Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures

PhD Thesis

London School of Economics and Political Science

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2010

A dissertation submitted in satisfaction of the requirements for a PhD in Government, awarded by the Department of Government of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

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Nikos Chrysoloras

To my Father

Religion and Nationalism in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures

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Acknowledgements

Long treatises, like PhD dissertations, are usually the outcome of the work and the co-operation between many different people. Traditionally, there is only one, the author, who takes the credit- or the blame- for the result. Let me just name a few who undoubtedly deserve a credit.

First, and foremost, I should emphasize that the writing of the present work would be impossible without the financial assistance of the 'National Bank of Greece Research Award' which was kindly offered to me by the Hellenic Observatory of the London School of Economics. I hope that the National Bank of Greece will continue to actively support academic research at the LSE and elsewhere. Additional financial aid was made available to me by the Department of Government through its 'Research Studentships' scheme. My gratitude goes to all those who decided to offer me this award. Finally, part of the costs for this study was covered by my family, to whom I am grateful for everything that they have done to support me since I started my studies in Great Britain.

Obviously, all those sources of income would be meaningless without the administrative and academic support of my studies by the Department of Government and the Hellenic Observatory of the LSE. More specifically, the academic guidance of my supervisors, Dr. John Hutchinson and Prof. Kevin Featherstone, was priceless. Many thanks are also due to Dr. Yannis Stavrakakis. Throughout the course of my postgraduate studies, Yannis has been a good friend, a helpful colleague, and a supportive teacher. My field research in Cyprus was guided and supported by Dr. Victor Roudometof of

the University of Cyprus, to whom I am grateful. Last but not least, I should mention that this research project started as an M.A. dissertation in Political Theory at the Department of Government of the University of Essex. My supervisors there, Dr. David Howarth and Dr. Jason Glynos, were those who supported me in my first steps and encouraged me to apply for a PhD in the same subject.

Much of the credit for what is written in the following pages goes to the persons and institutions named above, and, naturally, all of the blame for possible shortcomings and fallacies to me.

Synopsis

This thesis investigates the reasons for the idiosyncratic politicization of religion and the Church in Greece and Cyprus, and seeks to account for the production, development and propagation of religious nationalism and the sacralisation of politics in these two countries. It is a study of the birth (1830-1864), development, and contemporary mutation (1974-2000) of the 'Helleno-Christian' nationalist discourse, which reached its zenith, not in Greece, where it was born, but in Cyprus, immediately before and after independence (1950-1974). The aim of the project is to explain the political processes whereby this ideology (Helleno-Christianism) attained a hegemonic status in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot political cultures, and to account for the present eminence of this prominent type of Greek nationalism.

Hopefully, this thesis fulfils a threefold purpose: firstly, it covers important gaps in the relevant historiography on Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms. This 'historical' task is carried out through the analysis of the important role of the Orthodox Church in the consolidation of Greek and Greek-Cypriot national identities. Secondly, this case study is used as a test ground for an alternative theoretical framework in the study of nationalism which may offer solutions to the practical and theoretical problems of the dominant modernist paradigm. Thirdly, a comparative approach to the study of Greek nationalism in mainland Greece and in Cyprus is adopted— to my knowledge, for the first time—in the following pages.

There are two main research questions to be answered by this project: Why and how religion in Greece and Cyprus has been politicized in such manner so that Orthodoxy and nationalism became so closely associated? And, what are the results of this politicization in terms of contemporary Church policy, and national identity awareness in contemporary Greece and Cyprus? In other words, the logic that will be underlying my argument is that in order to understand contemporary Greek nationalism, one has to look back at its formative period.

Acronyms:

AKEL [A.K.Ε.Λ]: Communist Party of Cyprus

EOKA [E.O.K.A]: National Union of Cypriot Fighters

KEK [K.E.K.]: Free Citizens Rally (Greek centrist party)

KKE [K.K.E]: Communist Party of Greece

LAOS [Λ A.O. Σ]: People's Orthodox Rally (Greek far right party)

ND [N.Δ]: New Democracy (Greek centre-right party)

PASOK [ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ]: Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Greek centre left

party)

SYRIZA [ΣΥ.PIZ.A]: Coalition of the Radical Left (Greek leftist party)

Notes:

- * The names of Greek and Greek-Cypriot authors are transliterated
- * Greek titles are translated by the author. Original titles in Greek are cited in parentheses
- * Quotes from Greek are translated by the author, unless stated otherwise. The original Greek texts are cited in footnotes, whenever there is a possibility of ambiguity in the translation.

Chapter I: Introduction

I.I Prologue

The first article of the first constitutional text of modern Greece, the "Epidaurus Constitution" of 1821, classifies as Greeks "all natives [autochthonous] who believe in Christ".1 The phraseology of this sentence is indicative of the views of the first revolutionaries regarding the components of Neo-Hellenic identity. The newborn Greek nation was defined by a certain territory (hence the use of the word 'natives'); a certain language (the text was written in an artificially archaic Greek dialect, which came to be called katharevousa); and a particular religion (Orthodox Christianity). Scholars of nationalism would not find it difficult to explain the implicit reference to language and geography. Claims to a geographical 'fatherland' are shared by all nationalist movements. Similarly, allusions to a 'glorious past' are far from uncommon in most nationalist declarations. But why Orthodoxy? If nationalism is a social by-product of modernity, as most scholars in the field have been arguing, then a centralized state, a common vernacular, a common citizenship, and a common economy would be enough for the consolidation of a Greek identity. Nonetheless, in the aforementioned arch-definition of the Greek nation, the emphasis is placed on the Orthodox identity of the referent population. In the first three Greek revolutionary constitutions (1822-1827), there is not even clear distinction between the notions of 'Greek citizen' and

¹ Cited in Vasilis Rafailidis, 1993. Ιστορία (Κωμικοτραγική) του Νεοελληνικού Κράτους, 1830-1974 [A History of the Modern Greek State], (Athens: Εικοστούπρώτου), p.445 (Original text in Greek: Όσοι αυτόχθονες κάτοικοι της επικρατείας της Ελλάδος, πιστεύουσιν εις Χριστον, Έλληνες εισίν...). See also appendix.

'Greek Orthodox Christian'.² One can observe in these constitutions two noteworthy parameters regarding Greek identity. First, the fact that it was not self-evident who was 'Greek', and therefore had to be somehow defined with reference to specific criteria, and, second, the crucial role of Orthodoxy in identifying 'Greekness' in a rather exclusionary manner.

Even if, for some reason, Orthodoxy was necessary back in the formative period of Greek nationalism, what is more peculiar for the contemporary observer is that Orthodoxy and Greekness are still inseparably linked in our epoch. Even today, the Greek constitution uses a sanctified language, which denotes the close links between Hellenism and Orthodoxy, while Orthodoxy is the established religion in Greece (article 3 of the 1974 constitution, even after the 1986 and 2001 revisions). Since the declaration of independence, the close ties between the 'Orthodox Eastern Apostolic Church of Greece' and the Greek nation have been reinforced and re-affirmed. In the words of the former Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis, in a speech he gave in 1981, while in office:

The nation and Orthodoxy...have become in the Greek conscience virtually synonymous concepts, which together constitute our Helleno-Christian civilization.⁴

The equivalence between Orthodoxy and national identity is equally solid in Cyprus. When the first constitution for an independent Cyprus was

² A. Paparizos, 2000. "Διαφωτισμός, Θρησκεία και Παράδοση στη Σύγχρονη Ελληνική Κοινωνία" [Enlightenment, Religion and Tradition in Modern Greek Society]', in Nicos Demertzis (ed.), Η Ελληνική Πολιτική Κουλτούρα Σήμερα [Greek Political Culture Today], (Athens: Οδυσσέας, 3rd ed.), p. 89

³ See appendix

⁴ Cited in Kallistos Ware, 1983. "The Church: A Time for Transition," in Richard Clogg, (ed.), *Greece in the* 1980s (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1983), p.208

drafted in the late 1950s (towards the end of the British rule in the island), the British Empire -and everyone else involved, including the local population, Greece, and Turkey- considered it natural to delineate membership in one of the two main ethnicities of the island according to religious criteria: that is, whoever was Orthodox was Greek and whoever was Muslim was Turk.⁵ Ethnicity, nationhood, citizenship, and religion were thus conflated, with profound consequences for the island. Later, the archbishop of the Church of Cyprus became president of the Cypriot Republic, and he was referred to as the *Ethnarch* (i.e. the father of the nation).

This dissertation problematizes the relationship between Orthodoxy and Greekness. Why is being Orthodox considered an almost necessary pre-requisite for being Greek? Why was Orthodoxy instrumental for the consolidation of the Modern Greek and Greek-Cypriot national identity? What are the reasons of the heavy politicization of the Church and of the Orthodox tradition in Greece and Cyprus? If the Orthodox Churches in Greece and Cyprus are politicized, what kind of political discourse do they produce? And finally, what are the results of the nationalization of religion in these two countries?

I.II. Orthodoxy and Greek Public Culture

Anywhere you look in Greece, the presence of Orthodoxy is remarkable. For instance, in Serifos, a small tourist destination island in the Cyclades complex, which has a population of about 1,000 habitants,

⁵ See appendix

according to the 2001 census, there are 117 churches, that is to say more than one church for every ten locals. During religious celebrations on nearby islands, army units are deployed to honour holy icons. Each evening, soldiers in most Greek army camps pray to God "to keep the Greek nation and its army safe, and to send His Angels to protect them". Holy icons decorate the walls of public and government offices. The Greek Constitution derives its legitimacy from the "Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity". The president of the Greek Republic and the country's parliamentarians are inaugurated with a religious oath in the presence of Athens's archbishop, who is also an honorary guest in all official government ceremonies. A relatively recent dispute between the Church of Greece and the ecumenical patriarchate over the ecclesiastical regime in parts of northern Greece became a major political issue, in which Greek political parties struggled to keep their neutrality.

The last census on the religious attachments of Greeks was conducted in 1951. According to it, 96.7 percent of Greeks considered themselves members of the Greek Orthodox Church.⁸ In 1991, a *Eurobarometer* survey showed that 98.2 percent of Greeks are Orthodox Christians.⁹ The 2008 CIA

⁶ Official evening prayer of the Greek Army (original text in Greek: Δέσποτα Παντοκράτωρ, ο καταξιώσας ημάς διελθείν το μήκος της ημέρας ταύτης, πρόσδεξαι τας εσπερινάς ημών δεήσεις και κατάπεμψον το πλήθος του ελέους Σου επί πάντας ημάς τους δεομένους Σου. Τοίχισον ημάς τοις Αγίοις Αγγέλοις Σου, περιχαράκωσων ημάς τη αληθεία Σου, φρούρησον ημάς τη δυνάμει Σου, φύλαξον υπό την σκέπην Σου του Στρατόν και άπαν το Ελληνικόν Έθνος, παράσχου δε ημίν και την επερχομένην νύκτα ειρηνικήν και αναμάρτητον, και πάσας τας ημέρας της ζωής ημών. Πρεσβείαις της Υπεραγίας ημών Θεοτόκου, και πάντων των Αγίων, Αμήν).

⁷ See preamble of Greek Constitutions (appendix)

⁸ Kallistos Ware, Op. Cit.

⁹ Yannis Stavrakakis, 2002 "Religion and Populism: Reflections on the 'Politicised' Discourse of the Greek Orthodox Church," *Hellenic Observatory, Discussion Paper No.* 7, European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, p. 5

World Factbook places this figure at 98 percent. This trend does not appear to vary significantly when it comes to the younger generation, since a 2002 Eurobarometer survey showed that Greek youths (ages 15-24) are the most religious in Europe after the Irish. A recent European Social Survey shows that church attendance levels in Greece are on the rise and among the highest in Europe. Moreover, the level of those who do not attend church services at all has dropped over the past few years. The attitude of Greeks towards Orthodoxy is exemplified in the words of a Greek dentist, as it is narrated by the author Kallistos Ware: "Personally I am an atheist; but because I am Greek, I am of course a member of the Orthodox Church". 12

But what is the response of the Church to the strong feelings of affiliation of the Greek people? What is certain is that the Orthodox Churches in both Greece and Cyprus have always been operating as political institutions. But this fact in itself is not anything new. Unless one accepts that Churches are divine organizations or messengers of the will of God, the political nature of these institutions is indisputable. Like all other religious institutions, Christian Churches have had to defend their place within the public sphere of a particular social milieu (in this case, the nation-state). Consequently, their politicization was inevitable. Indeed, it is doubtful if a depoliticized religion ever existed.

¹⁰ The survey was conducted throughout the 15 pre-enlargement EU countries; see www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archive/flash_arch.htm

¹¹ The results can be found online at www.ekke.gr/ess and www.europeansocialsurvey.org. For relevant articles, see Ελευθεροτυπία [Eleftherotypia] and Καθημερινή [Kathimerini] (both November 6, 2003).

¹²Kallistos Ware, Op. Cit., p. 205

Therefore, the questions that we will be asking in this dissertation will be focused on the nature of the politicization of the Orthodox Churches in Greece and Cyprus, rather than with the question of whether they are politicized or not. More specifically, the focus will be on the relationship between these Churches and nationalist ideologies. The existence of this link is well-known to all those who have an interest in Modern Greek studies, but under-investigated in the relevant literature. The *Economist* 'Intelligence Unit' summarized the nationalization of religion in Greece as follows:

The Orthodox Church regards itself as the repository of Hellenism during the 400 years of Ottoman rule and the first 150 years of the struggle to establish the Modern Greek state. The church argues that over the past 20 years the Socialists have adopted an increasingly secular stance in order to achieve European and international acceptance. This, according to Archbishop Christodoulos, has undermined the unique Greek cultural heritage of which the church considers itself the guardian (The identification of the church with a Hellenistic state was best embodied in Cyprus, where the first head of state at independence was Archbishop Makarios, who was also known to the Greek Cypriots as the Ethnarch, essentially the embodiment of the state in the person of the cleric). Archbishop Christodoulos has repeatedly spoken out in public against what he considers the corrosive influence of the EU on the spiritual and nationalist character of Hellenism. He has likened the EU to

a grinder making mincemeat of the national identities of member states and refers disparagingly to the "Euro-craving" of Greek politicians.¹³

As the *Economist* columnist rightly points out, the identification of Greekness with Orthodoxy has been even more evident in the case of the Greek-Cypriot community. The paradox here is that Christianity (unlike Judaism for example) is an ecumenical religion, and not an ethnically-specific one.

Nonetheless, the Church responded to the strong feelings of affiliation of the Greek public by acting as a political agent whose basic aim is to counter the effects of the 'westernization' of Greece by articulating a nationalist discourse, while at the same time protecting and promoting its political privileges. It appears to regard itself as the guardian of the 'Greek identity' and continuously interferes in Greek political affairs. This Church policy came into direct antithesis with the spirit of secularization of the Socialists (PASOK), one of the two major parties in the Greek political landscape. At the same time, it has often brought the current centre-right government into a difficult position. Several bishops have repeatedly intervened in the media of the country, demanding that the Greek governments should adopt a more aggressive foreign policy towards Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Moreover, the case of an exchange of public lands with a lake which "belonged" to a monastery in northern Greece proved to be a scandal that has turned the tide in Greek politics.

¹³ See the Economist, 7/6/2000

The liberal view with regard to the societal role of the Church is quite clear, and suggests that the practice of religion should be confined to the private sphere. This tension between the traditionalist discourse of the Church and the reluctant, yet westernization-oriented, public policies of the Greek governments is becoming increasingly important for Greek politics, since it creates cultural and political tensions in the Greek society. For example, as it will become obvious in the following chapters, the influence of the church in Greek society has obliged the governments to avoid compromises in a series of foreign policy disputes with its neighbours.

In Cyprus, on the other hand, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that the Church's involvement in nationalist politics has altered the history of the island. Not only has the Church been involved in the anti-imperialist struggle against the British, but it also actively participated in the government of the island until 1977, since its archbishop, Makarios, stayed in office as a president for 17 years. More recently, the Church's fierce opposition to the reunification plan put forward by the United Nations demonstrated its continuing commitment to Helleno-Christian nationalism.

This thesis will study the development of the aforementioned religious nationalist political discourse in Greek and Greek-Cypriot political culture. It seeks to investigate the reasons for the politicization of religion and the Church, to account for the production, development and propagation of religious nationalism and sacralisation of politics, and to explain the paradoxical way in which the Orthodox Church has acted as a nationalist political and cultural institution, while its canonical tradition, the Gospel, and

its Byzantine past were inherently ecumenical in character. It is a study of the birth (1833-1871), development, and contemporary mutation (1998-2006) of the "Helleno-Christian" nationalist discourse. The aim of the project is to explain the political processes whereby this ideology attained a hegemonic status in Greek and Greek-Cypriot political cultures, and to account for the present eminence of this prominent type of Greek nationalism.

I.III. Greece, Cyprus and the Wider Picture

Our line of argument is that the study of the link between religion and nationalism in Greece and Cyprus is an important enterprise for historical, theoretical, and political reasons. The study of the conflation between religion and nationalism in Greece and Cyprus is important in itself as an effort to understand the political culture of these two countries. As it was mentioned before, the tension between the traditionalist discourse of the Church, the New-Orthodox theories of a significant number of acclaimed intellectuals and the westernization-oriented policies of the Greek governments creates cultural and political tensions in the Greek society. Outcomes of the present 'identity' conflict (which one may argue is an everlasting feature of Greek politics since independence) will almost certainly affect the future of this country. In Cyprus, whose entrance into the European Union has revived international interest for reunification, the stance of the Church towards peace efforts is of seminal importance for their chances of success.

Secondly, the type of nationalism described above is, according to the view of many commentators, a worrying social phenomenon. As Greece becomes an increasingly multicultural society, the identification of Greekness with Orthodoxy lays the basis for social conflict and unrest. Over the last decade, more than one million immigrants have settled in Greece, and, naturally, not all of them embrace the Orthodox religion. Moreover, Greece has a sizeable Muslim minority in Western Thrace, a small Slav-speaking population in the province of Macedonia, a Roma minority dispersed around the country, as well as some increasingly populous communities of Roman Catholics, Protestants, Evangelists, Jewish and Jehovah's Witnesses. All these religious and ethnic minorities find it difficult to effectively integrate in a 'Greece of Greek Orthodox Christians'.14

In Cyprus on the other hand, the side-effects of Helleno-Christianism are, more or less, well known. The failure to construct a Cypriot national identity which would replace existing 'ethno-religious identities' played a crucial role in the outbreak of civil unrest, ethnic fragmentation, and the subsequent dichotomisation of the country. Ethnic identities have and will continue to play an important role in influencing the political situation of the island. In light of an attempt to reunite the two communities on the basis of a federate or confederate model, the importance of Orthodoxy in drawing frontiers between the communities needs to be investigated.

Part of the present work is focused on an important period of Balkan history: the era of the birth of Balkan nations in the 19th century. It has been

¹⁴ Nicos Demertzis, 1997 "Greece", in Eatwell, R., (ed.), European Political Cultures: Conflict or Convergence?, (London: Routledge) p. 113

argued that some of the other Balkan nationalisms (e.g. Bulgarian nationalism) were formed as a reaction to the successes of Greek nationalism and irredentism.¹⁵ They were, in a sense, counter-nationalisms. Similarly, Turkish Cypriot ethno-nationalism was definitely influenced and augmented by the explosion of Greek-Cypriot 'irredentist ethno-nationalism' during the late 1940's. The success of Greek nationalism has had a profound effect on the eventual resolution of the 'Eastern Question', and the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the fact that the investigation of these issues is not the main focus of the present enquiry, the historical account offered here may shed some light at least to a historical epoch which has become obscure due to the effects of nationalist historiography.

Additionally, the present research work addresses questions of citizenship and identity, as it enquires into the role of religion in influencing the content of concepts such as *citizenship*, *otherness*, *exclusion*, and *national identity* in non-secularized, yet liberal, systems of government. Undoubtedly, issues of identity are becoming increasingly pertinent in the globalized world of late modernity. However, in the field of nationalism studies, the treatment of the concept of identity has been, to say the least, trivial. There are two main reasons for that: firstly, political analysis is being increasingly dominated by a natural sciences type research model. Comparative institutional studies, and rational choice approaches to societal phenomena and human behaviour, have jettisoned alternative paradigms to the periphery of the discipline. The

¹⁵ Roudometof, Victor, 2000. 'The Social Origins of Balkan Politics: Nationalism, Underdevelopment, and the Nation-State in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, 1880-1920', in *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 144-163.

second reason for the underdevelopment of the 'identity issue' in the study of nationalism is the hegemonic position of the modernist paradigm in the relevant literature. This paradigm usually tends to place its emphasis on the economic and political dimensions of nation-building, thus overlooking the importance of cultural aspects. "The result of this state of affairs is that identity is becoming fashionable as a word without, however, its meaning as a theoretical category and a tool for analysis becoming more clear in the process. Such problems in conceptual clarity and theoretical rigour have serious analytical repercussions". Not only are questions left unanswered with regard to the emergence and persistence of national identities, but such questions are not even being asked by many modernist scholars of nationalism.

The issue of the relations between church and state is closely associated with the wider topic of the relations between state and civil society,¹⁷ and the results from this study of religious nationalism may be used in order to provide further insight into topics such as *public discourse*, *identity-construction*, *populism*, or the *return of God* to politics. Especially this last issue has lately drawn considerable attention in social sciences, and not without a reason.

In his book *Dieu est-il fanatique?*, ¹⁸ Jean Daniel argues that Europe is reenchanted, meaning that religion has regained its significant position in

¹⁶ Yannis Stavrakakis, 2005. "Passions of Identification: Discourse, Enjoyment, and European Identity", in David Howarth, & Jacob Torfing (eds.) Discourse Theory and European Politics, (London: Palgrave)

¹⁷ Evangelos Venizelos, 2000. Οι Σχέσεις Μεταξύ Κράτους και Εκκλησίας [The Relationship between State and Church], (Thessalonica, Παρατηρητής), p. 28

¹⁸ Jean Daniel, Dieu, Est-Il Fanatique?, (Paris, Alréa: 1996)

European politics. The phenomena, which mainly manifest the 'return of God' to politics are, the rise of political Islam, the spread of various religious groups and sects in Europe, the resurgence of Christian Churches in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War, the growing influence of Buddhism, the renaissance of Jewish Orthodoxy, and the growing influence of religion in contemporary ethical philosophy (e.g. Alasdair Macintyre, Emanuel Levinas) and politics.¹⁹ At the same time, religious right is revived throughout the Western world and the ex-president of a secular superpower was a selfdeclared 'reborn Christian'. The aforementioned phenomena discredit these historical and philosophical views, which perceive modernity as a linear process towards rationalization and secularization of society.²⁰ The revived religious discourses in Europe usually are, according to some commentators in the field, "religions without God, and should be better understood as sources of personal, ethnic, and cultural identification, rather than as confessions of faith".21 The return of religion to politics illustrates that the processes of Western European integration and globalization do not automatically dilute the forces of communal fragmentation and nationalism in Europe.

However, one may argue that any conclusions drawn from the present project regarding the general issues discussed above may be valid only if they are subject to comparative analysis and verification/falsification within a different social context beyond the Greek and Greek-Cypriot case. Despite the

 $^{^{19}}$ Stavros Zoumboulakis, 2002. Ο Θεός στην Πόλη [God in the City] (Athens: Εστία), p. 18 20 Yannis Stavrakakis., "Religion and Populism...", p.13

²¹ Stavros Zoumboulakis Op. Cit. p. 52

fact that comparative testing is definitely invaluable as a method of social research, this is not undermining the importance of 'case-study' as a central feature to social enquiry in itself. Especially the case-study of Greek nationalism becomes particularly interesting due to a specific distinctiveness that characterizes it: Greek nationalism is, so to speak, 'geographically dispersed'. It has been developed in mainland Greece, in Cyprus, and in large Diaspora communities around the world. To my knowledge, a comprehensive comparative study of the varied facets of Greek nationalism in mainland Greece and in Cyprus has not yet been undertaken. Due to academic and methodological limitations, the inclusion of the nationalism of Greek Diasporas was not possible in this essay. Despite that, the parallels drawn between Greece and Cyprus in this case-study signify a step towards a comparative approach to Greek nationalism.

Additionally, the present thesis will allow for the testing of a series of hypotheses with regard to the study of nationalism. More specifically, the arguments here pose a challenge to the heuristic value of modernism and modernization theory in the field of nationalism studies. Instead, an alternative theoretical framework is adopted, one which, hopefully, can offer a more convincing analysis of the emergence and longevity of nationalist ideologies. The extent to which this theoretical framework can correspond to empirical observations in the cases of Greece and Cyprus will generate useful conclusions with regard to its validity. Nevertheless, the extent to which general conclusions about national identity formation can be drawn from this study will be judged by the reader. Before moving on to the discussion of the

theoretical outlook which will be used in the following chapters, it is necessary to provide an overview of the basic research questions and hypotheses of this thesis.

I.IV. Research Questions and Hypotheses

The thesis will attempt to challenge existing theorizations of the development of Greek nationalism, by focusing on two moments in Greek history: i) The period of national identity(-ies) formation in Greece between 1830-1871, and ii) The post-dictatorial period (*metapolitefsi*), especially in the years between 1998 and 2004, when there is for the first time a serious disruption in the harmonious relations between Church and State in Greece, while at the same time a secular 'Cypriotist' nationalism is being developed in Cyprus. Developments in national identity consolidation in Greece will be contrasted with parallel developments in Cyprus.

There are two main research questions to be answered by this research project: First of all, how and why religion in Greece and Cyprus has been politicized in such a manner that Orthodoxy and nationalism became so closely associated? And secondly, what are the results of this politicization in terms of contemporary Church policy, and national identity awareness in contemporary Greece and Cyprus? In other words, the logic that will be underlying my argument is that in order to understand contemporary Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalism, one has to look back at its formative period, when the equivalence between national and religious identities was established.

Hypotheses:

- 1) In the course of modern history, both in Greece and Cyprus, where it has held an active and critical political function, in the formation and reshaping of the idea of the nation, the Church assumed the role of a political institution and ideological mechanism, which has been disseminating to the values of Greek nationalism and functioned as a national religion. However, it has been increasingly difficult for the Church to compromise with lesser political power and influence, as both its agents and institutions have held relatively stable identities.
- 2) Efforts made by the state and some intellectuals to articulate and promote a secular political mechanism in Greece and Cyprus were unfruitful due to the prevailing of the 'Helleno-Christian' thesis for three reasons (independent variables): i) As it was based on folklore traditions, symbols, myths and recollections linked to the past of the majority of the population, it was compatible with a number of identities (familial, communal, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and citizen identities) assumed during the periods under research and thus held a great degree of familiarity, connecting Greek people to pre-modern and pre-national existing collective ties. What we now call Helleno-Christianity became a particular system of meaning, encompassing a number of practices, for example churchgoing, expressing animosity towards the Turks or using archaic Greek, and was thus experienced by individuals as the "Greek way of life". Consequently, by replacing

nationalist ideological structure, these contingent and otherwise isolated practices acquired meaning within this new symbolic order. ii) The birth and supremacy of Helleno-Christianism was further assisted by the legal and political position of the Churches of Greece and Cyprus. In order to reinforce and spread its distinctive cultural nationalism, the Church employed the mechanisms supplied by its legal position, which also enabled it to retain a certain degree of cultural autonomy (education, charity, Sunday masses, etc.). Consequently, although it was politically subjected to the secular authority of the state, it succeeded in preserving an extensive degree of sovereignty. iii) From an ideological viewpoint, 'Helleno-Christian' nationalism erected unyielding boundaries between insiders and outsiders, Greeks and non-Greeks, granting the infant nation a concrete collective identity. In the words of Freud: "it is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, as long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness".22 By placing emphasis on the Hellenic aspect of the Greek identity, the Helleno-Christian discourse offered adequate grounding for a solid distinction between Greeks and the other Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire, an element that other forms of nationalism that were emphasizing the religious character of Greek identity were unable to provide. However, since the masses that formed the Greek nation were separated in different and fragmented

²²S. Freud, (1982: 44), as cited by Yannis Stavrakakis, "Passions of Identification..."

groups in terms of ethnicity, language and culture, an Hellenized notion of the Greek nation was alien to the Greek people as only few could understand the 'language of Plato', despite the fact that they were mostly using Hellenic dialects.

3) The modernization/secularization process in Greece has been further complicated and obstructed by a number of hindrances created by preexisting cultural material and symbolic resources. The interaction of official western-style institutions formed in Greece in the early period of independence with the local Orthodox tradition altered their character to such an extent that it replaced a Western polity with Eastern political culture qualities with an Eastern political culture in a western-style institution context (at least during the period until 1974). Therefore, the functioning of western-type institutions in Greece has not always been harmonious, instead often quite problematic.²³ Consequently, the Church as an institution has consistently been the sole point of identification for Greek people, as it maintained a long and stable presence in Greek and Cypriot social life in the problematic and inharmonious context of ineffective bureaucratic politics and dysfunctional western-type institutions, especially in Cyprus where these were formed and shaped by colonization. Therefore, it is evident from the Greek case that pre-modern institutional structures and

²³ See also Nicos Mouzelis, 1979. Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment (London: Holmes & Meier), and Nicos Mouzelis, 1986. Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America (Basingstoke: Palgrave)

political culture can obstruct the process of rationalization and secularization of society, thus impeding the linear process of modernity.

I.V. Organization of the Chapters

The main task of this chapter was to introduce the research problem of the dissertation at hand, make some preliminary historical remarks which have hopefully introduced the reader to the context of the case studies under investigation, problematize the current state of affairs with regard to Greek and Cypriot religious nationalism, and pose the research questions to be answered. Subsequently, the research questions were placed within a wider political and theoretical framework in order to demonstrate their significance and relevance. In short, the introduction's aim was to delineate 'what will be done in the thesis', 'why will it be done', and 'how it will be done' in the following chapters. The next chapter will be mainly concerned with the theoretical outlook of the thesis. After presenting a short literature review which, as we shall see, will reveal the gaps and inadequacies in the existing literature, the underlying logics of the thesis and its theoretical framework will be presented. Before finishing this introduction it would be useful to provide the reader with a short description of the main chapters of the thesis:

Chapter 3: The period of National Identities Formation- 1830-1864: The focus of this chapter is historical, providing an account for the emergence of different nationalisms, and of how these confronted each other during the period of

nation building in Greece. The role of the Orthodox Church in the debate regarding the content and meaning of Greek identity will be analyzed in detail.

A number of different and often contrasting paradigms define this particular period. Articulated by a plethora of agents in different ends of the spectrum, we come across cases that vary from extreme republican nationalism to an extremely theocratic conception of the nation, and in between less radical but equally nationalist views. This comes in direct opposition with popular views of the existence of only two opposing blocs, the traditionalists and the modernizers and is further supported by the presence of other nationalist groups which cannot easily fit to a "religious/non-religious" ideological spectrum.

What is significant here is that in this newly founded Greek state there was no major cosmopolitan, non-expansionist, and forward thinking political movement of modernizers, as it was unthinkable by the vast majority of the Greek people, let alone legitimate or broadly accepted. The only sign of progressive thinking, by today's standards, was the view that supported the separation of the Greek Church from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. In today's public discourse, progress is synonymous to those who opposed the 'populist Archbishop Christodoulos' in support of the Patriarch's views against him. This irony demonstrates the relativity of categories such as 'progress' and 'reaction'.

Moreover, there was not a unified Church policy, or a single source of an 'underdog' Eastern oriented culture. Concepts, such as 'the East',

'Orthodoxy', 'the West', 'Byzantium', 'nation', etc. acquired different meanings and place within different discourses. The most peculiar example of such discursive ambiguities can be found in the word 'genos', which came to denote, under different discourses, anything from 'race', to the 'Hellenic Volk', and from Greek speaking populations, to the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire. Within this context of political, social and discursive struggles, a particular national imaginary attained a hegemonic position in Greek society. This hegemonic form of nationalist discourse was structured around a series of nodal propositions: i) there is a unified history of one Greek nation starting from the pre-Homeric era, through to Classical Greece, the Hellenistic epoch, the Byzantium, and continuing in modern Greece. ii) The nation is bound together by geography, history, language, and religion. iii) Being Orthodox Christian is an almost necessary pre-condition for being Greek. iv) The Greek nation is superior to almost any other nation in the world since Greeks are the heirs of almost all the great civilizations of the West (Ancient Greek, Hellenistic/Macedonian, Eastern Roman/Byzantine).

Ethno-symbolism and its emphasis on pre-national ethnic affiliations can explain why this particular 'Helleno-Christian' nationalism prevailed. Moreover, the role of legal and political arrangements that took place during that period should not be underestimated. The techniques of discourse analysis will be used in the study of this 'formative period' of Greek nationalism in order to illustrate how words and concepts acquired different meanings within the context of the ideological processes of modernity.

Chapter 4: Aspects of the Helleno-Christian thesis in Cyprus 1950-1974: The paradox with Cyprus is that, until 1974, it failed to develop a Cypriot national identity. Greek-Cypriot nationalism was in essence a Greek ethnonationalism and Greek Cypriots understood themselves first and foremost as Greeks and perhaps secondarily as Cypriots. The ethnic, linguistic and religious similarities between Greek-speaking Orthodox Cypriots and Greeks are not enough to explain this phenomenon. While being largely Anglo-Saxon Protestants, for instance, Americans gradually developed a distinct identity, which, of course, overrode their 'English' national identity. Similarly, Walloon Belgians are a national community clearly distinct from the French. Yet again, the role of the Orthodox Church was decisive in fostering Greek ethno-nationalism in Cyprus.

In this chapter, it shall be investigated how the aforementioned understanding of reality, society, and self-identity (Helleno-Christianism) was transmitted and developed to Cyprus and affected key moments in Greek-Cypriot history. The aim here is not to present a 'short history of modern Cyprus', but to illustrate how a system of meaning mobilized subjects, institutions, and government decisions in critical historical junctures. The emphasis will be on the role of the Church of Cyprus in the development of ethno-nationalism in Cyprus from 1950 to 1974 (i.e. the short period starting with the struggle for independence and ending Turkish invasion). The conclusion reached in this chapter is that the Church has acted in the same way in Cyprus as it has in Greece, though even more actively. However, in the case of Cyprus, the presence of a large ethnic minority and several

other small ethnic minorities triggered the production of a counter-ethnonationalism on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot community.

The Church played a significant role both in disseminating religious ethno-nationalism, and in dividing the ethnic communities of the island. The constitution of Cyprus divided the two main ethnic groups of the island on the basis of religious criteria. This fact also illustrates the importance of Orthodoxy in defining *ethnic* identity and preventing the establishment of a non-ethnic Cypriot *national* identity. As in Greece, Helleno-Christian nationalism in Cyprus managed to transcend party and class differences, to legitimize government policies, to constitute political orthodoxy and to define publicly accepted social behaviours.

The analysis of Greek-Cypriot ethno-nationalist ideology will be conducted through the use of the techniques of discourse theory, while emphasis will also be placed on the importance of ethnic-symbols and myths, as well as on the relationship between the development of Helleno-Christianism in Greece and in Cyprus.

Chapter 5: The Post-Dictatorial Period 1974-2001: Since the restoration of democracy in Greece, the state has attempted to change the legal status of the Church and the ideological position of Orthodoxy in Greek society. The stance of the Church during the "colonels' dictatorship" may have contributed to boosted attempts for secularization in post-authoritarian Greece. On the other hand, a non-ethnic 'Cypriotist' nationalism developed in Cyprus, as a response to the tragic events of 1974. As we may note, historical

contingencies can be used in this case as independent variables which may explain the sudden dislocation of the Church-state-nation equivalence in both countries (dependent variable).

In this chapter we will be critically studying the production of nationalism on the part of the Church and its affiliated intelligentsia in the post-authoritarian period, with particular emphasis in the period starting from the enthronement of the radical archbishop Christodoulos Paraskevaidis in 1998 until his sudden illness in 2006 that dispensed most politicized activities. More specifically, the construction of the national imaginary in the political discourse of the Greek Orthodox Church shall be described, and explain why the Church remains a nationalist institution in our era. The Greek Church seeks to protect the role which has been assigned to it during the nation building period. Such is also the case in Cyprus, where the Church tries to protect its 'ethnarchic' role. Moreover, the present political discourse of the Greek Church signifies a structural change in Greek politics, whereby the Church emancipates from the political influence of the state, and assumes the role of an autonomous political agent. Within this climate of antagonism between the Church and the state, a new series of competing nationalist doctrines has developed, which have indeed provoked a debate over the 'renegotiation' of Greek national identity. However, religious nationalism remains the hegemonic form of nationalist ideology in Greek and Greek-Cypriot political cultures and public discourse, and this can be explained on the basis of the tradition that the 1830-1865 and 1950-1974 historical developments produced, respectively for each country. Instead of a

weakening of religious nationalism in Greece, we may empirically observe a revival of 'Helleno-Christian' ideas (among political parties, intellectual elites, and the Church) in the face of liberal globalisation, while in Cyprus, after an initial decline between 1974 and 1985, Greek ethno-nationalism started to gain ground again, reaching its peak during the negotiation of the U.N. peace and reunification plan.

One of the aims of this chapter will be to expose the problematic, racist, and exclusionary arguments of religious nationalism in Greece and Cyprus. In short, this chapter will be an account of the current state of Greek and Greek-Cypriot political cultures with reference to the role of religion in shaping nationalism and national identity in Greece and Cyprus, while it is also a study of social antagonisms and ideological dislocations in post-1974 Greek and Greek-Cypriot politics.

Chapter 6: Conclusion: In the conclusion, we will attempt to summarize the empirical observations with regard to the emergence and persistence of religious nationalism in Greece and Cyprus and draw theoretical inferences from the present empirical study. In particular, we will assess the significance of discourse analysis as a heuristic tool for studying nationalism and the possibilities of using its techniques to advance the ethno-symbolist paradigm's analytical validity. Moreover, we will consider the extent to which other concepts from classic theories of nationalism and ideology can supplement the methodological/technical approach of discourse analysis, and therefore enhance our understanding of the nationalist phenomenon.

Additionally, possibilities for future developments in Greek and Greek-Cypriot political cultures based on the 'historical lessons' drawn from this study will be assessed.

Finally, the chapter outlines trajectories for future research in the field of Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms. More specifically, there are three areas in which further research is required: i) the nationalism of the Greek diasporas and its relation to Orthodoxy and mainland Greek nationalism, ii) comparative analysis of the role of the Church in producing nationalism, between Greece and other Orthodox countries, and iii) comparative analysis between Greek nationalism and other nationalisms of the Balkan and Southern-Eastern European region where cultural attitudes towards the West are also ambivalent.

Before examining the formative period of Greek nationalism, it is necessary to provide a brief account of the existing literature and its limitations since, it is the existence of these limitations which justifies both the empirical and the theoretical parts of this dissertation. Moreover, the theoretical outlook of the thesis will be described in detail.

Chapter II: Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Perhaps the most significant claim of this research project is that it suggests a novel theoretical approach, which will contribute to a most comprehensive understanding of Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalism. This claim is partly based on the assessment of the theoretical perspectives adopted in the existing literature, which is indeed limited in scope and unable to explain the multiple facets of Helleno-Christianity, and account for its force and salience.

II.I. Existing Literature and its Limitations

Nations are the primary loci of individual and collective identification within the milieu of modernity, and nationalism has been the most comprehensive, persistent, and widespread ideology of the modern epoch. It spread across continents, societies, social classes and genders. Nationalism divides the world into clearly defined nations- each with its own particular 'national character'- which exist almost since time immemorial. Freedom, for nationalists, is inseparably linked with national-self-determination, in the form of political sovereignty.

Until the early 1960s very few social scientists disputed the aforementioned nationalist myth. However, the emergence of a new discipline- what is generally known as nationalism studies- has contributed to the gradual but steady deconstruction of the nationalist narrative.

We may now claim with confidence that nations are relatively recent ideological and political constructions which emerged at the dawn of the modern era, as a result of the serious crisis of legitimacy which characterized late traditional societies in Europe and the Americas. This crisis of legitimacy

arose when the increasingly powerful middle class disputed traditional political structures in which sovereignty lied with the 'divinely appointed' king or the feudal class. Eventually, this new class struggled and achieved to shift political sovereignty towards the people, or -what came to be called- 'the nation'. Moreover, the proclaimed 'death of God' has stripped religious leaders, kings, and aristocracy from their exclusive claim to power. But how did the bourgeois class managed to win peoples' 'hearts and minds' and convince them to adopt the new ideology of nationalism? How did nationalism spread from the limited circles of urban intellectuals, merchants and entrepreneurs, to the countryside, to become later on an official state ideology?

In order to answer these questions, several theoretical approaches to nationalism have been developed, including primordialism, modernism, perennialism, and ethno-symbolism. Of course, this is an ideal-types categorization and downplays to a certain extent the importance of substantive differences among individual authors and schools of thought. However, such classification is useful for analytical purposes as it brings to light the central ideas behind each of the existing approaches to nationalism.

