which interconnections are found. First, both data sources show that the overall level of association is weaker for salience than for position. This is expected, given the weaker logical ties that exist between salience levels. The weaker level of association is especially true for the expert survey dataset. The r-values for the bivariate correlations are lower across the board for the salience issue pairs. Moreover, the PCAs for the association of salience levels produced weaker results than the PCAs for positional links. In the 2003 survey, the Eigenvalue for the first component is over three for positional interconnections, but only 1.47 for salience linkages. Thus, for the expert surveys the variance explained by the extracted components in the PCA is far smaller when considering salience. Turning to the manifesto results, the number of issue pairs where a significant association was found is smaller (18 for salience, compared to 24 for positions). When an association was found, this was weaker in terms of the added variance explained. There is thus evidence that the links in terms of salience are, on the whole, weaker than positional interconnections.

Beyond broad comparisons of association strength, it is also possible to see which issue pairs are strongly linked to one another. I will consider the expert survey findings first. Here, the salience interconnections appear to be more complex, in that more dimensions are needed to summarise how parties emphasise the various political issues. In particular, the aggregate analysis of all parties in terms of positions tended to indicate that there was one underlying dimension that captured a large part of the distribution of parties. This dimension contained economic and non-economic New Politics issues. A second, weaker dimension concerned multi-level governance issues: EU and decentralisation. In terms of salience, there is a clear separation between New



Figure 7.17 **Comparison of static interconnections and static salience interconnections, CMP-extracted data**

Note: Information drawn from Figure 7.16 (salience) and Figure 5.2 (position); shaded boxes indicate that an interconnection was found for both position and salience; boxes marked with respectively 'P' and 'S' indicate an interconnection for only position or only salience; all position coefficients positive; all salience coefficients negative unless marked by *.

Politics and economic policy, a distinction that was not consistently found in the analysis of positions as recorded by experts. It therefore appears that, as expected, static salience interconnections are mostly due to logic rather than circumstance.

A similar conclusion is also reached for the manifesto dataset. A summary of the findings for the two types of issue interconnections is presented in Figure 7.17. Boxes that are shaded represent issue pairs with positional and salience linkages, while the presence of just one type of interconnection is indicated by 'P' for positional and 'S' for

Position-Salience comparison	Basis for interconnection	number of issue pairs
Both present and positive	Logic	3
Both present, salience negative	Circumstance or strong logic	8
Position only	Logic	12
Salience only	Logic, but opposites	8
Neither	No interconnection	14

Table 7.3 **Summary of position-salience comparison and basis for interconnections**

Note: Information drawn from Figure 7.17 and Table 6.2.

salience. In order to understand the pattern that Figure 7.17 uncovers, it is necessary to refer again to the nature of the interconnection between the issue pairs, that is, whether it is based on logic or circumstance. The relevant framework for interpretation is summarised in Table 7.3 and is described in the following framework, with reference to the findings in Figure 7.17:

- If both associations are present and positive, this signals a logical tie between the issues: this case is straightforward, but quite rare (three issue pairs, shaded and marked by an asterisk).[59]
- Second, if both associations are present but a negative salience coefficient exists (shaded areas without an asterisk), this usually reflects the fact that the basis for the interconnection is merely circumstance. There is some positional connection between the two issues, but the salience findings demonstrate that parties see the two issues in terms of a trade-off when it comes to strategic emphasis. Eight issue pairs fall into this category. One way of examining whether these eight issue pairs are those where the positional interconnection is based on circumstance is to refer back to the findings of the previous chapter. There, the existence of static interconnections together with the absence of dynamic interconnections was seen

[59] One issue pair, education and urban-rural relations, has a positive coefficient for salience but is not interconnected in terms of positions.

as an indicator of a circumstance- (and not logic-) based linkage. In fact, of the eight position-negative salience issue pairs found here, fully six were such static-only pairs in the previous chapter. This further supports the assertion that these pairs are mainly based on circumstance.

- Third, if there is only a positional linkage, then this is a sign of 'normal', logic-based interconnections (twelve pairs, marked by 'P' in Figure 7.17). The position interconnection means that the ideological content of the two topics is related, while the lack of a salience interconnection means that parties will not reduce coverage of one of the two issues to raise emphasis on the other. For example, economic and foreign policy, the New Politics issues, and EU and decentralisation are all issue groups that are strongly associated in positional terms but have no salience interconnections.
- Fourth, the inverse – an interconnection for salience but not for position – was found for eight issue pairs (marked with 'S' in Figure 7.17). This should reflect the fact that the two issues are opposites. Positions are not related, and instead the two policy areas cut into each other's salience level.
- Finally, no interconnection at all was found for 14 issue pairs.

Using this framework of interpretation, the salience analysis therefore supports and supplements rather than contradicts the findings for static positional interconnections. Overall, the analysis of static salience interconnections in expert surveys and manifestos thus provides further confirmation that there is a separation of topics related to economic policy and topics related to the organisation of society, which I call 'New Politics' issues. In addition, it provides further confirmation that the source

	all parties	
Raw salience	**n**	**mean (s.d.)**
Economic policy	118	2.13 (2.05)
Liberal-authoritarianism	116	2.86 (1.97)
Environmental policy	118	2.10 (2.11)
Decentralization	112	1.87 (1.98)
Controlled salience	**n**	**mean (s.d.)**
Economic policy	116	1.90 (1.59)
Liberal-authoritarianism	114	2.98 (2.35)
Environmental policy	116	2.02 (1.76)
Decentralization	110	1.46 (1.53)

Table 7.4 **Mean salience change by expert survey issue between 1989 and 2003**

Note: 'Raw salience' presents the mean raw change between 1989 and 2003 scores; 'controlled salience' presents the mean change between 1989 and 2003 scores relative to the systemic salience of each issue; see text for details on calculation; data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).

of interconnection – logic or circumstance – provides an important guide to the presence and nature of interconnections.

Dynamic salience interconnections

The previous section considered cross-sectional differences in salience profiles between parties; the following section moves on to consider the interconnections between levels of salience in dynamic terms. I will first briefly describe which issues changed most overall before establishing the extent of salience interconnections within political parties.

Levels of salience change

Before considering these interconnections, I briefly present some descriptive information on the level of change in terms of salience for some key issues. I begin with the expert surveys. Four issues were measured in both the 1989 and the 2003: economic policy,

Issue	n	all parties mean (s.d.)	median
European integration	969	1.18 (2.79)	.59
Environmental policy	1251	.88 (1.57)	.53
Decentralization	1253	.81 (1.85)	.53
Urban-rural relations	1359	.90 (2.07)	.51
Liberal-authoritarianism	1561	1.14 (3.87)	.50
Education	1453	.80 (1.74)	.46
Democracy	1713	.87 (1.77)	.45
Culture/Ethnic relations	1666	.81 (1.74)	.42
Foreign policy	1670	.85 (2.84)	.39
Economic policy	1858	.59 (2.36)	.29

***Table 7.5* Proportional change in salience levels, CMP-extracted measure**

Note: Change in salience between t-1 and t relative to level of salience at t-1; sorted in descending order by median value; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

liberal-authoritarianism, environmental policy and decentralisation. Table 7.4 presents the level of absolute change for the four issues included in the two expert surveys by Laver/Hunt (1989) and Benoit/Laver (2003); both the raw and system-controlled salience levels are shown. The issue with the largest changes in salience is liberal-authoritarianism, with a mean raw change of 2.86 points. The other three issues follow with raw changes of around 2 points. One-sample t-tests show that all the means are different from 0. Comparing the four issues, however, only the change on liberal-authoritarianism is significantly different from the other issues. The results using salience scores that control for systemic salience are not substantively different.

Table 7.5 shows the levels of absolute change for the manifesto data, presented here as the change proportional to the salience in the preceding election.[60] The issue on which parties modify their emphasis the most is European integration (mean 1.18,

[60] I present proportional and not absolute change level as the level of absolute change may depend on the overall importance of the issue. A three per cent reduction on a topic that formed 30 per cent of the manifesto at *t-1* is clearly different from a three per cent increase on a topic that formed merely two per cent of the manifesto at *t-1*. This notwithstanding, measuring the proportional level of change also has limitations, as increases from a small base may be exaggerated. I report the median as well as the mean to take this into account.

median 0.59).[61] Parties also tend to change the salience of liberal-authoritarianism and environmental policy more than other issues. The lowest level of change is on economic policy (mean 0.59, median 0.29), with all other issues at mean levels of change between 0.80 and 0.89. Overall, there are few great differences between the proportional changes on the ten issues measured in the manifesto dataset, though the relatively large value for liberal-authoritarianism does match the finding for the expert surveys.

Dynamic salience interconnections (1): expert surveys

After presenting this descriptive overview of the data, I now turn to the analysis of dynamic salience interconnections. A first look at these linkages across time is provided by the expert surveys. Of course, these surveys contain only two time points, 1989 and 2003, so it is necessary to be careful in drawing broader conclusions from this limited evidence. For longer-term trends and changes, the manifesto data is examined in detail below.

Table 7.6 presents the bivariate correlations for the four issues that were included in both expert surveys. The upper section of the table presents the results for the raw scores and the lower section for those controlling for systemic salience (following the simple method used above).[62] The correlation strength is generally weak, with no r-value over .35. The clearest evidence of an association for change is on environmental policy and liberal-authoritarianism. A party that increased its emphasis on one of these issues also increased its emphasis on the other. Somewhat weaker evidence is found for economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism as well as for environmental policy and

[61] If the level of manifesto salience was below 1 per cent of the document at both *t* and *t-1*, these manifestos were not included in the analysis. As a result, the sample size is different for each of the issues considered.

[62] I also tried more complicated regression models, for example including the systemic salience levels as separate independent variables. The results do not differ, and the bivariate correlations are presented here for the sake of simplicity.

raw salience

		Decentralization
	Environment	.09 (112)
Liberal-authoritarianism	.31*** (116)	.09 (110)
Economic policy	.27*** (116)	.05 (118)	.03 (112)

controlled salience

		Decentralization
	Environment	.22** (110)
Liberal-authoritarianism	.32*** (114)	.14 (108)
Economic policy	.18* (114)	-.04 (116)	.10 (110)

***Table 7.6* Bivariate correlations for salience change between 1989 and 2003, expert surveys**

Note: 'Raw salience' presents the correlation for mean raw change between 1989 and 2003 scores; 'controlled salience' presents the correlation for mean change between 1989 and 2003 scores relative to the systemic salience of each issue; see text for details on calculation; data from Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006).

decentralisation. A PCA for the expert survey was carried out, but due to the low levels of correlations, no clear results emerge. Overall, then, dynamic salience interconnections are relatively weak, though there is some evidence of correlation of salience change for three of the six issue pairs.

If we compare the results for salience change to static salience interconnections, the similarity is definite (Table 7.7). The two strongest static salience interconnections were found for liberal-authoritarianism and environment, and decentralisation and environment. Both these issue pairs are also clearly linked in terms of dynamic salience interconnections. In addition, there are no interconnections, either static or dynamic, for liberal-authoritarianism and decentralisation. However, findings for salience links with economic policy are less clear. For example, findings for the static salience interconnections between economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism were

Issue 1	Issue 2	Static interconnection	Dynamic interconnection
Economic policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	no	yes, positive
Economic policy	Environment	positive (2003), negative (1989)	no
Economic policy	Decentralization	no (2003), negative (1989)	no
Liberal-authoritarianism	Environment	yes, positive	yes, positive
Liberal-authoritarianism	Decentralization	no	no
Environment	Decentralization	yes, positive	yes, positive

Table 7.7 **Summary of findings for salience interconnections in expert surveys**

Note: Information drawn from Appendix 7.1 (static interconnections) and Table 7.6 (dynamic interconnections).

mixed: a negative association was found in the 1989 survey and a positive association in 2003. No dynamic interconnections were found for this issue pair, perhaps reflecting this uncertain position. A similar finding exists for economic policy and decentralisation. Finally, for the weakest issue pair for dynamic interconnections, economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism, no static interconnection was found. Thus, there is a relationship between static and dynamic salience interconnections, but this is clearly visible only for the two strongest and clearest issue pairs.

Dynamic salience interconnections (2): manifesto data

The analysis of the expert survey data was limited by the existence of only two time points and the small number of issues included. For a broader picture of dynamic salience interconnections, I now turn to the manifesto data and examine salience levels since 1945 for ten distinct issues.

As in Chapter 6, I use separate regressions to estimate the added variance explained by changes in the independent variable issue, but focus here on changes in salience. An example of the regression is presented in Table 7.8, again for economic and foreign policy. The dependent variable is the change in the total salience of economic

Dependent variable: economic policy salience (change)	**Model 1** b	std. err.	**Model 2** b	std. err.
Foreign policy salience: Change			-.18***	0.03
Economic policy salience, t-1	-.56***	.03	-.57***	0.03
Foreign policy salience, t-1	.08**	.03	-.06	0.04
Economic policy: Systemic salience change	.35***	.05	.35***	0.05
Foreign policy: Systemic salience change	-.12**	.05	-.05	0.06
Economic policy: Systemic salience, t-1	.23***	.05	.23***	0.05
Foreign policy: Systemic salience, t-1	-.15**	.06	-.09	0.06
Constant	8.57***	1.61	9.17***	1.58
R^2	0.3158		0.3289	
n	1590		1590	

Note: *:p<0.1, **:p<.05, ***:p<.01

***Table 7.8* Example of a multiple linear regression using CMP-extracted issue salience**

Note: Model 1 includes all controls for previous salience, systemic salience and systemic salience change for both the dependent-variable and the independent-variable issue; Model 2 adds the raw salience change on the independent variable issue; *: p<.1, **: p<.05, ***: p<.01; standard errors clustered by election; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).

policy compared to the previous manifesto. The main independent variable is the change in the total salience of foreign policy, again compared to the previous manifesto. Three types of independent variables are also included: the level of salience on economic and foreign policy in the previous manifesto; the level of systemic salience in the previous election; and the level of systemic salience change, compared to the previous manifestos. The added variance (R^2) is determined by comparing the full model to the one without the key independent variable, here the change in foreign policy salience. In the example, the coefficient for foreign policy salience change is negative and significant, indicating

that increased coverage of foreign policy will reduce coverage of economic policy, holding the other variables constant. An increase in one per cent of coverage of foreign policy reduces economic policy coverage by .18 per cent. The added variance explained, 0.013, is relatively low.

