Legislative package deals in EU decision-making: 1999 - 2007.
PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
This is a thesis about legislative package deals in the European Union and their effects on EU policy outcomes. It analyzes inter-chamber legislative exchange between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The key argument is that package deals increase the legislative influence of the European Parliament across legislative procedures and policy areas. Package deals allow Member States to establish control over the financial aspects of legislation and to ensure its adoption without delay. In exchange, the European Parliament gains further institutional powers and access to some of the EU's most salient policy areas.
Legislative bargaining between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament is analyzed across all EU legislation, completed in the period 1 May 1999 - 30 April 2007. The argument is tested empirically through the quantitative analysis of 1465 co-decision and consultation proposals, 19 policy areas and 8 years. Five in-depth case studies complement the findings.
The results indicate that the use of package deals in the EU is conditional on the distributive nature of legislative proposals, and their urgency. In turn, package deals and urgency affect legislative outcomes. Package deals and delay increase the EP's legislative influence in the consultation procedure. Package deals and Council impatience increase the EP's legislative influence in the co-decision procedure. Overall, package deals extend the EP's legislative influence in distributive policy areas and increase its institutional powers.
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