Primordialist perspectives on nations and nationalism emphasize the significance of individual emotional ties to the nation, as well as of 'primordial' traits that demonstrate the uniqueness of each nationality. These qualities and kinship ties which unite the nation may be the result of biology, belief in biological decent, or of cultural environment. In the words of Pierre Van Den Berghe, "both ethnicity and race (in the social sense) are in fact

extensions of the idiom of kinship, and that, therefore, ethnic and race sentiments are to be understood as an extended and attenuated form of kin selection". Such implicitly racial views on Greek identity have been articulated by New-Orthodox and Neo-Romantic Greek thinkers, who idealise the communal nature of Greek Orthodox culture, 25 or argue for the superiority and uniqueness of the inherent traits of 'Greekness'. Their advocates come both from the left and the right of the ideological spectrum. For example, in 2003, Mikis Theodorakis, a music composer, intellectual, and icon of the Greek left commented the following: "Greeks, like Jews, are unique people. But Greeks are not inherently fanatic and self righteous like the Jews. They [the Jews] are the root of most evil, and not a force for good [like the Greeks]. This is because their weapons are shadows – for example Abraham and Jacob, while we had the almighty Pericles. That is why our nature is not aggressive, like the Jewish one". 26

Nations, for most primordialist authors, exist since time immemorial, and nationalism is essentially an extension of kinship bonds characterizing pre-modern ethnic communities, which arise from natural 'givens' of human history (race, language, environment, etc.).²⁷ This perspective, in all its variants, is rejected in this thesis, mainly due to the lack of any substantive

²⁴ Pierre Van Den Berghe, 1994 [1978]. "Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective", in Anthony Smith & John Hutchinson (eds.), *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

²⁵ See for example, Christos Yanaras, 2000. Το Αλφαβητάρι του Νεοέλληνα [Modern Greeks], (Athens: Πατάκης)

²⁶ See Ελευθεροτυπία daily [Eleftherotypia], November 13, 2003. Also cited in Akis Gavriilidis, 2006. Η Αθεράπευτη Νεκροφίλια του Ριζοσπαστικού Πατριωτισμού [The Unbearable Necrophilia of Radical Patriotism], (Athens: Futura), p. 9

²⁷ For an excellent account of the primordialist perspective on nations, see Anthony D. Smith, 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism*, (London: Routledge), pp. 145-151, and Anthony D. Smith *Nationalism*, 2001. (Oxford: Polity) pp. 51-56

evidence that there are inherent environmental characteristics or biological phenotypes, which justify particular certain social behaviours, such as the deep psychological attachment to a conceptual entity called the 'Greek nation'. Besides, the reduction of social phenomena to biological or 'metaphysical' determining factors has met little approval in social sciences in general, since such simplification lacks any solid theoretical or scientific substantiation.

Perennialist thinkers also hold that nations (or at least some nations) existed before the emergence of nationalism. However, unlike primordialists, perennialist authors hold a historicist, instead of an organic view of the nation.²⁸ Through exhaustive historical research, these 'historians of nations', are at pains to demonstrate the existence of ethnic and/or national affiliations well before the modern era. For example, Greek historian Nicos Svoronos summarizes his book titled *Review of Modern Greek History* [Επισκόπηση της Νεοελληνικής Ιστορίας] as a "story of the sustained efforts of an ancient people to transform itself into a modern nation, to realize its character, and to secure its place as a distinct entity into our world".²⁹ Although one cannot dispute the prevalence of a common religion and the existence of a dominant language (albeit in several local variations), in the Greek peninsula and the island of Cyprus well before the Greek War of Independence, there is not any

²⁸ See for example the work of Adrian Hastings, 1997. The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), and John Armstrong, 1982. Nations Before Nationalism (Chapell Hill, N.C: University of North Carolina Press)

²⁹ Nicos Svoronos, 2007. Επισκόπηση της Νεοελληνικής Ιστορίας [Review of Modern Greek History], (Athens: Θεμέλιο), p. 155. Even if Svoronos is considered a "modernist" scholar by many commentators of his work, there are numerous perennialist arguments in his books. See Akis Gavriilidis, 2006. Η Αθεράπευτη Νεκροφίλια του Ριζοσπαστικού Πατριωτισμού [The Unbearable Necrophilia of Radical Patriotism], (Athens: Futura)

evidence, again, that these elements were perceived by people as constituent characteristics of the Greek nation. Moreover, there are not any scientific or historical indications that people living in these regions believed that they belonged to any nation or even understood the concept of the nation. Hence, one may wonder if all this discussion about nations before nationalism is anything more than an anachronism.

Modernist conceptions of the nation constitute indisputably the orthodoxy in the field, while the majority of the analyses of Greek nationalism are influenced by modernist paradigms. Most well known scholars of nationalism subscribe to the modernist paradigm (Kedourie, Gellner, Hobsbawm, and Anderson). Although important differentiations do exist between the various modernist approaches to nationalism, essentially the basic assertion of modernism remains unaltered: "Nationalism...is a product of modernity, nothing less...But it is not only nationalism that is modern. So are nations, national states, national identities, and the whole 'inter-national' community".³⁰

For Ellie Kedourie³¹ nationalism is a modern religion, an essentially millenarianist movement, which arose as a result of the radical changes in societal values that modernity produced. Ernest Gellner³² on the other hand, articulated a more structuralist approach to nationalism. He argued that nationalism has been the product of the modern capitalist state, which used its "educational machine" in order to produce a class of literate clerks who

³⁰ Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism, pp. 46-47

³¹ Elie Kedourie, 1993. Nationalism, (New York: Blackwell, 4th Edition)

³² Ernest Gellner, 1983. Nations and Nationalism, (New York: Cornell University Press)

could meet the administrative needs of modern bureaucratic politics. Nationalism has spread throughout the world due to the effects of combined and uneven development and revolution. Though Gellnerian approaches to Greek nationalism are not dominant in the literature, we may still find some examples of them. Anna Koumandaraki for instance, emphasizes the role of the Greek state in fostering Greek nationalism and national homogeneity, and downplays the importance of the Greek Church in the production of national identity.³³

The aforementioned theoretical approaches to nationalism have undoubtedly shed light to the importance of the objective conditions of modernity in the rise of nations. Nonetheless, the claim that nationalism is an ideology which arose under the specific historical conditions of the capitalist industrial epoch, has very little to contribute to our understanding of the idiosyncratic nature of Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms and the role of the Church in their legitimization.

Finally, Benedict Anderson views nationalism as an 'imagined community'. "Rather than thinking of it as fabricated, one should understand national distinctiveness in terms of its style of imagination and the institutions that make that possible" (e.g. print-capitalism).³⁴ Anderson's concept of 'imagined communities' is well-received in analyses of Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalism, and has been the basis for one of the most authoritative conceptualizations of the place of Orthodoxy in nation-building

³³ Anna Koumandaraki, 2002. "The Evolution of Greek National Identity", in *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 2:2, pp. 39-51

³⁴ John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith (eds.), 1994. *Nationalism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.48

by Paschalis Kitromilides.³⁵ Kitromilides argues that the 'Orthodox commonwealth' was one of the most powerful imagined communities in the Balkan region during the Byzantine and Ottoman eras. Orthodoxy had been outspokenly hostile to the nationalist ideals of the Enlightenment due to the ecumenicity of the Orthodox dogma, as well as because of the institutional interests of the Constantinople Patriarchate. The nationalization of the Orthodox Churches throughout the Balkans and Eastern Europe replaced the Orthodox imagined community by national imagined communities.

Kitromilides does not – nevertheless - fully substantiate the claim that cultural, economic and political mechanisms led to the Church's ideological "conversion" to nationalism. He also fails to take into account the possibility of an inverted causal relationship between nationalism and Orthodoxy, that is to say the seminal role of the Church in the production of nationalism. This shortfall is rooted in Kitromilides' insistence on implicitly comparing "true" Orthodoxy, with Orthodoxy as a vehicle of nationalism. Hence, the paradox he traces is based on an essentialist approach to religion. One could argue, for example, that the stance of the Greek Church towards Turkey, or Israel, does not conform to the "ecumenicity" of Orthodoxy. However, even if such ethical and religious "pureness" ever existed in the Orthodox Church, it would still not be a reliable criterion for the interpretation of its political behaviour, under varying - and constantly changing - social and political circumstances. Therefore, nationalism and even anti-Semitism have

³⁵ Paschalis Kitromilides, 1989. "Imagined Communities And the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans", in *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 19, pp. 149-194

characterized Church rhetoric, in line with a particular reading of the Gospels, and not against a supposed true meaning of the Gospels.

Apart from Kitromilides, other authors have also noted the antithesis between Orthodoxy and nationalism. Gregory Jusdanis, in his *Necessary Nation*, argued that there is a fundamental antinomy between the ecclesiastical conceptions of knowledge, time and progress and the nationalist ones in Greece.³⁶ Even if this conception of 'ecclesiastical wisdom' is accurate, it appears that there is a sharp difference between abstract Orthodox philosophy and concrete Church practice.

Indeed, there is recurrent pattern in the work of several critics of the Orthodox Church in both Greece and Cyprus. They have been repeatedly argued that nationalism is an un-Orthodox doctrine.³⁷ This line of approach to the issue at hand is fundamentally flawed, as it contrasts a political ideology with the teachings of a metaphysical dogma. An authoritative interpretation of the fathers of the Church is beyond the analytical scope of a social scientist. Moreover, religious institutions do not generally adhere to a transcendental reading of "sacred" books, like the Bible, or the Koran. On the contrary, such texts are constantly revisited and reinterpreted in light of the changing historical conditions. This is not true just for Orthodoxy, but for every other religion. Besides, let us not forget that religious institutions are, after all, social institutions, and not metaphysical ones.

To return to our exposition of theories of nationalism, a large number of modernist scholars of nationalism adopt an instrumentalist view of

³⁶ Gregory Jusdanis, 2001. The Necessary Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 109

³⁷ See also Nikos Chrysoloras, 2004. "Unorthodox Politics", in http://www.greekworks.com

nationality. This is particularly the case with Marxist and Neo-Marxist thinkers (e.g. Eric Hobsbawm), and rational choice theorists. For Hobsbawm, nations are 'invented traditions', used by elites to legitimize their authority. These traditions are invented, or constructed, through national education, national symbols, national monuments, and national ceremonies. In general, contemporary Marxist thinkers have been exceptionally hostile to nationalism.³⁸

Perhaps the most typical Marxist analysis of the relation between religion and nationalism in Greece has been carried out by Apostolis Harisis.³⁹ Harisis argues that the conflation between religion and nationalism in Greek political culture is the result of particular dynamics and configurations of power in Greek capitalism, and arises as a result of the manipulation of farmers, petty-bourgeois and 'luben' classes by capitalist elites. Structural-Marxist theories of Greek nationalism, though useful in identifying structural features of Greek political culture tend to reduce nationalism to a feature of the capitalist dynamics at a particular historical juncture, thus ignoring other facets of nationalism apart from the economic ones. Moreover, the reduction of nationalism to a conspiracy of some 'dark elites', which plot behind closed doors in order to manipulate the mindless masses, underestimates both the complexity of society and history, as well as

³⁸Especially classical Marxist thinkers like Rosa Luxemburg. However, even among classical Marxism, there were voices that saw nationalism as essentially an anti-imperialist (and thus progressive) force. See M.R. Ishay, (ed.) 1997. *The Human Rights Reader*, (London: Routledge). Moreover, the Communist Party of Greece has been supportive, or at least in line with several Church arguments, especially in the field of foreign policy, as we shall see in the following chapters.

³⁹ Apostolis Harisis, 2002. Θρησκεία και Πολιτική στην Ελλάδα [Religion and Politics in Greece], (Athens: Σύγχρονη Εποχή)

the dialectic between production and popular understanding of ideologies. Above and beyond that, we should add that important figures in Marxist currents of thought (e.g. Lenin, Otto Bauer) hailed nationalist liberation movements, and considered them as progressive reactions to colonialism.

Finally, ethno-symbolic approaches to nationalism (Anthony Smith, John Hutchinson) accentuate the significance of pre-modern ethnic symbols and cultural resources for the construction of national identity. Elites may have been able to produce nationalism, but their efforts were constrained by the cultural environment in which they operated and lived, since both them and the people were already bound together by cultural and ethnic mechanisms of social cohesion, including religions, customs, and traditions. Ethno-symbolism shifts the focus of the analysis of nationalism from economic, political, or socio-biological factors, to the importance of ideas, myths, memories, symbols, and traditions.⁴⁰ Ethno-symbolism has not been yet implemented in any comparative study of the role of the Church in producing Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalism. In spite of this, as we will be arguing in the following sections, ethno-symbolism is probably the paradigm which provides us with the most fruitful conceptual resources for studying the complex dynamics of Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalism. This is mainly because ethno-symbolism may offer theoretical solutions to the major flaws of the modernist paradigm on nationalism and offer answers to questions yet unresolved.

⁴⁰ Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism, p.59

These flaws can be summarized with reference to two points: first of all, modernist theories of nationalism fail to account for the immense role of the pre-modern past for the popular legitimization of nationalist movements, and the subsequent amalgamation of tradition and modernity in nationalist ideologies. This failure is basically the result of the overemphasis of many modernist scholars on forces of production (e.g. print capitalism- Anderson) and relations of production (e.g. unequal development- Gellner), which downplay the importance of the realm of ideas. Secondly, modernist theories of nationalism tend to exaggerate the role of the elites in manipulating the masses into nationalism, and thus contain 'conspiracy theory' undertones (e.g. Hobsbawm) which are unable to account for the durable effects of nationalist feelings in the human psyche. In other words, modernism fails to explain how ideology communicates with the 'masses' and affects individual identifications.

The above portrayal of some of the main theoretical arguments regarding nationalism was not by any means an exhaustive review of the bourgeoning literature around the subject. Besides, the study of theories of nationalism at an abstract level is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. The purpose of exposing the reader to some of the major theories of nationalism was to place this work within the wider context of academic debates regarding nationalism and national identity and to give a picture of the views on Greek nationalism which have already been conveyed.

This thesis will seek to challenge the aforementioned theorizations of Greek and Cypriot nationalism by putting forward an alternative angle of analysis. It will also aim to question the dominant theoretical scheme of Greek political culture, which has been articulated by Nikiforos Diamandouros. Diamandouros perceives Greek society as an arena where two political cultures are at conflict with each other: the first one, "the underdog culture", is anti-western, parochial, clientist, and statist in outlook (religious nationalism has sprang from this culture), and the other one is the culture of the "modernizers", inspired by the Enlightenment and its liberal ideals. Diamandouros believes that the latter political culture will eventually prevail within the milieu of the European Union. However, this is a reductionist and oversimplified approach to political culture, which maybe reflects the differences among Greek academics, but definitely underestimates the complexity of the Greek society.

First of all, the ideological horizon of Greek politics has been a great deal more fragmented than Diamandouros suggests, and the intellectual and social struggles during the first years after independence cannot fit into a one-dimensional spectrum which would divide the political map of Greece between two opposing camps. Even if there is an antagonistic struggle between two ideological formations in Greece, we should be aware that social antagonisms are a constitutive feature of every society and they are unlikely to be resolved with a *complete* prevalence of a particular political discourse.

⁴¹Nikiforos Diamandouros, 1993. "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-1991: An Interpretation", in Richard Clogg, (ed.), Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade, (Basingstoke: Macmillan), pp. 3-5. See also Nikiforos Diamandouros, 2000. Πολιτισμικός Δυϊσμός και Πολιτική Αλλαγή στην Ελλάδα της Μεταπολίτευσης [Cultural Dualism and Political Change in post-Authoritarian Greece], edited and translated by Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, (Athens: Αλεξάνδρεια), pp. 41-50. Other Greek authors also share similar views. Generally speaking, Diamandouros' theory is the dominant interpretation of Greek political culture today.

Antagonisms are the outcome of the essential contingency of subjective identities and the consequent impossibility for total closure in the horizon of social meanings. In contrast with Enlightenment, naturalist, or theological conceptions of identity which assume the existence of an autonomous and unified individual, the theoretical perspective adopted here emphasizes the social construction of identities and their inherent contingency. Identities are never permanently fixed, but always subject to change and reconstruction.

Furthermore, unlike what Diamandouros believes, the boundaries between discourses are not always clear, resulting to what some authors have described as 'the perpetual crisis of the 'Neohellenic identity'. For example, on the one hand, many Greeks were enthusiastic supporters of the late anti-European Archbishop of Athens, Christodoulos, and, in opinion polls, Christodoulos consistently ranked among the three most popular public figures. On the other hand, 68% of the Greeks are supportive of the country's E.U. membership (E.U. average 54%).42 In addition to that, even though the Church is a fierce critic of the E.U., it is a beneficiary of its budget. Consequently, when we make the distinction between 'modernizers' and 'traditionalists', we should bear in mind that individual's identities are not completely coherent. Individuals hold multiple and often self-contradictory views and self-images, which cannot always fit in a concrete theorization between two opposing ideologies. Subjects occupy numerous subject positions within a social structure. These subject positions constitute, in a sense, 'mini' fragmentary identities. A subject may therefore occupy a 'pro-

⁴² Standard Eurobarometer, vol. 56, p.20

European', a 'Christian', a 'nationalist', a 'right wing' and a 'worker' subject positions at the same time. The different subject positions of individual agents may at times conflict with each other in certain respects (e.g. someone may be a 'right-wing worker' or a 'pro-European nationalist'). In this case, different subject positions prevail under different circumstances.⁴³

A final point that demonstrates that the boundaries between the two opposing discourses of 'tradition' and 'modernisation' are blurred is that modernisation cannot exist outside a tradition. Modernisation presupposes a tradition,⁴⁴ and this is most evident in nationalist movements in which the past is 'recruited' in order to legitimize the present and the future. The whole meaning of concepts such as modernization, or secularization is defined in relation to what we usually call 'tradition'. In any case, Greek nationalism is far from a parochial traditionalist remnant, since, as modern social theory has repeatedly emphasized, nationalism in general is both modern and vibrant.

Despite the existence of the abovementioned theories of Greek nationalism, we should note that *most* of the literature of the 'academic left' on Greek political culture disregards questions about the emergence of religious nationalism and the reasons for its persistence. It just assumes that the Church is and has always been nationalist, and develops polemical arguments against this nationalism. Although this study will expose racist and nationalist elements in the political discourse of the Greek Orthodox Church, the aim is to proceed further than that. On the other hand, New-

⁴³ Obviously, there is a hierarchy between different subject positions. However, this does not change the fact that an individual may hold several contradictory self-images and positions.

⁴⁴Nikos Demertzis., 1997. "Greece", in R. Eatwell, (ed.), European Political Cultures: Conflict or Convergence?, (London: Routledge), p. 118

Orthodox academics view through rose-tinted glasses the role of the Church in Greek and Greek-Cypriot political culture. Sofia Mappa evaluates the current state of affairs in Greek social science work related to Orthodoxy, as follows:

With very few exceptions, Orthodoxy today constitutes the object of praise of the 'faithful' and the new-Orthodox...and the object of rejection... of those who are supposed to be prowestern and 'modernizers'...both the former and the latter spend most of their time reaffirming themselves and fighting each other, rather than reflecting or deliberating.⁴⁵

The majority of studies, which have addressed the issue of the political function of the Church of Greece, have been mainly concerned with the legal aspects of the problem. Especially the works of Alivizatos and Dimitropoulos have been very helpful in delineating the constitutional aspects of the complex relationship between the state and the Church. However, constitutional legal research is inept to account for the dynamics of an issue, which is so closely related to political culture.

Moreover, the vast majority of legal works (in particular the works of Venizelos) reduce the complexity of the subject matter to an issue of constitutional arrangements. A plethora of examples from around the world points out that constitutional separation between the Church and the state

⁴⁵ Sofia Mappa, 1997. Ορθοδοξία και Εξουσία στην Ελληνική Κοινωνία [Orthodoxy and Power in Greek Society], (Athens: Εξάντας), p. 20

⁴⁶ See Nicos Alivizatos, 2001. Ο Αβέβαιος Εκσυγχρονισμός [The Uncertain Modernization] (Athens: Πόλις), Evangelos Venizelos, Op. Cit., Panayiotis Dimitropoulos, 2001. Κράτος και Εκκλησία: Μία Δύσκολη Σχέση [State and Church: A Difficult Relationship], (Athens, Κριτική), Antonis Manitakis, 2000. Οι Σχέσεις της Εκκλησίας με το Κράτος- Έθνος [The Relationship between Church and Nation-State], (Athens, Νεφέλη)

does not necessarily confine religion to the private sphere nor it does produce a 'secular ethos'. This is particularly the case in the U.S.A. and Turkey for instance, where there are no established religions, but Christianity and Islam, respectively, have a considerable effect on the public life of these two countries. The Prime Minister of Turkey and the former President of the United States, for example, are not only 'men of faith', but, in addition to that, their religious convictions seem to have influenced their political agenda and caused controversy both in the interior and the international politics of these two countries.

Beyond the realm of practical politics, the effectiveness of the liberal doctrine of secularization has also been theoretically challenged. William Connolly, in his Why I Am Not a Secularist, contended that "secular models of thinking, discourse and ethics are too constipated to sustain the diversity that they seek to admire",⁴⁷ in the sense that they seek to hegemonize the public space with a singular view of public reason (like the one presented by Rawls⁴⁸), which excludes alternative pictures. However, a careful reading of Connolly leaves the reader with the impression that he has not yet managed to produce a concrete alternative to secularization, and that his "ethos of engagement and pluralisation" is a vague scheme. Moreover, the principle of secularization has managed to gain the acceptance of both the *neo-liberal* right

⁴⁷ William Connolly, 1999. Why I Am Not a Secularist, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), p. 6

⁴⁸What Rawls's liberal political project proposes is that people should use their public reason, independently of religious doctrinal adherences, and conform with the basic principles of justice as they are laid out in democratic constitutions. Reasonable comprehensive doctrines (i.e. systems of belief that define what is of value in human life), whether ethical, philosophical or religious, should not challenge the basic institutions of a democratic society, or else social cohesion is threatened. See John Rawls, 1993. *Political Liberalism*, (New York: Columbia University Press), especially pp. 35, and 58-59

as well as that of the democratic and radical left and there is not a concrete alternative legal framework, which will ensure the equal treatment of religions in a democratic society. The contribution of Connolly to the recent discussions about disestablishment is to be found in the fact he drew our attention to the reality that secularization and disestablishment may be essential for the protection of the rights of minorities in a multicultural society, but they are not a panacea. Moreover, Connolly is among those thinkers who have pointed out that legislative and constitutional secularization does not necessarily lead to societal secularization.

Besides, Durkheim maintained that there is no such thing as a 'nonreligious' society, since there can be no society without symbols, rituals, and beliefs that bind it together, or without some form of distinction between the sacred and the profane.⁴⁹ For Durkheim, religion performs similar functions as nationalism performs for Anthony Smith. Even sociologists who predicted the eventual withering away of religion, like Marx or Weber, accepted that at least up until the modern era, religion has been a primary source of social meaning.⁵⁰

These functions of religion remain relatively *unexamined* in Greek historiography of the Orthodox Church, which has yet to present a coherent social and political history of the Greek Church since independence.⁵¹

⁴⁹L. F. Edles, 2002. Cultural Sociology in Practice, (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 32. For a detailed account of the 'functions' of religion, see Emile Durkheim, 1915. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, translated by J. Swain (London: Allen &. Unwin)

⁵⁰Marx believed that religiosity will disappear with the eventual win of proletariat over capitalism. Weber thought that bureaucratic legitimization will replace divine legitimization of societal arrangements. See L. F. Edles, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 23-55

A notable effort to present a comprehensive summary of church-state relations in Greece is the one of Georgios Karayannis, 1997. Εκκλησία και Κράτος 1883-1997 [Church and State 1833 - Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures

Historical accounts of Orthodoxy are usually nationalist, like the 'official' Greek history of Paparrigopoulos,⁵² which exemplifies the primordialist perspective on nations, or they are written by theologians and support the historical narratives articulated by the Greek Church.⁵³ An exception to this rule may be the work of Paraskevas Matalas,⁵⁴ and some historical chapters in sociological or legal works which, however, are not detailed enough to grasp the complexity of the issue.

However, the most serious gap in the literature regarding Greek nationalism is the absence of a comparative study between metropolitan Greek nationalism and peripheral Greek nationalisms (Cyprus, Diasporas). This thesis is a case-study of Greek nationalism, but within a geographically comparative perspective. The comparison between Greece and Cyprus will not be balanced in its details, since the main focus will be on Greece. The aim of the comparison will be the extraction of theoretical conclusions regarding the relation between Orthodoxy and nationalism in Greek and Greek-Cypriot political culture. Therefore, the focus of the comparison is very specific and

^{1897], (}Athens: Το Ποντίκι). However, as the author admits in the preface of this work, his outlook is clearly journalistic and aims to present the course of events without any theoretical inferences.

⁵² Constantinos Paparrigopoulos, 1886. Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους [History of the Greek Nation], (2nd ed., Athens: Ανέστης Κωνσταντινίδης)

⁵³ See Leon Brag, 1997. Το Μέλλον του Ελληνισμού στον Ιδεολογικό Κόσμο του Απόστολου Μακράκη [The Future of Hellenism in the Ideological World of Apostolos Makrakis], (Athens, Αρμός), and Ch. Maczewski, 2002. Η Κίνηση της Ζωής στην Ελλάδα [The Zoi Movement in Greece], (Athens, Αρμός). Despite their pro-Church bias, these two works have some insights to offer to Greek ecclesiastical history. For a detailed, but somehow outdated review of the state of Greek historiography, see, Alexander Kitroeff, 1990. pp. 143-172, in M. Blinkhorn & Th. Veremis (eds.), Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality, (Athens: ELIAMEP)

⁵⁴ Paraskevas Matalas, 2002. Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία, οι Περιπέτειες μίας Σχέσης [Nation and Orthodoxy: the Adventures of their Relationship], (Heracleon, University of Crete Press). This is an extended M.A. dissertation written at the University of Crete and examines the Bulgarian and the Greek schism from the Constantinople Patriarchate. Another work of impressive quality is Paraskevas Konortas' 1998, Οθωμανικές Θεωρήσεις για το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο [Ottoman Perspectives on the Ecumenical Patriarchate], (Athens: Αλεξάνδρεια). However, this work only examines the Ottoman perspective on the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

limited to a particular social, cultural and historical context. However, the comparative aspect is necessary since, until now, a contrast between the dynamics of Greek nationalism in mainland Greece and in another country has not been attempted, despite the fact that it is widely accepted that nationalist movements develop differently within different social and historical contexts.

Cypriot economic, social and political development has been undoubtedly dissimilar to that of Greece, and this is not only due to the colonial past of the former. Greece and Cyprus have led different histories since the 11th century when the latter ceased to be a province of the Byzantine Empire. Furthermore, Cypriot society is far less ethnically homogeneous than the Greek one. The comparative outlook of this study will hopefully provide some insights into the role of Orthodoxy in fostering nationalism under different social contexts.

On the whole, there are only a handful of noteworthy studies regarding Greek-Cypriot political culture. Possibly, the most notable of those is the work of Caesar Mavratsas.⁵⁵ Despite the theoretical depth of this analysis, Mavratsas only dedicates five pages to the role of the Church in the production of nationalism, only to repeat the antithesis between the ecumenicity of Orthodoxy and nationalism, which has already been noted by Kitromilides. Kitromilides⁵⁶ has also written on the effects of Greek irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus, along the same line of reasoning.

⁵⁵ Caesar Mavratsas, 1998. Όψεις του Ελληνικού Εθνικισμού στην Κύπρο [Facets of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus], (Athens: Κατάρτι)

⁵⁶ Paschalis Kitromilides, 1990. "Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus", in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 26:1, pp. 3-15

Moreover, we should note the work of Niyazi Kizilyürek⁵⁷ who blames the present discontents of Cyprus to the existence of ethno-nationalisms in both sides, but again does not give a detailed account of the role of Orthodoxy in cultivating ethno-nationalism.

Finally, the Cyprus problem has drawn considerable attention from anthropologists, who seek to explain the different understandings of history and identity among the two ethno-religious communities. Influenced by the work of the prominent Cypriot anthropologist, Peter Loizos, Rebecca Bryant's recent study, titled *Imagining the Modern*, argues that "two conflicting styles of nationalist imagination led to the violent rendering of Cyprus in 1974 and sustained this division over the decades". According to Bryant, these "conflicting styles" turned Muslims in Cyprus into Turks, and Christians into Greeks. Nonetheless, the author allocates very few pages to the institution of the Orthodox Church, and its role in the aforementioned procedure of the nationalization of religious identities.

Expectantly, this review revealed that there are indeed gaps and inadequacies in the literature regarding the production of nationalism by the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Churches, which necessitate the conduct of further research. Nonetheless, the aim of this project is not simply to cover gaps in the literature, but also to develop a new perspective on Greek nationalism by using a theoretical framework which has not yet been applied in the Greek

⁵⁷ Niyazi Kizilyürek, 1999. Κύπρος: Το Αδιέξοδο των Εθνικισμών [Cyprus: the Dead end of Nationalisms], (Athens: Μαύρη Λίστα)

⁵⁸ Rebecca Bryant, 2004. *Imagining the Modern – the Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*, (London: Tauris). On the Greek case, see as well Umut Ozkirimli & Spyros A. Sofos, 2008. *Tormented by History – Nationalism in Greece and Turkey* (London: Hurst)

case, and thus analyze historical and political phenomena that do not fit to existing theorizations. This framework is based on the fundamental assumptions of the ethno-symbolic approach to nationalism. These assumptions are justified and reinforced through the use of the major methodological tools of discourse theory. The specific concepts which are relevant to the Greek case will be explored in subsequent chapters.

II.II. Theoretical Framework and Methodology

An immediate question which may occur to the reader is why we should attempt this juxtaposition of two different theoretical frameworks. The answer to this question may be extracted from the previous section. Given that the logic of this dissertation is question-driven, the reason for choosing to bring together these two theoretical frameworks is that they can provide us with sufficient answers to the questions left unanswered, or unconsidered, by other methodologies. To put it simply, ethno-symbolism is used to explain how Orthodoxy served as a pre-modern cultural resource as well as a stable institution in order to consolidate Greek and Greek-Cypriot identities. Discourse theory is used to explain how Helleno-Christian nationalism has been socially and linguistically constructed and sustained over the past two centuries. The two theoretical traditions act as complementary to each other in this dissertation, and may therefore explain both the pre-modern cultural roots of Greek nationalism as well as its longevity.

II.II.i. Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism

The era of the emergence of modernity was a time of crisis in Europe. This crisis was a derivative of new developments in the economic base of society (industrialization, vernacular print capitalism, etc.), the political system (consolidation of liberal systems of government in bureaucratic states with clearly demarcated borders), and the cultural superstructure ('death of God'). Existing political cosmologies were unable to explain and accommodate the aforementioned radical break with the pre-modern world in their symbolic order. They were therefore dislocated and replaced by the new cosmology of nationalism. So, what was nationalism all about?

The political aims of the nationalist project are to some extent 'universal', meaning that they do not significantly vary among different cases of nationalist movements. "These generic goals are three: national autonomy, national unity, and national identity, and, for nationalists, a nation cannot survive without a sufficient degree of all three". 59 The core themes of nationalist ideology as they are presented by Anthony Smith are the following:

Table 1: The Core Themes of Nationalist Ideology⁶⁰

- 1. Humanity is naturally divided into nations.
- 2. Each nation has its peculiar character.
- 3. The source of all political power is the nation, the whole collectivity.

⁵⁹ Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism., p. 9

⁶⁰ Source: Anthony D. Smith, (1983: 21), as cited by F. Halliday, 1997. "Nationalism", in J. Baylis & S. Smith, (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p. 362

- 4. For freedom and self-realization, men must identify with a nation.
- 5. Nations can only be fulfilled in their own states
- 6. Loyalty to the nations overrides all other loyalties
- 7. The primary condition of global freedom and harmony is the strengthening of the nation-state.

These 'core themes of nationalist ideology' are widely accepted as the founding rules of legitimacy of the modern interstate system. They are reflected in the basic texts of contemporary international law,⁶¹ international politics,⁶² and international political theory.⁶³ When, and if, a specific community achieves a 'sufficient degree' of its abovementioned 'generic goals', it follows that a nation has been constructed and a significant part of what is perceived by nationalists to be the national population has internalized a national identity.

As we can conclude from the table above, the emergence of nationalism is inseparably linked with the 'objective' conditions of modernity. Nationalist ideology required the establishment of some notion of citizenship, since, for nationalists, sovereignty lies with the people (and not with the

⁶¹ See for example Article 1, §2 of the U.N. Charter, which states that among the basic purposes of the U.N. is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples…". This principle of national self-determination was later 'promoted' to a human right in international law. See for example the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), The Helsinki Agreement (1975), the Vienna Declaration (1993), etc.

⁶² Especially among the dominant realist school of international relations (e.g., K. Waltz). However, even liberal-institutionalism nowadays accepts these principles, while Neo-Marxist schools of autonomous development (e.g. I. Wallerstein) contain nationalist overtones.

⁶³ Even liberal political theorists, who are supposed to have cosmopolitan principles, accept the basic themes of nationalist ideology. For example, in 1861, John Stuart Mill wrote: "Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a *prima facie* case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart". John Stuart Mill, in M. R. Ishay (ed.), *The Human Rights Reader*, p. 282

king).64 It also requires, or aims at, the founding of a centralized state, something which only became technologically, economically and politically feasible at the dawn of the modern era. Furthermore, the presence of a vernacular language which would ensure undisrupted communication between the members of a nation greatly facilitated the nationalist cause. In this sense, the emergence of nationalism is unthinkable in pre-modern contexts. Thus, in his *Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Anthony Smith points out that modernists, meaning those who share "a belief in the contingency of nationalism and the modernity of the nation," must be right.65 By acknowledging this fact, ethno-symbolism distinguishes itself from perennial and primordial approaches to nationalism. In short, nationalism could adequately accommodate the novel conditions of modernity into its ideological symbols, and therefore managed to make the new social reality intelligible to subjects.

The obvious question which now emerges is why nationalism in specific, and not some other ideological discourse? Modernism, with its exclusive emphasis on the conditions of modernity, fails to explain the specificity of the nationalist system of beliefs, as well how nations came to acquire a positive ontological status in the eyes of the 'people' in Europe and elsewhere. The answer of ethno-symbolism is that we should search at the 'ethnic origins of nations'. Identities do not emerge *ex nihilo*. The starting

⁶⁴ I use the term citizenship with caution here. Rather than referring to the formalistic sense of the term (universal suffrage and voting rights), citizenship here implies a form of political self-awareness of the sovereign nature of the referent population, as well as a degree of political participation. Political participation may take various forms other than voting (e.g. commitment to a revolutionary cause, wide participation in social upheavals, etc)

⁶⁵ Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 11

point of a new identity is a previous one. What we mean by this is that new symbolic orders do not only emerge through the creation of new symbols, but also through the *re-arrangement* of existing symbols in a new order. This is necessary for a smooth passing from one hegemonic political discourse to another since individuals are more easily 'converted' if the new ideology uses some familiar symbols, rituals, and practices. The conclusion drawn from this line of thought is that pre-modern ethnic, religious, and cultural material not only shaped the character of individual nations but it was also a necessary condition for their emergence. It was probably as equally necessary as the objective conditions of modernity were.

This conclusion differentiates ethno-symbolism from classic modernist accounts of nationalism. It explains the specific nature of nationalism by referring to pre-existing ethnic ties. Thus, ethno-symbolists are not "constructivists" ex nihilo. To put it in Smith's words, "the rise of nations and nationalism is placed within a framework of earlier collective cultural identities, and especially of ethnic communities, or ethnies".66 The category of ethnie accounts for the longevity of nationalism, by emphasizing the importance of strong pre-modern cultural bonds. It also explains why nationalism was so successful in communicating with the people, since it emphasizes the role of the politicization of cultural norms as the basic method of legitimization of nationalist claims. It gives answers to the question of why nationalism has been a 'universal' social phenomenon which has arisen during several historical phases of modernity, and in all the continents of the

⁶⁶ Anthony D. Smith, 2001. Nationalism (Oxford: Polity), p. 58

globe, and tended to hypostasize in different forms under different social contexts. This is obviously because culturally and historically specific communities existed everywhere, well before nationalism emerged. Finally, it explicates why there is no single canonical text of nationalism, like it is the case with other political discourses, since the political ideas of each nationalist movement differed in each case, and were dependent on the different historical and social environments. In short, ethno-symbolism deals with the questions left unanswered by the modernist paradigm: "By relating national identities to prior ethnic ties, and showing the influence of subjective dimensions of shared symbols, myths and memories, ethno-symbolism throws light on the continuing hold exercised by nations over so many people today".67

After making these important preliminary observations, we may now proceed to a working definition of the nation for the purposes of this dissertation: Nation is a modern mode of conceiving the political identity of a population, based on the politicization and re-interpretation of pre-existing cultural material and symbolic resources in this referent population by nationalists. In other words, it is the ideology of nationalism that defines what is the nation, and not some 'objective' criteria. A subjective definition of the nation has been chosen over an 'objective' one, since the use of 'objective' elements (geography, history, religion, 'race', ethnicity, citizenship, etc.), and their articulation within a particular system of meaning which describes 'what is the nation' differs from case to case and ultimately depends on the

⁶⁷ Anthony D. Smith, Op. Cit. p. 59

handling of symbolic resources by nationalists. Thus, nationalism is an ideology which constructs the "nation-as-this and the people-as-one." Moreover, this definition places emphasis on the existence of pre-modern communal affiliations and allegiances ('pre-existing cultural material') in the nationhood-construction process. Hence, it attempts to explain the intertwining between tradition and modernity within nations, while it hopefully avoids the essentialism of 'objective' definitions. Finally, this definition pre-supposes that an image of the nation may exist in the minds of nationalists well before the people who are supposed to constitute the nation have internalised a national identity. This definition merges discourse theory with ethno-symbolism. But how can this 'blending' be usefully translated into the Greek case?

II.II.ii. Discourse Theory and Nationalism

Like every fashionable word in the world of social sciences, the concept of 'discourse' has been widely used and abused in a variety of different contexts. 'Discourse analysis' has been used to describe a plethora of different methodologies, from the extreme positivist/behaviouralist end of content analysis, to structural linguistic analysis and post-structuralist (Derridean, Lacanian, etc.) analysis of 'texts'. I use the term 'discourse' here as almost synonymous to the one of 'ideology'. The reason for choosing to refer to 'discourse' instead of the more familiar concept of 'ideology' is that particular emphasis is placed on the linguistic and semiotic elements that did

⁶⁸ Jacob Torfing, Op. Cit., p. 193

hold Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalist doctrines together. This paper rejects the idea that discourse (or ideology, for that matter) is a form of 'false consciousness':

Discourse analysis refers to the process of analysing signifying practices as discursive forms, This means that discourse analysts treat a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic material – speeches reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas, even organizations and institutions – as 'texts' or 'writings' that enable subjects to experience the world of objects, words, and practices.⁶⁹

The linguistic connotations of the term 'discourse', as opposed to the one of 'ideology', are important for the purposes of this thesis. In contemporary linguistics words, or 'signifiers', do not contain a fundamental meaning in themselves, other than the one that is assigned to them in relation and in opposition to other signifiers. This relational aspect is crucial in understanding concepts such as 'nation', 'Hellenism', and 'Orthodoxy', as these were shaped and evolved within various systems of meaning (discourses).

Conversely, discourses are particular ways of perceiving social reality. The exterior world is not sensed by the individual as a series of random and unconnected events. On the contrary, social reality is meaningful in the sense that language mediates between the 'real' and our discursive perceptions of the 'real' (what we may call 'reality') and therefore ascribes 'meaning' to the world. Discourses are schematic and historically specific systems of meaning which

⁶⁹ David Howarth, 2000. *Discourse* (Buckingham: Open University Press)

determine the individual's sense of reality and place its practices within the context of a particular symbolic order. Consequently discourse is not a form of 'false consciousness'; it is the only possible form of consciousness.

Unlike other 'post-modern' social theories, discourse analysis is neither idealistic nor it reduces the social world into language. The perspective on discourse analysis adopted here does not deny the existence of a world exterior to human thought or language; that would constitute a form of arbitrary idealism. It just states that the social world acquires meaning only through language. Words like nation, people, democracy, republic, acquire different, and often contrasting meanings in different political discourses. Hence, each 'signifier' is not objectively connected with a particular 'signified'. The signifier nation does not 'naturally' signify anything specific, unless it is placed within the context of a political discourse. This basic principle is widely accepted in modern linguistics.