The summary results of all these regressions analyses are presented in Figure 7.18 (with full results in Appendix 7.5). Economic policy clearly has the greatest number of dynamic interconnections, with only change in the salience of EU integration not significant. Foreign policy, liberal-authoritarianism and culture-ethnic matters are also often significantly linked in terms of salience change (six each). Significant associations are relatively rare for democracy, EU integration, decentralisation and urban-rural relations (four each). Again, most issue pairs are negatively associated. The only significant positive links are: culture-ethnic relations and decentralisation; foreign policy and environment; and decentralisation and environment.

Discussion: comparing static and dynamic interconnections

Figure 7.19 compares these results with those found for the static salience interconnections. First, it is worth stressing that the data source was not exactly the same for the two analyses: static interconnections were determined using long-run salience levels, while dynamic interconnections used each election manifesto. This substantially increased the sample size used to consider dynamic interconnections, so it is unsurprising that a number of dynamic interconnections were found where no static links were detected (marked with 'D'). It is more important that there are eleven issue pairs with both static and dynamic interconnections (shaded boxes). Of the five issue pairs with the strongest static interconnections, four also exhibit dynamic salience



Figure 7.18 **Dynamic salience interconnections, CMP-extracted measure**

Note: The number at the end of each row represents the total number of interconnections for each issue (e.g. 8 for economic policy, 6 for foreign policy and so on); each box represents the summary of two multiple regression models (e.g. the box at the bottom left contains the information on the regression with economic policy as the dependent and foreign policy as the added independent variable, as well as the regression with foreign policy as the dependent and economic policy as the added independent variable); boxes are only shaded where the coefficient of the added variable is statistically significant at .1 or better (as in Model 2, Table 7.8); the shadings are based on the amount of added variance explained by the additional variable (e.g. between .01 and .02 for economic policy and foreign policy, see Table 7.8); all coefficients negative unless marked by *; more detailed results in Appendix 7.5; data from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2007).



Figure 7.19 **Comparison of results for static and dynamic interconnections, CMP-extracted issue salience**

Note: Shaded boxes are issue pairs with both static and dynamic interconnections; boxes marked respectively with 'S' and 'D' have static or dynamic interconnections only; all coefficients negative unless marked by *; information drawn from Figure 7.16 and Figure 7.18.

interconnections.[63] The two issue pairs where the strongest positive association for static interconnections was found (culture-ethnic relations and decentralisation; environment and foreign policy) are also the two strongest cases for positive dynamic interconnections. While the similar cases are thus those where the strength of interconnections is strong, the seven cases where static interconnections are not mirrored in the dynamic analysis are concentrated among issue pairs where the added explained variance was low. In other words, I find dissimilar results for static and dynamic links mainly for issue pairs with weak static interconnections.

An interpretation of this comparison leads to the following conclusions:

- First, if both static and dynamic associations are found for salience, then the two issues are likely only connected in that they are seen as political opposites. If a party gives one of the two issues more emphasis, it will reduce its focus on the other. The strength and regularity of the connection reflects an oppositional relationship replacement between policy areas, so increased mention of one topic leads to a decrease in salience in another. Looking at Figure 7.19, the issue pairs that are statically and dynamically interconnected for salience are mainly topics that do not appear to share inherent ties, for example economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism. This supports the conclusion that these are opposed or unrelated topics. In two cases the association was positive: culture-ethnic matters and decentralisation; and environment and foreign policy. These are cases of close logical ties rather than of opposition.
- Second, if a salience but no dynamic interconnection is detected, then this will represent a case where there is a weak level of issue opposition. The precise

[63] The sole exception is environment and education.

interpretation is difficult, but such issue pairs are in any case relatively rare (seven issue pairs).

- Finally, if a dynamic association is found without evidence of a static salience interconnection, then this could in fact be evidence of logical ties. The number of issue pairs with only dynamic interconnections may partly be due to the much larger sample size used to examine the latter type of issue linkage. However, the absence of a static interconnection indicates that there is no strong evidence that parties see the two policy areas as clear opposites. The fact that there is some dynamic association may thus reflect the fact that the two issues are nevertheless in some way connected for political parties. Thus, while the original approach to the manifestos stated that negative associations are generally a sign that topic areas are opposed or unrelated, the boxes marked with 'D' may be cases where the issues are in fact closely linked. Salience levels may be therefore be interconnected (and show up as negative) because parties see the topics as belonging to one larger area of concern. This is supported by the fact that the issue pairs which only have dynamic interconnections are also those with particularly strong ties as identified in Chapters 5 and 6. Thus, this group contains links between New Politics issues (environment, liberal-authoritarianism, culture-ethnic relations) and between economic and foreign policy.

A comparison of the dynamic interconnection results with the findings for the expert surveys is presented in Table 7.9. The results are completely consistent for two of the six issue pairs that can be analysed in both datasets (E and F: decentralisation and liberal-authoritarianism, decentralisation and environment). For two further issue pairs, a significant association is found in the manifestos but not in the surveys (B and C: economic policy and environment, economic policy and decentralization). Economic policy, which is usually the main topic in manifestos, is one of the issues in both pairs,

			Dynamic interconnection		
	Issue 1	**Issue 2**	**ES**	**CMP**	**Conclusion**
A	Economic policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	yes, positive	yes, negative	independent
B	Economic policy	Environment	no	yes, negative	independent
C	Economic policy	Decentralization	no	yes, negative	independent
D	Liberal-authoritarianism	Environment	yes, positive	yes, negative	interconnected
E	Liberal-authoritarianism	Decentralization	no	no	independent
F	Environment	Decentralization	yes, positive	yes, positive	interconnected

Table 7.9 **Summary of findings for four core issues, expert surveys and CMP**

Note: Information drawn from Figures 7.18 and Table 7.6.

and the manifesto finding may thus reflect the fact that increased consideration of environment or decentralisation has to come at the expense of some other topic (due to the measurement approach used to analyse the manifestos). These two issue pairs therefore are likely to be examples of associations that result from a weak interconnection.

Such conclusions are more difficult to draw for the remaining two issue pairs (A and D: economic policy and environment, liberal-authoritarianism and environment). The ties between liberal-authoritarianism and the environment were particularly strong in the expert surveys, but the association is negative in the manifestos. The clarity of the expert survey finding however suggests that this may be the result of a strong interconnection rather than independence. Moreover, no static salience interconnection was found for this issue pair in the party manifestos, further supporting the assertion that the ties between liberal-authoritarianism and the environment are based on strong connection, though nevertheless perhaps a circumstantial rather than a logical one.

In contrast, the finding for the final issue pair, economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism, was far weaker in the expert surveys. In addition, a static salience interconnection was also found for this pair in the manifestos. The negative association

in the party manifestos will thus probably have been caused by independence rather than interconnection in this case.

Discussion: comparing positional and salience interconnections

Finally, it is useful to compare the findings for position and salience interconnections. The first point of comparison is the extent to which static interconnections help predict dynamic interconnections. For positional links, the conclusion reached was that static ties only act as a guide if they are based on the constraints of logic and not of circumstance. Thus, static interconnections predict dynamic interconnections, but only for certain types of linkages. Turning to salience interconnections, it is clear that static interconnections act as a much better predictor here. The static links found for salience tend to predict well the occurrence of dynamic interconnections, especially if only the stronger static links are considered. Of course, many more dynamic interconnections were found than static interconnections, but this is (as I have argued) likely to be the result of the increased sample size. Static interconnections are better predictors for dynamic linkages in terms of salience than in terms of positions.

A second point of comparison is between the precise issue pairs for which dynamic interconnections are found. This is summarised in Figure 7.20. It is clear that dynamic salience linkages are far more frequent than the equivalent interconnections for positions. In nine cases, a positional but no salience interconnection was found, but for 17 pairs I only detected a salience interconnection. The findings are identical for only 19 of the 45 issue pairs. Partly, this is likely to be the result of the nature of the manifesto data with its inherent upper limit on issue coverage. This means that dynamic interconnections are found even when (and indeed because) the two issues are in fact independent. This is particularly clear for the issue pairs that include economic policy.



Figure 7.20 **Comparison of results for position and salience interconnections, CMP-extracted measures**

Note: Shaded boxes are issue pairs with both position and salience interconnections; boxes marked respectively with 'P' and 'S' have position or salience interconnections only; information drawn from Figure 7.16 (salience) and Figure 6.4 (position).

The salience links found with liberal-authoritarianism and decentralization, for example, are likely to reflect independence rather than interconnection. On the other hand, the nine cases where an association was found for both salience and position indicate that these are strongly linked issue pairs. Again, this clearly applies to economic policy, which is consistently strongly tied to foreign policy and the environment.

Conclusion

This chapter builds on and extends the work on position interconnections by applying the same ideas and framework to issue salience. The key difference between the two types of linkages is that salience interconnections are weaker overall than position interconnections. This is because the incentives that support the establishment and maintenance of position interconnections have less force where issue salience is concerned. Put simply, raising or lowering the salience of one topic has fewer inherent logical consequences for the coverage of other topics: issue importance has less of an impact on the overall coherence of a party programme. Parties are thus more flexible when it comes to deciding on the importance they attach to each issue. This does not mean that parties do not exhibit internal interconnections for the salience of issues, but that these are relatively rare. Moreover, if they do occur, they are likely to be due to strong logical links between the policy areas concerned.

The way this difference of interconnection strength is expressed varies between the two datasets. The weaker interconnection finding is particular clear for expert surveys, where static interconnections are clearly divided into basic issue groups. In addition, dynamic interconnections only exist within each of these issue groups and for those issue pairs that have particularly strong static interconnections. In the party manifestos the measurement approach itself creates a strong restriction on the freedom of

parties. This captures an important difference between positions and salience: unlike for positions, there is an inherent upper limit in the amount of emphasis a party can put on each issue. The consequence of this scarcity of salience resources means that issues that are unrelated are negatively associated in terms of salience: parties reduce coverage of one topic to make way for another. In contrast to the analysis of positions, the existence of 'opposing' issues is important to the examination of salience interconnections.

Moving beyond interconnection strength, systematic differences were found between static and dynamic as well as between salience and position interconnections. Importantly, these differences again led back to the source of interconnections: when considering the links between salience levels, it is again necessary to know whether two issues are connected due to circumstance or merely due to logic. With this knowledge, it is possible to build solid predictions for dynamic from static salience interconnections and for salience from position interconnections. In many ways, salience interconnections are more clearly structured than position interconnections once the particularities of salience in both theory and measurement have been understood.

Salience is an important political tool for political parties and deserves as much attention as positional choices. In particular, the analysis in this chapter confirms that salience manipulation may be an attractive strategy for parties because interconnections are weaker. In other words, parties can (and do) change the salience of different issues without necessarily affecting the level of emphasis they are seen as putting on other topics. This is strongly underlined by the expert survey findings. While the manifestos presented a slightly different picture, partly because of the mechanical effects created by the compositional nature of that data source, even here the number of static interconnections was lower than for positions. While salience and position are the two key characteristics of the issues that make up policy bundles, they differ strongly in the

way interconnections are realised. Understanding these differences illuminates the place of each characteristic in party strategies.

Benoit and Laver survey (2003)

						Deregulation
					Foreign Policy	.68*** (100)
				EU support	.40*** (104)	.16 (74)
			Immigration	.11 (117)	.03 (13)	.09 (106)
		Decentralization	-.05 (149)	.28*** (117)	-.08 (130)	-.06 (106)
	Environment	.17** (149)	.07 (149)	-.01 (117)	.33*** (130)	.26*** (118)
Liberal-authoritarianism	.29*** (153)	-.06 (141)	.28*** (141)	-.05 (117)	-.01 (122)	-.12 (110)
Economic policy	-.13 (153)	.15* (161)	-.04 (149)	.04 (149)	.10 (117)	.56*** (130)	.87*** (118)

Note: sample size in brackets.

Laver and Hunt survey (1989)

				Urban-rural relations
			USSR relations	.06
		Decentralization	-.07	.26***
	Environment	.42***	.08	.15*
Liberal-authoritarianism	.30***	-.01	.17**	.06
Economic policy	.04	-.22***	-.20**	.52***	.05

Note: n=149 for all issue pairs.
p-values: *<.1, ** <.05, *** < .01

Appendix 7.2 PCA, static interconnections, Laver and Hunt expert survey

all parties (n=143)	*Components*			unexplained
Issue	1	2	3	variance
Economic Policy	**0.53**	-0.19	0.06	0.28
Public Ownership	**0.57**	-0.01	-0.05	0.21
Foreign Policy	**0.53**	0.07	-0.01	0.34
Environment	-0.02	**0.65**	-0.03	0.24
Decentralization	-0.09	**0.55**	0.12	0.41
Clericalism	-0.14	-0.35	**0.62**	0.17
Urban-Rural	0.07	0.17	**0.75**	0.16
Liberal-Authoritarianism	0.27	0.28	0.16	0.67
Eigenvalue	2.37	1.79	1.36	
Proportion of total variance explained	0.30	0.22	0.17	

Note: Rotated component loadings shown; varimax rotation used; components with Eigenvalues over 1 extracted; loadings above .4 and lower than -.4 in bold.

