Fumagalli, Roberto
(2011)
Philosophical foundations of neuroeconomics: economics and the revolutionary challenge from neuroscience.
PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science.
Abstract
This PhD thesis focuses on the philosophical foundations of Neuroeconomics, an
innovative research program which combines findings and modelling tools from
economics, psychology and neuroscience to account for human choice behaviour. The
proponents of Neuroeconomics often manifest the ambition to foster radical
modifications in the accounts of choice behaviour developed by its parent disciplines.
This enquiry provides a philosophically informed appraisal of the potential for success
and the relevance of neuroeconomic research for economics. My central claim is that
neuroeconomists can help other economists to build more predictive and explanatory
models, yet are unlikely to foster revolutionary modifications in the economic theory of
choice.
The contents are organized as follows. In chapters 1-2, I present neuroeconomists’
investigative tools, distinguish the most influential approaches to neuroeconomic
research and reconstruct the case in favour of a neural enrichment of economic theory.
In chapters 3-7, I combine insights from neuro-psychology, economic methodology and
philosophy of science to develop a systematic critique of Neuroeconomics. In particular,
I articulate four lines of argument to demonstrate that economists are provisionally
justified in retaining a methodologically distinctive approach to the modelling of
decision making.
My first argument points to several evidential and epistemological concerns which
complicate the interpretation of neural data and cast doubt on the inferences
neuroeconomists often make in their studies. My second argument aims to show that the
trade-offs between the modelling desiderata that neuroeconomists and other economists
respectively value severely constrain the incorporation of neural insights into economic
models. My third argument questions neuroeconomists’ attempts to develop a unified
theory of choice behaviour by identifying some central issues on which they hold
contrasting positions. My fourth argument differentiates various senses of the term
‘revolution’ and illustrates that neuroeconomists are unlikely to provide revolutionary
contributions to economic theory in any of these senses.
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