The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God' depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute

themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence.⁷⁰

Discourse theory is therefore the study of emergence, logic, hegemony, and eventual dislocation of discourses. Discourses are never completely stable systems of meaning. Since they are only representations of the world, and not the world itself, they are unable to explain every possible contingency, historical situation, or social change. Political ideologies are themselves 'languages' through which the world becomes intelligible. Thus, they are always vulnerable to criticism and change, by disillusioned individuals or groups.

In this sense, discourse analysis avoids possible charges of 'hyper-structuralism', since it leaves sufficient space for agency, relative autonomy, and self-institution. Discourse analysis is a 'creative catachresis' of the concept of 'discourse' which is now used in a much wider than its original linguistic sense. It is a technique for studying any meaningful social practice, and thus any human practice, since, for discourse theorists, any human practice is meaningful. Discourses are therefore systems of meaning that are bound together be particular signifiers (e.g. 'the nation') and make the social world intelligible to subjects. These systems of meaning are contingent ideological structures which are subject to change, since a discourse can neither close the horizon of social meanings nor represent the 'real'.

Another nodal point in the logic of discourse analysis is 'antagonism'.

Despite the fact that one may acknowledge that there are some positive

⁷⁰ Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe, 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, (London: Verso), p. 108

aspects in group or individual identities, the fundamental logic of identity construction is basically negative and oppositional. The hegemony of a certain discourse always suppresses, or at least ignores, other possibilities. Similarly, individual political subjectivities are constructed on the basis of a series of oppositions (I am a father means I am not a mother, I am a worker means I am not a bourgeois, I am Greek means I am not Turkish, Western European, or Slav). In David Campbell's words, "the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside', a 'self' from an 'other', a 'domestic' from a 'foreign'."71 Identities are never fully positive. This is especially the case when it comes to nationalism. Nationalism illustrates the importance of drawing political, social, and cultural frontiers between 'us' and 'them', in constituting individual and collective identities.

Therefore, a discourse analysis perspective on nationalism would skeptic towards other 'post-modern' theories of nationalism which talk about the 'twilight of nations', 'post-national identities', 'deterritorialization', etc, for two main reasons: first of all, because of the remarkable ability of nationalism in drawing frontiers, and thus fostering stable identities, and secondly, because identities are not easy to get rid of. Even if one acknowledges her nationalist identity, or the nationalist character of her actions, this does not mean that it would be easy for her to assume a different identity. "Perhaps the post-modern consumer can purchase a bewildering

⁷¹ David Campbell, 1998. *National Deconstruction*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), p. 9

range of identity-styles. Certainly, the commercial structures are in place for the economically comfortable to change styles in the Western world ... One can eat Chinese tomorrow and Turkish the day after ... But being Chinese or Turkish are not commercially available options".⁷² Identities are not clothes that one can change at will. A different political identity (e.g. a European identity), can only replace existing ones, only if it manages to perform similar functions and deal with the 'weak points' of previous identities. However, the presence of antagonisms in every society ensures that alternative subjectivities and discourses may always emerge.

...The social only exists as a partial effort for constructing society- that is, an objective and closed system of differences-antagonism, as a witness of the impossibility of final suture, is the 'experience' of the limit of the social.⁷³

Discourses are internalized by subjects either through the exercise of force by privileged actors of a social milieu (e.g. state), or through the ritualization of certain social practices associated with particular discourses. These practices are experienced by individuals as parts of 'their way of life' and their identity. Even if individuals do not realize, their socialization into practices and symbols usually associated with 'banal nationalism' plays an extremely important role in their transformation into nationalist subjects. This emphasis on symbols and practices is one of the main meeting points

⁷² M. Billig, 1995. Banal Nationalism, (London: Sage) p.139

⁷³ Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe, Op. Cit. p.125

⁷⁴ For example, the ritualization of practices like the eating of the Paschal lamb, the Good Week fast, and the attendance of Sunday Masses, fosters the Eastern Orthodox Christian identity of Greeks.

between discourse theory and ethno-symbolism. It explains the cross-class penetration of nationalism, since the roots of the phenomenon are to be found in the political and cultural superstructure rather than in the economic base. By arguing for this 'primacy of the political', discourse theory avoids the shortfalls of classic Marxist approaches on nationalism.

We hope that it is obvious by now that this thesis rejects any primordialist, essentialist (e.g. Marxist-determinist), and sociobiological perspectives on modern nations and nationalism. Instead, it is closer, at an ontological and epistemological level, with those approaches/theoretical traditions that view modern nations as discursive constructions of nationalism. Nationalism is viewed in this paper "as a way of imagining political community and communitarian fullness". 75 The fact that nations and national or religious identities are discursively constructed does not make them any less 'real'. Conversely, discourses are materially effective in the sense that they determine political subjectivities and constitute subject positions within a society, and they are "materialized in specific types of institutions and organizations". 76 This ontological stance also implies that the author is conscious of what Rawls calls 'the burdens of human judgement' and suspicious of any claims of 'scientific objectivity'. That said, we should note that a balanced and coherent approach to the subject of Greek national identity is possible, while the aim is to avoid the polemic and overwhelmingly biased (even hysteric) rhetoric of some previous analyses.

⁷⁵ Jacob Torfing, New Theories of Discourse, p. 193

⁷⁶ David Howarth, 2000. Discourse, (Buckingham: Open University Press), p. 94

The question which now emerges is where does ethno-symbolism fits in all this. Discourse theory alerts us to the dangers of reducing discursive formations, like nationalism, to a mere reflection of the economic conditions of modernity. Nationalism cannot be reduced to rational self-interested motivations, economic conditions, and institutional dynamics. As important as the aforementioned factors may be, the play of identifications should be at the heart of any effort to study group actions and human agency in nationalist movements. Our perspective may also explain how nationalist discourses were constructed on the basis of pre-existing symbols, practices and symbolic material. In this way, it enters the area of ethno-symbolism. Moreover, the valuable insight of ethno-symbolism "merely displaces the terms of our paradox. Surely ethnic and cultural elements are also the products of social, historical construction – a construction that took place in earlier centuries and went through a successful process of sedimentation and/or re-activation. In that sense, we seem to need something more to make sense of the attachment of people both to the nation and to its ethnic fabric".77 The emphasis placed by discourse theory on the oppositional, exclusionary and salient nature of identities is of seminal importance in our effort to appreciate this attachment.

The theoretical framework adopted here has been summarized in an article co-authored by the writer of the thesis at hand and Yannis Stavrakakis. The article, titled, "(I Can Get No) Enjoyment: Lacanian Theory and the Analysis of Nationalism", was published in the peer-reviewed academic

⁷⁷ Yannis Stavrakakis & Nikos Chrysoloras, 2006. "(I Can Get No) Enjoyment: Lacanian Theory and the Analysis of Nationalism", in Psychoanalysis Culture and Society, vol. 11, p. 147 Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 70

journal *Psychoanalysis Culture and Society* in 2006, and was well received among academics who study Greek nationalism. Although its outlook was theoretical and the article was not focused on the Greek or Cypriot cases, its main arguments were used in subsequent case-studies of facets of Greek nationalism.⁷⁸ Moreover, an earlier articulation of some of the arguments of this thesis, regarding the emergence of Helleno-Christian nationalism, has been published in the journals *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* and *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*.⁷⁹ The two articles have been cited by several authors.⁸⁰

II.III. Applying Political Theory to the Study of Political Practices: The Greek and Greek-Cypriot Cases.

The foregoing analysis of the relevant theoretical frameworks hopefully provides clear indications about the way in which our perspective on the political theory of nationalism will be applied in the context of the Greek and Greek Cypriot cases: our initial engagement with the particular case-studies of the dissertation at hand, will start by examining the structural conditions that facilitated the birth of nationalism in the two countries that will be studied here. Here, Anthony Smith's emphasis on 'the crisis of

⁷⁸ See the book of Akis Gavriilidis, 2007. Στον Κόσμο των Αυθεντικών Είμαστε Όλοι Ξένοι [In the World of Authentic, we are all Foreigners], (Athens: Πανοιτικόν), where the author applies the theoretical framework of Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras in his study of Greek nationalist intellectuals, particularly of the acclaimed Greek composer Mikis Theodorakis.

⁷⁹ Nikos Chrysoloras, 2004a. "The Political Discourse of the Greek Orthodox Church", in *the Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, vol. 30.1.2004, pp. 97-119 and Nikos Chrysoloras, 2004b. "Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political Culture", in *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, vol.4.1.2004, pp. 40-61

⁸⁰ See for example, Maria Koundoura, 2007. The Greek Idea: The Formation of National and Transnational Identities (London: Tauris), p. 189. Tomasz Kamusella, 2009. The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe (Basingstoke: MacMillan), p. 263. Yannis Stavrakakis, 2008. The Lacanian Left, (New York: SUNY Press), p. 208

legitimation' in pre-modern societies and the existence of 'ethnic' cultural material in the referent populations which later formed nations is instrumental for understanding why Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms took their specific forms in these specific communities. Subsequently, discourse theory will be used to analyze and elucidate the semiotic/rhetorical structure of nationalist discourses and the practices that perpetuate them: "the multifarious practices and rituals, verbal and non-verbal, through which a certain sense of reality and understanding of society were constituted and maintained".⁸¹

Hence, the importance of cultural bonds and customs that provided populations in present day Greece and Cyprus with a sense of community cannot be underestimated. For a number of reasons, Orthodoxy was the most prominent of these bonds. This is not only because, like nationalism, religion is a comprehensive doctrine that ascribes meaning to most aspects of the society in which one lives in. Social hierarchy, good and evil, sacred and profane, ethics, relations with the other sex and the social Other, daily routines, etiology of natural phenomena, customs, even dietary habits, are just some of the aspects of human life that have been profoundly influenced by religion, especially in pre-modern times, when science had not yet put religious metaphysics into question.

Moreover, we could not fail to note the absence of any other significant social institution or cultural characteristic which could match the place of Orthodox Christianity in the lives of the people in Greece and Cyprus. This

⁸¹ Aletta Norval, 1996, p.2 as cited in David Howarth, Discourse

becomes evident if we consider that the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Sultan could not unite around political parties, military leaders, armies, or any other political or cultural force, simply because this was strictly prohibited in the Ottoman Empire. Needless to say that identification with the Sultan himself, a distant ruler with a foreign language, religion and habits, was not any less improbable. On the other hand, Orthodoxy, beyond its prominent place in the system of beliefs of Christian subjects, enjoyed quite important political privileges and rights, which made its transformation into a vehicle of nationalist political claims, a likely outcome.

The details of the politicization of the Orthodox culture will be examined in the following chapters. For the moment, it is worth pointing out that nationalism not only shifted the meaning of concepts like 'Greece', 'Cyprus', 'Christian', 'Muslim', 'nation', and others; it also used these concepts in the construction of a new reality for the people of the region, in which both personal ('I') and collective identities ('we') are seen through the prism of the Helleno-Christian political discourse.

II.IV. Sources

I have reached to the abovementioned conclusions following the study of a wide range of primary and secondary sources, related to my research question. More specifically, my basic primary source for the formative period of Greek nationalism, which is examined in Chapter III of this thesis, were the Archives of the Greek National Awakening [Ta Apxela της Ελληνικής Παλιγγενεσίας]. This is a collection of the full body of available legal

documents, speeches, official statements, and laws, which were issued during and immediately after the Greek War of Independence. They were published in 2003 by the Parliament of Greece, both in electronic form and in 28 hardcopy volumes. In this priceless source of historical information, the reader can observe and appreciate the fierce ideological and political struggles which marked the "birth" of modern Greece, as well the first signs of the consolidation of Helleno-Christian nationalism. Moreover, I consulted all of the constitutional texts of modern Greece and Cyprus, in which a meticulous researcher can trace the institutional dimension of Helleno-Christian discourse. Finally, as I am going to argue in the following chapter, Helleno-Christian nationalism was crystallized in Constantinos Paparrigopoulos' monumental work, titled The History of the Greek Nation - from the ancient years until the present day [Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους – από των αρχαιοτάτων χρόνων μέχρι των νεοτέρων], which was completed in 1876. Paparrigopoulos was the historian who shaped the narrative of the "uninterrupted history of the Greek nation", in which Orthodoxy is a primary factor of unity. Since the thesis at hand places this narrative under scrutiny, Paparrigopoulos' history was a basic point of reference. Needless to say, I conducted research on the work of other important 19th century Greek historians, intellectuals and decision makers (e.g. Adamantios Koraes, Theoclitos Pharmakidis, Constantine Oikonomos, Spyridon Zambelios, and others). However, their views do not feature extensively in the thesis, since, as I demonstrate in the relevant chapters, the formation of Helleno-Christian nationalism started to take shape

in the legal documents of the War of Independence, and was completed by Paparrigopoulos.

Further primary sources of data were the official Church publications, statements, and leaflets (e.g. Apostle Varnavas [Απόστολος Βαρνάβας] – the periodical of the Church of Cyprus; Ethniki Epalksi [Εθνική Έπαλξη] - a periodical publication of the Church of Cyprus). Special emphasis was also placed on the views expressed by archbishop Makarios, of the Church of Cyprus, and archbishop Christodoulos, of the Church of Greece. As it will become obvious in the following chapters, these two personalities had a profound influence in the political discourse of the Church of Cyprus and Greece, respectively. During their archbishopric tenure, all dissenting voices within the Church were marginalized, while, for the vast majority of the population in Greece and Cyprus, Christodoulos and Makarios were considered the rightful "voices" of Orthodoxy, by virtue of their place as heads of the respective Holy Synods. Hence, the reader of the thesis will find several references to Sunday sermons, books, speeches, statements and political manoeuvres, by Christodoulos and Makarios.

As part of my research, I spent two years in Greece, six months in Cyprus, as well as three weeks in Istanbul. During this period, I had the chance to attend Sunday masses, listen to several sermons, follow closely the local press, study opinion polls and social surveys, discuss my research with academics, clergymen (including Patriarch Bartholomew) and intellectuals, visit Greek and Cypriot libraries, and even observe, as participant, numerous rituals related to the Helleno-Christian culture. References to this rich body of

ethnographic material are mostly found in the introduction and the fifth chapter of the thesis. Nonetheless, my central arguments are the product of the study and interpretation of legal documents, and archival and historical sources, and not of ethnographic research or participant observation. Although a discussion regarding the epistemological foundations of ethnography is well beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth pointing out that the reason for excluding *some* of the field research material is the fact that, due to my personal background, I *often* found it impossible to position myself "objectively" within the particular cultural context of my case studies.⁸² Therefore, the study of discourses (texts, ideologies, institutions, laws) from a "safe distance" was seen as a much more reliable route to draw sound conclusions. This is not to suggest that ethnography lacks heuristic value, but only a remark regarding its *weight* the specific research project.

The theoretical framework of the thesis was formed while I was studying for an M.A. in Political Theory at the University of Essex and, later, while attending the Doctoral Workshop in Ethnicity and Nationalism, at the London School of Economics. Although it is original, I draw on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, both in the field of nationalism studies, and in political philosophy (see bibliography). Some of my initial findings were also presented and discussed in workshops and academic conferences,⁸³

⁸² See: Edward Said, 1995. Orientalism (London: Penguin); James Clifford, 1988. The Predicament of Culture (Boston: Harvard University Press);

⁸³ June 2004, ECPR Standing Group on European Studies Conference, John Hopkins University, Bologna Campus. Paper presented on "Orthodoxy, Greek national identity and the European Union; April 2004, ASEN Conference, LSE, London: "The Nationalism Debate". Paper presented on the relationship between religion and nationalism in Greece; February 2004, 6th Annual Kokkalis Workshop, JFK School of Government, Harvard University: "Religion in South-Eastern Europe: Historical and Contemporary". Paper presented on the Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 76

and subsequently published in the form of three articles in peer reviewed academic journals.⁸⁴ In short, the questions posed in this thesis have been tackled from almost every available angle.

[&]quot;relevance of A.D. Smith's theoretical framework for the study of Greek nationalism"; June 2003, 1st LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece: "Current Social Science Research on Greece". Paper presented on Religion and Nationalism in Greece

^{84 &}quot;I Can Get No Enjoyment: Lacanian Theory and the Analysis of Nationalism" (with Yannis Stavrakakis), in *Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society*, vol. 11, 2006, pp. 144–163; "Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greece", in *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, vol. 4.1., July 2004, pp. 40-61; "The Political Discourse of the Greek Orthodox Church", in *the Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, vol. 30.1, June 2004, pp. 97-119

Chapter III: The Period of National Identity Construction in Greece, 1830-1864

III.I. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to describe, analyze and explain the emergence of nationalism in Greece. Initially, and in accordance with the modernist approach, we will be arguing that the emergence of the nationalist phenomenon in Greece is inseparably linked with the objective conditions of modernity. The emergence of an educated Greek-speaking middle class, the development of trade and industry, and the diffusion of the liberal, secular and scientific spirit of the Enlightenment in the Greek peninsula, were instrumental factors for the construction of the idea of the nation. In that sense, the Greek nation- like every nation- is an historical and social construction which emerges as a result of the fundamental split between the pre-modern and the modern.

However, none of these two features (historicity and social construction) of Greek nationalism- or any nationalism for that matter- can explain the longevity, specificity, and power of nationalist identifications. If Greek national identity was constructed for specific socio-historical reasons, then why has it shown such a remarkable resistance to reconstruction or deconstruction over the past two centuries? If Greek national identity is a simple by-product of the adaptation process of a pre-modern society to a modern bureaucratic state, then why is the Greek nation still the primary locus of individual and collective identification in late-modernity? If Greek nationalism has been 'produced' by modernized elites and intellectuals, then why was it 'consumed' by the people? If nationalism has been inspired by the

ideals of Enlightenment, then why has Orthodoxy been the cornerstone of Greek national identity?

Modernist and constructionist approaches are unable to provide answers to those questions. The value of the theoretical framework which is proposed in this dissertation is to be found in its ability to deal with such questions which would otherwise remain unresolved by alternative approaches.

The main argument of this chapter is that in order for nationalist symbols (language, institutions, architecture, paintings, music, etc.) to gain public acceptance and popularity, they have to build on and integrate preexisting demotic cultural material, with which people are already familiarized and which they hold dear. The main source of cultural material in the Greek speaking areas of the Ottoman Empire was the Orthodox Church and its traditions. Therefore, Orthodoxy was instrumental for the consolidation of Modern Greek national identity, and an essential component of Greek Helleno-Christian nationalism. Let us start though by providing the reader with the historical background on the politicization of the Orthodox Church, which may explain both why the Orthodox tradition exercised such influence over Greek-speaking populations of the Ottoman Empire, and why its position in the Greek state which emerged after the War of Independence became an issue of heated political debate. Subsequently, we will move on to analyze the political and ideological struggles that took place during the first years after independence. During this period of nation building and identity formation, several competing nationalist imaginaries tried to win the

allegiance of the people and the state and define the content of 'Greekness'. Out of these ideological struggles the hegemonic form of Greek nationalism, Helleno-Christianism, emerged which confirmed the position of Orthodoxy as an integral part of Greek national identity. Helleno-Christianism remains the dominant way of imagining Greek national identity even in our epoch.

III.II. Orthodoxy before Independence

The roots of the politicization of the Greek Orthodox Church can be traced back to the times of the Byzantine Empire. Since its establishment as the official religion of the Eastern Roman Empire in the fourth century, the Church became a department of the Byzantine state and played an active political role in the development of Imperial policy. The ties between the Church and the state in Byzantium were legal, political, and most importantly 'ideological' in nature. The emperor derived his power and legitimacy from God (' $\epsilon\lambda\dot{\epsilon}\omega$ $\Theta\epsilon\sigma\tilde{\nu}$ $\beta\alpha\sigma\lambda\epsilon\dot{\nu}$ s), and the official Orthodox dogma was under the protection of the state that showed little, or no religious tolerance at all. It may well be argued that the Byzantine emperor was carrying out the role of the holy inquisition in Byzantium, ⁸⁵ and that the religious policy of the Byzantine Empire was based on the doctrine, 'one God, one empire, one religion'. ⁸⁶

This attitude of the Byzantine Empire was not an idiosyncratically Eastern or Orthodox phenomenon. Throughout the medieval Europe, religious homogenization was seen as a precondition for the consolidation of

⁸⁵ V. Adrachtas, 2001. Op. Cit. p. 41

⁸⁶ Thid

that it remained an imperial institution throughout the rule of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires in the Balkans (altogether more than fifteen centuries), and therefore religion in the region did not follow the path of privatization which took place in the rest of Europe, where Enlightenment and nationalism displaced the protagonistic role of the Churches in public life.

The 'Great Schism' between Orthodoxy and Catholicism in 1054 divided Christian Europe into two parts, the 'Byzantine East' and the 'Papal West', with profound political consequences for the historical and social development of the two parts of the Continent. 88 If we add the regions that followed the Reformation to this map, we will see that the religious division of Europe remains unaltered until today, a fact that demonstrates the remarkable salience of religious identities even in the milieu of 'secular' modernity.

⁸⁷J. R. Llobera, The God of Modernity, p. 134

⁸⁸ Some commentators have even attributed the 2010 Greek financial crisis to the religious division between East and West. See for example Robert D. Kaplan, "For Greece's economy, Geography was Destiny", in *the New York Times*, April 25, 2010



Map 1: Religious Division of Medieval Europe. Source: Philip Ralph et al. 1997. World Civilizations, (Kingston, MA: R.S. Means Company)

It is, of course, well-known that the reasons for the division of Europe between Orthodox East and Catholic West were not solely theological in nature. Suffice to say that the Orthodox defiance to negotiate a rapprochement with the Pope before the end of the Byzantine Empire resulted in a brief occupation of Constantinople by the Crusaders, and, later on, the denial of Western Christian kings to help their 'Eastern Christian brothers' in their fight against the Ottomans. The justification for this denial was the rejection of the prospect for reunification of the two divided Churches by the Byzantines. Indeed, the issue of reunification of Catholicism and Orthodoxy became quite pertinent in the Byzantine Empire in the years just before the fall of the city. After a long period of deliberations and discussion, the Orthodox Church eventually rejected the Catholic demands for union. In reality, it is doubtful if the fragmented and weak West would be in a position to help the Byzantine Empire anyhow, since the Ottoman army

was at the zenith of its power during that period, and its forces even managed to reach the walls of Vienna later. The fall of Constantinople in May 29, 1453 marked the beginning of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans for the next four centuries.

The Byzantine legacy left its mark in the later formation of Greek nationalism in two important ways. Firstly, it isolated the territories which were to be included in the Greek state after the 1821 War of Independence from the rest of Europe. Ottoman rule in the Balkans meant that the development of nationalism in the region took place in a social environment relatively secluded from the rest of Europe and in a manner distinctively 'South-Eastern', given the particularities of the Ottoman system of government. To name one of these, anti-Western sentiments, which initially sprang from the ecclesiastical Schism, were further inflated by the Crusaders' occupation of Istanbul and their denial of help to the Byzantines in the face of the Ottoman hazard. In the last days of the Byzantine Empire, a Byzantine high official said that he would rather see the turban of the Turk rule in Constantinople, than the Latin Mitre.89 This anti-Western attitude influenced Greek-speakers of the Byzantine Empire, who gradually started to perceive themselves as different and distinct from the rest of the European Christians, led them to appreciate their linguistic heritage, and encouraged the use of the word 'Hellene' as a self description:

This development had been well prepared. In the eleventh century, the scholar-bishop, John Mauroporus wrote a poem asking Christ to

⁸⁹ Paschalis Kitromilides, 1994. Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy, (New York: Variorum), p. 191

save Plato and Plutarch. In the twelfth, the decoration of Digenis's Palace on the Euphrates...is described as showing Samson, David and Goliath; then Achilles, Agamemnon, Penelope, Odysseus, the Cyclops, and Bellerephon; then Alexander's victory over Darius, and his encounter with the Indian Brahmins; finally, Moses, the exodus, and Joshua...In the same century, a writer could describe his father as a pure Hellene and a bishop specifically contrasted Hellene with barbarian in promoting someone at court.⁹⁰

This juxtaposition of Hellenism with Christianity was of course initially an elite movement, with no evidence suggesting a wider popular appeal. However, it did exist among intellectuals and seminal personalities of the Byzantine world, like "Georgios Gemistos Plython (c. 1370-1452), Cardinal Bessarion (c. 1403-1472) and Constantine XI Palaeologus (1403-1453), the last 'Basileus and Autokrator of the Romans' ".91 Anti-Western sentiments were further enhanced by the Ottoman Empire and the Orthodox Church, due to both religious and political differences.

The second important mark that Byzantium left in the nationalist development of the region was the influence of Orthodoxy in the political and social life of the Christian subjects, as we shall see in the following section.

III.II.i. Orthodoxy during the Rule of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans

⁹⁰ Costa Carras, 2004. "Greek Identity: A Long View", in Maria Todorova (ed.), Balkan Identities – Nation and Memory (London: C. Hurst & Co), p.p. 313-314

⁹¹ Stephen G. Xydis, 1968. "Mediaeval Origins of Modern Greek Nationalism", in Balkan Studies, vol. 9, No. 1, p. 6

Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalist historiographies have created a number of myths with regard to the position of the Orthodox Church under the Ottoman rule. The most common of them suggests that the Church suffered greatly under the rule of a heterodox imperial ruler. Archbishop Christodoulos described the widely accepted view regarding the status of Orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire as follows: "Frequent insults against the Church and its emissaries, murders of patriarchs, archbishops and other priests, abusive characterizations of the Symbol of Faith, raids on holy temples and stealing of sacred valuables, turning of churches into mosques, and violent islamizations, are just some of the torments of medieval Hellenism".92

However, contrary to this common doxa, historical evidence suggests that the Church, far from being enslaved, actually operated as an institution of the Ottoman establishment: "The Patriarch and the high-ranking clerics had assumed responsibility for all the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman conquerors. Their power, privileges, and influence were great, not only in comparison with the Orthodox people, but also in comparison with most poor Muslims. We could actually argue that the prestige of Orthodoxy had been augmented after 1453, following the decision of the Sultan to allow the

⁹² Christodoulos, "Εισηγητική Ομιλία επί τη Ευκαιρία Συμπληρώσεως 180 χρόνων από την Έξοδο του Μεσολλογγίου" [Introductory Speech on the Occasion of the 180th Anniversary from the Messologi Exodus], April 10, 2006, cited in http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/archbishop/default

Patriarch to retain all of his Byzantine powers and to exclude the clergy from the requirement to pay annual taxes".93

In a highly decentralized system of government, in which local (often Greek-speaking) lords enjoyed great autonomy, the Church often found itself performing a number of administrative tasks, in addition to its typical religious and spiritual functions. These tasks included arbitration in local disputes, tax collection, and the supervision of the adherence of Christian subjects to traditional Orthodox family law. The words of the Sultan himself to the first appointed patriarch after the fall of Constantinople are clear: "Be Patriarch, preserve our friendship, and receive all the privileges that the Patriarchs, your predecessors, possessed". 94 The reasons which led the Ottoman Empire to transform the Orthodox Church into a component of the state apparatus are beyond the scope of this essay. It suffices to say that they were related both to a set of established governance practices in the Empire, as well as to the constant pressures created by the influence of Russia to the Orthodox populations of the Balkans. 95

In short, after the fall of the Byzantine Empire, and the emergence of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans, the Orthodox Church found itself again in an advantageous political position. Isolated from the emerging religious scepticism in Europe, local populations continued to live in accordance and harmony with Orthodox traditions, rituals, myths, and symbols. Moreover,

⁹³ Nikiforos Diamandouros, 2002 [1978]. Οι Απαρχές της Συγκρότησης Σύγχρονου Κράτους στην Ελλάδα, 1821-1828 [Political Modernization, Social Conflict, and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State, 1821-1828]. (Athens: MIET), p. 73

⁹⁴ Cited in John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, 1969. *Modern Greece*, (New York: Frederick A. Paeger), p. 189

⁹⁵ Stephanos Papageorgiou, 1988. Το Ελληνικο Κράτος, 1821-1829 [The Greek State, 1821-1829], (Athens:Παπαζήση), p. 31

the religious division between the subjects of the Empire (what is known as the *millet* system) benefited the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople who became the spiritual leader of all the enslaved Balkan Christians, responsible for the collection of some of their taxes, and the representative of the people to the Sublime Porte. "Subaltern Metropolitans, in their turn, became civil governors responsible for civil jurisdiction, enjoined, in the words of Mahomet II, to 'watch day and night those entrusted with their guidance, to observe their conduct, and to discover and report their lawless action to my government'; and they looked upon, and addressed, the holder of the Ecumenical throne as 'their sovereign, their emperor, and their Patriarch'".96

Finally, since religion became the main -and perhaps only- dividing line between Muslims and enslaved subjects, Orthodoxy developed into the primary locus of cultural and political identification among Christians. This was especially true in times when linguistic and ethnic identities were quite fluid within the milieu of the multi-ethnic and multilingual Ottoman Empire. An idiosyncratic example of this flexibility of identities was the ethnic group of *Karamanlis*, the members of which were Christians, but spoke only Turkish which they wrote with Greek characters.⁹⁷

The Christian subjects who formed the *millet-i-Rum* (literally, the nation of Romans) and fell under the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate were not, of course, exclusively Greek speakers. The Orthodox *millet* "contained Serbs, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Orthodox Albanians, and

⁹⁶ John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, 1969. *Modern Greece*, (New York: Frederick A. Paeger), p. 190

⁹⁷ Paschalis Kitromilides, 1994. Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy (New York: Variorum), p. 185

Arabs".98 What is interesting for the Greek and Greek-Cypriot cases is the progressive Hellenization of Orthodoxy in the course of the years between the fall of Constantinople and the Greek War of Independence.99 The Ecumenical Patriarchs as well as the vast majority of the highest ranking clergy were Greek speakers. This trend was the result of both the linguistically Greek Byzantine tradition and Orthodox ritual, but it also reflected the social hierarchy in the Ottoman Empire, in which the Greek element enjoyed a privileged status among the non-Muslim populations. One cannot fail to point out that this progressive conflation of the Greek language and culture with Orthodox Christianity served later as an important nation-building factor in the nationalist era.

However, during the period under investigation, the Hellenization of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Orthodoxy in general, did not lead the Church to an unreserved acceptance of Greek nationalist claims. On the contrary, its traditional anti-western sentiments, which dated back to the schism of 1054, meant that it considered Enlightenment as a Protestant and Catholic political project. Moreover, dialect variations between Greek speakers in the various parts of the Ottoman Empire impeded the communication of nationalist claims, while the same can be said about the conflicting interests and political aspirations of the different social classes of Greek speakers. Besides, we should not forget that nationalism had not yet

⁹⁸ Paschalis Kitromilides. Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy, , p. 185

⁹⁹ Charles A. Frazee, 1969. The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 6

¹⁰⁰ Nikiforos Diamandouros, 2002 [1978]. Οι Απαρχές της Συγκρότησης Σύγχρονου Κράτους στην Ελλάδα, 1821-1828 [Political Modernization, Social Conflict, and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State, 1821-1828]. (Athens: MIET), p. 75

been widespread in Europe, while the Orthodox Church functioned in a multi-ethnic Empire. For hundreds of years, Orthodoxy had been an imperial institution (Byzantine, and later Ottoman). Hence, its scepticism towards demands for the creation of national states was something to be expected, since it could potentially threaten the Church's political status.

In fact one of the main duties of the Orthodox Church was to ensure that the Christian subjects of the Empire would remain obedient to the Sublime Porte. Naturally, when the ideas of Western Enlightenment and nationalism reached the Balkans, the Church vehemently opposed them. Not only western conceptions of progress and science undermined the authority of the Orthodox Christian dogma, but they also threatened the ecumenicity of the Constantinople Patriarchate by encouraging local populations- mainly Slavic- to emancipate their Churches from the Greek-dominated 'Great Church' in Istanbul. Nonetheless, by the dawn of the 19th century, the spread of Greek nationalism among the Christian subjects of the Sultan was well under way. In the preface of an 1802 Greek-Rumanian-Albanian-Bulgarian lexicon, the author suggests the following course of action to the non-Greek speaking Christians:

Albanians, Vlachs, Bulgarians, speakers of other tongues rejoice,

And prepare yourselves all to become Greeks,

Abandoning your barbaric language, speech and customs,

So that they may appear to your descendants as myths.

Do honour to your Nations, together with your motherlands,

By making your Albanian and Bulgarian Motherlands Greek.¹⁰¹

Nationalism and the consequent nationalizations of local churches were developments that the Church opposed for religious, cultural, and Given the degree of control of the Church over the political reasons. education of Christian pupils, it was unavoidable that the ideas of the West and the Enlightenment were filtered through the Orthodox prism before they reached the curricula of the various Church schools around the Balkans. Moreover, many of the Greek 'Enlighteners' were clerics themselves, and therefore, they either transmitted the teachings of Voltaire from their Orthodox point of view, or, when they did not, they were persecuted. The Patriarch himself published, in 1798, an anonymous pamphlet called Πατρική Διδασκαλία [Paternal Instruction], in which he claims that the rule of the Sultan over the Orthodox Christians is a will of God. 102 Moreover, he suggested that Enlightenment "is a trick of the devil... while the so called political system of liberty may seem good at first glance, but it contains the spirit and the venom of Satan, which will lead peoples to loss and lawlessness". 103

This state of affairs created a tension between, what we would call, 'soft Orthodox enlighteners' who mainly lived in the territories of the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and their more radical Diaspora counterparts who lived in Western Europe. This tension would later be reflected in the political formations and ideological struggles which emerged during and

¹⁰¹ Cited in Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy, p. 189

¹⁰³ Nikiforos Diamandouros, 2002 [1978]. Οι Απαρχές της Συγκρότησης Σύγχρονου Κράτους στην Ελλάδα, 1821-1828 [Political Modernization, Social Conflict, and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State, 1821-1828]. (Athens: MIET), p. 77

after the revolution. What is certain is that the Orthodox Church was an important part of the everyday life, customs, and political organization of Christian subjects in the times of the Ottoman Empire, and that, since it functioned in accordance with the Eastern Byzantine tradition and under the auspices of the Ottoman apparatus, it was reluctant to identify with western-bred nationalist movements.

III.II.ii. the Church during the 1821-1829 War of Independence

Unlike what is still sometimes maintained in Greek political historiography,¹⁰⁴ the Orthodox Church was very reluctant to support the nationalist War of Independence. As we explained above, there were serious political, cultural, and religious reasons for that. The Orthodox establishment knew that its spiritual and political authority was put into question by local warlords, politicians, and Western-bred nationalists. Indeed, Patriarch condemned the uprising and excommunicated revolutionaries, 105 whiles the Paternal Instruction was published in Constantinople, a pamphlet which, as we have seen above, urged the Christians before the War of Independence to accept the authority of the Sultan, and denounced the ideas of liberty and civil disobedience as the works of devil and the atheist French Revolution. However, Gregory's conservatism did not save him from decapitation by the Ottoman mob when the news about the massacre of Turks in Tripolitsa reached in Istanbul. His

¹⁰⁴ Christos Yannaras, 1992. Ορθοδοξία και Δύση στη Νεώτερη Ελλάδα [Orthodoxy and the West in Modern Greece], (Athens: Δομός]

¹⁰⁵ Paschalis Kitromilides, 1994. Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy, p. 193

brutal killing turned him from a fierce critic of the revolution to one of its martyrs in the eyes of the Orthodox people, and, together with the support of low-ranking clerics, it served as a legitimizing factor for this very un-Orthodox war.

Besides, the revolutionaries could only legitimize their endeavour and thus mobilize the local population by presenting it as being in accordance with the will of God and the Orthodox dogma. This is clear in the sources of the time. For example, the revolution was often presented as the realization of a series of popular folklore myths which predicted the rebirth of the Byzantine Empire, the return of the 'Race of Princes' to the throne of Constantinople, and the resurrection of the last Emperor of the Byzantine Empire, Constantine Palaeologus, who had supposedly turned into stone after the fall of the 'City' in 1453. The most popular of these prophecies was one that claimed that a fair haired race will deliver the Christians from the evil of the Turkish yoke. Φιλική Εταιρεία [Friendly Society], the freemason-like group which played a seminal role in the organization of the revolution, purposefully built on these myths and repeatedly implied that the fair haired race (i.e. the Russians), will back the War of Independence. 106 Hence, the revolution was presented as a Christian struggle against a Muslim oppressor.

The popular painting shown below for example, called 'the Oath', shows a Greek revolutionary taking an oath of allegiance to the *Friendly Society* and the cause of Greek Independence in the presence of a priest. This

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 263-275

is an explicit symbolism which suggests that the revolution enjoyed the support of the Church.



An 1823 letter of the "minister of religion" of the second revolutionary government, to the bishops of the Cyclades islands is indicative of the effort to legitimize the War of Independence on Orthodox grounds:

The Greek race, having suffered from the tyrants for almost four centuries, having been deprived from its right to self-government, having been scorned and mocked because it observed its sacred rules, has started an armed struggle against the infidel oppressors, in order to achieve political sovereignty and honour its Orthodox faith... may our Lord and Saviour be with us, and guide our decisions.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Hellenic Parliament, 2003. Τα Αρχεία της Ελληνικής Παλιγγενεσίας 1821- 1832 [The Archives of the Greek National Awakening, 1821-1832], vol. 14., p. 265 (Original Text in Greek: Το ελληνικόν γένος, στένον υπό τον τυρρανικόν ζυγόν τέσσαρας σχεδόν αιώνας, εστερημένον ιδίας πολιτικής νομοθεσίας και διοικήσεως, περιυβριζόμενον και περιφρονούμενον δι΄ ην ετήρει θείαν και εκκλησιαστικήν νομοθεσίαν, εκίνησε τέλοσπάντων τα όπλα κατά των άθεων τυράννων ίνα και την πολιτικήν του ύπαρξιν συστήση και τα αμωμήτου και ορθοδόξου πίστεως επιστηρίξαν θεία και ιερά όρια ευκλεώς καταλαμπρύνη και όλως ειπείν έθνος αναδειχθή, εξ αμφοτέρων τούτων των συστατικών του συγκροτούμενον. Επείδεν άνωθεν ο επουράνιος βασιλεύς και προστάτης του γένους, αποδέχθη τον ζήλον κατεύθυνε να διαβήματα ημών....)

In September 23, 1823, the head of the Greek revolutionary government, analyzed the role of religion in public life, in a formal letter he also sent to the prelates of the Cyclades islands:

The role of the ministers of our national church is to enlighten our people, to spread the word of the Gospel, to set an example of virtue, to teach Greeks respect towards our sacred traditions... and to contribute to the creation of citizens who will be praiseworthy successors of their ancestors and will perform their holy duties, assigned to them by heaven.¹⁰⁸

The "holy duties assigned by heaven", in which the author of the aforementioned letter refers, is the obligation to serve in the cause of the War of Independence, which is supposedly the will of God.

But why was this justification of revolution on religious grounds necessary? The answer to this question partially lies to what has been argued in the previous section. Throughout the years of the Byzantine, Frankish, and Ottoman rule in the Balkans, the Church was the only institution that retained an extensive degree of civil and spiritual authority in the Balkan Peninsula. In the absence of a stable state and army, generation after generation of local peoples changed imperial rulers and local prelates, with the Church being the only stable point of reference as a source of authority and legitimacy. Moreover, since the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires isolated the local populations from the influence of historical, social, and intellectual developments which took place in Europe, Orthodoxy remained the only

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., vol.10, p. 208

locus of cultural identification, and united the Christian subjects of the Empire under a set of common rituals, practices, customs, and rights, which formed the core of their identity. It is worth that the revolutionary government often used a sanctified language to address the people, or even threatened those who were not obeying its will, with religious retaliations. For example, the minister of religion issued a command in 1822, according to which, those who helped the bandit revolutionary Odysseus Androutsos will be excommunicated. Among other religious curses, he mentions the following:

In the name of our Lord, all those who cooperate with this unholy monster, this lawless enemy of our religion and our nation, will be excommunicated, and cursed, they will not be buried, and will be left rotting when they die....They will meet the fate of Judas, and will wonder upon the earth like Cain.¹⁰⁹

Further evidence of the Orthodox Christian solidarity during the initial stages of the struggle for independence can be found in the historical records of the time. Many of the protagonists of the revolution were not Greek speakers, while Rigas Feraios, its ideological father and a Hellenized Slav, argued for the formation of a multi-ethnic Christian Republic in which the Greek element will hold a seminal position. The political discourse of the

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., vol. 14, p. 254 (Original text in Greek: Τον οποίον εν ονόματι Κυρίου Σαβαώθ, με όλους εκείνους όσοι ποτέ ήθελαν φανή βοηθοί από τώρα και ύστερα εις τα επιβλαβή φρονήματα του κακοποιού τούτου, του καταφρονητού της θρησκείας, του παραβάτου των νόμων, του εχθρού της πατρίδος, τούτους πάντας μετ΄ αυτού έχομεν αφωρισμένους, κατηραμένους, ασυγχώρητους και αλύτους μετά θάνατον και τυμπανιαίους. Κληρονομησείαν...την αγχόνην του προδότου Ιούδα. Στενόντες είησαν και τρέμοντες επί της Γης ως ο Κάιν...)

revolutionary governments often implied that the Greek nation owes its existence to Orthodoxy:

The character, the customs, the ethos, the elegant language, the ancestral glory, and the name of our nation derive from our holy religion. We owe our very political existence and independence to our religion, since the Great Lord of Christians, who defends his Church, fights on our side against tyranny and blasphemy.¹¹⁰

Moreover, it is often forgotten that the War of Independence broke out simultaneously in mainland Greece, and the Danubean principalities, where Romanian-speaking populations were in majority. However, the revolution only survived in the southern parts of Greece (Peloponnese, the Cyclades islands, and Roumelis).