Appendix 7.3 Component scores, PCA, Benoit and Laver expert survey

Component scores of the main party families (BL survey)

	Components					
	Economic and Foreign Policy		**EU/Decentralization**		**New Politics**	
Party family (n)	*mean*	*s.d.*	*mean*	*s.d.*	*mean*	*s.d.*
Communist (10)	1.40	1.00	-.03	.93	.44	1.62
Green (7)	.19	.94	-.11	1.06	1.76	.26
Social Democratic(13)	.09	.82	-.33	.69	-.28	.71
Liberals (8)	.79	1.62	-.25	.76	.03	.78
Christian Democrats (8)	-1.44	1.63	-.86	1.03	.16	.62
Conservatives (8)	1.41	1.41	-.05	.85	-.82	.83
Ethnic-Regionalists (6)	-2.36	.86	1.01	.82	-.69	1.21

Note: 10 countries included (Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK)

Appendix 7.4 Detailed results: static interconnections, CMP dataset

Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 2 --> Issue 1		Issue 1 --> Issue 2		
		b	R^2 added	b	R^2 added	n
Economic policy	Environment	-0.31	0.0993	-0.53	0.1369	167
Economic policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	-0.29	0.0987	-0.54	0.1178	190
Economic policy	Culture-ethnic matters	-0.5	0.0894	-0.27	0.0652	190
Foreign policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	-0.22	0.0657	-0.79	0.1317	184
Education	Environment	-0.07	0.0472	-1.05	0.0618	163
Liberal-authoritarianism	EU support	-1.1	0.0415	-0.06	0.0424	140
Urban-rural relations	Education	.35	0.0288			163
Economic policy	Decentralization	-0.43	0.0263	-0.1	0.0227	164
Liberal-authoritarianism	Decentralization	-0.38	0.0173	-0.1	0.0195	163
Culture-ethnic matters	Decentralization	0.27	0.0165	0.14	0.0192	162
EU support	Urban-rural relations	0.07*	0.0157			131
Liberal-authoritarianism	Urban-rural relations	-0.17*	0.0141	-0.12*	0.0156	164
Foreign policy	Decentralization	-0.16*	0.0101			161
Foreign policy	Environment	.06*	0.0095	.33*	0.0331	164
Democracy	Education	-0.24*	0.0093	-0.06*	0.0102	183
Culture-ethnic matters	Urban-rural relations	-0.09	0.0091			165
Culture-ethnic matters	Democracy	-0.12*	0.0083	-0.14*	0.0113	187

Only significant coefficients shown; p-values lower than .05 except if marked by *: sig at .1 only

Appendix 7.5 Dynamic interconnections, CMP dataset

Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 2 --> Issue 1		Issue 1 --> Issue 2		n
		b	R^2 increase	b	R^2 increase	
Foreign policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	-0.16	0.0333	-0.3	0.0357	1281
Economic policy	Liberal-authoritarianism	-0.21	0.0326	-0.23	0.0354	1443
Liberal-authoritarianism	Education	-0.47	0.0283	-0.08	0.0257	1108
Liberal-authoritarianism	Environment	-0.31	0.026	-0.13	0.0283	862
Liberal-authoritarianism	Urban-rural relations	-0.28	0.026	-0.12	0.0294	988
Economic policy	Environment	-0.32	0.0215	-0.1	0.023	1016
Economic policy	Culture-ethnic matters	-0.25	0.0193	-0.11	0.0176	1598
Economic policy	Foreign policy	-0.18	0.0131	-0.11	0.0114	1590
Foreign policy	Culture-ethnic matters	-0.15	0.011	-0.11	0.0116	1427
Economic policy	Democracy	-0.16	0.0092	-0.08	0.0079	1634
Foreign policy	Urban-rural relations	-0.14	0.009	-0.1	0.0117	1057
Economic policy	Decentralization	-0.27	0.0088	-0.05	0.0097	1028
Economic policy	Education	-0.26	0.0086	-0.05	0.0079	1324
Culture-ethnic matters	Decentralization	0.18	0.0081	0.07	0.0098	952
Democracy	Culture-ethnic matters	-0.12	0.0077	-0.1	0.008	1448
Economic policy	Urban-rural relations	-0.15	0.0072	-0.07*	0.0091	1202
EU	Decentralization	-0.1*	0.0071	-0.12*	0.0099	491
EU	Education	-0.09	0.0066	-0.12*	0.0077	619
Decentralization	Environment	0.07*	0.0056	0.1	0.005	688
Democracy	Urban-rural relations	-0.11	0.0056	-0.09	0.009	1084
Culture-ethnic matters	EU	-0.17	0.0055	-0.05	0.0046	704
EU	Environment	-0.06*	0.0043	-0.13	0.006	537
Liberal-authoritarianism	Culture-ethnic matters	-0.11	0.0043	-0.05	0.0039	1331
Foreign policy	Education	-0.12	0.0039	-0.05	0.0042	1212
Democracy	Education	-0.12	0.0032	-0.05	0.004	1216
Foreign policy	Environment	.07*	0.0029	.07*	0.0032	925

Notes: All coefficients significant at less than $p<.05$ unless marked by * ($p<.1$).
Issue 2--> Issue 1: Issue 2 change regressed onto Issue 1 change (and vice versa).

Chapter 8

The salience of unusual issue preferences

In this chapter, I introduce an alternative approach to conceptualising and measuring static issue interconnections: the relative unusualness of a party's policy position compared to its programmatic profile as a whole. 'Unusualness' here refers to the extent to which a party's views on a particular topic are more extreme or more centrist than its general average stance. The concept of unusualness is related to that of static issue interconnections: the difference of one policy stance compared to the party's mean position is another way of capturing the extent to which an issue position can be predicted from a party's other views. One key advantage of the unusualness measure is that it provides an issue- and party-specific assessment of the strength of static interconnections. In this chapter, I use unusualness to demonstrate the impact of policy interconnections on party competition, in particular on the political strategy of modifying issue salience.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the salience theory of party competition is one of the oldest and best-established rivals to the Downsian spatial model (Downs, 1957; Budge and Farlie, 1983). The latter assumes that parties compete by taking up identifiable positions on shared policy dimensions, while in the former political parties 'talk past each other', mentioning only those topics where they have a clear advantage. For many years, salience theory was weakened by its position as an alternative, rather than as a complement, to spatial competition, and has as a consequence remained relatively underdeveloped and under-examined. Recently, renewed attention has been paid to the role of issue salience in party competition, with a particular focus on explicitly combining party strategies on position and on salience (Green-Pedersen, 2007; Bélanger and Meguid, 2008;

Green and Hobolt, 2008; Meguid, 2008; Tavits, 2008). It is rightly argued that position and salience are two attributes of party views on political topics, and that these two characteristics are often related. This chapter builds on this recent renewal in interest in issue importance in party competition. In particular, I examine which issue positions within their policy profiles parties choose to emphasise.

The relationship of a party's position to its overall ideological package can be summarised by the degree to which the position in question is 'unusual'. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I define the unusualness of an issue position as its distance from the overall mean extremeness of the party from the political centre. Issue positions can thus be unusually extreme or unusually moderate compared to the party profile as a whole. When it comes to which issues parties should emphasise in the pursuit of electoral success, parties should, at first glance, stress those topics on which they are relatively moderate. After all, these are the policy areas where the party is likely to be closer to the median voter. However, I suggest that parties may also choose to emphasise precisely those issues within their policy profile where their position is relatively extreme. For one, an unusually extreme position may reflect a party's concerted effort to distinguish itself on that issue and may indicate the intensity of a party's preferences on that issue, particularly on the part of its supporters. For niche parties (Meguid, 2005; Adams et al., 2006), this incentive may be even stronger as their survival depends in particular on carving out for themselves a unique role within the party system. I therefore also suggest that the incentives for the emphasis of relatively extreme issue preferences should be greater for smaller parties, as well as in crowded party systems.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I define 'unusual issue positions' and then give an account of the measurement approach and descriptive results for the 2003 expert survey. Next, I review the extent to which existing literature on salience as an electoral strategy in party competition has also taken issue positions into account. I then

consider the theoretical expectations concerning the effect of positional unusualness on issue salience, including the mediating impact of political and institutional factors. Next, I outline the measurement of the key variables and present the results of the empirical analysis. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of the findings for party competition research and for the theory of issue interconnections.

Unusual issue positions: definition and measurement

In Chapter 3, I defined static interconnections as the issue linkages between two policy areas and argued that this concept was well-captured by the predictive power of one issue position for a party's position on a second topic. This chapter presents an alternative approach to conceptualising and measuring static issue interconnections, though one that is based on the same theoretical foundations.

This new concept is that of an issue position's 'unusualness' within a party's programmatic profile. An 'unusual position' is here defined as one that is more centrist or more extreme than those otherwise defended by the party. I therefore assume that there is a tendency for parties to be similarly extreme (that is, equally distant from the political centre) on most issues. Such an assumption can be justified by the fact that a left-right dimension is a universal phenomenon, which means that party programmes can often be reduced to a position on a single underlying continuum (Miller et al., 1999; McDonald and Budge, 2005). In other words, the parties' positions on all issues are often relatively similar, at least in terms of placement on a Euclidean scale. This simplification of programmes has advantages for parties, who benefit from the existence of a simple heuristic (left-right or liberal-conservative) that can transmit a large amount of information to potential voters (Downs, 1957; Ferejohn, 1993).

However, while there is a tendency towards low-dimensional spaces and simple party programmes, this tendency is not complete. Left-right does not capture all there is to

party competition, and its usefulness varies depending on the national context (Benoit and Laver, 2006). Within a party's programmatic profile, some issue positions will be more unusual than others. Thus, positions differ in their distance from the party's mean position relative to the political centre, and the further away from this mean the position on the given issue is, the more unusual it is. It is worth stressing that in this chapter only the relative position of a party on an issue compared to the party's other positions is considered. In other words, I am not looking at how unusual – be it extreme or centrist – a position is within a particular party system, that is, compared to the positions of other parties.

It is worth presenting in detail how unusualness is operationalised. The degree of unusualness equals the distance from the political centre of one issue position minus the party's mean distance from the political centre. In other words, for each issue *i* in a party *p*'s policy profile, $\text{Unusualness}_{ip} = \text{extremeness}_{ip} - \text{mean extremeness}_{ip}$. Positive values mean that the party's position is unusually extreme, negative values that it is unusually centrist.

To measure the level of unusualness, three pieces of information are therefore needed: first, the location of the political centre; second, the distance of the party on the issue in question from the centre; and third, the party's mean distance from the centre on all others issues. All these were calculated using expert survey data. In determining the location of the political centre, the fact that this may differ between countries was taken into account: the location of the political centre is therefore the mean position on each issue of all parties, weighted by the parties' vote share in the preceding election. The issue-specific extremeness is then the party's absolute positional distance from that centre. The party's mean extremeness was then calculated as the party's mean absolute distance from the political centre on all issues except for the one in question. Subtracting the mean extremeness from the issue-specific extremeness provides the unusualness value.

Issue	raw party position (bold) and political centre	distance from political centre	mean distance from centre of other issues	positional unusualness
Economic policy	-9.5 ← -3 0.6 → 9.5	3.58	2.18	1.41
Liberal-authoritarianism	-9.5 ← -3.8 1.1 → 9.5	4.85	2.00	**2.86**
Immigration	-9.5 ← -1.6 0.9 → 9.5	2.48	2.34	0.15
Environment	-9.5 ← 0.4 0.8 → 9.5	0.42	2.63	**-2.22**
EU: Accountability	-9.5 ← -1.9 -0.9 → 9.5	1.00	2.55	-1.55
EU: Authority	-9.5 ← -1.2 -0.5 → 9.5	0.69	2.43	-1.74
Peacekeeping	-9.5 ← -2 -0.2 → 9.5	1.81	1.72	0.09
Decentralization	-9.5 ← -1.2 2.4 → 9.5	4.01	2.12	1.89

Figure 8.1 **Example of positional unusualness: Austrian Social Democrats (SPÖ)**

Note: Data from Benoit and Laver (2006).

It is worth illustrating this with an example. Figure 8.1 presents a party's policy package and the unusualness of different issues within it. This example uses the positional information provided by Benoit and Laver (2006) on the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), measured on a scale from -9.5 to 9.5. The spatial illustration in the second column depicts the raw party position as indicated by experts as well as the political centre. For instance, the political centre on economic policy is just to the right of the centre (0.6) in Austria. Since the SPÖ's raw score on economic policy is -3, the party is 3.6 points to the left of the political centre. The party's mean level of extremeness, that is, its mean distance from the political centre on all other issues, is 2.18. The difference between this and the issue-specific extremeness produces the unusualness score. Here, the SPÖ is unusually extreme on economic policy, with an unusualness score of 1.4. The party is most unusually extreme on liberal-authoritarianism and most unusually centrist on environmental policy. Appendix 8.1 presents the complete results for one country, Germany.

The overall unusualness is presented in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 for the various issues and party families. For each issue and party family, the graphs show the mean *absolute* level of unusualness in the Benoit and Laver survey, thus disregarding differences between unusual extremeness and unusual centrism. The 95% confidence intervals and a line at the overall mean value are also included. The differences between the issues are not great, with levels for unusualness close to the mean for all seven policy areas. Economic policy is clearly below the mean, while liberal-authoritarianism and decentralisation are above. This indicates that positions on economic policy are generally close to the overall party mean extremeness and positions on the latter two issues are further away. Turning to the party families, a clear pattern emerges: mainstream party families tend to be relatively homogenous in their positional profiles, while smaller, niche competitors – especially Green and Communist parties – tend to exhibit high levels of positional diversity.

Figure 8.4 presents the level of relative unusualness, making it possible to see whether issue positions are unusual in their extremeness or in their centrism. It is clear that liberal-authoritarianism is overwhelmingly more extreme than the parties' general profile. The same applies, if to a lesser extent, to immigration and deregulation. Decentralisation, on the other hand, is an issue where parties are generally more moderate than their overall programmatic package would suggest. Other relatively moderate issues are European integration and environmental policy.

It is also possible to compare this overall picture with the levels of relative unusualness for the seven issues for each party family (Figures 8.5 to 8.13). There are clear differences between the party families, who vary in the level of unusualness of the different policy areas. On economic policy, for example, Communists and Conservatives are unusually extreme, and Christian Democrats and Agrarian parties centrist. On the environment, Green parties are unsurprisingly more extreme, as are Christian Democrats on liberal-authoritarianism and Liberals on deregulation. Despite these inter-family



Figure 8.2 **Absolute unusualness by issue, Benoit and Laver expert survey**

Note: Figure shows absolute levels of unusualness for each issue, i.e. the mean absolute distance from the political centre for each issue; line at mean overall salience; 95% confidence intervals shown; Dereg = deregulation; FP = foreign policy; Econ = economic policy; LA = liberal-authoritarianism; Envi = environment; Decent = decentralization; EU = EU support; Immig = immigration; data from Benoit and Laver (2006).



Figure 8.3 **Absolute unusualness by party family, Benoit and Laver expert survey**

Note: Figure shows absolute levels of unusualness by party family, i.e. the mean absolute distance from the political centre by party family; line at mean overall salience; 95% confidence intervals shown; Com = Communists; SocDem = Social Democrats; Lib = Liberals; CD = Christian Democrats; Con = Conservatives; Agri = Agrarians; Nat = Nationalists; Eth-Reg = Ethnic-Regionalists; data from Benoit and Laver (2006).



Figure 8.4 **Relative unusualness by issue, Benoit and Laver expert survey**

Note: Figure shows relative levels of unusualness; negative values are unusually centrist; positive values are unusually extreme; line at mean overall salience; 95% confidence intervals shown; Dereg = deregulation; FP = foreign policy; Econ = economic policy; LA = liberal-authoritarianism; Envi = environment; Decent = decentralization; EU = EU support; Immig = immigration; data from Benoit and Laver (2006).