Finally, there was a further-more practical- reason which necessitated the support of the Church for the War of Independence. In poverty ridden regions, the -often fortified for fear of bandits and pirates- monasteries were important sources of funding for the war, while Sunday masses gave the opportunity for revolutionary indoctrination to illiterate local peoples. Indeed, despite the excommunication of the revolutionaries by the Patriarchate, many bishops and clergy in Peloponnesus, the southern part of the Greek mainland, joined the struggle:

¹¹⁰ Ibid., vol. 10, p. 207 (Original Text in Greek: Το ελληνικόν έθνος εις την ιεράν του θρησκείαν οφείλει τον χαρακτήρα του, τα ήθη του, τα έθιμά του, την προγονικήν του εύκλειαν και το λαμπρόν ονομά του. Εις την ιεράν του θρησκείαν οφείλει τα σημερινάς αριστείας του, την ανεξαρτησίαν και την πολιτικήν του ύπαρξιν, διότι Μέγας ο Θεός των χριστιανών, όστις υπερασπίζεται τα δίκαιά των και την αγίαν του εκκλησίαν και συμμάχεται μετ' αυτών κατά της ανομίας και της ασεβείας)

There, Bishop Germanos of Old Patra distinguished himself in the capture of his city from the Turks; other bishops were imprisoned and died while in captivity in Tripoli. Many village priests (there were 2,400 in the Peloponnesus in 1821), since they were natural leaders of their communities, enthusiastically joined the armies which sought the expulsion of the Turks.¹¹¹

However, there were various problems regarding the support of the Church for the nationalist cause of the Greeks. First of all, this support could only be given at a local level, since, as we have already noted, it was not feasible for the 'Great Church of Constantinople', to officially support a nationalist and separatist struggle. Other autonomous Christian churches, like the church of Crete, tried to contain the spread of the War of Independence in their territories. The bishop of the province of Chania, in Crete, for instance, wrote the following letter to be read during the Sunday mass in every Church under his jurisdiction, in July 15, 1822:

Our Great master, the Sultan, has ordered me to reassure you that you should not be afraid. If you lay down your arms and swords and demonstrate your allegiance to him, he will do you harm. Even if you have participated in the revolution, and have realized your mistake, he will forgive you like a good father.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Charles Frazee, 1977. "Church and State in Greece", in John T. A. Koumoulides (ed.), Greece in Transition – 1821-1974. (London: Zeno), p. 130

¹¹² Hellenic Parliament, 2003. *Op. Cit.*, vol. 15a, p. 116 (Original text in Greek: Λοιπόν ιδού και τώρα με προσταγήν του υψηλότατου αυθεντός μας, σας γράφω πάλι και σας βεβαιώνω δια στόματός του ότι ποτέ κανέναν φόβον μην έχετε. Μονον να ελθήτε και να προσκυνήσετε για το καλό σας, να ήστε πάλι εις τα σπαθιάν και πράγματά σας απείρακτοι και ανενόχλητοι. Επειδή και εκείνους όπου από την αγνωσίαν τους και με να τους γελάσουν κακοί άνθρωποι εσύκωσαν τα άρματά τους κατά της Τουρκιάς, σαν γνωρίσουν το σφάλμα τους και *Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures*

In other words, many officials and bishops of the Orthodox Church found it difficult to endorse the revolution, even if they wanted to. In addition to that, it gradually became evident that the struggle of independence could only be fought and won in -mainly- Greek-speaking regions. This was due to both tactical-strategic and socio-economic reasons, which lie beyond the scope of this essay. It thus became more and more a nationalist, rather than a social or religious struggle.

Therefore, even the local clergy, which also enjoyed a number of privileges under the Ottoman regime, began to doubt the cause. On the other hand, those church officials and clerics who joined the war had to come into conflict with the Patriarchate which remained faithful to the Sultan. Christos Yannaras also emphasizes the canonical problems which were caused by the revolution: The Patriarchate was unable to exercise control over the liberated regions and thus elect new bishops, arbitrate ecclesiastical disputes, or send holy Myron (holy oil), which is necessary for the baptism of Orthodox children.¹¹³

The 3rd National Assembly, which was convened in 1827, addressed the issue and decided that the Greek Church should not become autocephalous, but temporarily autonomous. The bishops who participated in the Assembly argued the following:

Since all of us, and above all the holy clergy of the Eastern Church, know no other mother than the Great Church, and no other head,

μετανοήσουν και αφήσουν τα άρματα, τους ευσπλαχνίζετε, τους συμπαθά και τους βάνει πάλι εις τας αγκάλας του, ωσάν καλός κύρης τα παιδιά του)

¹¹³ Christos Yannaras, 1992. Ορθοδοξία και Δύση στη Νεώτερη Ελλάδα [Orthodoxy and the West in Modern Greece], (Athens: Armos), p. 262

other than the Patriarch of Constantinople, and, since his Holiness, Patriarch Gregory was sacrificed a few years ago in defence of faith and country, it is impossible for us to break apart from this Church, and so the Bishops who currently preach in Greece will govern our churches, according to our strength, without causing any schism or division in our spiritual and ecclesiastical unity [with the Church of Constantinople].¹¹⁴

Nonetheless, this anomalous situation in which the spiritual leader of the revolutionaries was politically opposed to their struggle and subject to an enemy of the newborn state would later create problems to independent Greece and was finally resolved with the autocephaly of the Greek Church. The most important intellectual of the Greek Enlightenment, Adamantios Koraes, had pointed out the problem from as early as 1821:

The part of Greece which has been liberated thus far does not need anymore to recognize as ecclesiastical head the Patriarch of Constantinople for as long as Constantinople remains stained by the throne of the unholy tyrant, but needs to be governed by a Synod of priests, elected freely by the lay and the clergy, as it was besides happening in the ancient Church, and is still maintained in Russia which shares the same religion with Greece. For it is not fitting for the clergy of the liberated Greeks to obey in the commands of a

¹¹⁴ Cited in Ibid., p. 264

Patriarch who is elected by a tyrant and is obliged to live under the sword of a tyrant.¹¹⁵

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Orthodox tradition and way of life had to co-exist in the Greek kingdom with the modern and secular ideals of the West which were advanced by the philhellenic movement, the post-revolutionary Bavarian government and the western-bred intellectuals of the revolution: This 'Hellenic' "strand of modern Greek identity... posited classical Ελλάς (Hellas), in a central position in attempts to articulate a modernizing vision for the populations and territories in question. Informed by the intellectual force of the Western European Enlightenment and supported by its localized rearticulation in what has been called Neohellenic Enlightenment, this strand looked forward and backward: forward towards the establishment of a Hellenic state with clear European orientation, and backward towards the rediscovery/invention of a classical Greece that Western Europe, or more broadly Europe, claimed as one of its originary topoi, and that was, in addition, purged of the contaminating presence of the backward 'oriental barbarism' of the Ottoman Empire, and to a lesser extent of the memory of what was still viewed as Oriental Byzantium". 116 In that sense, the juxtaposition of Orthodoxy with modern politics turned out to be a necessary, but problematic political articulation, in the new framework which was created as a result of the successful War of Independence.

¹¹⁵ Cited in Ibid., p. 265

¹¹⁶ Umut Ozkirimi & Spyros Sofos, 2008. Tormented by History – Nationalism in Greece and Turkey, (London: Hurst), p.22

III.III. Orthodoxy after the War of Independence, 1830-1864

As we have seen in the previous sections, there has been an ideological friction in the Greek-speaking world during the revolution. On the one hand, there was a population that defined its identity with reference to its religious persuasion, as well as with the rituals and practices which were associated with this religious affiliation. On the other hand, nationalism and the spirit of the Enlightenment (including science and secularism) had come to Greece by Diaspora Greek-speaking intellectuals who were more detached from the Orthodox culture of the Ottoman East. And, in the middle of all this, were those in charge of drawing the ideological and political principles of the War of Independence who tried to reconcile this friction. Finally, one should always bear in mind that the War of Independence was legitimized in the eyes of romantics and neo-classicist Europeans on the basis of the ancient Hellenic heritage of Modern Greeks. Frederick Rosen summarizes the reasons for which the War of Independence drew public sympathy in England:

- 1. The birth of European civilization was indebted to the ancestors of Modern Greeks (who used similar alphabet and language), and therefore all European countries had to support the Greeks as a sign of recognition of this huge obligation.
- 2. Greeks were a Christian people who were fighting hard against the faithless Turks. Lack of support to the Greeks in their holy struggle meant that [Europe] would ignore its Christian duties.
- 3. Support towards Greece would lead to the creation of trade opportunities, not just with this new state, but with the wider

Mediterranean region, since this would limit the influence of the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁷

The problems that these ideological frictions created in the nation-building process of the newborn Greek state became apparent from as early as 1827. In that year, the 3rd National Assembly attempted to delineate who is Greek and who is not. In article 6, of the constitution it produced, it concluded to the following criteria:

Greeks are:

- a. All locals within the Greek territory who believe in Christ.
- b. All the Christians who migrated from the Ottoman territories to our liberated land, in order to participate in the War of Independence, or to live here.
- c. Everyone who has been born abroad to a Greek father....¹¹⁸

In any case, the destruction of the Ottoman navy in Navarino by the allied English, French, and Russian naval forces, that same year, opened the way for the creation of a geographically compact, but, *de jure* at least, independent Greece. However, it would not be an overstatement to argue that what the first Greek governor, Ioannis Kapodistrias, found when he came to Greece in 1828 was complete and utter chaos. Empty coffers, continuing battles with the Ottoman forces, a country run by local warlords and bandits, and a central government the authority of which did not extend

¹¹⁷ Rosen, Frederick, 1998. Ο Ελληνικός Εθνικισμός και ο Βρετανικός Φιλελευθερισμός, [Greek Nationalism and British Liberalism], translated by Maria-Christina Hadjiioanou, (Athens: Κέντρο Νεοελληνικών Ερευνών Εθνικού Ιδρύματος Ερευνών), pp. 27-28

¹¹⁸ Hellenic Parliament, 2003. *Op. Cit.*, vol. 3, p. 652. See the appendices for the original text in Greek


beyond the gates of the capital, were just a few of the problems that the governor had to face when he accepted his post. Naturally, ecclesiastical issues did not feature high in his priorities. Nonetheless, the severed links between the Greek clergy and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the fact that the Patriarch did not recognize the existence of an independent Greece posed a problem for him, a problem which he unsuccessfully tried to solve. His efforts for a rapprochement with the Ecumenical Patriarchate were largely fruitless. However, despite the fact that he was a very religious man himself, he did adopt a set of secularizing measures in line with western European legal systems. For example, the creation of a proper judiciary system, which included courts of appeal, limited the authority of church tribunals. On the other hand, his policies which aimed at the improvement of the financial and educational situation of the Greek Church and clergy were fragmentary and short-lived.¹¹⁹

After the assassination of the first Greek Governor, the 'Great Powers' of Europe decided to appoint Prince Otto of Bavaria as king of the Greeks. Clearly, king Otto and his Bavarian government took the neo-classicist side in the debate concerning Modern Greek identity. They transferred the capital from Nafplion to the historically symbolic city of Athens (which was then a mere village of not more than 4,000 people), they commissioned the construction of a series of impressive neo-classical buildings, and worked hard so as to create a legal framework for Greece similar to the one already established in Western European monarchies.

¹¹⁹ Charles Frazee, Op. Cit., p.74



Picture 1: The University of Athens. It was built in 1839 based on a study drawn by the Danish architect Christian Hansen



Picture 2: The National Library in Athens



Picture 3: The Academy of Athens



Picture 4: The Cathedral of Athens, completed in 1862. Note that its style is alien to Orthodox architecture

Within this general climate of modernization and westernization, the Bavarian regency tried to solve the aforementioned problem between the Greek Church and the Patriarchate along the lines and the philosophy of the Western model of church-state relations. In 1832, Otto wrote to his father: "If the heads of the Greek Church get involved into politics, by explicitly supporting a specific party, this could be dangerous for the monarch, because it would turn the whole clergy and the people against him. This problem may be circumvented if we create a governing body for the Church and place one of the bishops of the country as its head. The head of this Synod will be like the Speaker of our parliaments, meaning that he will not hold real executive

powers. The king will also have the authority to appoint new members on this Synod, at regular intervals". 120

In other words, it was clear that Otto would strive to weaken the Russian influence in Greece, which was mainly communicated by the Orthodox Church, and consolidate royal authority within the borders of the new state. In March 15, 1833, the Bavarians established a committee that would analyze the current state of affairs in the Greek Church and suggest ways to ameliorate its condition. The committee was led by the secretary of state on religious and educational issues and the liberal bishop Theoclitos Pharmakidis, both members of the English party. The commission unanimously decided in its first meeting that "recognizes no other spiritual leader other than its founder, Jesus Christ, and no other political leader than the king of Greece, while it remains dogmatically united with all the Eastern Orthodox Churches". 122

With a royal decree of 1833, the Eastern Orthodox Apostolic Church of Greece was declared autocephalous and independent from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The attempt of the government to resolve the ecclesiastical issue concluded to the following decisions:

1) The Church of the Kingdom of Greece does not recognize any other spiritual leader other than the founder of the Church, Jesus

¹²⁰ Cited in John A. Petropoulos, 1997 [1968]. Πολιτική και Συγκρότηση Κράτους στο Ελληνικό Βασίλειο, 1833-1843 [Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843], (Athens: MIET), p. 218

¹²¹ Lena Louvi, "Το Ελληνικό Κράτος 1833-1871: Το Πολιτικό Πλαίσιο των Πρώτων Βηματισμών [The Greek State 1833-1871: the Political Framework of its first Steps]", in Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού 1770-2000 [History of Modern Hellenism 1770-2000], Athens: Ελληνικά Γράμματα, vol. 4., p. 11.

¹²² Georgios Karayannis, 1997. Εκκλησία και Κράτος 1833-1897 [Church and State 1833-1897], (Athens: Το Ποντίκι), p. 13

Christ, while its political head is the King of Greece, and it shall remain independent of any other Church.¹²³

2) The Greek Orthodox Church is administered by a 5 members Synod, while a royal representative participates in every meeting of this Synod. Any decision taken in the absence of the royal representative is not valid. The Greek Church retained only its spiritual and dogmatic bonds with the other Orthodox Churches.¹²⁴

It was clear that these views represented a westernized model of ecclesiastical organization, and reflected the stance of the Bavarian government. What is more important though, is that the seeds of the continuous intertwining between the church and the state over the past two centuries rest in the aforementioned decisions. From the publication of this royal diktat onwards, the Greek Church was not allowed to retain any form of relationship with other Orthodox Churches (in Constantinople and/or Moscow), other than strictly dogmatic and spiritual.

III.III.i. the Institutional Consolidation of the Helleno-Christian Thesis

The new canonical law which established the autocephaly of the Greek Church was drafted by the Bavarian jurist and regent, Georg Ludwig von Maurer, with the valuable help and support of two like-minded Greek officials, Spyridon Trikoupis and Theocletos Pharmakidis. Especially the latter played a vital role in convincing both the bishops of the Kingdom as well as a fair number of refugee bishops from the Ottoman Empire that

¹²³ Cited in Christos Yannaras, Ορθοδοξία και Δύση [Orthodoxy and the West], p.p. 266-267

¹²⁴ Georgios Karayannis, 1997. Op. Cit.

autocephaly was logical, necessary, and in accordance with the Orthodox tradition. John Petropoulos notes the "the arrangement concerning Church-state relations in Greece was directed by Maurer, viceroy responsible for ecclesiastical issues, education and justice. Maurer was a Protestant and the relevant decree was inspired by his own secular values and the example of Bavaria, where state authority was imposed on the functioning of both the Catholic and the Protestant Churches". We should also add that Maurer was himself the son of a Protestant pastor.

The precedent of the autocephaly of the Cypriot Church provided his arguments with additional support, while similar views had also been expressed by the most prominent Greek intellectual of the time, Adamantios Koraes. The first two articles of the royal decree concerning the autocephaly of the Greek Church read as follows:

Article One: The Orthodox Eastern Apostolic Church of the Kingdom of Greece, in spiritual matters recognizes no head other than the founder of the Christian faith, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, while in secular affairs it respects the authority of the King of Greece. It is autocephalous and independent of all other authority, but preserves perfect unity according to the doctrines professed by the Orthodox Eastern Churches.

Article Two: The highest ecclesiastical authority is entrusted, under the authority of the King, to a permanent Synod, entitled 'The Holy Synod of the Kingdom of Greece'. The King will determine by an organic

 ¹²⁵ John A. Petropoulos, 1997 [1968]. Πολιτική και Συγκρότηση Κράτους στο Ελληνικό Βασίλειο,
 1833-1843 [Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843], (Athens: MIET), p. 217
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decree of the Secretary of State who will exercise this authority, and under whom, as regards this authority, the Synod will act. The Synod will hold its meetings at the seat of the Government and it will have its own seal, with a cross engraved on it exactly like that on the national arms and with the inscription 'Holy Synod of Greece'. 126

Moreover, the decree ordered the closing of all monasteries with less than six monks, the mandatory expulsion from monasteries of all trainee monks and all nuns aged under 40, and the nationalization of the estates of the closed monasteries.¹²⁷ Hence, in September 25, 1833, 412 out of the 545 monasteries were closed down and their estates and valuables were confiscated in order to fund the deprived farmers of the new state. Nonetheless, many commentators note that, given the extensive corruption of that time, it is doubtful whether the seized property and holdings were actually used for the intended purposes.¹²⁸

Furthermore, the control of the state over church decisions was so firm that is expectantly triggered fierce reaction. As we noted above, a royal delegate was to attend all meetings of the Holy Synod, while any decisions taken in his absence would be considered null and void. In fact, any Synodal decision required direct ratification by the king. Church officials, who disagreed with this unusual state of affairs, seized the opportunity given by the revolt of 1843, which forced the king to limit his powers with the

¹²⁶ Charles Frazee, Op. Cit., p. 113

¹²⁷ Christos Yannaras, Ορθοδοξία και Δύση [Orthodoxy and the West], p. 272

¹²⁸ Georgios Karayannis, 1997. Op. Cit.

establishment of a constitution. They asked the National Assembly to withdraw the autocephaly clause.

Their demands were not accepted, but some amendments were made. The first post-revolutionary Greek constitution of 1844 reaffirmed the authority of the king, but clarified that the church recognizes no one as its head other than its founder, and is spiritually united with the 'Great Church of Constantinople' and every other Orthodox Church. In addition to that, article 40 of the 1844 constitution required that the succeeding heirs to the Greek throne should be Christian Orthodox. The same provision was also established for the royal delegate to the Holy Synod.

In the following years, the Greek government attempted to normalize its tense relations with ecumenical throne. Finally, in June 29, 1850, the Patriarchate declared the autocephaly of the Greek Church (without however recognizing its previous status as autocephalous), on the condition that its administration will be carried out in accordance with the 'Holy Canons', without any state interference. The Patriarchate demanded that the election of bishops to the Holy Synod, as well as other, strictly internal, affairs will not be subjected to state ratification. The Greek government accepted these demands and issued a new ecclesiastical charter in 1852 that limited the powers of the royal delegate - and the government - in the Holy Synod. That said, the royal delegate's presence remained necessary for the ratification of

¹²⁹ Ivi Mavromoustakou "Το Ελληνικό Κράτος 1833-1871: Πολιτικοί Θεσμοί και Διοικητική Οργάνωση [The Greek State 1833-1871: Political Institutions and Administrative Organization]", in Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού 1770-2000 [History of Modern Hellenism 1770-2000], vol. 4., p. 36.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

Synodal decisions, while the king was still the one who appointed bishops, although his decision was limited by the suggestions of the Holy Synod. The charter was not revised until 1923, whilst its basic principles remain the same even today.

In 1863, King Otto was expelled from Greece, and he was replaced by Prince George of the Danish royal house of Glücksburg. The house reigned until 1973, when monarchy was abdicated in Greece. A new constitution was drawn in 1864, in which, however, the provisions regulating church-state relations remained as they were.

The ecclesiastical charter's provisions obviously were related to the status Orthodox Church of Greece, which is also the main focus of this thesis. Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that not the entire geographical surface of modern Greece falls under the jurisdiction of the autocephalous Greek Church, which is limited to the territories of the first Greek state, with the additions of the Eptanese islands, Epirus and Thessaly. The island of Crete has its own semi-autonomous Orthodox Church. In the north of the country, there is the administratively autonomous monastic community of Mount Athos (*Aghion Oros*), while the ecclesiastical dioceses of the Dodecanese islands fall under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch. Finally, the territories that were annexed to the Greek state, during its century-long expansion, known as the 'new territories', have a different ecclesiastical status in comparison with the 'old territories', and their bishops are supposedly elected with the approval of the Ecumenical Patriarch.

With this ecclesiastical constitution the church continued the tradition of operating as a state department. The aforementioned royal decree brought it under the direct authority of the state and nationalized Orthodoxy in Greece, after the example of the Bavarian model. The essence and the spirit of this legal arrangement remain intact even in our epoch as we shall see in the following chapters. In addition to that, the laws of the Greek kingdom provided for the religious indoctrination of young pupils in the Orthodox dogma. The Holy Synod adopted the national arms as its symbol, and the state is using the sign of the cross as national arms. However, this legal regime only explains one facet of Helleno-Christianism, i.e. the nationalisation of Orthodoxy. We now need to turn our attention, to its other facet, which is the sacralisation of nationalism.

III.III.ii. The Ideological Consolidation of the Helleno-Christian Thesis

Unlike what is usually argued, the period of national identity formation in Greece was not characterized by the presence of only two opposing blocs: the modernizers and the traditionalists. In a sense, contemporary historians who analyze the ideological struggles of the period under investigation as a debate between "progressive modernizers" and "conservative traditionalists" seem to fall into the fallacy of anachronism. For how can the obvious differences between the vision of the Greek nation espoused by Rigas Feraios and the one espoused by Adamantios Koraes, fit into the "progress/tradition" dichotomy? Rather than that, as we shall see in the following pages, multipleand equally nationalist- paradigms of Greek national identity were

articulated by a plethora of agents: from a republican nationalism (Kairis, Koraes, and others), to an extremely theocratic conception of the nation (Oikonomos, Fanariots, and luben Orthodox). Between these two extremes, there were less radical, but equally nationalist views (Pharmakidis, Enlighteners, Bavarians, etc). Other nationalist views also existed, which cannot easily fit to a 'religious/ non-religious' ideological spectrum (e.g. the Helleno-Ottoman position).

The basic difference between these competing notions of 'Greekness' was the weight that classical antiquity, and Orthodoxy should respectively have in the formation of national identity. As Ozkirimli and Sofos rightly argue, the 'Hellenic' narrative of Greek national identity was characterized by a serious inconsistency: "the linear past of the nation was invariably disrupted, as Koraes and his disciples could not account for the severing of modern Greece's link to classical antiquity that arose from the establishment of a Christian (not Hellenic) Byzantine Empire, the 'dark' centuries of the Middle Ages, and the often 'unrational' conduct of the Church, the clergy and other elites that dominated the Rum millet of the Ottoman Empire". 131 On the other hand, "the Orthodox Church, despite its ambivalence regarding the Greek national(ist) project still had influence on local societies and Orthodoxy had permeated the realm of everyday life". 132 This tension between the main pillars of Greek national identity was reflected in the political discourses of the time.

¹³¹ Umut Ozkirimi & Spyros Sofos, 2008. Tormented by History – Nationalism in Greece and Turkey, (London: Hurst), p.82

¹³² Ibid., p. 83

For example, Bishop Theocletos Pharmakidis was the advisor of the Bavarians in ecclesiastical issues and a champion of Greek nationalism. His opponents accused him of surrendering the Orthodox Church to the authority of a heterodox ruler (king Otto), while his supporters communicated their views through the popular newspaper Αθηνά [Athena].¹³³ Undoubtedly, the royal decree of autocephaly, which, in essence, adopted every single one of his suggestions, was his greatest moment and a personal triumph. Pharmakidis' main opponent was Father Constantine Oikonomos, who challenged autocephaly both on theological and political grounds. The former called the latter 'Russian', while the latter responded by calling Pharmakidis 'crypto-protestant', through the like-minded newspaper Aιών [Aeon].¹³⁴ The Patriarchal Tome of 1850 which recognized the autocephaly of the Greek Church on the condition that it would remain dogmatically united with the Patriarchate was perhaps his only consolation for what he considered to be a new schism in Orthodoxy.

The main problem that the researcher of this period has to face is the absence of any data that would count the public's response to these ideological antagonisms. Nonetheless, the fact that the views of the opposing ideologies were represented by newspapers, demonstrates that the issue ranked high in everyday public discourse. Besides, the ecclesiastical dispute became the excuse of a popular revolt during that era against the Bavarian government. The revolt was led by a monk known as Papoulakos, whose

¹³³ Ibid., p. 284

¹³⁴ Paraskevas Matalas, 2002. Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία: Οι Περιπέτειες Μίας Σχέσης [Nation and Orthodoxy: The Adventures of a Relationship], (Heracleon: University of Crete Press)

political position without a doubt expressed a fundamentalist Orthodox political outlook. Papoulakos political discourse disputed the rule of law, which, in his view, was much less important than the Orthodox preaching.

Our law of Christ has been written by four evangelists, seven ecumenical and eleven local synods, and eleven thousand martyrs.¹³⁵

The fact that Papoulakos' revolt challenged the legitimacy of the Bavarian king and took the combined forces of the Greek army and navy to put down is illustrative of the penetration of Orthodox politics in the Greek culture of that epoch. Similar extremist Orthodox viewpoints continued to co-exist in parallel with mainstream politics throughout the course of the 19th century.¹³⁶

All of these nationalisms shared some common nodal points in their discourse: They all believed more or less to the superiority of the Greek nation and the Greek language at least in the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor, the need to hegemonize the Balkans with an educated class of Greek speakers, and the need to expand the Greek state. The first elected Greek Prime Minister, Ioannis Kolettis, stated in a famous speech he gave in 1844: "Due to its geographical location, Greece is in the centre of Europe, having the East in its right, and the West in its left, and its destiny has been to enlighten the West with its fall and to regenerate the East with its rebirth". It is quite interesting that, during this period, there were three major political parties in Greece: the Russian party, the French party, and the English party,

¹³⁵ Christos Yannaras, Ορθοδοξία και Δύση [Orthodoxy and the West], p. 291

¹³⁶ See Paraskevas Matalas, 2002. Έθνος και Ορθοδοξία: Οι Περιπέτειες Μίας Σχέσης [Nation and Orthodoxy: The Adventures of a Relationship], (Heracleon: University of Crete Press),

Ch. Maczewski, 2002. Η Κίνηση της Ζωής στην Ελλάδα [The Movement of Zoi in Greece], (Athens: Αρμός) and Leon Brag, 1997. Το Μέλλον του Ελληνισμού στον Ιδεολογικό Κόσμο του Απόστολου Μακράκη [The Future of Hellenism in the Ideological World of Apostolos Makrakis], (Athens: Αρμός)

each with a different view of the 'nation's destiny', and each representing the interests of a powerful European nation with different religious convictions and arrangements in its church-state relations.

Despite the existence of some common ground between the aforementioned nationalist imaginaries, there were undoubtedly important differences among them that necessitated either a synthesis or the eventual dominance of a particular national narrative. Republican nationalists like the renowned Greek enlightener Adamantios Koraes argued for the creation of a state in the model of western European standards and a national identity with particular reference to the 'classical heritage' of modern Greece. On the other hand, more traditionalist voices in the Greek society, mainly supporters of the Russian party, emphasized the importance of the Byzantine and Eastern tradition, and promoted a Slavic model of political organization. It is worth mentioning that very rarely have the intellectuals of that epoch questioned the place of Orthodoxy in Greek political and social culture.

The Church was also ideologically divided. While the patriarchate in Constantinople was usually in the Russian side, the Holy Synod in Greece was controlled by and expressed the views of the Bavarian government. However, even the patriarchate changed its position several times as a response to Russian policy, and appointments of new Patriarchs. The point here is that there was not at any time in Greece, during this period, a significant cosmopolitan, non-expansionist, and progressive political movement of modernizers. Such views would not even be imaginable by the majority of people, let alone legitimate, in the newly founded Greek state.

Moreover, there was not a unified Church policy, or a single source of an 'underdog' Eastern oriented culture. Concepts, such as "the East", "Orthodoxy", "the West", "Byzantium", "nation", etc. acquired different meanings and place within different discourses. The most peculiar example of such discursive ambiguities can be found in the word "genos", which came to denote, under different discourses, anything from "race", to the "Hellenic Volk", and from Greek speaking populations, to the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire. In short, the ideological horizon of Greek political culture during this period was vague. There was not a single source or a single type of nationalism, but instead many competing nationalisms. Within this context of political, social and discursive struggles, a particular national imaginary attained a hegemonic position in Greek society.

This hegemonic form of nationalist discourse was structured around a series of nodal propositions: a) there is a unified history of one Greek nation starting from the pre-Homeric era, through to Classical Greece, the Hellenistic epoch, the Byzantium, and continuing in modern Greece. b) The nation is bound together by geography, history, language, and religion. c) Being Orthodox Christian is an almost necessary prerequisite for being Greek. d) The Greek nation is superior to almost any other nation in the world since Greeks are the heirs of almost all the great civilizations of the West (Ancient Greek, Hellenistic/Alexander the Great, Eastern Roman/Byzantium). Hence, Helleno-Christian nationalism was (and still is) a comprehensive political discourse which claims that Greek national identity is based on two pillars: the ancient Hellenic cultural heritage, and Orthodox Christianity. This unreservedly cultural

form nationalism managed to transcend party and class differences, to legitimize government policies, to constitute political orthodoxy and to define publicly accepted social behaviours.

But why and how this happened? Our contention here is that the redeployment of Orthodoxy in a nationalist context was essential since religion was an indispensable part of the everyday life, traditions and customs of the Greek society. It was therefore the primary cultural material upon which national solidarity could be based. On the other hand, the Hellenic heritage of modern Greeks was both a necessary reference to a glorious past for the people of the newborn state, as well as a reason for the philhellenic sympathy towards the Greek cause in Western Europe. Hence, the fusion between religion and nationalism, classical Greece and Byzantine Empire, provided Greek irredentism with a valuable arsenal of arguments, demonized the enemy (i.e. the Ottoman Empire which conquered Constantinople and destroyed the Byzantine civilization), and offered a coherent national narrative which became the basis of national identity.

The most important intellectual resources in the effort to construct a Helleno-Christian national history were to be found in the traditional nationalist sciences, that is history and folklore studies. Zambelios, the most prominent Greek folklorist, spent his academic life at pains to prove the ancient roots of traditional songs and customs and to reveal the 'rich cultural heritage' of modern Greeks. In his own words, the aim of his research was to "uncover the fundamental unity of the Byzantine state, to shed light into its culture, to use the methods of historical and philosophical research in order

to discover the meaning of Greekness". 137 Paparrigopoulos, on the other hand, represents a classic example of Romantic historian. Educated in the motherland of romanticism, Germany, he became a professor of history at the University of Athens. He wrote the definite 'History of the Greek Nation', a work which can be characterized as the epitome of Helleno-Christianism. According to this version of history, there is an uninterrupted 'Odyssey' of the Greek people which starts from the mythical and pre-historic times, and it will end with the realization of their destiny, which is none other than a return to the greatness of the Ancients: "unlike all other nations, the Greek nation developed a civilization immediately after its birth in the ancient times. This does not mean that it appeared in the face of the earth in the same form that it has today, but that it had a remarkable culture long before we learn about it through the epics of Iliad and Odyssey". 138 Paparrigopoulos argued that the Christian Byzantine Empire was an indispensable part of the Greek identity. In 1878, he wrote: "It is an honour for Greece that produced such a remarkable civilization like Byzantium...But, without the Byzantine Empire, there would be no Greek nation, nor anyone left in the world to speak the Greek language". 139 Moreover, according to Paparrigopoulos, "medieval Hellenism deserves to be called Greek. It is true that the history of our people from the 5th century A.D. to the 13th century A.D, is not full of great deeds. But that is always the case with nations". 140 The establishment of

¹³⁷ Spyridon Zambelios, 1857. Βυζαντινές Μελέτες [Byzantine Studies] (Athens)

¹³⁸ Constantinos Paparrigopoulos, 1972. Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους [History of the Greek Nation], (Athens: Γαλαξίας), vol. 16, p. 9

¹³⁹ Vangelis Panagopoulos, 2001. Introduction to a special issue of E – Ιστορικά [E-Historica], on Paparrigopoulos, vol. 85, p. 5

¹⁴⁰ Constantinos Paparrigopoulos, Ibid.

a system of universal education played a crucial role in disseminating these ideas, and Professor Paparrigopoulos assumed the role of the 'national historian', despite the fact that many other historians in his time challenged his views. 141 In fact, Greek children are taught in schools today the historical schema of Paparrigopoulos, which divides the history of the Greek nation into an ancient, a medieval and a modern period.

In terms of state politics, Helleno-Christianism was expressed through the 'Megali Idea', foreign policy dogma which became hegemonic in the Greek society and pushed Greek governments until 1922 towards an expansionist foreign policy. It aimed at the liberation of the 'unredeemed lands' which used to belong to the Byzantine Empire and in which Greek-speaking Orthodox populations continued to live. Before coming to a catastrophic end with the Asia Minor disaster, the Megali Idea undermined any prospect for friendly relations between Greece and its neighbours. It served to solidify national identity against 'constitutive others', enemies against which the Helleno-Christian Greek self was defined.

III.IV. Conclusions

The heavy politicization of the Orthodox Church is not a new phenomenon. On the contrary, as we have argued in this chapter, the Orthodox Church has been acting as the main producer of a particular type of nationalism (Helleno-Christianism) since the founding of the Greek state, while the origins of its political activism can be traced even further back. For the last 1600 years, the

¹⁴¹ Vangelis Panagopoulos, Ibid.

Eastern Christian Orthodox Church has played an active political role in the Balkan region. Since the times of the Byzantine Empire, it enjoyed the status of the established state religion. In the years of the Ottoman rule in the Balkan region, the Church acted as an institution of the Empire with an extensive set of political, judicial, and cultural privileges. The nationalization of the Orthodox Church in independent Greece consolidated its role as a state department responsible for the cultural, religious and political nurture of Greek citizens. Despite the fact that the Patriarchate initially reacted to this decentralization, it eventually accepted the progressive nationalization of the Greek -and the other Balkan-Churches as an unavoidable consequence of the political situation of the time, and the rise of nationalism in the region. The legal regime of 1833 remains largely in effect until today, while Orthodoxy has been serving as a focal point of Greek national identity since mid-19th century.

What we hope that it has become evident in this chapter is, first of all, Hutchinson's point that: "In spite of significant differences between premodern and modern societies, long established cultural repertoires (myths, symbols and memories) are 'carried' into the modern era by powerful institutions (states, armies, churches) and are revived and redeveloped because populations are periodically faced with similar challenges to their physical and symbolic survival". In the case of Greece there was no premodern army and no pre-modern state, and therefore cultural repertoires were carried out by the only important pre-modern institution that was able, and indeed did so, to carry out cultural repertoires into the modern era was

the church. The Church remained the only pre-modern institution, which retained its importance throughout the modern era in Greece. As a result, it managed to 'relocate' pre-modern cultural material into the modern nation-state environment, thus forging the cultural base of national identity. Therefore, this chapter demonstrated how demotic ethnic cultural material became an indispensable part of Greek identity, much more important than citizenship, rights, and other modern categories. Ethnic symbols of Orthodoxy were reinterpreted within a nationalist framework, and religion was deployed in the Greek nationalist paradigm in an extremely durable fusion, Helleno-Christianism.

Another aim of this chapter was to dissolve some myths that exist in the Greek historiography about the 'positive role' of the Church during the War of Independence. In addition to that, and most importantly, we have been arguing that the seeds of separation of the Greek Church from the Patriarchate are to be found in the years of the War of Independence and even before that. Thus, nationalization of the Church starts before the doctrine becomes an official state policy, while autocephaly was not solely an arbitrary Bavarian policy, but an idea which was also adopted by a number of Greek officials, intellectuals and clerics in the face of the problems which were created with the outbreak of the War of Independence. The fact that the aforementioned elites never seriously questioned the position of Orthodoxy in Greek society and culture, demonstrates the effects of demotic cultural material to the modernization process.

Our analysis of the state policy towards the Church has shown that the Bavarian regime promoted a neo-classical conception of Greek identity, while trying to enforce a westernized model for the organization of the Greek Church. This official ideology (which was also shared by some intellectuals) achieved mixed results in communicating with the 'masses', both because of the resistance of Orthodox intellectuals and activists, as well as because of the penetration of the Orthodox culture in the Greek society. Instead, the particular national narrative which prevailed, Helleno-Christianism, was a durable fusion between the demotic culture of modern Greeks and a series of references to a glorious past which are necessary for the formation of a nation. Within a social milieu of political, social and discursive struggles, a particular national myth attained a hegemonic position in the Greek society which brought together Hellenism and Orthodoxy.

In subsequent years, Helleno-Christianism becomes an official state dogma, taught in schools and universities. Orthodoxy becomes the 'national religion' of modern Greece. Furthermore, it is more than likely that the legal arrangements of this period affected later Greek Church political culture in a controversial manner. Despite the fact that the legal status of 'semi-separation' has been widely perceived as a progressive measure which restricted any theocratic aspirations on the part of Church officials and ultra-Orthodox intellectuals, we may argue that the recent confrontations between the Church and the State in Greece are partly the result of the Church's legal status. The legal regime of 1833 in essence legitimized the intertwining between secular and ecclesiastical authorities. Contemporary Church policy

may be perceived as an attempt of the Church to 'stick' to its role as it has been drafted out during the first years after independence, despite the fact that it has originally reacted to this role. This phenomenon is an example of the antinomies of modernization, since it was a secularizing policy that established a tradition of political interference on the part of the Church, while nowadays we notice a situation in which a traditional institution such as the Church is the champion of Greek nationalism.

The prevalence of Helleno-Christianism demonstrates the importance of drawing political, social, and cultural frontiers between 'us' and 'them', in constituting individual and collective identities. As an ideology, 'Helleno-Christian' nationalism was able to construct rigid boundaries between insiders and outsiders, Greeks and non-Greeks, and thus provide the newborn nation with a solid collective identity. For example, other forms of nationalism that were emphasizing the religious element of Greek identity were unable to offer adequate grounding for a firm distinction between Greeks and the other Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire. The Helleno-Christian thesis managed to do so, by emphasizing the 'Hellenic' element of Greek identity. On the other hand, 'Hellenized' conceptions of the nation were unable to communicate with the masses that formed the Greek nation. These masses were divided into linguistically fragmented groups, very few of which could understand the 'language of Plato', despite the fact that they were mostly using Hellenic dialects. Therefore, Orthodoxy was a cultural resource with which they could easily identify (at least more easily than they could identify with Ancient Greece).

Pre-existing cultural material and symbolic resources posed obstacles and created complexities in the modernization/secularization process in Greece. Helleno-Christian nationalism was more appealing to the people, since it drew on pre-modern and pre-national existing communal ties. This type of nationalism was compatible with many of the other identities (familial, communal, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and citizen identities) that subjects were holding during the period under investigation, since it was based on myths, symbols, traditions and memories with which large parts of the population were familiar with. Helleno-Christianity was therefore ideally constructed in order to replace a previous symbolic order with familiar and at the same time novel symbols. Contingent and otherwise unrelated practices acquired meaning within this new symbolic order. Speaking an archaic Greek dialect, going to the Church, and disliking the Turks for instance were practices which were bound together in a particular system of meaning which was called Helleno-Christianity and these practices were experienced by individuals as aspects of the "Greek Way of life". The legal and political position of the Church of Greece facilitated the birth and eventual dominance of 'Helleno-Christianism'. Despite the fact that the Church was politically subjected to the secular authority of the state, it managed to retain an extensive degree of autonomy at a cultural level (e.g. influence to the people through education and Sunday liturgy), and thus was able to use the mechanisms that its legal position provided it with, in order to disseminate this distinctive cultural nationalism.

III.V. the Church in the 20th Century

The course of Church-state relations throughout the twentieth century up until the fall of the military junta in 1974 is beyond the scope of this study, since the legal, social and political arrangements that had already taken place in the period under investigation in this chapter did not go through significant changes. The nodal points of Helleno-Christian nationalism remained unaltered. Even a sketchy account of the facets of Helleno-Christian nationalism in the period following 1864 supports this conclusion.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Queen Olga attempted to publish a translation of the New Testament in Modern Greek, since the original text, written in a Hellenistic language was almost incomprehensible to the majority of the population. Her intention provoked a chain reaction in Greek society that ended with student rallies, the interference and condemnation of the translation by the ecumenical Patriarchate, and the resignation of the Athens archbishop. As a result, the constitution of 1911 included a clause that prevented the translation of the Bible without a previous authorization of the Ecumenical

Patriarch.



Popular painting of 1901, which depicts the student rallies in protest of the Queen's intention to translate the New testament in modern Greek

During the early decades of the 20th century, Greece carried a series of irredentist wars, which led to its significant territorial expansion. The basic legitimizing factor for these wars was the Orthodox religion of the populations of the "unredeemed lands". For example, the ecclesiastical dispute between Bulgaria and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople played a significant role in the short "cold war" between Greece, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, over the control of the region of Macedonia (1904-1908). A report by Pavlos Melas, officer of the Greek Artillery Corps, who was one of the protagonists of the "Macedonian struggle" is indicative of the role of religion in the aforementioned dispute: "Having summoned the villagers, and, in particular, the village elders, I suggested to them to return to

Orthodoxy [the Patriarchate]... they assured me that they never embraced the Schism [between the Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarches]... I then told them to that I demand, first, that they take an oath of faith to Orthodoxy... Also [I ordered them] to petition within ten days to be sent a priest and a teacher of Greek".¹⁴²

A few years later, during the First World War, the Church became actively involved in the national discord between the supporters of liberal Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and those loyal to the king. In December 1916, the Archbishop of Athens, Theocletos, excommunicated Venizelos, cursed him, and asked the people of Athens to "throw the stone of anathema". When Venizelos finally prevailed, he ordered the arrest of the Archbishop and those churchmen who supported the "anathema".

In 1923, a new ecclesiastical charter institutionalized the right of the Orthodox Church of Greece to "approve" all school textbooks. Undoubtedly, the new assignment related to a social and political dispute that divided Greek society: a new generation of intellectuals advocated the use of demotic Greek language and the replacement of the archaic "official" dialect, known as *katharevousa*. Their demand met strong resistance by conservative politicians and academics, who sought to "protect" the linguistic heritage of ancient Greece. The dispute was only resolved several decades later, when, in 1976, demotic Greek was finally adopted as the official state language. Throughout these years, the church remained a staunch opponent of linguistic

¹⁴² Cited in Umut Ozkirimi & Spyros Sofos, 2008. Tormented by History – Nationalism in Greece and Turkey, (London: Hurst), p.148

¹⁴³ Georgios Karayannis, 1997. Op. Cit., p. 34

reform. At the same time, the Holy Synod was recognized as the sovereign governing body of the Church, although the presence of a royal envoy was required in all of its sessions.

After the German invasion, the archbishop of Athens, Damaskenos, kept a moderate stance towards the Nazis, while, at the same time, several bishops joined the resistance movement. Some of them, like the bishop of Kozani, attempted to mediate between nationalist and communist guerillas, in order to solidify the unity of the anti-Nazi partisan groups, which were active throughout the occupation period in the mountainous regions of Greece. Others, like the bishop of Helia, Antonius, joined the communist "National Liberation Front" (EAM). Antonius was even appointed local guerilla captain in his parish. Another prominent cleric, Seraphim, joined the nationalist guerilla group EDES. Seraphim was to become archbishop of Athens after the fall of the military junta, in 1974.

The ideological frictions which divided the resistance movement did not die out after the liberation from the Nazis. On the contrary, political conditions deteriorated even further, eventually leading to a civil war between nationalists and communists. Although some members of the clergy who had initially joined the resistance against the Nazis kept a moderate stance towards the left, the Orthodox establishment remained loyal to the right-wing governments of the time.

The civil war ended with the defeat of communist forces and signaled the beginning of 25 years of oppression for the Greek left. The communist party was outlawed, and several thousand communists were sent to exile in

small or deserted islands of the Aegean Sea. At the same time, army officers formed secret societies aiming at the establishment of a military junta. The most active of these societies, known as IDEA, was in direct contact with the archbishop of Athens, Spyridon, and in 1951, they even suggested that he should be placed at the head of a military government. The plans for a military dictatorship eventually succeeded in 1967.

It is also worth pointing out that Orthodoxy has never been stripped of the privileged status of the "established" religion in Greece, in any of the constitutions of the 20th century. In essence, the institutional arrangement which was reached after the War of Independence remained unaltered until our days. Thus, all of the Greek constitutions (1822, 1823, 1827, 1844, 1864, 1911, 1927, 1952, and 1974) nominally protected freedom of religion and consciousness. Until 1974, this right was included in one of the first two articles of the Constitution, which referred to the position of Orthodoxy as the established religion. The most characteristic example of this conflation is the Constitution of 1927, the first article of which states that Orthodoxy is the established religion. Nowadays, freedom of religion is a separate clause in the second part of the constitution (the human rights part) and it is not associated with Orthodoxy. Nonetheless, the legal status of the Church of Greece throughout the 20th century not only meant that it enjoyed special privileges,

¹⁴⁴ Georgios Karayannis, 1997. Op. Cit., p. 108

but also confirmed the continuing hegemony of Helleno-Christian nationalism in Greek politics.¹⁴⁵

Some jurists dispute this conclusion and suggest that the constitutional articles on the established religion merely ascertain a fact – the fact that the majority of Greeks are Orthodox Christians. Nonetheless, this view seems to ignore that the function of constitutions is regulatory and proscriptive. Constitutions do not normally "inform" the public on demographic tendencies.¹⁴⁶

To conclude, throughout the 20th century, the Church remained actively involved in Greek politics, and defended its privileged place in the public sphere. The political developments of this period are beyond the scope of the thesis at hand. However, as it became obvious, Helleno-Christian nationalist was a significant factor in the most important of them (the national discord between supporters of Venizelos and royalists, the irredentist wars of the early 20th century, the struggle for the control of Macedonia, the Civil War, and the rise of the military junta). Finally, the institutional consolidation of the Helleno-Christian thesis (reflected in the legal order of Greece), has never been seriously challenged so far.

¹⁴⁵ For a more detailed list of the legal privileges of the Church in Greece, see Constantinos L. Georgopoulos, 1998. Επίτομο Συνταγματικό Δίκαιο [Concise Constitutional Law], (Athens: Σάκκουλας), esp. pp.165-202 and 531-544

¹⁴⁶ For more details on the legal debate regarding the status of the Orthodox Church in Greece, see Costas Chrysogonos, 2002. Ατομικά και Κοινωνικά Δικαιώματα [Human and Social Rights], (Athens: Σάκκουλα), and Costas Mavrias, 2004, Συνταγματικό Δίκαιο [Constitutional Law], (Athens: Σάκκουλα)

Chapter IV: Religion and Nationalism in the Greek-Cypriot Political Culture

This chapter examines in particular the impact of the Orthodox Church and religion on the development of Greek-Cypriot nationalism. Many commentators, especially nationalists, have claimed that given the cultural, religious, and linguistic differences which divide the two main ethnic groups in Cyprus, hostility between them and lack of a common civil culture was to be expected. However, there is no historical evidence to suggest that such was the case in pre-modern Cyprus before the appearance of nationalism, 147 and it is only nationalist 'mythistoriographies' which claim otherwise. Other possibilities of historical development were possible were it not for the dividing influences of other factors, among which we count the Orthodox Church. Assimilation, co-existence of the two groups within a context of a common Cypriot identity (as it happens in Switzerland and Belgium), or, if all else had failed, a peaceful federate model with an extensive degree of devolution (e.g. Canada), were other possible outcomes of the Cyprus question. In this chapter, we will be arguing that the Church of Cyprus should be counted as among one of the factors who prevented such outcomes. Obviously, the Cyprus question is a multifaceted problem, with both national and international dimensions. To claim that the Church is the only divisive agent in the island would be a crude reductionism. Nevertheless, it shall become obvious in the following pages that the importance of the Orthodox Church in producing ethnic frictions has been underestimated and understudied.

¹⁴⁷ Paschalis Kitromilides, 1977. "From Coexistence to Confrontation: the Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus", in Michael Attalides (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed*, (Jus Cypri: Nicosia), pp. 35-60

I will be arguing that the politicization of religion in the island is the main reason for the failure of a Cypriot national identity, and the development, in its place, of an ethno-religious Greek-Cypriot identity. The main characteristics of Greek-Cypriot nationalism are anti-Turkism, pro-Europeanism, and strong religious references. These characteristics show that it has a lot in common with the mainland Greek Helleno-Christian nationalism, despite the social and political differentiations in the history of the two countries. There are a few other examples in which ethnic communities with similar cultures- but which spread across diverse territories and live under various types of administration-politicize their cultural resemblances and demand political unification (e.g. the doctrines of Pan-Turkism, the Greek 'Megali Idea', and the ideology of Great Albania). This sociological phenomenon is usually described as 'irredentism'. However, irredentism in Greece, Cyprus or elsewhere is not a historical necessity- a consequence of cultural unity- as nationalists have argued. It usually arises as a result of specific institutional and national policies and ideologies. The Church of Cyprus and its Helleno-Christian nationalism were among those who shaped Greek-Cypriot irredentism.

IV.I. A Political History of the Church of Cyprus

Traditionally, the establishment of the Church of Cyprus is traced back to the 1st century, since, according to the Book of Acts, the island was evangelized by the Apostles Paul and Barnabas in 45 A.D. Barnabas is

considered the first archbishop of Cyprus and one of the 'proto-martyrs' of the Christian faith. By the 4th century A.D. Christianity was spread throughout the island, and, despite the claims of the Antioch Patriarchate, the Third Ecumenical Synod, which convened in 434 A.D. in Ephesus, ratified the autocephaly of the Cypriot Church.

After the fall of the Roman Empire, Cyprus became part of the Byzantine province of Antioch. Because of its geographical location, Cyprus was an area of the Empire susceptible to Arab, Ottoman and Western European attacks, and the control of Constantinople over the island was always fragile. In a radical measure taken by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian II, many of the island's Christians including the Archbishop of Cyprus were displaced from their homes and moved to Nea Justiniana, a new city closer to the mainland of the Empire and better protected from the Arab threat. Since then, the Archbishop of Cyprus retains the title of 'Archbishop of Nea Justiniana and All Cyprus'. After the defeat of the Arab navy by the Byzantine forces of Nicephorus Phocas, Cyprus came again under the control of the Byzantium.

Subsequently (1191), Cyprus was conquered by King Richard the Lionhearted, and then sold to French feudal lords, and then to Venetians. Until 1571, when the island was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, the authority of the Orthodox Church and faith was undermined by the Catholic hierarchy which was established in Cyprus. In fact, the Catholic monastic

¹⁴⁸ Victoria Clark, 1999. Why Angels Fall- A Portrait of Orthodox Europe from Byzantium to Kosovo, (London: Macmillan)

orders which settled there seized control over Orthodox monasteries, sent local bishops to exile in remote villages, abolished the autocephaly, while sustained attempts to convert the local population and the Church to Western Christianity took place over that period, but with mixed and ephemeral results.¹⁴⁹

Unsurprisingly, given the example of other Balkan regions, the position of Orthodoxy was ameliorated with the Ottoman invasion and the establishment of the *millet* system, which favoured and restored the –civil and spiritual- privileges of the Church. As it happened with the rest of the religious communities in the Empire, the Archbishop of Cyprus and the local bishoprics were given civil authority and duties as well as religious freedom, or, in other words, were raised to an 'Ethnarchic status'. The Orthodox Church was the only institutional point of reference for the Orthodox population of Cyprus in the rather secluded social environment of the island, as it performed important state functions such as the collection of taxes from the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan.

During this period, Orthodox and Muslim peasant populations coexisted relatively peacefully within the decentralized Ottoman system of government in mingled or mixed villages.¹⁵⁰ However, what is important at this historical stage for the later development of nationalism is that the *millet*

¹⁴⁹Stavros Fotiou & Georgios Efthymiou, 1990. Η Εκκλησία της Κύπρου [The Church of Cyprus], (Nicosia: Ιερά Αρχιεπισκοπή Κύπρου)

¹⁵⁰Peter Worsley, 1979. 'Communalism and Nationalism in Small Countries: The Case of Cyprus', in Peter Worsley & Paschalis Kitromilides (eds.), Small States in the Modern World-The Conditions for Survival, (SAGEM: Nicosia)

system divided ethnic groups on religious grounds, and assigned a series of important administrative duties to the local Churches.¹⁵¹

Already from 1660, the Church becomes a tax collecting agency of the Ottoman state and remains so until the arrival of the British in late 19th century. This privilege, along with the official application of Orthodox family law to the Christian subjects of the Empire, provided the Church with civil authorities and transformed it into a peripheral organization of the Ottoman state, 152 as it happened in Greece. The Sultan's decree of 1865 concerning the appointment of bishop Sophronios as new archbishop of the Church of Cyprus is illustrative of this point. Among other rights and privileges, the new archbishop and his companions were allowed to carry weapons for self-protection, to ride horses, while he was also appointed to act as an arbitrator in matters of wedding, divorce, and inheritance between Christians of the island, to collect taxes, to freely administer the Church's property, whereas proselytism against the Church and violent conversions to Islam were forbidden. 153

Gradually, the Church expanded its economic activities and developed into the largest property holder of the island. The economic growth of the Orthodox establishment, its political power and its cultural ties with the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, strengthened the relationship between

^{151 (}ibid.)

¹⁵²Michalis, Michail 2004. Η Διαδικασία Συγκρότησης Ενός Θεσμού Εξουσίας:Η Εκκλησία της Κύπρου 1754-1910 [The Making of a Powerful Institution: the Church of Cyprus 1754-1910], Unpublished PhD Thesis, (Nicosia: University of Cyprus)

¹⁵³Fillipos Georgiou, 1975 [1875]. Ειδήσεις Ιστορικαί της Εκκλησίας της Κύπρου [Historical Anecdotes Regarding the Church of Cyprus], (Nicosia: Κυπριολογική Βιβλιοθήκη)

¹⁵⁴ Michalis Michail, Op. Cit.

Church and people to an extent that turned the Church into a semiautonomous political authority on which Orthodox Cypriots were dependent for survival.

In 1821, with the outbreak of the War of Independence in Greece and the Balkans, the Ottomans took the pre-emptive step of executing the Cypriot archbishop along with 186 other senior clerics and prelates of the island. This bold move put an early stop to any thoughts for a War of Independence in Cyprus.¹⁵⁵ In mainstream nationalist history,¹⁵⁶ this event proves the Greekness of Cyprus since the island suffered its toll in the 'national awakening struggle' and was already seen by the Ottomans as a Greek territory that had to suffer for the actions of 'their brothers in Greece'. However, a more sensible explanation of the Ottoman reaction would point out to the fact that the War of Independence did not break out in 'Greece' alone. There were simultaneous revolts in the greater Balkan region as well (the Danube provinces of the Empire). The Ottomans tried to avoid another war front in Cyprus by executing whoever was susceptible of being able to organize it. Thus, the War of Independence only survived it in Greece (in what is today southern Greece, to be precise). Besides, even Greek-Cypriot nationalist authors admit that the conditions for an armed revolution did not exist in Cyprus in 1821, and therefore such thoughts were quickly abandoned.157

¹⁵⁵ Paschalis Kitromilides & Marios Evriviades, 1990. Cyprus, (Clio Press, Oxford)

¹⁵⁶ Athanasius Papageorgiou, 1962. Σύντομος Ιστορία της Εκκλησίας της Κύπρου [A Short History of the Church of Cyprus], (Nicosia: Εκδόσεις Ιεράς Αρχιεπισκοπής)

¹⁵⁷ Andreas Mitsidis, 1994. Σύντομη Ιστορία της Εκκλησίας της Κύπρου [A Short History of the Church of Cyprus], (Nicosia)

It is worth mentioning however, that the autocephalous Cypriot Church was the first political agent in Cyprus to adopt Greek irredentism. Although nobody can be certain about the extent of involvement of Cypriot bishops in the 'Friendly Society', the freemason-like revolutionary organization which disseminated nationalist ideas for a generalized War of Independence in Greece and South-eastern Europe in general, most authors agree that this group enjoyed at least a form of financial support from the Church of Cyprus. After independence, when the irredentist ideology of 'Megali Idea' became hegemonic in Greece, Cyprus was included in those territories which should be 'redeemed' from Ottoman rule.

The opening of the Greek consulate in 1834 at Larnaca, in conjunction with the establishment of Greek schools was instrumental in the dissemination of nationalist and irredentist ideals in the island. Cypriot merchants saw Greek citizenship as a way to liberate themselves from Ottoman taxation and the constraints of the inflexible millet system of the Empire.

In the largely agrarian Cypriot society of the time, where the merchant classes were but a small segment of the population, capitalism was not the decisive factor for the development of nationalism at that stage of historical development. However, one cannot ignore the importance of the fact that a wealthy – albeit politically powerless – fragment of the population opposed the parochial administrative organization of the Ottoman Empire. Frequent incidents of malpractice and incompetence by the local delegates of the Sultan

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

increased public unrest.¹⁵⁹ As a result, the Ottomans tried to implement a series of reforms that would modernize the administration of their territories. In 1830, a 4-member committee of senior citizens was appointed in Cyprus in order to replace the Church in tax collection. Moreover, representatives of the public and the clergy formed a type of advisory council that would participate in the administration of the island.¹⁶⁰ The Orthodox archbishop of Cyprus was an *ex officio* member of the Supreme Council of Nicosia, and thus, the involvement of the church in Cypriot politics was institutionalized.

The Ottoman rule in the island ended in 1878, when the British Empire 'leased' Cyprus from the Sultan. The defeat of Ottoman Empire in the 1st World War led to the annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain and the island was officially declared a colony. The British tried to limit the influence of the Church in politics and civil society by introducing secularizing measures, but their attempts were largely unsuccessful if we judge by their results. Besides, similar attempts have been made earlier during the 19th century, during the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire.

The Church reacted to both these secularization and modernization waves by swiftly adapting its organization so as to be able to function effectively in the new environment. Thus, for example, clerics were elected in the Legislative Council which was established by the British, and managed to further institutionalize the position of the Church in Cypriot society. Another

¹⁵⁹ Sia Anagnostopoulou, "Κύπρος 1830-1878: Από την Οθωμανική στη Βρετανική Κυριαρχία [Cyprus 1830-1878: From Ottoman to British Rule]", in *Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού 1770-2000* [History of Modern Hellenism 1770-2000], vol. 4., p. 363

¹⁶⁰ Sia Anagnostopoulou, "Κύπρος 1830-1878: Από την Οθωμανική στη Βρετανική Κυριαρχία [Cyprus 1830-1878: From Ottoman to British Rule]", in Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού 1770-2000 [History of Modern Hellenism 1770-2000], (Athens: Ελληνικά Γράμματα), vol. 4., p. 364

example of Church modernization is the fact that Cypriot people participated in the election of bishops in Cyprus. In this way, Church hierarchy was presenting itself as a natural representative of the people. The aforementioned examples demonstrate the adaptation capabilities of the Church to modern conditions. Consequently, the main results of the British efforts to weaken the Church were to turn it against them and lead it in the unreserved adoption of Helleno-Christian nationalism, an ideology which opposed their imperial rule.

One should not fail to note at this point, that the end of the 19th century marked the birth of a modernizing Greek-speaking bourgeois class in Cyprus, the members of which were much wealthier than their Muslim compatriots, and were often educated in Greece. This class was heavily involved in Church affairs and participated in the archbishopric crisis at the turn of the century, as we shall see later. This unequal development between Christians and Muslims- the results of which are visible even in today- undoubtedly led to an increasing alienation of the two religious communities.¹⁶¹

British hostility towards the Church was an important enough reason in itself for the latter to adopt a nationalist discourse in order to avoid further depletion of its privileges in the increasingly secular environment of the British Empire. Moreover, the Church, through its Sunday masses and its partial control of the educational system had much more effective channels to communicate its ideas with the public. Here, we may -with caution- draw parallels between the radicalization of the Cypriot Church policy as a reaction

¹⁶¹ Peter Worsley, Op. Cit.

to British modernization efforts, and the Greek case in which the Church similarly reacted to the modernization efforts of the Greek government at the end of the 1990s.¹⁶²

By the dawn of the 20th century, the Church became a champion of Greek irredentism and Helleno-Christian nationalism, and promoted demands for unification with Greece (what is known in Cypriot politics as the 'Enosis movement'). In Cyprus, like almost everywhere in the colonized world, nationalism became the ideological platform of resistance to imperialism and colonization. However, Orthodox nationalism in Cyprus did not sought independence for the island but unification with Greece. Again, the archives of the time can be demonstrative of the nationalist conversion of the Church. Already from the 1st issue of 'Απόστολος Βαρνάβας' (1918), the official periodical of the Cypriot Church, the national question arises as the main concern for the high ranking clergy of the island. 163 In another issue of the same periodical, which was published in November 1918, the 'close ties' between Hellenism and Christianity are emphasized, while it is argued that Greeks are the most civilized nation of all, the cradle of European civilization, which shined already from the ancient epochs, when the rest of Europe was still in a semi-barbarous civilizational stage. 164 The latter argument constitutes a common repertoire of Greek nationalism until nowadays. The infusion of political nationalism with religious (i.e. cultural) references has resulted, in

¹⁶² Nikos Chrysoloras, 2004a. 'The Political Discourse of the Greek Orthodox Church', in *the Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, vol. 30.1.2004, pp. 97-119

¹⁶³ Απόστολος Βαρνάβας [Apostle Barnabas], vol. 1, issue No. 7 Nicosia, October 31, 1918

¹⁶⁴ Απόστολος Βαρνάβας [Apostle Barnabas], Issue No. 8, November 18, 1918

most cases including the one of Cyprus, into a further strengthening of its appeal to the people.

Nationalism was such a force in the politics of the Church of Cyprus that it created a major institutional crisis in the years between 1900 and 1910. Because of the rivalry between a conservative bishop and a nationalist hardliner rival to the archbishopric throne, the Church hierarchy was unable to agree in the election of a new archbishop for ten whole years after the death of archbishop Sophronios.¹⁶⁵ Around these two camps, the predecessors of later political parties were formed. While conservatives were more eager to strengthen the position of the Church and the Greek-speaking population within the existing system of British administration and saw Enosis (unification with Greece), as a long-term possibility, nationalist hardliners adopted a much more radical anti-British stand. Nationalist segments of the Cypriot society attempted, through their effort to control the Church, to gain political power, while conservatives were more or less satisfied with the Ottoman status quo that assured political privileges for clerics and landowners. This politico-ecclesiastical crisis divided Greek-Cypriot society, and was resolved with a victory for the hardliners. Undoubtedly, one of the reasons that led the Church to such a hard-line nationalist position was the fact that it faced hostility by the British, and saw that the colonial power aimed at stripping the Church of most of its authority.

¹⁶⁵ Benedict Egglezakis, 1995. Studies in the History of the Church of Cyprus- 4th-20th Centuries, ed. by Silouan & Michael Ioannou, translated by Norman Russell (New York: Variorum)

In any case, the archbishopric crisis demonstrated the heavy politicization of religion in these early stages of the development of Greek-Cypriot nationalism. Another proof of that point is the role of the Church in the popular uprising of Greek-Cypriots against British rule in 1931. The British had to send to exile two bishops after these events, since they considered them as responsible for what happened, and suspended many of the civil liberties Cypriot enjoyed until then. The Orthodox Church became, in essence, the political terrain in which ideological rivalries in Cyprus were played out. The Orthodox Church became,

In addition to that, Helleno-Christian nationalism was imported to Cyprus from Greece. From the late 19th century Greek-speaking Cypriots started being educated in Athens, and were thus introduced to the values of Greek nationalism, of which the Greek university was a committed advocate. Even today, educational curricula are very similar between Greece and Cyprus and many Cypriot students study in Greece (and vice versa). The Greek student support towards the Cypriot demand for Union continued with the same zeal until the 1960s. The ex-chancellor of the University of Athens, Professor Bambiniotis, remembers from his student years in the early 1950s:

E-E-ENOSIS was the slogan of the students of the University of Athens in our demonstrations during the decade of the 1950s.

¹⁶⁶ Andrea Mitsidis, Op. Cit.

¹⁶⁷ Sia Anagnostopoulou, Op. Cit., p. 363

¹⁶⁸ Nicos Christodoulou,1999. Το Αρχιεπισκοπικό Ζήτημα της Κύπρου κατά τα Έτη 1900-1910 [The Archbishopric Question in Cyprus in the years 1900-1910], (Nicosia: Κέντρο Μελετών Κύκκου)
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures

Depending on the political situation, our rallies were often irritating [the politicians], and police officers were violently trying to scatter us, but we didn't falter. Our Cypriot fellow students were always marching ahead....Today, fifty years later, following the Turkish invasion... our uncompromising demand for unification with Greece has given its place to an accommodating request for reunification of Cyprus...¹⁶⁹

In 1950, the Church organized a referendum, in which the total of the Greek-speaking population voted for unification of Cyprus with Greece. 170 The result of the referendum was submitted to the British and the Greek governments and the U.N. This was the start of a long effort for the internationalization of the Cyprus question, a policy orchestrated by both the Orthodox Church and Greek-Cypriot politicians.

The involvement of the Church in nationalist politics was personified in the first president of independent Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III (1960-1977). In the years preceding independence, Makarios acted as political leader of the violent guerrilla resistance of Greek-Cypriots against the British. A British travel writer notes that 'by the mid-1950s wives of British servicemen were blown up, and the British tabloids had dubbed him "Black Mak". 171 Apart from Makarios, the struggle for Cypriot independence was co-led by general Grivas, who formed a guerrilla group (EOKA) aiming at independence and subsequent unification of Cyprus with Greece. The first

¹⁶⁹ Bambiniotis in Καποδιστριακό [Capodestrian], 15/4/2004

¹⁷⁰ Andreas Mitsidis, Op. Cit.

¹⁷¹ Victoria Clark, Op. Cit., p. 351

aim was realized in 1960, while the latter one proved to be a catastrophic chimera for Cypriot politics.

Ethnic violence broke out between the two communities almost immediately after independence, with frequent abuses of power from the Greek-Cypriot side, and frequent 'silencing' (even through murder) of reconciliatory voices. An attempted coup d'état against Makarios, which was backed by the Greek junta gave Turkey the excuse that it was asking for intervention. The Turkish invasion of 1974 led to the establishment, a few years later, of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', a state recognized mainly by Turkey. The failure to build a Cypriot national identity resulted in catastrophe and misery on both sides. The northern part of the island is ridden by poverty, lack of international legitimacy, dependency on Turkey and an increasing number of Turkish settlers. The, much richer and developed, southern part has to live with the reality of buffer zones, refugees, and reliance on Greek military forces for 'protection'.

IV.II. the Church in Cypriot Politics, 1950-1974

The previous section brought into our attention two important historical features that differentiate Cyprus from the Greek case. First, unlike the Greek Church, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus has a long history of autocephaly and, thus, relative autonomy from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. This particularity allowed it to develop into a strong peripheral organization, already since the early years of the Ottoman Empire.

Second, Cypriot history is marked by the presence of the British in the island for almost a century, which delayed the emergence of an independent state and galvanized Cypriot nationalism through the resistance of the people to colonial rule.

The first signs of Helleno-Christian nationalism in Cyprus are to be found in the years of the Greek War of Independence, when many Orthodox Cypriots hoped that the revolt in the Balkans would spread in Cyprus and that it would result in independence from the Sultan. However, all moves towards this direction were swiftly suppressed by the Ottomans. Nonetheless, the few Greek-Cypriots who did participate in the Greek Independence War returned to Cyprus as citizens of the Greek state and were thus excluded from tax payments.¹⁷² As a result, Greek citizenship became a attractive choice for Cypriots. When the British arrived in the island in 1878, the Church expected its position to improve since it perceived the new rulers as 'civilized fellow-Christians'. These hopes were depressed when the British adjusted their policy so as to limit the political powers of the Church.

However, the suppression policies of the British only managed to strengthen political (in addition to religious) solidarity among the flock of the Cypriot Church, which was mainly Greek-speaking. Civil unrest against imperial rule broke out, which was followed by even more oppression. Gradually, Greek-Cypriots came to the conclusion that they will liberate themselves from successive waves of oppression and imperialism only by uniting with Greece, with which they shared a common language (albeit a

¹⁷² Sia Anagnostopoulou, Op. Cit., p. 364

very different dialect), a common religion, as well as common cultural roots which can be traced back in the pre-Classical era.¹⁷³ A 1928 report by the British governor of Cyprus is indicative of the penetration of Helleno-Christian nationalism in Cypriot education: "All Greek-Cypriot primary schools use the curriculum of the Greek schools, which is approved by the ministry of education in Athens. The educational system functions in accordance with the guidelines of the Greek ministry of education. Classrooms are full of portraits of King Constantine, Eleftherios Venizelos, and Queen Sophia, and detailed maps of Greece. Maps of Cyprus are rare, and even when they exist, they are outdated".¹⁷⁴

According to the ethno-symbolic approach to nationalism which is adopted here, this was to be expected. When an ethnic community wants to define itself nationally and establish a valid claim to self-determination, it needs to prove to itself and the outsiders that it is a distinct entity with a glorious past. The monuments from the ancient-Greek period in Cyprus, its ecclesiastical landmarks from the Byzantine past, its Orthodox customs and its religious and linguistic identity played exactly that role in Greek-Cypriot nationalism. Given that both Orthodoxy and the ancient-Greek past served as points of identity reference only for Christian Greek-speaking subjects, there was no common cultural pre-national ground upon which a common

¹⁷³ It is believed that the Greek alphabet and culture have been established in Cyprus after the Persian Wars (5th century B.C.), although Greek-speaking populations had migrated to Cyprus much earlier. After the death of Alexander the Great, Cyprus was controlled by the Ptolemaic Hellenistic kingdom, before falling into the Romans and subsequently to the Byzantine Empire. See also Athanasius Angelopoulos, 1991. Εκκλησιαστική Ιστορία, (Thessalonica: Αδελφοί Κυρισκίδη)

¹⁷⁴ Cited in Greek, in Niyazi Kizilyürek, 1999. Κύπρος: το Αδιέξοδο των Εθνικισμών [Cyprus: the Dead End of Nationalisms], (Athens: Μαύρη Λίστα), p. 35

national identity could emerge. For example, two attempts to introduce a purely "Cypriotist" and anti-imperialist nationalism, which were carried out in the 1920s by the Rural Party of Cyprus (AKK) and the Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK), ended up in complete failure, as they did not draw substantial public support.¹⁷⁵

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, two parallel efforts began in order to advance the demand for unification with Greece; one from the communist party of Cyprus (AKEL, successor to KKK, and more open to the prospect of Enosis), and one from the Church. Greece was unwilling to discuss the issue, since it would seriously damage its relations with Great Britain. The Enosis (Unification) effort was intensified when the nationalist bishop Makarios took up the archbishopric throne. The demand for Enosis with Greece alienated Turkish-Cypriots from their fellow islanders and the anti-imperialist struggle. In fact, some of them allied with the British in order to prevent Unification, and this resulted to a permanent friction between the two communities. In 1955, Greek-Cypriots started an armed struggle against the British, this time with the unofficial support of the Greek government. The agent of this revolt was the guerrilla group EOKA (National Union of Cypriot Fighters), whose political leader was archbishop Makarios. The official policy of EOKA towards Turkish-Cypriots was that their "presence in the island will be tolerated and that they will leave in peace with Greek-Cypriots, once the

¹⁷⁵ Nicos Peristianis, 2006. "Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity and Politics", in Yannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis and Gisela Welz, *Divided Cyprus* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 101

British are gone, as long they do not pose obstacles to the demand for Enosis"¹⁷⁶.

In the meantime, the Greek government changed its approach to the Cyprus issue, as a result of the wholehearted support of the Greek public opinion towards the Cypriot demands, which was also shared by the Greek Church. Moreover, the internationalization of the Cyprus problem provided Greece and Cyprus with some support in the U.N., while the 1955 pogrom against the Greeks in Constantinople ended the fragile Greco-Turkish friendship which was established by Kemal Ataturk and Eleftherios Venizelos earlier in the 20th century. Makarios, along with two other senior clerics and an employee of the Church were sent to exile in Seychelles in a British effort to weaken EOKA. However, violence did not wither away, and the British had no choice but to compromise.

Finally, in 1959 the Zurich-London agreements were signed which granted Cyprus independence. The demographic realities of the island in which Greek-speakers formed the vast majority of the population were taken into account, and Greek-Cypriots enjoyed a more seminal place in the administration of the island in comparison with the Turkish-Cypriot minority. However, the two communities were recognized as equal, extensive autonomy was given to the Turkish-Cypriots who were represented proportionately in parliament and the executive, while Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain were assigned as the three powers that would safeguard

¹⁷⁶ British intelligence estimates, cited in Greek, in Niyazi Kizilyürek, 1999. Κύπρος: το Αδιέξοδο των Εθνικισμών [Cyprus: the Dead End of Nationalisms], (Athens: Μαύρη Λίστα), p. 41

independence for Cyprus and the normal functioning of the new Cypriot Constitution. The main failure of the London-Zurich negotiations and agreements is to be found in the fact that it recognizes the existence of two distinct *ethnie* in the island and divides the population into two communities based on religious criteria.

The Cypriot Constitution, adopted on 16 August 1960, is enlightening at this point. Articles 1 and 2 recognize the existence of two nationalities, a 'Greek' and a 'Turkish' one.

Article 1: The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities of Cyprus respectively as hereinafter in this Constitution provided.

Article 2: For the purposes of this Constitution: (1) the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church;

(2) the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems; (3) citizens of the Republic who do not come within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article shall, within three months of the

date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, opt to belong to either the Greek or the Turkish Community as individuals, but, if they belong to a religious group, shall so opt as a religious group and upon such option they shall be deemed to be members of such Community...¹⁷⁷

In 1963, a new round of ethnic violence broke out, and archbishop and president Makarios presented his famous '13 points', which gave the impression of an effort to strip Turkish-Cypriots of their privileges. It was clear that the policy of the Church and the government aimed at the creation of a Greek-Orthodox Cyprus. That said, it gradually became evident that the Enosis slogan was but an excuse for Makarios to gain support from Greece, since it was clearly a politically unrealistic target. When the Greek PM, Georgios Papandreou, stroke a deal with the British and the Americans which allowed unification of Cyprus with Greece, on the condition that 5% of the island would be leased to the Turks for fifty years as a military base, Makarios refused it. It was clear that unification would limit the political power of Makarios and the Church, since it would turn Cyprus into a mere province of the Greek state.¹⁷⁸

The rise of a military dictatorship in Greece further deteriorated the relationships between Athens and Nicosia. Violence against Turkish-Cypriots continued, and, as a result, Turkey threatened to retaliate unless Greece

¹⁷⁷International Constitutional Law Website,

http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/cy00t___.html, 10/10/05 This interpretation of events was provided by a senior Greek diplomat, during our field research in Greece. He moved on to suggest that 'Makarios would only have accepted the plan of we [Greece] had promised him that we will welcome him as our next Prime Minister.'

withdrew its army division from Cyprus. The eventual withdrawal of the Greek forces from the island removed any deterrent obstacle against Turkish intervention. The assault unfolded between July 20 and August 16 1974. A Greek military response was impossible given the realities of the balance of power between the two countries and, eventually, the Greek junta fell, and Cyprus remains dichotomized until today, despite all peace and reunification efforts.

IV.III. Helleno-Christianity as an Impediment to Reconciliation: the Church, the People, and the United Nations' Peace Plan

After the Turkish invasion, Makarios returned to Cyprus and grudgingly started negotiations with the Turkish side. His hard-line approach, which was followed by his successors as well as by the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauff Denktash brought all discussions for reunification to stalemate. As noted by Niyazi Kizilyürek, after the death of Makarios, Greek-Cypriot political elites (which were mostly comprised by ex-EOKA members) never supported the idea of an independent Cyprus. Instead, they tried to create a Greek state in the island, and they treated Turkish-Cypriots not as a political, but as a cultural community.¹⁷⁹

The Church of Cyprus, often with the support of the Greek Church, became the advocate of the most maximalist views regarding a possible political solution to the Cyprus problem: "The influence of the Church in

¹⁷⁹ Niyazi Kizilyürek, 1999. Κύπρος: το Αδιέξοδο των Εθνικισμών [Cyprus: the Dead End of Nationalisms], (Athens: Μαύρη Λίστα), p. 41

education has been a crucial factor towards in the mobilization of Greek-Cypriots towards unification with Greece. Indeed, Greek nationalism has spread from the cities of Cyprus to the countryside, through education and Orthodoxy".¹⁸⁰

At the same time, however, the events of 1974, which were triggered by the intervention of the Greek military junta, caused a certain 'bitterness' in the bilateral relations between Cyprus and Greece. The attempted coup against Makarios was characterized as a "betrayal" of Cyprus. Hence, Greek-Cypriot political leaders, mainly from the left (AKEL), started pushing for reconciliation with Turkish-Cypriots, especially after 1977. The result of this movement of "Cypriotist" nationalism and the traumatic Turkish invasion, was the relative marginalization of the demand for unification with Greece in the subsequent years (1980s).¹⁸¹ Thus "a) the Cypriot flag was gradually given pre-eminence over the Greek flag in most public administration buildings, ii) the Independence Day of Cyprus, legally established in the 1960s, started being officially celebrated (with parades etc.) in the 1980s, iii) is sports, Cyprus abandoned all Greek 'national teams' and formed its own in the early 1980s, participating for the first time as 'Cyprus', in international athletic games, iv) 'Cypriot history' was first introduced as a separate course from

¹⁸⁰, Niyazi Kizilyürek1999. Κύπρος: το Αδιέξοδο των Εθνικισμών [Cyprus: the Dead End of Nationalisms], (Athens: Μαύρη Λίστα), p. 47

¹⁸¹ Caesar Mavratsas, 1998. Όψεις του Ελληνικού Εθνικισμού στην Κύπρο [Facets of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus], (Athens: Κατάρτι)

Greek history at the secondary school level in 1977, v) the same happened with the lesson of 'Cypriot literature in 1986". 182

However, this is not to suggest that Helleno-Christian nationalism was also marginalized. On the contrary, the demand of Enosis was merely replaced by a demand for complete Hellenization of Cyprus, mainly expressed by the late presidents of Cyprus, Glafkos Clerides (1993-2003) and Tassos Papadopoulos (2003-2008). Even today, visitors in Cyprus will see Greek flags in abundance, almost everywhere in the internationally recognized Greek part of the island - in streets, balconies, stores, football stadiums, and mostly, in Churches. Some commentators attribute the successive failures of "Cypriotism" and the political comeback of "Hellenocentrism" to rational self-interest, in other words the recognition of the plain fact that an alliance with Greece is necessary in the unequal struggle against Turkey. However, "rational choice" cannot account for the continuing loyalty of a large part of the Cypriot population to the ideal of a unified Greek nation, which is espoused by Helleno-Christian nationalism. 184

Despite the difficulties created by mutual lack of trust, fanaticism, and obstinacy, the two sides reached to a common platform upon which a future solution would be based. This common platform is none other than a federate or confederate model of governance with extensive autonomy for both sides.

¹⁸² Nikos A. Stamatakis, 1991. "History and Nationalism: The Cultural Reconstruction of the Modern Greek Cypriot Identity", in *Cyprus Review*, vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1991, p. 76

¹⁸³ Nicos Peristianis, 2006. "Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity and Politics", in Yannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis and Gisela Welz, *Divided Cyprus* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 104

¹⁸⁴ According to a survey on political and national perceptions, which was conducted in 2000, less than half of Greek-Cypriots identify themselves as "Cypriots only", and not "Greeks" at all. See Nicos Peristianis, Op. Cit, p. 107

The prospect of a completely unified Cyprus in the future has been abandoned, something which also recognized in the ongoing (2010) peace talks.