Figures 8.5 to 8.13 **Relative unusualness by party family, Benoit and Laver survey**

Note: line at mean overall salience; 95% confidence intervals shown; Com = Communists; SocDem = Social Democrats; Lib = Liberals; CD = Christian Democrats; Con = Conservatives; Agri = Agrarians; Nat

differences, party families are nevertheless similar in their levels of unusualness on some issues. Thus, there is little divergence between party families on decentralisation and European integration.

In this section I have presented the conceptual underpinning of positional unusualness and described its empirical measurement using expert surveys. In the remainder of this chapter, I consider the place of issue unusualness in party strategies. In particular, I use this new indicator as an independent variable and examine its effect on issue salience.

Unusualness and salience

This chapter builds on recent work into party strategies by considering salience and position at the same time (Kriesi et al., 2008b; Meguid, 2008; Tavits, 2008). Thus, instead of arguing that salience should replace position in party competition theory or that salience variation should be considered an alternative electoral strategy, I suggest that position and salience are fundamentally linked.

Issue salience and policy positions

There are three stances in the literature on the relationship between issue positions and issue salience. The first of these argues that positional theories are faulty as parties compete only by raising and lowering issue importance. The early proponents of salience and valence theory in particular (e.g. Stokes, 1963; Budge and Farlie, 1983) concluded that issue positions were less important than often claimed. Instead, they suggest that one should look to salience rather than positions to describe and explain party strategies. In this view, salience is presented as an alternative, not complementary way of understanding party competition. The fundamental argument of such authors is that we are wrong to think

that parties compete by taking up distinct positions on common issues. Instead, they stress issues that they are seen as 'owning'.

A second view accepts that parties do occupy policy positions but argues that such positional reputations are very difficult to change (Petrocik, 1996). It is worth remembering that even Downs argued that party positions are likely to remain relatively stable due to parties' need to appear responsible and reliable (Downs, 1957, p. 109). In a situation where positions are relatively fixed, parties may find it easier and more effective to change the salience of their issues rather than attempt to change their policy position (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, p. 167). In this view, parties vary their emphasis on certain topics in order to exploit an existing positional advantage. Party politics then turns into a 'competition for issue space' (Carmines and Stimson, 1986, p. 915) where the introduction of new dimensions of political conflict can significantly alter the relative support parties garner (see also Riker, 1986). In other words, in this part of the literature salience is seen as not the only, but nevertheless the most strategically important policy characteristic, as policy positions are overwhelmingly stable.

The third and most recent approach considers salience and position to be distinct but complementary characteristics of political issues. Parties should be seen as making decisions regarding both the stance they take and how much they emphasise that stance (Meguid, 2005). Modifying issue emphasis is then a further weapon in a party's arsenal during an election campaign. A model of party competition that ignores either position or salience is probably too simple. Instead, we should examine how these two attributes of a party's policy profile are linked. Considering both position and salience as associated strategies in party competition is an approach that differs from the majority of existing literature. Recent work has, however, tried to integrate salience into a spatial model of party competition (Meguid, 2005; Kriesi et al., 2008b; Tavits, 2008). Here, party strategies are seen as encompassing salience and ownership elements as well as just programmatic

appeals (Meguid, 2005, p. 349). Both issue positions and issue importance can be manipulated by political parties in the pursuit of electoral gains.

The salience of unusual policy positions

I follow this recent work in considering salience and position at the same time: instead of arguing that salience should replace position in party competition theory or that salience variation should be considered an alternative electoral strategy, I suggest that position and salience are fundamentally linked. More precisely, in this chapter I examine which issue positions within a party profile are emphasised by political parties. The assumption in this chapter is therefore that positional decisions precede salience choices in party strategies. In other words, the decisions taken regarding policy positions have an effect on the salience the party publicly gives to the issue.[64] Policy positions are therefore treated as exogenous, and the level of issue salience as endogenous. A complete model of party competition would, as Steenbergen and Scott (2004, p. 167) point out, treat both aspects of policy programmes as endogenous because parties need to make 'strategic choices on both issue salience and issue positions'; however, they add that 'it is difficult to identify such a model'.

Parties should emphasise unusual positions more than others within their policy profile. I have argued that parties will tend to take similarly extreme or centrist positions on all issues. Parties will not diverge from such a homogenous policy profile without reason. Taking up an unusual position can reflect an effort to adopt a particular political stance, and one that is noticeably different from its overall profile. Instead of giving the automatic response to a political question, the party decides to diverge from its general position on an issue. The factors that lead parties to take such a decision mean that the

[64] This is arguably more realistic than the reverse assumption: that parties decide on the salience they wish to give to a topic before choosing a position. This would mean that a party would decide that it cared very strongly about, say, economic or foreign policy, before having some idea concerning the position it wishes to take.

position in question is also likely to be stressed by them. It is therefore worth considering what might lead parties to single out one issue over others.

In discussing issue ownership, Petrocik, Benoit et al. (2003, p. 602) argue that there are three reasons why a party might decide to concentrate on an issue: sincerity, internal party imperatives and strategic calculation. Sincerity refers to the beliefs of elite politicians, while internal party imperatives refer to the pressure exerted by the party's constituent groups. Strategic calculation refers to party behaviour aimed directly at increasing political success, whether through votes or office. These three incentives to stress specific issues also explain why parties might decide to take up an unusual position. Importantly, the motivation behind taking up an unusual issue position is different for unusually *extreme* and unusually *centrist* positions.

Explaining increased emphasis on relatively centrist positions is straightforward. While sincerity and internal party imperatives may of course play a role, the strategic motives are also strong. It is thus well-established that parties should have an incentive to stress those positions within its profile on which it is most centrist. For example, a Social Democratic party that wants to gain new voters can stress its tough approach to law-and-order, a tactic pursued by New Labour in the run-up to the 1997 election (van der Brug, 2004). If the aim is to capture the median voter, then the party should emphasise those issues where it is located close to the median voter. One of the oldest and most well-known predictions in political science is that parties, given certain assumptions, will converge towards the median voter (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957). The centripetal incentives leading to policy moderation should also mean that parties will stress those issues on which they are particularly centrist. Put simply, the aim of vote-maximisation should lead parties to stress their unusually moderate positions.

Of course, the reality of political competition has proved that this convergence is by no means perfect, and various explanations for this, even within the Downsian framework,

have been offered (Aldrich, 1983; Miller and Schofield, 2003; Schofield, 2003; Grofman, 2004; Adams et al., 2005; Schofield and Sened, 2006). Generally, the starting assumption is that parties should converge but that various reasons exist for parties to fail to do so, be it abstention, activists, campaign donors or other competitors. Similarly, it is also possible that parties will stress unusually extreme positions as much as unusually centrist ones. First, a party's unusually extreme positions can be the result of internal party imperatives: such issues might be those on which its supporters and funders have particularly strong preferences, preventing any moves to the centre. This would also mean that such positions are more likely to be emphasised. Second, there are also strategic incentives to present unusually extreme positions. Controlling for the general political environment, presenting such a position to the public is a way for parties to attract notice: they allow for the 'product differentiation' that can be a key to electoral success (Kitschelt, 1994, p. 118). Parties can in this way build up a strong reputation and issue ownership for themselves (Petrocik, 1996). In sum, it would make sense for parties to stress unusually extreme positions due to, first, the power of the party base and party funders and, second, the strategic benefits of product differentiation.[65]

Interactions with unusualness: party size and party system size

The impact on salience of the unusualness of an issue position should depend on two other factors. First, smaller parties will be more tempted to stress a unique stance. Such parties may try to carve out a particular issue-based 'niche' for themselves (Meguid, 2005; Adams et al., 2006). For one, small parties may be most successful in generating media coverage if they concentrate on one (controversial) issue. For Meguid (2005), this increased

[65] While the reasons to avoid stressing unusually extreme positions are relatively well-known, there might also be a reason why a party might fail to stress an unusually centrist position. Thus, an unusually centrist position could reflect the fact that this issue is not a party's priority. Taking up a position close to the centre may simply mean that the party has given a standard response when faced with a political issue. For example, extreme-right parties often have relatively centrist economic policies, but these positions are also generally of less relevance to those parties' image.

emphasis on a single issue is also fundamental to the electoral success of niche parties: 'Unable to benefit from pre-existing partisan allegiances or the broad allure of comprehensive ideological positions, niche parties rely on the salience and attractiveness of their *one* policy stance for voter support.' This gives them an incentive to put particular emphasis on topics that set them apart from their (larger) competitors. For niche parties, distinguishing themselves from mainstream parties will usually equate to taking an extreme position. Indeed, it has been shown that policy moderation is costly for niche parties but not for their mainstream competitors (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008b). Thus, these parties should be expected to stress their relatively extreme positions as a means of carving out a niche and ensuring party growth and survival. In contrast, larger, 'catch-all' parties, which aim to attract as great a number of voters as possible, tend to have more comprehensive policy platforms and the resources to publicise them (Kirchheimer, 1990 [1966]; Meguid, 2005). Concentrating on one issue will thus be less essential to that party's success.

Second, parties may be more likely to stress unusual issue positions within their programmatic profile if they are competing in a large party system. This is due to the incentives created by what Kitschelt terms the 'crowdedness' of the competitive space. In his view, the choice of electoral programmes by a party will depend on the positions of its competitors, in particular the extent to which certain political spaces are still unoccupied (Kitschelt, 1994, p. 34). According to Dow (2001, p. 111), it is often argued that a system with fewer political parties creates 'convergent spatial incentives', while larger party systems induce 'divergent spatial incentives'. This is due to the fact that the ideal positions for vote-maximisation are nearer to the centre when there are fewer competitors in the system. There is thus a stronger incentive for 'product differentiation' when a system is more fragmented (Cox, 1990; Kitschelt, 1994, p. 118; Ezrow, 2008a). The greater

incentive to differentiate in a large party system should mean that parties are more likely to stress unusual issue positions when they are faced with a larger number of competitors.

Political environment and issue salience

Of course, positional unusualness is not the sole determinant of issue salience for a particular party. The political environment will also play an important role. Therefore, two strategic aspects should be controlled for. First, parties do not have monopolistic agenda control (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, p. 169; Green-Pedersen, 2007, p. 610). Even if a party may want to de-emphasise a certain issue, it might not be able to do so if other parties choose to focus on that topic. The inverse is true as well: while a party may wish to stress an issue, it might not be able to if the other parties refuse to follow suit. Second, parties respond to electoral incentives when choosing to emphasise certain issues. Issues will only become salient if there is real political differentiation, that is, if it is possible to distinguish between the positions of political actors. Netjes and Binnema (2007, p. 40) give the example of European integration: 'The main reason for [the] absence of the EU issue from domestic party competition is said to be the pro-integration consensus among the mainstream parties. In other words, there is no incentive to compete, since parties cannot distinguish themselves.' Parties may thus only choose to stress unusual issues if there are no other parties that claim a similar position.

Measurement

As in the previous chapters, the main data sources are the two expert surveys carried out respectively by Laver and Hunt in 1989 and Benoit and Laver in 2003 as well as the CMP

dataset (Klingemann et al., 2007). Twenty-three countries, all EU/OECD members, are included in this analysis.[66]

Dependent variable: issue salience

Salience measurements were taken from the expert surveys and manifesto data. In the surveys, each expert was asked to provide the 'relative importance' of each policy area for each party (Benoit and Laver, 2006). The scale ranges from 1 to 20. In the 1989 survey, salience information is available for the same eight issues for all 23 countries.[67] In the 2003 survey, the issues for which data is available differ by country.[68]

Expert surveys provide a simple, straightforward measurement of salience, but one that is not altogether free of methodological concerns. Thus, experts may be influenced by the position of the party in their evaluation of issue importance: experts who assign an extreme position to a party on an issue may also be likely to think that this issue is important to that party. There may thus be a certain amount of interdependence between position and salience in the expert survey, possibly biasing the results. A second concern is that my measurement of the key independent variable, unusualness, is also based on the expert surveys, and the findings may as a result only be the consequence of the idiosyncrasies of these surveys. In order to provide further confirmation of my hypotheses and following the recommendation of Marks (2007), I therefore also use the manifesto data as a second measurement of salience.

Here, the manifesto chosen is from the election closest to that of the relevant expert survey. Salience levels from the CMP data were assigned to equivalent topics in the expert

[66] The 23 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US.

[67] The eight issues are: economic policy (taxes versus spending), social policy, environment, USSR relations, decentralisation, public ownership, urban-rural relations and clericalism. Clericalism is not available for Iceland in the 1989 survey.

[68] Four issues are nevertheless available for almost all countries: economic policy (taxes versus spending), social policy, environment and decentralisation. For more information on the issues included and the question wording, see Benoit and Laver (2006).

Dependent variables	n	mean	s.d.	min	max
Salience (expert survey)	1328	12.61	2.97	2.72	19.81
Salience (manifestos)	893	7.68	7.06	0.00	45.46
Independent variables					
Unusualness: extreme	1328	0.00	2.37	-7.39	10.03
Systemic salience (manifestos)	893	7.68	5.52	0.00	30.95
Systemic salience (expert surveys)	1328	12.61	1.89	5.60	18.11
Mean party salience	1328	12.57	1.77	-3.71	16.34
Vote share	1321	14.46	0.36	13.75	15.17

Table 8.1 **Descriptive statistics of main variables**

Note: Data from Laver and Hunt (1992), Budge et al. (2001), Benoit and Laver (2006) and Klingemann et al. (2001).

survey, using the categorisation developed in Chapter 4, which was based partly on the examples of Budge and Laver (1992a) and Stoll (2005). For a full list of the manifestos selected and the CMP categories assigned to each topic, see Appendices 8.2 to 8.4. It is worth noting that the expert survey and CMP measures have different theoretical bases. The manifesto data restricts itself to a party's public statements: it does not take into account what the party in fact 'does'. The expert survey summarises the informed opinion of academic specialists, so goes beyond the mere measurement of public statements. Therefore, the two measures reflect 'different conceptual underpinnings of salience' (Netjes and Binnema, 2007, p. 45).[69] Descriptive statistics for the salience measurements used in the regression models can be found in Table 8.1.