Makarios died in 1977, and his successor, archbishop Chrysostomos, remained in the archbishopric throne until 2006. As we shall see in the following pages, Chrysostomos remained faithful to the nationalist Orthodox tradition, and since a chronic illness prevented him from public interventions during his last years in office, the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus took up the role of defending the 'national rights' of Greek-Cypriots. 185

Moreover, the Church propaganda against a solution to the Cyprus problem reached its peak during the 2003-2004 period, when frequent interventions from the Church hierarchy (especially the Metropolitan of Pafos) encouraged the people to vote 'No' to the proposed U.N. settlement, and all this in defence of 'faith and country'. The official position of the Church is summarized in its official periodical 'Απόστολος Βαρνάβας', in which the bishop of Pafos argued that 'history leaves us with a heavy weight on our shoulders, the weight of the patriotism of our race...and it is not just our glorious ancestors whose heritage requires us to say No to the despicable peace plan. It is also our Christian faith. Those who choose slavery are a disgrace for the nature of man who is made in the image of God...And it is not only spiritual slavery that is hated by God. [God also hates] the denial of

¹⁸⁵Since Makarios' death, the elected presidents of the republic who succeeded him (Mr. Kyprianou 1977-1988, Mr. Vassiliou 1988-1993, Mr. Clerides 1993-2003, and Mr. Papadopoulos, 2003-) were not clerics. Others followed a more pragmatic approach aiming at a peace solution (e.g. Clerides), while others (e.g. Papadopoulos) kept a hardliner position.

our rights, the denial of our fatherland, and our national humiliation'. ¹⁸⁶ In this passage, the Helleno-Christian nationalist view is captivatingly depicted. God is presented as guiding the Greek-Cypriot nation to salvation, as standing by its side in a holy struggle against possible ground giving to the enemy who is personified to non-other than to fellow Cypriots who happen not to be Greek-speaking Orthodox. In other words, the Helleno-Christian God is a nationalist God.

A similar view on the Anan plan is expressed in the proceedings of the Holy Synod congregation which took place in 2002 to discuss the U.N. proposals. More specifically the plan is rejected on the following grounds:

- a. It forbids the return of internally displaced people.
- b. It is not functional, and it will create problems in the running of the state.
- c. It is very beneficial for the Turkish side and unfavourable for the Greek one
- d. It is legalizing the presence of Turkish settlers in Cyprus
- e. The Turkish side is not a reliable negotiator, and it is doubtful if Turkey will keep its part of the deal. 187

This position towards the peace plan was later supported by other Orthodox Churches, namely by the Greek Church with an announcement that

¹⁸⁶ Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Pafos, 2004. 'Γιατί Πρέπει να Πούμε Όχι στο Σχέδιο Αννάν [Why Should We Say to the Annan Plan]', in Απόστολος Βαρνάβας [Apostle Barnabas], March 2004, p. 102

¹⁸⁷Proceedings of the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus meeting; November 17, 2002

it made on November 20, 2002, and the Greek-controlled patriarchates of Jerusalem (November 21, 2002), and Antioch (November 24, 2002). Although an analysis of the exact legal nature of the U.N. proposals is beyond the scope of this paper, it is definitely worth making a few remarks concerning the reasons that the Church provides for rejecting the peace plan. There were two main features in the legal nature of the plan: the first one is that it constituted an attempt to balance contrasting interests, policies and ideologies, and the second feature is that an effort was made to be slow but sure with any changes that it introduced. Therefore, it provided the means for a gradual return of refugees and internally displaced people in their homes. It also requires a slow but steady withdrawal of foreign troops (both Greek and Turkish) from the island. It worked on the assumption that a confederate model of governance will be applied in Cyprus in order to avoid the mistakes and the tensions of the past. In any case, a federate Cyprus has been the basis of all negotiations since the late 1970s. Finally, I should mention that the plan provided for the return of a significant proportion of land to Greek-Cypriots which has been lost to the Turkish invasion of 1974. When it comes to the issue of settlers, one cannot fail to note the complexity of the situation given the frequency of mixed marriages and the fact that many settlers have been in Cyprus for decades. What is sure is that the Secretary General's plan took all the necessary precautions so as to stop the influx of more settlers in the future. In short, the position of the Church appears to do no justice whatsoever to the U.N. proposal.

¹⁸⁸A copy of the plan has been obtained from the Greek Service of the BBC News Website, http://www.bbc.co.uk/greek

What is most significant for our study is that the Church saw the plan through a nationalist prism. Hence, it argued that it is advantageous for Turkish-Cypriots, as if Turkish-Cypriots are not Cypriots themselves, but Turkish. In the eyes of the Holy Synod there is no such thing as a common Cypriot identity. Hence, the two communities are seen as antagonistic players in a zero-sum negotiation game. The views of the Church were identical with those of the then president of the republic, Tassos Papadopoulos. In a historic and emotionally loaded speech, ten days before the referendum, the president called the people of Cyprus to say a 'proud No' to the proposed peace plan. Despite the fact that he was the *de jure* president of all Cypriots, both Christians and Muslims, his speech was a direct attack against his compatriots on the North of the 'Green line'. Among others he claimed that 'the aim of the Turkish-Cypriot side for two peoples, two separate states which will just co-operate, will be fully realized [with the peace plan]'.189 Before wishing 'Happy Easter to all', he concluded as follows: I urge you to reject the Anan plan. I urge you, on April 24, to say a proud NO. I urge you to defend your right, your dignity, and your history...' 190

The plan was finally put to a test in April, 24, 2004, when two referenda were held simultaneously in both Southern and Northern Cyprus, one week before the official entrance of the island in the E.U. An overwhelming majority in the North voted 'Yes' to reunification, while, at the same time, an overwhelming majority voted for exactly the opposite in the

¹⁸⁹ The transcript of the President's TV message to the country was found in the periodical Εθνική Έπαλξη[Ethniki Epalksi], vol. 54, April-June 2004

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

South. The plan was rejected, and the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus joined the E.U, while the Northern occupied territory remains impoverished and isolated until today. The influence of the Church, through its public interventions and Sunday masses, in this decision was paramount. The two big parties of Cyprus, Left and Right, did not reject the plan. The liberal Right party (DESY) supported the plan, while the socialist Left (AKEL) initially accepted it and subsequently changed position, keeping therefore an ambivalent position towards the proposed solution. In other words, among the political powers of the Cypriot Republic, it was the Church and the President who carried out the 'No' campaign.

IV.V. Conclusions: A People in Search of National Identity

The millet system of Ottoman administration endowed the Church of Cyprus with several political privileges and an extensive degree of authority over Orthodox Cypriots. The attempted reforms towards the end of the Ottoman regime in the island did not affect it significantly, as the Church managed to secularize its structures, while the involvement of people in the running of the Church bestowed its power with legitimacy. In short, the Church of Cyprus was the most important political and cultural institution under both Ottoman and British reign.

After the crisis of the first years of the 20th century, the Church of Cyprus continued to function as a political institution with unique privileges and immense political power. The control of the Church was at the epicentre

of political rivalries and antagonisms in the Cypriot society for most part of the 19th and 20th centuries. When Cyprus became independent, it even managed to strengthen its position in comparison with the years of the Ottoman and British rule in the island. Even if the nationalization of Orthodoxy is a general historical trend which has been observed in the Balkan region and especially in Greece since the 19th century, the case of Cyprus is undoubtedly the most idiosyncratic of all. Church and state were completely united in the face of president Makarios, to the point that it was difficult to distinguish between them. Since the start of peace talks in 1977, the Church has remained faithful to the tradition of a maximalist nationalism which was first advanced by Makarios. Apart from the consequences of the Church's nationalism in terms of foreign policy, we should not fail to mention the most important outcome of Helleno-Christianism in the domestic politics of Cyprus, which is the deterioration of every possible prospect for a peaceful co-existence between the two communities on the basis of a single Cypriot consciousness. What is missing from Cyprus is not a legal regime that it will be arranging the relationships between the two communities. This legal regime would be much easier to establish if there was a Cypriot national identity that would transcend religious differences, or at least a common will to co-exist peacefully.

Of course, to blame exclusively the Church for the failure of peace efforts and ethnic co-existence would be a gross oversimplification and an analytical shortfall. The Cyprus problem was created by a combination of factors, both internal and external. Among others, British and Ottoman

Imperialism, 'motherlands' paternalism'¹⁹¹, and the Cold War's fragile balance of power were causes of continuous instability in Cyprus, which were intensified by a series of internal drawbacks in both the economic and political realm. Nevertheless, one cannot fail to point out the systematic attempts of the Church to undermine peace efforts and to construct rigid boundaries between the two communities. And, given the immense political and cultural power of the Church in the island, a balanced observer has no choice but to count this institution among the obstacles to peace.

Before bringing this chapter to a close, it is necessary to put together a sketch of the basic comparisons one can make between the Greek and the Cypriot Churches. Both Churches were significant determinants of the pre-modern ethnic cultures in the two regions. Moreover, under the auspices of the ecumenical patriarchate and the provisions of the Ottoman law, in both Greece and Cyprus the Church enjoyed a great deal of economic power in conjunction with political authority in the fields of family law, tax collection, and arbitration among the Christian population. These important historical facts seem to verify the argument made in the introduction of this paper regarding the importance of pre-modern cultural material and institutions in the nation building process.

Clearly, there are also significant differences between the Greek and the Cypriot case. The autocephaly of the Cypriot Church from a very early period (431 A.D) allowed it to emancipate from the ecumenical spirit of

¹⁹¹By this term, I mean the consistent efforts of Greece and Turkey to control Cyprus and use it to advance their own national and regional interests

the patriarchate and strengthen its particular ties with Christian community of the island. The process of nationalization was therefore much smoother in Cyprus and came as effortlessly as possible with the appearance of nationalism, without the presence of frictions and heated debates which characterized the Greek case. The antithesis with the Greek case becomes even sharper if we bear in mind that there was a certain degree of forceful state intervention in order to complete the conversion of the Greek Church to nationalist values. Conversely, the Cypriot Church adopted nationalism under the influence of European ideas and Greek irredentism. Cypriot nationalism was among the last pieces in a pan-European domino. What is more is that Orthodox nationalism in Cyprus was partly a reaction to imperial rule, given the methodical efforts of the British to abolish the Church's political and economic privileges. Nationalist and irredentist demands went hand in hand with self-protection for the Cypriot Church.

To conclude, our analysis illustrates that, as the conditions of modernity changed the Cypriot society, the Church also changed in order to adapt to the novel environment. Despite being a pre-modern institution, it embraced a plethora of modern features under a seemingly traditional veil. Given its functions and importance in medieval Cyprus, it was easy for it to politicize pre-modern structures, practices, and institutions in a nationalist manner and incorporate them in modernity. Thus, it offered individuals a

¹⁹² Nikos Chrysoloras, 2004b. 'Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political Culture', in *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, vol.4.1.2004, pp. 40-61

welcomed sense of continuity between the familiar symbolic universe of tradition and the brave new world of nationalism.

Chapter V: Orthodoxy and Nationalism in Greece after 1974

V.I. Introduction

In the previous chapters, we investigated the process of consolidation of Helleno-Christian nationalism in both Greece and Cyprus, during the periods of the respective independence struggles in these two countries. In Cyprus, Helleno-Christianity has remained a powerful political force until today, and had a profound impact on the recent Greek-Cypriot decision regarding the re-unification plan, put forward by the Office of the United Nations Secretary General.

Such is also the case in Greece, where, over the last 175 years since independence from the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Orthodox Church has developed a nationalist and conservative discourse, it has allied itself with extreme right wing governments, it 'anathematized' or excommunicated progressive political leaders and intellectuals (e.g., P.M. Eleftherios Venizelos, writers Nikos Kazatzakis, Emmanuel Roidis, and others), and it turned a blind eye on the military dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974). The autocephalous Greek Church has acted in the recent Greek history not only as a state-funded institution, but also as an ideological and legitimating mechanism of the state, which has been 'blessing' governmental decisions, in exchange for a privileged status in the Greek society. In effect, the institutional and ideological ties between church and state have remained unaltered until today, and this is reflected in official and unofficial public discourse regarding Greek national identity, as well as in the legal and political arrangements of church-state relations in contemporary Greece.

In 2005, the Department of Media of the University of Athens completed a survey regarding the political culture of young Greeks, aged between 15 and 29 years. The survey attempted, among other things, to measure the trust of the Greek youth in various institutions. As we can see in the Figure below, the Orthodox Church appeared to be one of the most popular and trusted institutions:




Figure 1. Trust in Institutions. Source: Nicos Demertzis et. al, 2005. The Youth in Contemporary Greece (Unpublished survey, translated in English by Nikos Chrysoloras)

The president and the Church are perceived as institutions that unite the nation, in contrast to political parties and labour unions which are seen as divisive actors in Modern Greek society. Moreover, according to the same survey which included a representative sample (1,600 individuals) from all the major cities in Greece (Athens, Thessalonica, Patras, Larissa, Serres), religion is one of the most important social values:




Figure 2: Ranking of Social Values. Demertzis et al., 2005. Op. Cit.

Finally, it worth mentioning that one out of four young Greeks attends

Church at least once a month, while almost 1 out of ten goes to Church each

week:




Figure 3: Frequency of Church Attendance. Nicos Demertzis et al., 2005. Op. Cit.

Both the cultural and institutional aspects of Helleno-Christian influence have undermined the supposed 'religious neutrality' of the state, the treatment of immigrants and minorities, the protection of human rights, and the conduct of abstemious foreign policy. For example, Greece was convicted in the European Court of Human Rights for not allowing the elected mufti of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace, Mohamed Ali Aga, to practice his religious role. Moreover, in its 2008 report, Amnesty International criticized Greece for discrimination against religious minorities, especially within the army and the public service. The 2005 report of the American Embassy in Athens regarding religious freedom in Greece, notes the following: "Representatives of some religious groups report difficulties in their relations

¹⁹³ Cited in the Greek news portal, *www.in.gr*, published on September, 9, 2006. See link: http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntityID=737259&lngDtrID=244

See the link in the official website of Amnesty International: http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/grc-summary-eng#4. Accessed on September 10, 2008

with Greek authorities. Religious and legal privileges which are provided to the Orthodox Church are, in principle, denied to other recognized religions. Non-Orthodox Churches have to submit separate and time-consuming applications to government authorities for issues such as permission to transfer their temples to larger buildings. On the other hand, the Orthodox Church enjoys a net of institutionalized relations between the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the Ministry of Education and Creeds regarding administrative issues". ¹⁹⁵

The Greek Church has come to understand itself as the guardian of tradition and national identity, and the expression of the 'true' Greek spirit. This myth has appealed to the Greek public. The Church considers itself more as a guardian of the nation (or even race- $\gamma \dot{\epsilon} vo\varsigma^{196}$), rather than as a messenger of the will of God. At the same time, it considers its views as carrying a divine legitimization, which places them above positive law, and makes them immune to criticism, 197 since the 'will of God' is perceived as the ultimate foundation for legitimizing one's views.

As we have seen in chapter III, since the declaration of the autocephaly of the Greek Church in 1833, the relationships between the Greek state and the Church have been relatively harmonious (after a short 'adaptation' period), within a legal context of subordination of the ecclesiastical power of the Church to the secular power of the state. The latter, with the help of

¹⁹⁵ http://athens.usembassy.gov/religiousfreedom_gr2005.pdf. Accessed on September 10, 2006

¹⁹⁶ The meaning of the word 'genos' (γένος) is ambiguous. It may mean 'Greek speaking populations', "Orthodox Christians of the Balkans", or 'the Greek race'.

¹⁹⁷ See the interview of the Archbishop of Athens Christodoulos in *Eleftherotypia*, 15/6/2000

Romanticist intellectuals and politicians (Paparrigopoulos, Zambelios, Kolletis), disseminated the basic arguments of the Helleno-Christian thesis to every layer of the Greek society through public education, policies, and laws. The Church on the other hand played an active role in supporting, through its influence to the people, state decisions and augmenting popular feelings of national solidarity and nationalism in the face of external 'threats' and internal dissents. This is not to suggest that there were not voices which opposed the hegemony of Helleno-Christianism. However, it is only after 1974 that we can observe a serious threat to the chain of equivalence between religious and national identity. A reason for that is the trauma of the military junta.

Despite the fact that the majority of the Greek people did not actively oppose the ideological and political dominance of the military dictatorship, almost immediately after its fall, the slogan Έλλάς, Ελλήνων Χριστιανών [For a Greece of Greek Christians] lost its popular support. 198 In a way, it became "politically incorrect" for a period of time. Traditional institutions (including the army and the church), slogans (including the infamous ἡΠατρίς, Θρησκεία, Οικογένεια [Fatherland, Family, Religion]), and political powers temporarily lost their legitimacy, after being associated with the dictatorship.

At the same time, the multi-party system of the pre-dictatorial period was replaced by the complete hegemony of two major parties in the post-authoritarian period [Μεταπολίτευση]: the centre-right 'New Democracy' and the centre-leftist PASOK. The parties of the radical left (both reformist and

¹⁹⁸ Mass resistance to the military dictatorship was not widespread during the early years of its rule, and it was limited in Athens.

orthodox communist) have never regained the popular support that the commanded until the late 1950s. They typically supported the complete secularization of the Greek state, while, at the other end of the spectrum, New Democracy has defended the status quo in Church-state relations. As we shall see in the following pages, PASOK has been a great deal more ambivalent in its intentions. During the 1990s, three different parties were formed, which attempted to challenge the dominance of PASOK and New Democracy in the Greek political landscape (the right wing *Politiki Anoiksi*, the left wing DIKKI, and the centrist KEK). None of them succeeded. Instead, in the early years of the 21st century, two other parties occupied the far right end of the Greek political spectrum: LAOS and Democratiki Anagennisi. The former one proved quite resilient and successful, drawing its political rhetoric from the main themes of Helleno-Christian nationalism.

However, the most significant sociological development in the postauthoritarian period was the emergence of a new type of nationalist discourse that attempted to replace Helleno-Christianism as the dominant ideology in the Greek political culture. It was PASOK's nationalist discourse, which was centered on a series of anti-imperialist and anti-American slogans and it incorporated elements ranging from populism to socialism. Having the benefit of hindsight, we may now conclude that clash between PASOK and the Church was unavoidable.

V.II. PASOK and the Church

The congruent cooperation amongst the Church and the State started disintegrating in the beginning of the 1980s when the leftist 'Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement' (PASOK) came to power. Since its first years in office, PASOK attempted to introduce a series of secularizing measures (e.g. civil marriage and divorce), which were perceived by the Church as direct attack against its hegemonic position in the Greek national life. 199 As James Pettifer argued,

The Church has generally seen PASOK governments as an object of cultural opposition; a secularist party with only a weak, if any, commitment to the position of the Church in national life and enemy likely to champion changes in social legislation of which the Church disapproves.²⁰⁰

The intentions of the Socialist Party regarding church-state relationships were already revealed from the its first days in office.²⁰¹ The decriminalization of adultery, the introduction of civil wedding and the simplification of the procedures for a divorce were among the initial pieces of legislation that brought the government into conflict with the Orthodox Church. The Holy Synod of the Church was caught by surprise, even though radical

¹⁹⁹ However, the popularity of the Church did not allow to any of the post-1974 Greek Governments to proceed to radical measures such as "disestablishment", or to permanently solve the issue of the Church property, despite the fact that there were relevant discussions among academics and politicians during the two constitutional reforms of 1986 and 2000.

²⁰⁰ James Pettifer, 1996. "Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy", in Kevin Featherstone,& Kostas Ifantis, (eds.), *Greece in a Changing Europe*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press) p.p. 21-22

 $^{^{201}}$ Ιός της Κυριακής [Sunday Virus], "Οι Εκατό Πρώτες Μέρες του ΠαΣοΚ στην Εξουσία...και οι Εκατό Τελευταίες" [The First 100 Days of PASOK in Office... and the Last 100], in Ελευθεροτυπία [Eleftherotypia], 14-3-2004

secularization measures were included both in PASOK's political manifestos as well as in frequent public statements of its members. During the parliamentary debate regarding the post-dictatorial constitution of Greece, in 1975, the leader of the socialist party, Andreas Papandreou, has made his intentions quite clear: "We support a full and complete separation of church and state. This is in the interest of both the state and the church. It is high time for the church to become independent and to disentangle from partisan politics". ²⁰² Among the fiercest critics of PASOK at that time, was the Metropolitan of Demetrias, and later to become archbishop, Christodoulos Paraskevaidis. ²⁰³

To the disappointment of modernizers, PASOK was not able to proceed to a complete separation of church and state at the 1986 constitutional reform. This was partly due to reactions from within the government itself, as many of its members during that period represented what was later called 'patriotic socialism', or, in sociological terms, an ideological mixture of populism, socialist parlance and nationalist attitude. Moreover, PASOK lacked popular support for its disestablishment project, as Helleno-Christianity remained, and still is, an ideology shared by vast numbers of the Greek population. It is worth mentioning that PASOK's attempt to solve the problem of ecclesiastical property, and to reform the electoral system for bishops, in 1987, created a prolonged crisis in church-state relations, which led to the resignation of the Minister of Education and Creeds, late Anthonis Tritsis, and the abandonment of further efforts of

²⁰² Georgios Karayannis, 1997. Op. Cit., p. 182

²⁰³ Ελευθεροτυπία [Eleftherotypia], 14-3-2004, Op. Cit.

secularization. PASOK lost the elections of 1989 amidst a series of scandals and accusations of corruption.

Even though the socialists did not succeed in separating church and state, the legacy of the eight-year rule of PASOK should not be underestimated. Apart from the liberalization of family laws mentioned above, PASOK also managed to alter the attitudes of the Greek society towards issues that the Church considers as taboos. Hence, despite its traditionalist political culture and the power of the Orthodox Church, Greece has established a very liberal - even by European and North American standards- legal framework in relation to issues such as duration of imprisonment, abortion, and prostitution.

The center-right party that succeeded PASOK in office, Nea Democratia [New Democracy], did not touch the sensitive issues related to secularization. Besides, popular disappointment with its tight financial policy quickly brought PASOK back in power with a landslide victory, in 1993. However, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou's poor health made PASOK more concerned about a smooth succession, rather than political reform issues. In the meantime, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disillusionment with communism, the consequent crisis among the Greek left that eventually led to its fragmentation, the political cynicism caused by the various corruption scandals of the early 1990s, and, more importantly, the dispute between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, over the 'Greekness' of Macedonia and the heritage of Alexander the Great, brought nationalism back to mainstream politics and public discourse. In 1992, millions of Greeks

protested in the streets of Athens and Thessalonica, with their main slogan being "Macedonia has been Greek for over 3,000 years". This phrase is nothing but an exemplar of nationalist thinking, according to which the Greek nation has been in existence since before the Trojan War, and Macedonia is an integral part of it.

Contrary to this political climate of nationalist populism, PASOK elected a Prime Minister, Costas Semites, whose main political catchphrase was 'modernization'. The government which was formed after the 1996 elections included many senior ministers who appeared to share Semites' vision of Europeanized and modernized Greece, while 'patriotic socialists' within the party were forced to step aside. Unfortunately for the modernizers, immediately after their election, nationalism was revived, since Greece won the Olympic Games bid and reached to the brink of war with Turkey, due to a dispute over the control of two small islands called Imia. The stance of PASOK during the latter crisis was criticized as being nationally treacherous, since the government made every effort to avoid a war and Semites thanked the United States for their help in this effort.

V.II.i. Christodoulos vs. PASOK

The relationships between the Church and the State further deteriorated when the dynamic and charismatic Archbishop Christodoulos succeeded the low-profile Seraphim as head of the Greek Church in 1998. Christodoulos seemed unwilling to make any further concessions to the state that would compromise the position of the Church in the Greek society. His

personal popularity, the strong attachment of the Greeks to the Orthodox dogma, as well as his rhetorical and leadership capabilities facilitated his cause.

In 1999, when the socialist government attempted to make one more step towards secularization, and abandon the requirement for the Greek citizens to state their religion in their identity cards, the Church fiercely reacted and asked for the carrying out of a referendum to decide on the issue. The government refused, and Christodoulos started a struggle against the government's decision, which included street demonstrations attended by hundreds of thousands of people, interventions in the media, and the collection of signatures in favor of a referendum. Although there are no official data for the exact number of those who signed for the illegal 'referendum' of the Church (we can only rely on the data given by the Church), virtually no one disputes that the Church managed to collect more than three million signatures (around 35% of eligible voters).²⁰⁴

From a legal point of view, the Church was clearly wrong. Both the independent Personal Data Protection Authority, and the superior constitutional court of the Greek state, the State Council, had ruled that even the optional inclusion of religious attachment in identity cards is unconstitutional.²⁰⁵ However, the Archbishop, through the use of a clearly populist discourse, managed to convince the people that he is carrying out a

²⁰⁴ According to the Church data, 3,008,901 signatures. Cited in Yannis Stavrakakis, 'Religion and Populism...'

²⁰⁵ It appears that there is a significant consensus among legal theorists, academics and jurists towards the view that the statement of religion in identity cards is unconstitutional, and violates the principle of personal data protection. See Antonis Manitakis, *Op. Cit.*, Panayotis Dimitropoulos, *Op. Cit.*, and Evangelos Venizelos, *Op. Cit.*

"holy war" against the alienation of Greece from her tradition. In addition to that, the Church enjoyed the support of the major opposition party of Greece, the center-right Nea Democratia, and the almost unconditional support of the whole spectrum of the Greek right. Finally, the legal status of the Orthodox Church as the 'established Church' of Greece provided it with special privileges and allowed it to intervene in public affairs.

The present constitution of Greece cannot dictate to the Church its views. It cannot prohibit the ethnocentric fundamentalist doctrines espoused by the Church hierarchy. In fact it gives Orthodoxy the role of the 'established' Church. Article 3 of the 1975 constitution (even after the last revision in 2001) recognizes the Christian Orthodox religion as 'the prevailing religion in Greece'. More specifically, Article 3 reads as follows:

1. The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. The Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably united in doctrine with the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and with every other Church of Christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they do, the holy apostolic and synodal canons and sacred traditions. It is autocephalous and is administered by the Holy Synod of serving Bishops and the Permanent Holy Synod originating thereof and assembled as specified by the Statutory Charter of the Church in compliance with the provisions of the Patriarchal Tome of June 29, 1850 and

the Synodal Act of September 4, 1928.

- 2. The ecclesiastical regime existing in certain districts of the State shall not be deemed contrary to the provisions of the preceding-paragraph
- 3. The text of the Holy Scripture shall be maintained unaltered. Official translation of the text into any other form of language, without prior sanction by the Autocephalous Church of Greece and the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople, is prohibited.²⁰⁶

That said, we should also emphasize that freedom of worship and belief are typically protected by the constitution in accordance with the Western standards. Article 13 of the Constitution reads as follows:

- 1. The freedom of religious conscience is inviolable. The enjoyment of civil and individual rights does not depend on the religious conviction of each individual.
- 2. Every known religion is free and the forms of worship thereof shall be practiced without any hindrance by the State and under protection of the law. The exercise of worship shall not contravene public order or offend morals. Proselytizing is prohibited.
- 3. The ministers of all religions are subject to the same obligations towards the State and to the same state supervision as the ministers of the established religion.
- 4. No person shall, by reason of his religious convictions, be exempt from discharging his obligations to the State, or refuse to comply with the laws.

²⁰⁶ http://www.mfa.gr/syntagma/artcl25.html#A3

5. No oath shall be imposed without a law specifying the form thereof.²⁰⁷

Moreover, article 16 of the Greek constitution, which describes the role and scope of education in the country, states the following:

Education constitutes a fundamental state objective and aims at the moral, intellectual, professional, and physical instruction of the Greeks, the development of national and religious consciousness, and the formation of free and responsible citizens.

Before finishing this brief summary of the place of religion within the Greek legal order, it would be useful for the reader to synopsize the political party system of modern Greece and its relationship with the Greek Church. Greece has been formally a constitutional democracy since 1864, though democratic politics has been interrupted twice in the past by dictatorial coups, foreign occupation and civil war (1936-1949 and 1967-1974). Since 1915, when a 'national schism' was brought about as a result of the disagreement between the king and the prime minister regarding the position that Greece was to take during the 1st World War, Greek party politics is characterized by the presence of a right and an anti-right coalitions (or, before that, liberal/conservative, and even before that, republican/royalist). The allegiance of the parties of the centre in this conflict varied in different historical periods. The right/anti-right distinction became even sharper during the consolidation period of the so-called Third Greek Republic (1974-), when many supporters of the left shifted their support to the center-left

 $^{^{\}rm 207}\,http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/gr00000_.html,$ emphases added

PASOK.²⁰⁸ Since 1996, the use of the 'right/anti-right' discourse has been limited and what we usually call Greek post-authoritarian period seems to have come to an end. A firmly consolidated democracy based on a Westminster-type two-party system has been established.

While the Church has been traditionally a supporter of the right, both the centre and the left had never been unequivocally hostile to the Church (although the left supports secularization), and this is partly because of the wide and cross-class appeal of Orthodoxy in Greek political culture. However, even the slightest secularizing measures, which are necessary for the protection of basic human rights, have been perceived by the Church as direct threats to its position in Greek politics, and it is in part because of this Church attitude that there is a continuous tension in the relations between the official Church and the parties of the left until today.

The conflict between the Church and the State on the issue of the identity cards finally ended in August 29th 2001, with the decisive intervention of the President of the Republic, Constantinos Staphanopoulos, who refused the demands of the Church for the carrying out of the referendum, on the basis of the argument that this would be an unconstitutional action. This intervention "led to the suspension of most politicized activities" of the Church at least for the next couple of years.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸ PASOK's founder, and three times-elected PM of Greece, Andreas Papandreou, managed to gain the support of the left, with the talented use of a populist discourse, in which he claimed that he represented all the democratic and 'anti-right' forces of Greece, and that he supported the claims of the "unprivileged".

²⁰⁹ Yannis Stavrakakis, Op. Cit., p. 8

Nevertheless, the period starting with the enthronement of Christodoulos in 1998, until the final resolution of the issue in 2001 was admittedly a period of heavy politicization of the Church discourse, and produced a considerable amount of academic literature on the subject. The main points of the Church discourse during that period were that a) the Church is the only agent available to protect Greek national identity, since the state is becoming increasingly detached from the idea of the nation, and b) membership in the E.U is potentially dangerous for Greek national identity in the absence of a strong Church, which will be able to protect the Greek tradition from the corrupting influence of the heterodox²¹⁰, and c) by linking Greekness with Orthodoxy, the Church has managed to convince a large part of the Greek population that secularization measures in Greece are irrelevant and illegitimate. In other words, the ideas of the West and the Enlightenment are only acceptable as long as they do not come into conflict with the Greek Orthodox 'tradition'. As we can note, the last years of confrontation between the Church and the governments of PASOK marked a radical change in the role of the Church, which, challenged the legal and political dominance of the state over ecclesiastical authority, and assumed the role of an autonomous political agent. ²¹¹

The aforementioned conclusions derive from the study, analysis, and interpretation of the Church's political actions and rhetoric, during the period under investigation. More specifically, for purposes of analytical clarity, the words and acts of the elected head of the Church of Greece, archbishop

²¹⁰ Panayiotis Dimitropoulos, Op. Cit., p. 158

²¹¹ Ibid. p.162

Christodoulos, are considered as representing the institution as such, especially because of the lack of any serious opposition views within the clergy in general and the Orthodox hierarchy in particular.²¹² Besides, by virtue of his place as the head of the Holy Synod in Greece, Christodoulos had been widely considered as the legitimate voice of the Church. The archbishop's public rhetoric during the identity cards quarrel is indicative of his views regarding Hellenism, Orthodoxy, Greek national identity, and the public good.

The first rhetorical strategy that the Archbishop used in order to articulate his nationalist discourse was the construction of a logic of equivalence. "The logic of equivalence constructs a chain of equivalential identities among different elements that are seen as expressing a certain sameness". ²¹³ In the case of populism, the political spectrum is simplified by the populists, to the extent that is perceived as being formed by two opposing camps: the people and its "enemies". ²¹⁴

Populism, characterized by the identification of all social groups as "the people" and by the masking of individual and corporate demands as "popular demands", affects political practice and shapes the manner in which social and political reality is perceived and understood.²¹⁵

In our case, the Archbishop refers to the "people" as a unified and undivided

entity. He then constructs a set of ideological and political frontiers between

²¹² Apart from the notable exception of the bishop of Zante.

²¹³ Torfing, Jacob, New Theories of Discourse, p. 301

²¹⁴ Lyritzis, C., 1987. "The Power of Populism: the Greek Case", in the European Journal of Political Research, vol. 15, p. 671

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 683

the people and its enemies. The imaginary 'will of the people' is the supreme will in a society according to the Archbishop:

The history and the will of the people are above the Constitution and the laws...When the people do not want the laws, then they are not implemented, they become useless and, in reality, they cease to exist. The consciousness of the nation about what is right and what is not rejects them.²¹⁶

In the above passage, one can see a direct challenge to constitutional democracy in the name of the people. And, since heterodox and atheists in Greece are officially less than 4% of the population, the Church assumes the role of the representative of the people, or at least of the vast majority of the people.²¹⁷ However, it is clear that even if Orthodox Christians comprise the vast majority of the population in Greece,²¹⁸ it does not follow that all the Orthodox Greeks have chosen the Church as their representative in political affairs; nor does it follow that their Christian identity leads them to challenge the political Constitution of Greece. Nevertheless, the Archbishop claimed to speak both in the name of the people (and not in the name of Orthodox Church), as well as in the name of God, since he was the head of the Holy Synod. These claims provided his discourse with an unusual status of

²¹⁶ Christodoulos, in Ελευθεροτυπία [Eleftherotypia], 15/6/2000

²¹⁷ Yannis Stavrakakis, 'Religion and Populism...', p. 24

²¹⁸However, according to the last census of 2001, the number of immigrants in Greece has increased to more than 800,000 (more than 7% of the total population). Only 52.7% of those immigrants are baptised Christian Orthodox. See Christos Vernadakis, 2003. *VPRC Έρευνες-* Δημοσκοπήσεις 2002 [VPRC Institute Researches and Surveys 2002], (Athens: Λιβάνης)

infallibility. Speaking in the name of the people is a typical practice of populist movements.²¹⁹

Another emblematic example of populist practice was Christodoulos' tactic of presenting himself as a direct and unmediated representative of the people, one who rejected the modern unpopular bureaucratic procedures, and his words appealed to the nation as a whole, independently of party attachments. He was acting like a media star, his speeches were deeply emotional (and therefore irrational), his vocabulary was extravagant, and sometimes included the argot of the youth. In a widely known speech at a high-school, Christodoulos asked young male students to come to church even "with their earrings", while, after they applauded his statement, he replied, "you're my men too [και 'γω σας πάω]". As Nicos Demertzis notes, Christodoulos did not hesitate to say jokes -often racist- in his church speeches, and to "conversationalize" theological discourse, a practice which until recently had been alien to Orthodox hierarchy culture.²²⁰ Like most of the populist movements, contemporary Greek populism was characterized by the presence of a charismatic leader.²²¹ This empirical observation seems again to be consistent with Laclau's theoretical framework for the analysis of

²¹⁹ Ernesto Laclau, 1997. Για την Επανάσταση της Εποχής Maς [New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time], edited and translated by Yannis Stavrakakis (Athens: Νήσος), p.p. 165-174

²²⁰ Nicos Demertzis, 2001. "Θρησκεία και ΜΜΕ στην Ελλάδα [Religion and Media in Greece]". Paper cited in professor Demertzis' personal webpage at the University of Athens website:

http://media.uoa.gr/people/demertzis/pages_gr/articles/docs/2001/religion_media.php ²²¹ Spyros Sofos, 2000. "Λαϊκή Ταυτότητα και Πολιτική Κουλτούρα στη Μεταδικτακτορική Ελλάδα: Προς Μία Πολιτιστική Προσέγγιση του Λαϊκιστικού Φαινομένου [Popular Identity and Political Culture in Post-Authoritarian Greece: Towards a Cultural Approach to the Populist Phenomenon]", in Nicos Demertzis (ed.), Η Ελληνική Πολιτική Κουλτούρα Σήμερα [Greek Political Culture Today], (3rd ed. Athens: Οδυσσέας) p. 141

populism. As it is noted by Lyritzis, in his Laclau-based study of Greek populism,

Even where populism is expressed through a strong grassroots organizational base, the latter seems to maintain a direct relationship with the leader, weakening the intermediary administrative levels between the top and the rank and file. Intermediaries are distrusted and are seen to impede the direct and immediate rapport between leader and led...Populism is thus often characterized by a plebiscitarian-charismatic leadership, which acts as a substitute for a strong and effective organization in achieving necessary political cohesion and a common identity.²²²

The issues that Christodoulos addressed during his public appearances were not theological, but political (or national, as he calls them) in nature. In his demonstration speech against the new identity cards legislation in Athens, Christodoulos was waiving the flag of *Ayia Lavra*, a symbol of the 1821 War of Independence. This was not accidental. This move intended to demonstrate that when the Church is 'under threat', then Greekness is also under threat. A large part of the Greek population was convinced by Christodoulos' arguments that secularization would be a step towards the alienation of Greeks from their tradition.²²³

²²² Christos Lyrintzis, *Op. Cit.*, p. 671

²²³The abovementioned views of the Church, and especially of its Archbishop, seem to be very appealing to the Greek public. According to a recent public opinion poll conducted by the Greek public opinion agency "MRB" (published on 03/07/2002. Cited in http://www.ego.gr/pegasus/articles/article.jsp?artid=71913&pubid=85872) the Archbishop's popularity remains very high- 68%, while in the past it has been as high as 74.6%. See Christos Vernadakis, *Op. Cit.*, p. 366

Another crucial observation is that "the people" in Christodoulos' discourse was defined in racial terms. In his Από Χώμα και Ουρανό [From Earth and Sky] (1999), he argued that, during the nation-building process, Greeks "unfortunately" lost the identity that the Church had assigned to them: their racial identity.

Against the conqueror [the Ottoman Empire], we had a religious as well as a racial difference. We were the Race [γ ėvo ς]. We kept our racial identity until around the 17th century when the ideas of the British philosophers about the Nation [$\dot{\epsilon}\theta$ vo ς] were spread among the Greek intelligentsia...Since then we lost the identity that the Church had given us, we ceased to be a race and we became a nation.²²⁴

In another passage of his book, Christodoulos even more boldly states: "The other man, the one who has a country, and a family and values, this man is today useful to the Race [yevos]. And this is the type of man that Orthodoxy shapes and supports: the man with self-consciousness and identity". ²²⁵ Apart from the clear indications of the development of racial ideas within the contemporary Church discourse, other authors have also emphasized the existence of strong Anti-Semitic ideas. The bishop of Corinth Panteleimon (an honorary Doctor of Philosophy of the Theological Faculty of the University of Athens) has written in his book *Jewish and Christians*:

[The Jews] are natural enemies of Hellenism, because Hellenism is based on the correct placement of mind, on rational thinking, on the correct

²²⁴ Christodoulos, Από Χώμα και Ουρανό [From Earth and Sky], p. 220

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 233

positioning of the human in his real dimension, while Judaism leads him to irrational and utopist dreams of material dimension.²²⁶

In the above passage, we find evidence which verify the view that contemporary Greek nationalism contains resilient racist beliefs.

The political identity of "the people" in Christodoulos' discourse was constructed through the articulation of the social antagonism between the people and its enemies; and the enemies are everywhere according to Christodoulos: Among the enemies of the people are "the Islamic menace", the Vatican, Turkey,227 the E.U, the intellectuals, or even the conscientious objectors.²²⁸ The common aim of all these 'enemies' is to alienate Hellenism from its tradition and culture. 229 Hellenism is an "endangered culture", 230 and the Church is the only political and spiritual agent available in Greece, which is able to carry out the Messianic role of saving Hellenism from assimilation into a global culture.²³¹ In a rather cliché manner, Christodoulos criticized the decadence of modern ethics, and argued that Greeks "have been infected with the malicious tumor of alienation". 232 Christodoulos' political positions, as they were presented in his From Earth and Sky, may be summarized into two demands: firstly, in order to combat the ethical decay of Modern Greek society, the social role of the Church should be protected and enhanced.

²²⁶ Cited in Stavros Zoumboulakis, Op. Cit., p. 82

²²⁷ Christodoulos, Από Χώμα και Ουρανό [From Earth and Sky], p.100

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 242

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 173

²³⁰ Ibid., p.219

²³¹ Ibid., p.153

²³² Ibid., p. 77

Secondly, in order to contain the "Muslim Curtain" in the Balkans, Greece should pioneer in the establishment of an "Orthodox Axis" in the Balkans.²³³

The Church considered itself as the only institution, which is eligible to speak in the name of the "people" and express such views, since it regards itself as representing 97% of the Greeks who are baptized Christian Orthodox. In this sense, it articulated an image of national identity that derives from the Byzantine theocratic culture. By linking Greekness with Orthodoxy, the Church has managed to convince a large part of the Greek population that secularization measures in Greece are irrelevant and illegitimate. In other words, the ideas of the West and the Enlightenment are only acceptable as long as they do not come into conflict with the Greek Orthodox 'tradition'.

When it comes to the question of what this tradition means, a careful reader cannot fail to note the typical nationalist narrative which underlines the political though of Christodoulos. In a 2001 speech entitled $E\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\sigma$ ia κ at Λ a $\dot{\sigma}$ [Church and People], Christodoulos admitted that European nations are products of 18th century nationalism. However, this is not the case for the Greek nation.

Homer teaches us that since the dawn of the centuries, we [Greeks] are a uniformed nation. Only members of the Greek race could participate in the Olympic Games. Obviously, there were city-states who fought between them. However, they were conscious that they

were fighting Greeks. Plato and Thucydides consider these wars as civil wars.²³⁴

But where does Christianity fit in this ideological schema? Christodoulos' answer, given during a sermon, is that, Jesus may have been Jewish, but he trusted the spread of Christianity and the New Testament to Greeks. This is why the Gospel was written in Greek. The superiority of the Greek thinking was the reason that God got His Word from the Jewish and delivered it to Greeks²³⁵ In this way, Greekness and Christianity are inseparably connected. This connection necessitates the protection of the constitutional position of the Orthodox Church.

You often hear me talking about the relationship between state and church, to defend it, and to ask everybody to leave this subject untouched. We consider this relationship as a priceless legacy, a historical given that will ensure the future survival of our race. ²³⁶

Furthermore, the Church's discourse, during the 1998-2001 period, aimed to undermine the Greek government. The Church argued that it is the only agent available to protect Greek national identity, since the state is

²³⁴ Christodoulos, 19/6/2001, "Εκκλησία και Λαός [Church and People]". A speech at the Shipping Club of Piraeus. Original text in Greek: "Ο Όμηρος μας διδάσκει από τα βάθη των αιώνων ότι είμαστε ένα και ενιαίο έθνος. Στις Ολυμπιάδες, τους Ολυμπιακούς αγώνες, μετείχαν μόνον μέλη του γένους των Ελλήνων. Βεβαίως υπήρχαν πόλεις κράτη, που συνήθως πολεμούσαν μεταξύ τους. Όμως, υπήρχε πλήρης συνείδηση ότι οι πόλεμοι αυτοί γίνονταν μεταξύ Ελλήνων. Για εμφύλιους πολέμους, για αδελφοκτόνους πολέμους μιλούν ο Πλάτων και ο Θουκυδίδης".

 $^{^{235}}$ Christodoulos, 30/11/2001, "Η Ελληνικότητα του Χριστιανισμού [The Greekness of Christianity]". A Sermon at Patras' St. Andrew Cathedral

²³⁶ Christodoulos, 19/6/2001, "Εκκλησία και Λαός [Church and People]". A speech at the Shipping Club of Piraeus. (Original text in Greek: "Συχνά με ακούτε να αναφέρομαι στη σχέση Εκκλησίας και πολιτείας, να την υπερασπίζομαι και μάλιστα να ζητώ από όλους να τη διατηρήσουμε σαν κεφάλαιο που δεν πρέπει να θιγεί. Επικαλούμεθα αυτή τη σχέση ως ανεκτίμητη κληρονομιά, εκφράζοντας ένα ιστορικό δεδομένο και προτείνοντας έναν τρόπο επιβίωσης του γένους μας αύριο")

becoming increasingly detached from the idea of the nation. Therefore, membership in the E.U is potentially dangerous for Greek national identity in the absence of a strong Church, which will be able to protect the Greek tradition from the corrupting influence of the heterodox.²³⁷ As we can note, the last years of confrontation between the Church and the governments of PASOK marked a radical change in the role of the Church, which in our epoch, challenges the dominance of the state over ecclesiastical issues as well as questions of identity. ²³⁸ Christodoulos believed that the Church was under attack by Semites and his modernizers, because it refused to modernize and remained faithful to its values and traditions.²³⁹

On the other hand, his support for the center-right party was not unconditional: For example, during the local elections of 2002, the Church clearly supported the extreme right wing party, LA.O.S [Popular Orthodox Rally]. The result of the Church support to LA.O.S was that a party whose percentages rarely reach above 4%, managed to get a staggering 14% in the crucial elections for the prefecture of Athens and Piraeus. Moreover, Christodoulos had overtly criticized and rejected the Kofi Annan peace plan in Cyprus, accusing it of being against the interests of the Greek nation. In a church speech he gave in 2001, he asked the Lord "to save our Cypriot brothers, who belong to the same race with us, who believe in the same God,

²³⁷ Panayiotis Dimitropoulos, Op. Cit., 158

²³⁸ Ibid. p.162

 $^{^{239}}$ Christodoulos, 1/1/2001, "H Ιδιοπροσωπία Μας [Our Uniqueness]", Interview at the Magazine Taftotita, found in the official website of the Greek Orthodox Church, http://www.ecclesia.gr

²⁴⁰ The prefecture of Athens and Piraeus comprises 25% of the total Greek electorate. We should also note that one of the reasons that the mainstream centre-right candidate did so bad in the 2002 elections in Athens and Piraeus was the 'disrespect' that he had shown to Christodoulos.

who speak the same language, and whose fate in this world is tied with our fate."²⁴¹

Finally, Christodoulos has asked Nea Democratia to commit itself in bringing back the optional inclusion of religious affiliation in national identity cards, in exchange for his unofficial support. Nea Democratia, won the 2004 elections, and Christodoulos congratulated it by saying that "the Lord's *Right* hand knows what's good for the nation". This statement has caused outrage to the socialists due to the ambiguous meaning of the signifier *right* in the sentence. Although it is beyond the period under investigation in this dissertation, it is worth pointing out that Christodoulos did not bring up the demand for optional inclusion of religious affiliation in identity cards after the 2004 elections. This compromise seems to be the result of appeasement policies on the part of the new government, which upgraded ecclesiastical academies to higher education institutions, and promised the building of a new Holy Synod building and a new Cathedral.

²⁴¹ Christodoulos, 3/5/2001, "Η Αγωνία των Κυπρίων Αδελφών μας [The Agony of our Cypriot Brothers". A sermon published in the official website of the Greek Orthodox Church, http://www.ecclesia.gr. (Original text in Greek: Καὶ σὲ α□τὲς τἰς ε□χὲς καὶ τἰς προσωτικὲς μου προσευχὲς καὶ τἰς προσωτικὲς μου ε□χὲς, νὰ δώσει □ Θεός, □στε νὰ διαλευκανθε□ α□τό τό μυστήριο καὶ νὰ □ρεμήσουν ο□ ψυχὲς καὶ ο□ καρδιὲς καὶ τ□ν συγγεν□ν καὶ φίλων καὶ □λων □μ□ν τ□ν □λλων □λλήνων, ποὺ □χουμε διδαχθε□ νὰ θεωρο□με □δελφοὺς μας, □λους μὲν το□ □νθρώπους, □λως □διαιτέρως δὲ □κείνους, ποὺ ε□ναι □μογενε□ς μας, ποὺ ε□ναι □μόφυλοὶ μας, ποὺ πιστεύουμε στὸν □διο Θεό, ποὺ λαλο□με τὴν □δια γλώσσα καὶ ποὺ □χομε συνενώσει καὶ τἰς τὺχες μας καὶ τἰς ζωὲς μας σὲ α□τὸ τὸν κόσμο).

V.III. Explaining the Persistence of Helleno-Christianism

In short, the political project that the Orthodox Church tried to launch mainly aimed to counter the effects of the 'westernization' of Greece, while at the same time protecting and promoting the political privileges of the Church. This project paradoxically seemed to be appealing to the Greeks, as the 'referendum' over identity cards has shown. Greeks have experienced the fruits of westernization, since the country enjoys a relatively satisfying economic growth, and has become a full member of the E.U and the European monetary system. At the same time however, people seem to be experiencing an identity dislocation, since westernization appears as a menace to their distinctive national culture. An increasing part of state legislation is subject to approval by the European commission, while the influx of more than a million immigrants in the country in the 1990s decade has augmented the popularity of the extreme right for the first time since the restoration of democracy. The approval of the Church's nationalist ideology may be seen as a reaction to this identity dislocation.

Many liberal modernization theorists have expressed their hope that Helleno-Christian nationalism would fade away within the context of liberal globalization and European unification. It would be useful at this point to define – for analytical purposes - the concept of globalization before getting into the discussion of its effects on Helleno-Christian nationalism. For the purposes of this dissertation we will use Scholte's definition of globalization: For Jan Aart Scholte, globalization "refers to processes whereby social

relations acquire relatively distanceless and borderless qualities, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place".242 In other words, globalization refers to the social phenomenon of increasing interconnectedness between societies. The virtue of this definition is that it emphasizes that globalization is at the same time an event as well as an ongoing process. Its vice is that it does not specify the mechanisms that produce these "processes". Baylis and Smith argue that globalization is transforming international politics to global politics. The new 'global' order is generated by and manifested through a series of social phenomena including, the emergence of a global economy, the development of a network of global media and communications, the expansion of global social movements, the acme of global franchises (McDonalds, Coca Cola etc.), and the occurrence of global risks (environmental hazards, epidemics, terrorism etc.).243 Time and space are collapsing due to the effect of global communications, and our world becomes increasingly homogenous due to the slow but steady development of a global culture. The states' educational systems find it increasingly difficult to prevent this new culture from intruding in the everyday lives of adolescents around the world. Information society and the Internet undermine the socializing monopoly of the state and family and disseminate a cosmopolitan life-style. In his Postmodern Condition, Lyotard writes:

²⁴² J. A. Scholte, 1997. "The Globalization of World Politics", in J. Baylis& S. Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 14

²⁴³ J. Baylis & S. Smith, 1997. "Introduction", ", in J. Baylis & S. Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 7

Eclecticism is the degree zero of contemporary general culture: one listens to reggae, watches a western, eats McDonalds food for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and "retro" clothes in Hong-Kong; knowledge is a matter of TV games.²⁴⁴

If that account of the emergence of a global culture is accurate, then national identities should be gradually weakening, national practices and customs should withering away to be replaced by a globalized life-style, and sub-national and supranational identifications should be winning the allegiance of ethnic and national groups. Indeed, in a world of transnational organizations, global institutions, and global risks, nations seem irrelevant. As Marx and Engels have put it in a famous passage, "in place of old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations".245 But have our identities, fears and dreams become global? Empirical evidence from the Greek and Greek-Cypriot cases shows the contrary. "Perhaps the postmodern consumer can purchase a bewildering range of identity-styles. Certainly, the commercial structures are in place for the economically comfortable to change styles in the Western world ... One can eat Chinese tomorrow and Turkish the day after ... But being Chinese or Turkish are not commercially available options". 246

²⁴⁴ J. F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, 1984. (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p. 76

²⁴⁵ Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, 1985. The Communist Manifesto, (London: Penguin), pp. 83-84

²⁴⁶ M. Billig, 1995. Banal Nationalism, (London: Sage), p. 139

Moreover, the persistence of national, ethnic, and religious fundamentalism around the world (including the countries under investigation here) indicates that people are not prepared to abandon their loyalty to community in favour of the formation of some kind of 'global village'. The periodic resurgence of fundamentalist and nationalist political projects- both in the West and the developing world- and the rise of the Christian right in the United States, and neo-fascism in Europe, attest to that conclusion.

Perhaps, the discussion around the effects of globalization to nationalism is unnecessarily blurred by the conflation of nations with states. Nations and centralized states were born and evolved together, and undoubtedly the existence of one depends upon the survival of the other. The weakening of the sovereign nature of modern states in the context of globalization has led to the conclusion that late-modernity will be the era of the twilight of nations. Our critique against this position may be twofold: first of all, the extent to which globalization is undermining the power of the statesystem has been overestimated. Obviously, the state has lost many of its past powers. It has lost the power to determine autonomously its economic, security, and legal policy. It has lost its dominion over the socialization process of its citizens. Global economic and environmental forces beyond its control undermine its sovereignty. One could not deny the fact that there is indeed a shift of power from the nation-state to a multi-layered and complex web of decision-making centres beyond the control of the state. On the other hand, it would be premature to write an obituary of the state, at least in the

short or medium term. Global markets still need stable and well-governed states in order to flourish. In addition to that, state apparatus persists and it is stronger than ever. Indeed, according to the criteria of a classic, and largely Weberian, definition of the state, this specific form of institutional organization of political communities is still very much with us today:

- 1. The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel
- 2. embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a
- 3. territorially demarcated area over which it exercises
- 4. some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organised physical force.²⁴⁷

Of course some states are more sovereign than others; the stronger the state, the greater its resistance to exogenous pressures. United States would find it much easier to break a WTO agreement without serious consequences for its economy or political status, than Greece or Cyprus would. To summarize, we would suggest that globalization has not annihilated the powers of the nation-state, but undoubtedly it has not let them intact either. The political power of the nation-state has undergone through serious changes in the era of globalization, but still, though restricted, it has not diminished, and it is unlikely that it will completely diminish in the near future. A *post-sovereign* nation-state emerges, one, which is not as powerful as the old one, but it still performs important functions in the new global order:

²⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 55

And everywhere it [the state] is the highest secular authority. It may decree that a man die; and with no less effort, it may offer him the protection that enables him to live. When no state wants him- when man is naked in his humanity and nothing but a man- he thereby loses the very first precondition for his fellows even to be able to acknowledge his existence. Whether it is to born, to live, or to die, he cannot do without official recognition-the recognition of a nation-state.²⁴⁸

Our second critique against the pre-mature obituary of nations and nationalism is related to the concepts of identity and identification. Identification is an everlasting characteristic of human societies and the nation is the main locus of individual and collective identification within the social and political milieu of modernity. If national identification withers away, then it should be replaced by something else, another social entity or a political/ discursive project. For the moment, nationalism does not seem to have a credible rival. The legitimacy of the nation-state still holds well. The evidence so far suggests that it may also survive the assimilating forces of globalization, while the stalemate of European Unification illustrates the resistance of nations to supra-national organizations. Nationalism is still a mighty force in world politics, and the nation remains a foremost source of group identification as the Greek case has shown. Not only has Helleno-Christianity survived globalization and European integration, but also Orthodoxy remains the distinguishing characteristic of Greece which gives

²⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 23

the impression of stability in a nation increasingly insecure about its identity. The fashionable and celebrated through the media discourse of globalization enhanced the feelings of threat among Greeks and therefore boosted the appeal of the Helleno-Christian discourse.

Since the restoration of liberal democracy in Greece (1974), the state has attempted to change the legal status of the Church and the ideological position of Orthodoxy in the Greek society. Despite the fact that predictions are a dangerous business in the field of the social sciences, we would dare to say that the dislocation of the Church-State-Nation equivalence in Greece does not appear to be probable in the foreseeable future. Crucial pieces of state legislation that serve as a garrison for the status of the Church in Greek society remain unchallenged. For example, the preamble of the constitution, as well as article 3 that recognizes Orthodoxy as the established religion in Greece have not been subject to revision. Moreover, article 16 of the Greek constitution affirms that the purpose of public education is the "development of national and religious consciousness" of Greek pupils. 249 In other words, the raison d'être which, at the dawn of Greek nationalism, turned Orthodoxy into a national religion remains pertinent in our era.

In the face of liberal globalization and European unification, Orthodoxy remains a distinguishing characteristic of Greece, which gives the impression of stability in a nation increasingly insecure about its identity. The growing infringement of Western liberal values in the Greek society and the new 'global' order, undermine the role of national culture and the socializing

²⁴⁹ Costas Chrysogonos, 2002. Ατομικά και Κοινωνικά Δικαιώματα [Human and Social Rights], (Athens: Σάκκουλας)

monopoly of the state and family. The state's educational system finds it increasingly difficult to prevent this new culture from intruding into the everyday lives of adolescents in the new world of information society and the internet. Under such social circumstances, the nationalist discourse of the Greek Church finds fruitful background in order to develop, since the Church presents itself as a cultural opponent to the forces of assimilation and homogenisation, which are perceived as a product of the Western liberal globalisation. The strong identification of the Greeks with the Church may be seen as a reaction to the abovementioned 'threats' against their imaginary collective identities.

Since its election in office in 1981, and the entrance of Greece in the E.U. club, PASOK (until 2004, the ruling party in Greece) has attempted to introduce secularisation and modernization measures in Greece (often using a populist discourse in order to gain the support of public opinion). Constantine Semites who succeeded Andreas Papandreou as head of PASOK in 1996 further boosted this policy. Semites promised- and made considerable steps towards this direction- to 'modernise' (i.e. westernise) the country in the sense of promoting Greek membership in the EMU, liberalising (i.e. privatising) the economy, and replacing the old clientist politics with an effective bureaucracy. A large part of the Greek population felt increasingly alienated from the new westernised 'image' of Greece. Besides, the Greek attitude towards the West has always been ambivalent, and the functioning of western-type institutions in has often been disharmonious, if not always

problematic. In short, Orthodoxy continues to function as a line of demarcation between Greeks and non-Greeks.

Secondly, myths, symbols and practices associated with Orthodoxy still remain an important part of the everyday lives of modern Greeks. The Church is generally connected in the Greek conscience with 'past glories' like the Byzantine Empire, while the Greek language occupies a central role in the Orthodox liturgy ritual. The Church claims for itself the role of the protector of the Christians during the Ottoman rule in the Balkans, as well as that of the saviour of the Greek language during the '400 years of slavery of the Greek people'. Even the Greek left has (almost) never been unequivocally hostile towards the Greek Church. EAM (the communist-controlled Greek resistance front during WWII) advertised an Orthodox bishop as its 'spiritual leader', while Greek intellectuals, politicians, and artists who are generally considered to belong to the left (e.g. Zouraris, Kaneli, Savvopoulos) frequently use a Helleno-Orthodox discourse.²⁵⁰ In other words, the identification of Orthodoxy with Greekness did not wither away with time. Orthodoxy is still the established religion in Greece, in every sense of the word: the construction of a mosque in Athens has been delayed for decades due to the interference of the Greek Church. Greek children are catechised in the Orthodox dogma since the age of eight in school; their school diplomas

²⁵⁰ See for example the lyrics of the popular song by Dionysius Savopoulos, Ας Κρατήσουν οι Χοροί [Let the Dances Go On]: "Either with the ancients, or with Orthodoxy, Greek communities construct another distinct galaxy" [Κι είτε με τις αρχαιότητες, είτε με ορθοδοξία, των Ελλήνων οι κοινότητες, φτιάχνουν άλλο γαλαξία]. A similar meaning is conveyed by many other songs of Savopoulos (e.g. Κωλοέλληνες [Bloody Greeks]). Moreover, Liana Kaneli (MP of KKE) publishes a nationalist magazine (Nemesis) and defines herself as Orthodox-Communist. The most characteristic example of Zouraris' nationalism is his book Βέβηλα κίβδηλα σκύβαλα (2007, Athens: Αρμός)

state their religion. Until recently, even identity cards stated the religion of Greek citizens. The Church is also inseparably linked with numerous Greek cultural activities (e.g. open fairs to honour local Saints), customs (e.g. Good Week fast), and foods (e.g. the Paschal lamb). These are just some examples from an endless list which illustrates the penetration of the aesthetics of the Orthodox culture in Greek public life.

Despite the existence of the various structural reasons described above which contributed the production and continuing hegemony of Orthodox nationalism, the importance of personal charisma should not be underestimated. The feelings of frustration and defensiveness felt by 'the people of the Church' in the face of secularizing measures adopted by the state were expressed by a charismatic personality, archbishop Christodoulos. Christodoulos, as we have seen, was a successful demagogue. He has drawn the attention of the media, and has become very popular with the people. His nationalist political discourse, arguing for the uniqueness and superiority of the Greek people, has covered a gap in the field of extreme right, which was created by the centre-right turn of the *Nea Democratia* party.

The role of the media in the rise of Christodoulos cannot be emphasized enough. "Miracles", religious celebrations, speeches of Christodoulos, Sunday masses and preaching, are favorite subjects for the Greek television. Sunday masses are broadcasted live from state television, the current bishop of Demetrias hosts a weekly talk show, and priests are called to comment on political events. On February 17, 2001, the news of the Greek TV station 'Star Channel', presented an icon which was weeping. When

the local priest was asked why this miracle has happened, he replied that the icon protests about the construction of Jehovah Witnesses temple nearby.²⁵¹ The reporters did not bother to question the possibility of such 'miracle'. Endless other similar cases, like the 'natural mummification' of the corps of a monk in 2006, and 'the bleeding of Virgin Mary icons', appear frequently in the news and leave the viewers with the impression that supernatural phenomena happen all the time in Greece, and that holy icons have political views.

Within this social, cultural, and political climate, it is no wonder why the archbishop of Athens was able to call those who advocate secularization as "Graecilus" (meaning decadent Greeks) in 1998, to sponsor Christian families with more than three children in areas where religious minorities reside, to react to the prohibition of confession in schools in 2006, and to question the authority of the ministry of Education in the instruction of religion courses in high-schools. In conclusion, the increasing politicization of Orthodoxy since 1998 has led to an equally increasing sacralization of politics.²⁵²

²⁵¹ Nicos Demertzis, 2001. "Θρησκεία και ΜΜΕ στην Ελλάδα [Religion and Media in Greece]". Paper cited in professor Demertzis' personal webpage at the University of Athens website:

http://media.uoa.gr/people/demertzis/pages_gr/articles/docs/2001/religion_media.php ²⁵² Ibid.

Chapter VI: Conclusion

As it was explained in the introduction of this dissertation, the purpose of this work was threefold: firstly to cover important gaps in the relevant historiography on Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms. This 'historical' task was carried out through the analysis of the important role of the Orthodox Church in the consolidation of Greek and Greek-Cypriot national identities, manifested in primary and secondary archival sources. Secondly, this case study was used as a test ground for an alternative theoretical framework in the study of nationalism which may offer solutions to the practical and theoretical problems of the dominant modernist paradigm. This theoretical framework incorporated elements from ethno-symbolism and discourse theory. Thirdly, my aim was to adopt, for the first time, a comparative approach to the study of Greek nationalism in mainland Greece and in Cyprus. Before discussing the main empirical and theoretical conclusions which we could draw from this study, it is necessary at first to summarize the main body of the argument so far.

VI.I. Summary of the Argument

Nationalism is not an ideology which aims to mobilize certain social groups for achieving specific political goals. It is a discourse upon which depends the very existence of the groups that we came to call "nations". To draw an analogy with another comprehensive doctrine, Marxism does not mobilize proletarians. It "creates" proletarians, in the sense that if this discourse attains a hegemonic position within a given social milieu, then a multitude of subjects will self-identify with the category of the "proletariat",

which does not otherwise "exist" as such, outside the symbolic universe of Marxism. Similarly, the fact that the Greek nation exists is an outcome of Greek nationalism, the discourse which claims that people who exhibit certain characteristics are Greeks.

Obviously, most of these characteristics are the rooted in pre-modern ethno-cultural materials. This ethnic 'fabric' is in turn filtered through a process of 'streamlining', 'rationalization', and politicization, by nationalists. However, one should always keep in mind that the process of producing "nations" out of "ethnie" is always political and subject to historical contingencies. In John Hutchinson's words "the point here is that one cannot deduce from the prior existence of *ethnie* that they necessarily have any causal status in the formation of modern national societies. To do so without empirical examination is to make uncritical assumptions about continuities between premodern ethnic and modern national identities and to fall into the post hoc propter hoc fallacy".²⁵³

Greek nationalism emerged out of the crisis of the previous social order. It unified subjects through the demarcation of boundaries, the discursive construction of a 'we'. Under its auspices, it accommodated a set of demands, not very different from the demands of other nationalist doctrines around Europe. In short, Greek nationalism argued that Greeks are different from other social groups in the Ottoman Empire, and therefore have the right to secede from the rule of the Sultan and govern themselves as they wish.

²⁵³ John Hutchinson, 1994, p. 26, cited in Anthony Smith, 1998. *Modern Nationalism* (London Routledge), p. 176

The obvious question which emerged was why some people were 'Greeks', and not members of the collectivities which already existed in the institutional order of the Ottoman Empire. What made Greeks different from 'Christians', 'Ottomans', and 'Romans'? This was a contentious issue; the process of its resolution was long and lasted long after the end of the Greek War of Independence. However, those who initially espoused the ideology of Greek nationalism and carried out the struggle for the achievement of its political and social goals defined as Greeks all 'natives' who 'believed in Christ'. The term 'natives' would later become a source of tension, in both Greek and Cypriot politics. Nonetheless, the reference to Christ left little room for doubt that religion was a factor of seminal importance for the demarcation of the boundary between 'Greeks' and 'Others', in early Greek nationalism.

A nodal argument of this thesis is that Orthodoxy was the basic cultural resource of the ethno-religious community of the *millet-i-Rum* in the Ottoman Empire. This cultural resource was politicized to legitimize the claim of nationalists that the *millet-i-Rum* was actually the Greek nation and ought to be sovereign. Consequently, Greek nationalism may be a modern discourse, but the symbolic 'material' for its articulation into a coherent and convincing narrative was to be found in traditional pre-modern myths, practices and rituals.

Anthony Smith has brought our attention to this interplay between the modern and the pre-modern, in a very productive way. He argued out that modernists, i.e. those who share "a belief in the contingency of nationalism and the modernity of the nation", must be right. Nevertheless, the modernists

do miss something. They cannot explain the durability and salience, the depth and longevity, of national identifications, which cannot emerge ex nihilo: "Hence the need for a type of analysis that will bring out the differences and similarities between modern national units and sentiments and the collective cultural units and sentiments of previous eras, those that I shall term ethnie" 254. In Smith's schema what is thus needed is an "intermediate position between 'perennialism' and 'modernism' [able to capture] the often subtle relationships between modern nations and older ethnie" 255. Indeed, the author of this thesis agreed with Smith that the modern nation is constructed out of materials that originate from pre-existing ethnic and cultural identifications and practices.

However, this thesis was not a mere application of Smith's ethnosymbolism theory to the cases of Greek and Cypriot nationalism. On the contrary, Smith's valuable insight brings a set of new questions into play. The pre-modern ethnic and cultural elements are also the products of social, historical construction – a construction that took place in earlier centuries and went through a successful process of sedimentation and re-activation. In that sense, we seem to need something more to make sense of the attachment of people both to the nation and to its ethnic fabric.

When it comes to the first issue, we underlined that the heavy politicization of the Church is not a new phenomenon. As we have seen throughout the preceding chapters, it has played an active political role in the Balkan region, for the last 1600 years. It was a point of reference for the

²⁵⁴ Anthony Smith, 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 13

²⁵⁵ A. Smith, Ibid. p 17

Christian subjects of both the Byzantine Emperors and the Ottoman Sultans. Obviously, the politicization of religion is not unique in the regions under investigation in this dissertation. Nonetheless, Orthodoxy was unique in its ability to compare and contrast the believers and the non-believers. Greek nationalists argued, rather convincingly, that the believers formed a collective entity, which was oppressed by another collectivity, the Ottomans; hence the need to unite and revolt.

The argument was met with considerable criticism. On the one hand, the leaders of the Orthodox Church in Constantinople never succumbed to the idea that religious differences justified a revolution. Besides, the Patriarchate was actually a department of the Ottoman apparatus. At the same time, competing nationalist paradigms placed much more emphasis on language, which was seen as a proof that the Greek speakers of the Ottoman Empire were heirs of ancient Greeks. However, no intellectual or senior political figure of the time ever challenged the plain fact that all those who were called to arms and demanded independence from the Sultan were Orthodox Christians. On the other hand, not all of them were Greek-speakers, nor everyone could identify with Classical Athens.

The debate continued after the achievement of independence, via two simultaneous and intertwined processes. During the process of modernization, the newly founded Greek state attempted to limit the powers that the Church enjoyed under the Ottoman administrative system. A byproduct of this policy was the fact that the Church was nationalized, despite its protests. This meant that its governing body, the Holy Synod, was placed

under the authority of the state. Even canonical and religious issues are still being resolved by the ministry of Education *and Creeds* in Greece, which is officially, a Christian state.

Moreover, the subsequent development of Greek nationalism consolidated the place of Orthodoxy, through the Helleno-Christian argument: there is one unified and unique Greek civilization which began in the pre-Homeric years, survived the Roman occupation, and was revived during the Orthodox Byzantine era. Orthodoxy preserved and protected this civilization during the Ottoman years and led the way for the revolution. Despite the fact that the Helleno-Christian argument cannot be supported by historical or sociological evidence, it is still a hegemonic ideology in Greece. This was proven during the recent identity cards crisis, as well as repeated social surveys.

In other words, the "Orthodox Eastern Apostolic Church of Greece" enjoys the status of the established state religion in Greece, while at the time that this thesis was being written, there was not any demonstration of political will to change in the constitutional place of the Church. Ecclesiastical and secular authorities were brought together, and the right of the State to intervene in the internal affairs of the 'autocephalous' Greek Church was institutionalized. At the same time, the Church obtained an important political and ideological role and retained some of its Ottoman legal and political privileges. At a social and cultural level, Orthodoxy was recognized as an integral part of Greek identity, and this idea was reflected in official and

unofficial public discourse, historiography, education, folklore studies, literature, poetry, architecture, as well as in everyday practices, and customs.

The autocephalous Greek Church has acted in the recent Greek history not only as a state-funded institution, but also as an ideological and legitimating mechanism of the state, which has been 'blessing' governmental decisions, in exchange for special its privileged position in the Greek legal order. The Greek Church has come to understand itself as the guardian of tradition and national identity, and the expression of the 'true' Greek spirit. This myth has appealed to the Greek public.

Since the declaration of the autocephaly of the Greek Church in 1833, the relationships between the Greek state and the Church have been relatively harmonious (after a short 'adaptation' period), within a legal context of subordination of the ecclesiastical power of the Church to the secular power of the state. The Church played an active role in supporting, through its influence to the people, state decisions, and augmenting popular feelings of national solidarity and nationalism in the face of external 'threats' and internal dissents. This congruent cooperation amongst the Church and the State started disintegrating in the beginning of the 1980s when the centerleft 'Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement' (PASOK) came to power. Since its first years in office, PASOK attempted to introduce a series of secularizing measures (e.g. civil marriage and civil divorce), which were perceived by the

Church as direct attack against its hegemonic position in the Greek national life.²⁵⁶

The relationships between the Church and the State further deteriorated when the dynamic and charismatic Archbishop Christodoulos succeeded archbishop Seraphim as head of the Greek Church in 1998. The decision of the socialist government to erase religion from the identity cards data set the ground for a direct confrontation which lasted for more than a year. Despite the church reactions, which included demonstrations, a 'referendum', and frequent media interventions, the desired results for its archbishop were not achieved. Nonetheless, the populist politicization of his discourse and actions had changed the tradition of subordination of the ecclesiastical views to the authority of the state. Even though the major opposition party - Nea Democratia - supported the Church demands, the government and the president of the republic were not willing to compromise, and new identity cards in Greece do not include sensitive private data like religion, profession, or place of residence. It was a victory for the modernizers, which, however, did not prevent the church from making further political interventions. In other words, the period starting with the enthronement of Christodoulos in 1998, has admittedly marked a radical change in church-state relations.

As in the Greek peninsula, so in Cyprus the Church has been politically active almost since its founding (A.D. 488) during the Byzantine era.

²⁵⁶ However, the popularity of the Church did not allow to any of the post-1974 Greek Governments to proceed to radical measures such as "disestablishment", or to permanently solve the issue of the Church property, despite the fact that there were relevant discussions among academics and politicians during the two constitutional reforms of 1986 and 2000.

Although, it subsequently suffered from the Frankish rule in the island, the Cypriot Church, like all Orthodox Churches, enjoyed relative autonomy and political privileges in the Ottoman Empire. After the attainment of the island by the British Empire, the British tried to suspend some of the Church's political activities. However, the Church managed to retain some control over education and became the champion of Greek irredentism in the island. After independence, the Orthodox Archbishop Makarios became the President of the Cypriot Republic. This move, together with Makarios' seeming²⁵⁷ insistence for unification with Greece (Evworg), served to alienate the Turkish-Cypriot population of the island, and further enhanced ethno-nationalism on both sides. The basic difference between the Greek and the Cypriot cases is the fact that in the latter one, the Church as an institution led the struggle for national independence. Orthodoxy in Cyprus was not just a cultural resource for nationalists, but also a pioneer of nationalism.

In other words, Helleno-Christian nationalism is the comprehensive political discourse which claims that Greek national identity, in both mainland Greece and Cyprus, is based on two pillars: the ancient Hellenic cultural heritage, and Orthodox Christianity. A third pillar was occasionally added, depending on the specific historical circumstances (e.g. "irredentism", during the Asia Minor war, "language" during the great dispute between the advocates of the demotic idiom and the proponents of *katharevousa*, or

²⁵⁷ I use the word 'seeming' with caution here. Despite the fact that Makarios was claiming to be a supporter of the unification with Greece, some of his actions during his presidency reveal that he was more interested in preserving his personal position as well as in maintaining an independent and Greek-dominated Cyprus. More on this issue in chapter IV.

"geography" during the struggle for Enosis). Nonetheless, ancient Greece and Orthodoxy always remained constant points of reference.

Assuming that the foregoing empirical and theoretical argument has been convincing, we may now summarize the main conclusions drawn from this study.

VI.II: Empirical Conclusions

This paper tried to emphasize the role of Orthodoxy, both as an institution and as a cultural resource, in fostering Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalism. This role has been underestimated by modernist approaches to nationalism. There are three main structural reasons which assisted the transformation of Orthodoxy into a national religion: First of all, Orthodox nationalism was consistent with pre-modern ways of life and practices. Therefore, at the dawn of Greek nationalism, Orthodoxy became the primary cultural material which formed the 'nature' of Greek nationalism. Orthodoxy continues to be a part of ritualized practices in Modern Greek and Greek-Cypriot societies; it remains closely linked with what is commonly referred to as the 'Greek way of life'; in short, Orthodoxy remains an integral component of Greek national identity.

Secondly, the discourse of Helleno-Christian nationalism was ideally suited to distinguish Greeks from non-Greeks in the process of evolution Greek national identity. In the face of European cultural and economic integration, Orthodoxy still serves as a cultural opponent to the 'forces of globalization'. Thirdly, the legal and political position of the Church of Greece

facilitated the birth and eventual dominance of 'Helleno-Christianism'. Despite the fact that the Church was politically subjected to the secular authority of the state, it managed to retain an extensive degree of autonomy at a cultural level, and thus it has been able to use the mechanisms that its legal position provided it with, in order to disseminate its distinctive cultural nationalism.

To the abovementioned structural characteristics of Greek nationalism, I have added the successfulness of Archbishop Christodoulos' populism as an important factor for the continuing dominance of the Helleno-Christian dogma. The Greek Church's discourse under Christodoulos claimed to represent popular demands against de-Christianized western educated, and alien to the 'people', state elites.

Important as they may be, legal and institutional arrangements do not suffice to offer a comprehensive theory of Greek nationalism. Disestablishment would indeed remove one of the main tools for the reproduction of Helleno-Christianity, since state assets and channels of communication will not be used to disseminate Orthodox views on issues like Greek identity, migration, European integration, Greek-Turkish relations, homosexuality, etc. At the same time, the rights of religious and ethnic minorities would be better protected, as other creeds would be treated as equal by the Greek state. Nonetheless, there should be wider considerations, as the relation between the Greek nation and Orthodoxy is not constitutional, but constitutive. This means that secularization will not lead necessarily to the demise of Helleno-Christianism, at least in the short term.

In Cyprus, religion is the actual "green line" that separates the two communities. The religious self-identification of Greek-Cypriots constitutes them as "Greeks", rather than "Cypriots". Orthodoxy has been a main obstacle to reconciliation, and it will continue to be so, unless Cypriot nationalism, or international pressure, manage to challenge, or override the grip of Helleno-Christian nationalism in the island.

As we have clearly seen in Chapter IV, populism was not absent from the political discourse of Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus either. The Church of Cyprus exercised profound influence in the shaping of the Greek-Cypriot political culture. The Church's engagement in the political life of the island was even more active than it was in Greece. Helleno-Christian ethnonationalism not only influenced the major political developments in the country over the past fifty years, but it has affected, to a large extent, the functioning of the Greek-Cypriot polity and determined the identity of the local population.

VI.III. Theoretical Conclusions

The foregoing empirical case-study leads us to a series of theoretical conclusions. These conclusions are primarily related to the Greek case, but some of them can be extended beyond it and provide us with useful insights for the study of nationalism.

Identity constitutes one of the main foci in social and political research.

The analysis of nations and nationalisms is no exception. However, within the

general field of nationalism studies, the issue of the attraction and salience of national identities has not been sufficiently examined. This is partly due to the hegemonic position of modernist and constructionist approaches in the relevant literature. Thus, more emphasis is placed on the production of nationalism under specific historical conditions, rather than on its "consumption" and "re-production", or, in other words, the continuity marking identification with nations by people in varying social and historical milieus. The aforementioned paradigms either tend to overemphasize the economic and structural conditions necessary for the emergence of nationalism, or, influenced by the so-called "post-modern turn" in the social sciences, mainly focus on the social construction, the historicity and contingency of national identities. However, none of these features of nationalism seem to be able to explain the sustained hegemonic appeal of national identifications. The theoretical framework adopted here may be able to offer substantial help on this front.

If today we can analyse nationalism as an identity construction it is mainly because modernity introduces a sustained awareness of the contingent and socially produced character of all identity. Some have concluded that this sustained awareness of the socially and politically constructed nature of identity entails a picture of our world predominantly governed by fluidity and multiplicity. Within such a framework it is sometimes argued that reality "is more or less what we make it". There is no doubt that modernity – late modernity in particular – has signaled a greater autonomy in the way people construct and reproduce aspects of their identities. However, anyone

subscribing to the idea of identity as invariably a fluid, multiple construction, must surely be challenged by the persistence of certain identifications.

Clearly, the basis of all identity formation – including the one attempted through national identification relies on difference. National identity, like all types of identities, is relational and socially constructed. It is constructed upon the opposition between insiders and outsiders. The Greek and Greek-Cypriot cases demonstrate the oppositional and constructed character of national identities. As it has been demonstrated in all of the preceding chapters, one of the reasons that "Helleno-Christianism" has been so successful was that it could establish an antagonistic relationship between Greek identity and its 'constitutive outsides', the Ottoman Empire/Turkey, the surrounding Slavic and Balkan populations, and Europe.

Nationalism illustrates the importance of drawing political, social, and cultural frontiers between "us" and "them", in constituting individual and collective identities. Apart from nation building this is also true of international politics and of the construction of supra-national entities such as the European Union. The purity and stability of the 'We' is guaranteed first in the naming, then in the demonization and, finally, in the cleansing of otherness". However, we would be wrong in limiting this only to a "pathological" version of identity linked to an (exclusionary) negation of difference. Every identity is only possible through difference. Exclusion therefore is not a by-product of nationalism, but a condition for identity.

That is not to suggest that the demonization of Other is not typical in nationalist narratives. On the contrary, romantic nationalist histories are often

based on the supposition of a golden era (Ancient Greece and/or Byzantium for Modern Greek nationalism.). During this imaginary period, which we can call "original state", the nation was prosperous and happy. However, this original state of innocence was destroyed by an evil "Other", someone who deprived the nation of its blessings. Nationalist propagandas are based on the assumption that the desire of each generation is to try and recover this loss. The evil "Other" differs in varying historical circumstances. It may be a foreign occupation, the Jews who "always plot to rule the world", some dark powers and their local sympathizers "who want to enslave our proud nation", the immigrants "who steal our jobs", etc. The enemy may be different, but the logic is usually the same. The source of all evil for our community is someone out there. Someone who is using all his powers to prevent our nation from realizing its potential; from fulfilling its destiny.

In the meantime, national solidarity is maintained through the ritualization of practices (celebrations, festivals, consumption rituals, etc.), as well as through the reproduction of the abovementioned myth of national destiny in official and unofficial public discourse. Needless to say, the lost golden era and the possibility of a return to this era is a chimera. However, the existence of this fantasy fosters the solidarity of the community, and consolidates national identity. Thus, nationalisms are always based on claims of cultural and communal solidarity. They are produced through complex social and political processes premised on the activation of social and cultural relationships and emotional attachments. In short, nationalism cannot be reduced to rational self-interested motivations, economic conditions, and

institutional dynamics. As important as the aforementioned factors may be, the play of identifications should be at the heart of any effort to study group actions and human agency in nationalist movements.

In this dissertation, I have tried to investigate the relationship between nationalism and the politicization of religion in Greece and Cyprus. To use Durkheim's terminology, both Orthodoxy and nationalism are discourses directed towards the building of 'ethical communities'. They are sources of transcendental meaning which bind together the members of a particular community and, as such, they have an enormous effect on individual souls. In a world characterized by the immanent presence of risk (in the form of natural and social hazards and contingencies) and under the Damoclean sword of eventual death, peoples and cultures, historical and contemporary, have been struggling to attribute a 'larger than life' meaning in their lives. The Christian Paradise, the nations' supposed millenarian 'destiny', or the communist society are examples of such utopias. Indeed, nationalism has been perceived as a substitute for religion: people still seek compensation for their lack of personal future "in the reflected glory of the nation's collective future".258 In the cases of Greece and Cyprus, Orthodoxy combined the utopian forces of religion and nationalism in a very durable fusion. In a social context where the utopias of the Enlightenment (progress, the 'invisible hand' of the market, reason) seem to betray expectations, the psychological power of a national religion is undoubtedly gaining ground.