Independent variable: unusualness

The measurement of the main independent variable was described above, and summary statistics for this variable can also be found in Table 8.1. Negative values indicate that the issue position is unusually centrist, and positive values that the position is extreme

[69] In order to assess whether one salience dimension underlies both measures, I carried out a correlation analysis, following the approach used by Netjes and Binnema (2007, p. 45) to examine different measures of salience of the EU issue. The correlation between the two measures is positive, but relatively weak (1989: r=0.34, n=756; 2003: r=0.28, n=893). This is very similar to the level of correlation found by Netjes and Binnema, who argue that the weakness of the correlation should not be surprising given the different theoretical foundations of the measures.

compared to the rest of the party ideology. While this variable has already been considered at length, two points are nevertheless worth making. First, as measured here the political centre varies by issue and is calculated as the mean position of all parties, weighted by vote share. It could have been argued that experts would have already taken the location of the political centre into account in their scoring approach, so that 10.5 (the midpoint of the 1-20 scale) could also have been chosen as a proxy for the issue-specific political centre. All models were also run with this measurement, with no noteworthy differences in the direction or magnitude of the results.

Second, the measure for unusualness in terms of extremeness is unsurprisingly highly correlated with the distance of the position from the political centre (r=.8). In a regression model, it would have been interesting to include both measures, as this would indicate the added explanatory value of the unusualness measurement as compared to the simple distance from the centre. However, including both measures would increase multicollinearity substantially, so it is difficult to distinguish empirically between the two characteristics of party positions. In terms of constructing an interpretable regression model, it is therefore necessary to choose one of the two measures, and this decision needs to be based on a theoretical justification and the nature of the research question. Here, I ask which positions within a party's profile are emphasised, so it makes sense to use the independent variable that captures this approach. Moreover, in practical terms, the unusualness measurement also allows the construction of a useful assessment of relative centrism if its squared value is included as an additional independent variable. Taking the distance from the political centre does not enable the creation of such a variable, at least not based on a strong theoretical grounding.

Independent variables: interaction effects

I suggest that two factors may interact with unusualness in their effect on salience: party size and party system size. As a measurement of party size, I use the score achieved by the party in the election immediately preceding the expert survey. In the case of the 2003 Benoit and Laver expert survey, this information was already included in the dataset. For the 1989 Laver and Hunt expert survey, the variable was added from the Parline database, available on the website of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU, 2007). I measure party system size using the most common index, the Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).[70] ENEP is calculated as $1 / \Sigma p_i^2$: 1 divided by the sum of the squared vote shares for each party (p_i) (Dunleavy and Boucek, 2003, p. 292f.). The scores were taken from Gallagher (2007) for 1989 and 2003, the years in which the expert surveys were carried out.

Independent variables: political environment

Three further measures were calculated in order to control for some of the influence of the political environment. First, I calculated the level of systemic salience for each issue in order to account for external agenda control (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004, p. 173). This is the average salience for each issue for all parties in a given country. The party under consideration was excluded in order to avoid endogeneity problems. For example, if there are three parties (A, B and C) then the systemic salience for party A is the mean salience for parties B and C.[71]

Second, in order to control for the electoral incentives created by political differentiation, I created a dummy variable for the existence of other parties in the political vicinity. A party was coded as taking up roughly the same position as another party if it

[70] Since this chapter addresses electoral rather than parliamentary politics, the index for electoral parties was chosen instead of that for parliamentary parties.
[71] As in Steenbergen and Scott (2004), each party was weighted equally.

was within one point on either side on the expert survey scale. For example, if party A and party B have scores of 4.5 and 5.3 respectively, another party was considered to be present at roughly the same policy position. Each side of the issue was seen as fundamentally separate, so if party A has a score of -0.5 and party B of 0.3, each party is seen as taking up distinguishable positions.[72] While this is a simple measurement, it should capture at least some of the extent to which two parties were seen as occupying a fundamentally similar policy position.

Finally, for each issue in the expert survey, a mean party salience score was calculated. This is the mean salience of all issues, excluding the issue under consideration. This controls for the possible occurrence that some parties might simply stress all issues more than others, for example due to their greater resources (Meguid, 2005, p. 349).[73] Descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the regression models can be found in Table 8.1.

Results and analysis

The main test of this chapter's claims is provided through a cross-sectional regression analysis for the 2003 expert survey. The same analysis was also carried out for the 1989 survey; the results, which do not differ meaningfully, are not discussed in detail but presented in the appendix. Changes within parties over time are examined by looking at salience differences between 1989 and 2003.

[72] In Germany, the CDU and CSU were not coded as competitors even though they were given separate scores in the Laver/Hunt survey. In Belgium, each language community was coded separately as the parties in each part do not compete with each other directly. Similarly, Northern Ireland was treated as a distinct political system.

[73] This score was not calculated for the CMP data as issue salience there is measured in percentage terms, i.e. in terms of relative presence.

Cross-sectional analysis

Tables 8.2 and 8.3 present the results of a multiple linear regression analysis of issue salience. In Table 8.2, the dependent variable is the salience measurement provided by the expert survey itself; in Table 8.3, the measurement extracted from the manifesto dataset is used. Party dummies were included as a control in all models. The results for the Laver and Hunt dataset do not differ substantially and are included in Appendix 8.5.

There is clear evidence that unusual issues are stressed more heavily: the more unusual an issue position within a party's political programme, the more that party will tend to emphasise it. The relevant coefficient is positive and significant in all models, and inclusion of this variable increases the explained variance (adjusted R^2). With the expert survey measurement, unusualness is almost as important as the systemic level of salience in explaining variation in salience levels. For the manifesto measurement, the standardised beta score is still over half the size of that for systemic salience. Adding the unusualness measure greatly improves the variance in salience explained by the models. This is especially true for the expert survey measurement. The model without an unusual measurement explains about 36% of the variance; this increases by 27% for the model with extreme unusualness. The additional variance explained by adding the squared term is just 1%. For the manifesto measurement, adding unusualness also improves the amount of variance explained by the model, but less impressively. Here, model 4 (without an unusualness measurement) explains about 40% of the variance; this increases by 6% for model 5 (extreme unusualness). Again, adding the squared term adds little in terms of explained variance.

However, in general unusually extreme positions are stressed more. In models 2 and 5, which only consider the level of positional extremeness, every one-unit increase in a position's unusualness is associated with a 0.32 increase in expert-survey issue salience

Predictors	Model 1 B	stand. B	Model 2 B	stand. B	Model 3 B	stand. B
Unusualness: extreme			.321*** (.076)	.256	.274*** (.074)	.219
Unusualness: squared					.047*** (.006)	.141
Vote share	-.041** (.018)	-.181	-.031** (.014)	-.138	-.022 (.014)	-.096
*Interaction: Unusualness*vote share*			-.006*** (.002)	-.067	-.006*** (.002)	-.064
ENEP	-.038 (.144)	-.021	-.052 (.110)	-.028	-.038 (.107)	-.021
*Interaction: Unusualness*ENEP*			.077*** (.013)	.326	.080*** (.013)	.323
Systemic salience	.654*** (.042)	.415	.495*** (.033)	.315	.509*** (.032)	.323
Mean party salience	-.611*** (.069)	-.365	-.213*** (.054)	-.127	-.198*** (.053)	-.118
Other party	-.644*** (.150)	-.108	.166 (.118)	.028	.177 (.115)	.030
Party dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Constant	16.470** (1.644)		12.272*** (1.263)		11.392*** (1.240)	
Adj. R^2	.36		.63		.64	
n	1321		1321		1321	

*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01; standard errors in parentheses.

***Table 8.2* Regression results with expert survey salience as dependent variable**

Predictors	Model 4 B	stand. B	Model 5 B	stand. B	Model 6 B	stand. B
Unusualness: extreme			1.08*** (.278)	.357	.955*** (.276)	.315
Unusualness: squared					.110*** (.024)	.132
Vote share	.016 (.048)	.029	.019 (.045)	.036	.049 (.045)	.093
*Interaction: Unusualness*vote share*			-.017** (.007)	-.079	-.015* (.008)	-.071
ENEP	-.132 (.413)	-.028	-.125 (.395)	-.026	-.018 (.390)	-.004
*Interaction: Unusualness*ENEP*			-.048 (.051)	-.080	-.036 (.051)	-.060
Systemic salience	.835*** (.034)	.653	.798*** (.033)	.624	.807*** (.033)	.631
Other party	-1.426*** (.429)	-.101	-.596 (.422)	-.042	-.480** (.418)	-.034
Party dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Constant	3.625 (3.087)		4.281 (2.948)		2.642 (2.931)	
Adj. R^2	.40		.46		.47	
n	893		893		893	

*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01; standard errors in parentheses.

***Table 8.3* Regression results with manifesto salience as dependent variable**

and an additional 1.08% of manifesto sentences devoted to that topic. By adding a quadratic term, it is also possible to examine the difference between unusually extreme and unusually centrist positions. In models 3 and 6, this added variable is strongly significant. To examine the precise effect of the quadratic term, it is necessary to plot the fitted values. For the expert survey (Figure 8.14), we can see that unusualness in terms of centrism has no effect on salience: below 0, the relationship between the two variables is relatively weak. The fitted values for the manifesto measurement (Figure 8.15) show a stronger U-shaped relationship, but only very centrist positions are stressed more than positions that are not unusual. The dominant impression is that unusually extreme positions are stressed far more than unusually centrist positions.

The larger the party is, the weaker the association between unusualness and salience. The effect is quite substantial, as is shown in Figures 8.16 and 8.17. Looking at the manifesto data, the predicted marginal effect of a position's relative extremeness within a party's programmatic profile is about half as great for a party with 30% of the vote than for a party with 10%. Above approximately 30%, we cannot be sure that there is a marginal effect at all. The expert survey data presents a similar picture, as the marginal effect of 'extreme unusualness' again declines with increasing party size, with no significant impact for parties above around 20%.

However, the evidence on party system size is not clear (Figures 8.18 and 8.18). For the expert survey data, party system size has the expected effect: the larger the party system, the more parties are likely to stress issues that are extreme within their positional profile. The effect is significant and quite strong: the predicted impact on salience of a one-unit increase in extreme unusualness rises by about 0.5 points if the effective number of electoral parties goes up by six points. For the manifesto data, there is no significant effect of party system size. Moreover, the sign is in the opposite direction than predicted: an in-



Figure 8.14 **Effect of unusualness on salience, expert survey measure of salience**

Note: x-axis shows relative level of unusualness, with negative values unusually centrist and positive values unusually extreme; y-axis shows predicted level of salience using the expert survey measure; values graphed based on Model 3 in Table 8.2; 95% confidence intervals shown as dashed line.



Figure 8.15 **Effect of unusualness on salience, manifesto measure of salience**

Note: x-axis shows relative level of unusualness, with negative values unusually centrist and positive values unusually extreme; y-axis shows predicted level of salience using the manifesto measure; values graphed based on Model 6 in Table 8.3; 95% confidence intervals shown as dashed line.



Figure 8.16 **Marginal effect of unusualness on salience conditional on party size, expert survey measure of salience**

Note: x-axis shows the size of the party measured in per cent; y-axis shows the predicted effect of extreme unusualness on salience; values graphed based on Model 3 in Table 8.2; 95% confidence intervals shown as dashed line.



Figure 8.17 **Marginal effect of unusualness on salience conditional on party size, expert survey measure of salience**

Note: x-axis shows the size of the party measured in per cent; y-axis shows the predicted effect of extreme unusualness on salience; values graphed based on Model 6 in Table 8.3; 95% confidence intervals shown as dashed line.



Figure 8.18 **Marginal effect of unusualness on salience conditional on party system size, expert survey measure of salience**

Note: x-axis shows the size of the party system measured as the effective number of electoral parties; y-axis shows the predicted effect of extreme unusualness on salience; values graphed based on Model 3 in Table 8.2; 95% confidence intervals shown as dashed line.



Figure 8.19 **Marginal effect of unusualness on salience conditional on party system size, expert survey measure of salience**

Note: x-axis shows the size of the party system measured as the effective number of electoral parties; y-axis shows the predicted effect of extreme unusualness on salience; values graphed based on Model 6 in Table 8.3; 95% confidence intervals shown as dashed line.

crease in ENEP is here expected to lead to a decreasing impact of extreme unusualness on salience. For the 1989 Laver and Hunt survey (see Appendix 8.5), the interaction effect is *positive* but not significant for expert survey salience and *negative* and significant for the manifesto-extracted salience. There is thus contradictory evidence on the effect of party system size on the impact of unusual issue positions on salience.

Finally, the controls taking into account the political environment have the following expected effects. The systemic level of salience has a positive and large effect on the party's level of salience on the same issue, while the presence of another party in the close vicinity tends to reduce issue salience substantially. The political environment thus has a clear impact on issue salience.

Issue and party family differences

The effect of unusualness on salience may differ depending on the issue under consideration. It is therefore worth distinguishing between the different policy areas included in the surveys. In order to let the effect of unusualness on salience vary by issue, I included issue dummies and an additional interaction term, extreme unusualness*issue, in Models 3 and 6.[74]

As seen in Table 8.4, unusualness has an effect on salience for almost all issues, for both types of the dependent variable. In the expert surveys, the effect is not statistically significant for only one issue, foreign policy; in the manifestos, the effect disappears only for European integration and immigration. This is already an interesting result. The overall effect of unusualness on salience is not due to one or two of the issues. Instead, it is a generalised phenomenon that holds across political topics. The same is also true for the 1989 expert survey, whose results are presented in Appendix 8.6.

[74] As before, mean party salience is not included when the manifesto measurement of salience is the dependent variable.

	Expert survey	Manifestos
by issue		
Economic policy	0.46	1.44
Liberal-authoritarianism	0.54	1.3
Environmental policy	0.73	1.61
Decentralization	0.39	1.37
Foreign policy	-0.09	0.9
European integration	0.19	0.58
Immigration	0.48	0.48
by party family		
Communist	0.24	1.06
Green	0.41	1.23
Social Democrat	0.17	0.78
Liberal	0.29	0.45
Christian Democrat	0.32	1.37
Conservative	0.61	1.35
Agrarian	0.37	0.53
Nationalist	0.64	1.20
Ethnic-Regionalist	0.34	0.84

Table 8.4 **Effect of extreme unusualness on salience by issue and party family**

Note: All coefficients significantly different from 0 at a .05 level, except for those underlined; results based on Models 3 (Table 8.2; expert survey salience) and 6 (Table 8.3; party manifesto salience), with interactions with issue dummies (e.g. extreme unusualness * economic policy dummy) or with party family (e.g., extreme unusualness * Communist party family dummy).

Of course, there are nevertheless some differences between the issues. The largest impact of unusualness is for environmental policy, where parties appear to stress their more extreme positions the most. Economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism also have a consistently large impact. The salience of two issues linked to international relations – foreign policy and EU support – tend to be least affected by their relative unusualness. The two data sources present remarkably similar results, with only few shifts in the ranking of issues.[75] It is particularly noteworthy that economics – often seen as the fundamental divide in politics – is one of the issues with the strongest unusualness effect. This lends further weight to the claim that it is not a marginal phenomenon that parties emphasise

[75] A model allowing the effect of the quadratic term to vary by issue was also run. The results are not presented here as no marked differences were visible.

their more extreme positions. Other topics generally seen as central to the political debate such as liberal-authoritarianism and the environment also exhibit a relatively strong effect. It is on the topics that parties tend to agree on, for example foreign policy and EU integration, where there is little influence of unusualness on salience.

Party families may also differ systematically in the effect of unusualness on salience. This was again examined using an interaction term, this time extreme unusualness*party family, which was added to Models 3 and 6. The summary results for the models are also presented in Table 8.4. Again, the dominant impression is that the effect of unusualness on salience is present for most party families. This is true for both the expert survey and the manifesto measurement of salience. In the former data source, there is no effect of extreme unusualness only on Social Democratic parties; in the latter, there is no significant effect for Liberal, Agrarian and Ethnic-Regionalist parties. There is definitely a general link that is not restricted to marginal parties. That said, there is a clear trend for smaller, niche-type party families to exhibit a greater effect. Green and Nationalist families show a relatively strong effect for both data sources. For Liberals and Social Democrats, the effect of unusualness is weaker or even absent.

Two party families are particularly interesting in the patterns exhibited. The Conservative parties tend to behave more like a niche party in this analysis. They are one of the party families that stress their relatively extreme positions the most. This result is consistent between the two salience measurements. Second, the Christian Democrats strongly differ in their placement depending on the salience measurements. According to the experts, their emphasis of unusually extreme positions is similar to that of other mainstream party families. However, the manifesto measure produces the diametrically opposite result: here, the Christian Democrats are one of the families most likely to stress unusually extreme positions. A closer analysis showed that this effect was the result of the Christian Democrats' extraordinary emphasis on liberal-authoritarianism in the manifestos;

this obscured the fact that the Christian Democrats generally do not emphasise their unusually extreme positions, a finding in line with the expert survey results. Therefore, there is further evidence for the finding that it is in particular niche parties that emphasise their unusually extreme positions. However, it is not the case that their mainstream competitors consistently fail to exhibit a similar strategy, only that they do so weakly compared to their smaller, more marginal competitors.

Unusualness and changes in salience

To add further confirmation to the hypothesis that parties tend to emphasise internally unusual issue positions, I also consider changes within parties. I thus examine whether increases in unusualness also lead to increases in salience. Using the 1989 and 2003 expert surveys, issue positions are compared with the associated changes in salience. Four issues were included in both surveys for a large number of countries: economic policy, liberal-authoritarianism, environmental policy and decentralisation.

Tables 8.5 and 8.6 present the results of the regression analysis for both expert survey and manifesto salience. The dependent variable for both series of regressions is the change in salience between 1989 and 2003. The main independent variables are the 1989 level of extreme unusualness and its change between 1989 and 2003.[76] Control variables are the 1989 levels of salience for the dependent variable issue, of systemic salience and mean party salience.[77] The changes in systemic and mean party salience between 1989 and 2003 were also included. Party dummies were added to all regressions.

For manifesto salience, the results confirm the hypothesis. If the unusualness of a party's position within its overall policy profile increased between 1989 and 2003, it also increased its emphasis on that topic. For every one-unit increase in extreme unusualness,

[76] The calculation of the unusualness measures differs for each of the surveys since the number and content of the other issues became country-specific in 2003. The two unusualness measures should nevertheless be roughly comparable.

[77] As in the cross-sectional analysis, mean party salience is included for the expert survey measurement of salience only.

Predictors	Model 1 B	stand. B	Model 2 B	stand. B	Model 3 B	stand. B
Unusualness: extreme (1989)			.569*** (.048)	.448	.562*** (.049)	.442
Change in unusualness:extreme			-.028 (.046)	-.020	-.024 (.047)	-.018
Vote share (1989)					.043 (.031)	.212
Change in vote share					.023 (.026)	.056
*Interaction: Unusualness*vote share change*					.003 (.006)	.013
Issue salience (1989)	-.478*** (.046)	-.553	-.636*** (.040)	-.737	-.638*** (.041)	-.738
Systemic salience (1989)	.166** (.074)	.128	.140** (.060)	.108	.136** (.061)	.104
Change in systemic salience	.377*** (.084)	.253	.330*** (068)	.221	.323*** (.068)	.216
Mean party salience (1989)	-1.377*** (.276)	-.682	-.575** (.230)	-.285	-.627*** (.237)	-.310
Change in mean party salience	-1.556*** (.192)	-.980	-.771*** (.165)	-.486	-.831*** (.169)	-.523
Party dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Constant	20.225*** (4.491)		15.928*** (2.565)		8.11*** (2.836)	
Adj. R^2	.55		.71		.71	
n	456		456		456	

*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01; standard errors in parentheses.

***Table 8.5* Regression results, dependent variable: change in salience between 1989 and 2003, expert survey measure**

Predictors	Model 4 B	stand. B	Model 5 B	stand. B	Model 6 B	stand. B
Unusualness: extreme (1989)			.803*** (.164)	.210	.778*** (.163)	.203
Change in unusualness:extreme			.438** (.176)	.104	.544*** (.179)	.130
Vote share (1989)					-.054 (.109)	-.094
Change in vote share					.091 (.090)	.079
*Interaction: Unusualness*vote share change*					.063*** (.023)	.103
Issue salience (1989)	-.663*** (.044)	-.712	-.748*** (.046)	-.804	-.754*** (.045)	-.810
Systemic salience (1989)	.626*** (.065)	.545	.627*** (.063)	.495	.643*** (.062)	.507
Change in systemic salience	.626*** (.065)	.494	.795*** (.063)	.518	.807*** (.063)	.526
Party dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Constant	3.303 (3.483)		3.272 (3.403)		1.892 (5.835)	
Adj. R^2	.52		.56		.56	
n	400		400		400	

*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01; standard errors in parentheses.

***Table 8.6* Regression results, dependent variable: change in salience between 1989 and 2003, party manifesto measure**

	Expert survey	Manifestos
Economic policy	0.10	0.3898017
Liberal-authoritarianism	-0.04	*0.8063781*
Environmental policy	*-0.19*	0.4774207
Decentralization	0.13	0.2638716

Table 8.7 **Effect of change in extreme unusualness on change in salience by issue and party family**

Note: Coefficients significantly different from 0 at a .05 level are in italics and those different at a .1 level underlined; results based on Models 3 (Table 8.5; expert survey salience) and 6 (Table 8.6; party manifesto salience), with interactions with issue dummies (e.g., change extreme unusualness * economic policy dummy)

that issue's salience is predicted to increase by about half a percent. The impact of this variable is significant and strong. For the expert survey, the evidence that an increase in extreme unusualness leads to an increase in salience is weak: the effect is far from statistical significance. Nevertheless, there is some support for the hypothesis that an increase in a position's relative extremeness also leads to a greater emphasis on that issue.

It is noteworthy that the 1989 level of unusualness also has a strong and positive effect for both dependent variables: the more unusually extreme an issue position was in 1989, the more likely the party was to increase the salience of that issue. For every point that an issue position is more unusually extreme in 1989, salience is predicted to have increased by more than half an expert-survey unit and by .8% of the manifesto. Thus, it appears that the internal unusualness of an issue has a strong effect on how salience levels change.

The effect of vote share is also tested (Models 3 and 6). Here, I examine whether an increase in vote share would also heighten the impact of a change in unusualness on changes in salience. However, for the expert survey this interaction effect is not significant, while for manifesto coverage it is among larger parties that an increase in unusualness has a greater effect. The findings thus do not conform to expectations. It is not possible to conclude that an increase in party size will weaken the effect of an increase in unusualness.

This could partly be due to the fact that only two time points are available, which is a strong restriction on the data.

Finally, I also examine whether the effect of unusualness change on salience change differs depending on the precise issue under consideration. To do so, I again add an interaction term, which this time lets the effect of change in extreme unusualness vary by issue.[78] The results are presented in Table 8.7 for the expert survey and the manifesto measurements. Issues where the change in unusualness has a significant effect on change in salience are in italics or underlined. For the manifesto measure, only the coefficients for liberal-authoritarianism and environmental policy are significant, with the former having a particularly strong effect. It thus appears that changes in the relative position of these two issues are clearly related to how salient they are. It is worth noting that the effect is in the predicted direction for all four issues. As for the aggregate examination, the results for the expert survey are not clear, with only change in the unusualness of decentralisation showing a clear positive impact on salience change. In fact, change in the unusualness of environmental policy is predicted as having a negative impact, in contradiction to the manifesto finding. Overall, there nevertheless is evidence that change in the unusualness (in terms of extremeness) of an issue position is reflected in the change of emphasis within a party ideology.

Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter's starting point was the presentation of an alternative approach to conceptualising and measuring static issue interconnections: positional unusualness. This is defined as deviation from the party's mean distance from the political centre. In other words, the more extreme or more centrist the position is compared to the party's other positions, the more unusual it is. I argued that the level of unusualness has an effect on a

[78] This interaction term is added to Model 2, with party dummies removed. Party family differences were not investigated due to the limited number of cases per family.

second element of party strategies, namely, issue importance. I suggested that parties should be likely to stress those issues that are unusual within their programmatic profile. The regression results, using two different salience measures, consistently show that this hypothesis is correct, but more so concerning internally extreme positions. The issue positions that are unusually extreme within a party profile are emphasised more than positions that are unusually centrist or not unusual. This position-salience association is also present for policy changes within parties: evidence was also found that issues that increase in terms of their relative extremeness grow in salience for that party.

This goes against the Downsian expectations of median convergence, under which parties should work hard at portraying themselves in the most moderate light possible. Parties' increased emphasis on their more extreme issues has several possible explanations. First, this could be due to internal party imperatives: activists and donors may be particularly attracted by those more extreme positions and lead the party as a whole to emphasise them as well. Second, this could reflect strategic calculation: relatively extreme positions will attract attention to a party and build its reputation. Conversely, relatively moderate positions may reflect the fact the issue is relatively unimportant for the party. It is worth reiterating that the argument is not that parties will become more extreme in their pursuit of electoral success, but rather that they are likely to stress those issue positions on which they have decided to be more extreme.

These incentives to stress relatively extreme issues are particularly strong for smaller, non-mainstream parties. In particular, some parties will try to carve out an issue-based 'niche' for themselves. Such niche parties operate on a narrower range of issues and need to develop a reputation for ownership over those topics. In fact, there is strong evidence that it is smaller parties that emphasise their unusually extreme positions. This provides further support for the finding that the incentives and strategies of niche parties are fundamentally different from mainstream parties (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008b).

Interestingly, the strategic environment as summarised by the size of the party system was not found to have a consistent effect. The effect on salience as a party strategy depends more on the size and type of the party than on the environment in which the parties operate.

This chapter's findings have three main implications for further political science research. First, party strategies do not always conform to Downsian expectations. There is a general tendency for parties to emphasise their relatively extreme positions. Second, this is particularly true for smaller, niche-type parties. In studying party competition, it is therefore necessary to take into account the different types of parties present in a political system. Third, it is important to view salience and position as associated party strategies. It is misleading to consider the two attributes of policy programmes in isolation. Two key ways that parties can appeal to and catch the attention of voters are taking up relatively extreme positions and stressing those positions. In recent work, the manipulation of position and salience have both been seen as useful weapons within a party's arsenal (Meguid, 2005). In this chapter, we have seen that these tactics are also generally combined: salience and position are associated issue attributes, so it may be misleading to see the two issue characteristics as providing distinct campaign tools available to parties.

The relevance of this chapter for this thesis as a whole is twofold. First, I described the concept of intra-party positional unusualness, an alternative approach to examining static interconnections within party programmatic profiles. Using the expert surveys, I then outlined the measurement of this indicator and presented the empirical differences between issues and party families in terms of this concept. Second, I showed that this concept has an important impact on the decisions parties take concerning the salience they give to political issues. The place of an issue position within the overall package of policy views defended by a political party has significant effects on how parties campaign on that issue.

When accounting for an issue's role within party strategies, it is also important to know the position of that issue relative to the overall character of that party's programmatic profile.

Appendix 8.1 Calculation of unusualness measure: Germany

Party name	Issue	Issue position	political centre (weighted country mean)	distance from political centre	mean extremeness	unusualness
CDU/CSU	EU: Accountability	0.13	-2.03	2.16	2.60	-0.44
	EU: Authority	0.27	-1.21	1.48	2.70	-1.21
	Decentralization	-1.99	-0.98	1.02	2.76	-1.74
	Economic policy	3.90	1.42	2.48	2.55	-0.07
	Environment	4.01	1.53	2.48	2.55	-0.07
	Immigration	4.12	-0.62	4.75	2.23	2.52
	Peacekeeping	-3.92	-3.98	0.07	2.90	-2.83
	Social policy	5.41	-0.50	5.92	2.06	3.85
FDP	EU: Accountability	-2.59	-2.03	0.56	3.24	-2.68
	EU: Authority	-0.55	-1.21	0.66	3.22	-2.56
	Decentralization	-4.58	-0.98	3.61	2.80	0.80
	Economic policy	8.21	1.42	6.80	2.35	4.45
	Environment	6.26	1.53	4.73	2.64	2.08
	Immigration	-2.63	-0.62	2.01	3.03	-1.02
	Peacekeeping	-3.82	-3.98	0.16	3.30	-3.13
	Social policy	-5.21	-0.50	4.71	2.65	2.06
Green	EU: Accountability	-6.50	-2.03	4.47	4.45	0.02
	EU: Authority	-3.56	-1.21	2.35	4.75	-2.41
	Decentralization	-5.14	-0.98	4.16	4.49	-0.33
	Economic policy	0.52	1.42	0.89	4.96	-4.07
	Environment	-7.31	1.53	8.84	3.83	5.01
	Immigration	-7.83	-0.62	7.20	4.06	3.14
	Peacekeeping	-3.90	-3.98	0.08	5.08	-5.00
	Social policy	-8.13	-0.50	7.63	4.00	3.63
PDS	EU: Accountability	-5.47	-2.03	3.45	4.98	-1.53
	EU: Authority	0.18	-1.21	1.39	5.27	-3.88
	Decentralization	3.12	-0.98	4.09	4.89	-0.80
	Economic policy	-7.51	1.42	8.93	4.20	4.73
	Environment	-1.36	1.53	2.89	5.06	-2.17
	Immigration	-5.35	-0.62	4.73	4.80	-0.07
	Peacekeeping	3.72	-3.98	7.70	4.37	3.33
	Social policy	-5.63	-0.50	5.13	4.74	0.39
SPD	EU: Accountability	-2.69	-2.03	0.67	1.86	-1.20
	EU: Authority	-2.46	-1.21	1.24	1.78	-0.54
	Decentralization	1.21	-0.98	2.18	1.65	0.54
	Economic policy	-1.18	1.42	2.59	1.59	1.00
	Environment	0.44	1.53	1.09	1.80	-0.71
	Immigration	-2.85	-0.62	2.22	1.64	0.58
	Peacekeeping	-4.96	-3.98	0.97	1.82	-0.85
	Social policy	-3.24	-0.50	2.73	1.57	1.17

Note: Data from Benoit and Laver (2006).