²⁵⁸ J. Stoessinger, 1991. "The anatomy of the Nation-State and the nature of Power", in R. Little & M. Smith (eds.), *Perspectives on World Politics*, (London: Routledge), p.25

In an interview to the author of this thesis, author and literary editor Stavros Zoumboulakis argued that the Church's conservative renovation and its appeal to the people are identitarian phenomena²⁵⁹, independent of religious beliefs, and cannot be explained on (de)secularization grounds. However, this explanation assigns an essentialist meaning to Orthodoxy, based on the metaphysics of the Christian dogma, and disregards the fact that Christian religious movements around the world have usually grown to dominate the public sphere irrespectively of the 'essence of the Gospel'. Religion has always been a facet of individual and collective identity, while the purpose of this thesis was to explain how a particular religion became the ground upon which a particular type of national identity was based.

Assuming that the foregoing theoretical analysis is convincing, how could it be applied in another case study? Although providing exact blueprints is beyond the scope and the philosophy of this dissertation, on the basis of the argument advanced here our initial engagement with a particular "case study" should start by examining the conditions that facilitated the birth of nationalism in a country. Here, Anthony Smith's emphasis on "the crisis of legitimation" in pre-modern societies and the existence of "ethnic" cultural material in the referent populations which later formed nations is instrumental for starting to understand when and why nationalisms took specific forms in specific communities. Subsequently, discourse theory can be used to analyze and elucidate the semiotic/rhetorical structure of nationalist discourses and the practices that perpetuate them, above and beyond

²⁵⁹ The exact expression that he used in Greek was "ταυτοτικά κινήματα".

moralistic oversimplifications about "bad" and "good" nationalisms. Our contention here was that nationalism necessarily entails inclusion and exclusion, or, to put it more poetically, love and hate. Denial of the violent face of national identifications serves only to repress the discussion around the issue without eradicating its effects. Surely nations are not eternal, but no change – in a post-national or other direction – can take place without a valid alternative.

VI.III. Epilogue

According to the logic of which was adopted here, the people who constitute a certain nation may incorporate certain common elements (phenotypes, geography, language, religion, etc), but a nation is not the aggregate of these common characteristics. It involves a certain degree of self-identification with the 'imagined community' of the nation. This assertion may have led the author to a subjective definition of nationhood, but, unlike what many theorists of nationalism believe, subjective definitions need not necessarily be voluntaristic. It became clear in this dissertation that the nationalization of the masses in Greece and Cyprus was the result of the exercise of power and is always dependent on the existence of specific power configurations. We argued that the forces of Europeanization, liberalization, and globalization do not automatically weaken the effects of nationalism. We also concluded that nationalist identifications presuppose the existence of a 'constitutive outsider', an enemy whom we hate in order to love ourselves. Finally, we contended

that Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms are cultural nationalisms. The only method by which we could dilute the effects of the exclusionary nature of Modern Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms is to face the empirical realities that surround these phenomena. Denying the Janus faced nature of Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms, and suppressing the discussion around their 'dark side' will only perpetuate the violence that has accompanied these nations since their birth.

We would suggest that the discussion regarding Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms is in need of further development towards three directions: firstly, definitive conclusions regarding the influence of Orthodoxy in fostering Greek nationalism will be extracted if there is further research on the national identity of the Greek Diasporas. Secondly, the conclusions from this study will be further scrutinized through comparative studies between Greece and other Orthodox and non-Orthodox counties. Thirdly, the theoretical framework used here may be further developed through its application to other case-studies of nationalist movements. In this way, our understanding of the 'God of modernity' will be enhanced. In short, the study of nationalism should emphasize the workings of the processes of identification in comparative and empirical perspective.

We will not risk raising any more theoretical issues in this dissertation. Before finishing, we should admit that the possible routes to transcend from an often racist cultural nationalism to a more tolerant conception of Greek national identity were not investigated in this thesis. Even the most superficial examination of Modern Greek and Greek-Cypriot societies will

reveal that there is no room for cultural and social pluralism in a 'Greece (or Cyprus) of Greek Orthodox Christians'. However, studying the roots of a phenomenon is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition in order to understand it and possibly uproot it.

APPENDIX

Table of Contents:

- I. Chronology of Important Events: Cyprus
- II. Chronology of Important Events: Greece
- III. Schematic Representation of Dependent and Independent Variables
- IV. Maps
- V. Legal Documents

Table 1: Chronology of Important Events in the History of Cyprus. This table is a schematic review of Cypriot history. It aims to illustrate the basic events that contributed to the cultural, economic, and political formation of Cyprus. *Sources:* Paschalis Kitromilides & Marios Evriviades, *Cyprus*, (Clio Press, Oxford: 1990); personal research; bibliography of the thesis.

bibliography of the thesis.			
1191 I. Cl	Richard the Principal and Principal States of the Principal and Principa		
8,500 ¹²⁶⁰ BC-2,700	Latins displace Orthodox hierarchy Orthodox Church Pre-historic period. Earliest signs of human presence		
ВС	subordinates to the Catholic one.		
¹⁴⁸⁹ _{2,700} ¹⁵⁷ _{BC-1,600}	Venetian rule in Cyprus Aegean. Asia Minor settlers in		
1571-1878	Ottoman Rule in Cyprus		
1,5700 BC	Restoration of the Orthodox Church by the Ottomans (Greek)		
1754	Orthodox hierarchy in Cyprus becomes responsible for		
1,190 BC- 1,150	the collection of the taxes successive waves of Achaean immigration from Greece		
1821	In reprisal for the outbreak of the War of Independence in		
1,050 BC- 950 BC	the Balkans the Archbishop of Cyprus, and other senior		
850 BC- 351 BC	successive waves of Coronization and domination by		
1856	Introduction of the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman		
	Empire The liberation by Greek city-states and local		
	collection of taxes from the Church.		
38381960	British rule in Cyprus the Great in his campaign of the		
323 BC - 58 BC	Cyprus becomes a matter of dispute between the heirs of		
4004	Secular legislative council. Alexander the Great		
383BC-330AD	Extensive riots and pro-Enosis demonstrations by Greek		
45 AD - 47AD	Aposiles Paurprisal, the British administration bans all		
1050	Political activity and suspends the Legislative Council.		
3250	Plebiscite of Greek Cypriots shows that 96% of them are in		
330	favour of unification with Greece Election of Archbishop		
488	Makarios III Zeno grants full independence and special		
1955	FOKA a guerrilla organization led by Lt. Col. Grivas,		
649	hegins its insurgency against the imperial rule, and		
689	cyphiots, led by their Archbishop move from Cyprus to		
1954-1959	Extensive diplomatic activity, including appeals to the UN		
965	asking the withdrawal of the British, and unification with Byzantine Emperor Nicephorus, Phokas recaptures		
	Eyprus		

1959	London-Zurich	Agreements:	Cyprus becomes
	independent. Archbi	ishop Makarios	is elected as president
	of the new republic		
1963	President Makarios	proposes 13	amendments to the
	constitution, which	aim at limiting	the privileges of the
	Turkish-Cypriot min	ority. First inter	communal conflicts.
1964-1967	UN and other diplo	matic attempts f	for a peace settlement
	reach to a stalemate.	Turkey threater	s with invasion
1967	Military coup in Gro	eece. Greek arm	y is withdrawn from
	Cyprus after a Turkis	sh ultimatum	
1974	Coup against preside	ent Makarios. T	urkish invasion of the
	Northern part of Cyp	orus.	
1977-	Repeated failed atter	npts for re-unifi	cation
2004	Cyprus becomes a m	ember of the Eu	ropean Union. Greek-
	Cypriots reject ye	et another U	N peace plan for
	reunification		
	l		


Table 2: This table only focuses on moments of history related to the study of this thesis; namely moments in history relevant for the study of Greek Helleno-Christian nationalism. References to ancient Greece are only mentioned since they are a point of reference for Modern Greek nationalists. Sources: bibliography of this thesis; personal research.

II. Chronology of Important Events: Greece		
7 th Century BC	Appearance of the first texts in the Greek language:	
	Homer's Iliad and Odyssey	
5 th Century BC	The peak of Ancient Greek civilization	
333 BC	All the Ancient Greek city-states apart from Sparta join	
	Alexander the Great in his campaign	
146 BC	Roman rule over Ancient Greek city-states	
1st Century	The New Testament is written in Greek	
323	Division of the Roman Empire into a Latin-speaking	
	Western Roman Empire and an increasingly Greek-	
	speaking Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium)	
1064	A Permanent Schism arises in the Christian Church	
	between Catholic West and Orthodox East	
1254	The Crusaders invade Constantinople	
1453	Fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks	
1821	Outbreak of a Revolution against the Ottomans in the	
	Balkans. It only survives in Greece	
1829	Greece becomes an independent state	
1833	With a royal decree, the Greek Church becomes	
	autocephalous of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the	

	state assumes control of its Synod
1838	Foundation of the University of Athens. Its history and
	theology departments play a seminal role in advancing
	Helleno-Christian nationalism.
1848	Publication of Paparrigopoulos' "History of the Greek
	Nation", the epitome of modern Greek nationalism
1852	The Ecumenical Patriarchate recognizes the
	autocephaly of the Greek Orthodox Church
1912-13	Balkan Wars. Greece makes significant territorial
	annexations
1917	Greece joins the Allies in the 1st World War
1922	Greece looses the war with Turkey together with most
	of its territorial gains from the 1st World War. A
	massive exchange of populations makes the country
	religiously homogenous. Irredentism does not survive
	as a mainstream political doctrine
1940	Greece joins the Allies as it is being attacked by Italy
1941-44	Greece under German occupation
1945-49	Civil War between communists and nationalists. The
	latter emerge victorious
1950-1967	Post-War Economic development within a climate of
	political instability and anti-communism
1967-1974	Military dictatorship. "Homeland, Religion, Family"
	become the ideological doctrine of the dictators. The


	Church remains mute, and even collaborates.
1974	Restoration of democracy. Abolition of monarchy. The
	Church retains its privileges under the new
	constitution
1981-1989	Socialist government in office. Introduction of civil
	wedding and civil divorce., adultery is decriminalized,
	first attempts for partial separation between Church
	and state and settlement of the Church property issue
1998	Enthronement of Archbishop Christodoulos
2000	Identity Cards Crisis. Direct Confrontation between
	Church and state.

III. Schematic Representation of Dependent and Independent Variables



We define as Helleno-Christian nationalism the ideological schema that links ancient Greek cultural heritage with Orthodox Christianity and presents Greek and Greek-Cypriot national identities as inseparably linked with Orthodoxy. The independent variables which are used to explain this form of nationalism are the following: i) in both Greece and Cyprus, Orthodoxy was the primary pre-modern cultural reference of Greek-speaking populations; ii) in the Ottoman epoch, the Orthodox Church enjoyed a great number of political privileges and had considerable political power. This tradition continued with the establishment of the Greek and Cypriot states. The justification upon which the political authority of the Church in the two modern states was based, is to be found in the first independent variable; iii) once Orthodoxy attained a seminal position in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalism, the Church converted into the latter's values. It used its political and cultural powers to perpetuate this link. Hence the three independent variables which are used to explain the subject matter of the thesis are interdependent.

IV. Maps



Map 2: Map of Modern Greece. Source: CIA World Factbook



Map 3: Map of Modern Cyprus. Source: CIA World Factbook

V. Legal Documents (The Original Greek Texts)

i) Article 3 of the current Greek Constitution (Following the 2001 Revision)

1. Επικρατούσα θρησκεία στην Ελλάδα είναι η θρησκεία της Ανατολικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας του Χριστού. Η Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία της Ελλάδας, που γνωρίζει κεφαλή της τον Κύριο ημών Ιησού Χριστό, υπάρχει αναπόσπαστα ενωμένη δογματικά με τη Μεγάλη Εκκλησία της Κωνσταντινούπολης και με κάθε άλλη ομόδοξη Εκκλησία του Χριστού? τηρεί απαρασάλευτα, όπως εκείνες, τους ιερούς αποστολικούς και συνοδικούς κανόνες και τις ιερές παραδόσεις. Είναι αυτοκέφαλη, διοικείται από την Ιερά Σύνοδο των εν ενεργεία Αρχιερέων και από τη Διαρκή Ιερά Σύνοδο που προέρχεται από αυτή και συγκρατείται όπως ορίζει ο Καταστατικός Χάρτης της Εκκλησίας, με τήρηση των διατάξεων του Πατριαρχικού Τόμου της κθ' (29) Ιουνίου 1850 και Συνοδικής Πράξης $4\eta\varsigma$ Σεπτεμβρίου της της 2. Το εκκλησιαστικό καθεστώς που υπάρχει σε ορισμένες περιοχές του Κράτους δεν αντίκειται στις διατάξεις της προηγούμενης παραγράφου. 3. Το κείμενο της Αγίας Γραφής τηρείται αναλλοίωτο. Η επίσημη μετάφρασή του σε άλλο γλωσσικό τύπο απαγορεύεται χωρίς την έγκριση της Αυτοκέφαλης Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδας και της Μεγάλης του Χριστού Εκκλησίας στην Κωνσταντινούπολη.

Source: Hellenic Parliament

[Translation: 1. The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. The Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably united in doctrine with the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and with every other Church of Christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they do, the holy apostolic and synodal canons and sacred traditions. It is autocephalous and is administered by the Holy Synod of serving Bishops and the Permanent Holy Synod originating thereof and assembled as specified by the Statutory Charter of the Church in compliance with the provisions of the Patriarchal Tome of June 29, 1850 and the Synodal Act of September 4, 1928. 2. The ecclesiastical regime existing in certain districts of the State shall not be deemed contrary to the provisions of the preceding paragraph. 3. The text of the Holy Scripture shall be maintained unaltered. Official translation of the text into any other form of language, without prior sanction by the Autocephalous Church of Greece and the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople, is prohibited.]

ii) The First Article of the "Constitution of Epidaurus" (Προσωρινόν Πολίτευμα της Ελλάδος), which was adopted on January 1, 1822

EN ONOMATI THE AFIAE KAI

ΑΔΙΑΙΡΕΤΟΥ ΤΡΙΑΔΟΣ

Τό έλληνικόν έθνος, το όπο την φρικώδη όθωμανικήν δυναστείαν, μή δυνάμενον νά φέρη, τον βαρύτατον καὶ ἀπαραδειγμάτιστον ζυγόν τῆς τυραννίας καὶ ἀποσεῖσαν αὐτόν μὲ μεγάλας θυσίας, κηρύττει σήμερον διὰ τῶν νομίμων παραστατῶν του, εἰς 'Εθνικήν συνηγμένων Συνέλευσιν, ἐνώπιον Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὴν πολιτικήν αὐτοῦ ὅπαρξιν καὶ ἀνεζαρτη σίαν.

Έν Έπιδαύρω την α΄ Ίανουαρίου έτει αωκβ΄ καὶ α΄ τῆς 'Ανεξαρτησίας

ΠΡΟΣΩΡΙΝΟΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΜΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ

TITAOE A'

TMHMA A'

Hept Opnaxetas

α΄. Ἡ ἐπικρατοῦσα θρησκεία εἰς τὴν ἐλληνικὴν ἐπικράτειαν εἶναι ἡ τῆς 'Ανατολικῆς 'Ορθοδόξου τοῦ Χριστοῦ 'Εκκλησίας' ἀνέχεται όμως ἡ Διοίκησις τῆς 'Ελλάδος πᾶσαν ἄλλην θρησκείαν καὶ αὶ τελεταί καὶ ἰεροπραγίαι ἐκάστης αὐτῶν ἐκτελοῦνται ἀκωλύτως.

TMHMA B'

Περί τῶν γενιχῶν δικαιωμάτων τῶν κατοίκων τῆς ἐπικρατείας τῆς Ἑλλάδος

β΄. "Όσοι αὐτόχθονες κάτοικοι τῆς ἐπικρατείας τῆς Ἑλλάδος πιστεύουσιν εἰς Χριστύν, εἰσίν "Ελληνες καὶ ἀπολαμβάνουσιν, ἄνευ τινὸς διαφορᾶς, δλων τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαιωμάτων.

Source: The Archives of the Greek National Awakening, 1821-1832

iii) The First Articles of the Constitution adopted by the Second National Assembly (Law of Epidaurus), in the Spring of 1823

EN ONOMATI THE AFIAE

KAI

ΑΔΙΑΙΡΕΤΟΥ ΤΡΙΑΔΟΣ

Τὸ ἐλληνικὰν ἔθνος, τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν φρικώδη ὁθωμανικὴν δυναπτείαν, μὴ δυνάμενον νὰ φέρη τὸν βαρύτατον καὶ ἀπαραδειγμάτιστον ζυγόν τῆς τυραννίας καὶ ἀποσεῖσαν αὐτὸν μὲ μεγάλας θυσίας, κηρύττει σήμερον διὰ τῶν νομίμων παραστατῶν του, εἰς 'Ἐθνικὴν συνηγμένων Σονέλευσιν, ἐνώπιον Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὴν πολιτικὴν αὐτοῦ ὁπαρξιν καὶ ἀνεξαρτησίαν.

Έν Ἐπιδεύρω τῆ α΄ Ιανουαρίου ,αωκβ΄ καὶ α΄ τῆς 'Ανεξαρτησίας

ΠΡΟΣΩΡΙΝΟΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΜΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ

TMHMA A'

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Α΄

Hept Opyoxelas

α΄. Ἡ ἐπικρατοῦσα θρησιεία εἰς τὴν ἐλληνικὴν ἐπικράτειαν εἴναι ἡ τῆς 'Ανατολικῆς 'Ορθοδόξου τοῦ Χριστοῦ Έκκλησίας' ἀνέχεται, όμως, ἡ Διοίκησις τῆς 'Ελλάδος πᾶσαν άλλην θρησιείαν και αἰ τελεταὶ καὶ ἱεροπραζίαι ἐκάστης αὐτῶν ἐκτελοῦνται ἀκωλότος.

TMHMA B'

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Β΄

Περὶ τῶν πολιτιχῶν διχαιωμάτων τῶν Ἑλλήνων

 β' . Όσει αὐτόχθονες κάτοικοι τῆς ἐπικρατείας τῆς Έλλάδος πιστεύουσιν εἰς Χριστέν, εἰσὶν ဪν Ελληνες καὶ ἀπολαμβάνουσιν, άνευ τινὸς διαφορᾶς, έλων τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαιω-

APXEIA THE EAAHNIKHE HAAIFFENEEIAE

μάτιον. Όμοίως, Έλληνές είσι καί τῶν αὐτῶν δικαιωμάτιον ἀπολαμβάνουσιν όσοι, Εξωθεν ἐλθόντες καί τὴν ἐλληνικήν φονήν πάτριον ἔχοντες καὶ εἰς Χριστόν πιστεύοντες, ζητήτ σωσι, παρρησιαζόμενοι εἰς τοπικήν ἐλληνικῆς ἐπαρχίας ἀρχήν, νὰ ἐγκαταριθμηθῶσι δι «ὑτῆς εἰς τοὺς πολίτας Έλληνες.

- γ΄. "Ολοι οι "Ελληνες είσιν ίσοι ένωπιον τῶν νόμων, ἄντυ τινός ἐξατρέσσως. δ΄. "Οσοι, ἔζωθεν ἐλθόντες, κατοικήσωσιν ἢ παροικήσωσιν εἰς τὴν ἐπικράτεων τῆς Έλλάδος, εἰσιν ἴσοι μὲ τοὺς "Ελληνας ἐνώπιον τῶν νόμων.
 - ε'. "Όλοι οί "Έλληνες είναι δεκτοί ἐπίσης εἰς τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ στρατιωτικά, καὶ εἰς δλας ἐν γένει τὰς τιμάς: δοτήρ δὲ τούτων, μόνη ἐκάστου ἡ ἀξιότης.
- ς΄. Ή ίδεοκτησία, τιμή και ἀσοράιεια ενάστου "Ελληνος και παντός ἀνθρώπου, ἐντὸς τῆς ἐπακρατείας εὐροσκοιμένου, εἶναι ὑπὸ τὴν προστασίαν τῶν νόμων. ζ΄. "Ολαι αι εἰστράξεις πρέπει νὰ διανέμωνται δικαίος και ἀναλόγους εἰς όλους τοὺς κατοίκους τῆς ἐπικρατείας καιμία δ' εἰστραξίς δὲν γίνεται, ἄνευ προεκδοβέντος νόμου, και κανένας νόμος περὶ εἰστράξεως δὲν ἐκδίδεται, εἰμή διὰ ἔν και μόνον ἔτος. τ΄. Ο! Έλληνες ἔχουσι τὸ δικαίομα νὰ κοινοποιῶσιν ἄλλως τε και διὰ τῶν τὑπων τὰς δοξασίας των, ἀλλά μὲ τοὺς ἀκολούθους τρεῖς δρους:
- α'. Νά μη γίνεται λόγος κατά της χριστιανικής θρησκείας
- β΄. Νὰ μὴν ἀντιβαίνωσιν εἰς τὰς κοινῶς ἀποδεδεγμένας ἀρχὰς τῆς ἡθικῆς·
 γ΄. Νὰ ἀποφεύγισσι πῆσαν προσωπικὴν ὑβριν.
 0'. Εἰς τὴν ἐλληνικὴν ἐπικράτειαν οὕτε πωλεῖται, οὖτε ἀγοράζεται ἄνθρωπος· ἀργούνητος δὲ παντὸς γένους καὶ πάσης θρησκείας, ἄμα πατήσας τὸ ἐλληνικὸν ἔδαφος, είναι ἐλεύδερος καὶ ἀπό τὸν δεσπότην αὐτοῦ ἀκαταζήτησης.
 ι΄. Κανένας δὲν δύναται νὰ βιασθή νὰ διαφύγη τὸ ἀνῆκον κρετήριου.
- ια'. Καθένας δύναται να αναφέρηται πρός το Βουλευτικόν έγγραφως, προβάλλιου τήν
 - γνώμην του περί παντός πράγματος.
- ιβ΄. Ή Διοδικησις πολιτογραφεί άλλοεθνεϊς, κατά τοὺς άκολοιθους δρους: ο΄. Νά διατρίψους πέντε άλδικληρα έτη και είς το διάστημα τοῦτο νὰ μήν άποθει-χθώσε ποτέ έγκληματίαι και νά άποκτήσουσιν έντὸς τοῦ πενταετοῦς διαστήματος ἀκίνητα אריוןומים ביי רון להואףמרבומ.
- β'. Τὰ μεγάλα ἀνδραγαθήματα και αι σημαντικαί ἐκδουλεθσεις εἰς τὰς γρείας τῆς πατρίδος, ἐνούμεναι μὲ τὴν χρηστότητα τῶν ἦθῶν, εἶναι δικαιώματα ἱκακὰ εἰς πολιτογρά-
- ιγ'. 'Ο πολιτογραφούμενος ἀπολαμβάνει ἀμέσως τὰ βικαιώματα, κατά τούς §§ β', ς' καὶ η', τὸ δε δικαίωμα τοῦ παραστάτου, μετά δέκα ἔτη τῆς πολιτογραφήσεως.

TMHMA I

KECAAAION I"

Περί σχηματισμού Διοιχήσεως

Excels. ιδ. Δύο δυνάμεις συγχροτούσι την Διούχησιν, Βουλευτική και

Source: The Archives of the Greek National Awakening, 1821-1832

iii) The First Articles of the "Constitution of Troezen", adopted in June 1827

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΝ ΣΥΝΤΑΓΜΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΟΣ

ΕΝ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΓΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΔΙΑΙΡΕΤΟΥ ΤΡΙΑΔΟΣ

Καὶ τρίτον ήδη τὸ ἐλληνικὸν ἔθνος, εἰς Ἑθνικήν Συνέλευσιν συναγμένον, κηρύττει διὰ τῶν νομίμων πληρεξουσίων του ἐνώπιον Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὴν πολιτικήν αὐτοῦ ὑπαρξιν καὶ ἀνεξαρτησίαν καὶ συσταίνει τὰς ἐξῆς θεμελιώδεις ἀρχὰς τοῦ Πολιτεύματός του:

KEΦAAAION A'

Περι θρησκείας

 Καθείς είς την 'Ελλάδα έπαγγέλλεται την θρησκείαν του έλευθέρως καὶ διὰ την λατρείαν αὐτῆς ἔχει Ισην ὑπεράσπισιν· ἡ δὲ τῆς 'Ανατολικῆς 'Ορθοδόξου 'Εκκλησίας τοῦ Χριστοῦ, είναι θρησκεία τῆς ἐπικρατείας.

KEQAAAION B'

Περί της έλληνικής έπικρατείας

- 2. Ή έλληνική ἐπικράτεια είναι μία καὶ άδιαίρετος.
- 3. Σύγκειται ἀπὸ ἐπαρχίας.
- Έπαρχίαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἴναι όσαι ελαβον καὶ θὰ λάβωσι τὰ ὅπλα κατὰ τῆς ὁθωμανικῆς δυναστείας.

KEΦAAAION I'

Δημόσιον δίχαιον τῶν Ἑλλήνων

 Ή χυριαρχία ένυπάρχει εἰς τὸ ἔθνος: πᾶσα ἔξουσία πηγάζει ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπάρχει ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ.

ΑΡΧΕΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΑΗΝΙΚΉΣ ΠΑΛΙΓΓΕΝΕΣΙΑΣ

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Έλληνες είναι:
 α΄. "Οσοι αὐτόχθονες τῆς ἐλληνικῆς ἐπικρατείας πιστεύουσιν εἰς Χριστόν'

- β΄. "Οσοι ἀπό τούς ὑπό τὸν ὁθωμανικόν ζυγόν, πιστεύωντες εἰς Χριστόν, ἢλθαν καὶ θὰ Ελθωσιν εἰς τὴν ἐλληνικὴν ἐπικράτειαν, διὰ νὰ συναγωνισθώσιν ἢ νὰ κατοικήσωσιν εἰς αὐτὴν:
 - γ΄. "Οσοι είς ξένας ἐπικρατείας είναι γεννημένοι ἀπὸ πατέρα "Ελληνα"
- δ΄. "Όσοι αὐτόχθονες καὶ μή, καὶ οἱ τοὐτων ἀπόγονοι, πολιτογραφηθέντες εἰς ξένας ἐπικρατείας πρὸ τῆς δημοσιεύσεως τοῦ παρόντος Συντάγματος, Ελθωσιν εἰς τῆν ἐλληνικὴν ἐπικράτεων καὶ ὁρκισθῶσι τὸν ἐλληνικὸν δρκον
 - ε'. "Οσοι ξένοι Ελθωσι καὶ πολιτογραφηθώσιν.
 - 7. "Ολοι οί "Ελληνες είναι ίσοι ένώπιον των νόμων.
- "Ολοι οί "Ελληνες είναι δεκτοί, έκαστος κατά τὸ μέτρου τῆς προσωπικῆς του ἀξίας, εἰς όλα τὰ δημόσια ἐπαγγέλματα, πολιτικά καὶ στρατιωτικά.
- Τὸ δικαίωμα τῆς ἀντιπροσωπείας καὶ πληρεξουσιότητος θὰ κανονισθῆ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἐκλογῆς νόμον, ὁ ὁποῖος θὰ ἐπιδιοςθωθῆ καὶ δημοσιευθῆ ἀπὸ τὴν Βουλήν.
- "Οσοι ξένοι έλθωσι νὰ κατοικήσωσιν ή νὰ παροικήσωσιν εἰς τὴν ἐλληνικὴν ἐπικράτειαν, εἴναι ἴσοι ἐνώπιον τῶν πολιτικῶν νόμων.
- 10. ΑΙ εἰσπράξεις διανέμονται εἰς δλους τοὺς κατοίκους τῆς ἐπικρατείας δικαίως καὶ ἀναλόγως τῆς περιουσίας ἐκάστου καιμμία δὲ εἴσπραξις δὲν γίνεται, χωρὶς προεκδομένον νόμον καὶ κανείς νόμος περὶ εἰσπράξεως δὲν ἐκδίδεται, εἰμὴ δὲ' ἐν καὶ μόνον έτος.
- *Ο νόμος ἀσφαλίζει τὴν προσωπικήν ἐκάστου ἐλευθερίαν κανεὶς δὲν ἡμπορεῖ νὰ ἐναχθῆ ἢ φυλικωθῆ, εἰμὴ κατὰ τοὺς νομικούς τύπους.
- "Η ζωή, ή τιμή καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἐκάστου, ἐντὸς τῆς ἐπικρατείας εύρισκομένου,
 εἶναι ὑπὸ τὴν προστασίαν τῶν νόμων.
- 13. Καμμία διαταγή περὶ ἐξετάσεως καὶ συλλήψεως όποιωνδήποτε προσώπων καὶ πραγμάτων δὲν ἡμπορεῖ νὰ ἐκδοθῆ, χωρὶς νὰ στηρίζεται εἰς ἰκανὰ δείγματα καὶ νὰ περιγράφη τὸν τόπον τῆς ἔξετάσεως καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ πράγματα, τὰ ὁποῖα πρέπει νὰ συλληφθώσιν.
- 14. Εἰς ὅλας τὰς ἐγκληματικὰς διαδικασίας ἔκαστος ἔχει τὸ δικαίωμα νὰ ζητῆ τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ φύσιν τῆς εἰς αὐτὸν προσαφθείσης κατηγορίας, νὰ ἀντεξετάζεται πρὸς τοὺς κατηγόρους καὶ τοὺς μάρτυρας, νὰ παρουσιάζη μαρτυρίας ὑπὲρ ἐαυτοῦ, νὰ λαμβάνη εἰς βοήθειάν του συμβούλους καὶ νὰ ζητῆ ταχεῖαν ἀπόφασιν ἀπὸ τὸ δικαστήριον.
 - 15. "Εκαστος, πρό της καταδίκης του, δέν λογίζεται ένοχος.
- 16. Κανείς δεν κρίνεται δίς δι' έν και τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμάρτημα και δεν καταδικάζεται, οὐδε προσωρινῶς στερείται τὰ κτήματά του, χωρές προχγουμένην διαδικασίαν. Πᾶσα δε ὑπόθεσις, ἄπαζ ὁριστικῶς δικασθείσα, δεν ἀναθεωρείται.
- Ή Κυβέρνησις ήμπορεῖ ν' ἀπαιτήση τὴν θυσίαν τῶν κτημάτων τινὸς διὰ δημόσοιον ὅφελος, ἀποχρώντως ἀποδεδειγμένον, ἀλλὰ διὰ προηγουμένης ἀποζημιώσεως.
 - 18. Αί βάσανοι καὶ αὶ δημεύσεις άπαγορεύονται.
 - 19. 'Ο νόμος δέν ήμπορεί να έχη δπισθενεργόν δύναμιν.
- 20. ΟΙ Έλληνες έχουσι τὸ δικχίωμα νὰ συσταίνωσι καταστήματα παντός εἴδους: παιδείας, φιλαυθρωπίας, βιομηχανίας και τεχνούν, καὶ νὰ ἐκλέγωσι διδασκάλους διὰ τὴν ἐκπαίδευσίν των.

Source: The Archives of the Greek National Awakening, 1821-1832

Εν τη παρούση παυτης, των οποίων ο αριθμός κατά την ημερομηνίαν της συνήθως κατοικούντων εις το αυτό δόγμα είτε υποκειμένων εις την αυτήν θρησκείαν και ανηκόντων είτε εις το αυτό δόγμα είτε υποκειμένων εις την αυτήν θρησκείαν και ανηθώς κατοικούντων ευς των οποίων ο αριθμός κατά την ημερομηνίαν της δικαιοδοσίαν ταύτης, των οποίων ο αριθμός κατά την ημερομηνίαν της περισφέρεντας των περισφέρεντας της περισφέρεντας των είτε εις των οποίων ο αριθμός κατά την ημερομηνίαν της περισφέρεντας της περισφέρεντας το αυτήν αυτή

Μοείται περαιτέρω ότι, εν η περιπτώσει η επιλογή, η γενομένη υπό αρνήσεως αποδοχής της επιλογής της ομάδος, να επιλέξη ατομικώς της αρνήσεως αποδοχής της επιλογής της ομάδος, να επιλέξη ατομικώς της θρησκευτικήν ομάδος, δεν γίνη αποδεκτή, επί τω λόγω ότι τα μέλη αυτής είναι αρνήσεως αποδοχής της επιλογής της εντός μηνός από της ημερομηνίας της αργήσεως αποδοχής της επιθυμεί να ανήκη τηρών την περιπτώσει της είναι αρνήσεως της επιθυμεί να ανήκη τηρών την περιπτώσευς της είναι ανότητες της επιθυμεί να ανήκη τηρών την περιπτώσευς της είναι εί

επελέξατο η ομάς αυτού.

3. Πολίται της Δημοκρατίας μη περιλαμβανόμενοι εις τας διατάξεις της πρώτης ή της δευτέρας παραγράφου του παρόντος άρθρου, επλέγουσιν ημερομηνίας της επλόγης της ουράκια της ενοπογράφου δηλώσεως αυτού υποβαλλομένης εντός μηνός από της πης κοινότητα ομαδικώς και επί τη τοιαύτη επιλογή θεωρούνται μέλη της κοινότητας της επιλέξαντο, τηρουμένου του κανόνος ότι πας πολίτης της Δημοκρατίας ανήκων εις τοιαύτην θρησκευτικήν ομάδα δικαιούται μέλη την διηγονοτήτας της επιλέξαντο, τηρουμένου του κανόνος ότι πας πολίτης της Δημοκρατίας ανήκων εις θρησκευτικήν ομάδα επιλέγουσι την ελληνική ή την διηγονρατίας ανήκων εις θρησκευτικήν θρησκευτικήν ομάδα δικαιούται μέλη της κοινότητος, ην επελέξαντο, τηρουμένου του κανόνος ότι πας πολίτης της λημοκρατίας ανήκων εις θρησκευτικήν θρησκευτικήν ομάδα δικαιούτης της πουρεικής της επιλέγουστι μέλη της κοινότητας της επιλέγουστικής και της ευλληνική ή την διαφορή της επιλέγουστικής και της ευλληνική η την διαφορή της επιλέγουστικής της επιλέγουστης της επ

υαραδόσεων ή είναι μωαμεθανοί. Αλωσσάν την τουρκικην η μι

2. Την τουρκικήν ή μετέχουσι των τουρκικών πολιτιστικών Δημοκρατίας, οίτινες είναι τουρκικής καταγωγής και έχουσιν ως μητρικήν γημοκρατίας, οίτινες είναι τουρκικήν ή μετέχουσι των τουρκικών πολιτιστικών

1. Την ελληνικήν κοινότητα αποτελούσιν άπαντες οι πολίται της γλώσσαν την ελληνικήν ή μετέχουσι των ελληνικών πολιτιστικών παραδόσεων ή ανήκουσιν εις την Ελληνικήν Ορθόδοςον Εκκλησίαν.

ζια 100ς ακοπούς 100 παρόντος Συντάγματος:

AP@PON 2

Η Κυπριακή Πολιτεία είναι ανεξάρτητος και κυρίαρχος Δημοκρατία, προεδρικού συστήματος, της οποίας ο Πρόεδρος είναι Έλλην και ο Αντιπρόεδρος Τούρκος, εκλεγόμενοι αντιστοίχως υπό της ελληνικής και της προεδρικού συστήματος, της οποίας ο Πρόεδρος είναι Έλλην και ο Αντιπρόεδρος Τούρκος, εκλεγόμενοι αντιστοίχως υπό της Ελληνικής και της προεδρικού συστήματος, της προεδρικός συστήματος, της προεδρικού συστήματος, της προεδρικού συστήματος, της προεδρικό

AP@PON 1

iv) The First two Articles of the Constitution of Cyprus

ενάρξεως της ισχύος του Συνάγματος υπερβαίνει τους χιλίους, εξ ων τουλάχιστον πεντακόσιοι κατέστησαν υπήκοοι της Δημοκρατίας κατά την ειρημένην ημερομηνίαν.

- 4. Πας όστις αποκτά την υπηκοότητα της Δημοκρατίας εις χρόνον μεταγενέστερον της παρόδου τριών μηνών από της ημερομηνίας της ενάρξεως της ισχύος του Συντάγματος ασκεί το εν τη τρίτη παραγράφω του παρόντος άρθρου οριζόμενο δικαίωμα επιλογής εντός προθεσμίας τριών μηνών από της ημερομηνίας, καθ΄ ην απέκτησε την υπηκοότητα.
- 5. Έλλην ή τούρκος πολίτης της Δημοκρατίας υποκείμενος εις τας διατάξεις της πρώτης η της δευτέρας παραγράφου του παρόντος άρθρου, δικαιούται να παύση ανήκων εις την κοινότητα, ης είναι μέλος και να επιλέξη την ετέραν κοινότητα:
- (α) επί τη υποβολή ενυπογράφου δηλώσεως περί της επιθυμίας αυτού, όπως μεταβάλη κοινότητα, εις τον αρμόδιον υπάλληλον της Δημοκρατίας και τους Προέδρους της ελληνικής και της τουρκικής Κοινοτικής Συνελεύσεως και
- (β) επί τη αποδοχή της δηλώσεως αυτού υπό της Κοινοτικής Συνελεύσεως της κοινότητος, εις ην δηλοί ότι επιθυμεί να ανήκη.
- 6. Οιονδήποτε πρόσωπον ή οιαδήποτε θρησκευτική ομάς θεωρούμενη ως ανήκουσα είτε εις την ελληνικήν είτε εις την τουρκικήν κοινότητα, συμφώνως προς τας διατάξεις της τρίτης παραγράφου του παρόντος άρθρου, δύναται να παύση ανήκουσα εις την μίαν των κοινοτήτων και να θεωρήται ως ανήκουσα εις την ετέραν κοινότητα:
- (α) επί τη υποβολή ενυπογράφου εγγράφου δηλώσεως περί της επιθυμίας της τοιαύτης μεταβολής υπό του προσώπου ή υπό της θρησκευτικής ομάδος εις τον αρμόδιον υπάλληλον της Δημοκρατίας και εις τους Προέδρους της ελληνικής και της τουρκικής Κοινοτικής Συνελεύσεως και
- (β) επί τη αποδοχή της δηλώσεως υπό της Κοινοτικής Συνελεύσεως της κοινότητος, εις ην δηλοί ότι επιθυμεί να ανήκη.
- 7. (α) Η ύπανδρος γυνή ανήκει εις την κοινότητα του συζύγου αυτής.
- (β) Το άρρεν ή θήλυ άγαμον τέκνον το μη συμπληρώσαν το εικοστόν πρώτον έτος της ηλικίας του ανήκει εις την κοινότητα του πατρός αυτού, επί δε αγνώστου πατρός και εφ΄ όσον δεν έχει υιοθετηθή, εις την κοινότητα, εις ην ανήκει η μήτηρ αυτού.

[Translation: Article 1. The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities of Cyprus respectively as hereinafter in this Constitution provided. Article 2. For the purposes of this Constitution: (1) the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church; (2) the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the

Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems; (3) citizens of the Republic who do not come within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article shall, within three months of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, opt to belong to either the Greek or the Turkish Community as individuals, but, if they belong to a religious group, shall so opt as a religious group and upon such option they shall be deemed to be members of such Community: Provided that any citizen of the Republic who belongs to such a religious group may choose not to abide by the option of such group and by a written and signed declaration submitted within one month of the date of such option to the appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers opt to belong to the Community other than that to which such group shall be deemed to belong: Provided further that if an option of such religious group is not accepted on the ground that its members are below the requisite number any member of such group may within one month of the date of the refusal of acceptance of such option opt in the aforesaid manner as individual which Community he would belong. For the purposes of this paragraph a "religious group "means a group of persons ordinarily resident in Cyprus professing the same religion and either belonging to the same rite or being subject to the same jurisdiction thereof the number of whom, on the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, exceeds one thousand out of which at least five hundred become on such date citizens of the Republic; (4) a person who becomes a citizen of the Republic at any time after three months of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution shall exercise the option provided in paragraph(3) of this Article within three months of the date of his so becoming a citizen; (5) a Greek or a Turkish citizen of the Republic who comes within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article may cease to belong to the Community of which he is a member and belong to the other Community upon (a) a written and signed declaration by such citizen to the effect that he desires such change, submitted to the appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers; (b) the approval of the Communal Chamber of such other Community; (6) any individual or any religious group deemed to belong to either the Greek or the Turkish Community under the provisions of paragraph (3) of this Article may cease to belong to such Community and be deemed to belong to the other Community upon (a) a written and signed declaration by such individual or religious group to the effect that such change is desired, submitted to the appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers; (b) the approval of the Communal Chamber of such other Community; (7) (a) a married woman shall belong to the Community to which her husband belongs. (b) a male or female child under the age of twenty-one who is not married shall belong to the Community to which his or her father belongs, or, if the father is unknown and he or she has not been adopted, to the Community to which his or her mother belongs.]

Source: Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs – Republic of Cyprus

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