Appendix 8.2: CMP elections used in regression analysis

	Election used	
Country	*2003 survey*	*1989 survey*
Australia	10/11/2001	24/03/1990
Austria	24/11/2002	07/10/1990
Belgium	18/05/2003	13/12/1987
Canada	27/11/2000	21/11/1988
Denmark	20/11/2001	10/05/1988
Finland	16/03/2003	17/03/1991
France	09/06/2002	05/06/1988
Germany	22/09/2002	02/12/1990
Greece[a]	09/04/2000	18/06/1989, 05/11/1989
Iceland	10/05/2003	20/04/1991
Ireland	17/05/2002	15/06/1989
Israel	29/05/1996	01/11/1988
Italy	13/05/2001	14/06/1987
Japan	09/11/2003	18/02/1990
Luxembourg	13/06/1999	18/06/1989
Netherlands	22/01/2003	06/09/1989
New Zealand	27/07/2002	27/10/1990
Norway	10/09/2001	11/09/1989
Portugal	17/03/2002	19/07/1987
Spain	12/03/2000	29/10/1989
Sweden	15/09/2002	18/09/1988
UK	07/06/2001	11/06/1987
US	07/11/2000	08/11/1988

[a]: *For Greece, average of the two elections taken*

Appendix 8.3: Composition of CMP issues

Economic policy: per401 (Free Enterprise: Positive), per402(Incentives: Positive), per403 (Market Regulation: Positive), per404 (Economic Planning: Positive), per406 (Protectionism: Positive), per407 (Protectionism: Negative), per409 (Keynesian Demand Management: Positive), per412 (Controlled Economy: Positive), per413 (Nationalisation: Positive), per414 (Economic Orthodoxy: Positive), per415 (Marxist Analysis: Positive), per503 (Social Justice: Positive), per504 (Welfare State Expansion: Positive), per701 (Labour Groups: Positive), per702 (Labour Groups: Negative)

Foreign policy: per103 (Anti-Imperialism: Positive), per104 (Military: Positive), per105 (Military: Negative), per106 (Peace: Positive), per107 (Internationalism: Positive), per109 (Internationalism: Negative)

Culture/ethnic matters: per601 (National Way of Life: Positive), per602 (National Way of Life: Negative), per607 (Multiculturalism: Positive), per608 (Multiculturalism: Negative), per705 (Underprivileged Minorities: Positive), per706 (Non-economic Demographic Groups: Positive)

Liberal-authoritarianism: per305 (Political Authority: Positive), per603 (Traditional Morality: Positive), per604 (Traditional Morality: Negative), per605 (Law and Order: Positive)

Decentralisation: per301 (Decentralisation: Positive), per302 (Centralisation: Positive)

EU: per108 (European Integration: Positive), per110 (European Integration: Negative)

Urban-rural: per703 (Farmers: Positive)

Environment: per416 (Anti-Growth Economy: Positive), per501 (Environmental Protection: Positive)

Appendix 8.4: Expert survey and CMP issues

Expert survey issue	*CMP issue*
Decentralization	Decentralization
Economic Policy	Economic Policy
Environment	Environment
EU: Authority	EU
EU: Joining	EU
EU: Larger/Stronger	EU
EU: Peacekeeping	Foreign Policy
EU: Strengthening	EU
Immigration	Culture/Ethnic Matters
NATO	Foreign Policy
Social Policy	Liberal-Authoritarianism
Urban-Rural	Urban-Rural
US	Foreign Policy
USSR	Foreign Policy

Note: This table shows which expert survey issues were assigned to which CMP issues for the regression analysis.

Appendix 8.5: Explaining salience, Laver and Hunt expert survey

A) Expert survey salience as dependent variable

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Predictors	B	stand. B	B	stand. B	B	stand. B
Unusualness: extreme			.297*** (.127)	.184	.397*** (.127)	.246
Unusualness: squared					.067*** (.012)	.144
Vote share	.034* (.017)	.129	.035* (.015)	.135	.039** (.015)	.149
*Interaction: Unusualness*vote share*			-.005 (.003)	-.047	-.006* (.003)	-.051
ENEP	.463*** (.169)	.185	.407*** (.154)	.163	.416*** (.152)	.166
*Interaction: Unusualness*ENEP*			.059** (.023)	.183	.033 (.023)	.102
Systemic salience	.662*** (.040)	.424	.629*** (.036)	.403	.628*** (.036)	.403
Mean party salience	-.911*** (.089)	-.404	-.677*** (.083)	-.301	-.628*** (.082)	-.279
Other party	-.780*** (.203)	-.105	-.131 (.191)	-.018	-.117 (.188)	-.016
Party dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Constant	4.228** (1.596)		2.713* (1.460)		1.508 (1.454)	
Adj. R^2	.34		.45		.47	
n	1178		1178		1178	

*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

B) Party manifesto salience as dependent variable

			Manifesto Project			
	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Predictors	B	stand. B	B	stand. B	B	stand. B
Unusualness: extreme			1.671*** (.412)	.441	2.000*** (.413)	.528
Unusualness: squared					.163*** (.037)	.157
Vote share	-.019 (.048)	-.032	-.008 (.047)	-.032	.003 (.046)	.005
*Interaction: Unusualness*vote share*			-.023** (.011)	-.094	-.024** (.011)	-.098
ENEP	.607 (.478)	.108	.545 (.464)	.098	.560 (.458)	.100
*Interaction: Unusualness*ENEP*			-.141** (.070)	-.194	-.226*** (.072)	-.311
Systemic salience	.822*** (.041)	.608	.782*** (.041)	.579	.794*** (.040)	.588
Other party	-.794 (.594)	-.046	.166 (.601)	.009	.174 (.593)	.010
Party dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Constant	7.555* (3.848)		7.554** (3.737)		5.565 (3.711)	
Adj. R^2	.32		.36		.38	
n	756		756		756	

*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Appendix 8.6 Effects of extreme unusualness on salience by issue and party family, expert survey salience, Laver and Hunt

	Expert survey	Manifestos
by issue		
Economic policy	0.60	2.09
Liberal-authoritarianism	-0.01	2.28
Environmental policy	0.72	2.34
Decentralization	0.44	1.42
USSR relations	0.15	1.38
Public Ownership	0.95	
Urban-rural relations	0.44	1.56
Clericalism	0.79	
by party family		
Communist	0.37	1.57
Green	0.63	2.09
Social Democrat	0.54	1.30
Liberal	0.52	1.71
Christian Democrat	0.56	1.53
Conservative	0.81	1.88
Agrarian	0.53	1.14
Nationalist	0.47	2.62
Ethnic-Regionalist	0.33	1.01

Note: All coefficients significantly different from 0 at a .05 level, except for those underlined; results based on Models 3 (Table 8.2; expert survey salience) and 6 (Table 8.3; party manifesto salience), with interactions with issue dummies (e.g. extreme unusualness * economic policy dummy) or with party family (e.g. extreme unusualness * Communist party family dummy).

Chapter 9

Conclusion

Party ideologies can be characterised by their policy interconnections. The programmes and policies that parties propound and defend can thus be summarised as sets of components that vary in the level they are linked to each other. When thinking about specific party policies, we should see them as part of a larger package of positions and consider how they are connected to the other elements that constitute that system. In the following, the key findings of each chapter are briefly summarised, followed by a consideration of broader theoretical and empirical conclusions. I finish by presenting six ways in which the research presented here could be improved upon and extended.

Summary of key empirical findings

The four empirical chapters of this thesis presented a series of conclusions regarding the nature of issue systems and their effect on party competition. Chapter 5 presented the findings for static interconnections using expert surveys and party manifestos. There are clear patterns to the existence of static linkages, though these differ on the economic left and right, between party families and between countries. In examining these patterns, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between logic- and circumstance-based linkages. Looking at specific issue pairs, the most tightly interconnected issues have logical links to both economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism, which are often seen as the anchor issues of political competition.

Examples of such strongly linked issues are immigration and the environment. Issues that are in principle free from links to both of these anchor topics are also relatively weakly statically interconnected.

Chapter 6 examined the occurrence of dynamic interconnections and reached three conclusions. First, dynamic interconnections are generally weaker than their static counterparts. This reflects the more demanding nature of this type of linkage as well as the relative absence of external forces creating interconnections. Second, there are clear patterns to the existence of dynamic interconnections. Differences between issue pairs exist and are systematic. Third, static interconnections can be used to predict dynamic interconnections, but with one restriction: only logic-based static linkages are likely to be reproduced dynamically. Overall, dynamic interconnections represent a limit to Downsian vote-maximising strategies in the sense that parties cannot move freely on logically interconnected issues.

Chapter 7 applied the framework used in the previous two chapters to the examination of salience interconnections. The first key difference between position and salience is the inherent upper limit of salience: in essence, issue emphasis is a scarce good that parties have to distribute between policy areas. This, together with the absence of external forces creating interconnections, means that salience interconnections tend to be weaker than positional interconnections. They are also generally more likely if two issues are logically linked. Thus, salience interconnections are similar to dynamic position interconnections in their overall weakness and in their basis in logic.

Chapter 8 explored the subject of issue systems and their effect on party competition from a different angle by examining the impact of 'unusual' issue positions on salience levels. Policy positions that are relatively extreme, compared to a party's

mean position, are more likely to be emphasised. This applies in particular to smaller, niche-type parties. This stress on extreme views is due to the need of such parties to develop a memorable and unique reputation for themselves and satisfy the demands of activists and campaign donors. This again weakens the impression that the vote-maximising strategies suggested by Downs might be generally applicable.

The characteristics and effects of issue systems

There are three important features of the components of party ideologies and of the policy interconnections that link them. First, the components – the distinct issue areas – have two main attributes: a position on a spatial continuum and a given level of salience. In taking this approach, this thesis combines the positional work of Downs (1957) and his successors with the salience model of Budge and Farlie (1983), in line with other recent work on party competition (e.g. Meguid, 2008). The positional attributes were considered in Chapters 5 and 6 and the salience attributes in Chapter 7, with Chapter 8 analysing the two features jointly.

Second, the connections between issues can be static and dynamic. Static interconnections refer to the extent it is possible to predict one issue position from another, while dynamic linkages concern the extent to which parties tend to 'move together' on a given issue pair. The distinction between these two features is at the core of policy interconnections. It was also examined whether static interconnections (both for positions and for salience) can predict the existence of their dynamic counterparts. Chapters 5 and 7 considered static, and Chapters 6 and 7 dynamic interconnections. Chapter 8, looked at positional unusualness, a characteristic which is similar to static linkage, both at one time point and over time.

Third, policy interconnections can be built on two foundations: logic and circumstance. A logic-based linkage exists due to some inherent connection between the two issues, for example due to a budget constraint or due to an underlying value that binds the two policy areas together. A circumstance-based linkage is created through historical and societal conditions that are coincidental and time-specific and is, therefore, not due to an inherent logical connection. The differences between logic- and circumstance-based interconnections were considered in Chapters 5 to 7 of this thesis.

These three categorisations form the basis of the analysis of how issues are interconnected within party ideologies, the first part of the research question of this thesis. Two core findings emerge from the empirical application of the theoretical approach. First, static position interconnections are the strongest and most frequent form of interconnection, which is due to the fact that both logic and circumstance act as strong forces on the creation of these linkages. Dynamic position interconnections and both types of salience interconnections are clearly weaker, relying as they do mainly on logic as their linkage foundation.

Second, there are clear patterns to the connections that exist between issues. Circumstance-based interconnections vary more between different subgroups of parties – such as the economic left and right and party families – than logic-based interconnections. For example, positions on economic policy and liberal-authoritarianism vary more in the level of static interconnection than economic policy and the environment. Overall, some issues such as immigration and environmental policy are characterised by their strong ties to other topics, while others such as decentralisation and EU support are relatively flexible. Thus, it is important to distinguish between logic and circumstance in predicting dynamic interconnections from static linkages. This was found for both position and salience linkages.

The second part of the research question focused on the consequences of issue interconnections for party competition. Here, there are three central findings. First, policy interconnections are a limitation on Downsian vote-maximising strategies. These dynamic ties between issues mean that parties do not move on each policy area at will. Instead, change on one topic will often require a repositioning in other areas as well. Parties may not be able to optimise their policy programme in order to place themselves at the median on each issue, due to the constraints imposed by interconnections.

Second, the trend to median convergence identified by Downs (1957) is in any case not universally applicable. The Downsian expectation would be that parties stress those positions where they are closer to the political centre. However, this research shows that some parties have an incentive to stress issue positions that are unusually extreme within their overall profile. Indeed, parties tend to emphasise such positions. There is even evidence that they increase the salience of an issue if they become more extreme on that topic.

Third, and in line with salience theory, parties will find it easier to modify the importance of issues than the positions they take. Positions are difficult to change: parties are rationally immobile due to need to create a reputation for stability and consistency (Downs, 1957), while voters may take a while to register positional changes (Ordeshook, 1976). Therefore, parties have an incentive to compete using salience, which may be easier to change than positions (Petrocik, 1996; Steenbergen and Scott, 2004). Another reason why salience modification is a more attractive tool for electoral campaigns than policy change is that salience interconnections tend to be weaker than position interconnections. This means that modifying salience is relatively easy because it is a modification of the issue system that is relatively free of consequences for the system as a whole.

Implications for research into political competition

The findings of this thesis have several implications for political science, in particular the study of party competition. Thus, this research adds to our knowledge in four areas: party ideologies, party system dimensionality, party strategies and political representation.

First, this thesis addresses the fundamental debate concerning the nature of party ideologies. In the Introduction, we saw that there are two approaches to understanding the competitive behaviour of political parties. The first view, generally if somewhat falsely ascribed to Downs (1957), sees parties as solely vote-seeking actors. All policy preferences derive from the party's aim to win as many votes as possible. The second view, as stated by Wittman (1973, 1983), argues instead that parties are ideological and policy-seeking. Any attempt to secure electoral success will be pursued only to further the aim of implementing the preferred policy preferences. Only under the second view would policy interconnections be expected to be frequent and strong. However, this thesis suggests that this dichotomy is false. There are both vote-seeking and policy-seeking reasons why parties should develop interconnected packages of policy positions. It is therefore appropriate to apply Converse's approach to individual-level ideologies to political parties; indeed, party ideologies are more strongly interconnected than voter ideologies. The strength and frequency of policy interconnections was demonstrated statically and dynamically, as well as for position and salience. Parties should therefore be seen as ideological actors whose programmes can be characterised as packages of interconnected policy views.

Second, the findings of this thesis have theoretical and empirical implications for the study of party system dimensionality. Dimensionality is a concept of considerable importance for the study of political competition. The number of

underlying lines of conflict that summarise party competition influences the nature of voter choice, party strategies and coalition formation (McKelvey, 1976; Laver and Shepsle, 1995; Warwick, 2002; McLean, 2006; Kriesi et al., 2008b). Dimensionality is not the immediate topic of this research. However, the concept of policy interconnections is closely related, even though it refers to a level below that of party systems. Instead of looking at the systemic level – a country, a region or even the European Union – I consider how issues are interconnected within each party ideology. Both concepts therefore refer to the extent to which a complicated universe of distinct issues is reduced to a simpler world where policy areas are linked and one position can predict another (Poole, 2005). Issue systems and policy interconnections refer to a lower level of aggregation than party system dimensionality. This research has suggested that policy interconnections underline the process of simplification that occurs within party ideologies and creates low-dimensional spaces. Dimensions are the end result of the translation of the potentially chaotic issue space into a more simplified and more easily navigable world. Each dimension is built on the interconnections between single issues, so this research contributes to the study of dimensionality by looking at the step between the highly complex action space and the simple basic space (Poole, 2005). This theoretical argument is backed up through extensive empirical analysis of existing policy interconnections within party ideologies. In sum, I therefore suggest that policy systems and issue connections are concepts that further our understanding of party system dimensionality and complement that existing strand of research.

Third, this research has important implications for the explanation of party behaviour and party strategies. Thus, my findings question the general assumption that parties are driven by vote-maximising motivations. The fundamental text on party

strategies is Downs' 1957 work, in which he argues that parties' overriding ambition is to win as many votes as possible. While the vote-maximisation assumption can indeed largely explain how parties behave, much research from Downs onwards has suggested modifications to his original framework (e.g. Strom, 1990). Particular effort has been concentrated on explaining the fact that convergence on the median voter is not perfect, even in two-party systems. This thesis shows that the existence of policy interconnections restricts the strategies open to political parties. First, some combinations of issue positions may not be attractive to parties even though they may appear to be the most electorally promising. Consequently, parties cannot combine issue positions at will, but must instead respect the requirements of logic and coherence. Second, parties cannot move on each issue freely, as such policy changes can affect other components of the issue system. The existence of dynamic interconnections restricts the ability of parties to change their programme for short-term electoral gains. Finally, parties have an incentive to stress those positions within their issue system that are more extreme than others as this can increase their unique profile and satisfy activists and donors. In sum, this thesis therefore provides further reasons, based on the policy interconnections approach, why parties may fail to engage in those electoral strategies that may at first sight promise the greatest immediate success at the polls.

This thesis also adds to our understanding of party behaviour by re-evaluating the manipulation of issue salience as a tool used by political actors. There has been a recent revival of interest in issue salience as a feature of party ideology and party strategies (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004; Meguid, 2005; Stoll, 2005; Netjes and Binnema, 2007; Bélanger and Meguid, 2008; Meguid, 2008; Tavits, 2008; Libbrecht et al., 2009; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009). In Budge and Farlie's (1983) original formulation, salience was seen as an alternative to the position-based spatial model of

party competition and was more akin to Stokes' (1963) valence approach. However, salience as a feature of party strategies is actually closely linked to positional approaches since both models assume that parties compete on substantive policy issues on which voters disagree. The most realistic approach would therefore be one that integrates salience and position, and this has indeed been suggested by Meguid (2005, 2008). In this thesis, salience and position are both explicitly considered as properties of the components of issue systems. Given the weaker inherent interconnections for salience, it makes sense that this element of party ideologies should generally be seen as more easily manipulated than positions (Petrocik, 1996). Moreover, this thesis also significantly extends this debate by considering the links between positions and salience; more precisely, I ask what kinds of positions are emphasised by political parties and come to the counter-intuitive conclusion that it is the unusually extreme views that should be stressed. This thesis therefore provides further insight into the use of salience as a political strategy and how it is linked to policy positions.

Finally, the findings of this thesis may also provide further insights into the limits of democratic representation through political parties. The extent to which governments are responsive to voter preferences and concerns has been a subject of political science research for several decades (Pitkin, 1972; Huber and Powell, 1994; Stimson et al., 1995; Wlezien, 1995). Issue systems and policy interconnections may limit the extent to which voter preferences can be represented by political parties and thus realised by governments. If issue interconnections are stronger among parties than among voters, then there may be systematic underrepresentation of frequent combinations of voter preferences. This means that voter choices will be inherently limited and constrained – and thus cannot be fully represented. Policy interconnections may also have consequences for the process of coalition formation if parties' choice of

government partners is limited. This could be due to existence of issue interconnections that may make compromises more difficult to achieve. In addition, coalition formation can be rendered more complicated if issue systems allow for multidimensional policy spaces (McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1978). Issue interconnections may thus also limit the realisation of representation of voter preferences at the government formation stage. While the impact of political representation is the least direct implication of policy interconnections, it is nevertheless a likely impact of the existence and nature of policy interconnections.

These are the main overall claims, findings and implications of this research, answering the questions of how issues are interconnected and what effect this has on party competition. To conclude this thesis, I now turn to a discussion of possibilities for future research based on this dissertation.

Opportunities for future research

A thesis, like all research, is necessarily limited by the time, space and resources available, so there are ways in which greater depth and accuracy could be added to the findings I have presented. My findings throw up important further questions that could be investigated in future research. Here, and to conclude this dissertation, I therefore consider six ways in which it would be possible to improve on and extend the findings of this thesis. The first three, regarding measurement and empirical focus, are largely practical and closely related to this dissertation; the last three, which consider models of party competition, the role of institutions and the effect on political representation, are more theoretical and broader in outlook.

The first extension concerns the measurement of position and salience of issue areas. In this thesis, I have used two separate data sources that provide information on

both issue features for a series of issues. However, as pointed out in Chapter 4, both data sources also have definite limitations. These may apply in particular to the party manifesto data, which have been criticised for both the theory and practice of its coding. A possible extension of this thesis would therefore be to explore other ways of measuring issue positions and salience. One such source of data has been provided by Kriesi et al. (2008b), who use newspaper articles to code the position and salience of a series of issues for political parties following a method suggested by Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings (2001). Six countries in Western Europe are included, and the election coverage includes one in the 1970s and three since 1990 for each country. This dataset thus lacks the country coverage of expert surveys and CMP data, with a time component that is greater than that of the expert surveys but smaller than that provided by the manifestos. A second data source that includes a new way of examining party positions and issue salience on a series of areas is available through the new expert survey carried out by Hooghe et al. (2008). However, this dataset includes information for only one time point, so is clearly more rather than less limited than the two expert surveys I examined in this thesis. Despite these limitations, it would be worthwhile to check whether the conclusions in this thesis also hold for the sources of data used by Kriesi et al. and by Hooghe et al.

More innovatively, it would be worthwhile to pursue the possibility of applying newer approaches to determining party positions to this research question. One such method that is currently being used is computer-aided content analysis, mainly through the software programmes Wordscores (Laver et al., 2003) and Wordfish (Slapin and Proksch, 2008). The advantage of these programmes is that they provide reliable and flexible methods of coding large amounts of textual data. However, for the research question of this thesis it was necessary to consider policy interconnections in a large

number of countries, and such a data collection simply does not exist yet and would be very work-intensive to create. Nevertheless, a fresh analysis of this thesis' research using these more novel approaches could yield interesting insights as well as greater reliability.

Further, it would be worthwhile to disaggregate the broad findings made in this dissertation: this is the second possible extension to this thesis. I have suggested that issue systems differ between countries, party families and time periods, and other types of systematic differences are of course also possible. While issue systems were analysed separately for these groups of parties or party systems in Chapter 5 and (to a lesser extent) in Chapter 8, the main focus of this thesis has been on the broader cross-national patterns of issue interconnections. In future work, it would be worth examining in greater detail patterns in party positions and issue salience at the level of countries, party families and time periods, whether using the two datasets used here or other sources of such information. For this dissertation, the restrictions imposed by data availability made it difficult to analyse dynamic interconnections at a disaggregated level. An alternative way of examining issue interconnections from a lower level of analysis would be through a series of case studies. At best, the analysis in this thesis examined party policy change between two elections, making it difficult to understand the exact mechanism of dynamic issue interconnections. A series of in-depth case studies of the evolution of party positions could provide a better understanding of when, how and why parties 'move together' on distinct issue areas. Two ways in which this could be done is by analysing the debates surrounding revisions of the party manifesto or by examining the processes of repositioning, for example following the election of a new party leader.

Third and conversely, it would also be worthwhile to extend the analysis to a broader range of countries. In this research, 23 countries were examined, and these were mainly democracies in Western Europe or the English-speaking world. The sole exceptions were Japan and Israel, both with longer democratic histories than some European countries, and both economically developed. These countries were chosen in order to maximise the comparability of the countries across time. For example, limiting the study to these 23 countries allowed a direct comparison of the findings for the two expert surveys. Looking to the future, two immediate possibilities for extending the scope of this research exist. First, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could be included very easily. For these, there is now substantial expert survey data (Benoit and Laver, 2006; Hooghe et al., 2008; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009). Manifestos have also been coded for these countries (Klingemann et al., 2007). Second, moving outside of Europe, expert survey data on Latin America will also soon become available (Wiesehomeier and Benoit, 2009). This straightforward availability of data means that this research could be easily extended to other areas, and it would be interesting to see how policy interconnections differ in these areas. Recent work already indicates that the structure of interconnections may be quite different in Central and Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe (Marks et al., 2006; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009).

A fourth extension of this thesis would be a closer examination of the links between position and salience. In Chapter 7, I argued that salience is more easily modifiable than positions; this is due in part to the fact that an issue's level of importance is less strongly interconnected with other topics. Chapter 8 added to the examination of issue salience and issue interconnections by showing that unusually extreme issue positions are also stressed more than others. Two paths for future research are possible. First, it is necessary to untangle the measurement of salience and

position. The two concepts are of course related, with directional theory, for example, essentially combining them into one concept (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). However, there is a fundamental difference between the salience of a position – that is, the level of coverage it receives by a political party – and the position itself. Experts assessing salience are likely to amalgamate the two, even if only unconsciously. Similarly, manifesto coding, which in the CMP approach is based in salience theory, has also been used successfully to examine party positions. It would therefore be useful to develop a measurement approach that clearly distinguishes between these two related but distinct features of the components of issue systems.

In addition, further exploration of the links between salience and position is necessary. Indeed, this will help provide a better understanding of the advantages and drawbacks of various measurement methods. In this thesis, I have shown within the context of issue systems that the two features are distinct (Chapter 7) but also affect one another (Chapter 8). For too long, salience and position have been considered as alternative approaches to understanding party competition. In future research, these two aspects of party strategies should be considered together, as has already been done in other relevant work (Meguid, 2005, 2008). Indeed, more research is necessary on how the two features of issue system components influence one another. For example, it would be interesting to know more about the kind of positions that are stressed by political parties, and under what conditions. In this thesis, I have provided a first answer to this question, but there is room for more research on the links between these two concepts.

Fifth, further research could consider in more detail the influence of institutions on the patterns of policy interconnections. This thesis has not considered in detail the possible impact of country-specific features on the kind of policy interconnections that

develop, though cross-national differences were examined in Chapter 5 and the impact of party system size in Chapter 8. There is a long list of potential institutional factors that might impact on policy interconnections. This applies in particular to circumstance-based interconnections, which are more flexible than logic-based linkages and could thus more easily be affected by national conditions. Possible institutional factors range from the organisation of society (e.g. the size of the manual labour force and the level of religiosity) via the electoral system (e.g. party system size and electoral rules) to the state structure (e.g. corporatism and federalism). Future research could use such institutional variables in order to predict patterns of interconnections, perhaps aided by a larger sample that includes Central and Eastern European and Latin American countries.

Finally, this thesis has concentrated on policy interconnections within party ideologies, and the findings have provided answers to the question of how issues are linked and how this affects party competition. However, I have argued that this research has consequences that go beyond our understanding of how political parties compete. Policy interconnections in party competition thus could also limit voter choice and influence coalition formation. Due to the focus of this thesis, these claims have remained theoretical. Future research could address these issues directly. For example, it would be possible to compare in detail the extent of issue interconnections within voters' views with those found among political parties. Two questions in particular could be answered. First, are voter ideologies less tightly interconnected than party ideologies? While this has been one of my theoretical arguments in this thesis, it has as of yet not been empirically examined. Second, are there frequent combinations of issue positions that are systematically underrepresented by political parties, and if so, which ones? This would partly be a consequence of looser interconnections among voters.

Importantly, this would strengthen the case that policy interconnections restrict the freedom of voter choice through the nature of the 'package deals' on offer. A second strand of research could examine coalition formation in multiparty systems in the light of issue interconnections. Here, it would be worth analysing the impact of the policy profiles of parties on their likelihood of joining a coalition.

In this thesis, I have developed a new approach for summarising party ideologies: they are systems made up of variously connected issue components. This approach is not only of descriptive value, but also adds to our knowledge of the nature of party competition. However, not all aspects and impacts of policy interconnections have been investigated here; this is the task for future research.

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